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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The history of Russian-American relations has been marked by numerous ups and downs, periods of cooperation and confrontation that have shaped not only bilateral relations but also had a significant impact on the global political stage. In this regard, these relations have always attracted the attention of researchers attempting to predict their development. Moreover, every U.S. presidential election is not just a change of power in the country but also an opportunity to reassess foreign policy, which, in turn, affects the interests of other nations, including Russia. Each new president comes to power with their own views, priorities, and strategies, directly influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. One only needs to recall examples where shifts in the White House have led to dramatic turns in foreign policy — ranging from escalations in tension to attempts to set a new tone for dialogue. For instance, consider President Obama's “reset” policy towards Russia, followed by the intensification of anti-Russian sanctions when the “reset” did not unfold according to American expectations. What significance do the 2024 U.S. presidential elections hold for Russian-American relations? Will the continuity of U.S. foreign policy towards Russia persist? How might the election results impact the future of these two great powers and their interactions on the global stage? At the Intersection of Hopes and Ambitions Among the factors influencing Russian-American relations are the views, priorities, and strategies of American decision-makers. In this regard, the 2024 U.S. presidential election drew the close attention of the international community. It is expected that a change in president and government could lead to a transformation of foreign policy. The position of the elected president serves as an indicator of the likely foreign policy tactics and strategies Washington may adopt towards other countries and in addressing various international issues during the upcoming four-year term.   So, what do we know about Donald Trump? First and foremost, he brings valuable presidential experience and is well aware of the pitfalls that await him now. He is better prepared for the role than he was eight years ago. Secondly, he might challenge the deep state, which, while unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out. He has nothing left to lose unless he amends the Constitution to create the possibility of running for a third term. Thirdly, he fiercely defends the national interests of the state in the spirit of realism. This means he can be engaged within this paradigm.   At the same time, he is a businessman, which implies that reaching an agreement with him is possible one way or another. The key is to offer him a “price” that aligns with his interests. If a foreign policy “business proposal” does not appeal to him or offer any tangible benefit, he will not even consider it.   It is also important to note that he is ambitious when it comes to wielding power. He has both the financial resources and influence within certain circles. It seems that what he lacks is global power. To realize his ambitions — such as demonstrating his ability to shape world destinies and influence international events through Russia — he may facilitate a revival of Russian-American relations from their current low point.  Whether Moscow would find this scenario acceptable is another question entirely. Nevertheless, American foreign policy does not depend solely on the desires and intentions of the president. Typically, it retains its key characteristics, even with occasional deviations from continuity in foreign policy tactics and strategies. An example of this can be seen in the shift towards a quasi-isolationist stance during Donald Trump's first term, followed by a reversal under Joe Biden's presidency (such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, reversing the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO, and lifting the travel ban on citizens from several Muslim and African countries). Now, a return to Trump's approach is anticipated, though the main directions of previous foreign policies across all fronts are expected to remain intact.   It is also crucial to consider the presence of the so-called deep state in the U.S., which may attempt to hinder Trump’s plans and intentions. During his first term, the deep state proved to be a significant force, preventing the president from implementing certain plans and agreements with other world leaders, including Russia — for example, in the realm of cybersecurity.  However, Trump is now more aware of the specific challenges he might face and is better positioned to shape his foreign policy strategy in a way that circumvents potential obstacles posed by the deep state, enabling him to achieve his desired outcomes. This includes negotiating and implementing agreements he reaches.  Who will prevail in this dynamic — Trump or the deep state — remains to be seen in the near future. At the same time, it is essential to consider the impact of previously made decisions on U.S. foreign policy. For example, laws are much more challenging to amend or repeal than executive orders issued by a previous president. This is particularly relevant to one of the major sticking points in Russian-American relations — sanctions. Reaching an agreement to lift sanctions would be extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, under current conditions, as a law can only be repealed with the approval of the U.S. Congress. In other words, the president does not have the authority to unilaterally lift sanctions without Congressional consent.   However, if such a move aligns with strengthening the global influence of the United States — particularly Donald Trump’s role — it is conceivable that he might find a way to achieve the seemingly impossible. At the same time, the U.S. president is not the sole influential figure in shaping the country’s foreign policy — Congress also plays a crucial role. The current situation is unfolding in a manner similar to 2016. The outcome of the 2024 U.S. elections resulted not only in the victory of former president and businessman Donald Trump, but also in Republican candidates securing a majority in Congress. The Republican Party now holds the upper hand, with 53 seats in the Senate compared to the Democrats' 47, and 220 seats in the House of Representatives compared to the Democrats' 215.   There is a likelihood that Republicans will be inclined to support Trump’s initiatives. However, opposition on certain issues is also possible, one of which could be Russia, particularly regarding anti-Russian sanctions, as was the case during his previous term.  In this context, it is important to note that Republican members of Congress have backed the nomination of the current Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, for the same position in the new House. The vote on his candidacy is scheduled for January 3, 2025. While he previously supported funding for Ukraine, his rhetoric has recently shifted, and he has started opposing this initiative.   Meanwhile, John Thune has become the new Republican leader in the Senate. He has already expressed his willingness to approve Trump’s cabinet appointments through a simplified and expedited process. Notably, he also supported aid for Ukraine in the past. However, this fact is now being downplayed in public discourse in the United States. In addition to the role of the president and the composition of Congress, those appointed to key foreign policy positions and the advisors to the head of state can also play a significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Currently, Donald Trump, drawing on his experience from his first term, is selecting candidates for his team who are not only loyal to him but also influential and well-resourced figures, such as Elon Musk. He is choosing individuals who share his ambitions.  In this regard, Trump and Musk are quite similar — both aspire to global influence. This has led to a consolidation of Trump’s inner circle around his expressed ideas, even if some of these individuals previously held different positions on foreign policy issues. This dynamic is evident, for instance, in the case of Mike Johnson.   Undoubtedly, this alignment is primarily motivated by the desire to secure positions in the upcoming administration. However, these individuals are also well aware that if they oppose Trump, they risk being replaced by more loyal candidates. One of the top priorities on the agenda for the newly elected president is filling government positions. The importance of those he selects for his team should not be underestimated. Despite their loyalty, it is important to consider the potential, albeit limited, influence they may have on the stance of the newly elected president. First and foremost, Donald Trump has selected U.S. Senator J.D. Vance from Ohio as his vice president. Vance considers Russia an adversary of the United States but believes treating Moscow as an outright enemy is counterproductive. He has been cautious in supporting anti-Russian sanctions, remarking that the Biden administration's use of this tool against Russia has been as effective as a “damp firecracker”.   J.D. Vance has been a vocal opponent of providing aid to Ukraine and has advocated for negotiations with Russia. According to him, “just because we don’t like someone doesn’t mean we can’t talk to them from time to time”. This suggests a degree of pragmatism in the approach toward Moscow within the future U.S. presidential administration.   Nonetheless, national interests will remain the top priority for Trump’s entire team, as well as for Trump himself. In this context, one potential negotiation strategy could involve emphasizing that agreements on specific issues align with American national interests. Currently, Michael Waltz is being considered for the role of National Security Advisor. This position is one of the most significant in the U.S. administration and does not require Senate confirmation. Waltz would be responsible for briefing Donald Trump on key national security issues and coordinating the work of various agencies.   Regarding his foreign policy views, Waltz believes it is necessary to reassess the U.S. objectives in Ukraine. At the same time, he is among those who support imposing sanctions on Russia and conducting strikes deep within Russian territory. So far, no changes in his stance on these matters have been observed.   However, it is unlikely that he will openly contradict Trump. Instead, a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic may emerge, which could align perfectly with the newly elected president's objectives. After all, Trump is advancing the concept of “peace through strength”. Donald Trump plans to appoint Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. In recent interviews, Rubio stated that Ukraine should seek opportunities for a peaceful resolution with Russia rather than focusing solely on reclaiming its territories. He was also one of 15 Republican senators who voted against the $95 billion military aid package for Ukraine passed in April 2024. This alignment with Trump’s position on Ukraine indicates Rubio’s intention to remain loyal to the U.S. president.   For the role of Secretary of Defense, Trump is considering Pete Hegseth, a Fox News host. Hegseth has expressed skepticism about continuing U.S. support for Ukraine, further reflecting his loyalty to Trump, consistent with other candidates being considered for positions in the new administration. Donald Trump has proposed New York Congresswoman Elise Stefanik as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Stefanik has called for “crushing actions” to defeat Russia and was one of the initiators of anti-Russian sanctions. However, she voted against a multi-billion-dollar aid package for Ukraine in early 2024.   For the position of Director of National Intelligence, Trump has nominated Tulsi Gabbard, known for her criticism of U.S. foreign policy regarding Ukraine and Russia. In early 2022, she attributed the conflict to the Biden administration's failure to acknowledge Russia's “legitimate security concerns” regarding Ukraine's potential NATO membership. Other key positions include Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Commerce, who are responsible, among other things, for implementing anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the Director of the CIA. Additionally, the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) will be led by businessman Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, Trump's former rival in the primaries.  In this context, it is important to note that Donald Trump places a high value on loyalty and support for his ideas. Consequently, members of his team are likely to carefully weigh their words to avoid contradicting him — or at least not contradicting him significantly — while subtly advancing their own views when possible.   In summary, all candidates share a common trait: loyalty to Trump and support for his ideas, particularly regarding Ukraine, even if they previously held differing views on certain issues. However, it would be premature to infer a shift in the U.S. position toward Russia based solely on their expressed desire to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Bridges or Walls: The Shape of Russian-American Relations After 2024  The trends in relations between Moscow and Washington after 2024 will largely depend not only on the outcome of the recent elections but also on the genuine readiness of both nations for dialogue and cooperation. Notably, Russia has already articulated its position, expressing its willingness for constructive dialogue. However, the question remains: Is Washington prepared for this, considering its deeply entrenched anti-Russian background? Can Donald Trump navigate these challenges effectively, and more importantly, does he even want to?   Russian-American relations after the elections stand at a crossroads. The choice between constructive cooperation and deepening confrontation will be critical. What factors will ultimately determine the future trajectory of these relations? It is important to remember that Donald Trump is a businessman who thinks and acts accordingly. He is ambitious and seeks to influence international relations while positioning himself as a leader. Consequently, he will never agree to concessions. At best, the outcome will be compromise solutions on a range of issues that he, as U.S. president, does not consider vital but which allow him to fulfill his ambitions and emerge as the winner in negotiations. On one hand, under current conditions, the shadow of conflict will continue to loom over Russian-American relations regardless of the statements and actions of Donald Trump and his team. Among the contentious issues that will be challenging to resolve are North Korea (a longstanding U.S. adversary), relations with China (Trump would like to reduce the level of Russian-Chinese cooperation), and Iran (its nuclear program remains a major concern for the U.S.).  On the other hand, potential areas for dialogue and cooperation could include counterterrorism efforts and cybersecurity. An attempt was made during Trump’s first term in 2017, when a bilateral working group on cybersecurity was proposed following a meeting between the Russian and U.S. presidents. However, these agreements ultimately fell apart due to pressure on Trump from the U.S. deep state. It is highly unlikely that Russia and the United States will be able to overcome their significant differences, establish a mutually beneficial dialogue, restore strategic stability, or “reset” their relations over the next four years, especially given Donald Trump's stance on achieving “peace through strength”. Interestingly, Trump has expressed a desire to resolve the crisis in Ukraine as quickly as possible. However, during his first presidential term, his administration approved the transfer of weapons to Ukraine. It can be speculated that this decision was influenced by the deep state, which may have pressured him to provide military aid to Kyiv.   That said, it is improbable that Trump's current desire to end the conflict will take Russian national interests into account. Notably, he has been largely silent on the broader development of relations with Russia. One should not expect a dramatic shift in Russian-American relations. The United States will continue to act in its national interests, as it always has. However, there is now an opportunity to reopen negotiations with Donald Trump, approaching him as a businessman open to a potential win-win scenario, provided that the strategy is carefully crafted — much like Henry Kissinger once did.   Russia has made its move; now it is Trump’s turn. Whether he is capable of restoring even a minimal level of trust between the two countries, necessary for de-escalating tensions, will become evident over the next four years.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has claimed that he could end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours of taking office. He now calls for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and the beginning of negotiations. However, history shows that what cannot be achieved on the battlefield is unlikely to be obtained at the negotiating table. Immediate ceasefire of the Ukraine war could be a double-edged sword for the United States under the current circumstances. Russia occupies significant Ukrainian territories, including Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and parts of Zaporizhzhia, amounting to approximately 18% of Ukraine’s territory. Ukraine has made incursions into the Russian regions of Belgorod and Bryansk, only amounting to less than 1% of Russia’s total territory. How can both sides achieve their goals at the negotiating table?  Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg suggests ending the war by halting weapon supplies to Ukraine if it refuses to engage in peace talks — and increasing weapon deliveries to Ukraine if Russia fails to do the same. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has suggested the possibility of negotiating a cease-fire deal with Russia, proposing that the status of occupied territories could be addressed diplomatically at a later stage. This reflects Ukraine’s constrained position under various pressures. Russia is open to a peace talk but is unlikely to make a huge compromise with Ukraine. Despite NATO’s extensive support, sufficient military resources such as ammunition and air defense systems have not been provided to enable Ukraine to effectively counter Russian advances and produce decisive outcomes in strategic offensives due to unclear strategic objectives and effective implementation measures.   Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not crippled the Russian economy as intended; instead, the Russian economy grew by 3.1% in the third quarter of 2024, and its national debt remains at 14.6% of GDP—approximately the same level as when the war began in 2022.  In 2023, Russia spent $160 billion on military needs, accounting for about 40% of its budget. For 2025, Russia has already allocated 13.5 trillion rubles (over $145 billion) for national defense, representing 32.5% of the budget. With support from North Korea, Iran, China, and other countries, Russia is likely to sustain its efforts on Ukrainian soil. In contrast, Ukraine is unlikely to achieve a decisive victory in the short term. If its allies continue with the current strategy while reducing financial aid, Ukraine risks depleting its resources and prolonging the conflict into an unpredictable stalemate, potentially leaving it at a disadvantage during negotiations. Without doubt, an immediate ceasefire could help stop further casualties and bring some much-needed relief to the people affected by the conflict. It can also ease the immediate burden of supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, freeing resources for domestic priorities and addressing other international challenges, particularly countering China’s challenges. However, an immediate ceasefire according to the current battlefield map could also benefit U.S. rivals—authoritarian regimes. First, it would solidify Russia’s control over occupied territories, allowing Moscow to claim a partial victory and bolster domestic support. Such an outcome rewards territorial aggression and undermines international norms. Second, it could weaken the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, signaling to adversaries that aggression can succeed if sustained long enough. European allies might interpret a ceasefire as a sign of wavering U.S. resolve, leading to fractures within NATO and weakening transatlantic unity. Allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, may question the reliability of U.S. security commitments in the region. Third, China has been closely watching the West’s response to the Ukraine crisis, focusing on the cohesion of alliances, the impact of sanctions, and the dynamics of military support. An immediate freeze of the war would demonstrate limited Western resolve and suggest that territorial aggression can yield lasting gains. This reinforces Beijing’s belief that the international community would hesitate to intervene militarily in Taiwan and encourages China to change the status quo over the Taiwan Strait, believing it can manage economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Fourth, an immediate ceasefire does not guarantee long-term peace. The lack of a comprehensive peace agreement leaves underlying issues unaddressed, and it merely postpones hostilities, making the prospect of sustainable peace elusive. Historically, frozen conflicts like those in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transnistria have fostered prolonged instability, enabling aggressors to consolidate control over occupied territories and exert leverage over affected states. The lesson from Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea demonstrates that tolerating an aggressor only encourages further expansion of their ambitions. Instead of an immediate ceasefire agreement, it is necessary to further support Ukraine in reclaiming its territory by changing the current strategy before reaching any cease-fire deal. Historical patterns show that successful territorial recaptures often require asserting military strength before engaging in peace talks. A cease-fire without the necessary restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty risks legitimizing Russia’s invasion. A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive could not only enhance Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations but also serve as a powerful deterrent against future territorial ambitions by other authoritarian regimes globally. The United States will not compromise American national interests when mediating a cease-fire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. However, it will be an extremely challenging task for any American president to broker a peace deal at this time because a deal should uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and internationally recognized borders, align with U.S. support for a rules-based international order, and ensure a balance between both parties instead of rewarding Russian aggression. It should strengthen U.S.-European relations rather than undermine allied unity, adhere to longstanding U.S. foreign policy principles rather than prioritize political gains, and enhance the U.S.’s reputation as a reliable global leader. Otherwise, immediately freezing the war could potentially harm U.S. national interests in the long term and directly encourage the ambitions of aggressors worldwide. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine faces mounting challenges as battlefield victory becomes unlikely, with Donald Trump’s proposed “peace plan” offering a ceasefire based on territorial concessions. While Russia’s vulnerabilities may push Vladimir Putin toward negotiations, the outcome risks freezing the conflict and undermining the international rules-based order. Winning the war against Russian through  “victory on the battlefield” does not look good for Ukraine. The odds are just too high:  from the overall sobering strategic outlook for Ukraine on the battlefield, Ukraine’s limitations in terms of overall military power, the weakening support from Western nations and their fear of a further escalation (falling for Putin’s red lines regarding nuclear escalation); to the president-elect Donald Trump’s newly touted “peace plan”  for Ukraine. Trump has made ending the war in Ukraine one of his election promises. The reasons for his optimism include his perceived personal diplomatic potential, but also necessity in US economic concerns, political strategy, and the ability to able to focus on the China challenge. Russia is weakened and needs a pause in the fighting Vladimir Putin’s own challenges, of course, might make him more inclined to listen to a US led “peace plan” for Ukraine. These include the worsening economic downturn, the erosion of his military power, and recent setbacks of Russian brinkmanship in the Middle East and its alliances with both Iran and Syria. Last week’s dramatic events in Syria with Bashar Al Assad’s regime finally toppling has revealed several miscalculations in Russia. The events of 7 October 2023 and the subsequent war in Palestine has shifted regional power dynamics, not only diminishing Russia’s role but also its ally Iran whose  ‘Axis of  Resistance’ , including Hamas and Hezbollah, hasbeen severely weakened. The fall of Syria is a major strategic loss for Putin and has serious consequences for Russia’s role and standing not only in the Middle East but beyond. The “strong” and perhaps “wise” man image is falling apart. Not a good prospect when it comes to China and the “no limits” partnership: a weak Russia is not what President Xi Jinping needs in his challenge to the current political and military Western order. Given these strategic circumstances it is in Putin’s interest to find a diplomatic solution for ending “his” war in Ukraine. A negotiated freezing of the conflict, with Russia keeping the current occupied parts of Ukraine and Crimea, might be a way out for Putin to declare “mission accomplished.” Ukraine’s precarious position President Volodymir Zelensky’s five step victory plan of November 2024, is already dead. its two main conditions, full NATO membership in the very near future and a step up in Western military assistance, will not happen. NATO maintains that Ukraine is on an “irreversible path to NATO membership,” subject to the Alliance members’ agreement and conditions being met, and the end of hostilities. Perhaps more concerning, the mood seems to have shifted among Ukrainians: recent polls show a majority of Ukrainians supporting a negotiated peace with Russia as current battlefield gains by the Russian Armed Forces continue. This poll also reveals that Ukrainians have become increasingly wary of promises of  support of the West. President Zelensky, maintaining optimism in the face of grave difficulties, has openly stated that he is looking forward to Trump’s return to the White House. He now also suggests  that the war may  end sooner with Trump’s re-election. The most contentious points remaining are NATO membership and no territorial concessions. Zelensky has recently indicated a willingness to trade (at least temporarily) territory for NATO membership. Given NATO’s clear messaging during the 2024 Washington Summit that this would not happen without peace first he might need to change his position in respect to NATO membership as well. How would Trump’s peace plan look like Trump’s “Peace Plan” is still vague but it will be a cease fire agreement with territorial concessions, a potential demilitarised zone, continuing security assistance, and potentially “boots on the grounds,” with sanctions relief for Russia as a further stimulus. In signposting his seriousness with the proposal, Trump has appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, and has met with Zelensky about ending the war during last week’s meeting of world leaders in France at the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral. President Zelensky called his discussions with Trump “good and productive.” An armistice in Ukraine cannot be just an extension of the Minsk II agreement of 2015. The agreement did not work for multiple reasons, but most importantly because of Russian non-compliance and a lack of a deterrence element. Such an armistice would need to be a modern day Korean Armistice Agreement with a potential UN monitoring presence in a demilitarised zone, and a sizeable military deterrence component from Western militaries for Ukraine. NATO membership in the immediate future would be the best option, but likely off the cards due to Russia’s opposition and lack of support from NATO. A twenty year moratorium on Ukraine’s NATO bid, as proposed by the Trump team, could be a way forward. A “West German model of NATO membership” for the unoccupied territories of Ukraine would also be a possible option for Ukraine, which President Zelenksy seems to support. Again, such a proposal seems unlikely given the headwinds from both NATO and Russia. A European permanent military presence in the unoccupied parts of Ukraine (inclusive of US military support), like the US in South Korea, would in theory be possible as they would explicitly be in the respective national but not NATO capacity. This option would rejuvenate an idea of French President Emmanuel Macron madeearlier this year, and if mandated by the UN could be a potential security safeguard for Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, care needs to be taken that this temporary “freezing” of hostilities does not become a de facto “victory for Putin” and a loss for the Rules Based Order. Trump’s attitude towards solving diplomatic and other issues has been described in the past as being “transactional” in essence: ending the Ukraine War has now become the first major test for Trump, the transactional president. Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is Professor in Law and Co-Convener National Security Hub (University of Canberra), University of Canberra, and a Research Fellow with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He is also a Fellow with NATO SHAPE – ACO Office of Legal Affairs where he works on Hybrid Threats and Lawfare. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Social media manipulation, rural discontent and mainstream complacency: Romania’s cancelled elections offer a stark warning for Europe’s democracies E lections are rarely straightforward, especially in high-stakes environments — and particularly in Romania. The EU member state at the Black Sea, which shares the longest border with Ukraine and, until now, has been a staunch US ally and trusted NATO member, now faces profound political uncertainty following the abrupt cancellation of its presidential elections last Friday. The elections were halted after intelligence services revealed interference in the electoral process by a ‘state actor’, widely presumed to be Russia, aimed at favouring an unexpected far-right candidate. The Constitutional Court intervened, ordering a complete restart of the electoral process. Proceeding with the second round under these circumstances would have effectively turned it into a de facto hidden referendum on Romania’s pro-Western orientation. However, the crisis is far from resolved. The electoral turmoil has left Romania’s democratic mainstream fragmented and facing difficult choices. Stabilising the economy, reducing the fallout from the political crisis and forming a functional parliamentary majority are critical tasks. The Romanian case offers crucial takeaways for other European nations, particularly regarding the disruptive role of social media platforms like TikTok in democratic elections. Curbing Russia’s hybrid warfare capabilities, which exploit these platforms to stoke public anxieties and deepen political divisions, requires swift and coordinated action at the European level. A far-right surge nobody saw coming Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in succession between 24 November and 8 December, with the parliamentary elections sandwiched between the two rounds of the presidential election. The sudden rise of the independent candidate Călin Georgescu, until recently a fringe figure, as a serious contender in the first round of the presidential election triggered a far-right surge. The parliamentary election results that followed one week later revealed the fragility of the democratic mainstream against the radical right, which nobody could have predicted mere weeks ago. Georgescu’s unexpected victory in the first presidential round dealt a heavy blow to Romania’s traditional parties, the Social Democrats (PSD) and the centre-right National Liberals (PNL), which have formed the governing coalition since 2021. Not only were their candidates – Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu (PSD) and Senate Chairman Nicolae Ciucă (PNL) – both surpassed by Georgescu. But the parties themselves each lost almost 10 per cent compared to previous elections. The Social Democrats recorded their worst performance in history, securing 22 per cent of the vote and 123 mandates (down from 157). Although they remain Romania’s largest political force, their ability to form a stable majority is now in question. Meanwhile, the National Liberals lost half their seats, securing only 72 mandates. The other centre-right party, Save Romania Union (USR), fared no better, dropping from 90 to 59 mandates, in spite of their candidate, Elena Lasconi, entering into the presidential runoff with Georgescu. This is in stark contrast to the gains made by the radical right. The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) surged into second place with 18 per cent of the vote, while two other smaller far-right parties – SOS Romania and the Party of Young People (POT) – crossed the five per cent threshold for the first time. Together, radical right-wing factions now control almost 35 per cent of the new legislature. Who is the far-right candidate who has upended Romania’s politics? A 62-year-old self-proclaimed expert on sustainable development, Călin Georgescu has ties to the ultra-religious, ultra-nationalist movement that also propelled AUR into parliament in 2020. His relationship with AUR, however, was short-lived, as some of Georgescu’s controversial statements proved too extreme even for this party. Dubbed ‘Kremlin Georgescu’ by some because of his Putin-friendly stance, he is no longer tethered to a single party — a factor that many believe has been crucial to his success in a country where trust in political parties is historically low. His blunt position on party politics is summed up in a short sentence: ‘Political parties are bankrupt’, he concluded after the parliamentary elections of 1 December. His statement echoes another rant from April this year when he emphatically declared that ‘Political parties are nags for the golden chariot of the Romanian people. There will be no more political parties in this country. None!’ When questioned about this, Georgescu retorted that he had merely quoted from a Romanian philosopher, Petre Țuțea, a former member of the Iron Guard, a fascist, ultra-nationalist organisation during Romania’s inter-war period. Țuțea’s exact quote, however, would send shivers down anyone’s spine: ‘Political parties are horses for the golden chariot of Romanian history; when they become nags, the Romanian people send them to the slaughterhouse.’ It’s all about the support for Ukraine Georgescu didn’t just reject party politics, he also questioned the core pillars of Romania’s foreign policy — its membership of NATO and the EU, and the US security umbrella. In Georgescu’s view, NATO is ineffective as a defensive alliance. He recently described the Deveselu Aegis Ashore anti-missile defence system, which Romania has been hosting since 2015, as a ‘disgrace to diplomacy’. While other presidential candidates reaffirmed Romania’s commitment to Ukraine, Georgescu campaigned on the promise of pursuing ‘peace’ through rapprochement with Russia, a move that aligns with his praise of ‘Russian wisdom’ in foreign policy. His position resonated with voters increasingly anxious about the war’s economic and security implications. Romania, which shares a long border with Ukraine, has felt the effects of the conflict through rising energy prices, an influx of refugees and trade disruptions. Public sentiment has shifted in recent months, influenced in part by debates in US politics about ending the war in Ukraine. Georgescu’s populist rhetoric, bolstered by the re-election of Donald Trump, helped him capitalise on these war-related anxieties and positioned him as a challenger to the status quo. Georgescu’s surprising rise reflects deep societal divisions in Romania and growing disenchantment with the political and economic establishment. His support is concentrated among voters in rural and economically disadvantaged regions, areas that have long felt neglected by post-communist reforms. A 2021 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) study described these regions as ‘rural and old industrial areas with significant socio-economic challenges’, where many residents experienced the transition to democracy and capitalism as a period of frustration, humiliation and injustice. Georgescu’s platform, ‘Food, Water, Energy’, resonated with voters in these areas. The programme proposes policies at odds with EU norms, including nationalisation and preferential taxation for local businesses. These ideas appealed to small farmers and business owners struggling with rising production costs and competition from cheap Ukrainian grain imports. EU environmental regulations, perceived as burdensome, further fuelled discontent. Protests by Romanian farmers earlier this year, blocking border crossings with Ukraine and Moldova, highlighted these grievances. His rhetoric also struck a chord with Romanians working abroad, many of whom feel abandoned by the state. For decades, urban centres have benefited disproportionately from EU funding and foreign investment, leaving the peripheries to fend for themselves. Georgescu positioned himself as the champion of the forgotten majority, offering a voice to those who felt excluded from Romania’s post-communist success story. A TikTok made Manchurian candidate TikTok proved to be the ‘secret weapon’ that catapulted Georgescu into the political spotlight. Just weeks before the elections, he was virtually unknown to the public, but his discreet TikTok campaign rapidly expanded his reach within days. Declassified documents from Romania’s intelligence services reveal that Georgescu’s TikTok network spanned 25 000 accounts and allegedly received substantial support from a ‘state actor’. Notably, around 800 of these accounts, initially created as early as 2016, remained largely dormant until two weeks before the elections. This highlights the alarming vulnerability of modern politics to manipulation via social media platforms. TikTok’s popularity in Romania – 47 per cent of the population has an account – has made the platform a powerful tool. By contrast, only 36 per cent of people in France and less than 27 per cent in Germany have an account on TikTok. Among voters aged 18-24, who predominantly use this platform, Georgescu secured 30 per cent of the vote, far outpacing his support among older demographics. This is the age group that, according to a recent FES Youth Study, declares the highest fear of violence and war (56 per cent), sees corruption as the main problem for Romania (72 per cent) and agrees with the statement that it would be good for Romania to have a strong leader who doesn’t care much about the parliament and elections (41 per cent). This is, however, only a small part of the picture. While social media played a role in Georgescu’s success, allowing him to rise from obscurity, the rest has to do with a combination of factors that culminated in a cascade of failures and bad decisions of the mainstream parties. The inability of Romania’s mainstream political parties to acknowledge and address the fears, anxieties, and grievances of the electorate alienated many voters. Amid rising concerns about an impending economic downturn and the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, the political class appeared detached from reality. Although the grand coalition remained in government, the Social Democrats and National Liberals devoted much of the electoral campaign to petty controversies and fruitless disputes, failing to engage with issues that mattered to voters. This relentless squabbling overshadowed any opportunity to highlight the government’s notable achievements, which were far from insignificant. These included massive progress on infrastructure projects on a scale unprecedented in the past two decades, Romania’s inclusion in the US Visa Waiver Program and a landmark breakthrough toward full Schengen accession. Adding to this, the lacklustre presidential candidates fielded by the mainstream parties compounded voter frustration and drove many to seek alternatives. The Social Democrats’ overconfidence resulted in sloppy campaign planning and a narrow focus on a single strategy that hinged on their candidate, Marcel Ciolacu, facing far-right AUR candidate George Simion in the presidential runoff. This strategy was decisively upended by Georgescu’s unexpected surge. Moreover, the PSD’s ‘accommodationist stance’ toward AUR – rooted in the party’s preference for transactional, give-and-take politics – contributed to the normalisation of far-right narratives centred on ethnic nationalism and Christian conservatism. This approach not only weakened the democratic mainstream but also provided fertile ground for the radical right to gain legitimacy and momentum. As Romania grapples with its largest budget deficit in years and faces mounting political uncertainty, the ability of democratic forces to regroup and form a stable majority will be critical in the weeks to come. So far, all parties from the democratic mainstream, Social Democrats included, have signalled that they understand how important it is to form a stable majority. Failure to do so risks further empowering extremist forces and destabilising the nation’s pro-European trajectory.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The victory of the “non-systemic” Donald Trump in the presidential election this time may not have been a surprise, but, as in 2016, it leaves no one indifferent. The world can be roughly divided into those who welcome the Republican's success and those who see the election results as bad news.   The first group includes the leadership of Israel, Georgia, Hungary, and Slovakia. The second group comprises Ukraine, Germany, France, China, and Iran. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan falls into the jubilant camp—he places high hopes on bilateral relations and joint solutions to global crises.  Does R. T. Erdoğan have grounds for optimism? “Chemistry” and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs Looking back at Donald Trump’s previous four years in office, it becomes clear that the results for Turkey were ambiguous. On the one hand, a personal chemistry developed between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump — the American leader has a natural affinity for strong leaders, as Angela Merkel recently noted in her book.   Even as a presidential candidate, Trump praised Erdoğan in an interview with The New York Times for successfully suppressing the attempted coup. In the same interview, given a week after the failed coup attempt, Trump suggested that the U.S., not being a model of democracy itself, has no right to demand Ankara adheres to civil liberties. Furthermore, he indicated that he would not prioritize ideological issues in relations with a NATO ally. Overall, Donald Trump largely fulfilled his campaign promises. The White House refrained from emphasizing human rights issues or openly supporting the opposition — despite having plenty of reasons to do so. During Trump’s first term, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cracked down on the organizers of the coup attempt and conducted mass purges within the military, law enforcement, judiciary, and education systems. He also arrested Kurdish politicians, including the founder of the Peoples' Democratic Party, Selahattin Demirtaş, and consolidated his power by transitioning from a parliamentary to a presidential system.At the time, the U.S. liberal press was particularly concerned that Trump was “ignoring Mr. Erdoğan's authoritarian repression of his own people”. Four months after Donald Trump's inauguration, he welcomed his Turkish counterpart to the Oval Office and acknowledged Turkey's efforts in the fight against ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). Shortly thereafter, in August 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces launched Operation Euphrates Shield to clear the Syrian city of Al-Bab of terrorists. Under Donald Trump, Ankara-Washington relations had their contentious issues, but many of them were largely inherited from Barack Obama's administration. The attempted coup in Turkey occurred during the Democratic administration in the U.S., and none of the Western leaders, except the British Prime Minister, condemned the coup. It was under Obama that Turkish-American relations entered a genuine crisis.   Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began turning away from NATO and the EU, strengthening ties with Russia by negotiating the Turkish Stream pipeline, purchasing S-400 missile systems, and constructing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. At the same time, the Obama administration refused to extradite preacher Fethullah Gülen, whom the Turkish leadership considers the mastermind behind the coup attempt. The Apple of Discord — Syria   The primary, though not the only, sticking point between Trump and Turkey was Syria. On one hand, U.S. support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the fight against ISIS began under Barack Obama, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized him for supporting terrorism. However, under Donald Trump, the U.S. continued supplying weapons to the YPG, which became part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under Pentagon patronage.  At the same time, Trump welcomed Turkey's fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), even though Ankara views the YPG as the PKK’s Syrian offshoot. In November 2017, however, the White House announced it would halt arms supplies to the Kurdish militias. The logic was that ISIS had been defeated, and the U.S. needed to focus on resolving the Syrian conflict and containing Iran. To achieve these goals, allies were essential, and Turkey, as a long-standing NATO member with the region’s most powerful army, clearly outweighed the YPG in strategic importance. Under Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had the opportunity to address the negative legacy of Barack Obama in Syria. In 2018, he launched Operation Olive Branch, seizing control of the Kurdish canton of Afrin alongside the Syrian armed opposition. In October 2019, Turkey conducted Operation Peace Spring.  Before its commencement, Turkey hoped that the U.S. would facilitate the withdrawal of Kurdish forces to the southern part of the country. Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Erdoğan warned that if the Pentagon failed to achieve this, the Turkish Armed Forces would unilaterally establish a so-called “safe zone” along the Turkish border. This zone would involve pushing out the YPG and their political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). On October 7, two days before the operation, Trump applied pressure on Turkey, threatening to “destroy and obliterate” its economy. Ultimately, Turkey carried out its operation. While the U.S. did not officially approve it, they withdrew their troops from the combat zones. On October 17, the U.S. and Turkey reached an agreement to pause the operation, allowing Kurdish forces to leave a 30-kilometer zone in northern Syria.   Details of the conflict resolution were finalized on October 22, when Erdoğan and Putin signed a memorandum in Sochi. According to the agreement, YPG members were required to withdraw 32 kilometers south from the entire Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey, along with the Syrian armed opposition, maintained control over the areas it had captured, stretching from Tel Abyad to Ras al-Ayn.  Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey agreed to conduct joint patrols in territories cleared of YPG, extending “up to 10 kilometers from the border to the west and east of the Peace Spring operation zone, excluding the city of Qamishli”. Relations between the American and Turkish presidents were further strained by Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems. Under Donald Trump, Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter jet development program as punishment for the deal.   Another point of contention arose in July 2018, when Trump threatened Turkey with “major sanctions” over the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Erdoğan suggested exchanging Brunson, who was accused of ties to Gülenists, for Fethullah Gülen.   In the end, Brunson was released in October the following year, but Ankara made it clear that the court’s decision was not a result of Trump’s pressure but rather an independent ruling by a democratic state. Donald Trump’s Pragmatism  Despite points of divergence inherited from Barack Obama and new conflicts that emerged, Donald Trump consistently sought to remain pragmatic. He acted from a position of strength, but avoided alienating his partner.  On October 15, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Turkish steel, and just two days later, he called Erdoğan a “hell of a leader” and thanked him for halting military actions in Syria.   Toward the end of his term, Trump attempted to ease tensions with Turkey. During a White House meeting on November 13, 2019, he openly admitted to being a “big fan” of the Turkish leader, describing their relationship as “wonderful”. In return, Erdoğan referred to the Republican president as a “dear friend”.   At the same meeting, Trump expressed hope to resolve disagreements over the S-400 and F-35 issues “through dialogue”. What Are the Expectations?  Donald Trump’s first term left a lasting impression on Turkish society. The Republican’s threats in 2018 triggered the first collapse of the lira, and now, with Turkey’s economy in deep crisis, similar incidents are even more dangerous.  Economist Fatih Ozatay fears that a new trade war initiated by Trump could provoke retaliatory actions from other players, including China. A reduction in global trade volumes would impact Turkey’s economy by shrinking its export opportunities and further increasing pressure on the lira. Optimism from Turkish Leadership The Turkish leadership remains optimistic. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among the first world leaders to congratulate the Republican on his return to the Oval Office. As soon as the U.S. election results were announced, Erdoğan posted on the social media platform “X”: “Congratulations to my friend Donald Trump, who won the U.S. presidential election after a hard-fought battle and was re-elected as president”. The following day, Erdoğan called Trump, expressing hope for future cooperation. An invitation for Trump to visit Turkey has already been sent. Peace in Ukraine Turkey has invested significant effort into resolving the Ukrainian conflict. Notably, the first and only successful attempt at addressing the conflict was made in Istanbul in March 2022. Turkey also acted as a mediator in the “grain deal”, the exchange of Ukrainian and Russian prisoners, and the largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the Cold War.   Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned that the war in Ukraine is heading either toward a frozen conflict or escalating into a global war. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly criticized the West for escalating the conflict. He recently described the decision to approve long-range strikes as “fueling the war” by Joe Biden.   “You won't achieve anything by following the principle 'after us the deluge'” Erdoğan cautioned. The Turkish leadership understands that no matter how much Erdoğan attempts to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow, all efforts will come to nothing without a shift in the White House’s stance. Under Joe Biden, Ankara grew disillusioned with the West’s willingness to negotiate, but with Donald Trump, things could change.  “If we see that the U.S. administration under Donald Trump approaches this issue from a settlement perspective, we can easily bring this war to an end”, Erdoğan stated. He emphasized that Turkey remains committed to pursuing peace, and if Trump’s peace-oriented rhetoric becomes reality, the chances of success will significantly increase. Gaza – Under Question, Hope for Syria When it comes to the Middle East, the main “issues” remain Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. In Lebanon, peace was achieved at the end of November — Joe Biden secured a ceasefire. The current head of the White House has promised to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well, but so far, no progress has been observed. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes that under Donald Trump, the Middle East could see “lasting peace and stability”, with the Republican exerting “significant influence on the political and military balance” in the region. Trump's skills as a businessman to impose his will and negotiate could lead to agreements. It is worth recalling that the Abraham Accords — Israel's agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco — were reached under his administration, and for Palestine, he developed the “Deal of the Century”. At the same time, Turkey understands Donald Trump and his team have a pro-Israel stance — this is evident from his previous decisions regarding Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the nuclear deal. In the new administration, Secretary of State Mark Rubio aims to eliminate Hamas rather than negotiate with it. The future Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, an evangelical, considers the construction of the Third Jewish Temple on the site of one of Islam's holiest sites, the Dome of the Rock, to be acceptable. Hakan Fidan highlighted Trump’s pro-Israel team at the end of November: “If you look at [Trump’s] cabinet, it signals that his pro-Israel team will support all of Netanyahu's expansionist ambitions. However, if we rely on Trump's own words, 'I did not come to start new wars but to end them,' we might see an opposing trend. We will observe how these two contradictory signals balance with each other and how this will impact the region soon”. In an earlier statement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested to the newly elected U.S. President that halting arms supplies to Israel would help resolve the situation in the region. However, it is unlikely that this request will be heeded, especially considering that even Joe Biden, who has been critical of Benjamin Netanyahu, did not dare to take such a step. Cooperation in Syria appears more realistic for Ankara, albeit with reservations. Speaking at the COP29 conference in Baku, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once again stated that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) might resume fighting against Kurdish militias in Syria and complete Operation “Peace Spring”, advancing both westward and eastward from already controlled territories.  In his “analysis of Trump”, Hakan Fidan expressed hope that Trump would withdraw 800 American soldiers from all of northeastern Syria, which would enable the TAF to carry out the operation. However, the minister expressed doubts that President Trump would agree to such a step immediately: “My impression of Donald Trump is this: despite his statements on various issues, he tends to postpone decisions on critical matters”. “A Trusted Ally” in the White House  While the situation with Israel is relatively clear—Donald Trump is surrounded by anti-Iran and anti-Palestinian hawks—Turkey has fewer allies in the new administration. One notable exception is political strategist Susie Wiles, who will serve as the Chief of Staff at the White House. Wiles is a veteran of politics and a trusted adviser to Trump, having worked on his presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. She has strong ties to lobbying networks and a deep understanding of the president's interests.   Wiles has extensive experience working with prominent lobbyist Brian Ballard, who represented Turkey's interests in Washington. A key moment in this relationship was the 2017 meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Brian Ballard, which advanced the lobbying of Turkish business interests in the United States. Susie Wiles, leveraging her connections and influence, successfully conveyed Turkey's priorities to Donald Trump and his administration, resulting in significant actions — such as attempts to close legal cases against the Turkish bank Halkbank, whose executives were accused of illegally transferring billions of dollars to Iran. Wiles' ties to Brian Ballard suggest that she will continue to advocate for Turkey's interests in her new role, particularly in the context of strategic trade between the two countries. The political strategist's influence could potentially soften the “America First” stance when it comes to Turkey, possibly leading to compromises in areas like Syria. For the finalization of Operation “Peace Spring”, Ankara requires a “green light” from the U.S., which currently backs the YPG. Wiles' position may play a pivotal role in facilitating this agreement. Optimism for the Future? The Erdoğan administration's hopes for improved relations with the U.S. under Donald Trump are not solely based on prior positive experiences with him and his encouraging statements on various issues. Turkish leadership had a highly unpleasant experience interacting with Joe Biden's team. Early in his presidency, Biden officially recognized the mass deaths of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. His administration exerted pressure on Turkey over its stance on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, even imposing sanctions on Turkish companies.   The State Department and the White House frequently criticized Turkish authorities for human rights violations and the erosion of democratic principles in the country, almost openly supporting the opposition bloc during the 2023 presidential elections. Additionally, largely due to Pentagon opposition, Turkey refrained from completing its operation in Syria. Just days before Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's meeting in 2019, the House of Representatives approved sanctions against Turkey for its military operation in Syria. While many issues during Trump’s previous presidency could be attributed to an anti-presidential Congress, this time, the Republican president will face fewer restraining mechanisms, as his party dominates both the Senate and the House of Representatives.   It is also worth noting that the anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobbies wield greater influence over the Democratic Party than over the Republicans. Donald Trump's pragmatism, combined with his support from Congress and the presence of a “trusted ally” within his administration, provides grounds for improving Turkish-American relations. However, systemic issues between the two countries remain, imposing limitations even on a “dear friend” like Trump.  Turkey continues to diversify its foreign policy. Ankara is unwilling to sacrifice key economic, energy, and infrastructure projects with Russia and China as it integrates into the SCO and BRICS. The Syrian case could become a factor of either convergence or antagonism, particularly if Trump refuses to compromise on the Kurdish issue.  At the same time, potential escalation in Idlib, which could hinder normalization between Damascus and Ankara, would enhance U.S. influence in Turkish politics. Lastly, if Trump fails to bring peace to Palestine, Turkey is likely to intensify its policies and rhetoric against Israel, further straining relations with the newly elected president.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The French president appoints veteran centrist François Bayrou as prime minister after Bayrou threatened to withdraw his party from the presidential coalition. Strong with the weak and weak with those at his own level — quite small, in fact. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, displayed this behavior on Friday at the start of a new chapter in the endless decline of his presidency. The head of state, who in the past acted ruthlessly against union protests (2023) and the Yellow Vest Revolt (2018), gave in to the pressures of veteran centrist François Bayrou. The leader of the MoDem Party managed to impose himself as head of the Executive against Macron's initial intentions. It was a morning worthy of an episode of the series ‘Baron Noir’. A true reflection of the agony of the presidential model of the Fifth Republic. Nine days after the successful motion of no confidence against the conservative government of Michel Barnier, the Élysée announced that the appointment would take place on Friday morning. The president had already missed his initial deadline to make the appointment by Thursday night, and prolonging the uncertainty would have further heightened the sense of ridicule. On the same Friday, at five in the morning, Macron called Bayrou, whose name had been at the top of all predictions to replace the former European Brexit negotiator, and told him he would not be chosen, according to the TF1 network. That call led to a heated meeting of nearly two hours at the presidential headquarters. During the meeting, Bayrou threatened Macron with withdrawing his party's (MoDem) deputies from the presidential coalition if he was not chosen as prime minister. “I joined you to do great things, not small ones. (…) It’s simple: if you don’t appoint me, I will withdraw my people”, warned the three-time presidential candidate (2002, 2007, and 2012), according to ‘Le Monde’. Such a move would have dealt a severe blow to an already weakened Macronism, which holds only 164 deputies (out of 577) and represents the second-largest bloc in the National Assembly, behind the left (192). Macron gave in at the end of a tumultuous morning. Instead of his preferred choices when he woke up that day — Sébastien Lecornu (Defense Minister) or Roland Lescure (former Industry Minister) — he opted for the 73-years-old Bayrou. Interestingly, the French head of state, who arrived at the Élysée in 2017 promising to revitalize the Fifth Republic, has now moved from appointing the oldest prime minister in that regime's history (Barnier) to another of the same age. Both are career politicians with 40-year trajectories. And with the added complication in the case of the newly appointed Prime Minister, who is burdened by a corruption case set to be retried on appeal in 2025. Less neoliberal than Macron "I don't think Macron is thrilled about facing the final stretch of his presidency with a prime minister like Bayrou, who has a tough and complicated character," explains political scientist Virginie Martin about the mayor of Pau, a town of 80,000 inhabitants in southwestern France. His appointment as head of the executive reflects, on one hand, the internal tensions within Macronism, which is clearly in decline. On the other hand, it shows the president's stubbornness in retaining control of the government rather than accepting an opening of the Executive towards the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), which narrowly won the snap elections on July 7. Although Macronism obtained less than 15% of the votes in the European elections and came third in the first round of the legislative elections with 20%, it does not relinquish power. It takes advantage of parliamentary fragmentation into three nearly irreconcilable blocs (the left, Macronist center-right, and the far-right) and the extensive powers granted to the president by the Constitution. “It seems incomprehensible to me from an electoral standpoint,” criticized Marine Tondelier, secretary-general of the Greens, regarding the appointment of one of Macron’s earliest significant allies. The current president and the leader of MoDem joined their political paths in February 2017. At that time, they reached an agreement that led to Bayrou’s withdrawal from that year’s presidential campaign, which proved key to Macron’s victory in May. Just a few weeks before that pact, the veteran leader had made harsh remarks about his future ally: “It won’t work (…), because the French will see what’s behind this hologram. There is an attempt by financial powers that are no longer satisfied with economic control but also want political power.” Since then, relations between the two have never been entirely smooth. As he did again this Friday, Bayrou has repeatedly threatened to withdraw MoDem from the presidential coalition, which also includes Macron’s party, ‘Renaissance’, and Horizons. “He is an heir to the Christian democratic tradition. He is neither a Thatcherite liberal nor an anarcho-liberal — in the pure style of Javier Milei,” explains political scientist Jean Petaux regarding the main ideological difference between Bayrou and Macron, whose political DNA is more influenced by neoliberal ideas. Budgets defined by austerity "I am aware of the Himalaya we have before us," Bayrou stated on Friday afternoon during his inauguration ceremony at Matignon. He was referring to France's delicate financial situation, as the country is set to close the year with a public deficit exceeding 6%, more typical of a period of severe crisis. His first test will be the drafting and adopting the 2025 budget law. As Barnier previously attempted, the newly appointed prime minister will likely try to address the deficit with budgets marked by harsh austerity — his predecessor had planned a €40 billion cut in public spending. He may attempt to soften this by introducing some form of special tax on the wealthiest. The former Brexit negotiator “had already proposed a temporary tax on the windfall profits of large corporations. During the parliamentary debate, the left and Bayrou’s party deputies agreed to approve an amendment proposing that this tax be applied for more than two years,” recalls Petaux. The traditional right-wing party, ‘Les Républicains’ (LR), will likely support the approval of the public budget. Despite his strained relationship with former President Nicolás Sarkozy, who still holds some influence over LR, Bayrou may convince the post-Gaullist party to remain in the government, which it joined in September under Barnier. Key figures in the current government — Sarkozy ally Rachida Dati (Culture), conservative Catherine Vautrin (Territories), and the xenophobic Bruno Retailleau (Interior) — are confident they will retain their positions. A non-aggression pact with the Socialists? In contrast, ‘La France Insoumise’ (aligned with Spanish Parties ‘Podemos’ or ‘Sumar’), which represents the Popular Front party with the largest number of deputies, announced a motion of no confidence against Bayrou. “If they want to keep the same people in key positions, including Retailleau in Interior, and do nothing about pensions, ecology, and tax justice, I see no other option but censure,” stated the ecologist Marine Tondelier. Her party is divided but seems to lean toward outright opposition, like ‘La France Insoumise’. The big question is the position of the Socialist Party (PS) and the far-right National Rally (RN). Their stance will determine whether Bayrou lasts longer in Matignon than Barnier, who was censured less than three months after his appointment. The center-left party stated that it “will not participate in the government and will remain in opposition.” However, it distanced itself from its ‘La France Insoumise’ allies by opening the door to a non-censure agreement. Their conditions include the prime minister refraining from using Article 49.3, which allows laws to be passed without a parliamentary vote and contributed to Barnier's downfall. They also demanded that he abandon plans to push a tough immigration law early next year. "I feel that there are many false moves by the Socialists," says Martin, a professor at Kedge Business School. Their distancing from ‘La France Insoumise’, which is pursuing an uncertain strategy aimed at forcing Macron's resignation and preparing for early presidential elections, is due to "the pre campaign for the 2026 municipal elections" as well as "the Socialist Party's congress next year." The party's secretary-general, Olivier Faure, a supporter of unity among progressive forces, risks losing his position at that internal summit due to the offensive from the party's right wing, led by former President François Hollande and the mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo. A cordial relationship with Le Pen If Bayrou ultimately fails to secure a non-aggression pact with the Socialists, he will have the option of Marine Le Pen. The National Rally (RN) welcomed the appointment of the MoDem leader with apparent satisfaction, as he maintains a somewhat cordial relationship with Le Pen’s movement. “In 2022, he lent his signature to Le Pen so she could run in the presidential elections,” arguing for political pluralism. “He also proposed the creation of a ‘bank for democracy’ to address the far-right’s financing issues, which led them to seek funds (up to 11 million euros) from a Russian bank close to the Kremlin,” Martin recalls. Nevertheless, the major point of commonality between Bayrou and Le Pen is their legal troubles. Despite being one of Macron’s earliest allies, Bayrou has played a secondary role over the past seven years due to his alleged involvement in a scheme involving fake assistants in the European Parliament. The Paris Court acquitted him in early 2024, but it did convict eight MoDem officials and imposed a €400,000 fine on the party. Additionally, the prosecution appealed against the ruling, and the case will be retried on appeal. It is a scheme very similar to the one for which the far-right leader was tried this past fall. His verdict is expected on March 31, and he faces a possible five-year disqualification with immediate effect. This could trigger a political earthquake in France. The future of the Fifth Republic's crisis will depend not only on Parliament but also on the courts. This article was translated and licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Mass protests have been taking in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Over 100,000 Georgians who support their country joining the EU have taken to the streets since November 28 in response to the government’s recent announcement that it has suspended EU accession negotiations and will reject EU funding until at least 2028. The ruling Georgian Dream party blames the EU for the failure of accession talks. Announcing the decision, the prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, claimed Brussels was attempting to “blackmail” Georgia and “organise a revolution in the country”. Kobakhidze’s announcement came just a month after the Georgian Dream party claimed a mandate having won a third term at parliamentary elections at the end of October – elections that were reportedly fraught with irregularities. Georgian Dream claimed its victory was a reflection of the will of the people. But observer missions, both international and domestic, said the elections were neither free nor fair. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was monitoring the campaign noted imbalances in financial resources between competing parties, extreme and divisive rhetoric and widespread reports of intimidation and bribery. Georgian Dream, founded and led by pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, has spent years attempting to derail the country’s relationship with the EU. This is despite integration into the EU being enshrined in the Georgian constitution and public support for membership holding steady at around 85%. The EU granted Georgia candidate status in 2023. Georgian Dream has failed to meet any of the election promises it made in 2012. When it first came to office it promised to improve democracy and rule of law. In fact, behind the scenes, Ivanishvili’s party has slowly taken over control of what should be independent democratic institutions such as the judiciary and the security forces. Critics say it has created an entire shadow network that relies on corruption to influence political processes, undermining efforts to improve the quality of Georgia’s democracy and rule of law that are necessary for EU integration. Meanwhile Ivanishvili and his party have also maintained a strong relationship with Russia. The country refused to adopt sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine and has reportedly detained Russian nationals trying to flee conscription. Earlier this year the government passed laws that openly defy EU principles. In May, Georgia adopted what is known as the “foreign agents” law. Modelled on similar legislation passed in Russia in 2022, this law requires NGOs receiving more than 20% of funding from abroad to register. Georgia’s civil society sector is 90% funded from abroad, so this law puts virtually all NGOs working on issues related to democracy and rule of law in a vulnerable position. Critics believe the government will use this law to eliminate dissenting voices. In July the government also passed sweeping anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, claiming it was in line with Christian and European values. But the laws went completely against EU guidelines regarding discrimination. Before the laws were introduced the then EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell warned they would derail Georgia’s EU accession. And, after the foreign agents law was passed last July, the EU did indeed halt accession talks, but continued to provide funding aimed at supporting Georgia’s path towards membership. Now Kobakhidze says Georgia will not accept any EU funds until 2028. Is the EU playing difficult? The EU has released a statement condemning the use of force to break up protests, regretting the suspension of talks and reiterating its concerns about democratic backsliding in Georgia. EU Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, said that the “door to the EU remains open” to Georgia as long as it meets EU requirements for economic and political reform. But – both in the past and now – the EU has been inconsistent in its requirements. When Georgia first applied for candidacy status in March 2022, the EU responded with a list of “12 priorities” to be met before the country could progress with its application. These included addressing political polarisation, ensuring the independence of democratic institutions, and what it called “de-oligarchisation” – to reduce the influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life. Candidacy status was granted in December 2023, despite Georgia not meeting a number of those recommendations. At that point it listed nine steps the country needed to take before it could join. This lack of consistency may have partly been because these processes are unchartered territory for the EU. But it’s also almost certainly due to Brussels responding to broader political and geopolitical trends. Until the war in Ukraine, the EU was not considering adding new countries to the accession list. It was already struggling with rising populism, nationalism and issues with rule of law in some of its member states, including Hungary and Poland. Yet, as geopolitical tensions have risen, the EU has also been trying to keep a foot in the south Caucasus, giving it additional reasons to keep Georgia close. At the same time, joining up with the west is no longer the only viable option for Georgia. Russia and China are also pressuring the Georgian government into closer ties with alternative sources of support. And this doesn’t just apply to Georgia. There is a growing list of countries in the western Balkans and eastern Europe that are struggling to progress in the accession process – including Serbia, Bosnia and Turkey. This is not all the fault of Brussels, obviously. Many of these countries have work to do in terms of the quality of their democracy. But the EU may need to take a good look at its approach to accession processes in light of the changing geopolitical situation. It will need to do more to welcome a new member to the EU than just saying that the door is open.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Special Keynote Address by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al SaudDelivered at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue on 7th of December 2024 in Bahrain. This text is a verbatim transcript of the speech (As Delivered) HH Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: “In the name of God, all merciful, may you have a very blessed morning. Firstly, I would like to express my elation for joining the 20th Manama Dialogue while reiterating my thanks and appreciation for the Kingdom of Bahrain, two last decades, for hosting the most prominent Manama Dialogue, that is of increasing importance as a main dialogue platform, gathering officials from all over the world in order to discuss the most important issues that touch the security of the area at a time we need it, mostly towards security solutions, facing mutual solutions. Not to mention, I thank the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the chairman for so kindly inviting me. This is convened at a critical time that the global system is going through, an accelerating crisis and polarisation with increased mutual threats. Our area is not separated from the global arena, and vice versa is true, given the conflict that is crossing borders, affecting global security, creating risks for the global economy. Hence, the framework for the 20th Dialogue is leadership in the Middle East to create prosperity, which is increasing in importance – to attain prosperity, which is correlated to security and peace, that are based on permanent peace, that is sustainable and not on the basis of interests. For the Kingdom, it has forever been earnest in its political overcoming of crises, responding to economic development, not to mention that we have been committed to regional tolerance, cooperation and dialogue, a strengthening of partnerships and creation of new integration on the basis of economy. But the crises and the wars are deviating us towards a dangerous crossroad. Hence, it is upon us, in cooperation with the global community, to mutually mobilise ourselves effectively to correct the path, going back to tolerance and cohabitation in peace, ridding ourselves of wars [that are] leaving thousands of victims, void of attainment of strategic goals. Hence, our pivotal goal for political security is to focus on the challenges standing in the way of perpetrators towards a better future, not to mention that we have seen that this reality is achievable, but it calls for commitment and effort by everyone with a political will, even courage, steering away from personal or self-interest. Peace needs enabling to face all those standing in the way of achieving it and realising it, and above all, it needs earnest partners from all sides. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the continuity of war in Gaza is touching the region and global security and is standing in the way, as Israel has impunity and is getting away without punishment. One stand is important to preserve the peace and the global security. Otherwise, it will deteriorate all efforts to remedy the situation. Hence, the global community should intensify their efforts in order to have a ceasefire and entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza, release of all the detainees. We warn against speech of hatred that is feeding victims’ inclusive declarations, that are threatening Gaza settlements, and against the twostate solution.  When it comes to the Kingdom, the path to peace is clear but has obstacles. And if we look at the reality of crises, we find out that peace is a common denominator based on the two-state solution. Should the global community care to protect what credibility is left, they have to put their hands in the hands of the Kingdom and earnest countries in order to translate words into actions and realise the two-state solution based on responding to the needs and security. Everybody has to follow, including Israel. The Kingdom believes … the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is earnest to follow the peace followed by the Arab Peace summit and the two last summits. Not to mention, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with its alliance [inaudible] for the two-state solution, based on pragmatic steps to materialise the Palestinian state, ending occupation, based on the rights of selfdetermination by the Palestinian people void of any other obstacles from other parties. It is high time, in order for us to overcome the freeze of peace efforts, to move from speech to industry of peace. Not to mention, the Kingdom is going to continue its efforts in that way to have two states, Israel and Gaza, going back to the original borders, with Jerusalem as its capital. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom reiterates, it is important to be earnest against acceleration and escalation to avoid bad results, hence welcoming ceasefire in Lebanon, hoping that international exerted efforts to meet the 701 Resolution of the United Nations to empower Lebanon, ridding them of humanitarian suffering. As the rest of the crises – in Sudan, Libya, etc. – calls for shunning violence and military action towards political solution, void of external intervention, towards sovereignty, void of accelerating humanitarian and risk of collapse of national systems. Dear ladies and gentlemen, the Kingdom’s vision is a cornerstone to support socio-economic development on a sustainable basis with a foreign policy reflecting the priority of the vision towards creating a brighter reality that will seep into the entire area, hence invested all efforts for regional stability and mutual security by empowering unity among the brothers based on dialogue among countries of the region while mediating peace efforts. The events today call for worry, yet the Kingdom looks at an interactive future of the Middle East given our ample resources, geographical proximity amid three continents, rich resources, reiterating that the area continues to have importance globally – not to mention the popular call for peace in order to realise economic integration while being sure that lack of security is not inevitable, but due to political feuds, calling for political solution and ridding ourselves of the zero formula that is not a win–win situation. We look forward to an alternative path [that] falls into interests that are wide-ended as opposed to self-interest, towards hope and a better future for the people of the area. Thank you very, very much.” As Delivered Disclaimer:This speech is published under the principles of press freedom, with no commercial intent, and solely for the purpose of informing interested individuals. The speech was publicly delivered by HH Prince Faisal Bin Farhan Al Saud at the 20th Regional Security Summit The IISS Manama Dialogue. This publication aims to provide access to the content for informational purposes and does not imply endorsement or official authorization by the event organizers. Public Information:This speech addresses critical global and regional security issues and is therefore of significant public interest. Its publication aims to make these important topics accessible to a broader audience, fostering awareness and understanding. Transparency and Accessibility:Providing the speech in written form enhances access to key political and security-related information, making it easier for readers to engage with the content.