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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Arctic order historically, currently, and in the future reflects the world order. The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is not valid and is a poor guide for policy. During Cold War bipolarity, the Arctic was divided between the Soviet Arctic and the Nordic and North American Arctic. US victory and Soviet defeat in the Cold War led to US unipolarity and hegemony which was the basis for a circumpolar (including Russia) liberal (as opposed to realist) Arctic order with organizations, such as the Arctic Council, International Arctic Science Committee, University of the Arctic, Barents and Bering regional cooperation, all on liberal topics such as science, environment, Indigenous rights, people-to-people cooperation.Footnote1 US unipolarity and hegemony are slipping away to world order characteristics of continued US unipolarity and hegemony, Sino-American bipolarity in economics and S&T and multipolarity illustrated by BRICS+. Sino-US competition and US-Russia conflict to the extent of proxy-war in Ukraine reflect these changes. The Arctic, which is de facto divided between the US-led NATO-Arctic and the Russian Arctic, where Russia reaches out to the BRICS+ in diplomacy, economics, and S&T, reflects these changes to world order. There is wishful thinking in the West of returning to post-Cold War US unipolar and hegemonic ‘liberal world order’ or ‘rules-based order’ and the circumpolar liberal Arctic order with it. This wish is probably unrealistic for global trends in demography, economics, S&T, legitimacy, etc. Significant conflict can be expected between the US/West and China and Russia on developments in world order, with the Global South standing by. The Arctic is likely to remain divided between the US-led NATO Arctic and the Russian Arctic seeking engagement with the BRICS+ world for the future with extremely limited cooperation and risk of spill-over from the Ukraine War and other US-Russia-China conflicts. The Arctic in international order There are two common, but invalid, narratives about the Arctic, which are poor guides for policy: First, ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, that the Arctic was apart from international politics and allowed for West-Russia cooperation unlike elsewhere, especially between the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Second, a presentist discourse, where international interests in the Arctic are seen as rising in the last 15 years, driven by climate change, the Russian flag planting on the seafloor of the North Pole in 2007, and the United States Geological Survey’s assessment of oil and gas resources in 2008, north of the Arctic Circle. Rather, the Arctic has for centuries closely mirrored the international system, whether multipolar with Western colonial empires before the World Wars, bipolar Cold War between the US and the USSR, post-Cold War US unipolarity and hegemony, or the current emerging Sino-American bipolarity and multipolarity. During 2014–2022, cooperation in the Arctic was not exceptional compared to US-Russia non-proliferation cooperation, most notably with the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or removing chemical weapons from Syria. There was extensive US-Europe-Russia and wider collaboration around the International Space Station. There was extensive energy trade and investment between Russia and Europe, most notably with the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines under the Baltic Sea. The bipolar Cold War Arctic in the bipolar Cold War order Bipolarity with two superpowers standing out from all other great powers due to their demographic, economic, science and technology, military, and ideological weight and global claims, the US and the USSR, shaped the the Cold War order. Bipolar logic shaped the international order. John Mearsheimer explains well the structural logic of a nuclear-armed bipolar superpower security competition, and he points out how each superpower formed ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline them and mobilize their resources. These bounded orders were the West for the US with its institutions, and the East Bloc for the USSR.Footnote2 This bipolar logic was also clear in the Arctic, divided between the Nordic and North American Arctic of the West and the Soviet Arctic by the Iron Curtain in Europe and the Ice Curtain in the Bering Strait. Circumpolar Arctic cooperation was limited to the Polar Bear Treaty of 1973 between the USSR, Norway, Kingdom of Denmark, Canada, and the US, Norwegian Soviet joint fisheries management in the Barents Sea, and some Bering Strait cooperation. The Arctic was exceptionally militarized during the Cold War driven by the mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR, where the Arctic played a central role for geostrategic and technological reasons. The Arctic was the shortest flight path for bombers and missiles, and sea ice offered cover for nuclear ballistic submarines. This exceptional militarization of the Arctic harmed the human security of Arctic local and indigenous communities through forced displacement, security service surveillance, and pollution, including notable nuclear accidents, as the 1968 B52 bomber crash off Northwest Greenland with four H-bombs causing extensive radioactive contamination of much Soviet nuclear material in and around the Kola Peninsula, including sunken submarines with nuclear fuel or weapons on board.Footnote3 Circumpolar liberal Arctic order under US unipolarity The Cold War ended with US victory and Soviet defeat and dissolution, also caused by the US pressuring the USSR into a strategic nuclear arms race, that the Soviet economy could not support. US Navy operations near the Soviet Northern Fleet nuclear bastion around the Kola Peninsula were an important part of this pressure.Footnote4 The Arctic was also part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to save the USSR by reform and lowering external tension. Gorbachev called the Arctic as a zone of peace, environmental protection and scientific collaboration in his 1987 Murmansk speech, in contrast to being at the heart of a strategic nuclear arms race with the US, which the USSR could not sustain. Gorbachev’s reforms failed to avert the dissolution of the USSR and deep socio-economic, public health, and law and order crisis in Russian society during the 1990s. The Russian State withdrew to a significant extent from its Arctic, leaving military facilities and society behind. Sino-American bipolarity comes to the Arctic The relative distribution of comprehensive material and immaterial power of the strongest States shapes international order. States stay the predominant actors since the emergence of a state system, not denying powerful non-State actors historically and today. The US unipolarity after the Cold War was an exceptional time of international history and not the ‘End of History’ as believed by some quarters in the West (Fukuyama). History is returning to normal with the return of major centres of economic output and science and technology outside the West. Ironically, US unipolarity laid the foundation for the ‘Return of history’, rather than the ‘End of History’. Since the 1990s, the world experienced globalization with economic, science and technology, and cultural integration. The US as the sole superpower provided public goods and facilitated and coordinated many of these economic, scientific, and technological, and cultural flows. Globalization undermined US unipolarity, facilitating the faster relative growth of non-Western States. China’s export-oriented growth, returning it to its historical position as one of the world’s largest economies is the most important dimension for changes to world order. In parallel, other emerging markets have grown adding multipolar dimensions to international order. International Relations theory serves to think about how to respond to the return of China. About 20–25 years ago, Professor Joseph S. Nye (Harvard University) and Professor John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) articulated two major approaches with coherent theoretical and strategic visions for the Sino-American relationship. Nye, as a liberal institutionalist scholar and policymaker in the Bill Clinton Administration, presented a vision of ‘integrate, but hedge’. China integrated in the US-led world economy as member state of the World Trade Organization, while the US hedged against the rise of China by reinforcing its alliance with Japan.Footnote5 There were strong US and Western liberal expectations of Chinese economic growth and openness leading to political openness and reform. These expectations proved to be belied and ethnocentric. Mearsheimer, in line with his offensive realist theory, clearly outlined how the US had to keep China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia through a containment strategy.Footnote6 The US’ China strategy has shifted from the Nye perspective to the Mearsheimer perspective, while Mearsheimer himself is ostracized for his valid, but politically unacceptable, analysis of the Ukraine War. Mearsheimer explains how Sino-American bipolarity works with realist great power State security competition, and how competing great powers form their ‘bounded orders’ of allies and clients to discipline and mobilize these.Footnote7 The US is shaping a NATO+ order of the NATO member states and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The US is increasingly engaging in trade and technology wars with China to slow down its growth rate, clearly denying its access to fundamental technologies of future knowledge-based economies. A realist focus on relative gains explains US policy to reduce China’s growth rate. China has a population more than three times that of the US with an absolute economy approaching the US economy. The US cannot allow China to catch up relatively with it, as that would imply a much larger Chinese economy than that of the US. Liberals (politically and theoretically) would ascribe the US policy to different domestic political systems, but the logic of anarchy points out how domestic political systems are of secondary concern, and empirically the US firmly bypassed and disciplined the previous Anglo-Saxon superpower, Britain. US-India relations can be expected to deteriorate with India’s socio-economic development, where India has a much younger population than China with great economic growth potential. China predicted the US abandoning its own open and globalized international economic policy out of concern for China’s relative rise to the US. China pursued a domestic and international economic policy much less dependent on US benevolence. In the domestic sphere, China pursued an economy based on domestic demand. Externally, China built up a parallel international economic and science and technology system with the Belt and Road Initiative with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in security reflect parallel orders and institutions to the US-led Western institutions. Sino-American bipolarity also became clear in the Arctic about 10–15 years ago. China started to appear as a diplomatic, economic, science and technology actor in the Arctic. Western surprise and consternation to this development reflects the great difficulties many Westerners have in facing a world, where the Rest takes an interest in the West, and not only the West taking an interest in the Rest as during centuries of imperialism and colonialism. It should not be surprising that China as one of the world’s two largest national economies and science and technology systems (with the US) has interests in the Arctic, or anywhere else in the world. The US is globally present in politics, defence, diplomacy, economics, science and technology, culture, etc. The unfortunate Chinese term of ‘near-Arctic State’ to legitimize Chinese involvement in the Arctic drew much Western ridicule and opposition. In comparison, the US and the West seem to be ‘near-everywhere’ States. One place where the Sino-American bipolar logic appeared soon and clearly has been the Kingdom of Denmark with the North Atlantic and Arctic overseas autonomies of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US applies pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology, in line with Mearsheimer’s argument of a superpower building bounded orders to mobilize and discipline allies and clients in security competition with a competing great or superpower. The Faroe Islands are located between Iceland, Norway, and Scotland. They are centrally placed in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap controlling North-South access and blocking the Soviet-Russian Northern Fleet going south for NATO or the US and NATO navies going north for USSR/Russia. The Faroe Islands are becoming increasingly independent from Denmark. Huawei has long been a partner for the Faroese telecom company, which planned to continue with Huawei for 5G. This partnership came under increasing scrutiny from Danish and US sides. The Chinese ambassador to Copenhagen during a visit to the Faroe Islands linked the Faroe Islands choosing Huawei with prospects for a Sino-Faroese free trade agreement (the Faroe Islands are outside the EU and pursue an independent trade policy).Footnote8 The US ambassador to Copenhagen publicly spoke strongly against the Faroe Islands collaborating with Huawei for 5 G.Footnote9 Greenland is geographically North American (remember the Monroe Doctrine), crucial to US (North American) homeland defence, and pursuing independence from the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland and China have for some time eyed each other for investment and science and technology opportunities. Greenlandic independence primarily rests on economic independence from Denmark and human capital. The economic independence should be through, among other domains, mining, where China and Chinese companies were considered as very important likely investors. Copenhagen regarded Sino-Greenlandic mutual interest with great suspicion for a long time, which was evident from the report on Greenlandic mining from 2014.Footnote10 In 2014, the Royal Danish Navy abandoned Grønnedal, a small, remote old naval facility, established by the US during the Second World War, which was put up for sale. A Chinese mining company showed interest in the facility as a logistics hub for future operations in Greenland. The Danish government promptly took the facility off the market maintaining a token naval presence.Footnote11 Developing Greenlandic tourism requires upgrading the airport infrastructure, which is an enormous project for a nation of 57,000 on a 2 M km2 island. One of the finalists to an international tender was the China Construction Communication Company (4C), which might also have provided financing.Footnote12 The Danish government convinced the Greenlandic government to accept a Danish financing (with a Danish stake) of the renovated and new airports against choosing a Danish construction company.Footnote13 The Greenlandic government was reshaped over this intervention with a coalition party leaving in protest over accepting such Danish interference in Greenlandic affairs. In 2017, China publicly presented its interest in a research station in Greenland, including a satellite ground station, which the Government of Greenland might have been positive towards.Footnote14 This idea has never materialized, first probably delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but Denmark and the US would never accept a Chinese research station and/or satellite station in Greenland. The US government has made its pressure on the Danish government public, through former Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis.Footnote15 China and Iceland spearheaded Sino-Nordic Arctic research cooperation from the official visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to Iceland in 2012. In 2013, the China Nordic Arctic Research Center was founded, a virtual centre of Chinese and Nordic institutions hosted by the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai. CNARC has hosted an annual symposium between China and a Nordic country as well as researcher exchange. Today, Sweden has withdrawn from CNARC, and Denmark does not participate, as the participating Nordic Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Copenhagen has been closed. PRIC and RANNÍS (The Icelandic Center for Research, equivalent to Research Council) held the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory, now China Iceland Arctic Observatory, at Kárhóll, Northeast Iceland, in June 2014, which I attended. The Observatory opened formally—although unfinished—in October 2018. This collaboration had been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and negligence from central authorities and research institutions in the capital, Reykjavik. Today, Iceland is under pressure from the US, including a recent visit by US Congressional staffers, to close CIAO.Footnote16 US-Russia Eastern European security competition divides the Arctic US-Russia security competition, especially in Eastern Europe, became increasingly clear from around 2007–2008. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he unsurprisingly denounced US unipolarity. Russia had rejected US unipolarity and called for multipolarity since the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s calling for Russia, China, and India to balance the US. In spring 2008, at the initiative of the US—and with French and German reservations—the NATO Bucharest summit invited Georgia and Ukraine to become member states. In the autumn, fighting broke out between Georgia and Russian forces in the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia leading to Georgia’s defeat. In autumn 2013, the EU proposed an agreement to Ukraine, which forced Ukraine to choose between Russia and the EU. The Ukrainian President rejected the EU’s proposal, leading to popular protests met with government violence and eventually the President fleeing the country. Russia intervened annexing Crimea and supporting an insurgency in the Donbas.Footnote17 In December 2021, Russia proposed a treaty to the US blocking former Soviet Republics from joining NATO and rolling back NATO troops and equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, which was rejected by the US and allies in January 2022. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had led to a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine. The West extends wide-ranging political, military, economic, and further support to Ukraine and tries to isolate Russia as much as possible. The Rest of the world follows Western policy of isolating Russia to a very limited extent. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected the Arctic in limited ways. The West stopped military dialogues with Russia in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum. The West imposed sanctions on Russian Arctic energy projects, as the US $27 billion Yamal LNG project, which initially had Russian Novatek (60 per cent), French Total (20 per cent), and China National Petroleum Cooperation (20 per cent) ownership. Sanctions forced Novatek to sell 9.9 per cent to the Chinese government’s Silk Road Fund and rely on Chinese bank funding. Russia responded to these sanctions with counter sanctions on Western food exports to Russia, which also affected some Arctic seafood export to Russia. Russia accepted Faroese salmon exports, which led to a boom in Faroese economy. In 2014, there was some protests in the Arctic Council from the Chair, Canada. Otherwise, Arctic Council and other scientific, people-to-people, cooperation continued between Russia and the seven other Arctic States. For Northern Norway, extensive regional cooperation in the Barents region continued. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to an almost complete Western cessation of Arctic collaboration with Russia. The other seven Arctic countries refused to collaborate with Russia in the Arctic Council, chaired by Russia 2021–2023. The Seven—now all NATO member states—Arctic Council member states have since backed down significantly. The Arctic Council was always more important to them than to Russia, suggesting that this Western brinkmanship was poorly thought through. There are extensive Western sanctions against the Russian economy, including against Russian Arctic energy projects, which were a key basis for developing the Russian Arctic. Russia had sought to develop a Europe-Russia-East Asia energy system with Russian Arctic oil and gas being exported both West to Europe and East to East Asia and with balanced Western and East Asian investments.Footnote18 The West has almost completely cut science and technology relations with Russia, also in the Arctic. The rare exceptions to continued Arctic science collaboration between West and Russia are for instance, the Norway-Russia Barents Sea Fisheries Commission because Norway also depends on this collaboration. The US continues more academic collaboration with Russia than European countries allow themselves; for instance, receiving Russian Fulbright professors. Norway pursued an extensive regional cooperation policy with Russia, Finland, and Sweden in the Barents Region since 1993 with much support for cross-border people-to-people exchange for youth, in education, academia, culture, environment, business development, and further. This collaboration built extensive insight, experience, networks, and access in Russia at North Norwegian institutions, as UiT The Arctic University of Norway, UNN The University Hospital of Northern Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute, the Arctic Frontiers Conference, businesses such as Akvaplan-Niva marine environmental consultancy, and in academia, civil society, education, and government. The border town of Kirkenes depended for about a third of its economic turnover on trade with Russia. These connections are now almost completely cut by Norwegian government policy. Russian society and politics did become much more closed and authoritarian during this period, but that was for internal political reasons and not directed against Norway. Personally, I had successful high-level academic cooperation with some of the key Russian academic institutions funded by Norwegian public funds until they were forbidden by Norwegian government policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My last personal visit to Moscow was in December 2019, and I was planning to visit with a sizeable group of Norwegian faculty and PhD candidates in April 2020, postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid division of world order in a NATO+ and a BRICS++ world The world is separating into a NATO+ grouping of NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, under clear US leadership, and the Rest. The Rest, I call BRICS++ for the BRICS+ grouping and many other countries. This separation is clear through demography, economy, and science and technology. Humanity is about 8 billion people, compared to the West, which is about 1 billion, making it a small minority. Humanity is expected to grow to 10 billion, where the West will remain at about 1 billion, a shrinking small minority. The dominance of the West has rested on economic development and science and technology, translated into military force, with a shrinking demographic share of the world economy, scientific and technological development and relative power shifts from the West to the Rest. Legitimacy and credibility divisions are also clearly visible between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ worlds concerning the war in Ukraine, where the West is astonished by its own isolation. To great surprise, the Rest of the world have not followed the West’s attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically and economically. This rejection of the West’s position was clear from the very first UN Security Council debate on the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russian veto and Chinese and Indian abstentions were not surprising, but the abstention by the United Arab Emirates was remarkable considering the close security and other partnerships between the GCC countries and the US and historically the UK. The speech during the debate on 21 February 2022, a few days prior, by the Kenyan ambassador to the Security Council, condemning Russia’s recognition of breakaway regions but reminding that other UNSC permanent members had also violated international law, showed the lack of Western credibility and legitimacy on the issue.Footnote19 Western credibility and legitimacy have eroded further by supporting Israel’s genocide in Gaza since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The Division of the Arctic in a NATO Arctic and Russian BRICS++ Arctic. The effects of world order on the Arctic are clear, applying the analytical lenses of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar traits of world order to the Arctic. The world is increasingly becoming Sino-American bipolar, where the US seeks to maintain unipolarity through a global containment strategy of China. This struggle is also evident in the Arctic; for instance, US pressure on the Kingdom of Denmark to exclude Chinese investment, science and technology in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The US keeps up an ever-stronger anti-Chinese Arctic discourse from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s 2019 speech in Rovaniemi, Finland, to US Senator Lisa Murkowski at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik in 2024. Russia has opposed US unipolarity since the 1990s, seeking multipolarity. The conflict between US and Russian multipolarity ultimately escalated via the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the proxy war in Ukraine. This conflict has led to an almost complete division of the Arctic into NATO-Arctic (collaborating with the wider NATO+ world and further) and the Russian Arctic. Russia reaches out all it can diplomatically, economically, and in science and technology to the BRICS++ world, especially China and India. The Rest of the World seems restrained from pursuing Russian Arctic opportunities by the risk of US and Western secondary sanctions and other NATO Arctic pushbacks. Conclusion: looking forward for world and Arctic order The world is—as usual for international history—marked by the struggle over the world order among the strongest State actors. This struggle was forgotten especially by European observers during the post-Cold War era, with the illusion of End of History and confounding globalization and modernization with Westernization. Instead, we have had the Return of History and the return of historically very large non-Western economic, science and technology actors as China, followed by others. The current struggle over the world order also shapes the Arctic, as was historically clear, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War. The US is determined to prolong post-Cold War unipolar dominance expressed as ‘rules-based order’, where the US defines the rules, to whom, and when they apply. Europe has found an apparently comfortable and completely dependent position in this US-led order. The Rest of the World less so, with China and Russia explicitly rejecting this US-led order. The conflict over world order between the US and its bounded order in the NATO+ world in Europe, Oceania, and East Asia and the Rest of the World, can only be expected to escalate. The US must either stop Chinese economic, science and technology development (and later other peer competitors), or demographics, economy, science and technology will lead to a more bipolar and multipolar world. Europe by its dependence on the US is forced to follow this US strategy. The war in Ukraine can lead to a frozen conflict, where the overall Russia-West relationship remains highly conflictual, including in the Arctic. Ukrainian defeat or a negotiated settlement with a neutralized Ukraine and cessation of territory to Russia will also probably lead to a decadal severance of economic, science and technology, people-to-people ties between Russia and the West, including in the Arctic. A Russian defeat is unlikely because of difference in Russian and Ukrainian manpower and resources. China is unlikely to allow Russia to succumb to the US, which would put defeated Russia on China’s Northern frontier in China’s own conflict with the US. All in all, world order seems highly conflictual and with increased separation between the NATO+ and the BRICS++ world, which will only bring humanity more conflict and less economic development and growth, unlike the age of post-Cold War globalization. This division will be replicated in the Arctic. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationNotes on contributorsRasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen is Professor at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Views expressed are personal. Notes 1. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic’. Nina Græger, Bertel Heurlin, Ole Wæver, Anders Wivel, (Eds.), Polarity in International Relations. Governance, Security and Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2022 at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05505-8_16. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), 2019, pp. 7–50 at https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342 3. George Lindsey, ‘Strategic Stability in the Arctic’, Adelphi Papers 241, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989. 4. Steven E. Miller, ‘The Return of the Strategic Arctic’, in The Arctic Yearbook, 2023 at https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/6C_AY2022_Miller.pdf. 5. Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Stephen Van Evera (Ed.) How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security, The Tobin Project, Cambridge, MA 2006 at https://tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Make_America_Safe_The_Challenge_Of_China.pdf. 6. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All’, The Australian, 18 November 2005 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The-Australian-November-18-2005.pdf. 7. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order’, International Security, 43 (4), pp. 7–50, 2019 athttps://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. 8. Thomas Foght, ‘Hemmelig lydoptagelse: Kina pressede Færøerne til at vælge Huawei’ [Secret Sound Recording: China Pressured the Faroe Islands to Choose Huawei]. Danmarks Radio, 2019 at https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/hemmelig-lydoptagelse-kina-pressede-faeroeerne-til-vaelge-huawei. 9. Adam Satariano, ‘At the Edge of the World, a New Battleground for the US and China’, New York Times, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html. 10. The Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, ‘To the Benefit of Greenland’. Ilisimatusarfik-University of Greenland; University of Copenhagen, 2014 at https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/files/208241864/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf. 11. Martin Breum, ‘Analyse: Stoppede Danmarks statsminister kinesisk opkøb i Grønland?’ [Analysis: Did the Danish Prime Minister Stop Chinese Acquisition in Greenland?]. High North News, 2018 at https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/analyse-stoppede-danmarks-statsminister-kinesisk-opkob-i-gronland. 12. Teis Jensen, ‘Greenland shortlists Chinese company for airport construction despite Denmark’s concerns’, Reuters, 2018 at https://www.reuters.com/article/world/greenland-shortlists-chinese-company-for-airport-construction-despite-denmarks-idUSKBN1H32XG/. 13. Statsministeriet, ‘Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut om dansk engagement i lufthavnsprojektet i Grønland og styrket erhvervssamarbejde mellem Danmark og Grønland’ [Agreement Between the [Danish] Government and Naalakkersuisut [Government of Greenland] on Danish Involvement in the Airport Project in Greenland and Enhanced Business Collaboration Between Denmark and Greenland] Statsministeriet. Formandens Departement, 2018 at https://www.stm.dk/media/8148/10-09-2018_aftale_mellem_regeringen_og_naalakkersuisut.pdf. 14. Martin Breum, ‘Kina vil bygge kontroversiel forskningsstation i Grønland’. [China Wants to Build Controversial Research Station in Greenland], 2017 at https://www.information.dk/udland/2017/10/kina-bygge-kontroversiel-forskningsstation-groenland. 15. Damian Paletta and Itkowitz Colby, ‘Trump Aides Look into US Purchasing Greenland after Directives from President’. The Washington Post, 2019 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/16/america-first-greenland-second-is-trumps-latest-white-house-directive/. 16. ‘Letter to Anthony Blinking and Lloyd Austin’, Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, United States Congress, 2017 at https://democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/10.16.24_PRC%20dual%20use%20research%20in%20the%20Arctic__.pdf. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2014 at https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf. 18. Mariia Kobzeva and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, ‘European-Russian-Chinese Arctic Energy System’,in Xing Li (Ed) China-EU Relations in a New Era of Global Transformation, London: Routledge, London, 2021, 22p. 19. Martin Kimani, ‘Statement by Amb. Martin Kimani, during the Security Council Urgent Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine’, The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, United Nations Security Council, February 2022 at https://www.un.int/kenya/sites/www.un.int/files/Kenya/kenya_statement_during_urgent_meeting_on_on_ukraine_21_february_2022_at_2100.pdf.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, following the military actions that began with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The conflict is having devastating consequences, including widespread death and displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and a global energy crisis, also heightening geopolitical tensions (Kurapov et al., Citation2023). Pertiwi (Citation2024) contended that since the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU) has adopted sanctions as the key policy response targeting Russia’s aggressive behaviour. These restrictive measures were applied by the EU in multiple rounds and packages and gradually became the cornerstone of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (p. 61) There is extant literature studying the direct consequences of the war, such as humanitarian crises, economic impacts and geopolitical instability. Numerous countries have experienced food shortages and rising prices due to disruptions in supply chains, worsened by the crisis in Ukraine and the closure of airspace (Hellegers, Citation2022). Concurrently, the war has caused an unprecedentedly volatile energy market, as many European countries were obliged to seek alternative energy sources to Russian imports, demanding more oil and natural gas from alternative suppliers (Liadze et al., Citation2022). The invasion has also fuelled inflation across the EU, not only affecting energy, which is essential in all the sectors of the economy but also other sectors like food, for example, as Ukraine is a major global grain producer (Ozili, Citation2024). The added value and main contribution of this paper is based on the use of grounded social scientific methods like the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS and the Ordered Probit, to analyse the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions against Russia, providing more nuanced insights on what factors are the most important to be in favour and against the sanctions. Thus, in particular, our study contributes to filling one of the important gaps mentioned by Pertiwi (Citation2024) in the analysis of the literature on the EU’s approach to sanctions on Russia. Concretely, our study fills in part the fifth gap in the analysis of causal mechanisms that examine the sanctions, including relevant actors like the EU citizens. Thus, we first provide an in-depth analysis of European citizens’ views on EU sanctions to weaken Russia and support Ukraine. And then, we analyse the main factors that affect the EU citizens’ support of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia and in favour of Ukraine. The study includes data from 26,461 respondents across the 27 EU Member States, collected through the 98th Eurobarometer survey (Winter 2022–2023), which examined the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature review. Section 3 presents the dataset used, and the methodological approach. In Section 5, the results are presented, followed by Section 5, which offers a thorough discussion of the findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main conclusions drawn from the study, identifying implications, limitations of the study, and potential directions for future research. Literature reviewAttitudes towards EU’s sanctions against Russia war in Ukraine Public sentiment for the EU is a complex phenomenon to study and needs to be approached from different angles, including identity, governance, security and the economy. How the public perceives the EU as a guardian of democratic values and good governance directly influences support for its policies, including sanctions on Russia. Boomgaarden et al. (Citation2011) argue that if the people believe that the EU is going to safeguard democratic principles, then they will identify sanctions as a proper means of safeguarding such principles. However, if there is a lack of trust in the EU to defend such values, there will be little support for such sanctions. The purpose of European identity is primarily to determine people’s views on the EU’s actions. Kende et al. (Citation2018) believe that European identity can have a profound impact on solidarity with common EU policies, such as sanctions. This would imply that the framing of a common European identity can become the most important factor in eliciting public consent for EU programmes, especially in the midst of geopolitical crises. Thus, public opinion on sanctions is also based on perceptions of the EU’s ability to act in the interests of citizens. According to McLean and Roblyer (Citation2016), if citizens perceive the EU as doing the best it can for its citizens, particularly in terms of economic stability and governance, they are more likely to support sanctions against Russia. However, if the EU is perceived as wasteful, or its policies are perceived as economically harmful, then the potential for support for sanctions will be low. This explains the need to ensure that EU action is consistent with shared perceptions of political effectiveness and economic benefit. The imposition of economic sanctions is one of the highest prioritised tools in the modern world, especially against threats to stability and security. The EU sanctions on Russia, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, have stimulated an immensely wide public discussion (Karlović et al., Citation2021). An important question is: What is the role of perceived security threats in shaping public opinion about these sanctions? It has been made known through investigation that subjective security risk strongly predicts public opinion regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Frye (Citation2019) argues that sanctions are not always supported but vary depending on how people view security threats. Public support is higher when sanctions are framed as protection against an external threat. When sanctions are perceived as a threat to national or economic security, they can generate opposition. The EU’s collective response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict also shows that public opinion on sanctions is shaped by both security interests and normative expectations of justice and self-determination (Bosse, Citation2024). This mutual influence can lead to mixed public responses, with some seeing sanctions as an ethical necessity, while others withdraw their support due to perceived economic and national security risks. The way EU sanctions are proposed and implemented also influences public opinion. According to Sjursen (Citation2015), citizens will be more supportive of sanctions if they see EU institutions as representative and transparent. Conversely, an image of bureaucratic distance or lack of public participation in decision-making can undermine trust and lead to opposition. Thus, in line with this background, we pose our first research question as follows: (1) How do European values and security threats influence the intensity of public support for EU sanctions against Russia?Socioeconomic factors in shaping attitudes towards EU sanctions Support for economic sanctions against Russia is widespread among the EU, varying according to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics and political engagement. As Frye (Citation2017) has noted, economic prosperity is a key predictor of support for sanctions. Those who are financially ‘safe’ are more likely to support EU-imposed sanctions, as they are less directly affected by the economic burden. Previous studies have shown that those in more affluent income groups or with stable household finances are more likely to support foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, that represent broader European values, even if they are economically costly (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). This is consistent with the findings of Lepeu (Citation2025), which recognises that citizens who rate their own economic situation as ‘very good’ are far more likely to support sanctions than those facing financial hardship. On the other hand, citizens facing economic hardship are less likely to be sanction-supportive if they believe that sanctions will negatively impact inflation, increase unemployment or suppress national economic stability. Onderco (Citation2017) found that economic hardship is associated with higher scepticism towards foreign policy decisions that lack tangible personal benefits. This means that the economic price of sanctions is likely to disproportionately affect support among lower-income individuals. Generational differences also play a role in shaping public opinion on sanctions. Older individuals (over 55 years) are more supportive of EU sanctions, as they have a historical perspective on European security and are more politically engaged (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). On the other hand, younger people (15–34 years) have weaker support, possibly because they have different priorities, such as financial stability and employment, which could be considered more pressing than geopolitical concerns (Onderco, Citation2017). Alexandrescu (Citation2024) also suggests a new generational divide in attitudes towards coercive diplomacy, suggesting that efforts to build popular support for sanctions must consider young Europeans’ concerns and values about economic consequences and political transparency. Political interest is a second important predictor of support for EU sanctions. Politically knowledgeable and engaged citizens tend to be more supportive of EU foreign policy decisions, including sanctions (Alexandrescu, Citation2024). Thus, there is political ideology duality: left and centre-left voters support sanctions if they are anchored in a broader vision of upholding international law and human rights, while centre-right and populist voters are likely to be more sceptical if sanctions are perceived as infringing on national sovereignty (Onderco, Citation2017). As in the literature, the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions depends on several socioeconomic and demographic factors, our second research question builds on the following: (2) Do socioeconomic characteristics influence the likelihood of being a strong supporter of EU sanctions against Russia?Dataset and methodology The dataset of the study is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 98.2 (EB98) survey Winter 2022–2023 which was conducted from 12 January to 6 February 2023 in 39 countries or territories. In the study, we only use the dataset from the 27 Member States of the EU, without considering the data from the other twelve additional countries included. The dataset was collected about a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, covering the following five topic areas identified by the European Commission (Citation2024): (1) The EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine; (2) the actions taken as a unified EU response to the invasion; (3) the consequences of the war in Ukraine; (4) the European security threat; and (5) the future EU actions in the wake of the war., and aims to analyse the solidarity of European citizens with the Ukrainian people. The sample size for each country was around 1000 respondents except for Malta with 503, making a total of 26,461 respondents. The endogenous variable of the study is obtained by applying the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS approach to the items of the survey included to measure the degree of support of the respondents towards the measures taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The following five items were included in the analysis: (1) financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine; (2) imposing economic sanctions on the Russian government, companies and individuals; (3) providing financial support to Ukraine; (4) providing humanitarian support to the people affected by the war; and (5) welcoming into the EU people fleeing the war. The question introduction was the same for all the items: The EU has taken a series of actions as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these actions taken? The responses to the question for each item were given using a complete 5-point Likert scale, where: 1 = totally agree; 2 = tend to agree; 3 = do not know; 4 = tend to disagree; and 5 = totally disagree. The scale was reversed to enhance interpretability, ensuring that higher values are aligned with those citizens who expressed higher support for the measures taken by the EU. The analysis of the variables affecting the citizens’ support was based on the selection of 14 exogenous variables, including age, gender, political interest, perception of the situation in the country, employment personal perception, financial household perception, the labour market perception of the country, the provision of public services perception, the overall image of the EU, the perception of the threat posed by the Russian war in Ukraine to security in the EU and the country itself, the personal perception that standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, and the political orientation. More information about the exogenous variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. The Ordered Probit model will provide interesting and nuanced results of whether some exogenous variables affect the support of the EU sanctions taken by the EU in response to the Russian invasion. For example, for each of the variables included in the analysis, it will be possible to analyse to what extent some of the categories support more or less the sanctions. Similarly, it will be possible to determine if some of the variables have a significant effect on the level of support. Methodology Opinion surveys are affected by the subjective judgments of respondents, leading to potential inaccuracy in interpreting response categories (Disegna et al., Citation2018). For instance, ‘totally agree’ for one respondent could be equivalent to simply ‘tend to agree’ for another. For this reason, Fuzzy Set Logic methods are becoming very popular in social sciences to manage the uncertainty associated with survey responses effectively (Cantillo et al., Citation2021; Indelicato & Martín, Citation2024). The study uses the Fuzzy Hybrid TOPSIS Approach to calculate the endogenous variable that measures the support (sup) of the respondents towards the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The method is grounded in the fuzzy set theory proposed by Zadeh (Citation1965), which was introduced for handling the inherent uncertainty and vagueness of information provided by answers to social surveys (Carlsson & Fullér, Citation2001; Disegna et al., Citation2018; Mamdani & Assilian, Citation1999). There are multiple fuzzy set representations that can be used to associate the categories of the answers given in the survey (Nguyen et al., Citation2005). In the study, we use the Triangular Fuzzy Numbers (TFNs), which are the most used fuzzy sets (Anand & Bharatraj, Citation2017; Wang, Citation2017). The final representation of the answers from the dataset is as follows: (1) totally disagree is represented by (0, 0, 30); (2) tend to disagree by (20, 30, 40); (3) do not know by (30, 50, 70); (4) tend to agree by (60, 70, 80); and (5) totally agree by (70, 100, 100). The hybrid nature of the method is based on the application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which calculates the synthetic indicator (Hwang & Yoon, Citation1981). We omit the mathematical formulation of the method for simplicity and ease of exposition. Interested readers can consult many existing papers, such as (Cantillo et al., Citation2023; Indelicato et al., Citation2023; Martín et al., Citation2020; Martín & Indelicato, Citation2023). We will use sup which provides relative support for the sanctions on Russia taken by the EU after invading Ukraine, as the dependent variable for the econometric model. The variable will be categorised into five quintiles according to the ranking of the indicator in order to use an ordered probit model. The marginal effects of the results will be used to analyse the main determinants that explain the highest support of EU citizens. In the study, we use the Daly normalisation for all the categories that act as exogenous variables in the model. Thus, it is possible to determine the marginal effects of each category with respect to the sample-weighted average. We omit the discussion of the technicalities of the model and exogenous variables normalisation. Interested readers can consult Daly et al. (Citation2016), Greene and Hensher (Citation2010), Hensher et al. (Citation2015) and Martin and Roman (Citation2021). Results Figure 1 shows the kernel density of the exogenous variable that measures the support of EU individuals for the sanctions against Russia taken by the EU for the whole sample (panel a) and for those who totally agree and totally disagree with the EU imposing the sanctions to defend European values (panel b). The results indicate that a small number of respondents do not support the sanctions imposed by the EU at all, with 170 citizens giving a score of 1 to all survey items included in the scale. Conversely, a significant portion of the population holds a more neutral position, as shown by responses falling in the range of 0.3–0.6. Additionally, a substantial number of citizens – specifically, 6430 – express their strong support for the sanctions by responding with a score of 5 to all items.  Figure 1. Support kernel density. Panel (b) of the figure clearly distinguishes between the two categories of respondents. It shows that those who strongly support the defence of European values are more in favour of the sanctions compared to those who strongly oppose them. Similar figure patterns are obtained for the categories of those who have a positive or negative image of the EU, and for those who think that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is seen as an important threat to the security of the EU. Nevertheless, this will be further discussed with the results of the ordered probit model. Table 1 shows the main drivers to support or not the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia. The table is obtained from the marginal effects obtained from the ordered probit model, which is in the fifth quintile of the support distribution, and refers to the citizen group of the strong supporters (Table A3, in the appendix). It can be seen that the main drivers to support the sanctions are totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion, the EU is defending European values, having a very good or rather good image of the EU, totally agreeing that the EU security is under threat with the Russian invasion, and to have a very good financial situation in the household. All the coefficients are significant at 999 per thousand. The results of the ordered probit model, as well as the complete table of the marginal effects, can be consulted in the appendix. Table A2 shows that all the exogenous variables affect the support level except the area in which the respondent resides, so the support is transversal to whether the European lives in a rural, middle town or large town. It is also interesting to observe that all the threshold parameters of the ordered probit model result significant, i.e. the five different quintiles of the distribution can be allocated without the need to collapse some of the categories used in the estimation.  Table 1. Main drivers to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. Interestingly, the main drivers to be in the population segment of those who do not strongly support the EU sanctions are the opposite categories of supporting the sanctions: totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the defence of European values, totally disagreeing or tending to disagree with the fact that the invasion of Ukraine is a security threat to the EU and having a very bad image of the EU. The coefficients of Table 1 have been extracted from Table A3, and need to be interpreted as follows: the coefficients are the marginal effects of the category to be or not a strong supporter of the EU sanctions. For example, the coefficient of 0.105 for individuals who totally agree that the EU is defending European values by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine indicates that this group has a 10.5 per cent higher likelihood of being strong supporters of EU sanctions compared to the average citizen in the overall sample. In a similar manner, the coefficient of −0.225 for the category of total disagreement indicates a 22.5 per cent lower probability of being a strong supporter. Other interesting results that can be seen in the complete marginal effects table (Table A3, in the appendix) are that the type of urbanisation where the respondent lives, namely rural village, small and mid-size town or large town, is the only variable of the twelve under analysis which does not have any significant effect on being a strong supporter of the sanctions. For the rest of the variables, there is always a category with more odds of being or not in the category of strong supporters. It is interesting to note that the younger generations (between 15 and 24 and between 25 and 34) are less likely to be in the category of strong supporters than those over 55, who are significantly more likely to be in this category. Similarly, those who have a strong political interest, have a good personal job situation, think that the economic situation of their country is rather good, are leftist or left-centre, think that the employment situation of the country is rather good, are males, or have a rather good financial situation have a higher probability of being in the category of strong supporters. Conclusions In a recent speech by Jens Stoltenberg, former Secretary General of NATO, the following assessment was made: In just a few weeks, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid. We will make important decisions. To continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to a new security reality and protect our people and our values. I look forward to the day when we can welcome both Finland and Sweden into our Alliance. This will make Finland and Sweden safer. NATO stronger. And the whole Euro-Atlantic area more secure. (NATO, Citation2022) Although NATO’s strategic decision affects the entire geopolitical landscape, public perceptions of EU sanctions need to be addressed through a more nuanced, evidence-based approach. Public opinion on sanctions is driven not only by security concerns but also by economic and political factors that underpin individual belief systems. To measure the determinants of support for such policies, this study applies both the fuzzy hybrid approach and the ordered probit model. The first method calculates the endogenous variable that measures the level of support of each respondent. The second method is used to find the main factors of a set of 14 exogenous variables or covariates that affect the support. Our results reveal that there are four important drivers to be a strong supporter of the sanctions taken by the EU against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022: (1) totally agreeing that by standing against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is defending European values, (2) having a very good overall EU image, (3) totally agreeing that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU, and (4) having a very good household financial situation. Other factors, such as age, gender, or political orientation, among others, are less determinant in explaining the strong support category. The dataset for the study was obtained from the 98th Eurobarometer, covering winter 2022–2023, providing a solid foundation for the objectives pursued in the study. Our results imply that, at least in the salient category of being a strong supporter of the EU sanctions, European Parliamentarians and the political parties involved should promote a triad: the defence of European values (Anghel & Jones, Citation2023), a more integrated security defence system that will permit the EU to be more independent from NATO and US (Del Sarto Citation2016; Howorth Citation2018), and a solid campaign of improving the EU image, highlighting the benefits of being in the union (Elmatzoglou, Citation2020). The European values of human rights and dignity, as well as the principles of living in liberal democracies, should not be undermined by misinformation campaigns from autocratic regimes. The invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest security threat in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fostering a wave of fear and real politics about the necessity of increasing the military budget. Europeans have seen more closely how the lives of human beings are worth almost nothing when their homes are bombed, and they have to leave with just the bare minimum, stopping their daily lives and becoming refugees in countries that may not welcome them with open arms. There is a need for effective communication campaigns that change the focus from generic issues such as ‘Europeanness’ fostering a common national identity or sense of belonging to a pragmatic branding strategy that achieves a power actor in the new turbulent geopolitical battlefield. Recent developments, in the light of newly elected President Donald Trump’s views on NATO and US foreign aid, have added uncertainty to the EU’s strategic calculus on sanctions. Trump’s concerns about NATO’s burden-sharing and his ambivalent stance on continued US military aid to Ukraine have set off alarm bells among EU policymakers and underscored the need for a European security policy that is less dependent on US leadership (Sorgi, Citation2025). Thus, it is the time for a more than-less European Union mentality that decreases Euroscepticism, a time to strengthen public support for the EU. This shift requires an emphasis on the tangible benefits that EU membership brings to member states, including economic stability, enhanced security, and the promotion of shared values like democracy and human rights. By fostering greater awareness and understanding of the EU’s role in addressing cross-border challenges, citizens can better appreciate the advantages of unity over division. Engaging with local communities, encouraging open dialogues, and actively involving citizens in EU decision-making processes can further bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens, reinforcing a sense of belonging and shared purpose. This study has some limitations that can be addressed in future studies. First, the dataset is a point-in-time measure of public opinion, surveyed in the winter of 2022–2023. Due to the dynamic nature of the geopolitical environment, longitudinal studies are needed to examine how public support for EU sanctions may change over time in response to political, economic and military events. Second, other external factors can also be examined to gain a better picture of how other factors could shape people’s opinions. These range from cultural equivalence with Ukraine to geographical proximity to the war zone, exposure to social media narratives, and interaction with Ukrainian refugees. The role of media frames and disinformation campaigns in determining views on EU sanctions is another area that would require more work. Third, latent variables such as societal resilience, institutional trust, geopolitical affinity, and adherence to European values could provide a better understanding of the reasons for support or opposition to EU sanctions. Such variables could also explain the differences in public opinion between EU member states and between different demographic groups. Furthermore, as previous studies on public support (Onderco et al., Citation2023) have also shown, a comparative analysis with previous surveys, for example, in 2008 (Russia-Georgia war), 2014 (annexation of Crimea and Donbas war) with the full invasion of Ukraine in 2022–2023, could also be very useful. Although not directly compared in the current study, future research would benefit from a historical analysis component to explore the continuities and shifts in public opinion during these major geopolitical events and how they change in different EU countries. This would provide a better insight into how threat perceptions, economic concerns and EU identity evolve in response to Russian aggression and EU foreign policy initiatives. Supplemental Material Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2025.2476484. Additional informationFunding Dr Alessandro Indelicato research is funded by the research fellowship “Catalina Ruiz,” provided by the Consejo de Economía, Conocimiento y Empleo of the Gobierno de Canarias, the Agencia Canaria De Investigación Innovación Y Sociedad De La Información (ACIISI), and Fondo Social Europeo of the EU, through the Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain). Martín, J. C., & Indelicato, A. (2025). 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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This paper departs from an assumption derived from Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory: Germany is a de facto leader of European integration processes and the European Union as an institution.The first part of the analysis explores priorities and their corresponding challenges for the new German CDU-led cabinet. It examines issues around the ongoing war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and outstanding questions about German-China cooperation.The second part looks at the recently proposed Security and Defence Union (SDU) project and its various challenges.In conclusion, it is suggested that Germany will likely dominate future defence efforts, the actual shape of which will also be determined by other players such as the US, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, India or Turkey.Key Words: Germany, Foreign Policy, EU, Geopolitics Introduction According to the Federal Election Commission, the German election on February 23 saw a record-breaking voter turnout of 82.5%. That's an increase from 76.6% in 2021 and the highest voter participation since unification in 1990.  With vote counting finished, preliminary results show that the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) won the election with 28.6% of the vote. (As of the writing of this paper, the coalition negotiations are in progress, and the new Merz-Lead government will likely be formed by Easter this Year).  Before we analyse the challenges ahead of Merz's Government, let us briefly note that Friedrich Merz belongs to the so-called 'Davos Crowd'. He regularly attends the World Economic Forum Meetings. Before fully dedicating himself to politics, Merz worked as a corporate lawyer and held a significant position at BlackRock, a leading global investment management firm. He served as the head of the supervisory board of BlackRock's German branch, a role that has drawn scrutiny due to BlackRock's CEO, Larry Fink, being a key figure at the WEF. By his critics, Merz is seen as a 'globalist puppet' who is likely to promote Agenda 2030-related policies and the Klaus Schwab Great Reset initiative at the expense of German citizens.   Challenges ahead of Germany and its new political leadership Under the new CDU-led Government, Germany will face significant international challenges in supporting Ukraine, managing US relations, and balancing China ties. - The war in Ukraine The ongoing war in Ukraine is a pressing issue, requiring Germany to sustain its support for Ukraine while managing its own energy security and economic interests. This involves coordinating with other EU and NATO members, which could be challenging given potential fatigue and differing national priorities.  The ongoing war in Ukraine, initiated by Russia's invasion in 2022, remains a critical challenge for Germany. The new CDU-led Government must sustain this support amidst potential fatigue and economic pressures. It goes without saying that the war has disrupted energy supplies, with Germany suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and facing higher energy costs. The CDU, under Merz, has advocated for a strong stance against Russia. Still, challenges include maintaining EU unity, especially with some member states favouring dialogue with Moscow, and managing domestic economic impacts, such as inflation and cost-of-living pressures. This support towards sustained support to sanctions against Russia seems necessary, but it may strain Germany's resources and require coordination with NATO and EU partners. - Navigating Transatlantic Relations Germany's relationship with the United States, mainly through NATO, is vital for its security and economic interests. Even before the Trump election, German experts were ready to address the incoming challenges.  Trump's opposition to previous policies, such as climate commitments and trade agreements, has led to tensions. Traditionally aligned with the US, the CDU knew the need to balance cooperation on security issues, such as defence spending, with potential trade and climate policy disagreements. This challenge is compounded by the need to prepare for a world where Germany must pay more for its security, especially given the war in Ukraine.  Today, Germans are painfully aware that the relations with the United States are crucial, especially given that Trump's presidency has already led to tensions over trade and security policies. Germany seems willing to balance cooperation with the US while asserting its interests and those of the EU. This will be complicated due to conflicting interests regarding trade and the economy. Trump is expected to continue his protectionist policies, imposing tariffs on German goods like cars to address the trade deficit. This will likely lead to retaliatory measures from Germany and the EU, straining economic ties.  In fact, the European Commission already declared it would impose "countermeasures" from April 1 in response to US tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and aluminium imports.   Regarding defence and security - Trump will likely pressure Germany to increase defence spending, possibly threatening to reduce US troops in Germany, as he did in his first term by announcing a withdrawal of 12,000 troops (later reversed by Biden). This could push Germany to enhance its defence capabilities and meet NATO targets.  As for climate change and energy - Trump's scepticism towards climate agreements, such as the Paris Accord, will likely continue, clashing with Germany's leadership in renewable energy and its goal to phase out coal by 2038 at the latest.   Finally, there is the question of foreign policy, especially Russia and Ukraine - Trump's potential alignment with Russia could complicate Germany's position, particularly given its significant support for Ukraine. Reports suggest Trump might cut Ukraine out of negotiations with Russia, forcing Germany to take a more independent stance.   - Balancing Economic Relations with China Germany's economic ties with China are significant, with China being a primary export market and investment partner. However, the new German Government faces the challenge of addressing security and human rights concerns, such as intellectual property theft and China's assertive foreign policy. The CDU-lead coalition may push for greater diversification of supply chains and stricter regulations, as suggested by recent analyses.   This balancing act is crucial, as economic dependence on China could limit Germany's ability to take a firm stance on delicate issues regarding human rights. The challenge is maintaining economic benefits while mitigating risks, potentially through EU-level coordination and bilateral agreements, which could create diplomatic pressures and affect Germany's global trade position. Economic ties and the challenge of de-risking. Germany has deep economic ties with China, with significant trade and investment flows, particularly in the automotive and manufacturing sectors. However, the new government will face the challenge of reducing economic dependence, as outlined in the CDU's election platform, which calls for "reducing reliance on China".  This is driven by concerns over supply chain vulnerabilities, as seen in the CDU's criticism of previous decisions like allowing a Chinese state-owned company to invest in Hamburg's port.  The challenge lies in implementing de-risking strategies without triggering economic repercussions, such as reduced exports or investment pullbacks. Recent statements from Merz, such as warning German firms about the "great risk" of investing in China, indicate a stricter stance. Still, experts question whether this rhetoric will translate into firm policy, given the economic interests at stake.   Security concerns and strategic competition are at the forefront - Friedrich Merz recently grouped China with Russia, North Korea, and Iran in an "axis of autocracies," highlighting perceived threats to German and European security.  The CDU's position paper, adopted around Easter 2023, states that the idea of peace through economic cooperation "has failed with regard to Russia, but increasingly also China," signalling a shift toward a more security-focused approach.  This includes addressing issues like technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and cybersecurity, which could strain bilateral relations. The challenge is strengthening defence and economic security measures without escalating tensions, particularly as China's military capabilities grow. Merz's focus on European strategic autonomy, especially in light of US policy shifts under Donald Trump, may lead to increased cooperation with EU partners in China. Human rights and values-based diplomacy are important for the incoming CDU-led government. Therefore, it is likely to take a firmer stance on human rights issues, reflecting the CDU's emphasis on preserving the rule-based international order.  Merz has consistently called China "an increasing threat to [German] security," suggesting a values-based approach that could lead to diplomatic tensions.  The challenge is maintaining constructive engagement while addressing these issues, especially as China has offered a "stable, constructive partnership" post-election, seeking to inject "new vitality" into China-EU relations. Balancing economic interests with values-based diplomacy will be a key test for Merz's government.  As for the coordination with EU partners, Germany's China policy should probably align with the EU's broader strategy, which has shifted toward de-risking under the European Commission. This requires coordination with other member states, some of whom may prioritise economic ties over security concerns, creating potential friction. The challenge is to ensure a united EU front, particularly in trade negotiations and investment screening, where Germany's leadership will be crucial. Merz's advocacy for improved coordination with major European allies such as France and Poland suggests focusing on EU unity. However, coalition dynamics, potentially involving the dovish Social Democrats, could dilute this approach.  Compared to Angela Merkel's pragmatic approach and Olaf Scholz's cautious stance, Merz's leadership is expected to mark a "Zeitenwende" or turning point, with a more critical and security-focused China policy.  However, the extent of change depends on coalition dynamics, with potential partners like the SPD possibly moderating his approach, creating tension between rhetoric and policy implementation. The EU as a security actor This section of the paper outlines the significant challenges ahead for the EU, considering Germany's influence and the broader geopolitical landscape, especially regarding the future EU defence cooperation and its potential relations with NATO. According to German experts and policymakers, The EU must maintain unity in supporting Ukraine amid Russia's ongoing invasion. Under the CDU, Germany will most likely continue its policy in this regard, providing military aid and economic support. According to the Federal Foreign Office, the German Government has, since the start of the war, made available around 43.62 billion euros in bilateral support for Ukraine (as of 31 December 2024); this aid includes the critical area of air defence, a substantial winter assistance programme and energy assistance, help for those who have fled Ukraine, humanitarian aid, mine clearance operations and assistance with efforts to investigate and document war crimes. Furthermore, Ukraine and Germany signed a bilateral agreement on security cooperation on 16 February 2024.  European Army The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership's vision regarding the Europen defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four 'revolutionary' ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to potentially 35 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.   The German leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's 'special responsibility' for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government's 'special responsibility' for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity.   In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the 'best equipped armed force' in Europe.  Former Chancellor Scholz would, however, make it an open claim at times: "As the most populous nation with the greatest economic power and a country in the centre of the continent, our army must become the cornerstone of conventional defence in Europe, the best-equipped force".  The re-entrance of Trump into global politics only reinvigorated German calls for stronger defence cooperation. Amid a drive to shore up support for Ukraine after Donald Trump halted US military aid and intelligence sharing, European leaders held emergency talks in Brussels (6 March 2025). They agreed (Hungary did not support the document) on a massive increase in defence spending. According to the European Council's Conclusions, the European Commission is to propose a new EU instrument to provide Member States with loans backed by the EU budget of up to EUR 150 billion.  Apart from that, the document mentions several other instruments that are supposed to enhance Europe's defence capabilities: additional funding sources, new EU instrument for loans, support from the European Investment Bank (EIB), mobilising private financing, priority areas for defence capabilities (air and missile defence; artillery systems, including deep precision strike capabilities; missiles and ammunition; drones and anti-drone systems; strategic enablers, including in relation to space and critical infrastructure protection; military mobility; cyber; artificial intelligence and electronic warfare), joint procurement and standardisation, simplification of legal frameworks and finally coordination with NATO. Overall, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, presented a plan worth EUR 800 billion to increase European defence spending against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Will it be enough to create actual European defence capabilities, finally? Time will show. Europeans have been talking about common European defence for decades. So far, most of their achievements fall short of lofty political declarations.  Consequently, on March 19 this year, the European Commission unveiled the Joint White Paper for European Defence 2030.  (White papers are policy documents produced by the Governments that set out their proposals for future legislation.) Accordingly, the 22-page-long document consists of numerous 'bold' ideas to advance European defence cooperation toward a European Army. The key threats to European Security include correspondingly: military aggression from Russia, strategic competition (there is increasing strategic competition in Europe's wider neighbourhood, from the Arctic to the Baltic to the Middle East and North Africa), transnational challenges (issues such as rapid technological change, migration, and climate change are seen as serious stressors on political and economic systems), actions of authoritarian states (countries like China are asserting their influence in Europe and its economy, posing a strategic challenge due to their authoritarian governance style), hybrid threats (these include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and the weaponisation of migration. The document notes that these threats are interconnected and increasingly prevalent), geopolitical rivalries (ongoing geopolitical tensions in various regions, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, are highlighted as contributing to instability that directly affects Europe) and last but not least instability from neighboring Regions (proximity to conflict zones, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, leads to spillover effects such as migration and economic insecurity).  Notably, at the very beginning of the document, the EC makes an unequivocal statement: "The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole. Since 2022, we have seen a full-scale, high-intensity war on the borders of the European Union with hundreds of thousands of casualties, mass population displacement, huge economic costs and deliberate destruction of vital energy systems and cultural heritage. The outcome of that war will be a determinative factor in our collective future for decades ahead". The document proposes several measures to support Ukraine amid its ongoing conflict, mainly through a "Porcupine strategy" to enhance Ukraine's defence and security capacity. The "Porcupine strategy" includes elements such as:  Increased Military Assistance - The EU and its Member States should significantly step up military and other assistance to Ukraine (providing large-calibre artillery ammunition with a target of delivering a minimum of 2 million rounds per year, supplying air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strikes), and drones, supporting Ukraine's procurement of drones and further developing its production capacity through joint ventures with European industries and training and equipping Ukrainian brigades and supporting the regeneration of battalions). Direct Support to Ukraine's Defense Industry (the document emphasises the importance of directly supporting Ukraine's defence industry (encouraging EU Member States to procure directly from Ukraine's defence industry for donations to Ukraine and utilising EU loans to boost Ukraine's defence industry spending, estimated to reach around EUR 35 billion in productive capacity by 2025). Enhanced Military Mobility (the EU aims to improve military mobility corridors extending into Ukraine, facilitating smoother deliveries of military assistance and enhancing interoperability). Access to EU Space Assets (Ukraine should have enhanced access to EU space-based governmental services, which would aid in its defence capabilities). Coordination of Military Support (the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell will coordinate military support for Ukraine, enhancing collaboration with NATO and other partners). Integration of Ukraine into EU Defense Initiatives (the document proposes integrating Ukraine's defence industry into EU initiatives and encouraging its participation in collaborative defence projects. Conclusion A 'Security and Defence Union' (SDU) has been recently proposed as a new institutional form of military cooperation among EU Members.  It is suggested that the SDU includes the UK, and given the special attention paid to Ukraine in the White Paper, it is logical to surmise that it (Ukraine) will also be a de facto member. The devil lies in details, however, and so financially speaking, Europeans have to address numerous challenges. For example, the European Defence Fund (EDF) details Euro 8 billion over 7 years (approx. Euro 1.12 billion/year), supports R&D, and has committed Euro 5.4 billion since May 2021.        Meeting these ambitious goals will be especially challenging given the funding constraints (EU instruments like EDF and EDIP have limited impact; EDIP at €750 million/year is less than 1% of €90 billion 2024 procurement, needs €9 billion/year for 10% impact), capability and industry gaps (post-Cold War cuts left significant gaps, needing €160 billion by 2018 if 2008 levels maintained, €1.1 trillion if all spent 2% GDP 2006-2020), political and partnership issues (US scepticism, especially under second Trump administration, makes EU states cautious), policy integration (balancing security and economic priorities).  Against this backdrop, Germany claims to rise to the occasion and take the leading role, passing a new defence budget, referred to by media as 'bazooka'.  A massive increase in military spending is paralleled by another military aid package to Ukraine (The €3 billion package approved by the Bundestag Budget Committee comes on top of the €4 billion in military aid to Ukraine already planned in the 2025 budget).  Where does it leave NATO? 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Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council, March 6, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/special-european-council-6-march-2025/   See more at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/watershed-moment-eu-leaders-close-to-agreeing-800bn-defence-plan-ukraine   The European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is a joint military project between 13 European countries outside of existing structures, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union's (EU) defence arm. The Initiative was first proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Sorbonne keynote in September 2017. ASee more at: https://archives.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/535740/9215739/file/LOI_IEI%2025%20JUN%202018.pdf   A week before on 12th of March 2025 European Parliament adopted a ‘resolution on the ehite paper on the future of European defence’ which includes 89 points. See more at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0034_EN.html   European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030." Brussels, March 19, 2025. JOIN(2025) 120 final. https://defence-industryspace.ec.europa.eu/document/download/30b50d2c-49aa-4250-9ca6-27a0347cf009_en?filename=White%20Paper.pdf   See more at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/34278_en   See more at: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en   See more at: https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2025/towards-eu-defence-union   See more at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en   “Germany's historic spending plan has passed - so what is the money going to be spent on?”, The Journal, 22 March 2025. https://www.thejournal.ie/germany-spending-plan-explainer-6656255-Mar2025/   Sexton Karl and  Hubenko Dmytro, “Germany approves $3 billion in military aid for Ukraine”. DW, 21 March 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-approves-3-billion-in-military-aid-for-ukraine/a-72001265

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Whether French or European, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is governed by one absolute rule: it is not an end in itself, but means to an end, so that we cannot put the atomic cart before the political horse. To avoid getting bogged down for the umpteenth time in futile discussions about a European nuclear deterrent, let's recall the fundamental principles of this strategy. Deterrence is a mode of operation with a negative goal as old as war itself. Aimed at preventing an adversary's offensive intentions, it has been used with varying degrees of success due to its random nature. It is based on the calculation of probabilities. Usually, if an aggressor takes the risk of transgressing deterrence based on conventional forces and its venture goes wrong, the aggressor has gambled and lost, suffering at worst the humiliation of defeat. With nuclear weapons, deterrence now takes on a whole new dimension, since the probability of nuclear retaliation entails the risk of an exorbitant loss, said to be unbearable, exceeding the value of what is at stake. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is not peace. It cannot prevent limited regional conflicts or suppress terrorist action. It can only be applied in the event of a massive attack of any kind against the vital interests of the country under attack. This “perimeter of vitality” does not have to be precisely defined, but is left to the discretion of the Head of State, so as to create uncertainty for the would-be aggressor. The strategy of nuclear deterrence is based on five identified principles, theorized in France by Generals Gallois [1] and Poirier. [2] Principle of credibility: nuclear deterrence requires the creation and demonstration of technical capabilities. This was the role of the tests suspended indefinitely in 1994 and prohibited by treaty (CTBT). Principle of permanence: the SDN is ensured by the Head of State, who is the sole decision-maker, with 24-hour access to electronic codes and means of transmission to strategic air forces on standby and submarines on patrol. Principle of uncertainty: “the deterrent effect results from the combination of certainty and uncertainty in the mental field of a would-be aggressor: certainty as to the existence of an unacceptable risk... uncertainty as to the exact conditions of application of the model in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.” Principle of sufficiency: for a medium-sized power like France, in terms of quantity and quality, neither too much nor too sophisticated. During the Cold War, this was known as “deterrence of the weak by the strong” (the strong being the Soviet Union, which French leaders wisely never named explicitly). To avoid embarking on a ruinous arms race, two conditions need to be met: A. An invulnerable nuclear force capable of retaliating in the event of aggression (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines - SNLE - are permanently undetectable). It is essential to provide redundancy in the event of human or technical failure. B. Ability to penetrate enemy defenses. There is no such thing as 100% interception. The damage remains tolerable if the explosive charges are conventional, but if they are nuclear, the problem changes completely. An SSBN salvo sends 96 charges that can “vitrify” potentially as many targets. No defense system would be able to intercept them, no matter how much progress is made. All the more so as these warheads are surrounded by decoys, maneuverable (change of trajectory) and stealthy (low radar signature). This lasting superiority of aggression over protection means that the SDN is the only response. Principle of proportionality: the amount of “unbearable” destruction is related to the value of what is at stake. In this case, is the invasion and conquest of France worth the annihilation of one or more of the aggressor's vital centers?  So what should be the target? “Anticité” (men) or antiforces (weapons)? Progress in precision has made it possible to target smaller areas with greater precision. The official line is that France is no longer targeting cities, but rather the command centers of nuclear forces and political decision-making centers. However, such targets are rarely located in the heart of deserts, but have the bad taste of being buried deep in the middle of densely populated areas. The creation of a European strategic nuclear deterrent will therefore have to go along with all these principles. How and with what facilities? The stakes for the aggressor would change dimension. From the vital interests of France alone, we would move on to those of all the member states of the European Union, or at the very least, of those who would agree to join us. The calculation of proportionality would be affected, with ipso facto repercussions on the principle of sufficiency. Given its flexibility and visibility, should the air component be expanded? Should the number of nuclear weapons be increased? Should territorial positioning be extended, where and how far? Could France extend its nuclear deterrent to cover the interests of its European partners?  The nuclear “umbrella” declared by U.S. leaders since Kennedy's Defense Secretary McNamara has often been the subject of skepticism about its credibility, starting with General de Gaulle. Donald Trump openly exposes the eminently selfish nature of nuclear weapons. Who can still believe today that this President and his successors would sacrifice New York for Warsaw, Berlin or Paris? A fortiori, are the citizens of the countries of Europe prepared to make their existence dependent on the decision of the French President alone? Who could believe that he would sacrifice Paris for Tallinn? In truth, if the allies (European and Asian) thought they could rely on the commitment of the United States, it was because of the growing strength of American conventional forces capable of effectively opposing non-nuclear aggression. Any comparison with the USA is therefore absurd. Together, do the EU states have 11 aircraft carriers? 14 strategic nuclear submarines? Do their navies lock up world trade routes? Do they control Space? The little European frog won't reach the enormity of the American ox. But would this be necessary if their governments were to make an objective assessment of the real threat, free from ideological prejudices and corporatist interests? Let's move on to the crux of deterrence: the cost of “burden-sharing”, NATO's constant worry. Are states like Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland prepared to pay for the construction of a so-called European nuclear deterrent, without having access to the ultimate decision? Money is also time. A single multi-state nuclear strategy cannot be improvised overnight. Are we forgetting that some EU members do not perceive Russia as a threat; that others, like Austria, are leaders in favor of a ban on nuclear weapons? Last but not least, where would the post-Brexit United Kingdom fit into this scheme? Even if the will is strong and widely shared, the political, financial and technical development of a nuclear deterrent involving a number of European states will take time, on the order of several years. What will the Russian Federation look like, and how will US-China competition have evolved in five to ten years' time? Peacetime declarations (Franco-German, Franco-British) often express only grand illusions or pious hopes that cost nothing. The true ally is seen at the foot of the war, when egoistic realism reclaims its icy rights.  Yet for the past twenty years, in every crisis (financial, migratory, health - Covid- and military - Ukraine-), the EU has shown itself to be unprepared, slow to react and, above all, divided. The creation of a credible NED is therefore in flagrant contradiction with the very existence of the EU in its current form and operation. We need to return to the foundations of the Community project. Those countries of Europe which share a rigorously identical conception of their global situation, to the point of merging their vital interests, will have to agree on a lasting political framework defining common goals, in a sort of Charter; to equip themselves accordingly with a military alliance such as a European Defense Society for as long as deemed necessary; to guarantee themselves by a European Intelligence Community. Whether French or European, the strategy of nuclear deterrence is subject to one absolute rule: it is not an end in itself, but means to an end, so that we cannot put the atomic cart before the political horse. Copyrights for his picture : Copyright Mars 2025-Géré/Diploweb.com Marie-France Géré

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском ' Germany and Europe must invest more in defense and deterrence capabilities to assert and maintain themselves. This requires substantial and long-term investment in our armed forces, in research and development, in infrastructure, material and personnel. ' Various analyses indicate that the upcoming significant increase in defense spending is a fantastic opportunity for German industry. However, despite the high demand, it is very hesitant to transfer its partially idle capacities to the lucrative defense sector. ' To strengthen the competitiveness of the German defense industry and thus benefit from lower prices through mass production, better use should be made of the advantages of the EU internal market. ' Germany has globally unique knowledge and unparalleled production networks in many sectors that are needed to produce defense equipment. At the same time, many of these sectors are currently in crisis and have spare capacity. ' At the same time, sustainable and long-term financing of military procurement is essential, which is primarily achieved through long-term contracts or purchase guarantees. ' Such measures should also contribute to a change in mentality so that employees, customers, and financiers increasingly perceive the defence industry as a positively valued industrial sector. Defense capabilities: Investment is essential. President Donald Trump has made it clear that the United States no longer sees itself as a security guarantor for Europe. While the USA is scheduling talks with Russia on the future of Ukraine, there is great concern in Europe about new arbitrary border demarcations: a division of Europe. The Munich Security Conference has ruthlessly exposed the USA's disengagement from Europe and the breakdown in values between the EU and the Trump administration. Since then, developments have become thick and fast. There are fears of the end of the transatlantic partnership and the US reneging on its NATO commitment. However, it has long been clear that Germany and Europe must invest more in deterrence and defense capabilities to assert and maintain themselves and can no longer be free riders for the USA. The EU is not helpless: the accumulated economic power of the EU states is equal to that of the US and ten times that of Russia. However, defense capability requires considerable and long-term investment in the armed forces, in research and development, in infrastructure, material and personnel. Closing capability gaps is the top priority. With this goal in mind, the procurement of fighter jets, drones, transport and combat helicopters, air defense systems, infantry fighting vehicles, transport vehicles, submarines, corvettes and much more has been commissioned over the past three years. So far, however, only the essentials have been ordered and made up for, which have been neglected for years. The defense industry: fragmented and underfunded Despite clear analyses, good plans and declarations of intent, the European defense industry remains underfunded and fragmented, according to the Draghi Report1. As of 2023, for example, the European NATO states were operating nineteen different battle tanks, twenty different fighter aircraft and ten diverse types of submarines. Projects for joint development and production revealed some insurmountable hurdles, as the FCAS example shows. Europe has so far benefited little from the additional funds for defense: between mid-2022 and mid-2023, 78% of total procurement expenditure went to non-EU companies, 63% of which went to the USA. In this respect, it is particularly important to strengthen domestic and European industry. To remain competitive, investments must be made at increasingly shorter intervals. Development cycles are becoming shorter and shorter - as can be seen in drone production, for example. The potential of an integrated European defense is huge! The new and first-time EU Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, has set himself the goal of exploiting this potential. In March 2025, he will present the first White Paper on the future of European defense. Various analyses indicate that the upcoming significant increase in defense spending is a terrific opportunity for German industry. It has been calculated that an increase in defense spending to 3 percent of GDP would increase economic output by 1 to 1 ½ percent.2 It is clear that economic output in Germany will only increase as a result of defense spending if domestic manufacturers or suppliers are involved in the production of the goods in question. However, despite the high demand, German industry is very hesitant to shift its partially idle capacities into the lucrative armaments sector. Why is that? Germany: in a particularly good technological position In terms of technical capabilities and the necessary production capacities, Germany is fundamentally in a particularly acceptable position. Traditional companies as well as young, agile start-ups are thriving on the market. The country has unique expertise and unparalleled production networks in many sectors that are needed to produce defense equipment. This applies, for example, to vehicle construction, mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, the metal industry, the aerospace industry, and automation technology. At the same time, many of these sectors are currently in crisis - primarily due to the transformation in the automotive industry - and have spare capacity. With a view to the goal of expanding the production of defence equipment in Germany quickly, resiliently, and efficiently, there is immense potential here that can be realized quickly and operated economically. In December 2024, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed that the global defense industry will continue to grow by 4.2 percent in 2023. Four German companies are among the top 100 companies worldwide: Rheinmetall (26), ThyssenKrupp (66), Hensoldt (73) and Diehl (83), as well as three European companies: Airbus (12), MBDA (33) and KNDS (45).3 At the top of the global list are companies from the USA, the UK, Russia and China. Some of them focus entirely on armaments or on dual use, as the example of Boeing shows. There is potential in Germany and Europe that needs to be tapped into now to secure the continent. However, many details have so far stood in the way from the point of view of the private sector. Defense industry: obstacles Industry often waited a long time for contracts, sometimes in vain. While Russia switched to a war economy, Germany missed a real turning point. There is a lack of reliable commitments from the German government regarding long-term financing for procurement. This is because companies only invest in new capacities if they can assume that these can be utilized profitably for at least ten years. In addition, social acceptance of the arms industry remains low. Companies not previously active in the armaments sector - for example in the automotive industry - fear that employees, customers, and investors will be skeptical about a shift towards weapons production. However, tank manufacturer KNDS has shown that there is another way with its takeover of Alstom's former locomotive plant in Görlitz. The financing of armaments projects is still more expensive than for civilian projects. This is also due to the EU's taxonomy, which, despite a recent weakening, still makes investment in armaments more difficult. This increases financing costs and may make projects completely unprofitable. The production of armaments is also subject to significantly more regulations than civilian production, which is justified. However, it should be possible to significantly reduce the regulations to the absolute minimum necessary without reducing safety. It is also often overlooked that the defence industry can hardly take advantage of cross-border supply chains - the core of German industry's high competitiveness. This is due to different export licenses in European countries. As a result, there is an incentive to keep supply chains in one's own country. Synergies from mass production based on the division of labor cannot be promoted in this way, and as a result, armaments are still often manufactured products with correspondingly soaring prices. Finally, there are still civilian clauses that prohibit universities from conducting research on military issues and purposes and from cooperating with the arms industry. This cuts the arms industry off from the traditional path of innovation. Seven viable solutions The following measures could enable the arms industry to ramp up its production capacities quickly and become much more competitive: 1. The immense economic advantages of the EU internal market can only be exploited if there is a significant simplification and standardization of export rules for the arms industry. Up to now, most German-made systems used in the Bundeswehr can only be exported to other NATO or EU partners without any problems. However, it is desirable for European producers to be able to specialize and focus on the global market so that they can achieve the competitiveness that otherwise characterizes the German export industry. This requires European supply chains, which has hardly worked in the military sector to date due to the strict German export regulations, as the participation of a German company is tied to strict arms export regulations. The term german-free has been a selling point at international arms fairs to date, as this is the only way to guarantee smooth deliveries and maintenance of military equipment. The possibility of exporting to third countries such as Israel, Japan or South Korea would bring advantages: Bundeswehr weapons systems and spare parts would become cheaper due to economies of scale. 2. Further European and German regulations should be revised immediately. These include the sustainability directive in the financial taxonomy, the dual-use regulation and many particularly stringent requirements for the arms industry, whose production in many cases hardly differs from other branches of industry (only a few companies work with explosives or other hazardous materials). Special economic zones for arms production would also be conceivable, in which selected regulations and rules would not apply or would apply differently than otherwise. 3. Long-term contracts of the federal government for arms purchases should be secured by a robust and sustainable regular defense budget. 4. For other equipment (ammunition, protective equipment, light vehicles, etc.), Europe-wide tendered purchase guarantees are a much better means than "priority procurement in Germany". Ideally, the Bundeswehr would conclude a contract with more than one company that stipulates that a certain quantity of military equipment must be purchased at a minimum price - even if the item in question can be bought more cheaply on the world market. On the other hand, the company guarantees a maximum price at which it must sell the specified quantity to the Bundeswehr - even if the prices on the world market are higher. It is right to put such contracts out too tender throughout Europe and to take advantage of the EU single market. The German (supplier) industry is so strongly positioned in Europe that it participates in a substantial proportion of production. With reference to the safety aspects that apply here, the associated exclusion of non-European producers is WTO-compliant. 5. In view of the above, regulations that stipulate procurement only from Germany or provide for quotas of domestic production should be dispensed with. 6. KfW should provide credit lines for the conversion of existing industrial plants into defense plants. 7. Civil clauses should be abolished. This should ensure for all researchers at universities and colleges that third-party funding and other sources of financing will not be reduced or completely cut if they decide to cooperate in research with the defense industry. Conclusion The measures would strengthen the competitiveness of the German defense industry and deepen cooperation between EU states. They should also contribute to a change in mentality so that employees, customers, and financiers increasingly perceive the defense industry as a positively valued industrial sector. This should be flanked by political communication and, if necessary, marketing measures. With an appropriate policy that focuses on incentives and not on detailed regulations, several goals could be achieved at the same time: German industry could grow again in its traditional sectors, the Bundeswehr would be able to procure urgently needed equipment and material for its defense and deterrence capabilities faster and more cheaply, the European Union could grow closer together and Europe's security in these turbulent times would be strengthened. References 1 The Draghi report on EU competitiveness, 9. September 2024. 2 Vgl. EY, Dekabank: Wirtschaftliche Effekte europäischer Verteidigungsinvestitionen. Februar 2025 und Ethan Ilzetzki: Guns and Growth: The Economic Consequences of Defense Buildups. Kiel Reports Nr.2/2025, Kiel Institute for World Economy. 3 The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-producing and Military Services Companies, 2023 | SIPRI, Dezember 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In response to the weakening of the Atlantic Alliance and the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, the Europeans have announced their intention to rearm, leveraging the European Union (EU) as part of this effort. To fully grasp the dynamics unfolding in Brussels—particularly regarding military financing—and to bring order to the myriad of initiatives launched in this field in recent years, it is essential to take a step back. ReArm Europe: Prioritizing National Over European Financing For several years now, the EU has developed new competencies to support and strengthen Europe’s defense industrial base. Since 2017, it has introduced various programs aimed at funding collaborative defense projects among member states, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the upcoming European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP)—the latter still under negotiation. These programs, managed by the European Commission and financed through the EU’s ordinary budget, have remained relatively limited in scope. So far, member states have been reluctant to allow the European executive to gain too much influence in this area, which they consider a matter of national sovereignty. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape—particularly the rapprochement between the United States and Russia—has underscored the urgency for European countries to pursue strategic autonomy by increasing their military spending and by joining forces through their common defense policies. Consequently, they have asked the Commission to explore ways to support defense sector investments while maintaining national control over decision-making. On March 6, 2025, the Commission proposed a plan called ReArm Europe, in an attempt to square the circle desired by the Member States, namely reconciling the principle of national sovereignty with the need to act together. At this stage, the plan does not directly expand the existing EU defense support programs, such as the EDF or the future EDIP. Decisions regarding funding for these programs will be made in the coming months as part of the negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034). Instead, ReArm Europe focuses on facilitating national military budget increases while ensuring a degree of European coordination. Five Key Measures of ReArm Europe To achieve this balance, the Commission has proposed five key measures: • Activating the Stability and Growth Pact’s escape clause—which allows member states to exceed deficit and debt limits during crises. Under this proposal, countries could be allowed to increase their military budgets to up to 1.5% of GDP without this expenditure being counted in their national deficits. This measure could generate an estimated €650 billion over four years for defense spending.• Raising €150 billion through EU-issued bonds, which would then be lent to member states at low-interest rates and with long repayment terms. This funding would support pan-European military projects, such as air defense systems, by pooling demand and enabling joint procurement. Some of the military equipment financed through this mechanism could also be sent to Ukraine.• Facilitating the use of cohesion funds for defense investments. In this regard, it should be recalled that Member States remain free to decide whether or not to use the cohesion funds due to them for defense. These, in fact, must finance projects that are identified by the Member States and their local entities, although they must subsequently be approved at EU level.• Creating a European savings and investment union to encourage private financial institutions to support the military industry—something they have been reluctant to do.• Expanding the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) role in defense financing. Currently, the EIB can only fund dual-use (civilian and military) projects. The proposal seeks to lift restrictions on military financing entirely. However, this issue has been debated for years, and since the EIB’s board of directors comprises member states that make decisions unanimously, the Commission has no direct authority over this matter. The Risk of a Counterproductive Outcome The plan could undoubtedly strengthen European defense, but it could also weaken it. Much will depend on the technical details, as yet unknown, that will be adopted to implement it. To understand this point, it is worth recalling that the ultimate purpose of EU action on armaments is to reduce the fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, in order to consolidate it and make it more competitive. The EU must create a critical mass in terms of defense capabilities and technologies that will enable Europeans to stand up to the world’s major powers together. However, if ReArm Europe simply leads to increased national military spending without coordination or a common EU strategy, it could produce the opposite of the intended effect. In such a scenario, each country would finance its own defense industry in isolation, exacerbating fragmentation and duplication of efforts, rather than strengthening Europe’s collective military capabilities. Difficult Questions That Are Still Waiting for an Answer The technical and regulatory details that will be adopted to implement the ReArm Europe plan will determine whether it will serve a European strategy or whether it will be nothing more than a futile attempt to water the desert sand. Several contentious issues remain to be addressed—particularly regarding the proposed exemption from the Stability and Growth Pact. These questions can be grouped into three main categories: What Types of Defense Expenditures Will Be Exempt from Deficit Calculations? The EU must clarify which military expenditures will be excluded from national deficit calculations and which will still count: Will ReArm Europe apply only to investment spending (e.g., R&D, acquisitions), or will it also cover operational costs (e.g., salaries, training, deployment expenses)? 1.Under What Conditions Will Defense Spending Be Exempt? The EU will also have to define the conditions under which arms expenditure will not be taken into account in the deficits: • Will Member States have to invest in equipment identified as a priority at EU level, or will they be able to finance whatever they want without coordination within the EU?• Will they have to do so through trans-European collaborative projects or not?• What about European preference and eligibility criteria? Will they have to use this money to produce or purchase European equipment, or will they also be able to equip themselves abroad? Who Will Decide? Finally, the issue of decision-making power remains unresolved: • To what extent will the European Commission have discretion in determining which military expenditures qualify for exemption?• Will the Commission have the authority to reject certain expenditures if they do not align with EU strategic objectives?• For EU-backed loans, how will the projects to be financed be selected? The negotiations that will have to be initiated within the EU to answer these questions will not be easy. Behind their bureaucratic appearance lie the perennial political and existential challenges that have plagued European defense since its inception: What level of integration are the member states prepared to accept? What role should Brussels and the Commission play? The squaring of the circle is far from resolved.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском War is a numbers game. Each side involved must marshal the supplies, troops and firepower needed to sustain the fight, thwart advancing armies and, hopefully, prevail. But it’s also a game of uncertainty. For the past three years, Ukraine’s military planners have had to approach every battle with a series of cold calculations: How much ammunition is left? How many air defense interceptors can be fired today, without running short tomorrow? Do we have the men and equipment needed to advance or hold position? But now, with U.S. military assistance on hold and European support constrained by economic realities, that uncertainty is growing. As an expert on warfare, I know this isn’t just a logistical problem; it’s a strategic one. When commanders can’t predict their future resource base, they are forced to take fewer risks, prioritize defense over offense and hedge against worst-case scenarios. In war, uncertainty doesn’t just limit options. It shapes the entire battlefield and fate of nations. Trump orders a pause On March 3, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a suspension to all U.S. military aid to Ukraine. It followed a fractious Oval Office meeting between the U.S. president and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after which Trump declared the Ukrainian leader “not ready for peace.” Two days later, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe announced Washington was also pausing all intelligence sharing and ordered key allies such as the United Kingdom to limit the information they give Kyiv. National security adviser Michael Waltz has linked the pause to ongoing U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations, stating that weapons supplies and intelligence sharing will resume once Ukraine agrees to a date for peace talks with Russia. A critical supplier of weapons Any pause, no matter how long, will hurt Ukraine. The U.S. has been the largest provider of military assistance to Kyiv since Russia’s 2022 invasion, followed by the European Union. While the level of support is debated – it is often skewed by how one calculates equipment donations using presidential drawdown authority, through which the president can dip into the Department of Defense’s inventory – the U.S. has undoubtedly delivered critical weapons systems and a wide range of ammunition. Though this assistance has decreased U.S. military stockpiles, it has helped Washington invest in its domestic defense industry and expand weapons production. In addition, while Europe is starting to increase its own defense expenditures, EU members are stuck with flat economic growth and limits on how much they can borrow to invest in their own militaries, much less Ukraine. This makes the U.S. a critical partner for Ukraine for at least another two years while Europe expands its military capacity. These conditions affect the design of Ukraine’s military campaigns. Planners in Kyiv have to balance predictions about the enemy’s strengths and possible courses of action with assessments of their own resources. This war ledger helps evaluate where to attack and where to defend. Uncertainty skews such calculation. The less certain a military command is about its resource base, the more precarious bold military maneuvers become. It is through this fog of uncertainty that any pause in assistance shapes the course of the war in Ukraine and the bargaining leverage of all parties at the negotiating table. A new uncertain world The White House has indicated that the pause in military aid and intelligence sharing will be lifted once a date for peace talks is set. But even if U.S. weapons and intel begin to flow again, Ukrainian generals will have to fight the duration of the war under the knowledge that its greatest backer is willing to turn off the taps when it suits them. And the consequences of this new uncertain world will be felt on the battlefield. Ukraine now faces a brutal trade-off: stretch limited resources to maintain an active defense across the front, or consolidate forces, cede ground and absorb the political costs of trading space for time. Material supply has shaped operational tempo over the course of the war. When Moscow expects Kyiv to be low on ammunition, it presses the attack. In fact, key Russian gains in eastern Ukraine in 2024 coincided with periods of critical supply shortages. Russia used its advantage in artillery shells, which at times saw Moscow firing 20 artillery shells to every Ukrainian artillery shell fired, and air superiority to make advances north and west of the strategic city of Avdiivka. Looking to the front lines in 2025, Russia could use any pause in supplies to support its ongoing offensive operations that stretch from Kherson in southern Ukraine to Kharkiv in the north and efforts to dislodge Ukrainian units in the Russian Kursk region. This means Ukraine will have to decide where to hold the line and where to conduct a series of delaying actions designed to wear down Russian forces. Trading space for time is an old military tactic, but it produces tremendous political costs when the terrain is your sovereign territory. As such, the military logic of delaying actions creates political risks in Ukraine – sapping civilian morale and undermining support for the government’s war management. A horrible choice This dilemma will drive where and how Ukraine weights its efforts on the battlefield. First, long-range strike operations against Russia will become increasingly less attractive. Every drone that hits an oil refinery in Russia is one less warhead stopping a Russian breakthrough in the Donbas or counterattack in Kursk. Ukraine will have to reduce the complexity of its defensive campaign and fall back along lines deeper within its own territory. Second, Russia doesn’t fight just on the battlefield – it uses a coercive air campaign to gain leverage at the negotiating table. With U.S. military aid on hold, Moscow has a prime opportunity to escalate its strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing Kyiv into painful choices about whether to defend its front lines or its political center of gravity. From Vietnam to Ukraine, airpower has historically been a key bargaining tool in negotiations. President Richard Nixon bombed North Vietnam to force concessions. Russia may now do the same to Ukraine. Seen in this light, Russia could intensify its missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure – both to weaken defenses and to apply psychological and economic pressure. And because Kyiv relies on Western assistance, including intelligence and systems such as U.S.-built Patriot surface-to-air missiles to defend its skies, this coercive campaign could become effective. As a result, Ukraine could be faced with a horrible choice. It may have to concentrate dwindling air defenses around either key military assets required to defend the front or its political center of gravity in Kyiv. Interception rates of Russian drones and missiles could drop, leading to either opportunities for a Russian breakout along the front or increased civilian deaths that put domestic pressure on Ukrainian negotiators. Uncertainty reigns supreme The real problem for Ukraine going forward is that even if the U.S. resumes support and intelligence sharing, the damage is done. Uncertainty, once introduced, is hard to remove. It increases the likelihood that Ukraine’s leaders will stockpile munitions to reduce the risk of future pauses, rather than use them to take the fight to Russia. And with battlefield decision-making now limited, Ukraine’s military strategists will increasingly look toward the least worst option to hold the line until a lasting peace is negotiated.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the resolutely pro-Moscow approach of the new team in Washington mean that Russia is the big winner in the Ukrainian war at this stage? That Ukraine will have resisted for three years for (almost) nothing? That the United States will reap the long-term benefits of this strategic position in Europe? And will the EU be marginalized and reduced to a secondary role on its own continent? Visible success should not obscure the strategic setbacks of the self-proclaimed winners. Ever since the second Trump administration unilaterally opened direct and exclusive talks with Russia on the fate of Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on 18 February, MAGA communicators everywhere have heralded the end of the conflict. Even if a simple ceasefire now seems highly unlikely, the new American president proclaims that he will soon lead the "peace side" to victory, since he claims to be its leader. Who knows if he will have the courage to apply for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize himself? After three years of war, if the terms of negotiation announced last week are confirmed, we must return to the essential question of victory and the corollary question of defeat: who can claim the title of victor in this armed conflict? And, conversely, who is to be condemned to the status of the vanquished? The war of narratives has long since doubled and intensified the military war: European geopolitics is now confronted with a viral narrative that portrays Russia and the United States as winners to relegate Europeans and Ukrainians to the status of "losers". But if geopolitics feed on narratives, narratives - especially propaganda narratives - do not exhaust the strategic situation. As Machiavelli noted in Chapter XVII of The Prince: "The politician knows how to create illusions, but when it comes to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy, he must avoid relying solely on his eyes (which judge appearances) and instead use his hands (which feel reality). Let us be clear: at this stage of Ukraine debate, the reality of victory and the irreversibility of defeat are still matters of narrative. Let us plunge into reality. Ukraine, now vilified and resilient According to the Trumpian narrative broadcast everywhere today, Ukraine and its president must be treated as losers, even defeated. Everything about the behaviour of the American president and his team is aimed at hastening and consecrating the country's defeat: After having been asked to surrender its rare earth resources at rock-bottom prices, Ukraine, like the vanquished in the two world wars, is being excluded from the negotiating table on its own destiny by its self-appointed protector; its legitimate government is being openly denigrated and its legitimacy undermined; it is even being threatened with "war sanctions" to compensate the United States for the financial effort it has made to support it in the face of an illegal invasion. Beneath the strategic shift and the military evasion lies a continuity: for the United States, Ukraine is not a participant but a stake. Ukraine's symbolic defeat - that of history - is obviously compounded by its real setbacks. In addition to the 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers killed on the battlefield, the country of forty-three million people has lost more than six million refugees and millions of citizens who have been incorporated into the Russian Federation. And more than 20% of its territory is now in danger of officially falling under Russian sovereignty. Deprived by the Trump administration of the prospect of NATO membership, it risks a demilitarization comparable to that imposed on Germany after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At a time when symbolic defeat seems destined to go hand in hand with human and material misery, Ukraine can only save itself from despair by remembering that it has manifested its national identity - so often denied - with arms in hand. The narrative is that of a failed, slaughtered state, while the strategic reality is that of a state that has repelled the total occupation of its territory. The Ukrainians may not be the winners, but they are not "losers" reduced to an international minority. The United States, strategically discredited Can Washington, for its part, claim the trophy of strategic victory in Ukraine? Is the second Trump administration not determining the destiny of the old continent just as the Biden administration claimed to do, but in a different direction? Can't the United States now, more than ever, claim to be Europe's arbiter? Nothing is less certain: Ukraine's policies over the past decade (the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations) have indeed demonstrated the United States' refusal to play a leadership role in Europe. They encouraged Ukraine's inflexibility towards Russia but failed to prevent it from annexing Crimea in 2014, escalating tensions under the first Trump administration, and then invading in 2022. It then supported it for almost three years, only to disown it in a political transition. Washington has behaved not as a leader but as an arsonist in Ukraine, declaring on the one hand that Kyiv should be free to pursue its alliance policy but ruling out any concrete prospect of NATO membership on the other. One of the main lessons of Washington's Ukraine policy is that being one of the United States' "allies" is a risky business: not only does it leave you at the mercy of sudden shifts in alliances, but it also exposes you to constant admonishment and vilification on the international stage. The Europeans have paid the price: criticized by the Biden administration for their pacifism at the start of the war, they are now being criticized, along with the Ukrainians, for failing to bring the war to an end. The United States has made no major strategic gains in this war: it has undermined its own network of allies, damaged its largest military alliance in the world, NATO, and failed to dislodge its strategic regional rival, Russia. Trump's communication tricks will not change this: the United States has suffered undeniable structural strategic setbacks in this conflict. The long Ukrainian crisis, from the Orange Revolution to the current talks, via Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea, is the opposite of a show of strength for US international strategy: it is a financially costly and strategically ruinous fiasco. The contamination effect on Asian alliances is likely to be massive and rapid: who will want to rely on the American umbrella against the People's Republic of China? Russia, permanently "de-Europeanized What about Russia? Is it the big winner in all this? After all, hasn't it received the promise of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, its demilitarization, and its transformation into a rump state between Russian and EU territory? In addition to the 20% of Ukrainian territory (population and natural resources) it has seized, it wants to enjoy the prestige of being treated as a strategic peer by the United States. But is this a victory, even a Pyrrhic one? In historical terms, Moscow has lost in just a few years all the investment it made in its dialogue with the West between 1990 and 2000. It has deliberately squandered its relations with its natural economic outlet: Europe. Russia has been permanently de-Europeanized and will pay the price of this divorce in the form of lower growth potential (loss of markets, investors, assets) and in the form of a substantial defence effort that it will have to maintain in the long term throughout its western part, unless political forces favorable to it come to power simultaneously in the main EU countries, which seems unlikely. Again, we must measure this success with our hands, not our eyes: Russia has not achieved all its war aims, far from it. It did not make Ukraine disappear, and it did not make NATO retreat. Will this strategic hiatus - deliberately pursued by Russia in this war - be compensated for by a successful "pivot to Asia"? At best, the People's Republic of China could give Russia the role of "brilliant second" that Prussia gave Austria-Hungary. It is not so much a Pyrrhic victory as a strategic gamble that China has taken, the payoff of which is neither certain nor substantial. The EU faces up to its responsibilities Despite the condescending statements of the second Trump administration, can the EU claim to have made any strategic gains in this war? Again, the gains are meagre and the costs high: it has made great strides in terms of its capabilities but has not moved into a war economy; it is supporting the Ukrainian state at arm's length but has not forced its way to the negotiating table. If it proves reactive and creative, it can, in the medium term, take advantage of the gaping holes left by Russia and the United States on the European scene. As a result, it can no longer attract states to its side without the threat of arms. The Union must therefore quickly resume its enlargement efforts in order not to leave any space on its doorstep. On the other hand, the United States has openly renounced its status as Europe's protector: it wants to be its ideological dynamo, its industrial and technological supplier, and its strategic dominator. If Europe does not want to be among the losers in the Ukrainian war, it must therefore resolutely take full responsibility for its own defence. The time has come.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source