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Diplomacy
Presidente de la República, Gabriel Boric Font, asiste a la asunción del Presidente de Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz. Gobierno de Chile, CC BY 3.0 CL <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/cl/deed.en>, via Wikimedia Commons. Dirección de Prensa, Presidencia

From MAS to Reopening: Bolivia, International Relations, and Economic Prospects

by World & New World Journal

Bolivia, an Andean country, historically battered by economic, social, and political tensions, has experienced one of its most decisive moments in recent decades. The victory of Rodrigo Paz, the Christian Democratic Party candidate, has brought an end to a political cycle lasting nearly 20 years, initiated by Evo Morales, which resulted in the hegemony of the Movement for Socialism (MAS). Paz's victory has not only changed Bolivia's course but also opens a new phase, signaling a clear shift to the right, a rearrangement of its international relations, and a rethinking of its foreign policy in a volatile American context. The Decline of MAS and the Rise of Paz To understand the magnitude of this change, it is necessary to look back. Since Evo Morales came to power in 2006, MAS consolidated itself as the dominant force in Bolivia, promoting a nationalist, statist agenda and strong state intervention in strategic sectors such as hydrocarbons and natural resources. Furthermore, during the MAS period, an anti-imperialist discourse marked Bolivia's foreign policy. In this tone, Bolivia aligned itself with left-wing governments in Latin America, notably Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, within the ALBA framework, and distanced itself significantly from Washington. However, after two decades in power, internal divisions and power struggles within MAS caused deep wear within the party and its supporters. Bolivia's economy faced its worst crisis in decades: a recession marked by a decline in gas production — a key source of fiscal income and exports for the country — high inflation levels, and a shortage of foreign currency that limited the functioning of the state apparatus. Faced with this scenario, and with a frustrated citizenry over economic and social management, the Bolivian electorate opted for a radical change in October 2025. Rodrigo Paz, a centrist politician with a pragmatic message, secured a surprising 54.5% of the votes in the second round, ultimately defeating rival candidate Jorge Quiroga, marking the end of almost two decades of MAS governments. Although Paz was considered a less significant candidate by polls and analysts, he comes from a more orthodox and moderate political tradition, and his rhetoric has been seemingly conciliatory toward social sectors. His father, Jaime Paz Zamora, was president of the country, and Paz has a solid political career, making him no stranger to the responsibilities of leadership. His campaign slogan, loosely translated as "capitalism for all," aimed to inspire some economic openness while still addressing the social demands traditionally favored by MAS. A Shift to the Right... but with Nuances Although it is referred to as a “shift to the right,” Bolivia’s reality is not monolithic. It could be more accurately described as a shift toward a pragmatic center-right, seeking to balance economic openness with the protection of certain social programs. MAS was defeated not so much due to a complete rejection of its ideological proposals, but because of an economic crisis that weakened and divided its political base and its dominant discourse. This nuance is key. Paz's victory was not solely due to a traditional conservative vote but also to the mobilization of sectors disillusioned by MAS's unmet promises. In this sense, his proposal positioned itself as a hybrid fusion: a moderate economic liberalization, while maintaining a minimal social protection network. However, although MAS has become an almost irrelevant opposition — receiving very low support and reduced to a symbolic presence in the first round — Paz's new government inherits a fragmented internal political landscape, which will require negotiating alliances with various legislative blocs in order to govern. Relations with Neighbors: Rebuilding What Had Been Dismantled Bolivia's foreign policy over the past two decades was marked by its alignment with left-wing governments and regional movements such as ALBA, which included Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other governments with anti-U.S. or at least skeptical stances toward Washington. Under Evo Morales, Bolivia strengthened ties with China, Iran, and Russia, diversifying alliances outside of the traditional Western bloc. With Paz’s victory, this framework seems to have been dismantled. The president-elect has been explicit in not inviting leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua to his presidential inauguration, citing differences concerning democracy and governance. This gesture, although symbolic, signals a shift in foreign policy: moving away from pre-configured ideological positions and prioritizing relations based on democratic criteria and economic cooperation. Bolivia’s exit from the ALBA bloc and its suspension by the organization for “anti-Bolivarian and pro-imperialist behavior” reflects the diplomatic impact of this shift. Furthermore, the presence of leaders such as Javier Milei, president of Argentina, at Paz's inauguration ceremony consolidated Latin American representations more aligned with free-market economic policies and oriented toward cooperation with the United States and Europe. Another relevant factor is the relationship with traditional South American neighbors such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Although political orientation may vary regionally, there is consensus on the need to strengthen trade and cooperation in infrastructure and energy, especially considering Bolivia’s economic challenges. Paz himself mentioned that Bolivia’s “cooperation” with its “five borders” — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru — “will be essential” for his new administration. He has even already held meetings and encounters with Boric (Chile), Milei (Argentina), and Noboa (Ecuador). The Relaunch of Relations with the United States Perhaps the most symbolic and geopolitically significant element of Bolivia's new direction is the resumption of relations with the United States. Bilateral relations had been fractured since the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador in 2008 under Evo Morales’ presidency, following years of tensions over mutual accusations of interference and conspiracy. Paz's announcement to restore diplomatic ties and reopen the U.S. embassy in La Paz represents a drastic shift in approach. This reopening not only restores formal political dialogue but also opens opportunities for cooperation in trade, investment, and security — especially at a time when Bolivia faces currency problems, a fiscal deficit, and a fuel shortage. In addition, the United States and several Latin American countries issued a joint statement of support for Paz after the elections, emphasizing the willingness to collaborate in stabilizing the economy, strengthening democratic institutions, and boosting international investment. This relaunch is not without political conditions. Cooperation could focus on the fight against drug trafficking, corruption, and other transnational challenges, areas in which Washington has shown strategic interest. The involvement of agencies like the DEA and other security organizations could intensify once again. The DEA issue has been controversial, with both former presidents Evo Morales and Luis Arce expressing concerns, as they consider both the DEA and U.S. cooperation agencies to be conspirators, something the White House has always denied. The openness to cooperation with the United States may also have a tangible economic component: investment flows, access to international financing, and support for macroeconomic stabilization. Given the foreign currency crisis that has suffocated Bolivia, these relations could translate into crucial financial relief. The Stance on Venezuela and the New Regional Context Another geopolitical axis that has changed drastically with the rise of Paz is his stance on Venezuela and its political crisis. Under the MAS, Bolivia historically maintained close ties with Nicolás Maduro’s regime, aligning itself with anti-imperialist rhetoric and supporting governments considered ideological allies. However, Paz has adopted a critical stance toward the Venezuelan government, especially after recent events — including the capture of Maduro by U.S. forces in January 2026. In his public statements, the Bolivian president has emphasized that the way out for Venezuela is to "respect the vote and democracy," positioning Bolivia alongside a narrative of democracy and institutionalism that contrasts with the country’s previous alignment with Chavismo. This approach places Bolivia on the opposite side of traditional left-wing governments in the region, such as Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, or Mexico under Claudia Sheinbaum, who have condemned the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and called for peaceful solutions based on international law. In contrast, Paz has preferred to emphasize the importance of democracy as the guiding principle of Bolivia's foreign policy. The invitation to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado to the Bolivian inauguration also underscores this renewed focus on democracy and human rights, marking a clear break with La Paz's previous political ties to Caracas. Economic Implications and Future Prospects The new Bolivian phase faces enormous economic challenges. The transition to a more market-oriented model and the opportunities to attract foreign investment offer prospects for recovery, but they are not without risks. The country is dealing with high inflation, fuel shortages, a fiscal crisis, and an urgent need for foreign currency. In this context, the opening to the United States and international markets could boost key sectors like lithium, where Bolivia holds some of the world’s largest reserves. Bolivia's mining sector could also benefit from the country's opening. Cooperation with external investors, including Americans and European allies, could transform Bolivia’s productive capacity and position it as a strategic player in the global critical minerals supply chain. In fact, recently, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) visited Bolivia, and with a message to the nation, Paz announced “[…] 7 billion dollars for infrastructure works, employment, and labor, which we need so much in Bolivia.” At the same time, Paz’s government will need to carefully manage internal tensions. Social sectors traditionally aligned with MAS may feel displaced or fear the loss of social assistance programs, posing challenges for internal cohesion — a critical issue is the elimination of fuel subsidies. On the other hand, although the legislative situation is not as complicated, the need to form legislative alliances and engage in political dialogue will be crucial to avoid institutional conflicts that could weaken his ability to implement necessary economic reforms. Conclusion Rodrigo Paz’s victory not only symbolizes the end of MAS's dominance after nearly two decades, but it also represents a profound reconfiguration of Bolivia’s political, economic, and diplomatic course. This new chapter is characterized by pragmatism focused on the economy, a shift towards strategic relations with the United States and other Western partners, and a stance based on defending democracy in the face of regional crises such as the Venezuelan one. However, this path is not without internal tensions and structural challenges that could determine whether Bolivia manages to consolidate a sustainable development model or if social and political fractures reappear on the horizon. The country's contemporary history, in this sense, continues to be written with the uncertainty of whether this pragmatic center-right experiment will be a definitive solution or a prelude to new turns in the future. From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bolivia finds itself on a new hemispheric stage where the competition between the United States and China, as well as tensions between right-wing and left-wing governments in the region, shape the agenda. Paz's election can be seen as part of a broader trend in Latin America towards governments that prioritize macroeconomic stability, diplomatic pragmatism, and international cooperation beyond rigid ideological alignments. References Buenos Aires Times. (2025, November 11). Argentina's Javier Milei to attend new Bolivia president Rodigo Paz’s inauguration. Retrieved from Buenos Aires Times: https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/argentinas-javier-milei-to-attend-new-bolivia-president-rodigo-pazs-inauguration.phtml?utm_source=chatgpt.com CiberCuba Editorial Team. (2025, October 21). The elected president of Bolivia will not invite Díaz-Canel, Maduro, or Ortega to the inauguration: “They are not democratic.”. Retrieved from CiberCuba: https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-10-21-u1-e207888-s27061-nid313318-presidente-electo-bolivia-invitara-diaz-canel-maduro?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette Flores, F. (2025, Octubre 21). Bolivia: Los desafíos del próximo gobierno de Rodrigo Paz. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/bolivia-los-desafios-del-proximo-gobierno-de-rodrigo-paz/ Guevara Condore, M., & Pimentel Huerto, R. (2025, Octubre 27). Bolivia regresó a la derecha tras casi más de 20 años gobernado por el MAS y en medio de una crisis económica. Retrieved from La República: https://larepublica.pe/mundo/2025/10/19/bolivia-regreso-a-la-derecha-luego-de-mas-de-20-anos-gobernado-por-el-mas-y-en-medio-de-una-crisis-economica-1455609?utm_source=chatgpt.com Jara, R. (2025, Octubre 16). Segunda vuelta en Bolivia: País se prepara para dar un giro a la derecha tras dos décadas de dominio izquierdista. Retrieved from emol: https://www.emol.com/noticias/Internacional/2025/10/16/1180557/bolivia-segunda-vuelta-candidatos.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com Orlando Peralta, J. (2025, Noviembre 13). De lo ideológico a lo pragmático: se mueve el péndulo en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/de-lo-ideologico-a-lo-pragmatico-se-mueve-el-pendulo-en-bolivia/ Romero Ballivian, S. (2025, Noviembre 24). Fin de ciclo: el MAS cede el poder tras veinte años de hegemonía en Bolivia. Retrieved from Latinoamérica21: https://latinoamerica21.com/es/fin-de-ciclo-el-mas-cede-el-poder-tras-veinte-anos-de-hegemonia-en-bolivia/ RTVE.es. (2025, Noviembre 09). Estados Unidos restablecerá las relaciones con Bolivia a nivel de embajadores, interrumpidas hace 17 años. Retrieved from RTVE.es: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20251108/estados-unidos-restablecera-relaciones-con-bolivia-a-nivel-embajadores-interrumpidas-hace-17-anos/16807541.shtml#:~:text=Estados%20Unidos%20restablecer%C3%A1%20las%20relaciones%20a%20nivel%20de%20embajadores%20con,emb Stabroek News. (2025, October 20). Centrist Rodrigo Paz wins Bolivian presidency, ending nearly 20 years of leftist rule. Retrieved from Stabroek News: https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/10/20/news/regional/centrist-rodrigo-paz-wins-bolivian-presidency-ending-nearly-20-years-of-leftist-rule/?utm_source=chatgpt.com urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 03). Bolivia expresa respaldo a Venezuela en medio de ataques de EE.UU. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/bolivia-expresa-respaldo-venezuela-en-medio-de-ataques-de-eeuu urgente.bo. (2026, Enero 12). Rodrigo Paz recibe la visita más importante; el Presidente del BID trae respaldo financiero. Retrieved from urgente.bo: https://www.urgente.bo/noticia/rodrigo-paz-recibe-la-visita-m%C3%A1s-importante-el-presidente-del-bid-trae-respaldo-financiero Velasco-Guachalla, X., & Hummel, C. (2025, October). Why Bolivia Voted for Change—And Continuity. Retrieved from Journal of Democracy: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-bolivia-voted-for-change-and-continuity/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Visión 360. (2026, Enero 03). Bolvia apoya la ruta iniciada en Venezuela "para recuperar la democracia". Retrieved from Visión 360: https://www.vision360.bo/noticias/2026/01/03/37852-bolivia-apoya-la-ruta-iniciada-en-venezuela-para-recuperar-la-democracia

Diplomacy
Somaliland Flag Between Traveler's Accessories on Old Vintage Map. Overhead Shot

Opinion – Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland

by Jamal Abdi

Upon gaining independence from British colonial rule on 26 June 1960, Somaliland received full recognition from 35 states, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council. On 1 July 1960, it merged with Italian Somalia. After a decade-long armed struggle, Somaliland withdrew from the union and unilaterally restored its sovereignty. Following the dissolution of Somalia’s central state in early 1991, all communities in Somaliland voluntarily entered negotiations, ceased hostilities, and ultimately forged an inclusive democratic state. Between 1991 and 1997, seven major peace conferences were held across Somaliland. All key decisions, except for the selection of the president, were reached by consensus. Somaliland’s peace and state-building trajectory was entirely locally driven, with no external involvement in the political process. By contrast, Somalia became an UN-led experiment in Post-Cold War peace and state-building. Despite – or perhaps because of – the extensive external intervention that shaped Somalia’s externally driven process, repeated efforts to construct a viable and legitimate state have failed. The first municipal elections since the 1960s were held in Mogadishu earlier this year. Even these were highly contested, confined to the capital, and boycotted by the opposition. In contrast, since 2001 Somaliland has conducted four free and fair multiparty general elections, characterized by peaceful transfers of power. In early 2024, a memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia was announced, granting the latter access to the Red Sea in return for formal recognition of the former. Reigniting hopes for recognition, prominent Republicans have expressed support for Somaliland. Notably, on 14 August, U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz released a press brief urging President Trump to recognize Somaliland. For Cruz, recognizing Somaliland – a close ally of Taiwan – is vital to counter China’s influence. On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announcing that Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords. While the specific details of the deal between Israel and Somaliland remain unclear, it is unlikely that Israel’s actions are driven by a desire to reward Somaliland’s democratic record. More plausibly, Israel is motivated by concrete geostrategic interests, such as securing a foothold in Somaliland from which it could counter the threat posed by the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen. Israel’s move also fits a broader trend in which global and regional powers prioritize security competition and project influence beyond their borders. Somaliland sits in the Horn of Africa, boasts an 800-kilometer coastline, and possesses proven oil reserves and deposits of rare minerals. Although Somalia has condemned Israel’s move as a violation of sovereignty and international law, it has itself entered an oil and gas exploration agreement with Turkey and hosts a major Turkish base. According to sources in Somaliland, additional countries are expected to follow Israel in formally recognizing Somaliland. Although the United States has yet to issue a definitive statement, U.S. military and diplomatic delegations are currently in Somaliland, and Washington has long shown interest in establishing a base in the port city of Berbera. Some commentators argue that recognizing Somaliland could destabilize the Horn of Africa, undermine counterterrorism efforts, and encourage separatist movements across the continent, rather than positively contributing to Somaliland’s development and stability. These claims, however, do not withstand scrutiny. Numerous Muslim and Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, have developed strong economic and diplomatic ties with Israel without experiencing a surge in extremism. The absence of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab and ISIS in Somaliland is principally due to the presence of a functioning state. Al-Shabab continues to control large portions of southern Somalia, making it imprudent for Mogadishu to sever ties with the United States in retaliation for recognizing Somaliland or for supporting Israel’s move. In reality, there is little Mogadishu can do beyond issuing condemnations. The claim that recognizing Somaliland would embolden secessionist movements across Africa overlooks the fact that Somaliland enjoyed de jure recognition of sovereignty prior to merging with Somalia. Recognizing Somaliland is therefore a restoration of the borders established during colonial rule, making Somaliland a unique legal case. Commentators have asserted that China has previously sought to destabilize Somaliland due to its pro-Western and pro-Taiwan strategic orientation. Meanwhile, Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti have voiced strong support for Somalia, condemning Israel’s move. Djibouti, which controls a near monopoly on the import and export trade for over a hundred million landlocked Ethiopians through its ports, faces a strategic challenge from a recognized Somaliland. Additionally, Djibouti wields considerable influence in Somaliland’s far western region, home to the Issa sub-group, which also dominates the political landscape in Djibouti. In sum, Israel’s move to spearhead the re-recognition of Somaliland is a watershed moment that marks a potential point of no return in Somaliland’s quest for de jure sovereignty. However, Somaliland faces both immediate and long-term challenges that will be critical to how its recognition efforts unfold. In the short term, it must carefully balance the pursuit of diplomatic recognition with deterring hostile external meddling. In the long term, it will face the consequences of having alienated China and the potential Security Council and recognition roadblocks this may signal.

Diplomacy
Warsaw, Poland - January 04 2026: Venezuelan flag waved during protest against U.S. intervention in Venezuela.

Venezuela at a Critical Juncture (Part II): The Capture of Maduro and the Debate over Sovereignty, Intervention, and Power

by World & New World Journal

In Part I of this article, a brief historical overview was presented, spanning from the Venezuelan presidential crisis of 2019 to the tensions in the Caribbean — between the United States and Venezuela — and the total economic blockade imposed on Venezuela. The article also left several questions open, which, considering recent events, have now been resolved, although at the same time new ones have emerged. U.S. Operation in Venezuela and the Capture of Maduro The situation between the United States and Venezuela ended in 2025 with a total U.S. economic blockade and the “seizure” of a Venezuelan oil tanker. However, the situation changed dramatically when, on January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro was captured in Caracas by U.S. forces. Preceded by threats and sustained military and economic pressure on Venezuela, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, carried out an operation to capture and remove Maduro and his wife from Venezuela. The operation was surgical — lasting approximately two hours — and although successful, it also resulted in human losses (80 fatalities according to The New York Times — an unofficial figure — including 32 Cuban combatants confirmed by Havana) and damage to military infrastructure in Caracas, as well as in Miranda, Aragua, and La Guaira. As was already known, the U.S. government had classified Maduro as a member or leader of the Cartel of the Suns. In addition, a reward of $50,000 had been offered for his capture, and since 2020 the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York had charged Maduro with drug trafficking and conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. In this context, Maduro’s capture was followed by his transfer to New York, where he will face trial. Venezuela: an uncertain present? Following Maduro’s detention, Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the role of head of state due to Maduro’s “temporary” absence. After the U.S. attacks, Rodríguez spoke out strongly against what she called “foreign aggression,” describing Maduro’s capture as an “illegal and illegitimate kidnapping.” However, after being sworn in, she softened the tone of her statements and even invited the Trump administration to “work jointly on an agenda of cooperation, aimed at shared development, within the framework of international legality and to strengthen a lasting community coexistence.” Rodríguez likewise emphasized the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. All of this stems from the imperialist rhetoric of Trump and Rubio. Trump made it very clear that he will “govern” Venezuela “until we can achieve a safe, appropriate, and prudent transition.” Everything indicates that, although under the threat of “doing the right thing,” Trump plans to give Rodríguez an opportunity; if it does not work or if she fails to meet Trump’s expectations, the United States will intervene again. On the other hand, both Edmundo González — who on January 4 released a video declaring himself the “president of Venezuela” and calling for a “peaceful and clear” transition — and María Corina Machado have been practically sidelined by the U.S. government, citing a lack of internal support, referring to the fact that those who support them are “outside” Venezuela. On the social front, reactions have been mixed, ranging from celebrations over Maduro’s capture to demonstrations against U.S. interventionism. The current situation is very delicate: with Rodríguez’s appointment and no clear short-term roadmap — plus the threat of U.S. intervention and interference — and the snubbing of the opposition, Venezuela’s social reality appears not to have changed, nor is it likely to change much in the near future. However, Rodríguez’s stance — her invitation to the United States to work together, albeit under threat, practically placing oil and resources on a silver platter — could become the social fuel capable of generating real change in Venezuela in the near future. International reactions The events in Venezuela took many by surprise, and international reactions were quick to follow. South Africa issued a press release stating that the actions of the United States constituted “a violation of the United Nations Charter,” and called on the UN Security Council to urgently address the situation. Indonesia also underscored the importance of “respect for international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.” Similar statements were issued by Japan, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand, and Australia. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise emphasized the violation of “Venezuelan sovereignty and the threat posed to peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.” It also called for the release of Maduro and his wife. With a stronger tone, Iran condemned the U.S. attacks and likewise appealed to the United Nations. In a very similar vein, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. attack, denouncing acts of U.S. hegemony and calling on the international community to recognize the “catastrophic” situation in Venezuela and to denounce the United States’ “habitual acts of violating the sovereignty of other countries.” On the other hand, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar, posted on X: “Israel praises the United States operation, led by President Trump. […] Israel stands with the freedom-loving Venezuelan people, who have suffered under Maduro’s illegal tyranny. Israel celebrates the removal of the dictator […].” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel supported the actions of the United States in Venezuela. In Europe, most countries supported the decision behind the actions of the United States, underscoring the illegitimacy of Maduro’s government and the importance of de-escalation and dialogue, always within the framework of international law. When asked about Maduro, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded that the United States “knows what to do now,” referring to dictators. Other countries such as Norway, Serbia, Slovenia, and Spain also expanded their criticism of the U.S. military operation, arguing that it was not in accordance with international law. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Belarus and Russia, in varying tones, condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “direct threats” to international peace and security. For his part, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico strongly criticized U.S. actions and the UN, emphasizing that “international law is not applied, military force is used without the consent of the UN Security Council, and whoever is big and powerful will do whatever serves their interests…” In the Americas, Mexico condemned and rejected the U.S. military intervention and urged the United States to adhere to international law. Honduras did the same, describing the capture of Maduro as an act of kidnapping. Cuba condemned the “criminal act,” calling it “state terrorism against the brave Venezuelan people and against our America.” Nicaragua also condemned the U.S. intervention and expressed its support for Delcy Rodríguez. Argentine President Javier Milei posted, “Freedom advances, long live freedom, damn it!” celebrating the capture of Maduro and his wife. In Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz also referred to freedom, stating that “the only way out for Venezuela is respect for the vote.” Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa stated that “for all narco-Chavista criminals, their time has come. Their structure on the continent will completely collapse.” Paraguay and Peru also celebrated Maduro’s removal. In contrast, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva condemned the attacks and Maduro’s capture, describing them as “very serious […] and extremely dangerous as precedents for the international community.” Chilean President Gabriel Boric also criticized the attacks and called for a peaceful resolution under international law, while President-elect Antonio Kast said that Maduro’s capture “is good news for the region.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro also rejected the “aggression against the sovereignty of Venezuela and Latin America,” while calling for a meeting at the UN and the OAS. Finally, Uruguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemned the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and called for respect for the UN Charter. The UN, the OAS, and the EU also issued statements, using more cautious rhetoric and emphasizing respect for international law. The Don-roe Doctrine and the future of Venezuela In Part I of the article, Venezuela’s significance in terms of oil, biodiversity, water resources, rare earths, and more was presented. Based on this, and as mentioned earlier, the attack on alleged drug boats and the fight against drug trafficking became a pretext to promote the new Donald Trump–Monroe Doctrine, the “Don-roe Doctrine / Monroe Doctrine 2.0.” In December 2025, the United States published its new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes and promotes the United States as the sole actor or hegemon in the Americas, making any foreign presence outside of the United States unwelcome. The results of the application of this doctrine were immediate — and there is more. It is not only Venezuela: the Trump administration — particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio — has already set its sights on Cuba, in addition to repeatedly raising the possibility of carrying out military activities against drug trafficking in Mexico and Colombia, and more recently, engaging in a dispute with Denmark over strategically important Greenland. Discussion The implications for Venezuela stemming from these events are profound. First, there is a crisis of legitimacy: although Delcy Rodríguez has assumed the presidency, Edmundo González has also raised his voice, leading to both internal and external questioning. Likewise, there are institutional challenges. In the end, only the head of the regime was removed; Maduro’s inner circle remains in power. Therefore, regardless of the change at the top, a transition toward a more democratic or stable system appears distant given the current conditions. This is independent of the existing social discontent — once again, the regime retains control, making a drastic change unlikely in the near term. Regarding the U.S. side, the Trump administration has been clear — and consistent with its foreign policy — in always prioritizing its national interests over those of any other country. The example is clear: by acting unilaterally and without adherence to international law, the United States has once again undermined the sovereignty of a state. The U.S. government could justify its actions in legal terms — Maduro is accused in the United States of drug trafficking and conspiracy — on health and security grounds — the Venezuelan regime facilitates drug trafficking into the United States — or even on geopolitical grounds — weakening an administration perceived as allied with rival powers and holding interests contrary to those of the United States. However, the validity of these arguments must be examined. Moreover, as Robert Fico pointed out, there was an absence of authorization from the UN Security Council or even from the U.S. Congress itself, which, for experts in the field, renders the operation legally unlawful. Ultimately, the debate remains open. Countries’ positions are divided, and, more importantly, this could become a dangerous precedent for national sovereignty and for the conduct of great powers toward independent states. There are also the potential consequences for the region: the act alters the balance of power in Latin America and redefines the narrative surrounding U.S. influence in the region. On the other hand, there is oil and what its control represents as a long-term strategic factor. Finally, there is the global tension over control and influence in regions — one in which Russia and China are far from pleased. Finally, Fico’s statements and the following quote from Mexican lawyer José Mario de la Garza are worth analyzing in order to understand the importance of international law and why we must live in a rules-based world — even if several reforms may be needed to improve it: “Overthrowing a dictator sounds morally right. No one mourns a tyrant. But international law was not built to protect the good, but to restrain the powerful. That is why it prohibits the use of force almost without exception: not because it ignores justice, but because it knows that if every country decides whom to ‘liberate’ at gunpoint, the world returns to the law of the strongest.” References @josemariodelagarza. (04 de January de 2026). @josemariodelagarza. Obtenido de Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/DTDmcSNgPmK/?hl=en&img_index=1 Caro, I. (05 de January de 2026). "Vengo con dolor, pero también con honor": Delcy Rodríguez juramenta como presidenta encargada de Venezuela tras la captura de Maduro. Obtenido de BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cd9exjjkvw8o Holcman, T. (05 de January de 2026). Maduro's rival in Venezuelan elections demands presidency, 'freedom to all political prisoners'. Obtenido de The Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/international/article-882323 Lozano, D. (05 de January de 2026). Delcy Rodríguez jura como presidenta de Venezuela "por Maduro y por Chávez". Obtenido de El Mundo: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2026/01/05/695be102fc6c8323518b45a0.html Muggah, R. (03 de January de 2026). 5 scenarios for a post-Maduro Venezuela — and what they could signal to the wider region. Obtenido de The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/5-scenarios-for-a-post-maduro-venezuela-and-what-they-could-signal-to-the-wider-region-272675 Página 12. (06 de Enero de 2026). Aseguran que son más de 80 los muertos tras el ataque de Estados Unidos a Venezuela. Obtenido de Página 12: https://www.pagina12.com.ar/2026/01/05/aseguran-que-son-mas-de-80-los-muertos-tras-el-ataque-de-estados-unidos-a-venezuela/ Reuters. (04 de January de 2026). Trump says U.S. will run Venezuela after U.S. captures Maduro. Obtenido de Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/loud-noises-heard-venezuela-capital-southern-area-without-electricity-2026-01-03/ Urrejola, J. (06 de January de 2026). Venezuela tras Maduro: por qué el chavismo sigue en el poder. Obtenido de DW: https://www.dw.com/es/venezuela-tras-maduro-por-qu%C3%A9-el-chavismo-sigue-en-el-poder/a-75400562 Walia, G. (03 de January de 2026). Venezuela's President Nicholas Maduro captured by US forces: Where has he been taken? What we know so far. Obtenido de The Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/venezuelas-president-nicholas-maduro-captured-by-us-forces-where-has-he-been-taken-what-we-know-so-far-caracas/articleshow/126321249.cms?from=mdr "South Africa urges UN Security Council Session following unilateral military action in Venezuela" (Press release). Pretoria, South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Dirco slams US efforts to 'run' Venezuela". TimesLIVE. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on the U.S. Military Strikes on Venezuela" (Press release). Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "World reacts to US strikes on Venezuela". Reuters. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. 'Matter of deep concern': MEA reacts to US strikes on Venezuela; urges restraint, calls for dialogue". The Times of India. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Iran strongly condemns US attack on Venezuela". Iran International. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Iran Condemns U.S. Attack on Venezuela". Foreign Policy. West Asia News Agency. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Halpern, Sam (3 January 2026). "Israel commends US operation that led to capture of Venezuela's Maduro". The Jerusalem Post. Sa'ar, Gideon [@gidonsaar] (4 January 2026). "Israel commends the United States' operation, led by President Trump, which acted as the leader of the free world. At this historic moment, Israel stands alongside the freedom-loving Venezuelan people, who have suffered under Maduro's illegal tyranny. Israel welcomes the removal of the dictator who led a network of drugs and terror and hopes for the return of democracy to the country and for friendly relations between the states. The people of Venezuela deserve to exercise their democratic rights. South America deserves a future free from the axis of terror and drugs" (Tweet). Retrieved 4 January 2026 – via Twitter. "Netanyahu says Israel supports 'strong' US action in Venezuela". Al Arabiya English. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Sokolin, Anton (4 January 2026). "North Korea condemns the U.S.' military intervention in Venezuela". NK News. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "North Korea sends tough message to US after Venezuela attack, fires multiple ballistic missiles". Wion. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Malaysia stands firm on UN principles, opposes foreign intervention in Venezuela". Malay Mail. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Pakistan urges restraint, peaceful resolution in Venezuela". The Express Tribune. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Thailand urges US to settle conflict with Venezuela peacefully". Bangkok Post. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Vietnam deeply concerned about reports on situation in Venezuela: spokesperson". Vietnamlawmagazine.vn. 4 January 2026. Retrieved 5 January 2026. "Venezuela latest: Trump says US is going to 'run' Venezuela after capturing President Maduro". BBC News. 3 January 2026. "World reactions to US operation in Venezuela". Le Monde. 3 January 2026 "Sviluppi sulla situazione in Venezuela, nota di Palazzo Chigi". www.governo.it (in Italian). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Statement from Minister Eide on the Situation in Venezuela". Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Russia Condemns U.S. Military Strikes Against Venezuela". The Moscow Times. 3 January 2025. Retrieved 3 January 2025. Vlasova, Svitlana; Stockwell, Billy (3 January 2026). "Russia reaffirms solidarity with Venezuela after "act of armed aggression" by US, calls for dialogue". CNN. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Вучић: После акције у Венецуели јасно је да међународни правни поредак не функционише; сачуваћемо мир али својом снагом". Radio-Television of Serbia. 4 January 2025. Retrieved 4 January 2025. "Slovakian Prime Minister Fico condemns US attack". Yahoo News. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Fico, Robert (3 January 2026). "STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC". Facebook (in Slovak). Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Spain will not recognize US intervention in Venezuela, PM says". Reuters. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Zelenskyy reacts to US operation in Venezuela and hints at Putin". RBC-Ukraine. 4 January 2025. "Starmer won't be drawn on whether US strikes on Venezuela broke international law". BBC News. 3 January 2026. "Cuba's president denounces strikes on Venezuela as a "criminal attack by the U.S."". CBS News. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Alvarez, Carolina (3 January 2026). "Honduran President condemns US "military aggression" and "kidnapping" of Nicolás Maduro". De Último Minuto. Retrieved 4 January 2026. "Mexico Says Venezuela Strikes Breach U.N. Charter, International Law". The Wall Street Journal. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Gobierno de Nicaragua exige liberación de Nicolás Maduro y defiende soberanía de Venezuela". SwissInfo. 1 March 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Godsell, Oscar (3 January 2026). "Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responds to US President Donald Trump's attack on Venezuela". Sky News. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Venezuela attack: New Zealand 'concerned', expects everyone to follow international law – Winston Peters". RNZ. 4 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026. Romero, Juan (3 January 2026). "Intervención militar en Venezuela: así reaccionaron en América Latina a la operación militar de EE.UU. para extraer a Maduro y su mujer". Fobes (in Spanish). Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Rodrigo Paz dice que «salida para Venezuela es respetar el voto», tras captura de Maduro". SwissInfo. 5 January 2026. Retrieved 1 March 2026. Durães, Marina (3 January 2026). "Lula diz que ataques à Venezuela e prisão de Maduro são 'inaceitáveis'". UOL. Retrieved 3 January 2026 "World reacts to US bombing of Venezuela, 'capture' of Maduro". Al Jazeera. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026 "Kast califica la detención de Maduro como "una gran noticia para la región"". Diario y Radio Universidad Chile (in Spanish). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Taylor, Harry; Rogero, Tiago (3 January 2026). "Global outcry after US launches strikes on Venezuela and captures president". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 3 January 2026. Pannell, Alfie; Glade, Jim. "Colombia braces with alarm after Maduro's removal in Venezuela by US". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 3 January 2026 Quilca Catacora, Mariana (3 January 2026). "José Jerí se pronuncia tras captura de Maduro y situación de venezolanos en Perú: "Daremos las facilidades para su regreso"". infobae (in European Spanish). Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Uruguay rechazó la intervención militar en Venezuela y llamo a buscar una "solución positiva"" [Uruguay rejected military intervention in Venezuela and called for a "positive solution".]. Ámbito Financiero (in Spanish). 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Venezuela | Secretary-General | United Nations". United Nations. 3 January 2026. Retrieved 3 January 2026. "US actions in Venezuela 'constitute a dangerous precedent': Guterres". Peace and Security. United Nations News. 3 January 2026. Archived from the original on 4 January 2026. Retrieved 4 January 2026 "Statement by OAS Secretary General Albert R. Ramdin on recent developments in Venezuela". Press Release E-001/26. Organization of American States. 3 January 2026. Hayden, Jones (3 January 2026). "EU urges respect for international law after US capture of Maduro". POLITICO. Retrieved 3 January 2026.

Diplomacy
Flag of Israel and Palestine on the map. Events in Palestine and Israel. israel flag

Advancing Peace Between Israel and Palestine

by Saliba Sarsar

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

Diplomacy
Ulsan, South Korea - September 28th, 2024: View of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan Headquarters, South Korea. A key player in shipbuilding, this landmark facility.

South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam show that economic statecraft is not just the preserve of great powers

by Robyn Klingler-Vidra

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

Diplomacy
Tegucigalpa, Honduras - November 30, 2025: Election Day, People attend to vote for their candidates at the voting centers provided by the Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE.

Latin America 2025: protest voting amid fragmentation and democratic erosion

by Flavia Freidenberg

In a 2025 marked by punitive polls, fragmented systems, and democracies under pressure, Latin America confirmed that voting remains an instrument of change, but no longer a guarantee of stability or democratic strengthening. The year ends with a powerful image: a president, a president-elect, and a defeated candidate — with radically different ideas and political visions — showing respect for electoral results, the electoral authority, and one another in Chile. An act that should be ordinary in any democracy became something almost revolutionary. It may seem like a mere formality, but it is not. In a Latin America divided by hate speech and polarized politics, these gestures of institutional courtesy and democratic normality make a difference. An intense electoral cycle shaped 2025. Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras held presidential elections that, in one way or another, redefined the regional political landscape. These were accompanied by numerous legislative elections, local contests, and referendums. Mexico, meanwhile, experimented with the unprecedented popular election of judges and magistrates, a reform meant to democratize the justice system but which, in practice, represented setbacks in electoral governance conditions that once seemed resolved. Holding elections that meet integrity standards is no minor matter at a time when the region is undergoing processes of democratic erosion. The quality of these elections determines whether alternation in power is possible, whether democracy can persist, resist, and remain resilient when facing multiple challenges such as political-criminal violence, citizen fatigue, institutional co-optation, affective polarization, and ideological radicalization. The ballot speaks: five regional patterns An assessment of the 2025 elections reveals five patterns that transcend national borders and illustrate key features of today’s regional political dynamics. First: protest voting has consolidated. From the overwhelming victory of the far right over the left in Chile on December 14 — when José Antonio Kast won 58% of the vote — to President Daniel Noboa’s failed referendum in Ecuador, the dramatic collapse of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, and the governing Libre party’s third-place finish in Honduras, the message has been consistent: voters punish those in power, regardless of ideology. In Bolivia, MAS suffered a dramatic defeat after nearly two decades of dominance. The party of Evo Morales and Luis Arce, which won 75 of 130 seats in 2020, was reduced to just two in the August elections. For the first time, Bolivia held a presidential runoff on October 19, where Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) won with 54.5% of the vote. In Honduras, the ruling party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, placed third, while conservative candidate Nasry “Tito” Asfura of the National Party became president-elect following a highly contentious race marked by external intervention, numerous episodes of political violence, and 24 days of uncertainty before results were finalized. Noboa suffered a devastating defeat in the November 16 referendum: “No” prevailed on all four questions, including rejecting the authorization of foreign military bases (60% voted NO) and rejecting the call for a Constituent Assembly (61% NO). This outcome surprised many, as it came just seven months after Noboa won the presidency with 55.6% of the vote. Interpretations are still developing, but it suggests that citizens are unwilling to grant “blank checks” to their leaders. Second: pragmatism is replacing ideology. Paz’s centrist message of “capitalism for all” in Bolivia, Noboa’s security-focused campaign in Ecuador, and the rejection of ruling parties across the region show that many Latin American voters in 2025 are moving beyond ideological alignment. Voters seem less interested in long-term transformative projects and more in immediate responses to pressing problems: insecurity, economic crises, and corruption. This trend has benefited conservative forces. In Chile, a far-right candidate — openly nostalgic for Pinochet — won for the first time, promising drastic public spending cuts, tough “law and order” policies, opposition to abortion and marriage equality, and aggressive measures against crime and irregular migration. Kast’s victory adds to right-wing governments like Javier Milei in Argentina, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Santiago Peña in Paraguay, and Luis Abinader in the Dominican Republic. This new “blue wave” shapes the current political map, though with different tones and levels of radicalization. Third: party fragmentation, divided governments, and minority presidencies. Except in Ecuador, where polarization between correísmo and anticorreísmo shaped both the April presidential election and the November referendum, other countries experienced deep fragmentation. In Bolivia, seven competitive presidential candidacies contended in the first round. In Honduras, three candidates fiercely competed in one of the country’s most tightly contested elections. High fragmentation often produces minority presidents and divided governments. This year, Bolivia and Ecuador joined Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, where presidents govern with weak congressional support. By contrast, two countries have extremely powerful presidents with unified governments: Mexico and El Salvador, where ruling parties hold supermajorities capable of passing constitutional reforms without negotiating with the opposition. Fourth: the hollowing of the political center and the crisis of moderate parties and leaderships. As previously argued with María Esperanza Casullo, “center-and-something” parties (center-left and center-right) have long struggled to attract votes from the middle. Moderate politics seems to lack electoral appeal in Latin America. This declining representative capacity of the political center has created a vacuum often filled by outsiders or new parties claiming to embody fresh demands and alternatives from the margins. This vacuum feeds polarization strategies. Fifth: institutional credibility crisis. With the exception of Chile — where results were announced two hours after polls closed and immediately accepted — electoral processes in Honduras and Ecuador faced serious challenges from political actors who refused to recognize the results. In Ecuador, after the April runoff, Luisa González of the Citizens’ Revolution questioned transparency. In Bolivia, accusations of irregularities persisted throughout the August elections. In Honduras, more than two weeks after the November 30 vote, the presidential result remained undefined. Trust in electoral institutions — the cornerstone of democracy — shows troubling cracks that deepened throughout 2025. Many countries now face governance crises alongside fragmented systems, hate speech, interpersonal and institutional distrust, and extreme polarization. Three lessons for the future This electoral year leaves lessons that will shape regional politics in coming years. First: political-criminal violence conditions democracy. Several elections took place amid criminal violence. Honduras recorded six politically motivated homicides during the campaign, four targeting candidates from the ruling Libre party. The NGO Cristosal documented 67 political violence incidents between September 2024 and November 2025, including assassinations, attacks, threats, and harassment. Ecuador held its referendum under a State of Emergency due to “internal armed conflict,” declared in response to escalating drug-related violence and loss of state control over prisons. Mexico continues to hold elections in violent contexts, particularly at the local level. The “Voting Between Bullets” project by Data Cívica and México Evalúa has documented rising political-criminal violence since 2018, with 2024 being the most violent year yet, especially locally. Second: external influence is redefining electoral sovereignty. U.S. involvement in the Honduran presidential election, as well as in Argentina’s legislative elections weeks earlier, raised alarms about political autonomy in the region. In Ecuador, Noboa actively sought to establish U.S. military bases, a proposal rejected by 60% of voters. This level of foreign intervention — openly supporting candidates, conditioning economic aid, pressuring electoral decisions, or warning of retaliation — sets a dangerous precedent that reshapes the regional political game. External actors become potential “balancers” of competition, creating tilted playing fields. Third: polarization can demobilize voters. Ecuador showed that even amid extreme polarization, voter mobilization is not guaranteed. The moderate vote, which could have tipped the balance in the referendum, simply vanished or dissolved between the two radical positions. This suggests polarization may demobilize sectors that feel unrepresented by either extreme, paradoxically weakening democratic participation. Democracies at risk Despite difficulties, elections are still being held with reasonable levels of integrity. Power alternation occurred in several countries. Most losing candidates — even reluctantly — accepted results. This shows that electoral institutions still retain some strength. However, democratic erosion comes not from the absence of elections, but from those elected through them. It arises from leaders who challenge democracy’s pluralistic foundations. Today’s central dispute is over what “true democracy” means: a system prioritizing rights and institutional checks, or one concentrating power in the name of the “popular will.” This debate cuts across countries as different as Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico. In 2025, Latin American democracies faced multiple threats: low institutional trust, persistent violence, co-opted electoral authorities, vulnerability to external actors, and illiberal governments fostering polarization. Protest voting was one of the year’s most visible patterns, but part of something broader: extreme electoral volatility, where citizens reject governments of any ideology in search of immediate solutions. The challenge for 2026 — when countries like Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil (municipal elections) head to the polls — will be to safeguard electoral autonomy and professionalism, strengthen pluralism, depolarize public life, limit external interference, and continue reinforcing democratic institutions without yielding to narratives that promise order at the expense of hard-won rights.

Diplomacy
Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Sessão de abertura do IV Fórum CELAC-China. China National Convention Center II, Pequim - China. Foto - Ricardo Stuckert / PR Lula Oficial, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>,

China and the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

by Tings Chak

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. On December 10, 2025, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.” That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (the first since 2016) outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week — Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 5 and China’s policy paper five days later — lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine returns Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s “highest priority”, with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China. Countries seeking US assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence” — a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments … aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58% of the vote (the most right-wing leader since Pinochet). The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, US strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking” — only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico. China’s alternative China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity. What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to “reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks” — new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (USD 28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year. China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” The historical pattern Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China, the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.” The US response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964 (less than three years after Goulart’s visit) a US-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed. The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2% to 24% since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a USD 9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option. The question before the Latin American people The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable — Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how US-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins. The question is whether Latin American governments (including right-wing ones) want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit … without imposing conditions.” That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced — Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces. At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “US-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker. This article was produced by Globetrotter. The original article is under a CC BY-SA license

Diplomacy
USA and China trade relations, cooperation strategy. US America and China flags on chess pawns soldiers on a chessboard. 3d illustration

New World Order: China vs the United States

by Manuel Alejandro Nuñez Vilcabana

Abstract This research article seeks to analyze the current geopolitical landscape, specifically the strategic confrontation between China and the United States and its impact on the international context. In this regard, the concept of the “World Order” refers to the hegemony that the United States held in the West following the end of the Cold War. Over the years, a new concept emerged, the “New World Order,” which defines the relationships that develop after a historical stage of international hegemony. The research begins by defining the variable “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order.” It then focuses on post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, which shaped the course of the West. This is followed by an analysis of China’s foreign policy in recent years, which has generated a shift in the international paradigm. Finally, the study aims to analyze the confrontation between both countries for global hegemony through various international policies and geopolitical strategies. In conclusion, the concept of the “New World Order” for the 21st century is based on the strategic rivalry between China and the United States within an increasingly multipolar system. Both countries have defined foreign policies: the United States seeks to maintain hegemony, while China aims to create an international environment in which all participants can benefit. The conflict itself defines the “New World Order.” Keywords: China, United States, New World Order, geopolitics, international economy. Introduction Currently, there is an ongoing struggle between two powerful states that influence the reality of other countries around the world: the United States and China. These economic and military powers are at an impasse. On one hand, the United States seeks to maintain its influence and hegemony in the West, setting the agenda in international organizations and resolving global conflicts according to its own rules. On the other hand, China, which has a historical rivalry with the U.S., has become the world’s second-largest economy due to its economic development and has joined powers such as Russia and India to counter the US ambitions. The old “World Order” is in decline, making it necessary to update this category of international relations and define what the “New World Order” is, what it consists of, why it emerges, and, above all, how it could be addressed. For this reason, this research article first defines what is understood by the “World Order.” It then analyzes the crisis of this “World Order” in the 21st century, which has led to the emergence of a “New World Order” spearheaded by China’s rise on the international stage. The study continues by examining the United States and the general actions it has taken to reach this critical point, followed by an analysis of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and finally, it explores how this confrontation impacts international reality. World Order To understand the concept of “World Order,” it is necessary to begin with a preliminary conceptual analysis of its underlying roots. “Hegemony” and “Power” are two key concepts for understanding the definition of “World Order.” “Hegemony” can be understood as the midpoint between the processes of influence and dominance in interstate relations, beyond its legal content in public or international law. The term has been used by Marxist and structuralist currents, but for general understanding, hegemony is predominantly the ability to lead or direct others. This can be understood from any perspective, whether international, social, or interpersonal. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981a) Hegemony cannot be understood without the exercise of power. In this context, power in the social sphere is the capacity of one person to influence another. A person becomes both agent and object simultaneously; the one who exercises power over another has the ability to influence decisions, activities, motivations, and more. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) The hegemonic process is explained through the exercise of power. “Power”, being the ability to influence an external agent, inherently requires being prepared to surpass this external agent in order to maintain a constant exercise of power and prevent, under any circumstances, the influenced agent from reacting and obstructing the full exercise of power. Consequently, it can be understood that the “World Order” is viewed from a hegemonic structural perspective, where the power exercised by one party — in this case, a country or countries — is largely consensual. This differs from a non-hegemonic order, where multiple actors coexist and compete for dominance over others. Even so, a notable distinction exists with respect to domination, which is the factual exercise of power. In other words, domination can exist without hegemony. (Cox, 2013) Naturally, under this definition, one might assume that the “World Order” follows a linear historical trajectory, with a clear beginning, middle, and end, along with defined actors and positions. This, however, is not the case. The “World Order” is a process marked by constant crises, emerging actors as they develop economically, socially, and militarily, specific interests seeking to influence others, and, above all, a continuous struggle for being the state at the top. (Schulz, 2023) Historically, the concept of “World Order” emerged after the Cold War. Another way to understand the term is through the hegemony of a political-economic model, materialized in the social and cultural expressions of countries. After the Cold War, a “neoliberal” model was established and adopted by most Western countries to perpetuate U.S. interests. Through “liberal” or “neoliberal” policies, a process of domination or hegemony is observed. (Duque-Vargas, 2021) Over the years, academia has reevaluated global events and defined categories through historical processes, which, due to circumstances, reemerge with new actors and in different geographic locations. Today, the concept of the “Cold War” is used as a framework to understand the struggle between powers. The so-called “New Cold War” refers to the confrontation between the U.S. and either Russia or China (Sanz Díaz & Sáenz-Rotko, 2022). It does not describe warfare in the same sense as from 1947 to 1991 but rather as a model of confrontation between powers, with the U.S. as a constant actor. From a political-philosophical perspective, liberalism has been and continues to be widely debated. To simplify — since defining this current is beyond the scope of this study — liberalism is politically expressed in liberal democracies and economically in the opening of markets to the international context and the development of capitalism as an economic model. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) Today, debate persists around the concept of “neoliberalism,” which emerges from liberalism, and no definitive canon has been established. Therefore, this term will not be defined to avoid straying from the focus of the study. Finally, the concept of “World Order” adopted for this study is a fusion of the concepts previously analyzed. The political-economic model in most Western countries over the past twenty-five years has been liberal democracy, imposed by the United States after the Cold War, expressed through culture, education, language, and other societal aspects, and continues to this day. (Dabat & Leal, 2019) In summary, the concept of “World Order” reflects the understanding that the United States maintained global hegemony over the past twenty-five years. This was due to its superior economic and military capacity, which shaped the political actions of other Western countries that adopted the pre-established model (liberal democracy). This allowed the U.S. to stimulate its market, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating its hegemony. Crisis of the 20th-Century “World Order” The World Order is affected by constant crises, as previously noted, but it is currently in a phase referred to as the “Interregnum.” This definition, noted by Gramsci, is understood as the midpoint where nothing is fully defined. It is a neutral moment, where there is neither progress nor regression, reached either because the dominant forces are unable to maintain their hegemony without detaching from coercive tools or, conversely, because the forces of change are insufficient to achieve their objectives. (Sanahuja Perales, 2022) This “stalemate” generates conflicts not only between countries but also within society itself. The post-capitalist economic model responds to this issue. Due to the technological rise of mass communication (social media) and the constant need to produce to sustain the model, problems of social identity emerge. As the identity of the “self” disappears, the identity of the “we” is eliminated; society itself disappears, leaving only a sum of undefined societies with shared problems such as anxiety and depression, which validate themselves through social media that consumes them. (Touraine & Guilpain Peuliard, 2016) The “World Order” after the Cold War established a globalizing mechanism that led to a paradigm of worldwide impoverishment, which is paradoxical to the intended outcome. This can be explained by the fact that the new production model adopted by large corporations sought to regress in social standards, promoting increased profits and reduced costs. This led major factories to relocate to countries where social policies were more easily circumvented, ignoring the regulations of their countries of origin, nullifying the consequences of their actions, and impoverishing the capacity of these populations to recover economically and socially. Consequently, this created not only a model of economic crisis but also a process of global social injustice with long-term consequences. (Chomsky, 2001) It is important to understand that the 20th-century “World Order” was not only afflicted by moral issues but also by global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, international organizations demonstrated their inability to prevent the very problems they were originally established to address. It is essential for international organizations to promote new guidelines that cover sensitive issues such as global health. Within this framework, the “New World Order” is characterized by a human-centered approach and common development objectives. (Caldera Ynfante, 2020) To address the challenge of identifying problems affecting the international community, CEPLAN developed a series of nine “megatrends,” which are: population aging, increased global urbanization, a poly-nodal world, growing social inequalities and persistent social conflicts, crises of liberalism and globalization, changes in disease patterns and health systems, scarcity of natural resources, climate change and environmental degradation, and accelerated technological innovation and development. While these megatrends focus on the Peruvian context, they were formulated considering international agendas such as the 2030 Agenda and prospective analyses. (Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva, n.d.) Emergence of the “New World Order” Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to renew definitions and ask: are we still in the post–Cold War era? The answer is no, and it is necessary to present updated sociological and international relations categories. For this reason, the term “New World Order” is used when analyzing factors such as deindustrialization, failures in multilateralism, and the emergence of new powers capable of determining and imposing new positions. (Ramírez Montañez & Sarmiento Suárez, 2021) A large amount of studies presents a central point: the United States is losing its hegemonic control. This can be explained by the policies adopted by different governments, the economic decline due to historical recessions such as that of 2008, the absence of a political model to replace the failed attempt at liberal democracy in the region, internal social crises caused by various factors, and the emergence of China as an antagonist to its objectives. (Lechuga Cardozo & Leyva Cordero, 2020) United States and Hard Power The foreign policy of the United States has been widely studied by international relations scholars. It is often the focus of imaginative interpretations that sometimes verge on the absurd. Naturally, it is necessary to study such an important country with historical and economic significance with objectivity. After the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, U.S. foreign policy took on a singular purpose: to be the world’s foremost power. This entails determining the direction of global affairs, whether through diplomatic or coercive means — military or economic. The various tools used to achieve this purpose have included multilateralism (as seen during the Obama and Biden administrations) and the radical unilateralism presented by Trump. (Domínguez López, 2021) This doctrine, however, has a history that predates the Twin Towers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the creation of international organizations, learning from the failures of those established after World War I. These new international organizations were intended to preserve peace and develop new mechanisms for political and economic cooperation. Naturally, as the victorious power of both World Wars, and in the absence of a figure of comparable stature, the U.S. determined the future of these organizations, their purposes, and their rules. (Barbé, 1995) It is therefore necessary to understand that U.S. domestic policy effectively became its foreign policy. In other words, every state seeks to maintain order within its territory, continuously develop, and achieve a peak that can be consistently surpassed. This was how the United States viewed the world: as its canvas. (Lascano, Vedia & Colotta, 2020) Theoretically, the U.S. has a clear distinction from other states regarding hard power. Hard power is defined as a country’s military capability at strategic points around the world. The United States maintains military bases in various parts of the globe, on islands and specific territories, to impose its authority. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This military power is accompanied by economic power derived from arms development. War serves as a mean to develop the American industry, whose involvement — necessary from a business standpoint, though not necessarily military — has become central to debates due to the close relationship between political power, state structure, and the military-industrial complex. (Lorden Zeddies, 2023) The US model has been vigorously copied by various political figures. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, a member of Brazil’s right-wing party, positioned himself as a “Latin American Trump.” (Rodrigues, 2019) This demonstrates the influence of American doctrine on Western countries. Bolsonaro is not the only figure in the region; others include Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele, while in Europe, Giorgia Meloni serves as a counterpart. In the most recent U.S. elections held on November 5, 2024, Donald Trump won the presidency of the White House again. This would be his second term, and his positions, rather than moderating, became increasingly radical. His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” calls for a historical revision of what the United States represented in the world, from a colonialist perspective. Additionally, his various speeches against Mexican immigrants have been characterized as xenophobic. (Bussaja, 2024) It is evident, then, that the U.S. stance continues to be one of maintaining dominance and hegemony. The New Giant: China Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. His first objective was the creation of a “New Silk Road,” referencing the Silk Road of the 2nd century that connected Europe, Africa, and Asia. This new route was designed to connect China with the rest of the world, opening its markets and leaving behind its historically insular past. (Zhongguo, 2019) This initiative also reflects the early stages of Jinping’s domestic policy based on soft power. The theory of soft power defines a country’s influence through economic strategy. In other words, it involves intervening in international markets to the extent necessary — or even obligatory — for the countries involved in the global landscape. In most cases, this is manifested through the accumulation of ports in different countries, controlled or financed by a single nation, with priority given to these key points as essential for its development. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This strategy not only promotes the economic development of a state but also enables the formulation of new political relationships. In China’s case, we see outreach to Japan, India, and Russia. (Rosas, 2008) Naturally, China initially sought to engage with these countries due to geographic proximity, but over time, and with the growth of its industry, it sought relationships with more distant nations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, China has established various agreements on economic, political, and social cooperation. However, as can be inferred, these initiatives have limitations due to China’s cultural gaps; while China seeks to open its cultural world to Latin America — and vice versa — the result is not an intercultural process but rather a multicultural one. (Staiano, 2019) This approach poses a challenge for the United States. In Latin America, the U.S. has historically held strong influence, but its challenges in various areas have allowed China to enter Latin markets freely. Countries in the region are not indifferent to China’s initiatives. The Chinese market offers cheaper products, more technologically advanced goods, and cultural visibility for the general public. (Zapata & Martínez-Hernández, 2020) A clear example of China’s soft power in South America is the Chancay mega-port in Peru. This port opens multiple opportunities for the region and the world. Asian products cost less and take fewer days to arrive. It increases tariff revenue in Peru and promotes the development of economic corridors in the region. (Villagra, 2023) Finally, China’s strategy is historically grounded in the “Century of Humiliation,” a historical period that continues to affect the Chinese Communist Party’s self-perception. Since China’s opening to the international market, measures have been taken to achieve the overarching goal: to “cleanse” its history. Communication strategies such as the “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” Peripheral Diplomacy, and its new international relations model based on win-win principles have made Xi Jinping one of the most recognized and lauded leaders when evaluated objectively in historical context. (Mazuelos Chávez, 2022) China vs. the United States The power dynamic between the U.S. and China has persisted over time. During his presidency, Obama made decisions that marked a rapprochement with China, but this paradigm shifted under Trump’s administration, which adopted a protectionist and nationalist policy line, culminating in a tariff war in 2018. China, on the other hand, maintained its party ideals, and under Xi Jinping, distanced itself from any hegemonic ambitions, promoting economic engagement with peripheral countries, respect for international organizations, and goodwill in international politics. (Barrera G et al., 2021) China’s stance is evident in the increase of exports to various countries. In multiple conferences, President Xi Jinping consolidated China’s economic openness, generating investment confidence in other countries by presenting a strong economic ally that does not interfere in domestic politics. Furthermore, economic exchanges benefit both parties. (Xu, 2021) Thus, on one hand, the U.S. seeks to protect its economy by radicalizing protectionist measures, triggering a tariff war, disturbing the international context, and increasing tensions with the Asian continent. Meanwhile, China’s economic model functions effectively as long as it opens itself to other countries, proposing alliances that mutually benefit both sides. Consequently, in the years leading up to the coronavirus pandemic, a confrontation between China and the U.S. was anticipated. By 2021, all signs pointed to an inevitable economic clash. Beyond tariff measures, questions arose as to whether China might repeat the same mistakes the U.S. made in managing hegemony, which have been analyzed over time and through unfolding events. (Gerig, 2021) Under these tensions, the U.S. emphasized that its intentions revolved more around physical warfare than economic conflict. Unlike China, the U.S. has allies that are more strategically positioned militarily but weaker economically. This is why a military agenda is promoted: in a hypothetical conflict, U.S. military capacity, combined with access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its military bases, and its industrial complex, would tilt the balance of war in its favor. Strategically, China has greater capacity to influence peripheral markets, making it difficult for the U.S. to initiate a conflict, as it would lack long-term trading partners, discouraging its production chain. (Gerig, 2021) Eventually, both countries need each other to maintain economic and technological development. China has independently developed innovative technologies but requires a large market to justify its multi-million-dollar investments, while the U.S. keeps many of its factories in China due to low labor costs. Trump’s first-term policies were later moderated by Biden, who adopted a more conciliatory approach, opening diplomatic channels while still emphasizing the importance of maintaining U.S. hegemony. (Fernández Tabío, 2022) So, where did this confrontation materialize? By 2023, Latin America became the preferred arena for both countries. Both sides recognized its importance, and peripheral economies were the center of attention. The notable difference between the two was, once again, their engagement strategy. The U.S. took a coercive approach toward Panama, whereas China approached Peru through port investments, creating new maritime routes that benefit the entire southern continent. (Carbajal-Glass, 2023) By 2024, with Trump’s second administration, the U.S. strongly opposed the rise of Asia, returning to isolationism. China maintained its perspective of mutual cooperation, while the U.S. pursued a militaristic stance, attempting to obstruct China’s cooperative development with Latin America and India. Even so, U.S. efforts were insufficient to prevent Asia’s engagement with other Western countries. Currently, China holds significant influence in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. (Nascimento, 2024) Discussion After conducting this comprehensive analysis of the “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order,” it becomes clear that the struggle for hegemony occurs between China and the United States. This confrontation is primarily economic, although it has cultural, military, social, and political dimensions. It is not comparable to the Cold War, but the term is used as a representation of a past that seems to echo in the present. (Crivelaro Neto, 2024) The “New World Order” for the 21st century represents a context of economic, political, military, cultural, and social crisis. The confrontation between these two major powers defines the current trajectory of the world. Countries that lack the capacity to participate in this confrontation (peripheral economies) nevertheless become geostrategic points of contention. This is evident in the case of Latin America. The diplomatic and cooperative relationships that China has built in recent years have strengthened its ability to confront the United States. (Rosas, 2008) The geopolitical landscape is fraught with uncertainty generated by the development of the conflict itself, making it difficult to establish definitive guidelines or perspectives in the analysis. The U.S., through its foreign policy, seeks to maintain its hegemony. Donald Trump exemplifies this approach. The American perspective is to prevent any other country from determining what should be done. This approach is not only aimed at countering China, which has become its primary adversary, but also applies to other countries, including the European Union, which remains its ally. China presents itself as the leader of this “New World Order” through its alliances in Asia and Latin America because it possesses the greatest capacity to confront the U.S., withstand policies directed against it, and develop new strategies through economic and technological development, preventing the U.S. from achieving international stability. The global reality (New World Order) is, in any case, a multipolar system. Finally, the United States faces multiple challenges. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, several events have contributed to its weakening. Moreover, the Biden administration has left a significant debt to the American people, and the crisis of liberal democracies continues to deepen. Trump represents the American mindset, while Xi Jinping is its most important adversary. This confrontation will ultimately be resolved with a single winner in a zero-sum equation. Conclusions Addressing the main objective of this research, the “New World Order” projected for the 21st century is the conflict between China and the United States. This impasse, as discussed, represents a deadlock in the international arena. It is necessary to allow more time for events to unfold. In due course, a winner will emerge in this economic contest. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the United States remains at the forefront, and figures such as Donald Trump clearly exemplify the country’s continued hegemonic perspective. In the case of China, Xi Jinping’s government has marked a decisive shift in foreign policy, achieving what the reform and opening period did not: transforming China into an international market. Only time will determine whether it can withstand U.S. measures. Furthermore, it is essential to closely observe, despite the party’s secrecy, the geopolitical actions that the Chinese Communist Party undertakes. Finally, the confrontation between the United States and China, in economic terms, is real and affects the entire world. It impacts the development of new international policies, the emergence of social and health crises, and the formulation of new bilateral agreements between states thousands of kilometers apart. This confrontation represents the “New World Order” — an order without a concrete order — something only time can define, perhaps as a precursor to an international paradigm shift. References Barbé, Esther. (1995). Relaciones internacionales. Tecnos. Barrera G, R. A., Suárez G, L., & Ospina, L. M. (2021). La balanza comercial de América Latina con China y Estados Unidos en el contexto de la guerra comercial entre Trump y Xi Jinping. 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Democracia y mercados en el nuevo orden mundial. Globalización y sindicalismo, 1, 47–83. Cox, R. (2013). Fuerzas sociales, estados y órdenes mundiales: Más allá de la Teoría de Relaciones Internacionales. Relaciones Internacionales, 24, 129–162. https://repositorio.uam.es/bitstream/handle/10486/677391/RI_24_7.pdf Crivelaro Neto, D. (2024). CHINA X EUA: RESTABELECIMENTO DA COMPETIÇÃO PELA LIDERANÇA DA ECONOMIA MUNDIAL. Revista Contemporânea, 4(3), e3445. https://doi.org/10.56083/RCV4N3-178 Dabat, A., & Leal, P. (2019). Ascenso y declive de Estados Unidos en la hegemonía mundial. Problemas del desarrollo, 50(199), 87–114. https://doi.org/10.22201/IIEC.20078951E.2019.199.67934 Domínguez López, E. (2021). De Bush 43 a Biden: cambios en el sistema-mundo y ajustes de política exterior en Estados Unidos. Política Internacional, 3(2), 27–42. Duque-Vargas, N.-H. (2021). Educación para una cultura de paz en el orden mundial posguerra fría. Revista Guillermo de Ockham, 19(2), 277–292. https://doi.org/10.21500/22563202.4086 Fernández Tabío, L. R. (2022). Estados Unidos, geoeconomía y pugna hegemónica con China. Política Internacional, 4(3), 19–31. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/7620/762081507003.pdf Gerig, M. (2021). El retorno de la Trampa de Tucídides: la Gran Estrategia de Estados Unidos y China frente a la disputa hegemónica desde la perspectiva de la economía política de sistemas-mundo. Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder, 12(1), 99–122. https://doi.org/10.5209/geop.68341 Lascano y Vedia, J. R., & Colotta, M. (2020). Formulación de una política exterior: su dimensión política y social. Revista Relaciones Internacionales, 29(59), 103–130. Lechuga Cardozo, J. I., & Leyva Cordero, O. (2020). Escenarios 2020 del Orden Mundial. Análisis desde la Prospectiva Estratégica. Ánfora, 27(48), 137–161. https://doi.org/10.30854/anf.v27.n48.2020.672 Lorden Zeddies, N. (2023). Defensa y negocios: el complejo industrial militar en los Estados Unidos [Universidad Europea]. https://titula.universidadeuropea.com/handle/20.500.12880/5577 Mazuelos Chávez, J. A. (2022). El sueño chino de rejuvenecimiento nacional y la política exterior bajo Xi Jinping. Agenda Internacional, 29(40), 31–55. https://doi.org/10.18800/agenda.202201.002 Nascimento, L. G. do. (2024). La geoeconomía y geopolítica de las rivalidades China-Estados Unidos en las estrategias del Asia-Pacífico vs Indo-Pacífico. Relaciones Internacionales, 57, 191–207. https://doi.org/10.15366/RELACIONESINTERNACIONALES2024.57.010 Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva. (s. f.). Recuperado 16 de octubre de 2025, de https://observatorio.ceplan.gob.pe/megatendencia Peña Galindo, A. (2018). ¿Soft power o Hard power? Reflexiones teóricas sobre la política exterior brasileña. Revista Relaciones Internacionales y Estrategias de seguridad, 13(2), 97–121. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6819790.pdf Ramírez Montañez, J., & Sarmiento Suárez, J. (2021). Nuevo orden internacional a inicios de la segunda década del siglo XXI. Estudios Internacionales, 52(197), 153–166. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2020.55138 Rodrigues, G. (2019). ¿EL TRUMP DEL TRÓPICO? POLÍTICA EXTERIOR DE ULTRADERECHA EN BRASIL. Análisis Carolina, 06, 1–11. Rosas, M. C. (2008). China y Estados Unidos en el siglo XXI: ¿hacia una nueva bipolaridad? Comercio exterior, 58(3), 198–217. Sanahuja Perales, J. A. (2022). Interregno. La actualidad de un orden mundial en crisis. Nueva Sociedad, 302, 86–94. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/72807 Sanz Díaz, C., & Sáenz-Rotko, J. M. (2022). ¿Segunda Guerra Fría? Un análisis desde la Historia y las Relaciones Internacionales. Relaciones Internacionales, 51, 167–184. https://doi.org/10.15366/RELACIONESINTERNACIONALES2022.51.009 Schulz, J. S. (2023). Crisis sistémica del orden mundial, transición hegemónica y nuevos actores en el escenario global. Cuadernos de Nuestra América, 3, 34–50. https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/handle/11336/206913 Staiano, M. F. (2019). La relaciones internacionales entre China y América Latina: encontrando un camino común hacia un nuevo orden mundial. Anuario en Relaciones Internacionales del IRI, 1–10. http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/95952 Touraine, Alain., & Guilpain Peuliard, Odile. (2016). El fin de las sociedades. Fondo de Cultura Económica. Villagra, M. E. (2023). Megapuerto de Chancay: Repercusiones en el Comercio Sudamericano e Impacto Geoestratégico. Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre, 2(2), 75–86. https://doi.org/10.56221/SPT.V2I2.28 Xu, Y. (2021). Los efectos internos de la apertura exterior de la Economía China [Universidad de Valladolid]. https://uvadoc.uva.es/bitstream/handle/10324/52272/TFG-J-341.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Zapata, S., & Martínez-Hernández, A. A. (2020). Latin American Foreign Policy before the hegemony of the United States and China’s emerging power. Colombia Internacional, 104, 63–93. https://doi.org/10.7440/COLOMBIAINT104.2020.03 Zhongguo, J. (2019). La Nueva Ruta de la Seda: Universalismo y pluriversalismo para un nuevo orden mundial. Memoria Académica, 32, 24–46. https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.13112/pr.13112.pdfInformaciónadicionalenwww.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar

Diplomacy
Flag USA and China on Computer Chip . Global chip shortage crisis and China-United States trade war concept.

Leading States in the Race for Artificial Intelligence in the Current International System

by Danna Fernanda Mena Navarro

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

Diplomacy
SANTIAGO DE CHILE, CHILE - JANUARY 26, 2018: View of the presidential palace, known as La Moneda, in Santiago, Chile. This palace was bombed in the coup of 1973

Chile elects most right-wing leader since Pinochet – in line with regional drift, domestic tendency to punish incumbents

by Andra B. Chastain

Chileans have elected the most right-wing presidential candidate since the end of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship over three and a half decades ago. In a runoff held on Dec. 14, 2025, José Antonio Kast, a Republican Party ex-congressman and two-time former presidential candidate, won just over 58% of the vote, while his opponent, Jeannette Jara, the left-wing labor minister of current President Gabriel Boric, won nearly 42%. Approximately 15.6 million Chileans were eligible to vote in the first presidential election to take place with mandatory voting and automatic voter registration. As a result of those new election rules, which went into place in 2022, an estimated 5 million to 6 million new voters went to the polls. These voters – found to be largely younger, male and lower-middle class – are seen as lacking a strong ideological identity and rejecting politics altogether. The verdict delivered by Chile’s voters puts it in line with a broader right-wing regional shift – most recently in Bolivia – that has reversed the “pink tide” of left-leaning governments in the past two decades. But as a historian of modern Latin America and Chile, I believe Chile’s election also reflects the important local context of years of increasing disenchantment with the political system. Amid Chile’s expanded electorate, the primary issues of voter concern during this campaign were crime and immigration. An October 2025 poll specifically found delinquency to be the top issue, with immigration, unemployment and health care also marking high. Though Chile has one of the lowest crime rates in Latin America, high-profile cases of organized crime have shaken the nation in recent years. Homicides increased between 2018 and 2022 and have decreased slightly since then. Immigration has also risen significantly, with a large number of immigrants coming to Chile having fled economic and political crises in Venezuela, as well as in Peru, Haiti, Colombia and Bolivia. The foreign-born population in Chile rose from 4.4% in 2017 to 8.8% in 2024. The key constitutional context Many commentators have highlighted the stark polarization of this election, with a Communist Party labor minister campaigning against the arch-conservative Kast, who has lauded the Pinochet dictatorship under which his deceased older brother once served. But there is more to the story. Some observers have drawn comparisons between Kast and other far-right Latin American leaders like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. But Chile is not merely following the same far-right playbook of its neighbors. In the weeks leading up to the runoff in Chile, both candidates moved toward the center. Jara vowed to expand the prison system to combat rising crime, while Kast – who had previously threatened expulsion of undocumented migrants – softened his tone to say they would be “invited” to leave. Moreover, Kast learned from his previous failed attempts at the presidency by speaking less about his controversial or more socially conservative positions. For example, he played down opposition to abortion under any circumstances. Chilean voters, in contrast, overwhelmingly approve of the limited abortion rights that were passed by Congress in 2017. Yet beyond the campaign trail messaging, the results also reflect a structural fact of Chilean politics that mirror political realities of other parts of Latin America, and even globally. In every presidential election since 2006, Chileans have voted out the incumbency to swing to the opposing side of the political spectrum. With candidates barred from consecutive presidential terms, the pendulum has swung back and forth since the alternating presidencies of socialist Michelle Bachelet – 2006-2010 and 2014-2018 — and conservative Sebastián Piñera – 2010-2014 and 2018-2022. Boric, a former left-wing student leader, took office in 2022 following a wave of upheaval and popular protests over inequality in 2019-2020. In what was a historic moment, the country voted to begin a process of rewriting its Pinochet-era constitution, which entrenched neoliberal economic policies and limited the government’s capacity to confront inequality. The constitutional convention was made up of directly elected citizens, many of them from grassroots movements. Yet in a stunning reversal, the progressive constitution – which would have protected rights to nature, Indigenous rights and social rights – was roundly defeated in a plebiscite in 2022. Just over a year later, voters similarly rejected a second attempt to rewrite the constitution, albeit under a process that conservative parties helped shape. Boric’s approval ratings, already low, suffered from this failed constitutional process. More than the right-wing elections elsewhere in the region, this national context helps to explain Chile’s own conservative turn. The ever-present discontent of voters Even as the pendulum has swung back and forth in recent Chilean presidential elections, there are deeper continuities across the different Chilean governments in the 21st century. Important among them is generalized voter discontent with the political system. This has traditionally been expressed in popular protests, such as the student movements of 2006 and 2011 and the ‘Estallido Social’– or Social Uprising – of 2019-2020 that were the largest protests since the return to democracy in 1990 and helped propel Boric to power. Public discontent was also expressed in the overwhelming vote to rewrite the constitution, which passed with 78% of the vote in 2020. Even though the constitutional process was ultimately rejected by voters, this underlying discontent has not gone away. One of the recent signs of discontent with the political choices on offer was in the first round of voting on Nov. 16: The third-place candidate was not one of the veteran politicians on the right, but Franco Parisi, a populist economist who has not set foot in Chile in years and who called on his supporters to intentionally vote null – or “spoil” their votes. Discontent has taken many forms – outrage about inequality and neoliberalism in 2019-2020, or unease about economic precarity and crime in the current election. But it has persisted, even as Chile’s political system remains stable. Some observers have pointed out that, unlike in many places around the world, Chile’s democratic norms are holding strong. The fact that power continues to pass peacefully despite major ideological differences is significant, particularly in light of the long struggle for democracy during the Pinochet regime. Kast’s style, for what it’s worth, is not as bombastic as that of U.S. President Donald Trump or Argentina’s Milei. Still, his apparent politeness belies what many fear is a coming erosion of rights: the rights of women to bodily autonomy; the rights of individuals to due process; the rights of workers to dignified conditions. These may well be up for negotiation under the new administration. Kast, a staunch Catholic and father of nine, is opposed to abortion under any circumstances and has even attempted to ban the morning-after pill. He was a supporter of Pinochet up until the regime’s end, campaigning for the “yes” vote in 1988 that would have seen eight more years for the authoritarian leader after 15 years already in power. Kast has likewise vowed to slash public spending and deregulate the economy, a clear echo of the Pinochet years. Despite the momentous shift heralded by Kast’s election, though, it is unlikely to change one of the principal challenges of Chile’s democracy in the 21st century: voter discontent and disenchantment. There has been a consistent trend for the government in power to lose popular support and face strong headwinds in Congress from the opposition. For all the celebration happening right now for Kast and his supporters, it is hard to see that changing once the new government takes office in March 2026.