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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The ongoing skirmishes in the South China Sea between China and regional states represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting Africa. As China grows increasingly aggressive in its race for global hegemony and influence, and the United States (US) slowly plunges into the battle to prevent China’s rise, the world is watching the unfolding of this rivalry with unease. Although a few places have felt intense pressure from this alarming competition, the South China Sea (SCS) region is where a violent showdown looks increasingly probable. Unlike the war in Ukraine or Gaza, the US and China may start a direct war in the SCS. And amidst this multifaceted new Cold War 2.0, Africa remains cautious. The South China tinderbox On 23 April, another skirmish took place between China and the Philippines when two Filipino patrol boats approached the shallow turquoise waters of a disputed shoal around 194 km west of the Philippine Islands province of Palawan. The patrol boats were there for an underwater survey near the disputed shoal claimed by both China and the Philippines, thus prompting a Chinese response. A Chinese coast guard, via radio, instructed them to leave the area and threatened hostile measures. Following several radio exchanges, the Chinese coast guard damaged both the Philippine patrol boats by firing high-pressure water cannons at them. However, this was not the first time China’s assertion in this region has caused friction with other SCS neighbours, including Japan and South Korea. China has used an unconvincing U-shaped “nine-dash line” that crosses the exclusive economic zones, or EEZs, of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to demonstrate its claim in the region. Despite their low intrinsic value, the region lies along a vital trade and supply corridor that supports over US$3 trillion in yearly shipborne commerce. Oil, gas, and fishing sources abound in the area. Beijing has declined to acknowledge a 2016 decision from the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled Beijing’s broad claims invalid based on historical grounds. China and the Philippines have already fought many times over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Bashi Channel. China has become increasingly aggressive in the region in the last few years, putting regional stability at high risk. So far, these skirmishes will likely remain regional without the risk of any full-scale war. However, there are risks of casualties or even the vessel capsizing. Making of Cold War 2.0 over the SCS Washington’s response to the upcoming crisis is still modest. US President Biden raised concerns about China’s actions in the SCS , including efforts to impede the Philippines from resupplying its forces on the fiercely disputed Second Thomas Shoal. The US has repeatedly warned China that it’s obligated to defend the Philippines, its oldest treaty ally in Asia, if Filipino forces, ships or aircraft come under an armed attack. The US also conducted Balikatan drills (‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ in Tagalog) with the Philippines with more than 16,000 American and Philippines military personnel. Indeed, its resources are thinly stretched, and Beijing seems to be moving ahead. To deter China by stepping up regional defence diplomacy, Washington is exploring the possibility of a security alliance with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, tentatively called SQUAD. This is in addition to two other existing groupings in the region, “Quad” and “AUKUS,” a defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. While AUKUS is a defence pact, Quad is simply a dialogue platform. Africa’s tricky balancing act Even while the socioeconomic repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war have not yet wholly subsided in Africa, the ongoing skirmishes in the SCS represent another severe threat to the world economy, directly affecting several African nations. Despite being geographically far, the conflict’s spillover effect would impact the continent’s food security in terms of both the availability and pricing of some food crops. In addition, the SCS region represents a crucial geographic sweet spot for Africa as a source of trade and investment, translating into growth and development for many African economies. The crisis can potentially fuel price rise, particularly for oil-importing countries. The prospect of a consequential price rise of essential commodities will have enormous ramifications for domestic stability in most African countries. Furthermore, many African economies heavily rely on trade, investment, and aid from South and Southeast Asia, the crisis will significantly hamper the development and growth of the continent. There are also strategic lessons for Africa to learn from the conflict. China’s principal interest in Africa consists of protecting its BRI investments and ensuring steady trade flow. Africa is also essential for China to fulfil its resource needs, maintaining industrial growth and energy security. Therefore, securing stability in countries where China has invested is in China’s interest, just like keeping a stable relationship with China is in the interest of those investment-starved countries. Further, since many investment projects in China are located in different African countries, these countries should be careful. China can become aggressively irredentist, even in Africa. Currently, China owns a naval base in Djibouti and a ballistic missile tracker Yuan Wang 5, off the coast of Durban. It has strong economic influence across the countries of Africa’s east coast thanks to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI). On the West Coast, China has many seaports financed or constructed by Chinese entities. If the national governments of these countries fail to pay, China would happily take control of these ports through lease as it did in Hambantota, Sri Lanka. In addition to Sri Lanka, other South Asian countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar also faced dire consequences due to the failure of their BRI debt payment, leading to economic crises, and sometimes even political crises. Therefore, caution would be expected from these African governments. Conclusion China’s increasingly aggressive posture over the SCS raises concerns about the stability of the region. As the current uneasy détente between the US and China bears remarkable similarities to the Cold War, questions are raised regarding the possibilities of a new Cold War 2.0. Questions are also raised concerning the possible reactions from different African countries vis-á-vis Chinese aggression in the region. Undoubtedly, any serious conflict between China and the Philippines would be dangerous. These frequent skirmishes may not lead to a direct war between the US and China. Yet, the risk of vessel capsizing and casualties is high. Any such event would ultimately spark a crisis in Africa. So far, Africa is cautious and continues to balance its great power relationships. Undoubtedly, it is increasingly concerned with the aggressive posture of the Chinese in the region. On the other hand, it needs China for economic purposes. Therefore, Africa will continue to walk the tightrope where it would want US involvement in de-escalating the situation without ruffling any feathers with China. The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Abstract This study investigates the academic discourse surrounding China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a multifaceted geopolitical project championed by the central government. Through a critical examination of BRI-related literature, primarily in political science and international relations published between 2015 and 2023, the analysis highlights a burgeoning field marked by both growing depth and intensifying critique. It further contends that despite a rise in scholarship, BRI's smaller players and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) call for further investigation. This nuanced approach fosters a comprehensive understanding of BRI's complexities and its evolving global impact. Keywords China- Maritime Silk Road Initiative- Silk Road Economic Belt- Belt and Road Initiative 1. Introduction Following the 2013 announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the ambitious undertaking has garnered significant attention from observers for its vast scope and projected economic and political implications.1 The BRI's potential impact on the global order, its member states, diverse regions, and all involved actors has raised a multitude of concerns. A huge body of literature on (BRI) aligns with China’s positive view of the initiative.2 However, a comprehensive review showed that previous research had limitations in scope and depth. Notably, repetitive investigations into established topics and examinations of prior inquiries are prevalent, which hinders the production of novel insights. Furthermore, the trend towards proliferation of topic areas, instead of deeper analysis within existing themes, impedes scholarly advancement. Additionally, many studies assign marginal roles to (BRI), disproportionately focusing on China's perspective. This results in imbalanced literature on China's initiative in terms of quality and nuanced interpretation. From the above mentioned, this study focuses on a key question that revolves around, what are the gaps and limitations in current understanding in BRI’s literatures in the study time period (2015-2023), and what are the challenges and opportunities for the initiative’s researchers and scholars? As focusing on these gaps serves as a catalyst towards more understanding of the dimensions of the initiative, and then contributes to providing a clearer vision for policy decision makers and scholars interested in the initiative. Given these deficiencies, this study aims to critically examine the existing (BRI) literature, drawing upon a diverse selection of academic research, primarily within international relations and political science, published between 2015 and 2023. More significantly, this overview would outline a framework for refining and renewing the discourse surrounding the initiative. This article aims for a deeper understanding of the participants, their plans and future developments. Research should move beyond broad overviews and engage in analyses of the Mari-time Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), focusing on specific regions and project development trajectories. This necessitates rigorous analyses and interpretations of data to lay forward local experiences and diverse future aspirations of (BRI) participants. Secondly, a closer examination of (MSRI) and (SREB) application is imperative. This entails meticulously evaluating the financial performance and sociopolitical implications of completed projects, with particular attention to both economic benefits and potential challenges like debt burdens. Furthermore, a thorough analysis of internal and external policy ramifications for participating countries is crucial, exploring how (BRI) projects align with or challenge existing national and regional frameworks. Thirdly, while existing studies have shed light on Chinese foreign policy through (BRI), further inquiries should expand beyond this singular perspective. Independent research conducted by scholars based in (BRI) recipient countries can offer invaluable insights into local needs, priorities, and concerns. Additionally, comparative studies across diverse regions can illustrate region-specific challenges and successes, enriching our understanding of participant experiences. Finally, it is essential to move beyond China-centric narratives and actively incorporate the perspectives of participating nations within BRI research, which necessitates prioritizing analyses that critically examine the role of Chinese soft power, encompassing cultural exchanges, media engagement, and educational initiatives, and their impact on shaping perceptions and fostering cooperation within the initiative. 2. China’s Initiative at Crossroads Since China's 2013 announcement of the (BRI), its purpose has sparked diverse interpretations among researchers, with ongoing debate focusing on the balance between economic and political motivations.3 While some researchers interpret (BRI) primarily as a domestic economic strategy aimed at market expansion, securing energy sources, and creating investment opportunities for Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs),4 others view it as a manifestation of China's global ambition to achieve dominance in the Eurasian region, and global order.5 A third group of scholars further argue that the BRI is a strategic tool for China to improve its diplomatic relationships with participating countries across Asia, Africa, and Europe. They suggest that by promoting economic cooperation and infrastructure development, the (BRI) can foster regional stability and reduce potential conflict.6 A fourth group of (BRI) studies focuses on the Chinese economy's structural vulnerabilities, arguing that they pose long-term risks to both economic growth and political stability. These vulnerabilities include rampant surplus industrial capacity, which threatens job security and social cohesion; overreliance on land-based energy import routes, potentially exposing China to geopolitical disruptions; and the economic stagnation of western regions, exacerbating regional disparities and social tensions. These studies further examine the extent to which the (BRI) can exacerbate or alleviate these challenges, particularly considering China's heavy reliance on investment, exports, and state-owned enterprises as economic drivers.7 Another area of research focuses on the evolving scope of international dispute resolution mechanisms within the (BRI) framework for projects between China and African countries. This study analyzes the strength and transparency of these new entities, considering factors like legal expertise, judicial independence, and efficient dispute resolution procedures. The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of how disputes relating to China-Africa cooperation will be addressed in the future.8 Adding to the complexity of understanding the BRI's aims, some studies analyze its role as a tool for China's soft power projection,9 They highlight how the initiative's focus on cultural exchange, infrastructure development, and media engagement fosters positive international perceptions of China and enhances its global influence. Others suggest that the (BRI) serves domestic political purposes, potentially serving as a means for Xi Jinping to solidify his leadership within the Chinese Communist Party and strengthen his legitimacy on the international stage.10 This diversity of interpretations underscores the complexity of the BRI's objectives, likely driven by a multitude of motives within China's vast political and economic system. While China emphasizes the collaborative nature of the initiative, portraying it as a 'symphony,' concerns remain about how individual participant interests align with China's own ambitions. Further research is crucial to understand how the BRI's complex motivations translate into tangible outcomes for all involved parties.11 Several studies assess the BRI's impact on both benefits and challenges by examining its relationship with past Chinese development initiatives.12 They argue that the (BRI) draws upon earlier programs like the southern and western campaigns, benefiting from existing infrastructure and communication networks in Central and South Asia. Given the multitude of perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative's objectives and potential consequences, a question arises: do existing research efforts sufficiently cater to the needs and concerns of participating countries? While studies provide valuable insights into aspects like soft power dynamics and geopolitical implications, a crucial factor often remains in the shadows - funding. Despite the BRI's reliance on vast financial resources, research rarely dives into the effectiveness of funding mechanisms, or their potential impact on participants' debt burdens and economic sustainability. To truly gauge the BRI's long-term success and ensure equitable benefits for all involved, future research must prioritize a deeper understanding of its financial dynamics and their consequences for diverse stakeholders. Despite the vast sums promised to the (BRI), a veil of ambiguity hangs over its true financial picture. While platforms like the (MSRI) and (SREB) lack explicit upper limits for project funding, details regarding specific project budgets remain shrouded in secrecy. This loose terminology surrounding "costs," "loans," and "investments" further obscures the potential debt burdens faced by participating countries. Although numerous financial entities, including banks like China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed willingness to participate, specific committed amounts remain elusive. This lack of transparency raises concerns about potential overestimations of the BRI's overall funding capacity and hinders a clear understanding of how financial resources are actually channeled into projects. Future research must prioritize unraveling this tangled web of finances to assess the BRI's true economic feasibility and its implications for all stakeholders involved. The financial picture of the (BRI) remains obscure despite estimations ranging from $400 billion to $8 trillion. This ambiguity stems partly from the lack of publicly disclosed budgetary allocations for specific projects under platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB).13 Further compounding the opaqueness is the loose terminology used by observers, who often conflate "costs," "loans," and "investments" without adequately differentiating their financial implications. Though numerous financial entities, including banks like the China Export-Import Bank and state-owned enterprises like the Silk Road Fund, have expressed interest in BRI projects, concrete commitments regarding specific funding amounts remain elusive.14 This lack of transparency impedes a clear understanding of the initiative's true financial capacity and raises concerns about potential overestimations of total funding. Unraveling this tangled web of financial ambiguity is crucial for future research to assess the BRI's economic feasibility and its implications for participating countries.15 Despite the increasing number of countries engaged in (BRI), its participant roster remains shrouded in a cloud of ambiguity. However, with the initiative's rapid expansion, accurately delineating participants has become increasingly complex. While some prominent nations like the United States, India, and Japan remain firmly outside the initiative, others, including Vietnam,16 Ethiopia,17 Myanmar, Nepal,18 Latin America,19 Africa,20 and numerous numbers of countries nearly 140 in the BRI,21 play significant roles. Estimates suggest the total number of BRI participants now approaches 140. This lack of readily accessible and transparent participant data poses a significant challenge for research and analysis. Accurately understanding the BRI's geographic scope, assessing its economic impact on diverse participants, and predicting its long-term geopolitical implications hinge upon a clear and comprehensive understanding of who stands as part of the initiative. Despite the multitude of studies analyzing (BRI), much remains opaque regarding the distinction between its "connectivity" and "non-connectivity" projects. This is surprising given the initiative's emphasis on hard infrastructure development, encompassing projects like railways, highways, bridges, airports, and seaports.22 However, beyond these tangible linkages lies a spectrum of critical "non-connectivity" projects vital for economic development. These include initiatives addressing areas such as bolstering economic growth, fostering diverse investment opportunities, facilitating mining development, establishing special economic zones, and even deploying satellite monitoring stations. Failing to delve into both connectivity and non-connectivity domains hinders a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's economic impact and broader geopolitical implications. Only by recognizing the intertwined roles of these project types can we fully grasp the initiative's complex landscape and its potential consequences for participating countries.23 While (BRI) draws extensive attention for its transformative hard infrastructure projects like railways, highways, and bridges, its success hinges on an equally crucial yet less visible layer: soft infrastructure. Bilateral investment treaties,24 and free trade agreements form the backbone of this soft infrastructure, establishing clear legal and regulatory frameworks that underpin cross-border investments, trade liberalization, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Recognizing the vital role of this soft infrastructure, alongside the hard connectivity projects, is essential for comprehending the BRI's full scope and assessing its potential impact on participating countries.25 To overcome the limitations identified, future research on (BRI) should shift its focus from broad analyses of the initiative as a whole to delving deeper into specific platforms like (MSRI) and (SREB). These platforms often lack transparency regarding project details, including participants, features, costs, and funding mechanisms. By conducting focused studies on these platforms, researchers can contribute substantially to demystifying the BRI's financial picture and identifying its true participants. 3. Problems Arising in Edited Volumes This section identifies limitations in existing edited volumes on (BRI) and proposes potential solutions, acknowledging varying degrees of implement ability. Remarkably, current volumes often prioritize specific aspects of the BRI, such as its geographical scope, key drivers, diverse stakeholder involvement (including private and public actors), and the participation of subnational and international organizations. However, this fragmented approach overlooks the initiative's broader implications for global governance, power dynamics, international trade flows, transportation infrastructure (including high-speed networks), social movements, and government accountability. Therefore, future edited volumes on the BRI require a more holistic analytical framework that transcends individual thematic strands and comprehensively examines the initiative's multifaceted impact across these interconnected dimensions.26 Another critical concern with a subset of edited volumes on (BRI) lies in the editors' failure to ensure consistent thematic engagement across chapters. This often leads to a lack of focus on empirical analysis, with some chapters delving into specific case studies or data-driven investigations, while others remain mired in theoretical discussions or abstract conceptualizations. This inconsistency undermines the potential for cross-fertilization between chapters and hinders the volume's ability to offer a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's multifaceted realities.27 The thematic inconsistencies between chapters in many edited volumes on (BRI) hinder the development of a comprehensive understanding of the initiative. To enhance the value of their work, (BRI) editors should prioritize thematic coherence and avoid redundancy by curating chapters that offer diverse perspectives and delve deeper into specific aspects of the initiative, rather than presenting overlapping analyses. Several edited volumes on (BRI) suffer from critical lacunae. A significant number lack robust introduction or conclusion, impeding the synthesis of key findings and the formulation of future research directions.28 While individual chapters may possess abstracts, these often fail to engage with overarching thematic threads, identify areas of divergence within the volume, or propose new avenues for inquiry. This fragmentation hinders the volumes' capacity to foster a holistic understanding of the BRI. Furthermore, some edited volumes suffer from outdated data, often relying on information presented at workshops or conferences years prior.29 This presents readers with potentially stale facts and hinders informed analysis. Additionally, a lack of consensus among contributors regarding key terms like "economic growth" and "global governance" can fragment the discussion. With varying definitions, contributors essentially discuss the (BRI) through different lenses, limiting the potential for cohesive analysis and knowledge accumulation. Building upon the identified weaknesses in edited volumes on the (BRI), this study has highlighted several challenges facing BRI research. However, it also offers invaluable groundwork and potential solutions for overcoming these limitations, paving the way for more robust and comprehensive future scholarship in this critical area. 4. BRI’s Operational Problems Operational challenges within (MSRI) and (SREB) projects necessitate a deeper understanding of the dynamic interplay between several factors. This includes the relationship between on-the-ground project realities and the expectations outlined in relevant treaties, as well as the internal and external political and economic forces that can facilitate or hinder project modifications. Such knowledge is crucial for informing sound decision-making. Furthermore, a granular understanding of these critical factors within specific states and regions holds the potential to significantly enhance research on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a whole. While a plethora of studies and analyses on (BRI) exist, many suffer from limitations that impede our understanding of (MSRI) and (SREB) projects. A significant portion focuses on a narrow range of cases, repeatedly analyzing the same treaties or memorandums of understanding. This repetitive approach overlooks the diverse factors and dynamics impacting (MSRI) and (SREB) development. Additionally, an overemphasis on specific, well-documented aspects like high-speed railways in certain Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Laos, and Pakistan, obscures the broader picture of project complexities and variations across the BRI's vast geographical scope. To enhance the analysis of project execution within (MSRI) and (SREB), four key areas warrant further investigation. Firstly, robust, comprehensive data on project development is crucial. Analyzing actual progress before drawing conclusions about (MSRI/SREB) nature will yield more reliable and nuanced insights. Secondly, researchers must scrutinize the factors with the highest impact on project development. Identifying these critical drivers will enable a deeper understanding of project outcomes and trajectories. Thirdly, examining the dynamic interplay between initial expectations and evolving ground realities is vital. Unveiling the reasons for deviations from expected outcomes, whether positive or negative, will provide valuable knowledge for project management and adaptation. Finally, researchers should delve into the complex interplay between funding mechanisms, project requirements, and associated costs. Untangling these financial relationships is essential for assessing project feasibility and optimizing resource allocation.30 Finally, a comprehensive analysis of project execution necessitates thorough examination of the diverse actors involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This includes scrutinizing their domestic political landscapes, individual characteristics, and contextual operating environments. Understanding these multifaceted influences helps illuminate the motivations, capabilities, and potential limitations of various stakeholders, thereby enabling researchers to more accurately predict their behavior and its impact on project outcomes.31 5. Statement of the Problem It is crucial to examine the multifaceted factors directly or indirectly affecting (MSRI) and (SREB) project execution. This includes a nuanced understanding of the initiative's benefits and costs across various scales: universal, regional, sub-regional, national, and subnational. These benefits encompass a wide range of aspects, including economic development, trade growth, infrastructure improvement, industrial development, productivity enhancements, technology and experience transfer, energy availability and production development, job creation, poverty alleviation, transportation cost and time reduction, and regional economic integration. Investigating the distribution and realization of these benefits, alongside the associated costs, is essential for assessing the overall impact and sustainability of projects.32 While existing research delves into various economic aspects of (BRI), crucial areas warrant further attention. Concerns surrounding heightened domestic trade competition, potential de-industrialization, rising trade deficits, and FDI displacement require deeper investigation. Similarly, political issues related to potential sovereignty concerns and BRI's impact on domestic and foreign policy deserve thorough analysis. Finally, social issues like environmental degradation, pollution, and potential social disintegration demand urgent attention from researchers beyond economics.33 Beyond economists, development specialists, and trade and infrastructure experts, scholars in political science, international relations, and related fields must actively engage with these critical (BRI) dimensions. Recognizing the multi-faceted nature of the initiative's impacts necessitates a concerted effort across diverse disciplines to ensure a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the BRI's potential consequences. Comprehensive data on the costs and benefits of (BRI) projects serves as a critical tool for enhanced decision-making. Several studies investigating (BRI) rely on broad-stroke statistical analyses and projected benefits without sufficient project-specific detail.34 This approach suffers from several limitations. Firstly, while (BRI) projects unfold over extended periods, these studies often base their conclusions on data from limited timeframes and utilize short-term analytical frameworks. This can paint an incomplete picture and lead to inaccurate predictions. Secondly, these studies often make optimistic assumptions about the guaranteed success, sustainability, and completion of all BRI projects. This overlooks potential challenges and complexities, hindering a balanced and nuanced understanding of the initiative's true potential and pitfalls. A common weakness is overlooking the ground realities of project implementation. While acknowledging potential tensions and rivalries among participating countries,35 these studies often fail to delve deeper into their impacts on project outcomes. Similarly, qualitative research on BRI benefits tends to provide fragmented views. While highlighting positive aspects like training, connectivity, technology transfer, and industrialization, these studies rarely conduct comprehensive analyses or compare benefit distribution across different parties. Additionally, the focus on specific sectors, regions, or countries in a limited number of studies,36 restricts our understanding of the initiative's broader implications. Furthermore, scarce research investigates the total costs of BRI projects in specific regions or their potential negative impacts, such as exacerbating trade deficits, hindering industrialization, or closing certain sectors. While some studies acknowledge the potential boost to China's global reputation and public approval in participating countries, this aspect needs further exploration.37 Likewise, existing research highlighting problems within (BRI) partner countries deserves deeper and more nuanced investigation.38 Elevating the quality of (BRI) research necessitates prioritizing three key areas. Firstly, rigorous studies exploring the proof of identity of (MSRI) and (SREB) are crucial. Secondly, quantitative research on (BRI) projects demands a shift towards realism. Moving beyond the ambitions and aspirations enshrined in official narratives, researchers must utilize robust data and meticulous analysis to assess project costs, benefits, and potential risks. Thirdly, both quantitative and qualitative research should dedicate greater focus to the distribution of (BRI) benefits. Lastly, it is important to focus on projects that affect the environment and society, represented by hydroelectric projects that are required to implement the BRI’s projects. In addition to the energy extraction projects, mining operations and power generation. Thus, it is important for both Finally, a critical research gap lies in analyzing the environmental and social impacts of infrastructure projects associated with the (BRI). This includes, but is not limited to, hydropower dams, energy extraction ventures, mining operations, and power generation facilities. Both quantitative and qualitative researchers must devote attention to assessing the environmental consequences of these projects, such as potential biodiversity loss, pollution, and resource depletion, evaluating their social impacts, including community displacement, cultural disruption, and potential violations of labor rights, and investigating the effectiveness of mitigation measures implemented to address these concerns. 6. Political Influence This section delves into the political ramifications of (BRI) projects for participating countries. It specifically examines the extent to which both internal and external Chinese policies influence the foreign policy characteristics of BRI partners. This includes analyzing the impact on: a) domestic foreign policy features, such as priorities, alliances, and voting alignments; and b) international positions, particularly voting behavior on China-related issues in international forums like the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While several studies have explored Beijing's foreign policy influence within the BRI framework, focusing on specific countries like Cambodia, Ethiopia, Greece, and Sri Lanka,39 a comprehensive understanding necessitates systematic comparative analysis across diverse (BRI) partners, in-depth investigation of both internal and external policy dynamics, and consideration of alternative explanations for shifts in foreign policy beyond solely attributing them to Chinese influence. Such a nuanced approach will ensure a deeper and more accurate understanding of the complex interplay between (BRI) projects, national interests, and the evolving foreign policy landscapes of participating countries. This section further explores the potential spillover effects of Beijing's domestic policies onto participating (BRI) countries. While some studies suggest that the attractiveness of (BRI) projects incentivizes compliance with Chinese regulations, this hypothesis requires closer scrutiny. More research is needed to systematically analyze the specific content and implementation of relevant Chinese policies and their potential impact on partner countries, investigate the mechanisms through which such influence might occur, beyond mere project incentives, and consider alternative explanations for policy changes in (BRI) partner states, such as domestic drivers, regional pressures, or global influences. By moving beyond simplistic assumptions and conducting rigorous empirical research, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between internal Chinese policies, (BRI) projects, and the evolving legal and regulatory landscapes of participating countries. The interplay between economic incentives and the political behavior of countries holds substantial research potential. Several studies have highlighted a correlation between economic and commercial relationships and the behavior of actors within those relationships. This link often involves a nuanced interplay of both positive and negative incentives, suggesting that economic factors can influence political decisions and actions in complex ways. Further research in this area should delve deeper into the specific mechanisms through which economic incentives translate into political behavior, the conditions under which these incentives have the strongest impact, and the potential unintended consequences of using economic levers to influence political outcomes.40 While political and economic factors are critical considerations for policymakers, it is crucial to avoid oversimplification. Assuming a direct and uniform impact of economic and political costs and benefits arising from bilateral relations between (BRI) partners and China on project-level outcomes would be inaccurate. As previously discussed, believing that all (BRI) projects will be flawlessly executed, yield solely positive outcomes, and universally benefit all participants is unrealistic. A nuanced understanding requires distinguishing between bilateral and project-level dynamics based on an interplay of economic and political factors which may differ significantly in individual (BRI) projects compared to broader bilateral contexts. Then, acknowledging project heterogeneity as (BRI) projects encompass diverse goals, scales, and contexts, necessitating an analysis that recognizes their potential for varying degrees of success and varying impacts on different stakeholders. Finally, accounting for unforeseen challenges as project implementation can be affected by unforeseen complexities, political shifts, and external factors beyond purely economic and political considerations. Therefore, policymakers should adopt a comprehensive perspective that goes beyond simple cost-benefit calculations and considers the interplay of diverse factors across different levels of analysis.41 Numerous studies highlight the fallacy of assuming uniformity in (BRI) projects' outcomes and universally positive net benefits. This critique stems from the understanding that economic relationships involve a complex interplay of positive and negative incentives, with clear linkages between economic stimuli and political behavior. Therefore, emphasizing the influence of political factors alongside economic ones becomes crucial. While pro-China sentiments and economic incentives often act as prominent motivators for countries to join (BRI), deeper analysis reveals that political factors frequently play a more primary role. Internal political motives can be particularly influential. Next, foreign policy objectives as joining the BRI can help countries secure allies, gain international leverage, or advance specific diplomatic goals. Finally, domestic policy priorities as (BRI) projects can be leveraged to address internal challenges like infrastructure deficiencies, economic underdevelopment, or resource scarcity. It is crucial to recognize that these political motives can interact with, and even supersede, economic interests in driving a country's decision to join the (BRI). Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of (BRI) participation necessitates going beyond simplistic cost-benefit calculations and carefully considering the complex interplay of internal and external political factors.42 Moving beyond participation alone, research needs to delve deeper into the implementation and impacts of (BRI) projects within partner countries. This entails addressing crucial questions such as project completion and success, political and economic costs and benefits and unforeseen consequences. Understanding BRI’s success necessitates analyzing the role of third-party actors. While existing research often focuses on bilateral dynamics between China and (BRI) partner countries, neglecting third parties introduces blind spots. A critical research gap exists in understanding (BRI) ramifications for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). While existing studies often delve into specific aspects like hardware acquisition or naval base plans, a more comprehensive understanding necessitates examining the initiative's broader impact on the PLA's military posture and engagement. This entails investigating, firstly, the potential alterations to the PLA's strategic capabilities, its strategic resources, logistical networks, or potential overseas deployment points. Secondly, research should illuminate the initiative's effects on China's strategic priorities. Thirdly, it is crucial to analyze the BRI's influence on inter-ministerial dynamics within China.43 Research on (BRI) requires careful consideration of China's internal institutional landscape. While existing studies often focus on external factors or aggregate dynamics, a critical gap lies in understanding the role of Chinese institutions in shaping and implementing the initiative. This necessitates investigation into both formal and informal structures.44 7. Understanding BRI from Different Lenses While existing research on (BRI) encompasses wide-ranging analyses, shifting the focus towards implementation, impact, and other enriching areas holds significant potential for advancing understanding of the initiative's outcomes. Examining the practical realities of project execution, assessing its tangible and intangible effects, and exploring complementary avenues can significantly improve the BRI's overall contribution. Future research on (BRI) should prioritize several understudied yet crucial areas. These include the role of non-state actors, the interplay with Chinese foreign policy, the efficacy of soft power, the impact on global governance and regional and infrastructural variations. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research, particularly understanding the diverse actors shaping its dynamics. Existing studies often focus solely on state-level interactions, neglecting the significant roles played by internal actors like Chinese ministries, think tanks, and subnational entities, as well as external actors like Chinese multinational companies and non-BRI regions. Such a comprehensive lens is crucial for appreciating the multifaceted dimensions of the initiative and the factors influencing its trajectory.45 While numerous studies dissect Chinese foreign policy, with detailed analyses of its key players, driving forces like ideology, culture, nationalism, internal factions, the military, and public opinion, a crucial research gap exists around (BRI). This lacuna lies in overlooking the internal and external actors who significantly shape the initiative's dynamics. Understanding the roles of Chinese internal actors, and non-BRI regions is essential for grasping the BRI's multifaceted dimensions and navigating its trajectory.46 The BRI's potential impact on Chinese soft power merits nuanced inquiry beyond simplistic assumptions. While the initiative positions China as a prominent economic sponsor, superpower, or development actor, its influence on international perceptions is likely multifaceted and context-dependent. Analyzing the soft power implications should move beyond mere project scale and "get-things-done" narratives. Crucial research avenues include deconstructing and activating soft power. By adopting this nuanced approach, research can move beyond simplistic claims about enhanced Chinese prestige and instead provide a comprehensive understanding of the BRI's complex soft power dynamics. This can inform more effective strategies for both China and partner countries in navigating the potential opportunities and challenges associated with the initiative's global engagement.47 A significant deficit within (BRI) research lies in its limited engagement with the issue of global governance. While existing studies often explore the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), their focus frequently remains narrowly confined to its creation, primary function as a (BRI) funding institution, and potential to challenge the established global economic order. This restricted lens obscures the broader ramifications of the BRI for global governance structures, norms, and practices.48 However, studies lack a deeper understanding of the BRI's interaction with and potential impact on global governance structures, norms, and practices. This includes international law and standards in various fields relevant to the initiative, such as trade, finance, environment, and development. A critical gap exists in (BRI) research: an overreliance on China-centric perspectives. While understandable given China's ownership and primary funding role, this viewpoint often leads to superficial analyses that neglect deeper examination of the initiative's multifaceted objectives. This results in a profusion of research that, despite focusing on the BRI, fails to adequately unpack its core aims and motivations.49 Beyond a solely China-centric lens, research on the (BRI) must delve deeper into regional variations, local-level impacts, and the complex interplay of international political and economic forces driving participation. Prioritizing the viewpoints of (BRI) partner countries is crucial for a more comprehensive understanding than can be achieved solely through analysis of Chinese perspectives. 8. Conclusion This study critically engages with the (BRI) research landscape with two guiding objectives. First, it systematically appraises existing scholarship, identifying gaps and limitations in current understanding. Second, it seeks to shape future (BRI) research by proposing avenues for more impactful and fruitful investigations. Through a comprehensive review of (BRI) related topics and analyses, the study reveals key shortcomings in current research including overreliance on China-centric perspectives, neglecting diverse viewpoints and local-level impacts. Surface analyses of (BRI) objectives and motivations, often overlooking complex political and economic driving forces. Inadequate exploration of implementation challenges and project outcomes across various regions and sectors. Limited engagement with translation issues, hindering accurate understanding of (BRI) dynamics in non-Western contexts. To address these limitations, the study proposes specific interventions for future research including prioritizing diverse perspectives of (BRI) partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, conducting in-depth case studies and comparative analyses through investigating implementation intricacies and project impacts across different contexts and leveraging translation as a research tool via employing multilingual approaches to gain deeper insights and overcome cultural biases. By actively addressing these critical gaps and adopting more nuanced research strategies, this study aims to significantly enhance the field of (BRI) scholarship and guide future investigations towards a more comprehensive and impactful understanding of this complex global initiative. This study's critical engagement with (BRI) scholarship holds profound implications for policymakers. By unveiling significant limitations in existing research, it demonstrates that overreliance on specific perspectives, superficial analyses of objectives, and inadequate exploration of implementation and impacts can mislead judgments. Decision-makers and policy analysts must therefore exercise caution when navigating the BRI research landscape. To avoid misinterpreting progress, political and economic ramifications, domestic/foreign influences, and broader implications, they should prioritize access to high-quality studies that address the identified shortcomings, critically evaluate all research: consider methodological rigor, bias, and the limitations outlined in this study and seek diverse perspectives: consider research beyond dominant viewpoints to gain a more comprehensive understanding. These steps are crucial for ensuring sound policy decisions informed by reliable and nuanced BRI scholarship. Similar caution applies to entrepreneurs engaging with BRI projects. Basing business, investment, and operational choices solely on analyses prone to the identified drawbacks can be reckless. They should either utilize analyses conducted with rigorous methodologies and awareness of existing research limitations or fully acknowledge the limitations of available research and factor them into their decision-making. By adopting these measures, entrepreneurs can mitigate potential risks and navigate BRI opportunities with greater prudence. For researchers and scholars, this study presents both challenges and opportunities. While the identified gaps indicate the need for considerable future research efforts, they also unlock exciting avenues for investigation. Scholars can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the BRI by conducting in-depth case studies that explore implementation intricacies and project impacts across diverse contexts, deepening the analysis of objectives and motivations, unpacking the interplay of domestic, regional, and global factors, prioritizing diverse perspectives, incorporating voices of partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars and addressing the limitations unveiled in this study is imperative for all stakeholders. Through rigorous and comprehensive research, we can navigate the complexities of the BRI with greater informedness and foresight, ultimately leading to more effective policymaking, informed entrepreneurial decisions, and a deeper scholarly understanding of this global initiative. Despite its continued, albeit bumpy, trajectory, the (BRI) faces growing research challenges that mirror its own complexities. A burgeoning volume of publications, propelled by an expanding pool of publishers, editors, and scholars, often overlooks methodological rigor and critical depth. Consequently, the full potential of BRI research remains unrealized. To unlock its true value, a shift towards more focused and nuanced investigations is imperative. This necessitates bolstering the infrastructure underpinning social science analysis through deeper engagement with diverse perspectives to incorporate voices from partner countries, local communities, and critical scholars beyond dominant viewpoints. Next, strengthened data collection and analysis which could employ rigorous methodologies and ensuring comprehensive project-level data across various regions. Additionally, enhanced communication and collaboration to foster interdisciplinary dialogue and knowledge sharing among analysts studying different BRI facets. Lastly, leveraging existing pathways by fully utilizing insights from diverse disciplines covering the BRI's multifaceted scope. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dr, Mona Alaa, Professor of Linguistics, Faculty of Languages and Translation, October 6 University for her helpful feedback on this manuscript. Disclosure Statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.   References 1 Robert Berke, “China’s New Silk Road Could Change Global Economics Forever”. Business Insider, May 22, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-new-silk-road-could-change-globaleconomics-forever-2015-5. Economist, “China’s Belt-And-Road Plans Are to Be Welcomed—and Worried About”, July 26, 2018. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/26/chinas-belt-and-road-plans-are-to-be-welcomed-and-worried-about. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Increasing geopolitical tensions and domestic political pressures have tested Fiji’s efforts to strike a balance in relations with its traditional partners and China. Its actions also illustrate that on questions of sovereignty, external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. When the Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was sworn into power in Fiji on Christmas Eve 2022 it marked an historic moment: the beginning of a peaceful transition of power, uninterrupted by coups or civil disturbance. But international attention was preoccupied not with whether Fiji had finally ended the coup cycle, but with what the new Government’s stance would be towards China. As a recently aired documentary by the Australian television program 60 Minutes makes clear, that preoccupation has fanned claims in Western media about China as a disruptive – if not predatory – actor in Fiji and the wider region. It is little wonder that the Fijian prime minister (who is also foreign minister) has repeatedly described the Pacific as being “at the centre of geopolitical tensions.” Major powers were, in his view, seeking to “polarize the Pacific into their own camps,” compelling countries to choose sides and further militarising the region. Like a number of other Pacific island countries, Fiji has long held the position of “friends to all, enemies to none.” In the Pacific islands context, this posture has been interpreted to mean being free to choose who to partner with; and not being told by others who they can or cannot be friends with. It is a form of non-alignment that does not preclude security agreements but seeks to avoid or resist being confined to spheres of influence. As former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama declared in 2015: “We have no desire as a Pacific Small Island Developing State to be drawn into the conflicts of others.” This non-alignment principle has been qualified to some extent by the foreign policy orientation of the government of the day. During the early years of the Bainimarama era, there was a tilt towards China. This was primarily a response to the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed on the government by Western partners (including Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) after the coup of 2006, which had compelled Fiji to actively seek new friends and allies. After the return to elected government in 2014, relations were restored with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and some foreign policy equilibrium was achieved. But it was not long before the Western partners, led by Australia, began publicly asserting the existence of a Chinese strategic threat to the region. Soon thereafter, these states launched a new campaign of “strategic denial” and, inter alia, escalated their engagement with Fiji. When Bainimarama’s regime was ousted by a coalition of parties dominated by Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party in the 2022 general election, it was expected that the new government would be less friendly towards China and realign itself more with its “traditional” Western partners. Some saw signs of such a shift in Rabuka’s cancellation of a meeting with the visiting Chinese foreign minister in April 2023, the March reinstatement of the Taiwanese mission’s name to Trade Mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Fiji (after a 2018 downgrade), and promises of an end to Fiji’s longstanding police cooperation agreement with China. But Western optimism did not last. The diplomatic upgrade of the Taiwan Trade Office was reversed; Fiji withdrew its signature from the 51 country statement at the UN calling for an end to China’s persecution of its Uighur minority; and revised but did not terminate the policing agreement. Fiji also accepted a large Chinese grant for the construction of roads in Vanua Levu and, to great alarm among its Western partners, announced on the sidelines of APEC that China had agreed to help with port upgrades and with developing a shipbuilding industry. The Chinese government admitted that the quid pro quo for this infrastructure assistance to Fiji was that “China expects Fiji to continue providing firm support on issues concerning China’s core interests and major concerns.” The “core interests and major concerns” are the One China policy, China’s domestic sovereignty, and its rights in its territorial disputes with neighbouring states. Fiji’s governments are likely to continue to provide such support as long as there is no serious conflict with Fiji’s fundamental foreign policy interests. These include upholding the sanctity of the principles and rules embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, Fiji benefits from Chinese development assistance, and does not view China’s regional presence as strategically threatening as do its Western partners. Rabuka’s continued engagement with China has had the effect of provoking these Western partners into seeking to outbid or delegitimise Chinese initiatives, especially in the security sector where China is suspected of attempting to extend its strategic reach. But, while his government would have anticipated and welcomed the Australian offer to replace China as its partner in upgrading Fiji’s ports and shipbuilding industry, Australia’s attempt to delegitimise the policing arrangement with China by associating it with official Chinese transnational drug promotion was not appreciated. As the Fiji government’s reaction to the latter suggests, its concerns about the effects on its sovereignty of external pressure, undue influence, and interference extend beyond China. That Western partners, and in particular Australia, have increasingly asserted their right to a say in regional and individual Pacific Island Countries foreign policy decisions has caused some dismay and discomfort. The Rabuka government may be attempting to maximise Fiji’s foreign policy independence, manoeuvrability, and leverage, or to strike a balance between its relations with its traditional partners and China. But it also may not yet have developed a settled foreign policy posture based on consultation and consensus within its foreign policy and security establishment. If there is some disagreement and a lack of direction and coordination, the recently initiated Foreign Policy White Paper drafting process should, if sufficiently inclusive, prove of great value. Sandra Tarte is Associate Professor and acting head, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of the South Pacific Pacific. Sandra specialises in the international politics of the Pacific Islands region with a particular interest in Fiji’s foreign policy. Nicola Baker lectures in the Diplomacy and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva. Her research interests encompass various aspects of the region’s geopolitics.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском MAY 2024.- Speaking about the spectacular growth of China's GDP, someone might argue that GDP is not the only indicator to observe in a country's improvement, and that is true. What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) has surpassed the latter in life expectancy of its inhabitants? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What explains that a country like China, with a per capita GDP ($25.02 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity) three times lower than that of the United States ($85.37 thousand dollars per capita, in purchasing power parity), has a much lower poverty rate than the United States? The answer is none other than the quality of human rights enjoyed by Chinese citizens compared to that of American inhabitants. (Datosmacro.com. Expansión)   What are human rights for the West? The most evident thing is that human rights for the West are a media weapon to attack China. Every time Western media mention China, they inevitably, as a self-imposed style guide, have to vilify China for its lack of human rights. “Tell me what you boast of, and I will tell you what you lack.” For the West, human rights focus on defending Western "Democracy" against what they term Chinese “Autocracy." If we look at this Western-style "Democracy," we see that it is characterized (primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries and to a lesser extent in other Western countries) by the alternation in government between two political parties that uphold the same political system. The exclusive dominance of these two parties over the state is built upon the absolute repression of organizations opposed to the system. This repression is executed through various means: Firstly, elections are designed on a marketing basis that requires mobilizing large sums of money to have any chance; secondly, the media, which shapes the population's thinking, is controlled by the same business groups that control the two parties; and thirdly, when any political force emerges with fresh air in this neoliberal jungle, the entire legal and illegal machinery of the state is unleashed upon it until it is annihilated. A system that has been working for two centuries now and has allowed the American empire to rise. The West fills its mouth with the word "Democracy" to cover up all its democratic shortcomings and deficiencies. A "Representative Democracy" based on elections every four or five years where the parties of the neoliberal system always "win" because other parties are prevented from having the necessary means to have any chance. And it uses this supposed legitimacy it claims due to its presumption of democracy to deny human rights to its citizens. (Of course, while the human rights of its citizens are denied, the human rights of citizens in the rest of the world are directly massacred. In addition to the hundreds of interventions in numerous countries, in Latin America and other continents, to manipulate and change their governments in favor of American interests, in just the current century, the United States has waged war with its military against the following countries or regions: Afghanistan -2001/2021-, Iraq -2003/2011-, Somalia -2007/2021-, Indian Ocean -2009/2016-, Libya -2011-, Uganda -2011/2017-, Iraq -2014/present-, Syria -2014/present-, Libya -2015/2020-, Mozambique -2021/present-, and Yemen -2023/present-.) The Political System of China Firstly, and it seems unlike the West, human rights in China consist of 30 rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations), and not just neoliberal democracy. Let's start with "Democracy." In China, there are nine political parties with parliamentary representation, and all of them support the existing participatory democracy in the country: Ø Communist Party of China Ø Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang Ø China Democratic League Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø China National Democratic Construction Association Ø China Association for Promoting Democracy Ø Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party Ø China Zhigong Party Ø Jiusan Society Ø Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League The political membership of Chinese citizens in these parties is much higher than in the West, and the majority far exceeds one hundred thousand members. If we look at Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the Right to participate in public affairs, we see that it establishes that: 1. "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives." 2. "Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country." 3. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." China's participatory democracy is based on People's Congresses, which currently have 2.77 million elected deputies. There are five levels of People's Congresses: municipality, county, city, province, and national. In last June elections, 921 million voters participated in municipal elections, representing 86.49% of registered voters, and 623 million voters participated in county elections, representing 85.63% of registered voters. The upper three levels of deputies (city, province, and national) are elected by deputies from the lower level. If we look at the XIV National People's Congress (NPC), it consists of 2,977 deputies. Some important characteristics to highlight about the composition of these deputies are as follows: Ø Ethnic minorities: There are 55 ethnic minorities in China represented by a total of 442 deputies. Ø Women: Their representation remains low. There are 790 female deputies, representing only 26.54% of the total NPC. Ø Workers and farmers: With 497 deputies, their participation reaches 16.69% of the total deputies. Ø Communist Party of China: There are 969 deputies, accounting for 32.55% of the total deputies. We can conclude that the North American political system is designed to perpetuate the neoliberal democracy upon which it is based. Similarly, the Chinese political system is designed to perpetuate Chinese socialist democracy. Both systems formally meet the three requirements of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. From the perspective of effectiveness, it seems that the neoliberal system, on one hand, in the current crisis situation, is generating a level of confrontation between the two parties that alternate in power (Republicans and Democrats in the United States, Socialists and Populars in Spain) that is hindering the government's work and muddying the political situation with the goal of obtaining power above any principle. On the other hand, the electoral marketing style on which it is based enhances government actions on short-term needs at the expense of medium and long-term plans, which cease to be an electoral priority. Looking towards China, the Chinese political system centered on grassroots People's Assemblies has two important advantages: on one hand, electoral confrontation does not occur between two national machineries geared to compete and win, but between grassroots individuals known to and neighbors of the voters who will elect them, where the individual holds greater value than the party itself. On the other hand, this system based on individuals allows for their selection based on their capabilities and promotes the rise to power of the most qualified. This phenomenon has been referred to as "Meritocracy" or the government of the best, and China today represents the clearest depiction of this meritocratic system. The other 29 articles of the Human Rights Declaration Without going deep into each of the Human Rights due to space constraints, let's focus on those that are driving the quality of life of Chinese citizens. In general, the United States uses human rights as a political tool for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, to influence and overthrow governments in its strategy of global domination. The State Department periodically publishes reports that are disseminated by Western media. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador expressed a few days ago regarding the latest U.S. report that "The State Department is talking about the human rights situation in Mexico being gray. The only thing is to ask [the agency] to review its recommendations because they violate the sovereignty of peoples. They are no-one to extend letters of good conduct to independent and sovereign countries and peoples." In relation to this latest report, many voices have risen up to rebuke the United States and assert that it lacks the capacity, or even the moral high ground, to criticize what happens in other countries regarding human rights. They point to everything happening with Julian Assange, the brutal repression of students in the United States, or the military support for the genocide of Palestinians, to express that this country cannot speak about human rights because it lacks moral authority. The right to equality and non-discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 are about the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination. If we use their representation in the highest legislative body of each country for various minority groups to compare their level of discrimination, the result is as follows:   While ethnic minorities in China are overrepresented in the highest legislative body, in the United States, Latinos and African Americans together are discriminated against compared to non-Latino white individuals in the House of Representatives. The situation of women in both countries in their legislative bodies is discriminatory and at a similar level. In China, only 26.5% of deputies in the National People's Congress are women, and in the United States, only 28% of congresswomen in the House of Representatives are women. The respect for ethnic minorities and their national integration in China is notable. The most evident case is the Uyghur minority settled in the Xinjiang region, which is of Muslim origin and for which the United States has been financing all kind of Islamist terrorist groups to destabilize China without any success and launching worldwide discrediting campaigns. The Right to the Satisfaction of Economic, Social, and Cultural Needs According to Article 22, every person has the right to the satisfaction of these needs. China's progress in poverty alleviation, as seen in the previous graph, is spectacular. It shows how, starting from extremely high poverty levels (over 50% in the year 2000), China outpaces the United States from 2014 until its elimination. Meanwhile, no progress is observed in the United States over the last 50 years. Never before so many people have exited poverty in such a short time in human history. This result is the consequence from the different objectives of both societies; while in the United States the focus is on maximizing the benefits of the capitalist system, in China, the focus is on meeting the social needs of the entire population. The Right to Social Security in the Event of Illness, Disability, Widowhood, Old Age, or Other Circumstances Beyond One's Control Article 25 speaks of this right. We have already shown above the evolution of life expectancy in the United States and China, which is the best indicator of the satisfaction of this right. China's advantage in healthcare and social services does not come from higher healthcare spending by this country. On the contrary, the United States is the world's largest spender on healthcare in terms of percentage of GDP, but this expenditure is not distributed evenly and solidarily among all its citizens. Nearly 30 million people in the United States lack health insurance and have had no insurance at all throughout 2022, and worse, they have also lacked the financial means to meet their healthcare needs, which in the United States are all paid for. The U.S. Census does not provide information on how many, in addition to these 30 million, have only had access to health insurance at some point during the year. The Right to Education Article 26: Everyone has the right to education. Let's see how the United States and China spend their budgets:   China has opted for the widespread and open generalization of education. For example, it has been sending nearly 400,000 students each year to American universities until Biden began to prevent their access, and another 300,000 students to other countries worldwide. The gross enrollment ratio in higher education in China reached 59.6% in 2022. Today, Chinese universities host most students worldwide enrolled in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. As a conclusión China draws its strength from human rights to drive its economy and progress. We find a country where the population shares the benefits of progress in solidarity, expanding social security, healthcare, and education nationwide. This has created the world’s most skilled workforce, setting annual records in patents, surpassing both the United States and all combined university systems of European Union countries in graduate students, with 11.6 million new graduates in the last academic year. And it's not just the labor force that the standard of living, healthcare, or education generate in a country; it's also the personal satisfaction of citizens with the respect of all their rights. The French company Ipsos is responsible for conducting worldwide studies on the level of happiness in different countries and has been pointing out China as the happiest country in the world. There is no doubt that Chinese society is a satisfied one. A satisfaction that hints at the pride of belonging to a country that has carried out the largest and fastest economic and social revolution in history.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group”Tensions between China and the Philippines are increasing the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2024 – Spring Update, Crisis Group looks at how the EU can support regional diplomacy to mitigate maritime disputes. Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea and the dangers it would pose to global trade. Several countries are implicated in the set of complex sovereignty disputes in the sea, which stem from rival claims to various features and the maritime entitlements they generate, but recent incidents involving Beijing and Manila have triggered the greatest concern. The Philippines controls nine outposts in the Spratlys, a contested group of land and maritime features at the heart of the South China Sea. A submerged reef known as Second Thomas Shoal has become a dangerous flashpoint, with Chinese boats continually trying to block Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship housing a handful of soldiers that a former Philippine government purposely grounded in 1999 in a bid to assert sovereignty over the atoll. China, which also claims the shoal, first started interfering with these missions in 2014, but relations between the two countries in the maritime domain have never been as volatile as during the last seven months. Chinese boats have regularly rammed the Philippine supply vessels or doused them with water cannons, occasionally wounding the sailors on board. Manila has a Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington, making this burgeoning maritime dispute part of the geopolitical competition between the U.S and China. In effect, the South China Sea has become a zone where conflict risks are rife – and where Washington and Beijing could be drawn into direct confrontation. Considering these developments, the EU and its member states should: • Seek greater diplomatic engagement with both Beijing and Manila to keep tensions in check. They should also expand their diplomatic presence across South East Asia and, where relevant, establish reliable channels through which they could communicate with high-level authorities in China and other claimant states should disputes at sea escalate; • Work to promote respect for international law, particularly the law of the sea, as a source of neutral rules for dispute resolution and conflict prevention, for example by organising public events, roundtables and dialogues in Manila and elsewhere. While this measure may not bridge the divides between Manila and Beijing, it could at least help establish a level of mutual support and understanding among the other South China Sea claimant states; and • Strengthen coast guard cooperation with the Philippines, focusing on building capacity in areas such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. Troubled Waters The sovereignty disputes that underpin the tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea go back decades. But it was Beijing’s manoeuvres to take control of Mischief Reef (in the east of the Spratlys) from Manila in 1995 that altered the perceived balance of power between the two states and in the region, setting off the territorial dispute that has now taken a turn for the worse. China’s assertiveness in the sea has grown in the past few years, along with its military capabilities. The brewing territorial dispute made headlines in 2012 when Beijing in effect took control of Scarborough Shoal, an atoll 220km west of the Philippine mainland but within Manila’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), after a maritime altercation. The incident prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to file a case challenging China’s territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On 12 July 2016, the presiding arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of Manila, dismissing China’s claim to all the waters within its “nine-dash line”, which constitute almost the entire South China Sea. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing not only rejected the adjudication and the subsequent ruling, but it had also already undercut efforts to settle the dispute through legal channels by building and fortifying seven artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was winding its way through the system. This move fundamentally changed the status quo, enabling Beijing to post permanent garrisons in the area for the first time. By many accounts, China has thus ensured itself control of the sea in any situation below the threshold of armed conflict. A short lull in the maritime dispute appeared to follow. After coming to power in 2016, Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte, pursued a pragmatic policy toward Beijing. Duterte downplayed the tribunal’s decision and cast sovereignty issues aside, hoping to benefit from Beijing’s economic largesse in exchange. Yet his ambitious gambit did not pay off. Tensions at sea continued in the form of regular standoffs between the country’s coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fisherfolk struggled to reach their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the precious oil and gas reserves within its EEZ to which it is entitled under international law. In March 2021, Chinese ships massed around Whitsun Reef, an unoccupied feature in the sea, ringing alarm bells in Manila, where senior officials voiced public criticism of China’s behaviour for the first time in years. By the end of the Duterte administration, the Philippines had revived its ties with the U.S. and become more assertive still, filing several diplomatic protests with the Chinese government. Elected in 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Duterte’s successor, was initially disposed toward friendly relations with Beijing, but the relationship soured only a few months into his presidency. Although China remains the Philippines’ top trading partner, Marcos, Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping did not achieve the desired results: Beijing neither agreed to make major new investments nor curtailed its “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea, understood as coercive actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. These rebuffs have helped push Marcos, Jr. toward strengthening ties with Washington, and the Biden administration has, on several occasions, publicly committed that the countries’ Mutual Defence Treaty would be deemed triggered in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft or public vessels. In perhaps the most significant recent development, after a series of high-level visits by U.S. officials to Manila, the two countries agreed to scale up implementation of their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gives U.S. troops rotational expanded access to Philippine military bases, and which China perceives as a provocation, especially given these bases’ proximity not just to the South China Sea but also to Taiwan. Manila has also received defence and diplomatic support from a host of other countries, particularly Japan and Australia. Despite the dispute it has with Vietnam over parts of the South China Sea, it has engaged, more quietly, with Hanoi, and acquired maritime defence equipment from India, thus expanding its circle of partners. Joint naval exercises with various countries have included large-scale ones with the U.S. in April, which involved the deployment of missiles that can reach targets almost 1,600km away – something that was sure to draw Beijing’s attention – and took place just after Manila wound up its first-ever trilateral presidential summit with Washington and Tokyo. In the meantime, the Marcos, Jr. administration has pursued what it calls a “transparency initiative”, publicising information about maritime incidents by inviting journalists to join its coast guard ships or posting video recordings of events almost as they are happening. Dramatic footage of Chinese vessels blocking, ramming or attacking its resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal with water cannons has generated widespread condemnation in the Philippines and abroad. Many consider these tactics to be bullying. For its part, and despite the 2016 ruling, Beijing asserts that Manila is intruding into its waters and maintains that it is demonstrating maximum restraint. China has also recently referred to a so-called gentleman’s agreement under former President Duterte that it says foresaw preserving a status quo in the South China Sea, with Manila ostensibly agreeing to supply only humanitarian goods and no construction materials to the BRP Sierra Madre; Manila denies that there was any such arrangement. Given the Philippines’ determination to continue resupplying its troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal will likely remain a flashpoint. Due to the constraints imposed at sea by the Chinese maritime militia and coast guard, Manila is starting to look into other means of provisioning its outpost, some of which are likely to irk Beijing even more, such as airdrops or closer U.S. naval escorts. In September 2023, a U.S. plane was in the shoal’s vicinity during a resupply mission, while a U.S. warship passed through waters nearby in December. But the shoal is not the only possible source of tension. Chinese vessels, both official and non-official, sail through many areas where Philippine fisherfolk traditionally work, while other features, such as Scarborough Shoal, are also points of friction. A large-scale encounter or accident at sea could be especially dangerous. Should a Filipino or Chinese national die during such a confrontation, it could stir nationalist sentiments in Manila and Beijing and heighten threat perceptions on both sides. In case of loss of life on the Philippine side, Manila would expect its U.S. ally to assist under the Mutual Defence Treaty, especially given the recent exchanges with Washington on that topic, although the U.S. has not said precisely how it would come to the Philippines’ aid. How such a dangerous situation would evolve depends in large part on Manila’s political decision to invoke the treaty and the choices Washington makes about how to fulfill its commitments. In principle, Beijing and Manila remain open to negotiations. But the bilateral consultative mechanism, a confidence-building measure designed in 2017 to manage maritime issues between the two countries, among other things, has generated no results of note. Meanwhile, efforts to create a Code of Conduct, which aims to reduce tensions at sea by setting up norms and rules between claimants and has been under discussion between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for over two decades, have stagnated. Why the Sea Matters The South China Sea is a vital waterway through which around one third of global shipping passes. Peace and stability in the sea are a prerequisite for safe trade and are demonstrably in the interest of the EU and its member states. At over 40 per cent, the share of the EU’s trade with the rest of the world transiting the sea is even higher than the global average. Instability in the area would deal a major blow to the European economy; even a slight disturbance of shipping routes could result in higher transport costs, shipping delays and acute product shortages. Should there be an escalation that pits China against the U.S. in a direct conflict, the consequences could be catastrophic and global. European positions toward South China Sea disputes have traditionally highlighted the importance of all parties respecting international law and the need for peaceful resolution, while being careful not to take sides. But over the last few years, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have driven a greater sense of urgency and something of a shift in European thinking. First, the EU and several of its member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies, designed to guide and promote cooperation with countries throughout the region. Secondly, Brussels has increased its diplomatic support for the Philippine position following maritime altercations, offering supportive statements in December 2023 and March 2024. Brussels and several European capitals now back Manila in regularly underlining the importance of UNCLOS and maritime law in the South China Sea context. Meanwhile, Europe’s presence in the region is growing, if slowly and in part symbolically. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific for the first time, while European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first trip to the Philippines by someone holding that office and an opportunity to express, at the highest level, the EU’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with the government in maritime security, among other areas. A German frigate entered the South China Sea in 2021, and French and Italian ships made port calls in Manila in 2023. In March 2024, the EU and the Philippines agreed to resume negotiations over a free trade agreement, while a month later France announced talks regarding a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines. While EU interest in the region is rising, European stances on the South China Sea are complex, with member states harbouring different views on maritime disputes in the region and, more broadly, on big-power competition. Some, such as France – which is the only EU member state to have overseas territories in the region (and which has significant EEZ interests there) – see themselves as having stakes higher than others and are keen to participate in the region’s discussions on security. Others, such as Greece and Hungary, are less concerned with maritime flare-ups so far away and tend to ascribe greater importance to maintaining good relations with Beijing. What the EU and Its Member States Can Do As the EU and its most powerful member states are drawn deeper into the South China Sea, they should raise their diplomatic game in the region – both to ensure awareness of mounting tensions and to look for ways to manage corresponding risks. As a practical matter, Brussels could leverage its status as an ASEAN Strategic Partner to seek more participation in that bloc’s security mechanisms and regional forums; the EU and member states could seek higher levels of engagement with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on matters concerning the South China Sea; and Europe could post more diplomats to the region, including permanent defence attachés who speak the language of naval diplomacy. Of particular importance will be maintaining strong lines of communication with Beijing, where Europe is seen as still having some distance from the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, which works to its diplomatic advantage. While to some extent this communication will be traditional bilateral statecraft, it may also mean looking for new opportunities and new channels for dialogue. For example, some member states could also seek to follow the precedent set by France and China in establishing a coordination and deconfliction mechanism between their militaries. Brussels should also continue raising the South China Sea in its engagement with Beijing as it did during the EU-China summit in 2023. Maintaining these channels will become both more difficult and more important if and when the EU and member states expand their operational presence in the region – for example, if they decide to establish a calibrated maritime presence in the South China Sea, as proposed by the EU envoy to the Indo-Pacific. Such a move is still deemed unlikely for now. As for public diplomacy, Brussels and EU member states should consider practical ways to promote principles of the law of the sea in the region, making the case that broader regional support for and adherence to these principles would provide neutral ground for peacefully avoiding and resolving disputes. While it is hard to see this approach appealing to Beijing, which has rebuffed the UNCLOS tribunal’s decision, there could still be benefits in forging closer cooperation among other claimant states. Convenings in Manila and other regional capitals could cover topics related to the continuing disputes but also to cross-cutting themes of regional interest such as fisheries. With negotiations over a regional Code of Conduct stuck, like-minded countries in the region could use these occasions to at least develop common positions on discrete issues that might be addressed by the Code or that could foster regional confidence-building in the South China Sea. Finally, in the realm of capacity building, European governments should continue to strengthen coast guard cooperation with South China Sea claimant states, helping them develop tools and protocols that might be used where appropriate to avoid confrontation and conflict. Since Aquino’s administration, Manila has tried to boost its coast guard capabilities. Given that many of the other claimant states’ vessels in the South China Sea are coast guard ships, and find themselves embroiled in maritime confrontations, a common approach on rules of engagement could help avoid misunderstandings at sea. Building on the EU’s integrated coast guard system, the EU could host or sponsor joint workshops to develop operating principles for the region’s law enforcement vessels and exchange best practices with Philippine authorities. Brussels could also fund agencies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to strengthen coast guard expertise on issues such as environmental protection, safety and search-and-rescue procedures. European member states could also participate in joint activities with the Philippine and other ASEAN coast guards to strengthen fisheries control and maritime border protection and deter piracy or smuggling.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Hotfoot from signing a security pact with North Korea on Wednesday, Vladimir Putin has popped up in Vietnam, another of the few remaining countries where the Russian president is still welcome (or doesn’t face arrest under the war crimes warrant issued by the International Criminal Court last year). Here he was congratulated by the president, To Lam, for his election victory earlier this year and for maintaining stability and continuity in Russia. Putin, meanwhile, made much of the Soviet Union’s historical support for the Vietnamese people’s struggle for independence and unity from the 1950s to the 1970s, referring, without a hint of irony, to Vietnam’s “heroic struggle against foreign invaders”. The visit has been billed as part of Putin’s strategy to promote a new “multipolar” world order, free from US control. But it should be noted that the pragmatic Vietnamese have already hosted Joe Biden and Xi Jinping over the past nine months. Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy” depends on the country being “actively neutral” – with one eye on China, Vietnam has also upgraded relations with the US, Australia and South Korea in recent times. So, while there will be plenty of expressions of goodwill from Vietnam’s leadership, they are less likely to commit to anything more concrete as things stand. North Korea knows little of such diplomatic niceties, though, and has fewer choices when it comes to its friends. Very little detail has emerged of the new pact with Russia, except that it would require each country to come to the aid of the other if attacked. But it’s likely that close to the top of the agenda would have been Russia’s military requirements. North Korea’s supplies of artillery and ammunition are thought to have been vital in helping Russia overcome the harsh sanctions imposed by the US as well as Beijing’s unwillingness to directly provide arms for the war in Ukraine. Kim, in turn, wants Russian know-how when it comes to sophisticated military tech as well as economic support when it comes to feeding his country’s starving population. But warm relations between the two countries is nothing new. Official pronouncements emphasised the “traditionally friendly and good” relations between Russia and North Korea “based on the glorious traditions of common history”. For Kim, writes Robert Barnes, a senior lecturer in history at York St John University, this is something of a family affair which harks back to the 1930s when the North Korean leader’s grandfather Kim Il-sung was a relatively unknown Korean communist leading a small guerrilla band fighting the Japanese in Manchuria. Kim spent much of the second world war in the Soviet Union, where he joined the Red Army and rose to the rank of major. After the conflict, he was handpicked by Stalin to lead the Korean Workers’ party and then North Korea when it was established in 1948. The Korean war which followed almost led to a nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the west. Hopefully, concludes Barnes, nothing as dramatic will result from this latest iteration of the relationship between the two countries. But pariah states such as North Korea aren’t the only countries where Putin can command a degree of support, if the recent European parliamentary elections are any guide. As Natasha Lindstaedt notes here, the rise of the far right in EU member states such as Germany, France, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria is throwing up an increasingly powerful group that stands in opposition to EU support for Ukraine. It may seem counterintuitive that such an avowed anti-fascist as Putin is courting extreme right organisations such as Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland party (AfD) or Hungary’s Fidesz party. But Lindstaedt believes that leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have shown little concern for the institutions of democracy – as shown by Hungary’s adoption of a similar foreign agents’ law which acts to curtail press freedom and the work of NGOs. She concudes: “Putin is seen by the far right as a strong and conservative leader that can defend himself against the liberal west, which is trying to undermine these values.” The west, meanwhile, remains divided over the manner and extent of its support for Ukraine. The good news for Kyiv is that the recent G7 meeting in Puglia, southern Italy, ended in an in-principle agreement to use the US$3 billion (£2.36 billion) interest from US$350 billion of Russian assets frozen in the western banking system to underwrite a US$50 billion loan to Ukraine. But Gregory Stiles and Hugo Dobson, experts in international relations at the University of Sheffield, sound a cautionary note suggesting that the details of how this will work are likely to take months to agree. Meanwhile, they write, five of the seven leaders – US president Joe Biden, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, the UK’s Rishi Sunak and Japan’s Fumio Kishida – all face elections this year which none of them are guaranteed to survive. And, to take just one example, if Biden loses in November to Donald Trump, the likelihood of this deal proceeding becomes significantly reduced. Summit on peace Many of these leaders went on to Switzerland at the weekend for the Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Stefan Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, was following proceedings and concludes that it’s hard to judge the meeting an unqualified success. Out of 160 countries and international organisations invited, only 92 attended. Biden was a no-show and Canada’s premier, Justin Trudeau, was the only G7 leader to stay for both days of the conference. The main problem, writes Wolff, was that the only peace plan on the table was that proposed some time ago by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. This calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, including Crimea, and the payment of reparations for rebuilding his country. Seven other peace plans, proposed by the likes of China (which also failed to send anyone), Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, a group of African states led by South Africa and the Vatican were not discussed. Most of these call for a ceasefire, which is anathema to Kyiv and its backers in the US and UK, as it would accept, for the time being at least, Russia’s territorial gains on the ground, including the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Putin, meanwhile, was trolling hard from the sidelines, releasing his terms for a ceasefire deal, which are for Ukraine to accept Russian annexation of Crimea and not just the land his troops currently occupy, but all of the four regions he annexed in September 2022. Putin’s column As previously noted here, a season of relative success on the battlefield, has left Putin in a bullish mood. It emerged recently that (despite being seriously disadvantaged by the war in Ukraine and the harsh western sanctions which have ensued) the boss of Russian energy giant plans to build an 80-metre column in St Petersburg to commemorate Peter the Great’s triumph in the great northern war, after which Russia declared itself to be an empire for the first time. As George Gilbert, an expert in Russian history at University of Southampton notes, anything honouring Peter the Great is a sure-fire way of buttering up the Russian president, who sees himself as a latter-day incarnation of the man who built his home town of St Petersburg, glossing over the fact that Peter saw his capital as a way of making Russia more of a west-facing country. Gilbert gives us some historical context about the conflict, in which Russia lined up alongside much of what would become Poland and Germany as well as Britain, by virtue of its king, George I, also being the ruler of Hanover. The key battle, he writes, was at Poltava, which is in the middle of what is now Ukraine, which involved defeating a crack regiment of Cossack cavalry, which you’d have to imagine is very much grist to Putin’s mill. One suspects, though, that it’s Peter the Great’s imperial achievements that Putin wants to emulate most of all.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском We can talk about selective tariffs - but not about protective tariffs - Concerns about the effects of economic dependencies are increasingly overshadowing the benefits of open global trade. - In the current geopolitically charged situation, there may be situations in which trade policy dependencies - for example in the case of rare earths - can be mitigated by state intervention. - In such cases, selective tariffs are the best choice. Subsidies to build up own production capacities are significantly less efficient, more expensive and undermine the market principle. - Protective tariffs for industries whose products are sufficiently available on the global market, such as the automotive and steel industries, should be rejected. - The fundamental goal should be the preservation of rule-based world trade in accordance with WTO rules. Any kind of state intervention must be justified on the basis of solid data. Background During Chinese party leader Xi Jinping's visit to Europe in May, there was once again a lot of talk about economic dependencies. They are seen as a threat to the "economic security" of Germany and Europe. What often seems to fade into the background is that the arguments for a global division of labor remain valid: it enables general prosperity precisely because certain countries and regions concentrate on the production of individual goods and consequently do not produce others themselves. On the other hand, it is also true that the economic damage more than compensates for these advantages if a state such as China uses economic dependencies as political leverage and, in the worst case, stops supplying goods for which it has a monopoly. In principle, China has achieved such a monopoly for refined rare earths and some other smelted metals.1 However, this clearly does not apply to electric cars, steel or solar cells. The reason for such quasi-monopolies is simple: Chinese companies export the products in question so cheaply that production elsewhere in the world is not worthwhile. If this were solely due to the fact that Chinese companies produce better, the only correct response would be to roll up our sleeves and become better ourselves. In the case of rare earths from China, however, the advantage of Chinese manufacturers is largely due to direct and indirect subsidies. In such an environment, in which Chinese producers have massive cost advantages due to politically granted benefits, it is not worthwhile for private companies outside China to build up their own capacities for the production of rare earths, for example. Even if prices were to rise and economic production were possible, this would not be rational; state-supported Chinese companies can easily survive periods of low prices. The usual market mechanism, whereby companies with the most competitive solutions survive, does not apply here. Even technologically superior production methods do not prevail due to Chinese subsidies. Possible reactions The best economic solution is undoubtedly for the state not to react at all and to see the availability of very cheap products that are available for domestic consumption or for further processing as an advantage. The fact that the products in question have been made cheaper by Chinese taxpayers' money can be gratefully accepted. It would be a genuine and courageous system competition not to respond with the same instruments, but to maintain a market economy system and thus exploit the weaknesses of the counter-design. Shaping the economic framework conditions politically in such a way that innovations that provide alternatives to the use of the raw materials in question can be developed more easily would be a reaction that is still justifiable within the framework of the social market economy. This would be, for example, favorable recycling processes. In most cases, such innovations are possible. However, their introduction and application is significantly more expensive than importing standard products from China. If dependence on China is really not justifiable in individual cases,2 there are two possibilities for state intervention in the form of subsidies or tariffs, which may be justifiable in rare individual cases, but are not provided for within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Important indicators for the assessment of dependencies are, for example, the lack of substitutability of the imported good, the degree of concentration of supply in a country and the relevance of the good in question for the domestic economy. However, state intervention to protect domestic production sites, such as is being discussed for electric cars or steel, appears to be explicitly unjustifiable. There is a sufficiently diversified supply of such products on the global market and there is no dependency on just one country. Economic effects of tariffs and subsidies Tariffs and subsidies both aim to compensate for the price difference to cheaper foreign competitors. Tariffs make imports more expensive, while subsidies make domestic production cheaper through state subsidies. Both have a negative welfare effect, but the correlation is more harmful in the case of subsidies. Figure 1 uses a schematic example, which is not based on empirical data, to illustrate the effect if the costs of producing rare earths in Germany were reduced to the level of the import price from China (country 1) through subsidies.   With the subsidies, it is now economically viable for the subsidized companies to produce the rare earths from ore in Germany. The actually cheaper ways of importing rare earths from alternative countries or using other technical solutions remain more expensive and would hardly be used. The goal of reducing dependencies would therefore be achieved in a very expensive way. Large sums of taxpayers' money would be spent on this. In this example, the most expensive possible route is discussed in order to clearly demonstrate the negative consequences. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that the cheapest route in economic terms will be subsidized. This is because there are always many different providers and technical solutions, which means that all the options are often not even known or can only develop in the long term. It is therefore very unlikely that the optimal subsidy recipients will be selected. A benefit is created for a specific, relatively arbitrarily selected application, but not for others. The effectiveness of the market is thus distorted and the competitiveness of the location decreases as a result. As the subsidies compensate for a competitive disadvantage, it is unlikely that high additional tax revenues will be generated. The funds spent are no longer available for other state investments. The result is a loss of welfare on this scale. Only the subsidized companies benefit from this. The price at which rare earths can be purchased in Germany does not change. It is also possible to subsidize production abroad in order to reduce dependence on one country. Such models are being attempted via "raw material partnerships", for example. Such an approach can be significantly cheaper than subsidizing domestic production. In the example (Figure 1), only the significantly lower import price from country 2 would have to be subsidized. However, the other disadvantages of subsidies listed above also apply in this case. In particular, it is even more difficult to obtain all the necessary information for projects abroad and therefore even less likely to choose the most cost-effective option. The targeted tariffs discussed here are intended to respond to dependencies on supplies from a specific country. They are therefore only imposed on imports from this country. Other imports are not affected. To stay with the example, the importer pays a surcharge on the imported rare earths. This makes his product, for which he processes rare earths, more expensive domestically. Manufacturers abroad who are not affected by the duty become more competitive in comparison.    If the tariff rate were set in the same way as above so that the competitive disadvantage for the most expensive option - metal processing in Germany - is compensated for in terms of price, the tariff rate on imports from China would be very high. However, consumers of rare earths in Germany would still have access to the significantly cheaper other options. Metal processing in Germany would therefore remain unprofitable, while imports - now no longer from China, but from country 2 - would continue to be significantly cheaper. However, the price difference to the cheapest processing variant in Germany, in the example (Figure 2) recycling, would no longer be so great, so that this variant would be easier to make economically viable by scaling up or using innovative technical solutions. In reality, the introduction of customs duties would not divert all procurement to a single country; there is no capacity for this anywhere. The result would be a mix of different suppliers, which would make it more worthwhile to drive innovation in Germany. Changes in the price structure between the different providers and processes over time can be tracked by customers in this model - the best process (or the second best, if the best is used in China) then prevails on the market. The welfare loss here arises from the fact that consumption or further processing of the imported products becomes more expensive by at least the difference to the second cheapest source of supply. However, the volume of the welfare loss is significantly lower than in the case of subsidies. It can be argued that tariffs make the prices of downstream products in the supply chain more expensive, whereas subsidies do not. While this is true, it overlooks the fact that the much larger group of companies and consumers who are not directly affected do not suffer any direct additional costs in the case of tariffs, but bear the costs of subsidies through their taxes. Political effects of tariffs and subsidies In terms of their political and structural consequences, subsidies are more harmful than targeted tariffs. This is simply due to the procedure at the end of which individual companies receive a subsidy decision. An "objective" allocation is hardly possible here. On the contrary: the procedure is susceptible to personal relationships, political influence and direct corruption. Furthermore, subsidies that are only granted in one country of the European Union jeopardize the integrity of the European Single Market. Similar problems can arise with customs duties. This happens when they are used to protect certain domestic industries. In the case of targeted, selective tariffs, which are based on clearly defined, objective categories, such as the degree of dependence on a product from a country, there is little scope for political influence once the criteria have been established. Tariffs cannot harm the European single market either, as they can only be imposed at European level anyway. WTO conformity The reduction of tariffs and subsidies within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the predecessor agreement GATT are a central reason for the reduction of global poverty in recent decades and one of the cornerstones of Germany's prosperity. It is therefore self-evident that tariffs and subsidies not only contradict the idea of the WTO. They also contradict its two basic principles: Subsidies for domestic production contradict the non-discrimination principle3, tariffs against individual countries violate the Most Favorite Nation Clause4. There are exceptions for both in the WTO rules. For example, WTO members must notify subsidies so that they can be examined and other countries can object to them if necessary. In principle, subsidies are only intended - and within a narrow framework - for developing countries, which still includes China. However, the notification of subsidies to the WTO hardly works any more. For example, 64 countries (around a third of members) have not even notified their subsidies for 20175. Nevertheless, some of China's subsidies may indeed be legal according to the letter of the WTO rules. But they are certainly not legitimate, as the aim of the WTO is to liberalize world trade and not to cement the opposite. And even if subsidies are known, the WTO cannot take legally binding action against them due to the dispute settlement mechanism blocked by the USA. Consequently, the USA has not reacted to the unresolved problem of China's subsidies within the WTO framework. Although tariffs have been imposed on some Chinese imports, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a huge subsidy program. If the dispute settlement mechanism were to work, the IRA would almost certainly have to be declared WTO-incompatible. However, as this path is blocked, many countries and regions of the world - including Germany and the EU at the forefront - are reacting with their own openly WTO-incompatible subsidy programs. The current subsidy race is constantly creating new reasons to impose subsidies in response to the subsidies of others. This will further damage the multilateral trading system, which has been very successful for Germany in particular. Targeted tariffs, on the other hand, which can be used to eliminate competitive disadvantages caused by subsidies and which are therefore only levied on goods from the subsidizing country, are in principle in line with the basic idea of the WTO. This is because it balances out a distortion of the world market created by subsidies. Therefore, tariffs are generally permitted as a reaction to dumping and subsidies6. A reaction to subsidies via tariffs within the strict WTO framework is currently hardly possible for the reasons mentioned above. In this situation, it should be actively communicated that in an unsatisfactory legal situation, the path of the least evil will be taken with tariffs. At the same time, serious efforts should be made to reform the WTO. Conclusion The argument: "We want to have the production of certain things in Germany because we believe that we would no longer be supplied with them in crisis situations" is not an economic argument. Production for strategic reasons is always a financially subsidized business. Because if there was money to be made, the private sector would do it. Politically, this line of argument is perfectly legitimate - as is the attempt to steer the economy directly in a politically acceptable direction through subsidies. However, this has nothing to do with a social market economy, but rather the opposite. However, if Germany and Europe are to remain committed to the social market economy and open multilateral trade, the only economically sensible response to problematic dependencies from abroad (if one has to respond at all) is to impose targeted, selective tariffs - but certainly not protective tariffs for domestic production sites. The German government should work within the EU to set a clear framework for this and at the same time work on a reform at WTO level to finally reduce the rampant subsidies. Because these - and not tariffs - are currently the biggest threat to the open global trading system that is so important to us. References 1 Vgl. etwa die Darstellung der Abhängigkeiten von für die Energiewende nötigen Metallen in Cernicky (2022): https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/16166715/Energiewende+und+Protektionismus+-+Wie+gehen+wir+pragmatisch+mit+China+um.pdf/442ba770-d504-43cc-25f1-eaf7d970dfc1, genaue Zahlen vgl. etwa die Auflistung des BDI: https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/analyse-bestehender-abhaengigkeiten-und-handlungsempfehlungen/ 2 Zum Versuch einer entsprechenden Bewertung vgl. etwa die von der KAS und dem Ifo-Institut durchgeführte Studie zu Abhängigkeiten in Lieferketten, Flach et al (2021): https://www.kas.de/de/analysen-und-argumente/detail/-/content/globale-wertschoepfungsketten 3 Art. III GATT 4 Art. I GATT/ WTO 5 WTO | 2023 News items - Members reiterate concerns on lack of transparency with subsidy notifications: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/scm_02may23_e.htm 6 GATT Art VI, Dumping und Ausgleichzölle Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de).

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In a complex new multipolar world, a country’s allies and friends will determine the global pecking order. Despite its large population, Africa is a small global player. Its combined economy is less than 3% of the world economy, and Africa’s political heterogeneity makes it difficult to stand united on contentious issues such as China’s claim over Taiwan or the war in Ukraine. Although most African countries aren’t part of global value chains, external economic challenges and tensions affect them deeply. Africa’s most violent period since independence was in the years before the Berlin Wall collapse in 1989. At the time, tensions between the United States (US) and former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) led to intense proxy wars in the Horn of Africa and Angola. Based on that experience, a new era of competition between the US and China doesn’t augur well for the continent. At its peak, the USSR’s economy was only half that of the US, whereas the US and China will be roughly equivalent in the next decade. China is already larger when using purchasing power parity. By 2050, the Chinese economy will be almost 30% bigger. China is the world’s factory, manufacturing cheaper and more than anyone else. It has flooded the world with affordable solar and wind products to fuel the green transition. China is the global trade destination for many and it builds much of Africa’s infrastructure. China and surrounding Asian countries are emerging as the most important source of economic growth globally. According to an in-depth study by The Economist in May 2022, ‘No other country comes near the breadth and depth of China’s engagement in Africa.’ In contrast, US trade and investment with Africa is declining. If the US wants to maintain its influence on the continent, it should find ways to collaborate rather than compete with China. The bill proposed in April by a bipartisan group of senators to renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for another 16 years shows that influential US groups are willing to engage with Africa for the long haul. With its low levels of trade reciprocity, the AGOA trade model is well suited to Africa’s needs. The US should use AGOA as a carrot to boost Africa’s exports, not a stick for economic coercion to achieve political objectives. The rise of China in a crowded world means the future will be quite different to previous periods of competition and cohabitation. Many of Africa’s ruling elites cast longing eyes towards China’s autocratic development model as a means to reduce poverty. Democracy and the free market haven’t delivered development, they argue. There is a sense of restlessness in Africa, where the median age is only 19. The youth bulge is expanding with limited prospects for formal employment, a healthy life or meaningful education. To analyse the impact of various global futures on Africa’s development, the Institute for Security Studies’ African Futures and Innovation programme has examined recent and likely global power shifts. For the past century, the US has been the most powerful country in the world. It has successfully presented a narrative that equates global development, stability and progress with American interests and values. Many Africans look to the US, given its freedoms and opportunities – although positive views of the US are dropping in number. The image of a violent mob descending on the Capitol in January 2021 shattered the myth of American exceptionalism, exposing a country torn asunder by its political divisions. Rural America’s reaction to globalisation and the rise of domestic populism detracts from US soft power. At the same time, its declining ability to deter others is on display in the Middle East, which is on a knife edge. Instead of oil from Africa, the next commodities boom for the continent will come from minerals needed for the renewable energy transition. This is reflected in a recent United States Institute of Peace report exploring Africa’s role in diversifying US critical mineral supply chains and strengthening the rule of law, transparency and environmental and labour standards. The US faces an uphill struggle since China has already secured much of Africa's known supply of critical minerals. China’s dominant position regarding these resources reflects the extent to which it is in a different league to the former USSR. Instead of confronting China in Africa, the US must find ways to collaborate with it. Africa cannot again serve as an arena for proxy conflicts and competition, this time between the US and China. Plus, it is Russia, not China, that is now the spoiler in Africa. The extent to which Sahelian countries are experiencing a resurgence of military coups with regime protection provided by Russia’s Africa Corps (previously Wagner) augurs poorly for the continent’s future. The more significant challenge is that the West faces a much larger and more powerful cohort of detractors, perhaps most readily depicted as the G7 versus BRICS+. The impunity that the West has provided to Israel for its war in Gaza and further afield reinforces global south views that different standards apply to them compared to the developed north. Current indications point to China becoming more influential in Africa, with many countries turning eastward. Rather than a new unipolar or even bipolar order, the trend is towards a complex, multipolar global power configuration where one’s allies and friends will determine the international pecking order. Learning to rely on them will be a new experience for the US. This article was first published in Africa Tomorrow, the African Futures and Innovation blog. Exclusive rights to re-publish ISS Today articles have been given to Daily Maverick in South Africa and Premium Times in Nigeria. For media based outside South Africa and Nigeria that want to re-publish articles, or for queries about our re-publishing policy, email us.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском In March and April, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son’s nearly back-to-back visits to the U.S. and China highlighted Vietnam’s increasing penchant for delicate diplomacy with major powers amid the U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and Vietnam’s territorial tussles with China especially in the South China Sea (SCS), which Vietnam calls the East Sea. Much of the (perceived) disorder in the Indo-Pacific hails from the SCS, and one of Vietnam’s principal challenges is fostering order on its maritime borders. Therefore, Vietnam—historically distrustful of major powers—has been diversifying its relations by seeking security and defense ties with Indo-Pacific partners like the European Union (EU), India, and Japan, as well as with Russia, a country that poses an “existential threat” to the transatlantic allies. At the same time, Southeast Asia is battling disunity within the region for resolving disputes in the SCS, for instance. The regional multilateralism embodied by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems to lack teeth even as China ‘controls’ some of its members using its financial and economic heft. So clearly, efforts beyond Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” that deepen international solidarity are required. In a similar vein, Europe’s reluctant rapprochement with China in recent times amid the EU calling China a strategic challenge but continuing to look for economic engagement is reminiscent of Vietnam and much of Asia’s predicament vis-à-vis China. Moreover, like in Southeast Asia, not every member-country of the EU is embracing the Indo-Pacific construct, led by the U.S. Or even if a member does, like France or Germany, it does not spell the end of a productive relationship with China. Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU has started to take a greater interest in the growing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific, even as the disunity over the extent of the Indo-Pacific priorities, including China, is as apparent. In such a scenario, is it possible for the EU and Vietnam, and by extension ASEAN, to have greater convergence, if not congruence, in their policies? Revisiting Vietnam’s Lack of an Indo-Pacific Tilt The Indo-Pacific, the maritime space and littoral between the western Indian and Pacific Oceans, has become the world’s most geopolitically critical region. In this region, much of the focus and debate among the EU’s more proactive members, such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany, is in response to Chinese unilateralism, trade dependency, and unchecked Sino-U.S. contestation. Several of these EU members have come to understand each other’s positions on the Indo-Pacific. Gradually, there is a realization that it is not just about what the EU and its members seek to accomplish in the region but just as much the perspectives and priorities of key Indo-Pacific resident actors—and their views on European strategies and contributions. Vietnam is one such country that is worthy of greater European strategic attention. Vietnam is known for its “bamboo diplomacy”—a reference to the bamboo plant’s strong roots, sturdy stems, and flexible branches—balancing ties with the two big powers, the U.S. and China. In the words of Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, Vietnam’s foreign policy caters to “independence, self-reliance, peace, friendship and cooperation, and multilateralization and diversification of external relations and proactive international integration.” However, Hanoi has never officially and fully embraced the term “Indo-Pacific” nor the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific construct although it does recognize that some aspects of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific tenet advocated by the U.S. and its allies are compatible with its national interests. For instance, the order in the Asia-Pacific, a term that Hanoi prefers to use, should be rule-based. This speaks to one of Vietnam’s most important foreign policy priorities: finding peace and stability in the SCS disputes with China and other claimants. However, the order that Vietnam seeks is in more than just the security domain. The goal of development has been the highest priority since Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986. Economic growth is considered the backbone of national security and regime legitimacy. Hanoi’s development of foreign relations can be said to be grounded in its national development experience, with the stress on economic priority leading to national stability and international standing. Vietnam chooses to engage in the Indo-Pacific construct on its terms. Vietnam and EU Convergence On both economic and security fronts, Vietnam and the EU can find converged interests that align closer to each other. Even as Hanoi has not officially adopted the term “Indo-Pacific,” the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, if implemented well, could address both Vietnam’s economic and security needs. Despite its security and military power limitations in the Indo-Pacific, the EU can still play a crucial role in effectively addressing these needs, which are vital for the EU’s strategic interests as well. The two already have a Framework Participation Agreement. Vietnam is also part of the EU’s Enhancing Security In and With Asia (ESIWA) project, which covers crisis management and cyber security. This also aligns with the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, where Vietnam is considered a “solid” partner. Notably, both the EU and Vietnam face (potential) economic coercion from China. As China is now Vietnam’s largest trading partner, sudden trade restrictions hindering Vietnamese exports to China would dramatically hurt the Vietnamese economy. In this vein, Hanoi welcomed the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), hoping it would give opportunities to diversify its trading partners and thus mitigate the risks of economic coercion from China. On the other hand, the EU and its member-states are also trying to increase economic resilience by diversifying trading partners as they wrestle with economic overdependence on China. So, strategically, Brussels presents an excellent opportunity for Hanoi and vice versa. However, challenges remain. For example, all the EU member-states are still to ratify the Investment Protection Agreement signed along with the EVFTA. Even though this is usually a time-consuming procedure, the imperative to reap benefits as soon as possible has taken a setback amid a challenging geopolitical landscape. Nonetheless, the two sides are concerned about more than just traditional economic development; they are concerned about sustainable development and green transition. For instance, under the EU’s Global Gateway framework, the EU and Vietnam have signed the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), which looks to provide a multi-projects credit facility worth €500 million. This is supposed to be the EU’s primary focus in Vietnam now. Yet, Hanoi’s cautious approach for fear of falling into any potential debt trap could stymie smooth cooperation. Projects involving vast sums of money, such as the JETP, are also practically challenging to push at the moment as officials are afraid to be the targets of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaigns. Vietnam would also be keen for ASEAN and the EU as blocs to reinvigorate multilateralism and shore up security cooperation, particularly in the SCS disputes. ASEAN states, in general, are looking to the EU as a non-threatening balancing power to reduce the impact of the China-U.S. strategic competition. Among the potential areas of cooperation between the EU and Vietnam within the ASEAN are regional climate action measures, food security, digitalization, and tech innovation. The two sides must also use their partnership to realize an ASEAN-EU FTA. EU as a Security Balancer? The EU and Vietnam also share their commitment to upholding the rules-based order—an essential component of security cooperation because of the region’s strategic importance. However, improving communication and understanding of maritime incidents more effectively is challenging. The SCS territorial conflict is simmering, particularly between China and the Philippines. In 2016, an arbitration tribunal constituted under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) overwhelmingly ruled in favor of the Philippines, which China rejected. However, the ruling bolstered Vietnam’s claims, which were not openly welcomed by other ASEAN states besides the Philippines. In the absence of an agreement for a code of conduct (CoC) between China and ASEAN, which has been dragging on for years, China’s violations of international law in the SCS, including the latest against Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, have increased. Against this scenario, Vietnam and the Philippines have signed maritime security deals. At the same time, Vietnam would be reluctant to do anything more drastic, such as support the Philippines in its attempt to draft a “separate” CoC for fear of Chinese retaliation. While Vietnam is less discussed in major global media than the Philippines on the issue, Hanoi is actively using diplomatic means to internationalize the problem, bringing in more players to address complex territorial disputes to safeguard its sovereignty and promote regional peace. In this context, winning the support of the EU and its member-states would be strategically important for Vietnam. The Vietnamese side can facilitate this by providing foreign entities, including the EU, with more transparent and timely information when incidents occur. Naturally, using a media strategy like the Philippines might sensationalize the issue, which might be different from what Hanoi prefers as it walks a tightrope to balance its complex relations with China. However, Hanoi can at least offer foreign diplomats transparent and detailed information in a timely fashion to help them verify and assess the situation on the ground. This will speed up the EU’s and other potential like-minded states’ response to sea incidents and foster ways forward for more multilaterally agreeable forms of modus vivendi in the South China Sea. Ultimately, such a modus should serve China too. EU No Longer a Bystander The EU’s recent stance on the SCS issue has been its respect for a rule-based order and freedom of navigation, strong opposition to unilateral actions, and supporting the ASEAN-led “effective, substantive and legally binding” CoC while mentioning China but not singling it out. This is a change from the EU’s pre-Indo-Pacific embrace when it was a more divided, neutral house. The EU’s heavy dependence on maritime trade through the SCS mandates that the EU can no longer stand as a bystander. However, ASEAN claimant states, particularly Vietnam, would perhaps expect a sharper or clearer position, which the EU has indeed been moving toward. For example, in March 2024, the EU released a statement expressing concerns about the incidents involving “repeated dangerous maneuvers” by the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia in the SCS. This tilts to the U.S. line, even as the U.S. has been more vocal in directly criticizing China on the SCS, by calling China’s claims “completely unlawful” even before the current events. One could argue that despite the U.S. and its allies having been vocal, this has yet to lead to a concrete resolution of the conflict. However, if the EU cannot send clear signals on the issue, the division among like-minded countries will be seen as weak and exploitable in China’s eyes. Importantly, this is true not just for the SCS disputes but also for China’s coercive activities in general. Therefore, given the convergent non-confrontational, inclusivity-, and economic interests-oriented attitudes of both Vietnam and the EU toward the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific region, both sides are primed to embrace the other’s strategic outlook and up their game in the face of a challenging China and efforts to foster order.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском It is not surprising that China’s Xi Jinping should visit France, Europe’s second largest economy and one of the dominant nations within the European Union. But why should he visit comparatively small and economically less important nations such as Hungary or Serbia? The answer lies not merely in the economic opportunities such a visit may bring to all parties, but in the increasingly anti-American themed politics of the three nations, and their governments’ belief that the future of international politics is a multi-polar order dominated by “civilization states.” These two factors make China, which promises to free the world from American political, economic, and cultural dominance and establish a new multipolar order, an attractive partner for France, Serbia, and Hungary. Equally, it makes them attractive to China, which seeks to divide Europe and the United States, and build greater economic and political ties with European nations desirous of a “new” Europe free of American dominance. Xi portrays China as not merely a nation-state, but a continuation of Ancient Chinese culture merged with Marxism. Xi is adamant that China must draw on its civilizational heritage, and reject the values of Western civilization, which are not – he argues – universal, but indeed particular to the West and thus unsuitable for China. Xi’s remark that China “will work with France to deepen China-Europe mutually beneficial cooperation,” and that the two are “major forces in building a multipolar world, two big markets that promote globalization, and two great civilizations that advocate cultural diversity,” underlines this civilizational perspective on global politics. Civilizationism, as a construct, is thus a tool of liberation through which Xi will free China of non-indigenous values and ideas, and through which it will overcome the United States and make the Chinese nation Asia’s dominant power. The leaders of both China and France, despite their differences, are drawn together due to shared antipathy towards the United States, and their shared civilizational perspective on global affairs, a perspective intrinsically connected with their anti-American politics. Naturally, China and France do not share the same opinion of the United States. China views America as a rival; France views America, perhaps, as a perfidious ally forcing “Anglo-Saxon” culture upon an unwilling French people. Experts have noted the importance Emmanuel Macron places on rejuvenating what he calls European Civilization. Indeed, where right-wing populist Marine Le Pen calls for the protection of France’s Judeo-Christian yet secular civilization, Macron is moving beyond the nation-state paradigm and speaking of centralising power within the European Union in order to protect otherwise moribund European civilization. Macron is very concerned about the future of European civilization, and believes that it represents the best of humanity and must therefore protect its “humanist” values. For Macron, European civilization has many enemies. But perhaps the key enemy is the United States, which is an enemy precisely because it is an anti-civilizational power that defends the nation-state paradigm, insists that its values are universal, and desires a relatively weak Europe. Macron argued that Europeans should take inspiration from the “civilisational projects of Russia and Hungary” and what Macron called their “inspiring cultural, civilisational vitality.” He says European civilization is “humanist,” and that to survive it must reject the “Anglo-American model” which permits the private sector to gain enormous power over human life. This position, of course, also rejects the Chinese model, in which the government is given total control over human life. Hungary and Serbia Victor Orbán is drawn to Xi in much the same way as Macron: both believe the rise of civilization states, such as China, as ineluctable, and both believe that China’s rise provides an opportunity for their respective states – if not civilizations – to free themselves from Anglo-American norms. Although Orbán possesses a civilizational rejuvenation project, it is of an entirely different nature to Macron’s “humanist” plan for Europe. Orbán calls for the re-Christianization of Europe, and for the strengthening of the nation-state and its borders, and he speaks not so much of European civilization but of Judeo-Christian civilization. Orban says, “the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose ‘universal values’ upon them in an effort to prevent war.” China’s rise comes at the expense of Orbán’s liberal democratic foes (i.e. Washington and Brussels), decreasing their ability to pressure Hungary to return to liberal democratic norms. Equally, because China is ruled by an authoritarian populist who has a civilizational perspective on international relations, the rise of China legitimises Orbán’s own authoritarianism and his civilizational rejuvenation project. It should come as no surprise that the date Xi chose to visit Serbia coincided with the 25th anniversary of the American-led NATO bombings of Belgrade’s Chinese embassy. The two nations have become increasingly close since the 2012 election victory of the governing populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which sees China as both a source of economic growth and technological development, and also as a partner that is less likely to criticise Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia, and its often socially conservative politics. Thus, President Aleksandar Vučić received Xi in Belgrade in a ceremony during which he promised the Chinese leader that he would receive in Serbia a degree of “reverence and love” not “found anywhere else.” He further promised that his government would only increase cooperation with Beijing, saying “the sky is the limit.” Xi authored an article in Serbia’s Politika news outlet noting that China and Serbia have similar positions on many important international and regional issues. In the piece, Xi is indirectly calling for Serbia to assist China in challenging US and Western dominance in the international sphere. Experts noted that “Serbia’s hosting of Xi is connected to broader efforts — notably by Moscow and Beijing — to challenge U.S. influence and potentially reshape the international order.” Conclusion Xi’s tour of France, Hungary, and Serbia demonstrates the growing influence of China in Europe. But it also tells us much about how some Europeans are responding to China’s rise as a self-styled civilizational power. This rise has inspired some European leaders to challenge US dominance in international politics and embrace the core values of “European civilization.” Many of Europe’s states thus may seek to emulate China, or help it rise and attempt to politically and economically benefit from it. Moreover, China’s rise seems to demonstrate how by rejecting normative Anglo-American (or more broadly Western) values, and embracing the traditional values and culture of one’s own civilization, these states can overcome American imperialism and cultural hegemony. Whether rejecting Western Anglo-American norms and embracing their own civilizational values can give these entire nations a shared purpose, and inspire reindustrialization, remains an unanswered question. Ihsan Yilmaz is a research professor of political science and international relations at Deakin University’s ADI (Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation). Previously, he worked at the Universities of Oxford and London.  Nicholas Morieson holds a Ph.D. in politics from the Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, and a Masters in International Relations from Monash University. He is the author of Religion and the Populist Radical Right: Christian Secularism and Populism in Western Europe, and a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation.