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“The world is not just Europe and America,” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson declared on April 10, 2023, implicitly echoing the views championed for years by the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic regarding the ostensible rise of China and Russia. Indeed, the moment when Iran shifted from a traditional balancing relationship between East and West to decisively embrace Russia and China occurred on May 8, 2018, when the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The U.S.’s decision to abandon the nuclear deal deeply disillusioned the Iranian leadership about any possibility of a rapprochement with Washington. Tehran had initially agreed to sign the JCPOA with the Obama administration based on the expectations that its promises to substantially reduce its nuclear program would be recompensed by the lifting of a substantial portion of U.S. economic sanctions.  Consistent with its long-held objective of maintaining distance from Washington, Tehran was pleased that the JCPOA, as agreed, had permitted it to avoid normalizing relations with its adversary while still reaping the economic benefits by being able to resume oil exports and welcome foreign investment. Yet following the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, Iran concluded that Washington’s policy toward Tehran is unreliable and the American political class could not be swayed. The Iranian leadership was further disillusioned by the Europeans’ limited ability or willingness to preserve the 2015 agreement. Moreover, the convergence of additional domestic factors — such as pressure from hardliners to bolster the country’s defensive and offensive military capabilities, the weakening state of the economy, and looming challenges to the continuity of the political system — led to intensive debates about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy. Though the foreign and defense policy bureaucracy made the decision to reorient Iranian relations more fully toward China and Russia as early as 2019, it had to wait until the Hassan Rouhani government completed its term in August 2021 before taking any concrete steps in this direction. A clear indication of that decision can be traced to the constant stalling tactics used by the Rouhani delegation during the talks with the U.S. and the broader international community on potentially reviving the JCPOA. The pivot to the East took on a more noticeable character following the inauguration of President Ebrahim Raisi on Aug. 5, 2021. The Raisi presidency led to higher levels of policy compatibility in the totality of the Iranian political system, but even more importantly, it resulted in the executive branch rank and file being staffed with devotees, loyal administrators, and 1970s-era revolutionaries. This was a necessary move following the Rouhani presidency, during which somewhat liberal administrators permeated the bureaucracy. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s legislative and judicial branches have consistently demonstrated their loyalty to the status quo. However, following each change of president, the executive branch has had the opportunity to fill some 11,000 administrative positions throughout the country with like-minded individuals. Now, with the inauguration of the more conservative Raisi government, all three branches are committed to maintaining the current inertia and coherence of the Islamic Republic. Iran is now pursuing a two-tiered foreign policy: a vigorous and determined shift toward Russia and China on the one hand, while, on the other hand, making incremental concessions on its nuclear program to give the impression that another deal can be struck to replace the JCPOA. The former approach is being implemented with almost zero fanfare and the latter with extensive publicity. Iran has been steadfast in its Eastward turn even though this shift does not enjoy the support of the general public or the professional and educated classes in particular. As such, all debate and discussions regarding the country’s foreign policy orientation have been restricted to tightly knit circles within the top ruling elite. Still, it is possible to deduce three broad reasons for Iran’s growing alliance with China and Russia: 1. A refusal to capitulate to or make vast concessions to the United States;2. The valuing of security concerns as more important than economic development needs; and3. The desire to see continuity of the political system.Avoiding capitulating to the United StatesIran has a long-standing policy of avoiding normalization with the United States. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, Tehran has deliberately avoided any moves toward rapprochement except in the face of imminent danger or a potential U.S. military operation against the Islamic Republic. The underlying calculus maintains that normalization with Washington would lead to profound consequences for the current Iranian political system, from disrupting its internal politics to overwhelming its economy and reshaping its culture. First of all, there is a deep-seated fear in Tehran that once American companies, educational institutions, and civil society organizations become active in the country, the Iranian leadership would gradually lose much of its grip on power. Anti-American sentiment also provides the revolutionary class with a common identity and keeps more internationally minded, moderate, or pragmatic groups out of positions of authority. Even following the JCPOA agreement and prior to the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the dominant perception in the Iranian capital was one of despair since most of the economic sanctions on the country remained intact. The ambiguous future of sanctions, combined with the possibility of spill-over effects on regional issues, created an atmosphere of uncertainty within the corridors of power in Iran. Another factor that dampens hopes for change in U.S.-Iranian relations is Washington’s long list of demands not only with regard to Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear program but also about the nature of its political system and internal conduct. A final facet standing in the way of improved bilateral relations — and closely related to the first — is the Iranian revolutionary class’s belief that rapprochement with the United States would inevitably result in undesired substantial changes in the political system. Any long-lasting improvement in the relationship would require not just policy change but also a redesign of state structures. In line with this thinking, concessions on the nuclear program would be inadequate; Iran would ultimately need to fully capitulate to the U.S., reviving bitter memories of the 1953 American-British coup d’état. The Farsi word for submission, tasleem, was, thus, widely used in the revolutionary state media and television to characterize Washington’s ostensible expectations from Tehran in the realization of the JCPOA. With its vast stake in the political and economic spheres of the state, Iran’s revolutionary class was not prepared to abandon power or open the political floodgates by making structural concessions to the U.S. and facilitating a possible takeover of the country by liberal presidential candidates. The disillusionment in the aftermath of the JCPOA agreement fostered a Raisi-type conservative presidency, an essential prerequisite to the consolidation and continuity of the revolutionary Iranian polity.Precedence of security concerns over economic developmentAt no point in its history has the Islamic Republic prioritized domestic economic development. Continued reliance on energy exports has furnished the state and its elites with a stream of income to maintain this system. Iran’s activist foreign policy antagonizes a large number of neighboring and external countries, yet the leadership considers it essential to protecting the state. For many decades, Iran’s national security doctrine has articulated a hedging strategy of relying on Shi’a and/or anti-Western enclaves in the Middle East to expand its territorial influence vis-à-vis major Arab countries, Israel, and the United States. Turkey is perhaps the only major country in the region with which Iran has been able to manage a stable relationship over the long term. In recent years, Tehran has additionally militarily aligned itself with a major outside power — Russia. Furthermore, Iran’s drone and missile capabilities as well as its geopolitical influence in much of the region have served as a dependable deterrence strategy. Such a conceptualization of national security, threat perceptions, and statecraft have left little room to pursue economic development in a globalized economy. This sharply contrasts with regional neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, which have deliberately been concentrating their energies on economic diversification, high-tech industries, renewable energy, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). The economic rise of China and Russia’s military and political capabilities have provided a wide range of opportunities for numerous developing countries, including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Mexico, to diversify their foreign and economic policies. However, while drawing on the support they can obtain from Beijing and Moscow, most still strive to maintain a balance between the West and the East. These countries benefit from European and American financial and technological sectors and earn sizeable profits by selling in their markets. But since national economic development is not a priority for the Iranian leadership, and it devotes a large proportion of its energies toward domestic and national security, even a complete political and economic pivot away from the West will not jeopardize Iranian state-owned industries nor affect the already-sidelined private sector and dwindling consumer markets. Indeed, Western companies and banks have also removed Iran as a potential market due to U.S. and European sanctions. Ultimately, Iran’s pivot toward the East will reduce its economy to selling fossil fuels to China and a few other Asian-Pacific countries in exchange for commodity imports. And it is unlikely that these consumers will turn around and invest in Iranian industries due to the sanctions restrictions currently in place. The only conceivable investment opportunities would perhaps be in the form of barter, wherein Iran might export petroleum in exchange for infrastructure development with no financial transactions involved. Furthermore, the timing of the Iranian leadership’s decision to reduce the country’s political and economic reliance on the West in general and Europe in particular was critical: Namely, that strategic choice was made ahead of the looming leadership transition at the top to avoid possible dissenting views when Iran’s third supreme leader takes over. Closer relations with Russia and China promise to not only de-risk Iran’s foreign economic relations but also help maintain an optimum level of progress on the nuclear program as a strategic component of the national security doctrine.Continuity of the political systemIran’s anti-Americanism is considered a highly treasured geostrategic asset in Moscow. In a sense, Iran is Russia’s southern Belarus. From a historical perspective, all permutations of the Russian state over the last two centuries, from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation today, have pursued a similar policy of trying to keep Iran out of the Western orbit. But the Russian-Iranian military partnership that developed in Syria and solidified over Ukraine — specifically covering military hardware, cyber software, and digital surveillance tools that Iran has no hopes procuring through cooperation with the West — has also furthered Tehran’s leverage vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. Iran is expected to receive 24 Su-35 fighter aircraft from Russia in addition to S-400 air-defense systems. And the relationship is developing in both directions. Tehran has also supplied Moscow with low-cost drones and weapons systems. Additionally, the two countries are cooperating in the energy sector, with Russia reportedly having delivered 30,000 tons of diesel fuel to Iran in February and March 2023; yet given Russia’s technological limitations in the energy sector, it is not clear whether these projects will eventually and efficiently materialize. Though relations with Russia have undoubtedly expanded in the military domain since the invasion of Ukraine, one can also deduct other Iranian motives to further solidify relations with Moscow. There are at least two crucial reasons behind Iran’s desire to tighten its cooperation with Russia and move from a transactional to a strategic bilateral relationship. First is Tehran’s need to secure intelligence on Israeli and American operations against Iran. And second is the desire to draw on Moscow’s potential political and intelligence assistance during the transition period to the third supreme leader of Iran. Such expectations can be met with or without Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin since they fulfill fundamental Russian interests vis-à-vis Iran and the West. Iran has reached a point where it can no longer depend on increasing internal control and expanding regional deterrence to maintain a status quo conducive to preserving the political system. Israel’s traditional “periphery doctrine,” of reaching out to non-Arab countries to build security partnerships, has now expanded to the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions. Moreover, most Arab neighbors of Iran today maintain normal or at least not overtly antagonistic diplomatic relations with Israel, which has improved American leverage with regard to Tehran as a result. Facing limited foreign policy options, including diminishing hopes of reaching a modus vivendi with the United States through reviving the JCPOA and a lasting divergence in relations between Russia and the West, Tehran has had to succumb to Moscow. This was not only to procure new military hardware but also to secure its position in a shifting regional matrix, deter potential future threats to its internal security, and safeguard the continuity of the political system. In this evolving context, as long as Russian interests remain opposed to those of the West, Moscow will likely do whatever is necessary to protect the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike Russia’s more strategic and long-term calculus vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic, China confines itself to mostly political and commercial relations with Iran and appears to cautiously act in parallel to the U.S. in the Middle East rather than in opposition to it. Beijing has immense short-term and long-term commercial and technological interests in maintaining peace and cooperation with Israel as well as with major Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Moreover, petroleum imports from Iran can easily be substituted in a global glut. That said, Beijing’s mediation role between Iran and Saudi Arabia highlights that for China, good relations with the Islamic Republic provide useful political leverage when navigating the region as well as in its global rivalry with the United States.Challenges aheadThis article attempted to explain Iran’s calculations behind politically and economically pivoting toward Russia and China, founded upon the assumption that the deep state in Iran is prioritizing continuity and issues of succession in the political system. Almost all matters of state are overshadowed by these medium- to long-term concerns — a set of priorities that Iranian leaders have, in fact, held for centuries. The question facing the government today, however, is how the revolutionary domestic apparatus can strive to survive the myriad sources of domestic and foreign challenges, including the Islamic Republic’s stand-off against the Western world. In contrast to the United States and Europe, Russia and China are not concerned with Iran’s internal political system, constitutional structures, or governmental machinery. Of its three main adversaries, namely, the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, Iran recently concluded that a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is a possibility, having made a complete U-turn on this in March 2023, with the help of Chinese mediation. Iran had learned the hard way to compromise with the Saudis, given the latter’s instrumental political and financial role among Iranian minorities inside the country as well as Iranian opposition groups in Europe and the U.S. In order to mitigate this influence, Tehran apparently decided to make concessions on Yemen in return for reduced Saudi support for the Iranian opposition. Of all the points of leverage at Iran’s disposal in the Middle East, Yemen appears to be the least valued, especially compared to Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Evidently, the Iranian leadership’s incremental moves toward China and Russia stem from an unwillingness to redefine the underpinnings of the country’s national security doctrine. Not only does Iran’s current foreign policy orientation not run in opposition to Beijing’s or Moscow’s overall international outlook, but in many ways, its anti-Western predisposition in a critical region of the world serves the two powers in their difficult relationships with the United States. By aligning with Russia and China in the security and commercial spheres, Iran feels it has acquired an insurance policy against any potential negative resolutions emanating from the United Nations Security Council. And even more consequentially, with an eye toward the potentially turbulent looming period of leadership transition and succession, Tehran may feel comfortable with relying on Moscow and Beijing for security, political, intelligence, and financial support. But a major challenge confronts the political system: Will the Iranian public, professional and intellectual groups, and the country’s slim private sector — all deeply accustomed to Western ideas, systems, and customs — be willing to embrace and adapt themselves to this Eastward shift that was formulated by Iran’s political and security elites? Perhaps the social and political atmospherics that emerge as the Islamic Republic’s third supreme leadership seeks to consolidate its power will reveal the durability of this unbalanced geopolitical reorientation.

In the last two years, China's leader, Xi Jinping, has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). What exactly are they, how do they differ from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and what do they imply for the State of Israel?  In the last two years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These new initiatives are a means of bolstering the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, with Xi at its head. More importantly, they reflect how China’s foreign policy has evolved and the lessons learned from its global engagement in the ten years since

The border standoff between China and India illustrates the growing rivalry between the two countries – and the part that other major powers play in it On 27 April, the defence minister of India, Rajnat Singh, met his Chinese counterpart, Li Shangfu, on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers Meeting in Delhi. The meeting was yet another attempt to find a way out of the three-year-long standoff between thousands of soldiers along the disputed border, which began in May 2020 when Indian and Chinese forces clashed in the Galwan Valley, killing 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese ones. Since then, officials from both countries have met for 18 rounds of talks to try to agree on a disengagement of troops from the area with no success. India has blamed China for unilaterally trying to move the border by sending troops beyond the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the countries. While it is in both China’s and India’s interest to settle the dispute, Beijing seems unwilling to engage in actual negotiations about the LAC, instead expressing hope that the two sides could move on from the issue and strengthen their mutual trust.   India’s and China’s dispute along the border is illustrative of the growing rivalry between the two countries, which is shaping the security landscape and strategic environment of South Asia. China is gaining power and influence in the Indo-Pacific – where India has long been the dominant power – and using it as yet another arena for its strategic rivalry with the United States. Given Europe’s trade with the region and the complex interplay of relations between China, the US, India, Russia, and the European Union, this dynamic will have severe consequences not just for the region, but for Europe as well. Beijing has tightened its grip over the entire Indian Ocean region in the past two decades. It has created a network of military and commercial facilities – the so-called string of pearls – and strengthened its economic relations with countries of the region. In 2022, Sri Lankan debt obligations to China rose to $7 billion, while the Maldives owes some 40 per cent of its GDP to China. These economic dependencies have eroded India’s influence in its immediate neighbourhood. New Delhi had built up strong diplomatic ties with other countries in the region through its “island diplomacy” and initiatives such as the Security and Growth for all in the Region maritime cooperation. China’s investment in the region has now pushed New Delhi into an economic competition which it may ultimately have difficulties sustaining. New Delhi still exerts a dominant role in South Asia and, specifically, the Indian Ocean, but as China consolidates its position in the region, its attitude towards India has become more assertive. India remains resolute about preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia, repeatedly stressing that a multipolar world starts with a multipolar Asia, and seeking partnerships with a variety of countries, including the US and the EU. Beijing is concerned about India’s growing military ties with the US and tends to consider India’s intentions through the lens of its own rivalry with the US. India’s inability to push back China at the border also further diminishes New Delhi’s influence over the smaller regional states, namely Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and even the Maldives, by absorbing the financial, military, and administrative resources that could be spent on expanding India’s footprint in the region. It also poses questions about India’s relative power and its ability to protect smaller neighbouring countries from Chinese coercion. This leaves New Delhi even more isolated in the region that includes its arch-rival Pakistan. Both India and China insist that they want to rebuild trust but they cannot agree on the process. Because it currently has the upper hand, China would like trust building to remain a strictly bilateral matter and does not want organisations such as the G20 and the SCO, the other three BRICS states – Brazil, Russia, and South Africa – or even the ASEAN-led institutions to play any role in the so far hypothetical normalisation process. In doing so, China challenges India’s multilateral aspirations and de facto reduces New Delhi’s capacity to manage collectively the consequences of China’s rise for itself and the region. The war in Ukraine makes this even easier as Russia, traditionally on India’s side in multilateral regional arrangements, seems distracted and neutralised by its new, albeit uneasy, proximity to China. The escalating tensions and aggression since 2013 are therefore no coincidence. Beijing’s coercion on the border and naval build-up in the Indian Ocean force India into a costly arms race and warn it against what Beijing considers excessive proximity to the US. In the ongoing great power competition between China and the US, every issue becomes a zero-sum game. This makes it harder for India to solve its border conflict with China and at the same time manage China’s rise and growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region in a peaceful manner. Strengthening India’s position in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region is in line with Europe’s own interests in free trade and supply chain resilience, as well as sustaining a multipolar world order – one in which countries’ political decision-making is not restricted by their economic dependency on China. In this regard, India should play a crucial role in the EU’s diversification and de-risking strategy. The Indo-Pacific region accounts for 40 per cent of the bloc’s extra-EU imports and 27 per cent of its total exports, most of which are sea-borne. As such, the Indian Ocean is Europe’s primary gateway to the Indo-Pacific region. China and India may be slowly but effectively moving towards a new phase of antagonistic rivalry. While the prospect of open confrontation remains only a distant possibility, further polarisation of India-China relations in the Indian Ocean is a problem not only for India, but also for Europe. The EU declared India a priority partner in its 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy, but its relationship with New Delhi has long been characterised as not living up to its full potential. Europe’s growing disillusionment with China over the past two years has shown the need and prepared the ground to further strengthen relations with India. The EU should prioritise the establishment and implementation of  the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU-India free trade agreement, the Trade and Technology Council, and the Connectivity Partnership to demonstrate its commitment and effectively move beyond symbolic cooperation with India.

Moscow-Beijing: combat coordination is growing. Powerful cold currents from the West determine the political atmosphere of the planet. Efforts are being made to counter them with warm currents from the East. Only the synergy of actions between Russia and China prevents the the consolidated camp of hegemony from entering the "final and decisive battle" against each of these recalcitrant powers individually. We are well aware of the situation on the western front of the global Cold War. However, on the eastern front, where there is no Ukrainian-scale conflict yet, tensions are approaching critical levels. Defense-related Chinese trade publications have published some very disturbing material in recent weeks. ... To destroy the latest American nuclear aircraft carrier Gerald Ford and the battle group accompanying it from a cruiser and 5 missile frigates, 24 hypersonic missiles without nuclear warheads were enough. In a computer simulation, rocket launches were carried out from 6 different areas, including even the Gobi Desert in Northwest China. Considered unsinkable, the carrier group was completely destroyed by a series of launches of distracting and damaging missiles. The Chinese took into account the capabilities of both the standard set of anti-aircraft weapons and the latest American SM-3 anti-missiles. According to the scenario described in the Chinese-language Journal of Test and Measurement, the American armada entered the waters of the South China Sea and continued to move in a menacing course, despite warnings. Similar scenarios play out regularly near Chinese shores. Another Chinese publication spoke about the mortal danger of such actions. The South China Morning Post, published in Hong Kong in English, reported that the war between China and the United States could begin in the South China Sea. On January 5, 2021, three US Navy anti-submarine aircraft searched for Chinese submarines near the Dongsha Qundao (Pratas) archipelago. Reconnaissance aircraft, as always, dropped electronic buoys and tracked the routes of Chinese submarines that were participating in major exercises. However, one plane flew too close to China, and Chinese fighters flew in from there. The Chinese regarded the situation as a huge threat to national security. There was a possibility of an armed conflict, and the Americans, taking into account the unfolding actions of the PRC Air Force and Navy, began to prepare for the worst and even destroyed expensive buoys with top-secret equipment. The description of the conflict in the Chinese specialized magazine Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures does not give details of the confrontation. However, everything was very, very serious. No wonder the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Mark Milley, made a phone call to the Chinese Minister of Defense a couple of days later, assuring him that the Pentagon had no intention of provoking a real war. He even promised to inform his counterparts in Beijing in advance about the intentions of policymakers in the event of a critical situation. These two sensational publications did not appear by accident. One can only guess how many dangerous situations arise on the line of contact between the military of China and America in the Asia-Pacific basin. But, as the Chinese proverb says, “Heaven proposes, Xi Jinping disposes.” The Supreme Commander, acting at the strategic level of planning and decision-making, is responding to Washington's growing aggressiveness by demonstrating readiness for retaliatory actions on the battlefield and intensifying combat coordination with Russia. Planned for April, Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow was postponed to the end of March, and negotiations with Vladimir Putin lasted a total of 8 hours. Even not so much the published documents as the subsequent events showed qualitative changes in the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The time has come for all-round combat coordination. It began with hours of face-to-face talks between the two supreme commanders. Soon, Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu came to Moscow. After the visit of an experienced and energetic military commander, Chen Wenqing, curator of internal and external intelligence services, arrived in Moscow. Reports of his meetings with the secretary of our Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, showed the resolute attitude of the chief intelligence officer of the Celestial Empire towards the West. For its part, the Kremlin decided to reinforce the dynamics of combat coordination with a "volley of the main guns." A delegation of high-ranking officials and business leaders headed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin headed to Beijing, unprecedented in size and level. The visit was prepared in a hurry and took place under the vigilant eye of the Western intelligence services. Therefore, the number and quality of signed agreements disappointed the optimists. But the bilateral meetings of officials, bankers and experts of the two countries that took place on the sidelines advanced the ongoing negotiations on strategic areas of cooperation and prepared serious deals. During the visit, influential publications noted the mutual interest of both countries in the accelerated growth of trade. Thus, the Global Times, which is close to the CCP Central Committee, noted the synergy of the two trends. Russia needs to increase the export of raw materials, especially energy. Against the backdrop of a rapid economic recovery, China needs to expand imports of the same oil and gas, agricultural products and other types of raw materials. The development of China's relations with the West repeats the history of the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West. The sanctions already imposed on China will be tightened. Access to sources of raw materials and markets will become a priority for Beijing for the foreseeable future. We should not turn a blind eye to the reaction of some Chinese experts and blogosphere activists to the arrival in Beijing of Mikhail Mishustin at the head of a thousandth army of the Russian elite. The emphasis is not even so much on the vital need for Moscow to receive income from trade with China as on the desirability of not offending the West, leaving the door open for relations with America. However, after 40 years of Chinese-American marriage of convenience, it would be naive to expect a quick change of shoes. There does not seem to be any improvement in relations between America and China, despite Biden's hints and the visit of Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao to the United States. Overcoming the pathological hatred of politicians for China, business people in Washington continue to do business even in the most adverse conditions. In 2022, bilateral trade reached an all-time high of $691 billion. At the same time, the Americans were able to sell their goods to the Chinese for less than 154 billion. The reduction or abolition of duties, which President Trump began to introduce back in 2018 and President Biden is increasing, could help improve the quality and further increase trade. They cost each American family $1,000 a year. However, the prospects for curtailing the trade war are very illusory. The White House and both houses of the US Congress are on the warpath. Any attempt to improve US-China relations ends in scandal—Pelosi's scandalous trip, the big white ball... The same fate awaits current hopes. The visit of Pelosi's heir, Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy to Taiwan is being prepared. At the G7 summit in Tokyo, there was a military coordination between NATO and Japan. China, along with Russia, is designated in the final documents as the main enemy. The bloc's regional headquarters is to be opened in Tokyo. It is impossible to get rid of historical parallels. Similarly, in 1936, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, directed against the Soviet Union. A few months later, the emboldened Japanese began an all-out war against the Celestial Empire, capturing Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Nanjing in 1937. Only the diplomatic, military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union prevented the capitulation of the Republic of China along the lines of France. Stubbornly resisting China, in turn, prevented Tokyo from attacking the USSR at the already appointed time - August 29, 1941. Then there were two fronts - Soviet and Chinese. Now the situation is repeating itself. The Chinese were not patient. They were defending then. Now, relying on a reliable Russian rear, they launched a counteroffensive. Thanks to Beijing's 12-point peace plan for Ukraine and Xi Jinping's phone call with Zelensky, China is destroying the Yellow Threat stereotype at minimal cost in the European theater and strengthening its image as a peacemaker. There is competition with America. The first study trip to Kyiv, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Moscow of Special Representative Xi Jinping, Ambassador Li Hui, has just ended. It was preceded by trips of "heavyweights" - Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, foreign policy curator on the party line Wang Yi, Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Another area of China's global counteroffensive is to prevent the West from filling the strategic vacuum in Central Asia. That was the task of the summit of the five countries of this region and China in Xi'an, the ancient capital of several Chinese dynasties. This also meets the strategic interests of Moscow. The combat coordination of the two mighty powers of the Eurasian continent is gaining momentum and taking on new forms. How can one not recall that in March, Xi Jinping, when saying goodbye to Vladimir Putin on the steps of the Grand Kremlin Palace, said: “Now there are changes that have not happened in 100 years, and we are driving these changes.” Putin's answer was short but meaningful: "I agree."

The meeting of the G7 in Hiroshima has become a new symbol of the combat coordination of the Western and Eastern fronts of the global cold war. These two fronts are designed to pincer Russia and China, to prevent them from continuing to create a world order that rejects the "rules" invented in Washington. On the Western Front, stretching from Finland to Turkey, a continuous chain of military bases has already been created and an open military conflict has been provoked in Ukraine. NATO, which has been preparing for a clash with our country for several decades, has played a key role in coordinating the countries and armed forces of the West against Russia. On the Eastern Front of the Cold War, the same scenario is repeated, but with a time lag of several years. After the failure of hopes for the “constructive involvement” of the Celestial Empire, an open confrontation with it began to unfold in 2018, when a trade, a “color    revolution” in Hong Kong and a massive pumping of weapons in Taiwan began. By that time, the US had military agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, but there was no coordinating organization like NATO. Therefore, Washington began to demand that the bloc's "zone of responsibility" be extended to the Indo-Pacific region. In the meantime, the military bloc AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain and the US) was urgently created and the military-diplomatic organization QUAD (Australia, India, the US and Japan) was activated. The successes achieved and the next tasks in building up the front of the anti-Chinese forces of America, Europe and Asia should have been the topic of discussion at the Hiroshima summit. AUKUS and QUAD, in turn, were going to demonstrate a new level of coordination during Biden's trip to Australia to meet with the leaders of the member countries of the two organizations. But something went wrong, and the US President did not fly to Canberra. Among the explanations, the most plausible seems to be Indian leader Modi's unwillingness to draw his country even deeper into Western bloc structures. The triumphal march was not performed upon returning to Washington, not only because of this discrepancy. With regard to “decoupling” with China, different approaches appeared in the ranks of the G7, which were reflected in the final communiqué. A real "divorce" with its largest trading partner does not suit the European members of the G7. The desire to “sit on two chairs” and maintain profitable ties with Beijing without violating the requirements of Euro-Atlantic discipline at the same time is obvious. This is a line of high-ranking visitors seeking a meeting with Xi Jinping, and the words of the communique, designed to be understood by Beijing leaders: “Our political campaigns are not designed to harm China or slow down its economic progress and development.” The communiqué also notes that the G7 does not engage in "divorce" and does not "lock inward." Washington's desire to strengthen the Eastern Front was not crowned with complete success also thanks to Beijing's own "counteroffensive" on the Western Front. The new "counteroffensive" was the mission of China's special envoy, Ambassador Li Hui. He should clarify the official position of the parties to the Ukrainian conflict and talk about different scenarios. Beijing emphasizes that Li Hui should collect information, and not offer ready-made solutions. Therefore, in addition to Kyiv, he will visit Warsaw, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and complete this first trip in Moscow. Prior to Li Hui's tour, China's Vice President Han Zheng, party foreign policy curator Wang Yi, and Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Europe a few weeks before Li Hui's tour. Even Xi Jinping got involved, talking to Zelenskiy on the phone. Beijing launched this "counteroffensive" in response to the "offensive" of NATO. The bloc's area of responsibility has already been officially extended to the Indo-Pacific region, and a regional headquarters is to be opened in Tokyo. The Chinese may well draw a parallel of the ongoing events with the accession of Japan in 1936 to the Anti-Comintern Pact. A year later, the emboldened Japanese began an all-out war against the Celestial Empire, capturing Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Nanjing in a few months. Only the diplomatic, military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union prevented the capitulation of the Republic of China along the lines of France. China, in turn, prevented Tokyo from attacking the USSR at the already appointed time - August 29, 1941. The Imperial Headquarters did not dare to fight until the end of the "Chinese incident" simultaneously with China and the Soviet Union. Then, for the first time, two interconnected and mutually beneficial strategic fronts emerged. Now the situation of "two fronts" is repeated. Russia's military successes coincided with the G-7 summit in Hiroshima. The Western Front again supported the Eastern. Now the Pentagon will once again analyze the plans for operations around Taiwan. The "combat coordination" of Russia and China began to pick up increased pace after the visit to Moscow of President Xi Jinping. The agreements of the two commanders-in-chief are now being implemented by other leaders. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Party curator of China's special services, secretary of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP Chen Wenqing visited Moscow. In turn, Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Mishustin and several hundred heads of ministries and departments, leading entrepreneurs went to Beijing. Although it is unlikely that all of them will be able to achieve a breakthrough on their tracks in a couple of days in the Middle Kingdom, even a short stay in Beijing and Shanghai will help you see the “Chinese miracle” with your own eyes and be convinced in detail of the importance of interaction. After all, the “turn to the East” should take place in the minds of our politically shaping elite, which has not yet got rid of the illusions about the possibility of returning the “good old days” with the West. The China-Central Asia summit, which took place on May 18-19, 2023 in the ancient capital of the Silk Road, the city of Xi'an (Chang'an), can also be considered part of the Chinese "counteroffensive" in response to the "containment" by the collective West. Ahead of us are new summits of NATO and the Group of Seven, new meetings of the leaders of the SCO and BRICS. All of them fit into the logic of the formation of a new global architectonics. A key role in preventing the concentration of Western forces against one or the other of the main competitors - Russia and China - is played by the "combat coordination" of the two countries. It meets the national interests of both nations and therefore will only grow.

The escalating geopolitical competition has placed the US and China at odds. Both sides need to stabilise their relationship given the role they play in world affairs. US National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, met for over eight hours over two days last week with Chinese Communist Party Politburo Member and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, Wang Yi, in Vienna. The meeting, which had not been publicised by either side before the talks, has been seen as a part of an effort by both countries to stabilise their relationship which is perhaps at its lowest level in recent decades. Both sides have been locked in a steadily escalating geopolitical competition, even as they have close and intense economic linkages and a joint interest in dealing with several global and regional affairs. They are locked in opposing sides on issues like Ukraine and Taiwan, and a slow-motion decoupling as US companies diversify away from China and earnings of US companies in China are falling. Both sides used identical language to describe the outcome of the meeting. A White House readout noted that the talks featured “candid, substantive and constructive discussions on key issues of US-China bilateral relationship, global security matters, Ukraine and Taiwan. A Chinese readout used the same terms “candid, in-depth, substantive and constructive discussions” on ways to “remove obstacles in the US-China relationship and stabilise the relationship from deterioration.” Wang laid out the Chinese position on Taiwan, Ukraine and other regional issues. Speaking on background, a US official said that both sides saw the balloon incident as being “unfortunate” and were now looking to “re-establish standard, normal channels of communications.” Two days before the Sullivan-Wang meeting, US Ambassador Nicholas Burns met China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang in Beijing. According to Qin, a series of “erroneous words and deeds” by the US had put the relationship between the two powers on “ ice” but stabilising ties was the top priority for both countries. Burns said that he and Qin had discussed “challenges in the US-China relationship” and the necessity of “stabilising ties.” The US is in a delicate balancing act with regard to its China policy. In recent years, American policy has shifted from engagement to competition and even containment. In the wake of the US-China trade war, and the first wave of US technology restrictions on Chinese firms like Huawei, there was talk of a “decoupling” of the two economies. The Chinese crackdown in Hong Kong and the post-Pelosi visit tensions over Taiwan have deepened the divide between the world’s two foremost powers. In 2021, Biden had told Xi of the need “to establish some common-sense guardrails” to ensure that the two do not get into an inadvertent conflict. Last November following their summit meeting in Bali, Biden said that “I am not looking for conflict, I’m looking to manage this competition responsibly” At the meeting, Xi called Taiwan “the first red line” that must not be crossed in China-US relations. This was to be followed by a visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Beijing, but that was called off last minute because of the balloon episode. Blinken met Wang at the Munich Security Conference later in February, but there was little forward movement. It may be recalled that last October, the US government put in place extensive new restrictions on China’s access to advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to make them. These restrictions were layered upon earlier decisions to restrict semiconductors to entities like Huawei and ZTE. Earlier this year, the US further tightened restrictions on the export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. It coordinated with the governments of the Netherlands and Japan to tighten the guidelines. More recently, it has made it clear that it will restrict the actions of chipmakers who get funds under the CHIPs and Science Act. These restrictions are part of Washington’s effort to secure the supply of components that are needed for AI and supercomputers, as well as everyday electronics. In March came harsh signals from China. Speaking in March, President Xi Jinping for the first time named the US and said that it was in a policy of “comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against us.” The next day, the new Foreign Minister Qin Gang was more explicit. He slammed the US for equating the Ukraine issue with Taiwan and said that the “so-called ‘competition’ by the US is all-round containment and suppression a zero-sum game of life and death.” He warned that if the US “does not hit the brakes and continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation.” In April, senior American officials have been trying to calm the turbulent waters. Last month, speaking at Johns Hopkins University, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said that decoupling would be “disastrous” and that US goals relating to national security were not aimed at stifling China. She called for a plan of “constructive engagement” with three elements—national security of the US and its allies; an economic relationship based on “fair” competition; and cooperation on urgent global challenges. The Yellen speech was a comprehensive take on US approaches to China and struck what The New York Times said was a “notably positive tone” after months of tensions between the two countries. A week later, the tenor of her remarks was underscored by the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan at a speech at the Brookings Institution. Sullivan used the term “de-risking”, a term used earlier by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen: “We are for de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling,” he noted. Sullivan had earlier described the US policy of technology restrictions on China as creating a “small yard, with a high fence.” Now officials like Blinken, Yellen, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin are trying to schedule meetings with their counterparts, but the going has been tough. According to Financial Times, the Chinese are reluctant to have Blinken visit because they were worried that the FBI may release the report based on the salvaged debris of the balloon. As for Austin, the problem is that his newly appointed counterpart General Li Shangfu is under US sanctions since 2018 in relation to Chinese imports of Russian arms when he was serving as a general. The US says that a meeting in third countries would not be affected by the sanctions, but it is unlikely that the Chinese will agree. General Li was appointed defence minister in March. With the tightening of the Western alliance in the wake of the Ukraine war, the US has sought to incorporate the European Union into its China project. Shortly after his three-day visit to China, French President Emmanuel Macron said in reference to Taiwan that Europe should not get caught up in crises “that are not ours”. Europe should try to be the “third pole” in the world order and that the need for Europe’s “strategic autonomy” was now accepted. But Washington points to a 30 March-speech by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen where she said that it was neither viable nor in Europe’s interest to decouple from China, adding “We need to focus on de-risking—not decoupling.” She added in blunt language “The Chinese Communist Party’s clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its center.” She added that it was there was a need for European companies to ensure that their “capital, expertise and knowledge are not used to enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of those who are also systemic rivals.” Just how much of the messaging from the US about the China relations is sincere, and how much of it is aimed at reassuring nervous allies who feel that Washington’s policies could have a negative impact on them is not clear. But Washington’s agenda remains clear. Speaking last week in Japan, where she is attending the meeting of G7 finance ministers, Yellen called for “coordinated action” by G7 nations against Chinese use of “economic coercion” against other countries. She also said that Washington has been considering the imposition of additional “narrowly targeted restrictions on outbound investment to China,” and that these have been discussed with other G7 partners. She said these would be targeted at technologies “where there are clear national security implications.” But as of now, it does appear as though the two sides are trying to create what David Ignatius called “a framework for constructive engagement.” There is some optimism arising from the detailed discussions that Sullivan and Wang held in Vienna which, as we note were described by both as “candid” and “constructive”. Both sides perceive the need to stabilise their relationship given the role the two countries play in world affairs. With the US going into election mode, it is not clear how long this period where the two sides are trying to work out a new modus vivendi will last. Engagement with China could become a political liability in the US where, if there is consensus on one issue, it is that of a hardline on China. World and New World Journal does not take positions on policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of World and New World Journal. 

In order to ‘walk, chew gum, and play chess’ at the same time, the US will have to both invest at home and sign more trade deals. A speech late last month by Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, on “Renewing American Economic Leadership” clarified that the administration wants to build resilience to “de-risk” from China. But dealing with Beijing will require more than investing at home. Washington also needs to re-engage in negotiations with China to manage difficulties in the bilateral relationship. And to better compete, the United States should get back into the business of signing trade deals. As Trade Representative Katherine Tai quipped during her 2021 confirmation hearing, the United States can “walk, chew gum, and play chess” at the same time. The Biden administration should not only invest in domestic resilience, but also participate in new trade agreements and negotiate directly with Beijing. Over the past two years, China joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), began acceding to the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), and applied to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). China’s integration into these new frameworks will create efficiencies in its own economy, while binding Beijing closer to the rest of Asia. Meanwhile, the United States does not expect to see the first “real outcomes” from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) until the end of 2023, more than one year after its announcement. IPEF, moreover, lacks the market-access agreements characteristic of other, more substantive economic agreements. It is not surprising, then, that the 2023 Lowy Institute Asia Power Index ranks China 100 out of 100 on its “economic diplomacy” index, while the United States receives a ranking of only 34.6. The 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey similarly shows that only 21.9 percent of respondents view the United States as a leader in championing free trade, down from 30.1 percent in 2022. To be fair, Beijing has significant ground to cover before its markets become as free and as open as those in the United States. What many trade partners care about, however, is not where China and the United States have been, but where they are going. To many, it appears as if Washington is turning inward while Beijing continues to open its markets. This leads to the second error in Jake Sullivan’s “new consensus” on international economic policy. He expresses fatalism about China’s economic trajectory without giving credence to the possibility that China may change, or that the United States can play a role in influencing Beijing’s behavior. Sullivan explains, when “President Biden came into office, we had to contend with the reality that a large non-market economy had been integrated into the international economic order in a way that posed considerable challenges.” In response, Sullivan focuses on building domestic “resilience” and “capacity” to reduce America’s dependence on China. Washington appears to have given up on addressing the non-market practices contributing to U.S. dependence on China in the first place, including state subsidies and dumping. The administration also seems to have forgotten that access to low-priced imports is an important factor in the competitiveness of U.S. firms and the standard of living of American consumers. Fatalism about China’s trajectory tracks with the Biden administration’s overall Indo-Pacific Strategy, which does not seek to “change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates.” Fortunately, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has bucked the trend by stating that she hopes to “engage” with Beijing “in an important and substantive dialogue on economic issues.” Not trying to influence Beijing, on the other hand, would give up an essential element of any effective China policy. Of course, prior negotiations were by no means unqualified successes. The Trump administration’s “phase one” trade deal largely failed to change Beijing’s behavior, in part, because the bilateral purchase agreements effectively, as Yukon Huang and Jeremy Smith of the Carnegie  Endowment for International Peace put it, “prescribed state-managed trade over market forces.” Other negotiations, however, have seen more success. Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was able to persuade Beijing to revalue its currency by more than 20 percent in the late 2000s, helping to level the trade relationship. China’s WTO accession negotiations also moved the needle on the country’s economic policy. While Beijing failed to carry out many of its WTO commitments, China did reform key aspects of its economy and, notably, slashed its average tariff level from 15.3 percent in 2001 to 9.8 percent over the next decade. U.S. policymakers should learn the lessons of past negotiations rather than standing by as U.S.-China economic relations deteriorate further. One way to pressure Beijing to continue along the path of reform and opening up would be to carry out negotiations in concert with U.S. friends and allies. The Trump administration gave up significant leverage by dealing with Beijing bilaterally, outside the parameters of the international trade system. Plurilateral negotiations with U.S. partners — many of whom share U.S. grievances — may be more effective at convincing China to change course. The consequences of not having an effective economic dialogue with Beijing will become more apparent over time. Despite Washington’s wishes, China is simply not going away. Beijing will continue to join new trade agreements and integrate itself deeper into the global economy, even as the United States focuses on building resilience at home.

With China increasingly assertive in pursuing its economic and geopolitical interests abroad, US–China tensions are rising, leading many traditional American allies to consider following Washington’s lead in pursuing economic ‘decoupling’ from China. Their strategy aims to reduce economic reliance on China through extensive export controls and re-ordered supply chains. Yet in Western Europe, France and Germany are showing an unwillingness to join their allies in decoupling from China. French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent comments that Europe should not get ‘caught up in crises that are not ours’ demonstrate this. If anything, their relationship with Chinese capital is thriving. China is one of France and Germany’s major trading partners outside of the European Union and a significant export market for goods such as luxury goods and pharmaceuticals. Exports to China made up 7.4% of Germany’s total exports and 4.21% of France’s in 2019, with these numbers growing over the last three years to record levels. Given China’s growing middle class, the country presents an enormous potential consumer market in years to come. According to recent reports, France’s bilateral trade in goods with China exceeded US$100 billion for the first time in 2022, an increase of 14.6% on 2021­. The recent signing of 18 cooperation agreements by 46 French and Chinese companies across numerous sectors further emphasises the gathering pace of these trade relationships. As for Germany, its total trade with China saw an increase of 21% from 2021. While exports increased by a modest 3.1%, Germany’s imports from China accounted for much of the growth, soaring by more than a third. Specifically, Germany imports from China about two thirds of its rare earth elements, many of which are indispensable in batteries, semiconductors, and magnets in electric cars. This shows that Germany and France will rely more on China as time passes for the critical raw materials needed to fuel their economic growth and energy transitions. Furthermore, various French and German companies would prefer to grow their established production facilities and extensive sales networks in China. With the trade relationship expanding so rapidly and estimates suggesting that more than 2 million German jobs depend on exports to China, the countries’ economies are set to become even more intertwined. German companies Volkswagen and chemical processor BASF, for instance, are significantly expanding their investments in China. Volkswagen, which already has more than 40 plants in China, recently announced that it will invest billions in new local partnerships and production sites. BASF, which has 30, says it will invest US$10.9 billion in a new chemical production complex there. Given all this new activity, making a show of decoupling from China could cause significant repercussions for France and Germany. Ultimately, the costs of decoupling outweigh the benefits for the two governments. While their allies might come to bemoan their inaction, they just won’t forgo such significant opportunities for French and German companies in China. Additionally, decoupling could trigger retaliation, as it did with Australia, with China halting exports to the two countries, increasing tariffs, or reducing market access to French and German goods. All in all, France and Germany are unlikely to shift from their stance. They’d prefer to let their markets flourish and work out the rest later.

It aims to signal its diplomatic ascendance and challenge Washington as the big shaper of outcomes. Late last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping finally made that much hoped-for call to Ukraine’s President Volodymr Zelensky and informed the world that his nation “always stood on the side of peace.” This was the first outreach by Beijing to Ukraine since  the latter’s invasion by Russia last February, and Zelensky was keen on this engagement, especially after Xi’s visit to Moscow in March. Ukraine views China as an important interlocutor that can engage with Russia and seems to have been encouraged by the “long and meaningful” phone call between the two leaders that in its view would “give a powerful impetus to the development of our bilateral relations.” Last week, Ukraine’s finance minister also suggested that Kyiv should use its bilateral relationship with China as leverage to bring an end to Russia’s full-scale invasion, though he refused to consider China as a friend. The Chinese President has been reported as saying that China, “as a responsible majority country,” would “neither watch the fire from the other side, nor add fuel to the fire, let alone take advantage of the crisis to profit.” But there was no suggestion that Beijing would be doing anything meaningful going forward. The call and associated choreography had more to do with positioning China as a global power that is willing to engage in resolving problems, as opposed to the US that is creating more trouble by continuing to support Ukraine and prolonging the war. China has already laid out its cards on the table when it comes to the Ukraine crisis. It had released a 12-point position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis earlier this February. In an attempt to present itself as a neutral peace broker, Beijing has enunciated a few standard principles, including respect for the sovereignty of all countries, resumption of peace talks, keeping industrial and supply chains stable and opposition to unilateral sanctions  as well as the use of nuclear weapons. Taking this forward, China has decided to send special representatives to Ukraine and hold talks with all parties in an attempt at peace-making. But beyond these principles, China’s credentials are hardly supportive of a larger role as a peace-maker, as it has long refused to view its ties with Ukraine and Russia at the same level. Russia has shown no inclination to step back from its aggression and Ukraine is seemingly preparing to launch a large-scale counter-offensive against Russian forces in a bid to retake territory in the east and south for which it has been preparing for months now. While Moscow has given no indication of backing down, perhaps assuming that it has time on its side and waiting for the Western consensus on backing Ukraine to collapse, Ukrainian forces feel that the weaponry delivered by the West over the past few months is likely to give them the momentum needed to shape battlefield realities in their favour. China is also unlikely to be viewed as an honest broker, given its ties with Russia that are increasingly becoming tighter. And despite repeated statements that the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all  countries must be effectively upheld,” Beijing has not only refused to acknowledge Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, but has continued to privilege its partnership with Moscow. Though Xi’s visit to Moscow in March did not result in any concrete help to Russia, it did signal to the West that  the China-Russia entente can shape the global balance of power in ways that can be deleterious to Western interests. More than anything else, Chinese posturing in the Ukraine conflict is aimed at the West. In its position paper, Beijing talks about the need to abandon a “Cold War mentality” and argues that “the legitimate security interests and concerns of all countries must be taken seriously and addressed properly,” making it clear that it largely agrees with Moscow’s perspective that it was the West that created the conditions for this war with the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). China has also been critical of Western sanctions on Russia, arguing that “relevant countries should stop abusing unilateral sanctions and ‘long-arm jurisdiction’ against other countries, so as to do their share in de-escalating the Ukraine crisis.” Both of these issues are germane for the long-term trajectory of China’s role on the global stage amid deepening tensions with the US. For China, clearly, this crisis is more about itself than it is about Russia. As China comes out of its covid- induced isolation, it would like to have a stable international environment for a sustained economic recovery. But it is also using an opportunity to emerge as a key global interlocutor by venturing into diplomatic arenas it has been shy of in the past, taking advantage of the West’s recent inward orientation. This effort was exemplified by its attempt to bring Iran and Saudi Arabia together in the highly volatile Middle East. China’s attempt at emerging as a global peace-maker is about presenting a diplomatic challenge to the US on the global stage. Beijing may not have much of an impact on the eventual outcome of the Ukraine crisis, but it is signalling that it is no longer shy of showcasing its growing diplomatic heft.

In China-brokered talks, the two oil-rich and rival states of Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year split. Although the two sides need much confidence-building, their rapprochement carries the potential to change the regional geopolitical landscape at the cost of concerns for policy hawks in the US and Israel. The longstanding Iranian–Saudi sectarian and geopolitical rivalry has been a major source of tension and conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Traditionally, whereas Iran has sought to project itself as the guardian of Shia Islam, Saudi Arabia has claimed the leadership of Sunni Islam. Both have also competed for regional geopolitical supremacy. They have been involved, in opposition to one another, in some of the conflict-ridden flashpoints in the region, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Fearing Iran’s nuclear program and regarding the country as a regional threat, the traditionally US-backed Saudi Arabia has opened backdoor diplomatic channels with Iran’s other US-allied regional foe, Israel, and supported the normalisation of relations between some of its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, in particular) with the Jewish state in an anti-Iran front. In response, Iran has forged close ties with Russia and China. The Saudi execution of a prominent Shia cleric and Iranians’ storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran resulted in Riyadh cutting ties with Tehran in early 2016. However, the regional picture has lately changed for the two protagonists. Despite being under severe American sanctions and beset by public protests since September 2022, the Iranian Islamic regime has managed to maintain its regional influence in the Levant—the area stretching from Iraq to Lebanon—as well as Yemen and has made a show of its military strength by supplying Russia with deadly drones in the Ukraine conflict. Saudi Arabia hasn’t been able either to rebuff the Iranian influence or to maintain its historical trust of the US as a very reliable ally, especially in the wake of America’s inability to rein in Iran and to avoid defeat in Afghanistan. It has increasingly found it in its interest to diversify its foreign relations, forging closer relations with the very powers with which Iran has established camaraderie, most importantly China. The kingdom’s young de facto ruler Mohammad bin Salman has viewed this diversification as not only signalling his dissatisfaction with Washington’s criticism of his alleged human rights violations, but also aiding him with realising his vision to make Saudi Arabia a regional superpower by 2030. For this, he wants to reduce the country’s dependence on hydrocarbon as a source of wealth; expand its economy, trade and inflow of investment and high-tech industry; and change its social and cultural landscape, though not its authoritarian politics. He has found the Chinese model more appealing in this respect. Beijing could not be more pleased with the Iranian–Saudi rapprochement under its diplomatic auspices. It constitutes a major step, along with the recent peace proposal for Ukraine, in Beijing’s global diplomatic offensives to raise China’s credentials as a peacemaker through a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states on the world stage. The underlying message is to present the US as an interventionist ‘warmonger’ power. In addition, it paves the way for China’s deeper and wider economic and trade ties in a region from which it imports some 40% of its annual oil needs. These developments can only be unsettling for the US and Israel, both of which regard any regional easing on Iran, especially with China’s support, as contrary to their interests. The US wants to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program, regional influence and handling of recent domestic unrest, headed by Iranian women against theocratic restrictions and declining standards of living. It is also not keen to see Saudi Arabia tilt towards the very powers that the US seeks to contain. Israel regards Iran’s Islamic regime as an existential threat and has vowed to do whatever it takes to prevent it from becoming a military nuclear power. The two sides have been locked in a shadow war for some time. Israel has frequently attacked Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, assassinated several of the country’s nuclear scientists and raided its ships. In a more daring act, recently it directly attacked defence installations in Isfahan where Iranian nuclear facilities are located. In turn, Iran has targeted Israeli ships, intelligence and diplomatic personnel, and has promised to retaliate against any hostile Israeli action. Israel and Iran have at times come very close to serious blows. Any direct confrontation between them could have devastating consequences for the region and beyond. Having said that, it’s also important to be reminded that China has good cooperative diplomatic, security and intelligence relations with Israel. Can we expect Beijing to step in there as well to bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, where the US has failed? Most likely not, given Israel’s intransigence not to give up its occupation and America’s unwavering strategic backing of it.