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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Cook Islands' recent deals with China sees shift from soft to hard-edged diplomacy embedded in Pacific. Strategic engagement between the Pacific and its partners has now well and truly switched to overt security transactionalism, from soft to hard diplomacy. The explicit position emanating from the United States under the Trump administration reflects what has already been happening in the Pacific, particularly with the region’s largest aid donor Australia. When the Cook Islands and China signed deals this month, they sidelined New Zealand, leaving it to reassess how to do business with Pacific island nations. In recent years there’s been a flurry of agreements, MoUs, treaties and more between Pacific island countries and their partners, both established and emerging. The recently confirmed Papua New Guinea rugby league deal with Australia introduced “strategic trust” into the lexicon. Grafted on to the prized spot in the Australian National Rugby League competition is an undertaking by PNG to rebuff any kind of security agreement with China. Similar trade-offs form part of Australia’s deals with Nauru last year and Tuvalu in 2023.  How this transactionalism can or should be accommodated, or even countered, by Pacific island states has the region talking. Professor Transform Aqorau in his keynote speech to last week’s Pacific Islands Political Science Association (PIPSA) conference in New Zealand stated: “The question that we must ask ourselves is, ‘how do we assert agency in this space while we avoid being drawn into the conflicts that are not of our making?’” Many who spoke at PIPSA agreed that conversations about security and strategy must be led by Pacific voices and underpinned by Pacific norms. There were numerous calls for partner countries (of all stripes) to do better - listen, focus on relationships, work more ‘Pacifically’.  The other side of the asymmetrical power dynamic remained largely unaddressed – what can and should Pacific leaders and officials do to shift partners’ behaviour to what is wanted and needed? And if business-as-usual is already getting these partners what they want, where is the incentive for them to change?  Unlike the successes Pacific nations have had when taking a united regional posture, guided by the Pacific Islands Forum and advancing their Blue Pacific Strategy 2050, the bilateral deals see them operating without the benefit of collective support.  There are some ‘green shoots’ of Pacific assertiveness. In a Facebook post over the weekend, Vanuatu’s newly-elected Prime Minister Jotham Napa said, “climate change is very critical to our survival. Moving away from (the) Paris agreement by (the) Trump administration is like committing suicide. Climate change must be part of any security agreement in the future.” The message to the U.S. is clear. It is also a message to Australia, who have long sought a security agreement with Vanuatu and will no doubt continue to press that with Napat. That is not to say partners’ approaches are not evolving. When it comes to engaging with China, the overall picture is that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now focused on smaller projects with greater use of grant financing rather than loans. Of course, it is often the case that the exception proves the rule. The recent agreement (and associated MoUs) between Cook Islands and China envisages serious infrastructure investment in the maritime sector, including ports. Cue “dual-use” alarm bells in Canberra, Wellington and beyond. The New Zealand government is now contemplating a more transactional approach with Pacific partners. Its relationships with Kiribati and Cook Islands have deteriorated markedly in the last few weeks, following what could be termed “assertive” actions by Pacific leaders. After months of trying, New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Winston Peters was all set to meet President Taneti Maamau in Kiribati in January. The arrangements were upended at the last minute resulting in a public diplomatic tiff. Peters has now initiated a review of New Zealand aid to Kiribati as an expression of his frustration. Meanwhile, Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown also raised the ire of Wellington. Peters has claimed that there was insufficient consultation by Cook Islands (which is in free association with New Zealand) about entering into a strategic partnership agreement with China and signing of other MOUs. Peters has now called for a “reset” of the relationship. Whilst much has been made of the geopolitical aspects of these tensions, the most significant implications are in the domestic spheres.  In Kiribati, opposition leader Tessie Lambourne has argued that the falling out with New Zealand is part of a pattern of isolationism on the part of Maamau, which is harming the interests of the i-Kiribati population. His government switched allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019 and has become increasingly withdrawn, including a ban on diplomatic visits last year. A New Zealand aid cut would have a significant impact on health, education, and climate resilience projects in Kiribati. In Cook Islands, Brown’s bullish approach has come back to bite him. Last week around 400 people marched in protest, and he faced a motion of no confidence in the Parliament, which failed. Whilst the strategic partnership with China was part of what prompted Cook Islanders to take the streets, they were also enraged at the debacle surrounding Brown’s attempt to introduce a Cook Islands passport, in addition to the New Zealand passport they currently hold. The geostrategic environment in the Pacific is becoming increasingly complex and the tempo of bilateral offers shows no sign of slowing. The calculated nature of relations offered by partners poses a huge challenge to Pacific leaders, negotiating in relative isolation, often in secret, while they try to maintain their “friends to all, enemy to none” positions. Pacific states will have to work harder than ever and expend precious resources to strike the right balance as they assert their agency while managing strategic partnerships. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Brief Despite its increasingly repressive domestic rule, more countries than ever are engaging with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. India’s first official meeting with the Taliban in January 2025 encapsulates a broader global trend of once-reluctant countries now engaging with the Taliban. Credible terrorism concerns, worsening humanitarian conditions and geopolitical rivalries are pushing governments toward quasi-acceptance and recognition of Taliban rule. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, the prevailing sentiment was that the regime would be an international pariah if it did not moderate its hardline positions. The Taliban’s violent past also made it inconceivable for some states to engage with it as the government of Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban’s repressive rule worsening considerably since it seized control in 2021, with restrictions on women taken to a new extreme and the reintroduction of brutal punishments for alleged moral crimes, the regime is overcoming its international isolation. More governments are prepared to look past the ethical dilemma of dealing with the Taliban and quasi-recognise it as the government of Afghanistan. India stepped up its outreach to the Taliban in January 2025, with India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi holding their first meeting. This is the highest level meeting between the two sides since India began small and indirect engagements with the Taliban after its return to power in 2021. For the Taliban, its meeting with India’s foreign secretary is a major diplomatic breakthrough given its tense and fractious relations with India since the 1990s. After this January 2025 meeting, the Taliban referred to India as a ‘significant regional and economic partner’. The sea change in relations likely stems from New Delhi not sensing any significant terrorist threats from the Taliban or groups allegedly linked to the Taliban. Worsening Taliban–Pakistan relations may have played a role in India’s outreach to the Taliban. Pakistan firmly backed the Taliban when it was mounting a comeback in Afghanistan. But since the Taliban’s return, border disputes and the rise of Pakistani Taliban militancy inside Pakistan have sent their relations into a downward spiral. The souring Pakistan–Afghanistan relations suggest New Delhi’s interests may not be as affected as feared when the Taliban took over in 2021. Despite India’s growing outreach, its relations with the Taliban are still very calibrated and limited — paling in comparison to China’s. Yet India’s outreach may be more diplomatically significant for the Taliban than China’s as it sets a precedent for Western democracies that also seek to strike a balance between not recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government, while engaging with it on necessary matters. Western governments, particularly the United States, were unfazed by some of India’s initial engagements, but now seem to recognise the necessity of limited engagements with the Taliban. It was revealed in January 2025 that the former Joe Biden administration negotiated with the Taliban to secure the release of two US prisoners in Afghanistan. In 2024, the Biden administration debated expanding direct engagements and cooperation with the Taliban to mount more effective counterterrorist activities. The return of US President Donald Trump is likely to change US–Taliban relations. Under Trump’s first administration, the United States pursued talks with the Taliban, culminating in the 2020 Doha Agreement that facilitated the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump’s return increases the possibility of greater US engagements with the Taliban, though it has also created uncertainties. President Trump was critical of how the US departure from Afghanistan was handled under the Biden administration. In January 2025, Trump said that the Taliban needed to return US military equipment in Afghanistan as a precondition for future financial assistance. The Taliban have also said that they seek a ‘new chapter’ in their relations with the United States under the second Trump administration. The biggest roadblock for the West engaging with the Taliban has been its repressive policies and human rights violations. But there are now compelling reasons for the West to engage with the Taliban. Western sanctions, in addition to having no effect on the Taliban’s draconian governance, have worsened humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Despite the sanctions’ ineffectiveness, it is unclear whether the West would go as far as to lift the sanctions. Instead, Western countries might find ways to work with the regime on specific issues. Foremost among these issues is addressing the growing presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan — such as Al-Qaeda, a Taliban ally, and the reviving Islamic State–Khorasan Province. The growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan also has Western countries concerned that turning their backs on Afghanistan may work to China’s advantage. China perceives Afghanistan as a gateway for China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Central Asia and seeks to exploit the country’s vast and untapped natural reserves. Though more governments are now prepared to engage with the Taliban, the Taliban’s most strategic relationship will likely remain with China. China–Taliban relations are comprehensive and long-term, spanning economic, political and security cooperation. China does not recognise the Taliban but was the first to accept a Taliban envoy. China and the Taliban have inked several notable agreements, including China granting the Taliban tariff-free trade access in October 2024, which could provide an economic boost to the cash-strapped regime. But China’s relations with the Taliban are also not without problems. Some Afghanistan-based terrorist groups have China on their radar and pose security concerns in the sensitive Chinese border provinces. The Taliban’s affiliates have previously attacked Chinese interests in neighbouring Pakistan. Despite these concerns, Beijing appears committed to strengthening its relationship with the Taliban, focusing on mutual security, technological exchanges and investments. Another diplomatic breakthrough for the Taliban is its improving relations with Russia. Russia invited the Taliban to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, among other meetings held in Russia in 2024. Russia also decided to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. These overtures suggest Russia is seeking closer relations with the Taliban. The Taliban played a long waiting game, biding its time since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It ultimately prevailed by returning to power as soon as the United States withdrew 20 years later. Growing diplomatic engagements prove that the Taliban is again capable of playing a long game to wear down governments into a quasi-acceptance and recognition of its draconian rule. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1741341600

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/] 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the return to power of the center-left coalition "Broad Front" (Frente Amplio, FA) in 2025, Uruguay has entered a new political cycle. Although Uruguay is a very stable country by Latin American standards, various forecasts about possible changes in the country's foreign policy under the new president, Yamandú Orsi, have already started appearing in the media. Most expectations focus on the regional dimension, which is logical for several reasons. Firstly, the regional subsystem of international relations plays a crucial role in Uruguay's participation in global politics, particularly in advancing key foreign policy priorities that are important to all ideological camps in the country, such as conflict mediation, development assistance, support for international law, and human rights. Secondly, a critical stance toward Latin American integration structures became a hallmark of the outgoing conservative government of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), which left office on March 1, 2025. His presidency was marked by debates over the direction of regional integration, including discussions on the potential revival of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), strengthening the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in response to crises in energy, healthcare, and food security during the 2020s, and overcoming the stagnation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Uruguay consistently positioned itself as a staunch and vocal skeptic on all these matters. According to one of Uruguay’s leading international relations experts, Nastasja Barceló, this stance has harmed national interests by contributing to the "isolation of Uruguay and a break with the country’s traditional foreign policy approaches".  Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the team of the newly elected president openly emphasizes the priority of the regional dimension. A key figure in Yamandú Orsi’s team is Álvaro Padrón, his advisor on international political affairs, who, in an interview, outlined the concept of "concentric circles" in Uruguay's foreign policy: "The first circle consists of bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil… the second is MERCOSUR… the third is South America". According to Padrón, aligning positions on various international issues with South American and Latin American neighbors should serve as the foundation for advancing Uruguay's interests on global platforms. Orsi’s allies also highlight that his government aims to leverage regional opportunities to facilitate Uruguay’s integration into the evolving multipolar world order. Thus, the election of Yamandú Orsi has raised hopes that Uruguay will significantly strengthen its presence in regional integration groups. At the very least, this is expected to apply to CELAC, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR, which are frequently mentioned in the rhetoric of the future president, Vice President Carolina Cosse, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin, advisor Álvaro Padrón, as well as in the still-limited assessments of international affairs experts. Naturally, questions arise about the specific opportunities and challenges on this path: what tools and strategies can Uruguay use to "revitalize" the regional framework? How will the new government's Latin American agenda align with its global policy? While it is difficult to provide definitive answers before Orsi officially takes office, contradictions are already apparent that may weaken the positive impact of the change in power on regional integration. Challenges to Regional Integration and Uruguay's Approach In a conceptual sense, projects like CELAC and UNASUR are associated with the so-called idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", which rose on the wave of the "left turn" of the 2000s - early 2010s. One of the brightest supporters of this philosophy was the popular Uruguayan President (2010-2015) José Mujica, who still exerts a significant influence on the balance of power in the "Broad Front". His support for the candidacy of Yamandú Orsi in the last elections was so obvious that the future president was literally nicknamed the "heir" of J. Mujica. In light of the close ties between the two politicians, it seems logical that J. Orsi will also promote the idea of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", defending the consolidation of his region on the international arena in the face of major powers that have their own interests in Latin America. In the speeches of J. Orsi and A. Padrón, there are indeed calls to strengthen CELAC so that Latin America can have more weight in international affairs, or to structure leadership in South America, but in real life there are challenges to the implementation of such plans. One of them is the reactive position of Iain Orsi's team on the Venezuelan issue. Over the past decade, discussions about the right of Nicolás Maduro to remain in power have polarized Latin America and prevented the development of unifying initiatives. The administration of L. Lacalle Pou has solidified its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of N. Maduro's government, which limits the possibilities of cooperation with the Chavistas. Although Iain Orsi has stated in connection with the Venezuelan issue that the importance of dialogue with states is higher than judgments about political regimes, his team has not made any special changes on the Venezuelan vector. After N. Maduro was re-elected to his post once again in the summer of 2024, Iain Orsi said that there is a “dictatorship” in the Caribbean country, and none of the key figures of the CF went to N. Maduro's inauguration in January. At one time, Jose Mujica offered his good services to Colombia, where the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC took the difficult path of reconciliation, and one might expect that the moderate leftist J. Orsi would try himself in the role of mediator of the internal political crisis in the Bolivarian Republic. But for agreements and mediation, Caracas and Montevideo need at least to restore normal diplomatic interaction, which was frozen after the elections in Venezuela in July 2024. As noted in the media, the prospect of "defrosting" is absolutely unclear. The second challenge is doubts that Uruguay under J. Orsi will be able to contribute to the consolidated and independent positioning of Latin America in the current geopolitical conditions. As far as can be judged now, the team of the elected leader is distinguished by an extremely evasive position on the crises around Ukraine and Gaza, combining emphasized official neutrality, non-participation in sanctions and diplomatic demarches, but also a certain sympathy for the Western point of view. This is hinted at, for example, by J. Orsi's positive attitude to sending a Uruguayan delegation to the summit on Ukraine in Bürgenstock in June 2024 and his statements about Russia in the spirit that "perhaps other points should have been included" in the program of principles of the "Broad Front", condemning US and NATO imperialism. In the Middle East drama, J. Orsi, like his vice-president K. Kosse, while agreeing with the Palestinians' right to claim statehood, does not condemn Israel's actions. This differs from the position of many other left-wing leaders in the region, which some critical experts have already noted. When analyzing the roots of these approaches, two key points emerge. First, it is likely that under this president the liberal attitudes characteristic of the mainstream of Uruguayan elites will be preserved. They may also be relevant for the moderate left within the “Broad Front”, to which Yamandú Orsi belongs, who defines himself as a “pragmatist” and “non-Marxist.” The consequence of adherence to such a political philosophy usually becomes a loyal attitude to the course of the Euro-Atlantic powers and their closest allies, so it is unlikely that Uruguay under Yamandú Orsi will oppose the Western-centric world order. Secondly, the involvement of major powers in geopolitical contradictions, the adoption of obligations or parties in this regard, including the unambiguous label of “non-alignment”, does not fit into Montevideo’s line of behavior on the global stage at all. The positioning of this small South American state in the context of the formation of a multipolar world, as built in the discourse of political elites, presupposes an economic-centric strategy and “free hands”. The key idea is to interact with various actors, especially for the implementation of the goals of trade and investment diversification, and to promote a positive image of Uruguay as a neutral and peace-loving state focused on socio-economic development. The U.S. dimension deserves special mention, as distancing from Washington and challenging its dominance has traditionally been a defining feature of proponents of Latin American patriotic unity. Uruguay has maintained relatively stable relations with the United States, though previous administrations under the "Broad Front" encountered certain areas of disagreement. One key issue has been hemispheric security and the functioning of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), which the "Broad Front" views as repressive and outdated. This stance was evident under the last left-wing government led by Tabaré Vázquez (2015–2020), which initiated Uruguay’s withdrawal from the treaty. However, the administration of Luis Lacalle Pou reversed this decision, leaving Montevideo’s future participation in the Rio Pact uncertain as of the 2024 elections. The program of principles of the "Broad Front" for 2025-2030, which the coalition formulated on the eve of the elections, stated that Uruguay should secure the support of the region and finally withdraw from the controversial treaty - "a legacy of the Cold War" and "a symbol of Latin America's status as the backyard of the United States." Moreover, as one of the "main experiments" of regionalism, it mentions the South American Defense Council (SADC). It operated under the auspices of UNASUR and was focused on developing common South American solutions in matters of military security and peacekeeping, excluding the influence of external powers. In Orsi's entourage, nothing has been said about Uruguay's attitude to either the Rio Pact or the SADC. On the other hand, shortly after his electoral triumph, Orsi met with US Ambassador Heidi Fulton, who confirmed that Washington and Montevideo have common views, including on security issues. In light of this, it currently appears that the Uruguayan leader is not interested in being at the forefront of critics of US influence in Latin and South America. The emergence of Donald Trump at the helm of the US, who in the first weeks of his presidency has already managed to enter into a rhetorical conflict with the heads of Mexico, Colombia and Central American states, may further encourage J. Orsi to behave cautiously. Especially considering that Uruguay is one of the few countries in the region under leftist rule that has not received its share of criticism from D. Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a “hawk in Latin American affairs”. The desire to maintain a calm, positive interaction with Washington, which the outgoing administration of L. Lacalle Pou achieved, can also be perceived as a consequence of J. Orsi’s pragmatism and moderation, despite his leftist orientation. It certainly cannot be considered a resource for uniting the regional neighbourhood with the idea of fighting against the “North American dictate”. Thus, at this stage, the new president’s approach to international affairs appears too passive and cautious to actively support any bloc identity in Latin America. Therefore, if strengthening CELAC and restoring UNASUR remain priorities for the new government, its focus will likely be on the inclusivity and representativeness of these platforms rather than their sovereigntist positioning. Nevertheless, although J. Orsi does not seem to be a figure who will strengthen political integration in the spirit of the "Greater Latin American Homeland", he may well increase the overall regional presence of Montevideo. The politician has repeatedly emphasized that in the Latin American field, the development of multilateralism and presidential diplomacy are important to him. Under his leadership, Uruguay will be able to show itself in individual initiatives and working groups under the auspices of CELAC or UNASUR on environmental issues, human rights, and sustainable development. For example, in December 2024, J. Orsi already discussed plans to promote a "regional alliance" on clean energy and joint efforts to preserve the Amazon with his Colombian counterpart Gustavo Petro. A New Phase for MERCOSUR? Regarding MERCOSUR, the "Broad Front" (FA) has a clear stance—to strengthen and expand it. This position is shared by the new president's team, and it seems to be more than just rhetoric. Even before the end of 2024, Yamandú Orsi met with all the bloc’s neighboring presidents except Javier Milei—Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Paraguay’s Santiago Peña, and Bolivia’s Luis Arce. During these meetings, the Uruguayan leader emphasized regional unity and expressed his commitment to developing MERCOSUR. Relations with Brazil are of decisive importance and have become a strategic priority for J. Orsi. Under L. Lacalle Pou, interaction with the northern neighbor was pragmatic. Lula da Silva's ambitions to turn MERCOSUR into a tool for promoting Brazil on the international stage irritated the Uruguayan president. Now, however, completely different assessments have begun to be heard from the Uruguayan side: A. Padron calls Brazil a regional "heavyweight", stating that, by increasing its own global role, Uruguay must "accompany Brazil's leadership". In his view, such "accompaniment" presupposes support for multilateral groups led by the northern neighbor, among which MERCOSUR plays a key role as the oldest organization. At the same time, the circle of J. Orsi is characterized by the established ideas in the political elites of Uruguay that MERCOSUR still requires reforms and should follow the path of open regionalism. On the one hand, this assumes that the economy remains a priority area of cooperation in the bloc, the improvement of the common market requires the growth of the organization's importance among all economic entities in the member states, the correlation of its work with the tasks of technological and innovative development of its participants. On the other hand, MERCOSUR must adhere to the principles of free trade and build up external relations in order to strengthen the positions of its participants in the international division of labor. At the same time, today the association finds itself in conditions where globalization is slowing down, the struggle for strategic resources is intensifying, and supply chains are being restructured. Given these circumstances, several areas can be identified that may be of interest to the government of J. Orsi, both from the point of view of revealing Uruguay’s competitive advantages in MERCOSUR and from the point of view of modernizing the bloc.  Firstly, this is an emphasis on the integration of production chains with neighbors, the promotion of "friendshoring" in MERCOSUR. This is supported by the fact that Uruguay's industrial supplies are primarily focused on the bloc's members. The electric transport industry, pharmaceuticals and the production of organic food products are growth points for the industrial and innovative potential of the Uruguayan national economy and at the same time create a field for complementarity of economies in MERCOSUR. For example, Uruguay is the record holder in South America for the prevalence of electric vehicles, and it also has the most extensive network of charging stations for them in the unification zone. However, the country's own production of cars and batteries has not been established and remains an important task for the future, as noted in a report prepared in 2023 by the Technological University, the National Institute of Employment and Vocational Education and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Uruguay. Resources to solve this problem can be found within MERCOSUR. The bloc now includes Bolivia, which is aiming to industrialize its vast lithium sector and has national expertise in producing electric cars. Secondly, Uruguay has traditionally been distinguished by its special attention to the concept of sustainable development, which is consistent with the concept of building bioeconomy in the South American Common Market. Recently, it has been discussed by scientists as an alternative to import-substituting industrialization, which guided the bloc until the 2010s and began to stall after the onset of the 2014–2015 crisis. According to IDB estimates, Uruguay has some of the highest standards in Latin America for the implementation of renewable energy sources, environmental awareness practices in organizational, managerial and production activities. Such competencies increase its importance for MERCOSUR if the bloc decides to focus on the energy transition and promote the formation of circular economies. For now, these plans seem hypothetical, but the appearance of an association agreement with the European Union on the horizon will make them relevant. Given that MERCOSUR not only reached a trade agreement with the EU in December 2024, but is also considering the formation of FTAs with China, Korea and Singapore, another important area for Uruguayan diplomacy will clearly be building the bloc's relations with external powers. The rhetoric of J. Orsi and K. Cosse, as well as A. Padron, shows that the Uruguayan side expects to combine all these areas and rely on its neighbors in order to strengthen its position in negotiations and reduce the asymmetry in interactions with larger global players. It was in this vein that the decision was made for J. Orsi to abandon a separate FTA agreement with China, which the outgoing government of L. Lacalle Pou sought. The beginning of the widespread protectionist offensive of the United States under D. Trump really creates an opportunity for MERCOSUR to open its doors to European and Pacific partners. Uruguay, which champions free trade principles, can take advantage of this. At the same time, the options related to the bloc leave their unspoken. The most obvious of them is the coordination of interests with Argentina, which, as mentioned, will be included in the “first circle” of the foreign policy strategy of the new government. Although J. Orsi optimistically declared that he would reach a consensus with Javier Miley, this has not yet been possible. Plans to hold talks with this eccentric leader at the MERCOSUR summit in Montevideo in early December 2024 have failed. The lack of mutual understanding with the far-right J. Miley remains a problem, because without the political consent of its members, the association is in principle unable to evolve. Argentina also plays an important role in the industrial and infrastructural potential of MERCOSUR, without its participation it is difficult to imagine initiatives to promote economic complementarity in the bloc. Another issue is the compatibility of plans to modernize the organization and accelerate cooperation with external actors. Thus, from the point of view of the prospects of the agreement already reached with the EU, the MERCOSUR zone attracts it primarily as a pool of strategic natural resources and food, which is especially true for Uruguay. In turn, the automotive, textile, pharmaceutical and chemical industries are viewed by Europe as niches for the expansion of its goods and services and its presence in South America. Such a view cannot but affect investment preferences, including plans for new models of MERCOSUR development. In one form or another, these layouts can be repeated in the interaction of the bloc with China and other highly industrialized players. Therefore, for Uruguay and its neighbors, no matter which option for increasing the global competitiveness of the association through openness they choose, the strategic problem will remain the preservation of industrial sovereignty and limiting the reprimarization of their economies. It is worth adding that similar warnings were already voiced at a meeting between Yamandú Orsi and representatives of the scientific and business communities in June 2024. What is the bottom line?  It is safe to say that the new Uruguayan government will increase its attention to regional integration. If Luis Lacalle Pou called MERCOSUR a "suffocating corset" that can and should be gotten rid of, then with the election of Yamandú Orsi, the integration platforms, on the contrary, emphasize the useful function of supporting national interests. Although calls to reform multilateral groups so that they better correspond to specific policy objectives and the spirit of the times have not gone away. In Latin American political science thought, participation in integration groups is often presented as a way to achieve autonomy or, as one of the leading Argentine international theorists, Juan Carlos Puig, put it, “the ability to independently make foreign policy decisions, taking into account the objective conditions of the real world.” The autonomist course is usually associated with left-wing forces, but it does not necessarily imply the creation of blocs like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which directly challenge the West. Pragmatic diversification of ties with major powers, support for regional leaders, neutrality and non-interference can also be reflections of such a course. If we look at the rhetoric and first steps of I. Orsi’s team from this angle, we can link his attitude to regional structures with the search for autonomy in the international arena. Of course, with an adjustment for the traditional principles and limitations of Uruguayan diplomacy. At the same time, a significant shift or revitalization of Latin American regionalism is unlikely to result from Uruguay's leadership change. This is not only due to Uruguay's relatively small geopolitical weight but also because the new president does not seem inclined to challenge the regional status quo, forge a distinct identity, or promote it on the global stage. Uruguayan political analyst Daniel Buquet, reflecting on how Yamandú Orsi's victory might impact the leftist forces supporting integration, used a chess metaphor: “It’s like winning a pawn, but not a bishop”—a rather fitting analogy.  This article was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant No. 23-78-01030, within the project "Latin America and the Concept of a Multipolar World: Key Approaches, Impact on Foreign Policy, and Relations with Russia".

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The European Union was taken by surprise by the geopolitical turning point of 24 February 2022. Yet, at a time when the geography of enlargement is changing, the Union is struggling to revive a process in the Western Balkans on which its credibility and, increasingly, its security depend. The European Union’s failure to ensure that its vulnerabilities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia do not worsen calls for a rethink of the European policy of influence in the region. The EU’s policy of influence in the Western Balkans is based primarily on the accession process in which Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are currently participating. This process, initiated in 2000 at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, makes these countries’ progress towards joining the EU conditional on the implementation of key reforms, with the aim of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. By pursuing this political, economic and legal convergence objective, the Union aspires to transform and shape the countries of the region in its own image. This goal reflects the ideals of the European project, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon, affirmation of Europe’s ambition to be a powerful force along its own borders. The EU’s strategy over the last 20 years has enabled the countries of the Western Balkans to be integrated into the European geography and system. And yet it has not brought them significantly closer to the door of membership. Reform proposals and a blind spot The situation is alarming. The fading membership prospects of the countries in the region, combined with political and institutional deadlocks within the EU, have created gaps into which rival powers, starting with Russia, are rushing. To offset this vulnerability, the EU has endeavoured to revive its accession policy with a series of summits and aid plans, to no avail. Under French leadership, it adopted a new approach in 2020, which emphasised the importance of the political logic inherent in the accession process, in addition to the reforms to be carried out. However, progress is slow, especially at a time when the EU faces new challenges in the East. The EU granted Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia the status of candidates for accession in 2022 —three countries whose territorial integrity is in dispute—. The EU has already opened accession negotiations with the first two countries. As the East seems to be overtaking the Balkans in the race for membership, the idea of reforming the accession process is now becoming a necessity in most capitals. The June 2022 European Council called for acceleration of the accession process. Various proposals have been put on the table: progressive accession, accession in stages, accession to the single market, setting an indicative date for accession, etc. Most of these proposals aim to further strengthen the integration of the countries in the region into the European system. They assume, as the Commission has done for the past twenty years, that integration is a guarantee of membership; that the former necessarily leads to the latter. This axiom is misleading, as the case of Northern Macedonia illustrates perfectly. The integration of the countries in the region is necessary, as are the reforms, but it is not sufficient to bring to a successful conclusion a process whose outcome, membership of the EU, is a matter of co-optation. One of the most ambitious proposals is the report released by the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, also known as the Group of Twelve, which is the fruit of Franco-German reflection. It has the merit of considering the enlargement of the EU in the light of the need for institutional reform, so that Europe’s ability to act and its sovereignty can finally be strengthened in a fragmenting world. The idea is to reform the accession process as part of a political project that the Union must carry forward both among its Member States and in the Western Balkans. Among these proposals, however, there is an unresolved issue: territorial disputes and disputed sovereignty, a key area in which the EU is struggling to take action. Yet what influence can the Union aspire to in the Western Balkans and beyond, if it sidesteps the most sensitive issues in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia? These issues, which involve sovereignty, territorial integrity, irredentism and geopolitics, are of cardinal importance. It is crucial that the EU now gets involved in these areas, so that the accession policy is no longer limited to promoting the rule of law, good governance and economic integration. It is not only necessary to affirm the credibility of the Union today in the Western Balkans, but also tomorrow in the East. Is the EU at an impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is confronted first and foremost with strong irredentism in Republika Srpska, which is contributing to a poisonous climate in the country. In its report of 23 November 2023, the Council of Europe condemned inter-ethnic violence, ethno-nationalist and hate speech, the denial of genocide and war crimes, the glorification of war criminals and, more generally, the intolerance that is gaining ground. This irredentism, which has been fuelled for several years by the historic leader of the Serbian entity, Milorad Dodik, is expressed at a political level by an assertive secessionism, striving to dismantle the Bosnian state. To achieve this, the Serbian entity is trying to challenge the authority of central institutions, starting with the courts, whose decisions it is hindering. It is also challenging the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, where international judges sit to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and the authority of the High Representative, who is also responsible for the Dayton Accords. The weakening of these institutions, further exacerbated by the spectre of a secessionist referendum, would pave the way for the dismantling of other regal bodies, notably the army, posing an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, Russia is stepping into these cracks, as the instability in the country is hardly attracting the attention of the West. The ties forged between Republika Srpska and Russia have been strengthened against a backdrop of international tensions. While the EU was anticipating a difficult winter, Milorad Dodik travelled to Moscow in September 2022, much to the EU’s displeasure. In January 2023, Milorad Dodik honoured Vladimir Putin with the highest distinction awarded by the Serbian entity, then went to the Kremlin at the beginning of the summer to receive a distinction himself —the Order of Alexander Nievsky—. This collusion between the two men prevents the central state of Bosnia-Herzegovina from aligning itself with the European sanctions against Russia; it facilitates the penetration of Russian propaganda into the country, and gives Serbian secessionism in Bosnia-Herzegovina an international dimension, since Russia is in a position to block or slow down certain decisions relating to the international presence in the country. According to a poll published in June 2022, 89% of Bosnian Serbs have a positive opinion of Russia’s role in the country, and Vladimir Putin’s popularity is undeniable. As well as undermining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik is suspected of embezzlement, corruption and nepotism. But unlike the United States, which adopted sanctions against him in 2022, the EU remains on the sidelines. And there’s a clear explanation for this. Milorad Dodik has an ally among the Member States: Hungary. Political affinities link the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its leader, Viktor Orbán, with political and financial support given specifically to Republika Srpska. Both politicians harbour the same ideological distrust of Brussels and progressive values. On the European stage, Milorad Dodik can count on Viktor Orbán’s protection, particularly when it comes to sanctions, since Orbán opposes any decision in this regard. However, Hungary is not the only country hampering Europe’s policy of influence. Croatia is also playing a shady game. It has lobbied, through the EU, for the adoption in 2022 of an electoral reform that consolidates the power of the Croatian nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if it means deepening the ethnic divisions in the country. This reform, which was also supported by Hungary, ran counter to the European vision of a system based on civic rather than ethno-national identities. The EU’s response to these challenges remains limited to the (necessary) promotion of the rule of law and fundamental rights, the fight against corruption and public administration reforms. In 2019, the EU identified fourteen priorities prior to opening accession negotiations, and then granted Bosnia-Herzegovina candidate status in 2022, despite the limited progress made in this area. For this reason, France, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Germany were less than enthusiastic about the decision. But in the current geopolitical context, it was the position of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy that prevailed, and in the end this enabled Bosnia-Herzegovina to move forward without penalising the political elites compromising the country’s future, or calling into question their relays among the Member States. Is the EU stuck in a rut in Kosovo? In Kosovo, the EU is facing a particularly serious challenge, and it has been working for over 10 years to tackle it through the dialogue it facilitates between Belgrade and Prishtina. Yet its efforts have not led to the much hoped-for normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In fact, the security situation on the ground has continued to deteriorate. Serbia, which opposes the country’s independence, supports pockets of instability and parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo, and fuels irredentism among a section of the Serb population that is resolutely hostile to the authority of the central Kosovan state. In March 2023, tensions arose when Kosovo Albanian mayors were forcibly prevented from taking up their duties in the north of the country, following municipal elections that had been the subject of a Serb boycott orchestrated by Belgrade. Scuffles broke out, with the participation of agitators from Serbia; the Serbian army was placed on alert, and for the first time Serbian protesters attacked Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers, an international NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo under the UN mandate. Instead of incriminating Serbia and Serbian irredentism in Kosovo, the EU, at the instigation of France and Germany, adopted sanctions against the authorities and civil society in the weakest party to the dispute, Kosovo. An even more worrying incident occurred shortly afterwards, in September 2023, when a group of Serb nationalists, armed with an impressive arsenal of weapons, attacked police forces, killing a Kosovar policeman. The attack, carried out by a Kosovo Serb political leader with close links to the political party of the president of neighbouring Serbia, gave rise to considerable concern, especially as Belgrade was at the same time reinforcing its armed forces on Kosovo’s borders. Nationalist, militaristic and pro-Russian rhetoric in Serbia fuelled the perception of an imminent threat to Kosovo, along the lines of that posed by Russia in Ukraine. KFOR stepped up its presence accordingly. In Serbia, a day of national mourning was declared in response to the death of three Serb assailants killed in the shoot-out. In European capitals, the incident was condemned, but the responsibility of the authorities in Prishtina, more so than Serbian irredentism in the north of Kosovo and the diplomacy of the srpski svet in Belgrade, was singled out. These serious incidents attest to the hardening of irredentism fuelled by Belgrade. Above all, they illustrate the current impasse in the dialogue facilitated by the EU. Devoid of any strategic objective, the dialogue has been limited to preparing the ground for an illusory agreement to “normalise” relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. To this end, it focused mainly on technical issues of document recognition, border management, freedom of movement and so on. This was the case, for example, with the “historic” agreement reached in Brussels in 2013, and the dozen or so others that followed. However, these agreements have all been poorly implemented. Furthermore, the attention paid to each stumbling block, along with the resulting tensions, has led the EU to lose sight of the political objective of resolving the dispute – that of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state and of its territorial integrity. This is not one of the objectives of the dialogue. The dialogue is focusing increasingly on issues of internal governance in Kosovo. In particular, the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in the north of Kosovo is giving rise to controversy, as it is reminiscent of the problems encountered by Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But with an added pitfall. The dialogue currently supported by France and Germany is now making the granting of a form of autonomy to these irredentist municipalities a prerequisite for the “normalisation” of relations with Serbia, with no guarantee that Kosovo will eventually gain international recognition. To increase pressure on Prishtina, France, Germany and Italy have now gone as far as withholding support for Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe in an unprecedented move that brought about satisfaction in Belgrade and Moscow. Unable to adopt a common position on the matter due to five Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia), the EU is struggling to project a policy of influence on this issue through dialogue. Instead, it finds itself forced to manage repeated crises as a matter of urgency, to prevent the situation on the ground from flaring up. To no avail, as the incidents worsen and multiply, the EU leaves a gaping hole into which the regimes in Serbia and, unsurprisingly, Russia rush. Both have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo on this issue, which is a vector of instability, and in ensuring that the EU stays in the same rut. The EU’s limited influence in Serbia The European policy of influence is showing its limits in Serbia too. It has failed to effectively support the democratic forces in Serbia that had been protesting for months against the rise of authoritarianism there. It continues placing its faith in a regime that has continuously demonstrated its neglect for democratic processes and political pluralism. The rigged elections of late 2023, which the EU has not sanctioned, illustrates the EU’s geopolitical helplessness and incapacity to itself face a local authoritarian regime at its doorsteps. The EU, likewise, has failed to significantly influence Serbia’s foreign policy towards Russia. In 2009 Serbia entered into a strategic partnership with Russia, which was extended in 2013 to include cooperation on security and defence. This partnership paved the way for the acquisition of various Russian weapons systems (fighter aircraft, guided missiles, etc.), and for joint military exercises to be held between 2014 and 2021 with Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Serbia joined as an observer. Economically, cooperation has intensified with the conclusion in 2019 of a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, although trade between Serbia and Russia, representing less than 10% of exchanges, remains well below that with the EU. The war in Ukraine and the EU’s policy of isolating Russia has not lead Serbia to reconsider its approach. At the United Nations, Serbia has indeed supported a number of resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, without saying so loud and clear. But this has not meant that the country has aligned itself with the European sanctions against Moscow. It has only adopted measures against Belarus and pro-Russian figures in Ukraine, and dual-use technologies banned from export by the EU are said to be finding their way to Russia via Serbia. Belgrade has also failed to align itself with most of the statements made by the EU High Representative and the decisions taken by the Council in all areas of foreign and security policy. Yet this is a contractual obligation under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Art. 10.) it concluded with the EU in 2013. Its behaviour as a candidate country for EU membership is troubling. In June 2022, Serbia was represented at ministerial level at the official St Petersburg International Economic Forum, alongside Milorad Dodik. In August 2022, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Belgrade sent Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbian intelligence, now deputy prime minister and figurehead of irredentism and srpski svet diplomacy in the Balkans, to the Kremlin. He was decorated by the Russian defence minister. In September 2022, Serbia signed an agreement with Russia reinforcing cooperation in foreign policy. After a few months of restraint, Aleksandar Vučić became more vocal in March 2023 when he expressed his disapproval of the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. In September 2023, he received the Russian ambassador in Belgrade to discuss the situation in northern Kosovo, and finally, in October 2023, he met Vladimir Putin in Beijing, with whom he had a “cordial exchange”. The presence of Russian media in Serbia, and the control of the press by the Serbian authorities, means that public opinion is shaped accordingly. Criticism of the depraved and hegemonic West is commonplace, as is that of the hypocrisy of the EU, the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO, and the injustice allegedly suffered by the patriots of srpski svet. Unable to assert itself on either the issue of recognition of Kosovo or Serbia’s geopolitical orientation, the EU has also had to deal with the close ties between Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orbán, and their affinities with the Enlargement Commissioner, Olivér Várhelyi. These connections facilitate Serbia’s access to European funds. Despite the democratic setback and pro-Russian ambiguities in the country, in February 2023 the Commission awarded Serbia the most generous subsidy (€600 million) ever granted in the region. This is part of a package worth more than €2 billion allocated to Serbia to finance a high-speed railway line extending the section that China is currently building between Belgrade and Budapest —a project plagued by corruption scandals, but which meets the objectives of trans-European connectivity—. Likewise, when it comes to accession policy, Aleksandar Vučić finds in Viktor Orbán an influential ally in the Council, to ensure that authoritarian and pro-Russian abuses in Serbia are not punished. The serious irregularities that marred the Serbian general elections in December 2023 and the poisonous climate that reigned during the campaign bear witness to the abuses taking place in Serbia. Can a policy of alliance make up for the EU’s powerlessness? Unable to exert strategic influence on the most sensitive issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, the EU faces a major challenge. Where could it be better to practice the “language of power” than in this small, landlocked region that has been earmarked for accession? The EU, which is an imperfect power, is struggling to shake off the illusion that the transformative power it is trying to exert through its accession policy will act as a miracle cure in a region plagued by irredentism, Russian disinformation and authoritarian tendencies. This illusion may prove harmful, for the Balkans lie in the shadows of an even more complex problem in the East. Institutional reform of the EU, which in the future may make qualified majority voting the norm, will not enable the Union to project strategic and political influence overnight, at least not in these most sensitive areas. The same is true of enhanced conditionality that emphasises the rule of law. So how will this help to establish the disputed sovereignty of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to anchor Serbia geopolitically in the European camp? Unfortunately, in the absence of a strong and visionary Commission, the Union cannot be expected to do much, as the Member States, and therefore the Council, do not share the same vision of the political union to which the European project should aspire. Some of them, mainly in the East, remain faithful to sovereignty and intend to resist the Union’s logic of interference everywhere. Others, such as Germany, swear by neofunctionalism and struggle to think of the (political and territorial) purpose of the European project beyond economic integration. As for France, it calls for a political deepening of the Union through a revival of intergovernmentalism but it rejects any federalist logic. These differences in vision inhibit the Union’s ability to develop a policy of influence that is not limited to a membership process that ultimately proves inadequate. To compensate for this weakness, what if the EU were to make greater use of alliances? Within the Union, this would mean strengthening coordination between Member States that share the idea that the challenges in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia should be the subject of a strong political and diplomatic commitment that is separate from the EU accession process. The challenge for the Member States in question would be to help the Union learn the “language of power”, with the aim of consolidating the contested sovereignties of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and changing Serbia’s foreign policy. In the Western Balkans, this logic of alliance would find support in civil society, in the opposition in Serbia and among the new generation of political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stronger support for these progressive political forces, including on the streets, and more scathing criticism of those figures, elected or not, who are fuelling irredentism and instability in the region, would send out an important signal and, above all, develop new levers of influence.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine of February 2022 has propelled EU enlargement to the top of Europe’s political agenda and linked it inextricably to the question of European security. The reshaping of the global political landscape, where strategic competition, growing global instability and attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are prominent features, has added further complexity to EU enlargement. The geopolitical imperative has seemingly expedited EU enlargement, while the merit-based transformative objectives of the process sit uncomfortably in the balance. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, zooming in on the EU perspective and key initiatives of its Member States. It explains how the initial ambition and hope that the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans embodied drifted towards enlargement fatigue. It also outlines the hurdles confronting the enlargement process and the Western Balkans, the efforts exerted to revive EU enlargement, and finally considers the questions facing the EU during the new legislative term. EU enlargement perspective – strict but fair? EU enlargement is perceived historically as having played a transformative role. It supported the consolidation of democracy in the Southern European countries and later, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU accession process is seen as having fostered stability, democratisation and economic prosperity. The arduous transformative process has, however, been longer and bumpier for the Western Balkans. North Macedonia has been stuck in the EU’s lobby for almost 20 years, Montenegro since 2011, Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 2014. This was partly due to the hardening of rule of law conditionality. A key lesson identified from Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession path was that the transformation of a country, in particular in the rule of law area, was not only a long process but it was also fraught with obstacles, notably resistance from applicant governments. To remedy the shortcomings identified, the 2005 negotiating framework for Croatia strengthened rule of law conditionality by introducing a specific Chapter 23 on ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ in addition to the existing Chapter 24 on ‘justice, freedom and security’ in the EU acquis communautaire. This approach continued and was hardened during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The Western Balkans were first promised a “European perspective” at the Zagreb Summit of 2000. At the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU. To deliver on this, the enlargement process was tied to substantial financial and technical support through which the EU has aimed to push for the democratisation and resilience of Western Balkan institutions, societies and economies. EU support was made conditional upon the Western Balkans meeting ‘European standards’ (conditionality), including (and especially) rule of law prerogatives. This approach was reflected in the negotiating framework adopted in June 2012 for negotiations with Montenegro, in the High-Level Accession Dialogues respectively with North Macedonia (then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, fYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with Kosovo, [1] all launched in 2012. The European Commission, but most adamantly civil society in the Western Balkans, repeatedly pointed to the failings of the region’s governments to implement reforms, leading to façade compliance. In parallel, the ‘Brussels dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia has oscillated between normalisation and a state of strained peace and conflict prevention, with the signature of the April 2013 ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ (known as the Brussels Agreement) constituting an exception of ephemeral hope. [2] Moreover, slowly but firmly, stabilitocracy grew roots. Autocrats in the Western Balkans, ruling through informal power structures, state capture by ruling parties, patronage and control of the media, managed to combine EU accession with stronger domestic control. [3] Certain Member States turned a blind eye to or downplayed the democratic backsliding, (indirectly) supporting autocratic leaders accused of nurturing stabilitocracy. Notable examples include Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanović and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who Member States initially hoped would be able to settle the Kosovo status question. EU enlargement fatigue: the breaking point The multiple and overlapping crises that Europe has faced since 2008, from the global financial crisis to the perceived 2015 migration crisis, to the 2020 Covid crisis and the energy and inflationary crisis that followed, relegated the EU integration of the Western Balkan countries to second tier. At the beginning of the Juncker Commission, it had become clear that EU enlargement would be for the long haul. The unfortunate European Council decision of October 2019 not to open EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania manifested the fatigue felt with the EU enlargement process, not only in the Western Balkans but on the EU side too. The merit-based process no longer rewarded prospective members engaging in reforms. While Skopje turned a page with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s election in May 2017, ending stabilitocracy, signing the historic June 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece that solved the name issue, it was NATO that granted North Macedonia membership in March 2020. The EU accession process was (and continues to be) often kept hostage by the vetoes of individual Member States which are utterly unrelated to the economic and democratic conditions that supposedly govern the process. The exasperation felt in the Western Balkan countries because of the empty promises and broken dreams, gave rise to alternative scenarios and Plan Bs if EU enlargement to the Western Balkans were not to materialise. It opened the doors of the region to other donors and contested powers, in particular Russia through disinformation, China on investments in infrastructure, and Turkey and the Gulf countries through investments and cultural programmes. Their influence in the region came to the detriment of EU leverage. [4] With EU enlargement on the backburner, ways to keep the momentum for reform and initiatives from the region were welcomed. The Berlin Process, a diplomatic initiative by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was launched in 2014 with a view to reinvigorating the integration process. A platform focusing on increased high-level regional cooperation and connectivity between the Western Balkan Six —Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia— and the EU Member States, the process also involves the EU institutions, international financial institutions and the region’s civil society. In addition, the 2013 Brdo-Brijuni Process is a regionally owned platform for political dialogue on sensitive bilateral and regional issues, initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The ‘Western Balkans Six’ format enables the region’s governments to agree on and promote joint initiatives, with the full cooperation of the European Commission. These initiatives were also a way to show other powers —notably Russia, Turkey and China— that the EU is in the region to stay. Revitalising EU enlargement? The 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans of the Juncker Commission marked a U-turn, putting the enlargement perspective of the region back on the EU agenda. It also set the tone for the 2019-2024 legislative term. Already during her campaigning for votes in the European Parliament for the confirmation of her nomination as Commission President following the 2019 European elections, Ursula von der Leyen had expressed her support for enlargement. This became clear in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, in which she committed to supporting the European perspective of the Western Balkans. [5] At the same time, experts argued that a move from Juncker’s political Commission to Von der Leyen’s geopolitical and therefore “politicized” Commission would translate to more pressure from Member States on the Commission. That could compromise the Commission’s role as guardian of the EU Treaties, they explained. [6] In a way, EU Member States’ backroom dealings that led to a deviation from the expected Spitzenkandidat process in 2014, were a precursor to how they would deal with the EU enlargement process. The February 2020 revamped EU enlargement methodology, urged by French President Emmanuel Macron, aimed to make the process more credible, more dynamic and predictable. It also sought to make the enlargement process more robust by putting pressure on those candidate countries (notably Serbia) that have been comfortably hiding behind empty political promises for reform while nurturing stabilitocracy. In terms of EU decision-making, the new methodology decreased the number of Member State’s veto points in the Council by introducing the opening of clusters instead of individual chapters, which was hoped would expedite the enlargement process. In addition, some experts highlighted that “by reinvigorating democratic reform, facilitating foreign and security policy alignment, and making real once more the idea that Western Balkan countries are welcome as new Member States, the EU would suck the oxygen from competing and malign illiberal influences”. [7] Nevertheless, at the outset, the prospective new members perceived the novelties in the enlargement methodology as yet another way to slow down the accession process. The new methodology further reinforced the requirements for rule of law reforms (including the oversight of the relevant institutions) allowing Member States to put negotiations on hold, re-open closed chapters, reconsider funding availability and, in the worst-case scenario, suspend accession negotiations altogether. Moreover, it took the Commission more than three years to implement the methodology, fuelling the uncertainty felt in the Western Balkans. At the same time, North Macedonia, in particular, and Albania as its collateral victim, given that its accession progress was coupled to that of North Macedonia, faced intense resistance to progress on its EU accession path both from France and the Netherlands. The European Council gave its long-awaited green light to start North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations in March 2020 (together with Albania). But even then, the unity in Council was tarnished by Bulgaria, which requested that a statement be attached to the March 2020 Council conclusions, insisting, among other things, on scrapping references to the Macedonian language and to the existence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. [8] These hurdles have effectively meant that accession negotiations have not started with either North Macedonia or Albania. In that light, more initiatives parallel to the EU enlargement process were launched, raising controversy. On the Western Balkans side, Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia agreed on the Open Balkans Initiative (better known as Mini-Schengen), in August 2021, although it had been under discussion since 2019. Its stated aim was to deepen political and economic ties by opening the borders between the three countries and creating a common market that would bring the countries closer to EU integration. Kosovo and Montenegro have expressed support for this idea, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to garner the necessary political support. Geopolitical EU enlargement: a turning point The 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has “injected new urgency into the enlargement debate but it has also underscored enlargement as a strategic necessity” for European security. [9] In June 2022, EU leaders expressed their full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and called for acceleration of the accession process. The latest EU Strategic Agenda “underscores the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity” [10] That geopolitical urgency led at last to the official opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022. The enlargement momentum, which accelerated the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and an offer for conditional candidacy to Georgia in December 2023, spilled over to Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its constitutional blockage. The EU decided to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024. These political decisions were a clear signal that the EU is still serious about the enlargement process. At the same time, in line with the general framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the 2006 renewed EU consensus on enlargement, the Council’s latest conclusions on enlargement of 12 December 2023 stressed the need for fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. The June 2024 endorsement of the rule of law benchmarks (Chapters 23 and 24 in the ‘fundamentals cluster’) at Montenegro’s Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) is a key milestone for the country’s EU accession path, but also of the centrality of the merit-based approach. In parallel, the Council led by French President Macron, has also stressed the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development, including its capacity to integrate new members. This new hurdle in the way of EU accession has led experts and policy-makers alike to consider the latest Council decisions on EU accession as “relatively symbolic”. Besides the length and unpredictability of the enlargement process, this is also the case because of the number of obstacles applicants have found on their way to the EU, including vetoes over bilateral disputes that are unrelated to the Copenhagen criteria. [11] In addition to the vetoes North Macedonia has faced consecutively from Greece and Bulgaria, Tirana’s opening of the first cluster of negotiation chapters was obstructed more recently by Athens over the jailing of an ethnic Greek Albanian mayor accused of electoral fraud. The momentum for EU enlargement has revived concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, i.e., the EU’s preparedness for accepting new members. These concerns have revived the debate on the need for EU institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of the Union post-enlargement. Yet much of this debate is linked to the decision-making bottlenecks in the Council, when responding to urgent and complicated crises (particularly the war in Ukraine). In terms of the legal feasibility of EU enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon contains the necessary provisions regarding institutions and decision-making processes for the EU to be able to welcome new members without any Treaty changes. In addition, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has liberated seats in the European Parliament that would make the absorption of small new members possible. In reaction, some experts and policy-makers have seen the determination with which France and a few other Member States push for EU internal reforms as yet another attempt to either hinder EU enlargement and/or rather move towards a multi-speed EU. [12] Against this backdrop, the rise of the populist right in the European elections and national elections across the EU has amplified the mantra that EU “values and the rule of law are our compass, both internally and externally”, [13] led by a group of Member States with France in the lead. Hence, support for EU enlargement may be more complicated in the Council, where a number of EU governments have shifted to the far right and when, in a super-election year, more such parties are likely to find themselves at the helm of or in governing coalitions in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the European Commission and Parliament are likely set to continue to support EU enlargement in the 2024-2029 legislative term. In her political priorities, incoming Commission President von der Leyen has framed enlargement as “a moral, political and geostrategic imperative” for the EU and appointed a Commissioner dedicated specifically to enlargement. In support for boosting enlargement, von der Leyen has also committed to presenting in her first 100 days in office, pre-enlargement policy reviews across a wide array of EU policy sectors, implying that there will be post-enlargement phase. [14]  The political priorities also note that the “emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values…will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy”. [15]  This could entail further delays in the accession process, for reasons already explained. The Parliament has applied a ‘cordon sanitaire’ on all leadership positions (Committee chairs and vice-chairs, Quaestors and Vice-Presidents) to block those seen as positioning themselves against the EU project (namely the far right). It is hoped this will ensure that the EP’s mainstream positions hold, including its strong support for EU enlargement. In that regard, David McAllister MEP (EPP, Germany) was re-elected chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which is the main committee legislating on and scrutinising progress in EU enlargement. Initiatives on EU enlargement for a new legislative term 2024-2029 Several ideas have been discussed in EU circles on how to move forward with enlargement and capitalise on the current enlargement momentum. The EU has also launched new initiatives aiming to incentivise the Western Balkans to make the necessary reforms to meet the enlargement requirements. The discussion on gradual integration or “phasing-in”, in the words of the European Commission, is not a new concept. The idea of fashioning a new kind of conditionality, a way to encourage reform especially in the rule of law, but also in regional integration, good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and the resolution of bilateral disputes, now goes beyond the promises of the revised EU enlargement methodology. It became more concrete with the adoption of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, in May 2024, whose stated aim is to support the Western Balkans partners on their EU path by encouraging faster socio-economic convergence with the EU. Specifically, in return for socio-economic and fundamental reforms, including in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Western Balkans countries will benefit from EU integration in the areas where they have met the acquis requirements. In addition to those conditions, Serbia and Kosovo are expected to engage constructively on the normalisation of their relations, leading to tangible results. At the centre of this new plan is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, a new financial instrument that will provide €6 billion (€2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans) over the 2024-2027 period. An additional €2 billion was allocated to the Facility as part of the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027. For their part, each candidate and prospective candidate has prepared a detailed reform agenda explaining how it will undertake EU-related reforms. But experts have raised questions on whether the financial support is sufficient for such broad-based and demanding reforms, whether the carrots offered are enough to convince Western Balkan governments to implement reforms, whether conditionality is applicable and how it will be monitored and measured. [16] The idea of introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) —55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population— in the Council of the EU for decisions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy has inspired experts and politicians alike to consider QMV for decision in the intermediary steps of EU enlargement. The European Parliament has been a strong proponent of this idea during the last legislative term, but importantly, this idea has gained traction in the Council itself, the ultimate decision-maker on EU enlargement. Specifically, a Slovenian-German non-paper to the General Affairs Council of January 2024 proposed that the opening (and only the opening) of negotiating clusters, including the Opening Benchmark Assessment Reports (OBAR) be decided in Council by QMV. This proposal is supported by some 15 other Member States. Experts have explained that introducing QMV could facilitate bypassing blockages that result from bilateral disputes between Member States and candidate countries. [17] It has also been argued that QMV could be way of providing a realistic accession scenario for the Western Balkan countries thus, on the one hand, helping the EU regain its credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans while, on the other, rendering the enlargement process fairer and more effective. [18] Combining these two broad themes, some experts have pushed for a ‘staged accession’ to restore positive momentum to EU enlargement and ease the most serious concerns that EU Member States have regarding the prospect of further enlargement. Among other things, this proposal suggests granting QMV powers —rather than veto powers— to new Member States upon accession, in anticipation of and conditioned on streamlining the whole EU decision-making process. In that case, ‘new Member States’ could be regarded as avant-garde, in that their exclusion from veto voting power would align them to the revamped EU, which would itself progressively adapt institutionally by reducing unanimity requirements. In parallel, this provisional period of socialization would allow new Member States to be gradually introduced to the intricacies of EU policy-making. [19] The geopolitical imperative for enlargement is likely to be felt more strongly in the coming years. Russia, China and others remain active in the Western Balkans and continue to “capitalise on every opportunity that the EU fails to use and on any moment of strategic confusion and hesitance”. [20] The return of Donald Trump to the White House will likely mean a call for the EU to tackle its own responsibilities on its continent. It will take resolute EU leadership for progress in EU accession to be concrete. It implies that the enlargement process should be recalibrated so that the Western Balkan candidates are not left lingering behind the Eastern trio. It also requires that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) starting later next year adequately reflects enlargement as a priority. Geopolitical choices cannot resort to ‘selective democracy’ as each of the Western Balkan countries should be treated on its merits. Ultimately, the EU integration of the Western Balkans needs to be understood as a win-win for all. References and footnotes 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.2 Ioannides, I. (2018). “Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of the EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans”. EPRS, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2018)6218163 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (2017). “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy”. Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/policy-paper-the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/ 4 Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. Yale University Press. See also Shopov, V. (2021). “Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans”. European Council for Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/ 5 Von der Leyen, U. (2019). “A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”. Directorate-General for Communication. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/063d44e9-04ed-4033-acf9-639ecb187e87_en?filename=political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 6 Blockmans, S.; Gros, D. (2019). “From a political to a politicised Commission?” Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-a-political-to-a-politicised-commission/ 7 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 8 Ioannides, I. (2020). “The New EU Budget and Recovery Fund: A Positive Omen for the EU Enlargement Process?” IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-new-eu-budget-and-recovery-fund-a-positive-omen-for-the-eu 9 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 10 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 11 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 12 Buras, P.; Morina, E. (2023). “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU”. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/ 13 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 14 Von der Leyen (2024). “Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029”. Strasbourg, July 18, 2024, p. 25, p. 30. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 15 Von der Leyen (2024). Mission Letter from Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, to Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for Enlargement. Brussels, September 17, 2024, p.5. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1a2d0ad0-270d-441b-98c8-b6be364d8272_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KOS.pdf 16 Uvalic, M. (2024). “The Potential of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”. Civil Society Forum – Tirana 2023. European Policy Institute – Skopje. https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/The-Potential-of-the-New-Growth-Plan-for-the-Western-Balkans.pdf 17 Zweers, W.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Dimitrov, N. (2024). “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP, and Solutions. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf 18 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 19 Emerson, M.; Lazarević, M.; Blockmans, S.; Subotić, S. (2021). “A Template for Staged Accession to the EU”. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 20 Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Dimitrov, N. (2023). “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/its-a-package-deal-reforming-and-enlarging-the-european-union-in-a 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the arrival of the Donald Trump administration, trade relations between the United States and Canada have undergone significant changes, particularly in light of the introduction of new 25% tariffs on Canadian goods, including automotive products, steel, and aluminum. These measures are justified as a "national threat" due to migration and drugs [1]. In response, Canada imposed reciprocal measures worth $155 billion, affecting food products, alcohol, electric vehicles, and aerospace products [2]. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6%, while the U.S. GDP could decline by 1.6% [3]. Additionally, a revision of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is expected. The Trump administration intends to evaluate trade imbalances and their impact on jobs, which could lead to a shift from a trilateral agreement to bilateral agreements. Risks of this revision include tightening rules of origin for the automotive industry, pressuring Canada to open its dairy market, and using the USMCA as leverage to address border security and migration issues. There is also an expectation that the U.S. will attempt to include border security and military spending issues in trade negotiations [4]. Through these actions, the United States could push Canada toward closer dialogue with China, strengthening its role as an alternative market for Canadian resources and becoming another significant factor in the changing trade dynamics between the U.S. and Canada. In the midst of the trade war with the U.S., Canada was left without clear leadership due to the resignation of Justin Trudeau and the suspension of parliament until the end of March. Not only did this lead to a split within the Liberal Party, with its members simultaneously competing for leadership and attempting to formulate a response to the external threat, but the lack of a unified strategy also weakened the country's position in negotiations with the U.S. administration. Amid the crisis, the provinces took matters into their own hands, increasing pressure on Ottawa. The introduction of tariffs has caused a split between the provinces, whose economies depend on trade with the U.S. in different ways. Newfoundland Premier Andrew Furey called the tariffs an "existential threat" and demanded tough retaliatory measures, including sanctions on critical minerals important for the American industry [5]. Meanwhile, Ontario, home to the automotive industry, which accounts for about 25% of the province's GDP, is demanding an aggressive response from the federal government to the U.S. actions. Preparing for early elections, the province announced a $23 billion business relief package, as well as reciprocal tariffs on American goods, including alcohol and home appliances, setting a precedent for other regions [6]. Alberta, where oil and gas exports make up 68% of the economy, opposed the ban on shipments to the U.S. Premier Danielle Smith called such measures "harmful to Canadians" and urged targeted retaliatory actions, such as tariffs on goods from "red states" [7]. British Columbia and Quebec opted for symbolic sanctions. Premier David Eby, for instance, imposed a ban on alcohol imports from Republican states and announced a priority for Canadian goods in government procurement [8]. Quebec, whose aerospace industry is closely tied to the U.S., has so far limited itself to strong rhetoric. The conflict of interest also emerged in the issue of internal trade barriers. The Trudeau government announced plans to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers, which are said to reduce GDP by $130 billion annually [9]. However, provinces with developed agriculture (Manitoba, Saskatchewan) are blocking the liberalization of the meat market, while Ontario and Quebec are defending the retention of dairy quotas. Premier of Nova Scotia Tim Houston, as a symbol of this systemic issue, criticized the inability to "ship a bottle of wine across the provincial border" [10]. Interprovincial and intergovernmental escalation could strengthen Canadian regionalism. According to the "B.C. Economic Forecast", 25% tariffs could cost British Columbia 120,000 jobs, while Ontario would lose 200,000 [11]. This will likely lead to increased demands from regions for a redistribution of federal subsidies, becoming a factor that threatens the unity of the country. So far, provinces are acting separately, from Ontario’s push for infrastructure investments to British Columbia’s initiative to accelerate projects in remote regions. The federal government is facing criticism from opposition parties that are calling for more support for the population rather than businesses, warning of rising prices for food and fuel. The Conservatives and the New Democrats have responded decisively, urging immediate action to protect Canadian workers and industries from the impact of tariffs. Pierre Poilievre and Jagmeet Singh have demanded that the government implement protective measures, further intensifying the political discourse around trade and economic policy. While this situation risks deepening divisions between the federal and provincial governments, U.S. tariffs present an opportunity for political unity among parties that typically have differing views on trade. The immediate threat could force various factions within the Liberal Party to unite around a common strategy to combat U.S. trade aggression. This could strengthen Trudeau’s position, as he takes steps to address public concerns related to job losses and economic stability. However, the long-term consequences for Canada's domestic politics may extend beyond immediate economic issues. The tariffs have sparked noticeable public outrage in Canada. Many Canadians are bewildered by Trump’s actions, particularly given the historically close economic ties between the two countries. Canadians have begun to publicly express their displeasure, such as booing the U.S. national anthem at sporting events, which reflects deep frustration with Trump’s unilateral decision [12]. This reaction also indicates that American actions are perceived as an unfair attack on Canadian sovereignty and economic stability. A recent survey conducted by the Canadian Labour Congress revealed that a significant majority of Canadians (around 80%) believe that American tariffs will increase the cost of living in Canada and negatively affect relations with the U.S [13]. Nearly 90% of respondents support government investment plans aimed at strengthening the Canadian economy and protecting jobs from the adverse effects of these tariffs. In light of these events, a movement is growing among Canadians to prioritize domestic goods over American imports. Many citizens are actively seeking ways to support local businesses as a form of protest against Trump’s tariffs. Social media campaigns urging consumers to buy Canadian-made products are gaining momentum, and some citizens are even canceling plans to travel to the U.S. as a manifesto against American trade policies. If the government’s retaliatory measures do not yield favorable results or if they worsen the economic downturn, public discontent may intensify, leading to shifts in voter sentiment ahead of this year’s elections. Economic difficulties will turn into political challenges, as voters tend to hold the ruling parties responsible for perceived failures in managing trade relations. Moreover, as Canada reevaluates its trade strategies in light of the aggressive policies of the U.S., there may be calls for a more assertive approach to international trade agreements and partnerships outside the North American region, which could significantly alter the platforms of Canadian political parties. References [1] Imposing Duties To Address The Flow Of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border. The White House Official Website. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-duties-to-address-the-flow-of-illicit-drugs-across-our-national-border/[2] Canada responded with $155 billion in mirror measures affecting food, alcohol, electric vehicles and aerospace products. Experts predict that these mutual restrictions could reduce Canada's GDP by 2.6% and the U.S.'s by 1.6%. CTV News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/canada-to-slap-25-per-cent-tariff-on-155b-of-us-goods-after-trump-initiates-trade-war/[3] Trump’s 25% Tariff Threat: New Analysis Reveals Severe Economic Fallout for Both Canada and the U.S. Canadian Chamber of Commerce’s Business Data Lab (BDL). November 28, 2024. Available at: https://chamber.ca/news/trumps-25-tariff-threat-new-analysis-reveals-severe-economic-fallout-for-both-canada-and-the-u-s/[4] Experts React: Trump Just Slapped Tariffs On Mexico, Canada And China. What’s Next? Atlantic Council (признан нежелательной организацией в РФ). February 2, 2025. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-trump-just-slapped-tariffs-on-mexico-canada-and-china-whats-next/[5] Premiers decry Trump's tariffs, announce countermeasures and call for federal response. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/several-premiers-decry-trump-s-tariffs-and-call-for-powerful-canadian-response-1.7448301[6] As Trump's tariffs become a reality, Ontario's party leaders pitch plans to respond. CBC News. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/trump-tariffs-ontario-party-leaders-respond-1.7448203[7] 'It doesn't need to happen': Trump's tariffs rattle Alberta. Calgary Herald. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/it-doesnt-need-to-happen-trumps-tariffs-rattle-alberta[8] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[9] Lack of federal leadership hurts Canada’s response to Trump tariff threat. Policy Options. January 29, 2025. Available at: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2025/foreign-relations-confusion/[10]‘Time to fix this’: Could the tariff threat bring down Canada's interprovincial trade barriers, once and for all? Financial Post. January 30, 2025. Available at: https://financialpost.com/news/economy/tariffs-bring-down-canada-interprovincial-trade-barriers[11] Premier announces immediate response, vows to defend B.C. against Trump tariffs. Office of the Premier of British Columbia. February 1, 2025. Available at: https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2025PREM0014-000077[12] Fans at Raptors game continue trend of booing US national anthem at pro sporting events in Canada. Asssociated Press. February 3, 2025. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/fans-boo-national-anthem-tariffs-canada-2c7210574c0373348870a94445814407[13] Canadians reject Trump’s tariff threats: New CLC poll. Canadian Labour Congress. January 23, 2025. Available at: https://canadianlabour.ca/canadians-reject-trumps-tariff-threats-new-clc-poll/