Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Operation al-Aqsa Flood occurred amid Türkiye’s normalization of relations with Israel and its intent to further develop economic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, which initially influenced Türkiye’s position in the early days. However, as Israeli massacres unfolded, Ankara’s stance on the war on Gaza Strip (GS) evolved both in statements and actions, placing Türkiye in ongoing political conflict with Israel, and particularly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First: Determinants of the Turkish Position The Turkish stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: • It came as part of Türkiye’s broader efforts to de-escalate and normalize relations with several regional powers in recent years, aiming to resolve foreign policy crises and avoid regional conflicts that could threaten stability.• It came in the context of restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, reinstating ambassadors, and expressing a desire to cooperate primarily in the field of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was also a clear intention to separate the Palestine issue from the course of bilateral relations, aiming to keep Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians distinct from its relations with Türkiye, as stated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.• The traditional view that relations with Israel are one of the key factors in Türkiye’s ties with the US, remains significant. At this stage, Ankara seeks calmer and more positive relations with the US, especially as it awaits the conclusion of the F-16 fighter jet deal.• Türkiye’s advanced relations with both sides of the Palestinian spectrum are evident. On the official side, represented by the PA and President Mahmud ‘Abbas, Türkiye has been a key supporter of Palestinian diplomatic efforts, particularly at the UN. At the same time, Türkiye maintains close ties with the resistance, specifically Hamas.• Türkiye’s aspiration to play a leading role in the region and the Muslim world stems from its belief that achieving this requires taking a prominent stance on the Palestine issue, consistent with Türkiye’s moral and historical position on the matter.• Seeking to align with the popular stance on the Palestine issue, particularly regarding the war on GS, Türkiye has responded to the widespread and intense public anger. The public has demanded actions that correspond to the scale of the genocide and massacres occurring in GS.• The political consensus in Türkiye across various parties, almost without exception, has led to increased pressure on the presidency and the government from opposition parties to adopt stronger positions. This pressure is especially notable from Islamic and conservative parties, which are seen as rivals to the AKP within the conservative segment of society. Second: Aspects of Turkish Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The following aspects of Türkiye’s official stance toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be observed: • Ankara’s position in the first few days following Operation al-Aqsa Flood was characterized by restraint, taking a balanced approach by speaking of “targeting civilians,” calling on “all parties” to de-escalate, and urging the “release of hostages.”• With the onset of the ground war and the growing popular and partisan opposition within Türkiye against Israeli actions in GS, Ankara fully embraced the Palestinian narrative, condemning Israeli massacres as “genocide,” labeling Israel as a “terrorist state,” and declaring that it had “turned the page” on dealing with Netanyahu, now referring to him as a “war criminal.”• Türkiye rejects the classification of Hamas as a terrorist organization, affirming it as a resistance movement against occupation, viewing it as the first line of defense for Türkiye and the Muslim world. Türkiye has maintained ongoing communication and meetings with Hamas at various levels, including those involving President Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and the head of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) İbrahim Kalın.• Willingness to play a mediation role has been evident, as the Palestinian resistance released some foreigners in response to President Erdoğan’s mediation efforts.• Hosting dozens of wounded Palestinians in Türkiye’s hospitals for treatment and sending several aid convoys to Egypt to enter GS. Türkiye is the largest sender of aid, according to official data.• Proposing the deployment of Turkish troops in Palestinian territories as part of the concept of “guarantor states,” positioning Türkiye as one of the guarantor states for the Palestinian side—an idea that was rejected by Israel.• Participating in the joint ministerial committee established by the joint extraordinary summit between the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to monitor the situation and developments in GS.• As the massacres continued, Türkiye’s position has escalated through the imposition of gradual economic sanctions that could lead to a complete halt of all commercial dealings with Israel, despite reports suggesting alternative routes and third countries for delivering Turkish goods.• Türkiye’s announcement to join South Africa’s genocide case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).• Türkiye announced the dismantling of Israeli Mossad networks operating within its borders during the war months.• Verbal exchanges with Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz, who threatened Erdoğan with the fate of the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.• Türkiye has consistently criticized the US and European positions for being biased toward Israel, viewing them as partners in crime.• Hosting a speech by Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas before the Türkiye Parliament was a response to Netanyahu’s speech in Congress.• Türkiye has declared solidarity with and support for Lebanon in the face of Israeli threats and warned that Netanyahu’s policies may lead to a regional war that will harm everyone in the region.• On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi— AKP) and its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), rejected several proposals from opposition parties in parliament aimed at investigating the continued flow of Turkish goods to Israel, revoking the citizenship of Turkish nationals who are members in the Israeli army, and other related proposals. Third: Projections In light of the stalemate in field and political developments related to GS in particular and the Palestinian territories in general, it is expected that Türkiye’s official position will remain consistent. This means maintaining a state of political and media engagement with Israel, fully adopting the Palestinian narrative—including the resistance narrative—and condemning the ongoing genocidal war. It is expected that Türkiye’s efforts in the political and legal arenas to criminalize and hold Netanyahu and other Israeli officials involved in the genocide accountable will continue, especially following the killing of Turkish-American activist Ayşenur Ezgi Eygi in the West Bank, who was shot by Israeli soldiers. Ankara is unlikely to escalate further in the economic sphere, particularly regarding the ongoing transfer of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its ports. In addition to the developments in the field and political situation related to GS and the resistance, there are two possible factors that may lead to a change or modification of Türkiye’s position in the future. The first is the upcoming US elections and the potential return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office. The second possibility is a regional war involving several parties significant to Türkiye, which could be affected directly or indirectly, primarily Iran, Syria, Greece and Cyprus. This scenario makes it unlikely that Türkiye will remain an observer, especially given its suspicions and concerns about US and Western military buildups in Greece and Cyprus.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Few maritime security environments across the globe have consistently shown a degree of tension and volatility akin to the Baltic Sea scenario. Having established the deterrence of Russia's ambitions as an emphasis of European defence, the increase in military investments within the region, as well as the political realignments across the Baltic shore after the invasion of Ukraine show that the security assessment has radically changed in the last few months. The current deployment of NATO and Russian Federation forces in this region, along with the Alliance's geopolitical developments, provides a valuable perspective for analysing defence planning and assessing present and future vulnerabilities and areas of risk. The Baltic security architecture, and its continuous updates and transitions, justifies an integrative reading into the key aspects of the present security challenges in the area.  A new arena for security in the Baltic  Unbeknownst to many, the security environment along the Baltic is one of the most potentially volatile maritime areas in the world. Recent developments, especially the inclusion of Finland and Sweden into NATO, have resulted in a surge of military and intelligence-gathering activities, as well as grey zone operations by both NATO and Russia across those shores.  A central idea in any present assessment of this location is the significant shift in the last decades on many critical aspects. For one, the political geography has been radically altered. In 1990, Germany and Denmark were the sole NATO members in the whole region. To say the security strategy lacked some alignment would be an understatement. Even after the fall of the Iron Curtain, key security partners such as Germany and Poland were diametrically opposed in their security approach to Russia. The German foreign policy, for years, engaged the Russian political sectors, as well as the society at large by developing close economic and political links. Energy cooperation, namely, became a staple of Berlin’s policies [1]. In stark contrast, Poland adopted a cautious and often adversarial stance toward Russia, influenced by historical conflicts and concerns over regional security. Additionally, aware of the risks of relying on Russian energy, Poland invested in alternative sources, such as the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal in Świnoujście and pursued the Baltic Pipe project to import natural gas from Norway via Denmark [2]. Following the overall international consensus, the change of posture vis à vis Russia after 2022 has helped to align the strategies of the European countries on the Baltic, and has given an unprecedented impetus to security cooperation and the strengthening of political and military ties in the region.    Sweden and Finland's decision to abandon their decades-long, semi-neutral stance signifies that not only Germany, but the entire European continent, now acknowledges Russia's aggressive posture in the Baltic region. NATO membership was pursued, and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy began to tilt to other scenarios, such as the Baltic Sea, which may have been overlooked in previous analysis. The shift of the security policy in Europe, as some experts have called, has had a “shift to the East” [3].  Key Aspects and Challenges    Even if other policymakers are catching up only now with the crucial importance of this region for Moscow, the Baltic states are much more familiar with the nature of the Russian ambitions, the realities of hybrid warfare, and the crucial attention paid to the maritime routes by Russia’s economy and military. It holds primordial outlets for oil & gas, as well as consumer goods, offered by the harbours of Primorsk or St. Petersburg; perhaps even more critically, it is also home to the exclave of Kaliningrad, the base of the Russian Baltic Fleet and to its nuclear arsenal [4]. With border tensions with Poland and Lithuania growing every month, the fierce Russian intent of defending the freedom of passage to Kaliningrad is, perhaps, the most overt exemplification of Moscow’s grapple for control of the Baltic.  The geography of the Baltic could be serving Russian interests, as some experts claim. Actions not too dissimilar from a limited show of force, or mere military exercises over “token pieces of territory, such as an island in the Gulf of Finland, or an unpopulated area just across the border from Russia”, could very well be instrumentalized to divide the public opinion on the strategy, or even possibility, of a NATO response to such an act [5]. Grey-zone operations such as these, perhaps reminiscent of the 2014 invasion of Crimea, easily become a chip on the shoulder of international credibility for actors such as the United States, and could rapidly diminish general support for the Western security stance in the Baltic.   The challenge posed by Russia is heterogenous. Many different actions over the last decade have been understood by some as partial preludes to potential invasions. Mischief concerning military exercises and routes of air and sea-borne units, the constant sighting of illegal submarine activities, as well as the employment of “ghost fleet” tankers which could potentially be used as environmental weapons, are only some examples of the aggressive stance of Moscow.   Differences and persisting difficulties   Notwithstanding the challenges of the present security scenario, it must also be said that the positions of NATO in the Baltic are far stronger now than they were a couple of years ago [6]. The new membership of Finland and Sweden, as well as the overarching tactical shift concerning security policy, mean that the Alliance is now able to exert its air superiority, control of sea routes and logistic channels far more gracefully. The Enhanced Forward Presence missions in the Baltic states now face Russian ground forces with wildly different postures, morale and equipment, due to the tensions imposed by the fighting in Ukraine. Capabilities such as anti-submarine resources, mine countermeasures or amphibious operational groups have a larger and more advanced presence now in the Baltic; it is also expected that the Port of Gothenburg will serve as the main shipping point for NATO forces in the region.    Due to the reality of hybrid warfare in the region, along with the vulnerabilities of the Baltic Sea nations (cyberattacks, sabotage of subsea infrastructure, attacking gas lines and communication cables), the hostility of Russia will plausibly remain a principal concern of NATO in the near future. Moscow’s aggression towards  the West’s sovereignty, security and economic interests, are expected to continue, if only through the “less overt” operational examples such as disinformation operations or backing fringe political groups, just to name a couple [7].   The inherent geographical and energetic disadvantages currently faced by Russia do not mean that the Baltic Sea is under total NATO control. The diversity of capabilities and aggressive tactics available to Moscow mean that they could very well target naval or terrestrial assets of the Alliance with little extra preparation. The submarine and minelaying assets of Russia, for example, continue to be a long-established concern, and it may be hard to deter, even if effective and innovative technological countermeasures come to be deployed in the Baltic.  The strategic choke points of the region, under the environmental or geographical considerations of relevance, will not be easily evaded by any side. The commencement of the operational use of unmanned surface or undersea vessels will not limit the capacity for disruption of NATO or Russia.  Conclusion  The rise in investments and political interest for Baltic security is a welcome situation; nevertheless, it will need to be continued for years to come. The challenges faced by the Ukrainian forces in terms of international military or financial aid remain a stark reminder of the rapid disintegration of the toughest geopolitical conflicts’ weight in worldwide newsrooms and political cabinets. The key for the defence of peace in the Baltic seems to lie on the stalwart buttressing of NATO for the freedom of maritime traffic. This, in turn, both proves the validity of the security measures and resources in the area, as well as sending a clear message to the other nations that the supply lines, in both military and commercial terms, will continue to be supported. The real concerns for the security of the maritime routes into the easternmost parts of the Sea mean that the dependence on the Alliance’s militaries’ sea-going and aerial capabilities remains. Because of that, further efforts to coordinate, expand and train the different nations’ forces in the region continue to be called for. And not only that, as the antics of maskirovka (a Russian military term that refers to measures taken to mislead adversaries about military capabilities, intentions, and operations) to which the Russian Military Staff have continued to rely on time and time again have shown, the fear for limited, short-range, grey-zone scenario attacks remain another tangible possibility. Such an operation, an incredibly delicate venue for further international tensions and even military action, would clearly exploit the capabilities of amphibious Russian troops, well suited to the “island-hopping”, small squad black operations in a well-charted territory for them.   The stronger NATO, as seen today, will necessarily need to elicit further enhancements in the security policy for the Baltic Sea. Defence mechanisms, such as the development of territorial forces, the strengthening of the will to fight across the Baltic nations, or the continual efforts to guarantee the forces’ superiority in the aerial and naval domain, will need to continue their trajectory. In the end, only time will tell if the Baltic will finally come to be an example in the face of growing Russian aggression elsewhere.   References  [1] Westgaard, K. “The Baltic Sea Region: A Laboratory for Overcoming European Security Challenges”. Carnegie Endowment Research. 2023. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-baltic-sea-region-a-laboratory-for-overcoming-european-security-challenges?lang=en   [2] European Commission . “Inforegio - New Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Improves Energy Supply and Security in Poland.” Europa.eu, 2021, ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/poland/new-liquefied-natural-gas-terminal-improves-energy-supply-and-security-in-poland.  [3] Erlanger, S. “Ukraine War Accelerates Shift of Power in Europe to the East”. The New York Times. January 26th, 2023. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/world/europe/eu-nato-power-ukraine-war.html   [4] Messmer, M. “The Baltic Sea is far from a ‘NATO lake’ – the alliance must strengthen its defences”. Chatham House Comments. 2024. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/baltic-sea-far-nato-lake-alliance-must-strengthen-its-defences   [5] Lucas, E. et al. “Sea Change: Nordic-Baltic Security in a New Era”. CEPA Comprehensive Reports. 2024. Available at: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/sea-change-nordic-baltic-security-in-a-new-era/   [6] Wills, S. “BALTOPS 24 in a Contested NATO Lake”. Center for Maritime Strategy. 2024. Available at: https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/baltops-24-in-a-contested-nato-lake/   [7] Savitz, S. & Winston, I. “A Brief Naval Overview of the Baltic Sea Region”. RAND Corporation Expert Insights. June 2024. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2111-1.html#document-details 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There’s a degree of irony that countries attending the 2024 Brics summit this week voted to adopt the Kazan declaration (named for the capital city of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan in Russia, where the summit is being held). The declaration’s first clause emphasises that “all states should act consistently with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in their entirety”. There’s also a certain amount of chutzpah on the part of conference chair, Vladimir Putin, whose ongoing invasion of Ukraine is so egregiously in breach of that charter.  Article one stresses that the primary purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security”. Article two rules that: “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. If that’s not clear enough, it goes on to further insist that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”  Still, its a funny old world in which the UN secretary general, António Guterres, pitches up at a summit whose host is wanted on an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on charges relating to the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. In a country whose troops are currently fighting in Ukraine in direct contravention of the UN’s charter.  To add a further layer of irony, October 24 is the 79th anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945.  Guterres called on Putin to agree a peace deal “in line with the UN Charter, international law and UN General Assembly resolutions”. The Russian leader is perhaps more likely to listen to a deal proposed by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. He said: “We must uphold the three key principles: no expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning flames and strive for swift de-escalation of the situation.”  The UN chief’s idea of a just peace would call for Russia to give up its illegal occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Xi’s proposal appears to call for a deal based on the status quo – virtually the opposite, in other words.  This is pretty much all Ukraine can hope for, as far as the University of Portsmouth’s Frank Ledwidge is concerned. Ledwidge, who has written regularly for The Conversation since Putin launched his invasion in February 2022 and is well plugged into defence and intelligence networks in Nato as well as in Ukraine itself, believes that Ukraine cannot defeat Russia – at least as things stand.  Ledwidge says Ukraine’s western allies are partly to blame for the maximalist aims of the country’s president Volodymyr Zelensky. Western rhetoric has not properly been matched by sufficient weapons or the permission to use them as effectively as the situation warrants. Now is the time for realism, he writes:  A starting point could be accepting that Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk are lost … Then we need to start planning seriously for a post-war Ukraine that will need the west’s suppport more than ever.  One of the key factors that Ledwidge stresses is that just one of Russia’s allies, North Korea, has supplied twice as many artillery shells this year as the whole of Europe. Now North Korean troops are apparently also about to join their Russian comrades on the battlefield. This, writes Ra Mason – a Korea specialist at the University of East Anglia – will help ease the pressure on Putin to bring forward his mobilisation plans.    It’s a diplomatic coup for Putin, Mason believes – it’s a “clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order”, which “deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.”  But a military coup de grace against Ukraine? Probably not. The jury is out on how effective North Korea’s “poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished” troops will be against Ukraine’s highly motivated defenders. It will also be interesting to see where and how they are deployed. If sent to the frontlines in Kursk, they’ll be helping an ally in its struggle against an incursion by Ukrainian forces. If deployed inside Ukraine, they’ll join Russia in breach of international law. Mason concludes:  If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches.  Incidentally, the term “meat grinder” has been much bandied about of late. It follows reports from US intellegence recently that, while Russian forces have been making rapid advances and gaining a significant amount of ground in recent weeks, they are doing so at considerable cost in terms of dead and wounded. September was a particularly bloody month, with reports of Russian losses of more than 1,000 men a day, killed or wounded.  But Russian military strategists are well versed in such pyrrhic victories, writes historian Becky Alexis-Martin, who points to equally savage losses in Russia’s defence against Napoleon and in the first and second world wars. Stalin, in particular, was able to defeat the Nazi war machine by, inter alia, throwing millions of troops at their enemies (and incurring terrible casualties). But it’s not a strategy that guarantees success. And terrible psychological effects are beginning to manifest themselves in veterans returning from Ukraine with severe and often violent post-traumatic stress disorder.  The diplomatic front  As if things weren’t bad enough for Zelensky on the battlefield, the Ukrainian president was dealt a serious blow earlier this month when the US president, Joe Biden, was forced by extreme weather events, including a hurricane hitting the state of Florida, to cancel the planned meeting of the heads of government of up to 50 of Ukraine’s western allies in Germany. The “Ramstein Group”, so-called after the German air base at which they meet, was scheduled to meet in the second week of October to consider Zelensky’s “victory plan”. Stefan Wolff, an international security expert at the University of Birmingham writes that the Ukrainian president was hoping to get some degree of commitment for a path to Nato membership for Ukraine as well as permission to use western-supplied long-range missiles against targets deep inside Russia.  Neither of these seem likely to happen in the short term, says Wolff. Like Ledwidge, Wolff thinks Ukraine is doomed to defeat unless its allies double down on their aid – and fast. And like Ledwidge, Wolff sees little indication of that happening any time soon.  When it comes to continuing US support for Ukraine’s war effort, all eyes are now firmly fixed on November 5. The outcome of the presidential election will be seriously consequential for Ukraine’s future. Both candidates have made their positions clear and there is considerable difference between the two positions.  Donald Trump has said any number of times that had he not lost that “rigged and stolen” election to Biden in 2020, Putin would never have invaded Ukraine in the first place. Still, he says, if he wins this one, he’ll bring the war to a very rapid conclusion. But it remains to be seen, given Trump’s oft-stated admiration for Putin, whether the conclusion will be palatable to Kyiv – or to Nato in general.  Trump’s opponent, Kamala Harris, said the former president’s proposals are not “proposals for peace, they’re proposals for surrender”. As vice-president during the Biden administration, she flew to Europe not long after the invasion in February 2022 to help shore up support for Kyiv. Harris has also regularly restated her intention to continue to back Ukraine against Russia. In the only debate of the campaign she said that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland”.  Poland, incidentally, is an interesting case in point. While it is Ukraine’s firmest ally and it leadership is four-square behind Kyiv, the people are curiously divided on the country’s support for Ukraine. You can read more about that here.  One imagines that Zelensky is as transfixed as anyone else on the 2024 US presidential election campaign as it heads into its final ten days. All we can tell you is that the polls are still very, very close. Well within most pollsters’ margin for error, in fact. A poll of polls, which combines polls from different agencies, published on the website FiveThirtyEight on October 22 shows that Harris leads Trump by 48.1% to 46.3% in the national popular vote. But the accepted popular wisdom is that the complex electoral college system used in the US may well favour Trump’s candidacy.  We’ll be providing daily updates on the US presidential race and full coverage of election day on November 5 and its aftermath.  Update: this article originally said that Vladimir Putin launched Russia invasion of Ukraine in February 2024. This has now been corrected to February 2022. Apologies for the error. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]   Current Party Stances  When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics.  In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program.  Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription  Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”   These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?   Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations.  There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.   Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers  Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription.  Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past.  Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy   Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”   This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives.  Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”   In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”    Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism.  Conclusion  The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future.  The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat.  References  [1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/.  [2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan.  [3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The problem of piracy has cast a shadow over the maritime areas of Southeast Asia for many centuries. The waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which hold tremendous economic significance for international trade, are particularly susceptible to pirate attacks. In the 2000s, ASEAN countries launched a comprehensive regional campaign to institutionalize measures for collective action against maritime piracy, and these measures proved to be effective. However, excessive concerns about intrusions into their sovereignty have led the Association's member states to "dilute" their efforts, resulting in a lack of true unity. This situation could result not only in losses for international trade but also in the loss of lives of ship crews.  Introduction to the History of Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia  Despite the long and dark history of the ugly and inhumane activities of the "hostis humani generis" [1], the romanticized image of pirates continues to captivate the public's imagination, thanks to numerous literary and cinematic works. In these portrayals, pirates appear as free-spirited men and women, living outside the reach of legal and state institutions, driven by daring adventures. However, it is not only European privateers, Somali groups, and the inhabitants of Morocco's "pirate" Republic of Salé who have left their grim mark on the history of maritime trade routes. For many centuries, pirates in Southeast Asia have attacked trading vessels passing through the Straits of Malacca. As early as the 13th century, the Chinese traveler Zhao Rukuo described how the powerful maritime kingdom of Srivijaya controlled regional waters [2], sending boats to attack ships that did not dock at its ports. Trading hubs in Malacca, Johor, and the Riau Archipelago flourished under the rule of Muslim sultanates, with the support of the Orang Laut community — “the sea people” — whose culture was inextricably linked to maritime activities [3]. It is no coincidence that in 1856, the Scotsman John Crawfurd, considered a leading British authority on Malay history and culture, noted that many Malay rulers viewed piracy as an "honest and regular source of their income" [4].  The Economic Significance of Maritime Waters in Southeast Asia  However, in the 21st century, maritime piracy remains one of the most pressing issues for Southeast Asian countries. According to data from the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center, from 1992 to 2006, Southeast Asia was the most "pirate-infested" region in the world. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the waters of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, which are most susceptible to pirate attacks, are crucial for trade in the Asia-Pacific region. These straits also serve as "superhighways" of global shipping, with over 120,000 vessels passing through them annually. In 2000, 39% of Japan's foreign trade (equivalent to $260 billion) and 27% of China's foreign trade ($65.6 billion) were conducted through Southeast Asia's maritime routes [5]. Annually, the Malacca Strait facilitates trade valued at $3.5 trillion, accounting for two-thirds of China's maritime trade and 40% of Japan's maritime trade.  Despite significant improvements in the security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes over the past 20 years, thanks to the joint efforts of ASEAN countries and their partners, as well as the development of the shipping industry, the threat of maritime piracy remains a pressing issue. In this context, it is crucial to examine the existing initiatives aimed at combating maritime piracy in the region.  Overview of Projects, Agreements, and Initiatives  In 1999, at the ASEAN+3 Ministers' Conference under the concept of "Maintaining Peace in the World Ocean" Japan proposed an initiative to establish a permanent regional naval force based on national contingents. However, the project did not receive the necessary support. Five years later, in 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was signed, leading to the establishment of an Information Sharing Center to facilitate cooperation between stakeholders and coastal states in combating maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. These events marked the beginning of a new era of multilateral cooperation.  The activities of the Information Sharing Center (ISC) have been crucial in building operational links between member countries of the Agreement and coordination centers, enabling information exchange, incident reporting, and rapid response to threats. A key role in maintaining security in the region is played by the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, known as "INDOMALPHI" signed in 2017. Under this agreement, maritime security is ensured through coordinated surface patrols, combined aerial maritime patrols, and the operation of an Intelligence Exchange Group. These efforts collectively enhance regional capabilities to respond to piracy and strengthen the overall security of Southeast Asia's maritime routes.  Coordination efforts among Southeast Asian countries also take place through naval cooperation. For instance, the Singapore Navy works closely with Malaysian and Indonesian regional naval forces to combat maritime piracy through the Information Fusion Centre (IFC). The navies of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam also actively participate in multilateral exercises conducted annually by the United States Navy. A key objective of these exercises is to strengthen regional measures against the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, as well as in the South China Sea.  As a result of these efforts, the number of ship hijackings for ransom significantly decreased between 2007 and 2022. Representatives of Indonesia's Ministry of Defense noted that in the first six months of 2023, not a single incident of ship hijacking was recorded, whereas, in 2017, 99 cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea were reported in the patrol zone. Experts also highlight the potential benefits of Japan and India joining the "INDOMALPHI" initiative, which could further enhance regional security efforts against piracy.  Challenges to Regional Unity in Combating Maritime Piracy  Despite significant successes in consolidating the efforts of Southeast Asian countries in combating maritime piracy, there are still “gaps” in the “united front” of interested ASEAN countries that hinder individual and collective initiatives. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia have not ratified the 2004 Agreement and are not de jure participants in the Information Exchange Centre, although they participate in some events under its auspices. The Centre itself receives information on cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea from the coordination centers of the participating countries, which inevitably entails a time lag that may prove critical in the event of a threat to a ship and its crew. It is noted that an appropriate clarification of the mechanism of its work would be the obligation of ships to send information directly to the Centre, which would immediately transmit it to the relevant operational units of the participating countries responsible for deploying patrol vessels on site.  The Downside of the "ASEAN Way"  The Russian researchers note that while ASEAN is discussing the possibility of creating a unified navy to combat piracy, the approaches of the "ten" countries to the problem differ [7]. It is the absence of full-scale consolidated institutions that significantly undermines the successes already achieved and may provoke an escalation of the problem after the "lull" of 2000-2022. ASEAN's traditional rigid orientation towards the rejection of any supranational institutions and concern about maintaining national sovereignty may play a "dirty joke" on the Association's states, since the existence of multiple regional initiatives duplicating each other's functions and goals, as well as the fact that the Information Exchange Center does not have a real operational status, slow down progress. Finally, it should be borne in mind that at stake in this case is not only the stability of international economic turnover along the maritime trade routes of Southeast Asia, but also the lives and safety of ship crews, fishermen and sailors, whose professions are already associated with risk.  References  1. "Enemies of the Human Race" - author's note.  2. See in particular: Berezin E.O. History of Thailand M. 1973. 320 pages. p. 35.   3. There are conflicting views regarding the true role of the Orang Laut in maritime piracy. While some researchers portray their culture as inherently linked to piracy in the conventional sense, others argue that the "sea people" were driven to piracy due to the actions of British colonial authorities who controlled the port of Singapore. See on this: Barnard T.P. Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their Decline in History // Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 80. No. 2. 2007. P. 33-49.  4. Amirell S.E. Pirates of Empire. Colonisation and Maritime Violence in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. 2019. 266 pp. P. 37.  5. Frécon E. The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia. Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine. 2008. 131 pp. P. 72-73.  6. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective." // International Analytics. No. 1-2 (27-28), 2019, pp. 74-81, p. 77.  7. Paramonov O.G. "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Regional Perspective," p. 78. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Geopolitical tensions have intensified across the Middle East, amplifying the Iran-Israel standoff and reshaping regional power dynamics. Israel, deeply impacted by recent events, has adopted a more aggressive security stance, intensifying efforts to neutralise perceived threats from Iran’s regional network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias. Far from being minor, these dramatic developments reshape the strategic balance between Iran and Israel while considerably limiting Tehran’s options moving forward.  Strengths and Constraints of Iran’s Asymmetric Strategy  Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, meticulously armed and funded for nearly 40 years to indirectly challenge Israel and the US. With around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, this Lebanese Shiite militia serves as one of Iran’s main spearheads against Israel, providing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon, and exerting pressure on Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of nearly half of Hezbollah’s military capabilities over the past year, as reported by Israeli sources, along with the loss of key military and political leaders, is severely altering the balance between Israel and Iran. While Hezbollah has historically been a strategic shield for Iran, it is now fully reliant on the actions—or inactions—of the Iranian leadership.  The dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and the disruption of its decision-making apparatus come alongside the crippling of Hamas—another long-time ally of Tehran in its struggle against Israel. After nearly a year of conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas is facing existential challenges, and its leaders, including figures like Yahya Sinwar, have had their ability to act severely weakened.   It would be premature to consider an end to Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups remain key players in the conflict with Israel despite heavy airstrikes on their command-and-control centers. Despite recent setbacks, they continue receiving support from Iran and other allies, while their actions in Gaza and the Galilee persist. But, although these two organisations remain active, and their ability to recover shouldn’t be underestimated, their operational strength and impact on the balance of power with Israel have been significantly weakened. This, in turn, reduces the short-term influence of their Iranian sponsor in the Levant.   The limits of ballistic deterrence and the nuclear temptation  The neutralisation of Hezbollah and Hamas has significantly reduced the Islamic Republic of Iran’s room for maneuver, and its leaders are faced with choices that, as many analysts observe, all carry major disadvantages.  The ballistic confrontation between Iran and Israel has clearly highlighted the limitations of conventional military capabilities for Tehran. On 13-14 April, Iran launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. On 1 October, Tehran launched a new salvo of missiles in what it called Operation True Promise Two, in response to the elimination of key Iranian-backed leaders like Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.   In both cases, the Iranian attacks were aimed at conveying resolve to Israel, reestablishing deterrence, and reassuring the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” increasingly concerned about Iran’s relative idleness. Each time, however, Israel’s air defence system, supported by its American ally, intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles. During the April exchange of fire, the IDF responded by targeting an airbase in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, highlighting Iran’s vulnerabilities and limitations in its ballistic missile defences.  Given the limitations of its ballistic shield and the diminished potential of its proxy network, Iranian political and military leaders are increasingly aware that these resources are not enough for protecting the Islamic regime. Confronted with Israel’s strategy to contain Iran by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, they recognise a significant decline in terms of strategic depth. Acknowledging this mounting pressure, they are prompted to seek alternative solutions to compensate for these losses. Consequently, they are rationally driven to fortify the security of their Iranian stronghold by enhancing their nuclear deterrent capabilities.  Since 7 October 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. By the end of 2023, Iran was producing about nine kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent monthly, raising concerns due to its rapid potential for further enrichment. Despite earlier pauses in production, the rate has surged in response to heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the US, and allies have criticised this acceleration. This summer, Kamal Kharrazi, a close aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, raised international concerns by mentioning a potential “change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.”  The Eastern Pivot and Its Drawbacks  However, with no indication that Iran will be able to acquire an effective nuclear umbrella in the short term, the mullahs and the Guardians are compelled to consider alternative solutions. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders are faced with two equally unsatisfactory options due to their negative implications for Iranian sovereignty. The first possibility would be to seek a reconciliation with the West. Tasked with embodying this scenario, President Massoud Pezechkian recently expressed Tehran’s desire to renew ties with liberal democracies and reopen negotiations over their nuclear dispute. However, significant mistrust and numerous obstacles still hinder the warming of relations, especially if a new Republican administration takes office in Washington.  The alternative path, already widely explored by Tehran, is to move forward with the so-called “Look East” doctrine. In fact, Tehran has continuously sought to strengthen its ties with Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step towards deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Iran has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has even provided logistical and military support to Moscow.   At the September 2022 SCO summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping welcomed the Islamic Republic, highlighting the regime’s growing ties within a bloc opposing Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full BRICS member, and, recently, Tehran and Moscow have enhanced their military collaboration, raising concerns about potential nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, this pivot toward the Eastern bloc could threaten Iranian sovereignty by tying the regime’s future more closely to that of Russia and China, undermining Iranian nationalism and the aspiration to preserve independence.  The Islamic regime teetering on the brink of profound transformation  Faced with a drastic reduction in its international geopolitical room for maneuver, the Islamic Republic is also going through a serious economic crisis while facing a growing questioning of its internal political legitimacy. In all respects, the regime is at a crossroads; a decisive turning point that could go so far as to destabilise its political foundations.   In the past, showing extraordinary resilience, Tehran has always managed to get out of trouble by maintaining the course of its multifaceted policy conducted on all fronts and by all available means. Placed in a position of military and economic inferiority, the Iranian outsider has adopted an asymmetrical approach with considerable success by striving to avoid frontal combat and by striking blows where it was not expected. In this, the Iran of the mullahs and the guardians has managed, to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words, to “win by not losing.”  The capacity of Islamist leaders to navigate significant challenges and uphold their once unchallenged grip on the country now seems to be wavering. Increasing threats, coupled with a narrowing of strategic options, have placed the regime in a precarious position. The tactics and remedies that previously aided in maintaining the system’s stability no longer appear adequate to ensure the longevity of the political and ideological regime established in 1979.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s airstrikes of Oct. 26, 2024 – which hit around 20 military targets in Iran, Iraq and Syria – had been anticipated for weeks. Indeed, the operation followed a promise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to retaliate for an earlier ballistic missile attack by Tehran in early October. The move also follows a pattern that has seen Iran and Israel take turns to up the ante in what was for a long time a “shadow war,” but which has has now developed into direct confrontation. These tit-for-tat attacks prompted widespread fears that the whole region was poised to enter a more escalatory phase. But, counterintuitive though it may seem, I believe that the latest Israeli strikes may actually have defused tensions. To understand why, it is worth analyzing the nature and scale of the Israeli operation, as well as the likely stance of decision-makers in Israel, Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the attack. A calibrated attack by Israel The October air assault by Iran was itself retaliation for a series of Israeli operations against Iran’s proxy group Hezbollah. These included the assassination of a high-ranking Hamas official in Tehran on the eve of the inauguration of Iran’s new president in July and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in late September. Similarly, an earlier air assault on Israeli targets in April by Tehran was in response to Israeli provocations this spring – including a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, on April 1 that killed two senior military officers. Many observers anticipated, or feared, an Israeli response to Iran’s October missile and drone attack to be heavy, and punishing – Israel certainly has the military capability to do so. But rather than target vital infrastructure in Iran or the country’s nuclear facilities, Israel instead opted for “precise and targeted” strikes on the Islamic Republic’s air defense and missile capabilities. The somewhat limited scope of the Israeli operations suggests that the strike was designed to send a strong message to Iran’s supreme leader and Iranian military commanders. In essence, Israel was signaling that it has the capability to strike at the heart of Iran, while holding back from a full-throttled attack that would have had further damaged Iran’s fragile economy. While it will take time for a full assessment of the effectiveness of Israel’s strikes to emerge, early indications suggest that they succeeded in revealing weaknesses in Iran’s overall security. These weaknesses that could be further exploited against other more important targets, such as oil and gas production facilities or even nuclear power sites, should Iran or its partners in the so-called “axis of resistance” choose to retaliate. A cautious response in Iran Despite the apparent success of Israel’s attacks against a wide range of targets, statements from Iranian leaders suggest the operational impact was limited. An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemned the attack, noting that Iran “had a right to self defense.” But at the same it added that Iran would “uphold its commitments for regional peace and stability.” Reading into those words, it suggests to me that Iran is not immediately seeking to retaliate and escalate tensions further. Of course, that could change. Further messages by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini or Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani may give a clearer indication whether Iran will seek to retaliate, and how. But with Iran well-aware of the impact that escalation – and the potential for more U.S.-led sanctions and heightened support for Israel – would have on its ailing economy, it may well calculate that a return to the pre-escalation status quo with Israel is in its interests. In Washington, a wary White House A return to the shadow war between Israel and Iran – as opposed to open warfare – would no doubt be welcomed in Washington. Since the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Biden administration has been caught between competing obligations and concerns. This has included supporting longstanding ally Israel, while not alienating friendly Arab governments and trying to avoid conflict creep into all out war in the region. Meanwhile, in an election year, the Democratic ticket in particular is trying to balance its support for a largely pro-Israel Jewish voting block with a need not to offend potentially important Muslim votes in key states, nor a more pro-Palestinian youth vote. Escalation of conflict in the region does nothing to help the White House in these respects. Yet President Joe Biden’s decades-long relationship with Netanyahu has not led to outcomes that the administration has sought. Washington has not succeeded in pushing its ally toward a ceasefire in Gaza, nor a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon. And with the U.S. election looming on Nov. 5, elevated tensions in the Middle East on various fronts could impact how voters perceive Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump — especially in the battleground state of Michigan, where the Democratic ticket may lose votes among Arab and Muslim Americans angered over the Biden administration’s perceived pro-Israel stance. Threading the needle? Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts. It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region. But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the U.S. know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском There must be a reconciliation between the human rights agenda and current humanitarian realities. In Gaza, the daily struggle is frightening, and there appears no end or peace plan in sight.  As the Gaza conflict enters its second year, the situation in the Middle East is taking an alarming turn. Having already escalated tensions by carrying out a series of high-profile assassinations, including Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, and its top leadership, as well as Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Tehran on 31 July during his visit for President Masaoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration, Israel has now launched a ground incursion into Lebanon, further intensifying its conflict with Iran. As of 30 September, 42,337 Palestinians have lost the lives. This is compared to just 1,540 Israelis. Put differently, that number is 27 Palestinian killed for each Israeli since 7 October 2023. Although Israelis claim that a portion of Palestinians killed are Hamas fighters. On 18 September 2024, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution (124 nations in favour, 14 against, and 43 abstentions) demanding Israel end its illegal occupation of Palestinian territories within 12 months. This resolution builds upon the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion outlining the illegality of Israel’s ongoing settlements in the Westbank, and called on all nations to refrain from acknowledging legitimacy of this protracted occupation. The UNGA’s call underscores the international community’s growing impatience with the ongoing conflict. Yet, as diplomatic pressures mount, the human cost of this prolonged strife remains devastatingly high. Glaring double standards and changing dynamics of global diplomacy  In the one year since the 7 October massacre, the conflict has taken a devastating toll on Palestinian civilians including nearly 16,765 children fatalities. Every hour, 15 people are killed, six of whom are children, while 35 are injured. This staggering figure contrasts sharply with the Ukraine War, which has seen far fewer civilian casualties with 1,551 children killed in more than two years. In addition to civilians, 210 aid workers have been killed, surpassing the annual toll of aid worker fatalities in any other past conflict in last 20 years, including the Ukraine-Russia conflict where 50 aid workers have died. More than 125 journalists have been killed in Gaza, compared to only 11 journalists who have died reporting the Ukraine war. This stark disparity underscores the disproportionality of rights violations in the Gaza conflict. While the US and its allies have been strongly critical of Russia, their criticism of Israel has been minimal in spite of the much larger scale of civilian casualties. While thousands of Palestinians continue to die in Gaza, and now with a ground war raging in Lebanon, the West has imposed limited sanctions against only a few Israeli settlers. For instance, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, while strongly condemning Russia for waging a “ruthless war,” remained mostly muted on Israel’s atrocities, leading EU staffers to criticize her “uncontrolled” support for Israel.  These double standards have led to protests from San Francisco to Sydney, speaking out against atrocities committed in the name of “self-defence.” The Gaza war has been changing the dynamics of international diplomacy as a growing number of countries have taken steps to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state. As of June 2024, 146 of 193 UN member states have made this step, including several European nations like Norway, Poland, Iceland, and Romania. Spanish and Irish governments are leading voices in Europe, pushing for a joint recognition of Palestine, signalling a strengthening of support for a Palestinian state in the diplomatic landscape surrounding the conflict What lies ahead The path towards a just resolution remains elusive, and the questions raised demand a re-examination of the moral and ethical foundations that underpin global order. The fate of thousands of Palestinians hangs in the balance and the conflict shows no signs of abating. The escalation of tensions with Hezbollah and Iran complicates the situation, threatening to engulf the entire region in a wider conflict. The international community must act now, and decisively, to prevent further loss of lives and work towards a lasting peace in the region. Correcting the gross injustice to innocent civilians in Palestine and addressing the Israel-Gaza conflict starts with recognising humanity in equal measures as well as rights of both Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and security side by side. It involves implementation of international law, upholding human rights, and a concerted effort to address root causes of the conflict, such as the displacement of Palestinians from their abode more than seven decades ago. While killing of any innocent civilians, including Israelis by Hamas, is not acceptable, what is also equally true is that when generations of Palestinians are born and grow up without a state and a sense of national identity, there is always a risk that frustration growing over decades can get out of control. The 18 September UNGA resolution demands that Israel return land in the West Bank and other “immovable property,” as well as all assets seized since the occupation began in 1967, and all cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians. It calls for Israel to allow all Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their place of origin and make reparation for the damage caused by its occupation. It urges UN member states to refrain from recognising Israel’s presence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as lawful, preventing engagement in activities that support the occupation, ceasing imports of products from Israeli settlements, and implementing sanctions against entities involved in maintaining Israel’s unlawful presence. Unless some of the major players in the West, which includes countries like US, UK, Germany, and France, apply principles of rights and justice consistently, any effort will continue to remain infructuous. Advocating human rights and equality while turning a blind eye to atrocities does not work in the age of social media and digital platforms where the truth is more readily accessible and more difficult to suppress. The Gaza conflict is a wake-up call for the world, which has been for far too long oblivious to humanitarian crises. The fact that the state of Israel emerged from ruins of the untold sufferings caused to by the Nazis is a testament that justice prevailed. Today the Jewish peoples have a modern, prosperous, and democratic state in Israel. Hence, it is rather an irony that one of the educated and cultured populations of Middle East, the Palestinians, today are on the receiving end of human rights violation by a nation whose people went through one of the worst atrocities committed in the last century.