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Diplomacy
U.S. Nuclear Negotiations With Iran. U.S. Department of State, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Us-Iran Peace Talks: Options and Outcomes

by Ian Dudgeon

Will the US-Iran ‘peace talks succeed or fail? Given the mix of personalities and national interests involved, we just don’t know. Success would likely be a short-term, mutually face-saving compromise, leaving many major bilateral and regional issues still to be resolved. Failure is likely to lead to a US-initiated war with chaotic outcomes and perhaps no real winners. What does President Donald Trump want? In the short term, he wants a “peace deal” comprising multiple components. While not all details are public, the first and foremost goal is nuclear. Iran must not have the capability to make a nuclear weapon. While some reports suggest the US demands that Iran close down its whole nuclear program, most reporting claims US demands are limited to Iran ceasing the production of and giving up all enriched uranium beyond that needed for its domestic nuclear energy needs. US demands also include Iranian agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify they comply with this commitment. Other demands include limiting the range of all ballistic missiles to some 500 km (compared to some 2000 km at present), the cessation of all hostilities toward both regional countries, and support for other nations or proxies engaged in such hostilities. These terms would put all of Israel out of range and discourage further attacks from Iran on Israel, despite the term “hostilities” being left vague. It is difficult to see Iran agreeing to the former. A deal on the latter might be possible. One formula could be through recognizing Israel’s right to exit (as does the Palestine Authority - PA) and ceasing hostilities and support to proxies in the context of progress towards a two-state solution. Trump’s aim is ‘maximum pressure’, precipitating ‘regime change’— that is, the end of Iran’s conservative mullah-led autocracy and its military guardians, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is a longer-term goal, but one he would pursue opportunistically in the short term if circumstances permit, such as in the event of an outbreak of war. Denials and Tricky Negotiations Iran has always denied its intention to develop nuclear weapons; most recently, this week, by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi. The international community generally believes Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and would do so if it could; however, Iran won’t because it could not hide the process, and external intervention in response could be horrendous. Therefore, Iran is willing to negotiate the nuclear issue. It did so before, as part of negotiations between Iran and the US, resulting in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 during the presidency of Barack Obama. The difference between Obama and Trump is that Obama understood the subtleties of negotiating with Iran, i.e. build trust through the JCPOA before moving on to missiles and issues of regional hostilities. Trump 1.0 trashed the JCPOA in 2018, remarking it was “the worst deal in history.” Although Iran continued to comply with its conditions for a further 12 months. President Joe Biden dropped the ball on this issue, and Trump 2.0, upon re-election, continued where he left off in 2021. The Iranians are certainly not easy to negotiate with. Relevant “subtilties” include being a proud, fiercely independent, well-educated people who seek to own/control their own resources (e.g., oil) and, to the extent possible, be self-sufficient. They do not like being bullied, and trust is a key part of relationships. They claim Trump has consistently bullied them with his threats and actions, and all trust has long gone, dating back to Trump 1.0. Iranian officials have argued privately that the policies and actions of both Trump 1.0 and Biden, including the heavy economic sanctions, forced Iran into the “axis of evil” for basic survival reasons. They claim they want their independence, and have no particular affinity for the Russians, Chinese and North Koreans. One conclusion from that any negotiations with the US will occur in an atmosphere of tension and distrust. So, who does Iran trust? Violence on the Streets of Tehran: Regime Change and Civil Unrest On the issue of regime change, US (and Israeli) exploitation of last month’s widespread demonstrations throughout Iran was both an opportunity and a challenge. But the regime survived. There are four basic criteria for the successful change of any regime: leadership, the reason for change, the will of the majority of the people, and the support of a significant element of the armed forces and security forces to facilitate and sustain change Discontent with the Iranian government has been evident among different groups in the country for some time. Mostly, this has been political, but this time the driver was economic, driven principally by the hard squeeze of external sanctions, coupled with mismanagement and corruption. The outreach of hardship and dissent was much broader than before. And despite targeted input from outside Iran, the regime did not topple. Demonstrators were strongly suppressed by the government, and Trump’s threat to help demonstrators did not eventuate. Would his military intervention have been the tipping point? We can only guess. But here was no apparent split within the armed or security forces – given their deep involvement in the economy, there were strong self-interest motives not to – and no leadership figure, civilian or military, emerged. Attempts to promote Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, who was deposed in 1979, as a rallying figure, if only temporarily, failed. I doubt he has much appeal in-country due to the heavy suppression and corruption of his father. But the message was loud: there is disaffection, political and especially economic, which could ignite if the fuse is right. What to Expect Will Trump be tempted to use military force to try to facilitate regime change if he doesn’t get his way at the next round of nuclear negotiations, now due to be held in Oman late this week? He has the fleet in place, and comprehensive planning will be well underway, building on lessons learned from the Israeli-US 12-day war last June and recently in Venezuela. The planning focuses on key kinetic and non-kinetic targets, especially those requiring a preemptive strike. Israel will be part of this, with its own targets, which presumably will include key leadership, military and other persons. Iran will have done its planning also around its own lessons learned. Iranian early warning of an attack, even if measured in only minutes, will be critical in determining how quickly events unfold within and outside Iran, and how devastating they are. However, if this does force regime change, who will take over? Without the mullahs and lacking any civilian opposition infrastructure, the military (minus the IRGC?) would have to be the backbone of any new government. Civilian leadership is an unknown, though talented politicians and technocrats exist. Iran could become very fragmented and unstable as it sorts itself out. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Diplomacy
Washington DC, United States, August 9 2025: President Trump welcomes the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia to the White House for Bilateral and Trilateral meetings

“Move Fast and Break Things”. US opinions after the first year of Trump’s second term

by Hardy Ostry , Jan Bösche

Show strength, challenge traditions, put America’s interests — and its own — at the center: the first year of President Trump’s second term was a whirlwind of national and international change. In foreign policy in particular, he profoundly reshaped the role of the United States — and called the existing order into question. Opinion polls In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. presidents to convince large majorities of Americans of their policies and to achieve high approval ratings. The situation is no different for President Trump: his approval ratings were last positive in March of last year. Since then, Trump has become increasingly unpopular. RealClearPolitics aggregates various polls and now sees a disapproval rate for Trump of almost 56 percent. [1] Only on the issue of border security does approval remain positive; for all other issues such as immigration, security, foreign policy, or the economy, disapproval is rising.[2] Inflation, healthcare, and jobs are the most important issues for the Americans surveyed, for which a majority now sees the competence with the opposing Democrats. Even Trump’s Republicans are rather dissatisfied with the president’s economic policies: according to an AP poll, only 16 percent of Republicans think he has done much to reduce the cost of living. In general, however, they still support Trump: eight out of ten Republicans surveyed give him a good rating. [3] Domestic Policy “Move fast and break things” – is the mantra of the Silicon Valley, that the Christian Science Monitor uses to describe the past year of the president. Trump made a lightning start: “He expanded the boundaries of presidential power and, in his first year after returning, issued more executive orders than in his entire first term. He bypassed Congress, challenged the courts, invaded Venezuela and arrested its head of state, took revenge on his supposed opponents, and redecorated the White House with gold fixtures and a large-planned ballroom.” Trump’s second term makes his first term look like a rehearsal: “It’s almost as if he spent his first four years in office figuring out how much power he really had and then came back determined to fully exercise that power.” According to an analysis by the progressive think tank the Center for American Progress, after the first year of Trump’s second administration, the American workforce is feeling the effects of misguided economic policies: “2025 was marked by chaotic tariff announcements, rising costs for everyday necessities, increasing unemployment, as well as historic cuts in healthcare, food assistance, and clean energy, which drove costs even higher.” The economic turbulence of the first year has left most Americans skeptical about the new year. The think tank cites a survey showing that nearly 70 percent of respondents expected 2026 to be a year of economic difficulties. “Despite Trump’s claim that 2025 was the ‘best first year in history’ for an American president, Americans’ perceptions of their economic security and the latest economic data tell a different story.” “Is Trump trying to lose the midterm elections for Congress?” asks former Republican presidential adviser Karl Rove in the Wall Street Journal: “It was a year full of rapid changes, controversies, and upheavals. It was also a year full of puzzles.” Why does the president repeatedly take actions that go against his political interests? “Trump misses the opportunity to win over key swing voters for the Republicans.” As an example, Rove cites immigration policy and Trump’s approach at the border: “He stopped the flow of illegal migrants. He was right. We didn’t need a new law, just a different president. But Trump did not capitalize on the success to publicize it.” Instead, the Trump team misplayed its hand by sending immigration officers to hardware stores to arrest day laborers without valid papers who had otherwise done nothing wrong. “Americans are increasingly unsettled by the president’s erratic appearances and late-night tirades. Whether it is his age or his advisers, who cannot rein in his worst instincts, Trump behaves differently from any American president before him.” Trump dominates many news cycles but drives no substantial political change, writes conservative analyst Yuval Levin in The Atlantic: “He has worked more around the formal powers of the presidency than with them, and his goal often seems less about governing and more about showing strength.” This approach appears attractive, especially to those on the political right who feel disadvantaged by the American elites. Trump has been able to extract real concessions from some institutions. However, this approach is short-sighted and reactive. Levin writes that in his first year in office, Trump signed fewer laws than any other modern president, and most of them were limited in scope and purpose. The only significant law was essentially an extension of existing tax policy. Otherwise, there were interventions like DOGE and deals. In doing so, the president’s discretionary powers are “used as a lever to influence behavior, rather than using the government’s administrative authority to set predictable, uniform rules for entire areas of society. In other words: they use arbitrariness as an instrument. This can be a source of real power in the short term, but it is ultimately very dangerous for public life in the United States.” Donald Trump will get a third term — by overshadowing his successor, analyzes John Harris of Politico. Trump is on the path to changing the character of the American government and the United States’ international relations more profoundly than any of his predecessors in recent decades: “The reach of Trump’s policies and his disruptive way of implementing them will almost inevitably dominate the campaign and the first term of his successor — perhaps even more so if that successor is a Democrat.” In this way, Trump gets a third term, even if he is not unconstitutionally trying to stay in office. “The task of repairing what Democrats and many others see as Trump’s vandalism means that the first day of the next president will be backward-looking — and probably also the first month and the first year.” Trump has expressed his mix of ideas, grievances, and vanities in a much more concrete, programmatic way than friends or opponents would have expected. He has become more radical and less restrained. “In his first term, his critics cried, ‘This is not normal!’ Only now, it is normal.” Foreign Policy Benn Steil from the Council on Foreign Relations analyzes “Trump’s new world order” and the contradiction between his campaign promise to focus on the U.S. and interventions such as in Venezuela: “The obvious contradiction reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy thinking, which aligns with Trump’s preference but is independent of it: dominate what is easy to dominate, and appease or ignore what is not.” There is said to be a consensus within the administration, which is committed to maintaining the hemisphere’s dominance. There is an attempt to offset a withdrawal from persistent overseas conflicts with a simultaneous demonstration of strength closer to home. The goal is to restore the world order that existed before World War I, when America’s global ambitions were more restrained and its neighborhood was safer. What role will the United States play internationally this year? Leslie Vinjamuri of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs asks: “Will it be a stabilizing force? A peacemaker? Or will it continue to sow unrest?” Events at the start of the year have shown that Trump sees value in the latter. Trump does not feel bound by precedent, norms, or laws, and is not deterred by them. Neither allies, Congress, nor courts have so far given reason to believe that this could change. Trump is slowly changing public perception of sovereignty, territory, and national security: “There are already many people that look at maps of Greenland and think differently about its geography, significance, and proper place in the international order.” Whether Trump’s desire for public recognition will divert him from his pursuit of global power — or whether the public will be swept along by Trump — remains to be seen. William Alan Reinsch from the Center for Strategic and International Studies analyzes the president’s trade policy and constant new tariff threats. Whether these are economically sound steps is debatable, but they are undoubtedly politically savvy moves. The constant announcement of new “shiny objects” makes any detailed analysis of previous actions irrelevant: “When these decisions are announced, few facts are released, and by the time journalists, scholars, and other analysts have figured out what was actually decided and taken the time to assess its significance, the public has already moved on, captivated by the next shiny object.” The result is a lack of accountability. “When historians eventually write about this era, there will be accountability, but it will be too late.” The framers of the Constitution intended a government that acts prudently. Checks and balances were meant to ensure that no single branch of government holds disproportionate power over the others. When a president pursues so many political actions that they flood the space and undermine the oversight mechanisms, these accountabilities disappear. Donald Trump started 2026 as the true leader of Europe, writes Nile Gardiner of the Trump-friendly Heritage Foundation. In the first year of his second term, the Trump administration had already shaken the foundations of Europe to its core: “Trump may not be popular in Europe, but he is increasingly respected as a force to be reckoned with.” Trump is wrongly accused of being an isolationist. In reality, he cares far more about Europe than his predecessors: “He is the most transatlantic American president since Ronald Reagan and regards the salvation of Europe as a vital national interest of the United States. His approach to Europe is downright revolutionary. He is the first U.S. president to question the European project, and his ultimate goal is of great significance: the salvation of Western civilization itself.” The U.S. has every right to comment on the EU and Europe’s future because Americans have financed Europe’s security for decades. Whether President Trump actually has a plan is questioned by Thomas de Waal of the Carnegie Endowment. One version suggests he is trying to revive the Monroe Doctrine and govern the Western Hemisphere — a return “to an era of imperialism and spheres of influence”: “The threat he currently poses is primarily a threat of chaos. Calling the challenge a new Monroe Doctrine is only partly correct: it is more of a ‘Gone-Rogue Doctrine.’ However, it is no longer possible to establish spheres of influence in the 21st century in the old style. Trump needs to be reminded that he already has a modern variant: a friendly alliance stretching from Vancouver to Kiev, which he is now losing.” References [1] https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/approval/donal d-trump/approval-rating [2] Beispielhaft bei Strength in Numbers: https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/new-poll-trump-slipson-immigration [3] https://apnews.com/article/poll-trump-republicansimmigration-economy-inflation-costs634472fc2ee3b4477a7be997bbd0c69e

Diplomacy
Mark Carney, the former governor of the bank of england, speaking at an event with hand in the foreground and red background, New York City, October 7, 2025

Canada Takes the World Stage at Davos

by Bruce Mabley

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech at Davos on January 20th marks a watershed in the post-war economic world order. Riddled with sectoral US tariffs and fearful of potential draconian trade concessions in the upcoming renegotiation of the North American free trade pact (CUSMA), Canada has taken to the world stage to say the obvious – that most countries, except the superpowers, can no longer count on global economic multilateralism as a cornerstone of their prosperity. The Davos Speech The central theme of Carney’s Davos speech was to define what exactly is happening in the world’s economic sphere. His delivery was frank and brutal, tearing away the veil of uncertainty. Carney offered his explanation of the ‘rupture’ in the world economic order. Philosophers call it an epistemological break. It best defines the scope of the break Carney is referring to. Although President Trump was not named, the break extends to, but is not limited to, the worsening state of Canadian-American economic relations. It is more than that. According to Carney, the break is not a temporary phenomenon, meaning that nostalgia for the old-world order will not provide answers on how to move forward. A return to the past multilateralism will not occur. This stark conclusion was written on the faces of the attendees: America has become an unpredictable and unreliable partner. Trade diversification is required for Canada to pull away from too much dependence on the United States. Before arriving in Davos, PM Carney visited China in an effort to patch up relations that had been strained under the Trudeau regime. Trade diversification was discussed. The Chinese gave way on a few key agricultural products that had been subject to huge tariffs. The old ‘quid pro quo’ on the importation of Chinese electric vehicles was put on its head. Canada agreed to import 49,000 EVs. At the conclusion of the visit, one could sense a warming of relations, although there was no full-blown free trade deal. International Reaction (A Star Is Born) On the international level, Carney’s Davos speech thrust him into the spotlight. The appeal he made to middle powers in Europe and Asia, in particular, has won him praise from many world leaders. Despite early positive indications, the Trump administration has now changed course and seeks to marginalize Carney’s consequential message. National Level (clear skies) The national parliament in Ottawa features little opposition to Carney’s Liberals. There have even been some floor crossings to add to the Liberal minority government, several seats away from a majority. The main opposition party has been outflanked and outgunned by Carney. Their leader is facing a leadership review soon. The Provinces (Carney’s Achilles Heel) It is on the provincial level that Carney faces the most serious challenges. First, Carney must juggle the different and sometimes conflicting interests of the provinces. This was evident during the recent trip to China. Some relief was found in the agricultural sector. Carney’s decision to let a limited number of Chinese EVs into the country has angered Ontario Premier Doug Ford and his allies in the automotive sector. It looks as if that crisis is temporarily over, but the potential for further unrest remains a concern. Alberta Alberta is mounting an independence referendum this year. At this time, polls indicate that the independence option would fail if the referendum were held now. Both the Alberta and a potential third referendum in Québec could be subject to election interference from the United States, using their diplomatic missions as forward bases. American interest in Alberta’s oil fields is undoubtedly a consideration in this regard. Suddenly, Trump’s ‘idle talk’ about Canada becoming the 51st state becomes a real proposition. Is Alberta’s independence a prelude to joining the USA, or will it become an independent state in its own right? It is in the interests of the Alberta separatist movement to keep these two threats alive as plausible options in any future negotiations with the central government. Québec After Davos, Carney returned home to Québec. At the very site of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Carney delivered a speech to foster Canadian unity and explain how the 1763 battle paved the way for French-English cooperation, the future basis of Confederation in 1867. The reaction in French Québec was swift and bipartisan. Carney’s questionable interpretation of this event was strongly criticized as being patronizing, historically incorrect, and pro-English. Carney’s rejoinder in halting French did nothing to quell the anger. In Québec, events are moving fast. Québec Premier François Legault, a former separatist minister whose aim was to increase Québec provincial autonomy, has resigned amidst desperate polling numbers. A Parti Québécois separatist victory in October of this year now appears likely, heralding a third referendum on independence and adding more tension to already strained federal-provincial relations. Renewal of CUSMA (waning hopes) Prior to Davos, the Carney government sent several emissaries to Washington to seek to eliminate sectoral tariffs on products such as aluminum and steel and to prepare the ground for the renewal of CUSMA. More than 80% of Canadian goods delivered to the USA are CUSMA-compliant and tariff-free. At the end of the first year of Trump’s second mandate, no clear path towards that goal has been identified. CUSMA, an economic accord, is the basis of Canada-US bilateral relations. Such a rupture, despite Canada’s best intentions and efforts at renewal, would be a logical reflection of Carney’s Davos message. The Canadian people have responded to the situation by boycotting US goods and suspending visits to Uncle Sam. Anxiety over threats of annexation is rife. That sentiment is captured allegorically in a clip from a popular sixties movie: Soon after the Allied victory at El Alamein during World War II, Winston Churchill remarked that ‘Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.’ Carney’s Davos message will endure. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Diplomacy
China, Nicaragua bilateral relations concept background

A family state at the service of Beijing

by Martin Brown

The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

Diplomacy
A roll of US dollars with the American flag on top of a other currencies and country flags. Dollar hegemony concept.

The geopolitical strategy of the United States to maintain its global hegemony

by Daniel Seguel

The United States has employed different geopolitical strategies to maintain its status as a dominant power vis-à-vis rival countries such as China and to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Since his return to the White House, President Donald Trump has announced tariff increases on 60 countries, issued ultimatums to Russia to end the War in Ukraine, and recently intervened in Venezuela by capturing Nicolás Maduro. In this way, a rise in the use of hard power by the United States can be observed, aimed at forcing other countries to behave in a particular manner in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. The foreign policy process of a state is the most important means through which it formulates and implements the policies that determine its interactions with other actors in the international system. Hans Morgenthau (1949) argued that self-preservation is the primary duty of a nation; in this regard, the choice of foreign policy objectives and means is predetermined in two ways: by the goals to be pursued and by the power available to achieve them. For his part, Joseph Nye (1999) argued that a state’s interests are not revealed solely through power or security considerations, since they also include economic concerns. Thus, countries also focus on economic relations, which may entail interdependence effects among states. Consequently, both national security and economic well-being are important to states’ interests. Within this framework, it is possible to discern the geopolitical landscape that the United States is developing through its foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that they would not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States. “This is our hemisphere,” he affirmed, “and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened” (The White House, 2026). This warning, together with the National Security Strategy and the recent intervention in Venezuela, represents a new form of the Monroe Doctrine. In his address to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe articulated the United States’ policy regarding the new political order that was developing in the Americas and Europe’s role in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe administration warned the European imperial powers not to interfere in the affairs of the newly independent Latin American states. In this way, it sought to increase U.S. influence and trade throughout the southern region (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Likewise, the Trump administration’s geopolitical objective is to consolidate its hemisphere of influence in the face of rival powers, primarily China. Marco Rubio indicated that it is important to secure the national interest in the region and stated: “we have seen how our adversaries are exploiting and extracting resources from Africa. They are not going to do it in the Western Hemisphere” (The White House, 2026). In addition to Latin America, the United States has sought to increase its presence in Africa to counterbalance China. China’s main foreign policy strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of strengthening global connectivity through infrastructure initiatives such as roads, ports, and railways. As a result, China’s economic and political influence expanded by linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. By early 2025, more than 150 countries had joined the BRI, representing approximately 75% of the world’s population and more than half of global GDP. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that the cumulative value of BRI investments and construction contracts has exceeded one trillion dollars across all participating countries (Ulubel, 2025). In Africa, one example of Belt and Road infrastructure is the Mombasa–Nairobi railway in Kenya, which was financed by Chinese banks under the framework of the agreements. As a result, more than 2 million passengers and around 6 million tons of goods are transported annually, allowing transportation costs to be reduced by 40%. In addition, the expansion of the line toward Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is planned, with the aim of integrating the economies of East Africa into a common railway system (Ulubel, 2025). Figure 1 illustrates the countries that have partnered with the Belt and Road Initiative, by year of accession. The geographic areas where China is consolidating its presence can be observed, especially on the African continent. Source: Lew et al., 2021, p. 14. The Belt and Road Initiative, with the support of state-owned banks and Chinese companies, is displacing U.S. exports and challenging American firms in BRI countries. Consequently, the United States has increasingly moved closer to African countries to counter China’s influence. Recently, the House of Representatives voted to continue trade programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which protect and strengthen U.S. strategic, economic, and national security interests, including access to critical minerals found outside the country. In this way, AGOA seeks to challenge the economic coercion and exploitation of African nations by China and Russia (Ways & Means, 2026). This approach has also been pursued during the foreign policy of former President Joe Biden. In 2022, the Secretary of State of the Biden administration, Antony Blinken, launched the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which reinforced the view that African countries are geostrategic actors and key partners on urgent issues, ranging from promoting an open and stable international system to shaping the technological and economic future (U.S. Department of State, 2022). In this context, Blinken stated: “Africa is a major geopolitical force. It has shaped our past, it is shaping our present, and it will shape our future” (US Africa Media Hub, 2022). In 2022, Blinken indicated that even as President Putin’s war continues, they remained focused on the most serious and long-term challenge to the international order: the People’s Republic of China. This is because it is the only country with both the intention to reshape the international order and has the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Consequently, Blinken stated: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It is the second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It is home to some of the world’s largest technological companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. It has rapidly modernized its military and aims to become a top tier fighting force. And it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power” (Blinken, 2022). Consequently, the United States has sought to consolidate its bilateral relations in regions where China has a greater presence. However, U.S. power in the international system relies on the strength of the dollar. The petrodollar system helps sustain the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. In 1974, Saudi Arabia and other regional oil suppliers agreed to accept only dollars for the sale of oil in exchange for military aid and equipment from the U.S. In addition, the Saudis invested the surpluses from that production in U.S. Treasury bonds, thereby financing U.S. spending (Wong, 2016). This process, commonly called “petrodollar recycling,” is beneficial for the parties involved: oil-producing countries have a reliable destination to invest the income from their exports, while the United States ensures a source of financing to cover its fiscal deficit. Consequently, countries seeking to purchase oil must do so using U.S. dollars, which drives demand for this currency in international markets (Grant, 2018). Since that time, the oil market has been trading in dollars, increasing demand for the currency. The predominance of the dollar as the world’s reference currency gives the United States enormous geopolitical influence, with the ability to impose sanctions on countries it considers adversaries, freeze dollar-denominated assets, or exclude a country from the international financial system, paralyzing its foreign trade or complicating the import of raw materials priced in that currency, such as oil. This mechanism represents one of the foundations of U.S. power and allows it to maintain its status as a hegemonic power. However, if oil trade were to begin taking place in another currency, it would affect the dominant position of the United States. Within this framework, the United States has prevented rival countries from attempting to displace the supremacy of the dollar, such as the members of BRICS. This bloc has sought to reduce dependence on the dollar by using local currencies for trade. One example is the BRICS Pay initiative, a cross-border digital payment system being developed by the BRICS countries. This means that trade among its members could be settled directly in reais, rubles, rupees, yuan, or rand, with the system managing conversion, clearing, and settlement without routing transactions through the U.S. dollar. The initiative is part of a broader strategic effort to reduce dollar dependence, strengthen financial sovereignty, and create alternative global payment infrastructures outside systems controlled by the West (BRICS, 2026). With the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank, there has been speculation that they could launch a common currency as a strategy for de-dollarization. Given this possibility, many market operators advocate for the currency to be digital, backed by gold or other resource assets. If the project materializes, the implications for the international monetary system and financial markets would be significant (Lissovolik, 2024). The United States was aware of this possibility. When the BRICS 2025 summit was held, Trump stated that the bloc is not a serious threat, but that they are attempting to destroy the dollar so that another country could take control. “If we lose the dollar as the global standard,” he declared, “it would be like losing a great world war; we would no longer be the same country. We will not allow that to happen” (Messerly et al., 2025). Later, on his Truth Social account, he wrote: “Any country that aligns with the BRICS’ anti-American policies will receive an additional 10% tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy” (Reuters, 2025). Although there is still no BRICS currency, the United States has anticipated its potential effects. Dollar supremacy also gives the U.S. the power to sanction or economically isolate certain countries, such as Russia in 2022. In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom agreed to exclude several Russian banks from the international payment messaging system SWIFT. This decision was one of the most forceful sanctions within a set of measures aimed at economically isolating Russia and, consequently, weakening its financial system, with the goal of pressuring Vladimir Putin’s government to end its military operations in Ukraine (Pérez, 2022). Therefore, Russia has conducted its commercial transactions in another currency, such as the Chinese yuan. In this context, the growing weight of the Chinese currency in financial markets could erode the primacy of the dollar, a trend that began to concern Washington. In this scenario, Venezuela announced in 2017 that the country was prepared to sell oil to China and receive payments in yuan, thus making international agreements using a currency other than the dollar (Valladares & Medina, 2017). In 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (Pdvsa) announced that PetroChina International Corp purchased one million barrels of Venezuelan crude, a transaction carried out in digital yuan through the Shanghai International Energy Exchange. In this way, a trend is marked toward abandoning the dollar as the currency for transactions in the energy market (CIIP, 2023). When the United States intervened in Venezuela this year and captured Nicolás Maduro, it was not only seeking oil but also preventing the displacement of the petrodollar system. As a result, this operation directly affects China, since part of Venezuela’s oil exports to China is used to pay debts, estimated between 10 and 12 billion dollars. The U.S. intervention endangered the flow of discounted Venezuelan oil to China’s teapot refineries and will likely affect the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela’s upstream business. The Trump administration has declared that all Venezuelan oil will now flow through legitimate and authorized channels, in accordance with U.S. law and national security. This strategy seeks to prevent any influence over natural resources in the region. Consequently, the U.S. president’s approach of directing all oil flows from Venezuela will negatively impact China, Venezuela’s largest oil customer and a major creditor (Downs & Palacio, 2026). However, it is not only rival countries that have been affected by the U.S. attempt to maintain its hegemony; its allies and strategic partners have also been impacted. In January 2025, Trump posted an image of the map of Canada with the U.S. flag, hinting at a possible annexation. On other occasions, Trump referred to his neighbor as the 51st state. In February of that year, the White House announced an additional 25% tariff on Canadian imports and a 10% tariff on its energy resources (The White House, 2025). As a result, Prime Minister Mark Carney negotiated trade agreements with China, allowing for a mutual reduction of tariffs (Yousif, 2026). On the other hand, Trump generated tensions within NATO when he threatened to annex Greenland by force and warned those who did not support him of increased tariffs. He later declined both measures and assured that a framework agreement had been reached (Holland & Hunnicutt, 2026). Nevertheless, the political damage was already done. Trump’s plan for territorial expansion destroyed an important post-World War II norm: that borders cannot be redrawn by force of arms. Mark Carney stated at this year’s Davos Forum that “great powers have begun using economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion.” In this way, he indicated that the world order is “in the middle of a rupture, not a transition” (World Economic Forum, 2026). Consequently, the United States, as a hegemonic power, has acted unilaterally, disregarding the rule-based world order, and has even accelerated its breakdown. Therefore, from this background, it can be concluded that the United States has developed geopolitical strategies to remain a global power vis-à-vis rival countries, primarily China. Two strategies can be discerned. First, the U.S. emphasizes national security by securing the Western Hemisphere, reviving the Monroe Doctrine. Second, economic interdependence is intensified through the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, preventing financial alternatives. Moreover, the attention the United States has directed toward Africa responds to the intention to balance China’s growing influence in the region gained through the Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, it can be observed that the Trump administration has set aside soft power (attraction and persuasion) and has relied on hard power mechanisms, such as military threats to annex Greenland, ultimatums to Russia, intervention in Venezuela, and economic sanctions and tariff increases on countries that do not comply with its directives. These measures demonstrate that the United States has lost its capacity for attraction and has had to resort to threats to influence the behavior of other states. In summary, the frequent use of hard power shows that the status of the United States as the leading power has begun to decline, and it is striving to maintain its global hegemony by force, regardless of the consequences for the international order. References Blinken, A. (2022). The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ BRICS. (2026). What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work?What Is BRICS Pay and How Does It Work? BRICS. https://infobrics.org/en/post/77791/ CIIP. (2023). Compra de petróleo venezolano en yuanes afianza desdolarización del mercado energético global. Centro Internacional de Inversión Productiva. https://www.ciip.com.ve/compra-de-petroleo-venezolano-en-yuanes-afianza-desdolarizacion-del-mercado-energetico-global/ Downs, E. y Palacio, L. (2026). US Action Threatens Venezuela-China Oil Flows, Debt Repayment, and Investments. Center on Global Energy Policy al Columbia SIPA. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/venezuela-china-oil-ties-severely-impacted-by-us-action/ Grant, J. (2018). The end of the petrodollar? American Foreign Policy Council. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/the-end-of-the-petrodollar Holland, S. y Hunnicutt, T. (2026). Trump backs down on Greenland tariffs, says deal framework reached. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/davos/determined-seize-greenland-trump-faces-tough-reception-davos-2026-01-21/ Lew, J., Roughead, G., Hillman, J. y Sacks, D. (2021). Task Force Report N° 79: China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. Council on Foreign Relations. Lissovolik, Y. (2024). Changing the Global Monetary and Financial Architecture: The Role of BRICS-Plus. BRICS Journal of Economics, 5(1). https://brics-econ.arphahub.com/issue/4634/ Messerly, M., Hawkins, A. and Bazail-Eimil, E. (2025). ‘The president is pissed’: Trump's Brazil tariff threat is part of a bigger geopolitical dispute. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/10/trumps-brics-fueled-anger-sparked-50-percent-tariff-threat-on-brazil-00447814 Morgenthau, H. (1949). The Primacy of the National Interest. The American Scholar, 18(2), 207–212. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41205156 Nye, J. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049361 Office of the Historian. (s. f.). Monroe Doctrine, 1823. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe Pérez, C. (2022). What Does Russia’s Removal From SWIFT Mean For the Future of Global Commerce? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/swift-sanctions-ukraine-russia-nato-putin-war-global-finance/ Reuters. (2025). Trump says alignment with BRICS' 'anti-American policies' to invite additional 10% tariffs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-alignment-with-brics-anti-american-policies-invite-additional-10-2025-07-07/ The White House. (2025). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes Tariffs on Imports from Canada, Mexico and China. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-imposes-tariffs-on-imports-from-canada-mexico-and-china/ The White House. (2026). RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/ Ulubel, Y. (2025). 12 years, over 150 countries: Inside the Belt and Road Initiative's global legacy. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202509/17/WS68ca22caa3108622abca13d4.html US Africa Media Hub. (2022). [@USAfricaMediaHub]. X. https://x.com/AfricaMediaHub/status/1604782790029049858 U.S. Department of State. (2022). Travel to Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, August 2-12, 2022. U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda-august-2-11-2022/ Valladares, D. y Medina, J. (2017). Venezuela venderá petróleo a China en yuanes. Ministerio del Poder Popular de Economía y Finanzas. https://www.mppef.gob.ve/venezuela-vendera-petroleo-a-china-en-yuanes/ Ways & Means (2026). House Advances America’s Strategic Interests in Africa and Haiti, Eliminates Payments to Dead People. United States House Comittee on Ways and Means. https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2026/01/12/house-advances-americas-strategic-interests-in-africa-and-haiti-eliminates-payments-to-dead-people/ Wong, A. (2016). The Untold Story Behind Saudi Arabia’s 41-Year U.S. Debt Secret. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-05-30/the-untold-story-behind-saudi-arabia-s-41-year-u-s-debt-secret World Economic Forum. (2026). Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/ Yousif, N. (2026). Canada's deal with China signals it is serious about shift from US. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm24k6kk1rko

Diplomacy
Presidente de la República, Gabriel Boric Font, asiste a la asunción del Presidente de Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz. Gobierno de Chile, CC BY 3.0 CL <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/cl/deed.en>, via Wikimedia Commons. Dirección de Prensa, Presidencia

From MAS to Reopening: Bolivia, International Relations, and Economic Prospects

by World & New World Journal

Bolivia, an Andean country, historically battered by economic, social, and political tensions, has experienced one of its most decisive moments in recent decades. The victory of Rodrigo Paz, the Christian Democratic Party candidate, has brought an end to a political cycle lasting nearly 20 years, initiated by Evo Morales, which resulted in the hegemony of the Movement for Socialism (MAS). Paz's victory has not only changed Bolivia's course but also opens a new phase, signaling a clear shift to the right, a rearrangement of its international relations, and a rethinking of its foreign policy in a volatile American context. The Decline of MAS and the Rise of Paz To understand the magnitude of this change, it is necessary to look back. Since Evo Morales came to power in 2006, MAS consolidated itself as the dominant force in Bolivia, promoting a nationalist, statist agenda and strong state intervention in strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons and natural resources. Furthermore, during the MAS period, an anti-imperialist discourse marked Bolivia's foreign policy. In this tone, Bolivia aligned itself with left-wing governments in Latin America, notably Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, within the ALBA framework, and distanced itself significantly from Washington. However, after two decades in power, internal divisions and power struggles within MAS caused deep wear within the party and its supporters. Bolivia's economy faced its worst crisis in decades: a recession marked by a decline in gas production — a key source of fiscal income and exports for the country — high inflation levels, and a shortage of foreign currency that limited the functioning of the state apparatus. Faced with this scenario, and with a frustrated citizenry over economic and social management, the Bolivian electorate opted for a radical change in October 2025. Rodrigo Paz, a centrist politician with a pragmatic message, secured a surprising 54.5% of the votes in the second round, ultimately defeating rival candidate Jorge Quiroga, marking the end of almost two decades of MAS governments. Although Paz was considered a less significant candidate by polls and analysts, he comes from a more orthodox and moderate political tradition, and his rhetoric has been seemingly conciliatory toward social sectors. His father, Jaime Paz Zamora, was president of the country, and Paz has a solid political career, making him no stranger to the responsibilities of leadership. His campaign slogan, loosely translated as "capitalism for all," aimed to inspire some economic openness while still addressing the social demands traditionally favored by MAS. A Shift to the Right... but with Nuances Although it is referred to as a “shift to the right,” Bolivia’s reality is not monolithic. It could be more accurately described as a shift toward a pragmatic center-right, seeking to balance economic openness with the protection of certain social programs. MAS was defeated not so much due to a complete rejection of its ideological proposals, but because of an economic crisis that weakened and divided its political base and its dominant discourse. This nuance is key. Paz's victory was not solely due to a traditional conservative vote but also to the mobilization of sectors disillusioned by MAS's unmet promises. In this sense, his proposal positioned itself as a hybrid fusion: a moderate economic liberalization, while maintaining a minimal social protection network. However, although MAS has become an almost irrelevant opposition — receiving very low support and reduced to a symbolic presence in the first round — Paz's new government inherits a fragmented internal political landscape, which will require negotiating alliances with various legislative blocs in order to govern. Relations with Neighbors: Rebuilding What Had Been Dismantled Bolivia's foreign policy over the past two decades was marked by its alignment with left-wing governments and regional movements such as ALBA, which included Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other governments with anti-U.S. or at least skeptical stances toward Washington. Under Evo Morales, Bolivia strengthened ties with China, Iran, and Russia, diversifying alliances outside of the traditional Western bloc. With Paz’s victory, this framework seems to have been dismantled. The president-elect has been explicit in not inviting leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua to his presidential inauguration, citing differences concerning democracy and governance. This gesture, although symbolic, signals a shift in foreign policy: moving away from pre-configured ideological positions and prioritizing relations based on democratic criteria and economic cooperation. Bolivia’s exit from the ALBA bloc and its suspension by the organization for “anti-Bolivarian and pro-imperialist behavior” reflects the diplomatic impact of this shift. Furthermore, the presence of leaders such as Javier Milei, president of Argentina, at Paz's inauguration ceremony consolidated Latin American representations more aligned with free-market economic policies and oriented toward cooperation with the United States and Europe. Another relevant factor is the relationship with traditional South American neighbors such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Although political orientation may vary regionally, there is consensus on the need to strengthen trade and cooperation in infrastructure and energy, especially considering Bolivia’s economic challenges. Paz himself mentioned that Bolivia’s “cooperation” with its “five borders” — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru — “will be essential” for his new administration. He has even already held meetings and encounters with Boric (Chile), Milei (Argentina), and Noboa (Ecuador). The Relaunch of Relations with the United States Perhaps the most symbolic and geopolitically significant element of Bolivia's new direction is the resumption of relations with the United States. Bilateral relations had been fractured since the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador in 2008 under Evo Morales’ presidency, following years of tensions over mutual accusations of interference and conspiracy. Paz's announcement to restore diplomatic ties and reopen the U.S. embassy in La Paz represents a drastic shift in approach. This reopening not only restores formal political dialogue but also opens opportunities for cooperation in trade, investment, and security — especially at a time when Bolivia faces currency problems, a fiscal deficit, and a fuel shortage. In addition, the United States and several Latin American countries issued a joint statement of support for Paz after the elections, emphasizing the willingness to collaborate in stabilizing the economy, strengthening democratic institutions, and boosting international investment. This relaunch is not without political conditions. Cooperation could focus on the fight against drug trafficking, corruption, and other transnational challenges, areas in which Washington has shown strategic interest. The involvement of agencies like the DEA and other security organizations could intensify once again. The DEA issue has been controversial, with both former presidents Evo Morales and Luis Arce expressing concerns, as they consider both the DEA and U.S. cooperation agencies to be conspirators, something the White House has always denied. The openness to cooperation with the United States may also have a tangible economic component: investment flows, access to international financing, and support for macroeconomic stabilization. Given the foreign currency crisis that has suffocated Bolivia, these relations could translate into crucial financial relief. The Stance on Venezuela and the New Regional Context Another geopolitical axis that has changed drastically with the rise of Paz is his stance on Venezuela and its political crisis. Under the MAS, Bolivia historically maintained close ties with Nicolás Maduro’s regime, aligning itself with anti-imperialist rhetoric and supporting governments considered ideological allies. However, Paz has adopted a critical stance toward the Venezuelan government, especially after recent events — including the capture of Maduro by U.S. forces in January 2026. In his public statements, the Bolivian president has emphasized that the way out for Venezuela is to "respect the vote and democracy," positioning Bolivia alongside a narrative of democracy and institutionalism that contrasts with the country’s previous alignment with Chavismo. This approach places Bolivia on the opposite side of traditional left-wing governments in the region, such as Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, or Mexico under Claudia Sheinbaum, who have condemned the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and called for peaceful solutions based on international law. In contrast, Paz has preferred to emphasize the importance of democracy as the guiding principle of Bolivia's foreign policy. The invitation to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado to the Bolivian inauguration also underscores this renewed focus on democracy and human rights, marking a clear break with La Paz's previous political ties to Caracas. Economic Implications and Future Prospects The new Bolivian phase faces enormous economic challenges. The transition to a more market-oriented model and the opportunities to attract foreign investment offer prospects for recovery, but they are not without risks. The country is dealing with high inflation, fuel shortages, a fiscal crisis, and an urgent need for foreign currency. In this context, the opening to the United States and international markets could boost key sectors like lithium, where Bolivia holds some of the world’s largest reserves. Bolivia's mining sector could also benefit from the country's opening. Cooperation with external investors, including Americans and European allies, could transform Bolivia’s productive capacity and position it as a strategic player in the global critical minerals supply chain. In fact, recently, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) visited Bolivia, and with a message to the nation, Paz announced “[…] 7 billion dollars for infrastructure works, employment, and labor, which we need so much in Bolivia.” At the same time, Paz’s government will need to carefully manage internal tensions. Social sectors traditionally aligned with MAS may feel displaced or fear the loss of social assistance programs, posing challenges for internal cohesion — a critical issue is the elimination of fuel subsidies. On the other hand, although the legislative situation is not as complicated, the need to form legislative alliances and engage in political dialogue will be crucial to avoid institutional conflicts that could weaken his ability to implement necessary economic reforms. Conclusion Rodrigo Paz’s victory not only symbolizes the end of MAS's dominance after nearly two decades, but it also represents a profound reconfiguration of Bolivia’s political, economic, and diplomatic course. This new chapter is characterized by pragmatism focused on the economy, a shift towards strategic relations with the United States and other Western partners, and a stance based on defending democracy in the face of regional crises such as the Venezuelan one. However, this path is not without internal tensions and structural challenges that could determine whether Bolivia manages to consolidate a sustainable development model or if social and political fractures reappear on the horizon. The country's contemporary history, in this sense, continues to be written with the uncertainty of whether this pragmatic center-right experiment will be a definitive solution or a prelude to new turns in the future. From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bolivia finds itself on a new hemispheric stage where the competition between the United States and China, as well as tensions between right-wing and left-wing governments in the region, shape the agenda. Paz's election can be seen as part of a broader trend in Latin America towards governments that prioritize macroeconomic stability, diplomatic pragmatism, and international cooperation beyond rigid ideological alignments. References Buenos Aires Times. (2025, November 11). Argentina's Javier Milei to attend new Bolivia president Rodigo Paz’s inauguration. Retrieved from Buenos Aires Times: https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/argentinas-javier-milei-to-attend-new-bolivia-president-rodigo-pazs-inauguration.phtml?utm_source=chatgpt.com CiberCuba Editorial Team. (2025, October 21). The elected president of Bolivia will not invite Díaz-Canel, Maduro, or Ortega to the inauguration: “They are not democratic.”. Retrieved from CiberCuba: https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-10-21-u1-e207888-s27061-nid313318-presidente-electo-bolivia-invitara-diaz-canel-maduro?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette Flores, F. (2025, Octubre 21). Bolivia: Los desafíos del próximo gobierno de Rodrigo Paz. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/bolivia-los-desafios-del-proximo-gobierno-de-rodrigo-paz/ Guevara Condore, M., & Pimentel Huerto, R. (2025, Octubre 27). Bolivia regresó a la derecha tras casi más de 20 años gobernado por el MAS y en medio de una crisis económica. Retrieved from La República: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/10/19/bolivia-regreso-a-la-derecha-luego-de-mas-de-20-anos-gobernado-por-el-mas-y-en-medio-de-una-crisis-economica-1455609?utm_source=chatgpt.com Jara, R. (2025, Octubre 16). Segunda vuelta en Bolivia: País se prepara para dar un giro a la derecha tras dos décadas de dominio izquierdista. Retrieved from emol: https://www.emol.com/noticias/Internacional/2025/10/16/1180557/bolivia-segunda-vuelta-candidatos.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com Orlando Peralta, J. (2025, Noviembre 13). De lo ideológico a lo pragmático: se mueve el péndulo en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/de-lo-ideologico-a-lo-pragmatico-se-mueve-el-pendulo-en-bolivia/ Romero Ballivian, S. (2025, Noviembre 24). Fin de ciclo: el MAS cede el poder tras veinte años de hegemonía en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/fin-de-ciclo-el-mas-cede-el-poder-tras-veinte-anos-de-hegemonia-en-bolivia/ RTVE.es. (2025, Noviembre 09). Estados Unidos restablecerá las relaciones con Bolivia a nivel de embajadores, interrumpidas hace 17 años. Retrieved from RTVE.es: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20251108/estados-unidos-restablecera-relaciones-con-bolivia-a-nivel-embajadores-interrumpidas-hace-17-anos/16807541.shtml#:~:text=Estados%20Unidos%20restablecer%C3%A1%20las%20relaciones%20a%20nivel%20de%20embajadores%20con,emb Stabroek News. (2025, October 20). Centrist Rodrigo Paz wins Bolivian presidency, ending nearly 20 years of leftist rule. Retrieved from Stabroek News: https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/10/20/news/regional/centrist-rodrigo-paz-wins-bolivian-presidency-ending-nearly-20-years-of-leftist-rule/?utm_source=chatgpt.com urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 03). Bolivia expresa respaldo a Venezuela en medio de ataques de EE.UU. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/bolivia-expresa-respaldo-venezuela-en-medio-de-ataques-de-eeuu urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 12). Rodrigo Paz recibe la visita más importante; el Presidente del BID trae respaldo financiero. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/rodrigo-paz-recibe-la-visita-m%C3%A1s-importante-el-presidente-del-bid-trae-respaldo-financiero Velasco-Guachalla, X., & Hummel, C. (2025, October). Why Bolivia Voted for Change—And Continuity. Retrieved from Journal of Democracy: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-bolivia-voted-for-change-and-continuity/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Visión 360. (2026, Enero 03). Bolvia apoya la ruta iniciada en Venezuela "para recuperar la democracia". Retrieved from Visión 360: https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/01/03/37852-bolivia-apoya-la-ruta-iniciada-en-venezuela-para-recuperar-la-democracia

Diplomacy
Warsaw, Poland - January 04 2026: Venezuelan flag waved during protest against U.S. intervention in Venezuela.

Venezuela at a Critical Juncture (Part II): The Capture of Maduro and the Debate over Sovereignty, Intervention, and Power

by World & New World Journal

In Part I of this article, a brief historical overview was presented, spanning from the Venezuelan presidential crisis of 2019 to the tensions in the Caribbean — between the United States and Venezuela — and the total economic blockade imposed on Venezuela. The article also left several questions open, which, considering recent events, have now been resolved, although at the same time new ones have emerged. U.S. Operation in Venezuela and the Capture of Maduro The situation between the United States and Venezuela ended in 2025 with a total U.S. economic blockade and the “seizure” of a Venezuelan oil tanker. However, the situation changed dramatically when, on January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro was captured in Caracas by U.S. forces. Preceded by threats and sustained military and economic pressure on Venezuela, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, carried out an operation to capture and remove Maduro and his wife from Venezuela. The operation was surgical — lasting approximately two hours — and although successful, it also resulted in human losses (80 fatalities according to The New York Times — an unofficial figure — including 32 Cuban combatants confirmed by Havana) and damage to military infrastructure in Caracas, as well as in Miranda, Aragua, and La Guaira. As was already known, the U.S. government had classified Maduro as a member or leader of the Cartel of the Suns. In addition, a reward of $50,000 had been offered for his capture, and since 2020 the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York had charged Maduro with drug trafficking and conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. In this context, Maduro’s capture was followed by his transfer to New York, where he will face trial. Venezuela: an uncertain present? Following Maduro’s detention, Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the role of head of state due to Maduro’s “temporary” absence. After the U.S. attacks, Rodríguez spoke out strongly against what she called “foreign aggression,” describing Maduro’s capture as an “illegal and illegitimate kidnapping.” However, after being sworn in, she softened the tone of her statements and even invited the Trump administration to “work jointly on an agenda of cooperation, aimed at shared development, within the framework of international legality and to strengthen a lasting community coexistence.” Rodríguez likewise emphasized the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. All of this stems from the imperialist rhetoric of Trump and Rubio. Trump made it very clear that he will “govern” Venezuela “until we can achieve a safe, appropriate, and prudent transition.” Everything indicates that, although under the threat of “doing the right thing,” Trump plans to give Rodríguez an opportunity; if it does not work or if she fails to meet Trump’s expectations, the United States will intervene again. On the other hand, both Edmundo González — who on January 4 released a video declaring himself the “president of Venezuela” and calling for a “peaceful and clear” transition — and María Corina Machado have been practically sidelined by the U.S. government, citing a lack of internal support, referring to the fact that those who support them are “outside” Venezuela. On the social front, reactions have been mixed, ranging from celebrations over Maduro’s capture to demonstrations against U.S. interventionism. The current situation is very delicate: with Rodríguez’s appointment and no clear short-term roadmap — plus the threat of U.S. intervention and interference — and the snubbing of the opposition, Venezuela’s social reality appears not to have changed, nor is it likely to change much in the near future. However, Rodríguez’s stance — her invitation to the United States to work together, albeit under threat, practically placing oil and resources on a silver platter — could become the social fuel capable of generating real change in Venezuela in the near future. International reactions The events in Venezuela took many by surprise, and international reactions were quick to follow. South Africa issued a press release stating that the actions of the United States constituted “a violation of the United Nations Charter,” and called on the UN Security Council to urgently address the situation. Indonesia also underscored the importance of “respect for international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.” Similar statements were issued by Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand, and Australia. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise emphasized the violation of “Venezuelan sovereignty and the threat posed to peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.” It also called for the release of Maduro and his wife. With a stronger tone, Iran condemned the U.S. attacks and likewise appealed to the United Nations. In a very similar vein, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. attack, denouncing acts of U.S. hegemony and calling on the international community to recognize the “catastrophic” situation in Venezuela and to denounce the United States’ “habitual acts of violating the sovereignty of other countries.” On the other hand, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar, posted on X: “Israel praises the United States operation, led by President Trump. […] Israel stands with the freedom-loving Venezuelan people, who have suffered under Maduro’s illegal tyranny. Israel celebrates the removal of the dictator […].” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel supported the actions of the United States in Venezuela. In Europe, most countries supported the decision behind the actions of the United States, underscoring the illegitimacy of Maduro’s government and the importance of de-escalation and dialogue, always within the framework of international law. When asked about Maduro, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded that the United States “knows what to do now,” referring to dictators. Other countries such as Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain also expanded their criticism of the U.S. military operation, arguing that it was not in accordance with international law. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Belarus and Russia, in varying tones, condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “direct threats” to international peace and security. For his part, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico strongly criticized U.S. actions and the UN, emphasizing that “international law is not applied, military force is used without the consent of the UN Security Council, and whoever is big and powerful will do whatever serves their interests…” In the Americas, Mexico condemned and rejected the U.S. military intervention and urged the United States to adhere to international law. Honduras did the same, describing the capture of Maduro as an act of kidnapping. Cuba condemned the “criminal act,” calling it “state terrorism against the brave Venezuelan people and against our America.” Nicaragua also condemned the U.S. intervention and expressed its support for Delcy Rodríguez. Argentine President Javier Milei posted, “Freedom advances, long live freedom, damn it!” celebrating the capture of Maduro and his wife. In Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz also referred to freedom, stating that “the only way out for Venezuela is respect for the vote.” Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa stated that “for all narco-Chavista criminals, their time has come. Their structure on the continent will completely collapse.” Paraguay and Peru also celebrated Maduro’s removal. In contrast, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva condemned the attacks and Maduro’s capture, describing them as “very serious […] and extremely dangerous as precedents for the international community.” Chilean President Gabriel Boric also criticized the attacks and called for a peaceful resolution under international law, while President-elect Antonio Kast said that Maduro’s capture “is good news for the region.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro also rejected the “aggression against the sovereignty of Venezuela and Latin America,” while calling for a meeting at the UN and the OAS. Finally, Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and called for respect for the UN Charter. The UN, the OAS, and the EU also issued statements, using more cautious rhetoric and emphasizing respect for international law. The Don-roe Doctrine and the future of Venezuela In Part I of the article, Venezuela’s significance in terms of oil, biodiversity, water resources, rare earths, and more was presented. Based on this, and as mentioned earlier, the attack on alleged drug boats and the fight against drug trafficking became a pretext to promote the new Donald Trump–Monroe Doctrine, the “Don-roe Doctrine / Monroe Doctrine 2.0.” In December 2025, the United States published its new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes and promotes the United States as the sole actor or hegemon in the Americas, making any foreign presence outside of the United States unwelcome. The results of the application of this doctrine were immediate — and there is more. It is not only Venezuela: the Trump administration — particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio — has already set its sights on Cuba, in addition to repeatedly raising the possibility of carrying out military activities against drug trafficking in Mexico and Colombia, and more recently, engaging in a dispute with Denmark over strategically important Greenland. Discussion The implications for Venezuela stemming from these events are profound. First, there is a crisis of legitimacy: although Delcy Rodríguez has assumed the presidency, Edmundo González has also raised his voice, leading to both internal and external questioning. Likewise, there are institutional challenges. In the end, only the head of the regime was removed; Maduro’s inner circle remains in power. Therefore, regardless of the change at the top, a transition toward a more democratic or stable system appears distant given the current conditions. This is independent of the existing social discontent — once again, the regime retains control, making a drastic change unlikely in the near term. Regarding the U.S. side, the Trump administration has been clear — and consistent with its foreign policy — in always prioritizing its national interests over those of any other country. The example is clear: by acting unilaterally and without adherence to international law, the United States has once again undermined the sovereignty of a state. The U.S. government could justify its actions in legal terms — Maduro is accused in the United States of drug trafficking and conspiracy — on health and security grounds — the Venezuelan regime facilitates drug trafficking into the United States — or even on geopolitical grounds — weakening an administration perceived as allied with rival powers and holding interests contrary to those of the United States. However, the validity of these arguments must be examined. Moreover, as Robert Fico pointed out, there was an absence of authorization from the UN Security Council or even from the U.S. Congress itself, which, for experts in the field, renders the operation legally unlawful. Ultimately, the debate remains open. Countries’ positions are divided, and, more importantly, this could become a dangerous precedent for national sovereignty and for the conduct of great powers toward independent states. There are also the potential consequences for the region: the act alters the balance of power in Latin America and redefines the narrative surrounding U.S. influence in the region. On the other hand, there is oil and what its control represents as a long-term strategic factor. Finally, there is the global tension over control and influence in regions — one in which Russia and China are far from pleased. Finally, Fico’s statements and the following quote from Mexican lawyer José Mario de la Garza are worth analyzing in order to understand the importance of international law and why we must live in a rules-based world — even if several reforms may be needed to improve it: “Overthrowing a dictator sounds morally right. No one mourns a tyrant. But international law was not built to protect the good, but to restrain the powerful. That is why it prohibits the use of force almost without exception: not because it ignores justice, but because it knows that if every country decides whom to ‘liberate’ at gunpoint, the world returns to the law of the strongest.” References @josemariodelagarza. (04 de January de 2026). @josemariodelagarza. Obtenido de Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/DTDmcSNgPmK/?hl=en&img_index=1 Caro, I. (05 de January de 2026). "Vengo con dolor, pero también con honor": Delcy Rodríguez juramenta como presidenta encargada de Venezuela tras la captura de Maduro. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cd9exjjkvw8o Holcman, T. (05 de January de 2026). Maduro's rival in Venezuelan elections demands presidency, 'freedom to all political prisoners'. Obtenido de The Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/international/article-882323 Lozano, D. (05 de January de 2026). Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta de Venezuela "por Maduro y por Chávez". Obtenido de El Mundo: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2026/01/05/695be102fc6c8323518b45a0.html Muggah, R. (03 de January de 2026). 5 scenarios for a post-Maduro Venezuela — and what they could signal to the wider region. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/5-scenarios-for-a-post-maduro-venezuela-and-what-they-could-signal-to-the-wider-region-272675 Página 12. (06 de Enero de 2026). Aseguran que son más de 80 los muertos tras el ataque de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de Página 12: https://www.pagina12.com.ar/2026/01/05/aseguran-que-son-mas-de-80-los-muertos-tras-el-ataque-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela/ Reuters. (04 de January de 2026). Trump says U.S. will run Venezuela after U.S. captures Maduro. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/loud-noises-heard-venezuela-capital-southern-area-without-electricity-2026-01-03/ Urrejola, J. (06 de January de 2026). Venezuela tras Maduro: por qué el chavismo sigue en el poder. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/venezuela-tras-maduro-por-qu%C3%A9-el-chavismo-sigue-en-el-poder/a-75400562 Walia, G. (03 de January de 2026). Venezuela's President Nicholas Maduro captured by US forces: Where has he been taken? What we know so far. Obtenido de The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/venezuelas-president-nicholas-maduro-captured-by-us-forces-where-has-he-been-taken-what-we-know-so-far-caracas/articleshow/126321249.cms?from=mdr "South Africa urges UN Security Council Session following unilateral military action in Venezuela" (Press release). Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Dirco slams US efforts to 'run' Venezuela". TimesLIVE. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on the U.S. Military Strikes on Venezuela" (Press release). Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "World reacts to US strikes on Venezuela". Reuters. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. 'Matter of deep concern': MEA reacts to US strikes on Venezuela; urges restraint, calls for dialogue". The Times of India. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Iran strongly condemns US attack on Venezuela". Iran International. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Iran Condemns U.S. Attack on Venezuela". Foreign Policy. West Asia News Agency. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Halpern, Sam (3 January 2026). "Israel commends US operation that led to capture of Venezuela's Maduro". The Jerusalem Post. Sa'ar, Gideon [@gidonsaar] (4 January 2026). "Israel commends the United States' operation, led by President Trump, which acted as the leader of the free world. At this historic moment, Israel stands alongside the freedom-loving Venezuelan people, who have suffered under Maduro's illegal tyranny. Israel welcomes the removal of the dictator who led a network of drugs and terror and hopes for the return of democracy to the country and for friendly relations between the states. The people of Venezuela deserve to exercise their democratic rights. South America deserves a future free from the axis of terror and drugs" (Tweet). Retrieved 4 January 2026 – via Twitter. "Netanyahu says Israel supports 'strong' US action in Venezuela". Al Arabiya English. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Sokolin, Anton (4 January 2026). "North Korea condemns the U.S.' military intervention in Venezuela". NK News. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "North Korea sends tough message to US after Venezuela attack, fires multiple ballistic missiles". Wion. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Malaysia stands firm on UN principles, opposes foreign intervention in Venezuela". Malay Mail. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Pakistan urges restraint, peaceful resolution in Venezuela". The Express Tribune. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Thailand urges US to settle conflict with Venezuela peacefully". Bangkok Post. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Vietnam deeply concerned about reports on situation in Venezuela: spokesperson". Vietnamlawmagazine.vn. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 5 January 2026. "Venezuela latest: Trump says US is going to 'run' Venezuela after capturing President Maduro". BBC News. 3 January 2026. "World reactions to US operation in Venezuela". Le Monde. 3 January 2026 "Sviluppi sulla situazione in Venezuela, nota di Palazzo Chigi". www.governo.it (in Italian). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Statement from Minister Eide on the Situation in Venezuela". Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Russia Condemns U.S. Military Strikes Against Venezuela". The Moscow Times. 3 January 2025. Retrieved 3 January 2025. Vlasova, Svitlana; Stockwell, Billy (3 January 2026). "Russia reaffirms solidarity with Venezuela after "act of armed aggression" by US, calls for dialogue". CNN. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Вучић: После акције у Венецуели јасно је да међународни правни поредак не функционише; сачуваћемо мир али својом снагом". Radio-Television of Serbia. 4 January 2025. Retrieved 4 January 2025. "Slovakian Prime Minister Fico condemns US attack". Yahoo News. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Fico, Robert (3 January 2026). "STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC". Facebook (in Slovak). Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Spain will not recognize US intervention in Venezuela, PM says". Reuters. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Zelenskyy reacts to US operation in Venezuela and hints at Putin". RBC-Ukraine. 4 January 2025. "Starmer won't be drawn on whether US strikes on Venezuela broke international law". BBC News. 3 January 2026. "Cuba's president denounces strikes on Venezuela as a "criminal attack by the U.S."". CBS News. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Alvarez, Carolina (3 January 2026). "Honduran President condemns US "military aggression" and "kidnapping" of Nicolás Maduro". De Último Minuto. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Mexico Says Venezuela Strikes Breach U.N. Charter, International Law". The Wall Street Journal. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Gobierno de Nicaragua exige liberación de Nicolás Maduro y defiende soberanía de Venezuela". SwissInfo. 1 March 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Godsell, Oscar (3 January 2026). "Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responds to US President Donald Trump's attack on Venezuela". Sky News. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Venezuela attack: New Zealand 'concerned', expects everyone to follow international law – Winston Peters". RNZ. 4 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Romero, Juan (3 January 2026). "Intervención militar en Venezuela: así reaccionaron en América Latina a la operación militar de EE.UU. para extraer a Maduro y su mujer". Fobes (in Spanish). Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Rodrigo Paz dice que «salida para Venezuela es respetar el voto», tras captura de Maduro". SwissInfo. 5 January 2026. Retrieved 1 March 2026. Durães, Marina (3 January 2026). "Lula diz que ataques à Venezuela e prisão de Maduro são 'inaceitáveis'". UOL. Retrieved 3 January 2026 "World reacts to US bombing of Venezuela, 'capture' of Maduro". Al Jazeera. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026 "Kast califica la detención de Maduro como "una gran noticia para la región"". Diario y Radio Universidad Chile (in Spanish). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Taylor, Harry; Rogero, Tiago (3 January 2026). "Global outcry after US launches strikes on Venezuela and captures president". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Pannell, Alfie; Glade, Jim. "Colombia braces with alarm after Maduro's removal in Venezuela by US". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 3 January 2026 Quilca Catacora, Mariana (3 January 2026). "José Jerí se pronuncia tras captura de Maduro y situación de venezolanos en Perú: "Daremos las facilidades para su regreso"". infobae (in European Spanish). Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Uruguay rechazó la intervención militar en Venezuela y llamo a buscar una "solución positiva"" [Uruguay rejected military intervention in Venezuela and called for a "positive solution".]. Ámbito Financiero (in Spanish). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Venezuela | Secretary-General | United Nations". United Nations. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "US actions in Venezuela 'constitute a dangerous precedent': Guterres". Peace and Security. United Nations News. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Statement by OAS Secretary General Albert R. Ramdin on recent developments in Venezuela". Press Release E-001/26. Organization of American States. 3 January 2026. Hayden, Jones (3 January 2026). "EU urges respect for international law after US capture of Maduro". POLITICO. Retrieved 3 January 2026.

Diplomacy
Flag of Israel and Palestine on the map. Events in Palestine and Israel. israel flag

Advancing Peace Between Israel and Palestine

by Saliba Sarsar

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Diplomacy
Ulsan, South Korea - September 28th, 2024: View of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan Headquarters, South Korea. A key player in shipbuilding, this landmark facility.

South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam show that economic statecraft is not just the preserve of great powers

by Robyn Klingler-Vidra

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

Diplomacy
Tegucigalpa, Honduras - November 30, 2025: Election Day, People attend to vote for their candidates at the voting centers provided by the Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE.

Latin America 2025: protest voting amid fragmentation and democratic erosion

by Flavia Freidenberg

In a 2025 marked by punitive polls, fragmented systems, and democracies under pressure, Latin America confirmed that voting remains an instrument of change, but no longer a guarantee of stability or democratic strengthening. The year ends with a powerful image: a president, a president-elect, and a defeated candidate — with radically different ideas and political visions — showing respect for electoral results, the electoral authority, and one another in Chile. An act that should be ordinary in any democracy became something almost revolutionary. It may seem like a mere formality, but it is not. In a Latin America divided by hate speech and polarized politics, these gestures of institutional courtesy and democratic normality make a difference. An intense electoral cycle shaped 2025. Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras held presidential elections that, in one way or another, redefined the regional political landscape. These were accompanied by numerous legislative elections, local contests, and referendums. Mexico, meanwhile, experimented with the unprecedented popular election of judges and magistrates, a reform meant to democratize the justice system but which, in practice, represented setbacks in electoral governance conditions that once seemed resolved. Holding elections that meet integrity standards is no minor matter at a time when the region is undergoing processes of democratic erosion. The quality of these elections determines whether alternation in power is possible, whether democracy can persist, resist, and remain resilient when facing multiple challenges such as political-criminal violence, citizen fatigue, institutional co-optation, affective polarization, and ideological radicalization. The ballot speaks: five regional patterns An assessment of the 2025 elections reveals five patterns that transcend national borders and illustrate key features of today’s regional political dynamics. First: protest voting has consolidated. From the overwhelming victory of the far right over the left in Chile on December 14 — when José Antonio Kast won 58% of the vote — to President Daniel Noboa’s failed referendum in Ecuador, the dramatic collapse of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, and the governing Libre party’s third-place finish in Honduras, the message has been consistent: voters punish those in power, regardless of ideology. In Bolivia, MAS suffered a dramatic defeat after nearly two decades of dominance. The party of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, which won 75 of 130 seats in 2020, was reduced to just two in the August elections. For the first time, Bolivia held a presidential runoff on October 19, where Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won with 54.5% of the vote. In Honduras, the ruling party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, placed third, while conservative candidate Nasry “Tito” Asfura of the National Party became president-elect following a highly contentious race marked by external intervention, numerous episodes of political violence, and 24 days of uncertainty before results were finalized. Noboa suffered a devastating defeat in the November 16 referendum: “No” prevailed on all four questions, including rejecting the authorization of foreign military bases (60% voted NO) and rejecting the call for a Constituent Assembly (61% NO). This outcome surprised many, as it came just seven months after Noboa won the presidency with 55.6% of the vote. Interpretations are still developing, but it suggests that citizens are unwilling to grant “blank checks” to their leaders. Second: pragmatism is replacing ideology. Paz’s centrist message of “capitalism for all” in Bolivia, Noboa’s security-focused campaign in Ecuador, and the rejection of ruling parties across the region show that many Latin American voters in 2025 are moving beyond ideological alignment. Voters seem less interested in long-term transformative projects and more in immediate responses to pressing problems: insecurity, economic crises, and corruption. This trend has benefited conservative forces. In Chile, a far-right candidate — openly nostalgic for Pinochet — won for the first time, promising drastic public spending cuts, tough “law and order” policies, opposition to abortion and marriage equality, and aggressive measures against crime and irregular migration. Kast’s victory adds to right-wing governments like Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Santiago Peña in Paraguay, and Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic. This new “blue wave” shapes the current political map, though with different tones and levels of radicalization. Third: party fragmentation, divided governments, and minority presidencies. Except in Ecuador, where polarization between correísmo and anticorreísmo shaped both the April presidential election and the November referendum, other countries experienced deep fragmentation. In Bolivia, seven competitive presidential candidacies contended in the first round. In Honduras, three candidates fiercely competed in one of the country’s most tightly contested elections. High fragmentation often produces minority presidents and divided governments. This year, Bolivia and Ecuador joined Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, where presidents govern with weak congressional support. By contrast, two countries have extremely powerful presidents with unified governments: Mexico and El Salvador, where ruling parties hold supermajorities capable of passing constitutional reforms without negotiating with the opposition. Fourth: the hollowing of the political center and the crisis of moderate parties and leaderships. As previously argued with María Esperanza Casullo, “center-and-something” parties (center-left and center-right) have long struggled to attract votes from the middle. Moderate politics seems to lack electoral appeal in Latin America. This declining representative capacity of the political center has created a vacuum often filled by outsiders or new parties claiming to embody fresh demands and alternatives from the margins. This vacuum feeds polarization strategies. Fifth: institutional credibility crisis. With the exception of Chile — where results were announced two hours after polls closed and immediately accepted — electoral processes in Honduras and Ecuador faced serious challenges from political actors who refused to recognize the results. In Ecuador, after the April runoff, Luisa González of the Citizens’ Revolution questioned transparency. In Bolivia, accusations of irregularities persisted throughout the August elections. In Honduras, more than two weeks after the November 30 vote, the presidential result remained undefined. Trust in electoral institutions — the cornerstone of democracy — shows troubling cracks that deepened throughout 2025. Many countries now face governance crises alongside fragmented systems, hate speech, interpersonal and institutional distrust, and extreme polarization. Three lessons for the future This electoral year leaves lessons that will shape regional politics in coming years. First: political-criminal violence conditions democracy. Several elections took place amid criminal violence. Honduras recorded six politically motivated homicides during the campaign, four targeting candidates from the ruling Libre party. The NGO Cristosal documented 67 political violence incidents between September 2024 and November 2025, including assassinations, attacks, threats, and harassment. Ecuador held its referendum under a State of Emergency due to “internal armed conflict,” declared in response to escalating drug-related violence and loss of state control over prisons. Mexico continues to hold elections in violent contexts, particularly at the local level. The “Voting Between Bullets” project by Data Cívica and México Evalúa has documented rising political-criminal violence since 2018, with 2024 being the most violent year yet, especially locally. Second: external influence is redefining electoral sovereignty. U.S. involvement in the Honduran presidential election, as well as in Argentina’s legislative elections weeks earlier, raised alarms about political autonomy in the region. In Ecuador, Noboa actively sought to establish U.S. military bases, a proposal rejected by 60% of voters. This level of foreign intervention — openly supporting candidates, conditioning economic aid, pressuring electoral decisions, or warning of retaliation — sets a dangerous precedent that reshapes the regional political game. External actors become potential “balancers” of competition, creating tilted playing fields. Third: polarization can demobilize voters. Ecuador showed that even amid extreme polarization, voter mobilization is not guaranteed. The moderate vote, which could have tipped the balance in the referendum, simply vanished or dissolved between the two radical positions. This suggests polarization may demobilize sectors that feel unrepresented by either extreme, paradoxically weakening democratic participation. Democracies at risk Despite difficulties, elections are still being held with reasonable levels of integrity. Power alternation occurred in several countries. Most losing candidates — even reluctantly — accepted results. This shows that electoral institutions still retain some strength. However, democratic erosion comes not from the absence of elections, but from those elected through them. It arises from leaders who challenge democracy’s pluralistic foundations. Today’s central dispute is over what “true democracy” means: a system prioritizing rights and institutional checks, or one concentrating power in the name of the “popular will.” This debate cuts across countries as different as Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. In 2025, Latin American democracies faced multiple threats: low institutional trust, persistent violence, co-opted electoral authorities, vulnerability to external actors, and illiberal governments fostering polarization. Protest voting was one of the year’s most visible patterns, but part of something broader: extreme electoral volatility, where citizens reject governments of any ideology in search of immediate solutions. The challenge for 2026 — when countries like Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil (municipal elections) head to the polls — will be to safeguard electoral autonomy and professionalism, strengthen pluralism, depolarize public life, limit external interference, and continue reinforcing democratic institutions without yielding to narratives that promise order at the expense of hard-won rights.