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With Western actors preoccupied with the Ukrainian crisis, the Middle East may be heading towards a significant time of churn in 2023 As much of the West’s political capacities get bogged down with the crisis in Ukraine and the return of a Cold War-like geopolitics between Washington and Moscow, other areas of contention that were taking precedence only a few months ago, like Iran, have taken a back seat. During this period, in light of the war, ties between Russia and Iran have used the prevailing situation as an incubator to further the bilateral. According to reports, Iran is expected to receive new Sukhoi 35 fighter aircraft from Russia. When delivered, these jets will be the first major purchase by Tehran for its ageing air force fleet which currently, and perhaps ironically, still includes old American airframes from the pre-1979 Revolution era such as F-14s and F-5s along with older Soviet-made MiG-29s delivered in the early 1990s. Iran has been subjected to stringent sanctions over the decades, severely depleting its ability to purchase weapons from abroad. However, the silver lining for Tehran has come in the way of robust domestically sustained industries, specifically in the realm of defence, that manage to keep the country’s aged military infrastructure up and running with little outside help. Arguably, the pinnacle of this outcome has been the country’s indigenous drones programme. Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones, provided by Tehran to Moscow for use in Ukraine, became a symbol of Iran–Russia bonhomie at a time when the Kremlin was struggling to gain significant military wins in the conflict, and others, such as Türkiye, were providing Kiev with its now globally successful Bayraktar TB-2 drones. The Iranian government maintains that it is not taking sides in the conflict, which may be true strategically, but tactically, the evidence points to the contrary. However, the Su-35s are expected to add a significant boost to Tehran’s conventional arsenal. Geopolitically, the jets themselves tell a story of the volatility and constantly shifting interests in the region. Originally meant for Egypt, the Su-35s are being seen as Russian repayment for a consistent supply of drones by Iran (Moscow – Tehran cooperation on drones pre-dates the Ukraine war). From an Egyptian perspective, the Su-35s were an add-on to the country’s fleet of Russian MiG 29s, both being inducted due to Washington’s unwillingness to sell Cairo F-15s (a demand standing since the 1970s), in part owing to the country’s chequered human rights record. The US has been criticised for allowing partner states in the region to hedge their interests with the likes of Moscow and Beijing by taking too long in making strategic decisions. Iran’s move towards a degree of modernising its frontline fighter aircraft fleet comes at a time when the Middle East (West Asia) is staring down towards a complete collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and attempts to revive the same. The outreach to Iran by the West is perhaps at its lowest juncture, with the United States (US) saying it would, by all means, disallow Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities to the European Union (EU) looking to brand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terror organisation. With European capitals and the US overwhelmed with the reality of a war returning to Europe, the Middle East may be heading towards a significant time of churn in 2023, including a possibility of the region going nuclear, and this does not only elude to Iran’s nuclear programme, but others in the region as well pursuing nuclear energy. The US remains the most influential power in the region, however, others such as China and Russia have made their own inroads. For example, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) remains one of the closest allies of Washington in the region, it baulked initially when it came down to voting against Moscow’s aggressions at the UN. This was backed by the fact that a lot of Russian money trying to escape the war and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grab along with skirting sanctions ended up in places like Dubai, boosting the Emirati economy. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which still has a fractious relationship with the administration of US president Joe Biden, works closely with Russia as part of the OPEC+ construct, influencing global oil pricing. Along with this, most capitals in the region are looking to not get caught in the middle of future big power rivalries, specifically between the US and China. The above, interestingly, includes Israel, America’s ‘all-weather ally’ in the region. With the return of Benjamin Netanyahu to power with a coalition of far-right political parties in tow, Israel is expected to harden its posture against Iran in the coming year. With the news of Su-35s, Israel is already said to have approached the US for the purchase of 25 F-15EX aircraft, an advanced variant of the airframe already in extensive use by the Israeli Air Force (IAF). This purchase is specifically intended to build capacity to strike Iran’s heavily defended nuclear sites. Israel already operates the most advanced fighter aircraft in the region, the stealth F-35 Lightening II, and to maintain its military superiority, with its new political composition in a leadership role, may continue to be one of the issues stalling the UAE from attaining the same capabilities despite both signing the historic Abraham Accords in 2020. This shows that a level of divergence may always remain beyond the surface of Israel–Arab rapprochement. Both Israel and the US, although having differences over the political trajectory of the former in the recent past, are also conducting the largest-ever bilateral military exercise, with the US showing its full support behind Israel’s regional security interests. On the sidelines of the exercise, a senior US defence official has said that “Iran will not be allowed to go nuclear, period”. The unravelling of diplomatic efforts to engage with Iran had arguably been slowly running out of steam for some time, and the conflict in Ukraine has added a spring in the heels of Russia–Iran cooperation. With China remaining a silent outlier for now, despite having deep ties with both Moscow and Tehran, this defence cooperation may bring benefits for both parties in the time to come despite a complex diplomatic relationship that includes Russian presence in Syria as a point of contention. With domestic political compulsions out of the way for now, Biden has a window to restrengthen his position amongst traditional partners in the region. And with him continuing Trump’s bullish policies against Iran rather than the Obama-era approach of offering a buffet of carrots, the US taking a harder approach will be palatable in the region. However, the jury is still out on what the coming year looks like for the Middle East. Iran has consistently postured towards taking talks forward, while also continuing its strategic and tactical policies and not ceding any space in these areas of its interests. 2023 may witness an inflection point in the region, moving away from the prevailing status quos, specifically if there are significant strides made by Tehran with its nuclear programme. While Israel previously has covertly targeted the programme inside Iran, often at its own will and pace, there has been a period of lull with such operations, raising questions on where talks with Tehran stand today, and what the future holds for diplomacy which has been short-changed by strategic mistakes by both the US and Iran alike.

On November 26, 2022, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, approved a parliamentary resolution of November 18 to open an embassy in Israel. This decision corrects the existing asymmetry: notwithstanding the close relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, and in spite of the existence of an Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan since 1993, Baku had no embassy in Israel. Azerbaijan’s decision to open an embassy in Israel was accompanied by a decision to open a representative office in Ramallah. There are three reasons for the Baku decision. The first is Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenia in 2020. During the war and according to the agreements that concluded it, Azerbaijan liberated seven regions adjoining Nagorno-Karabakh that had been under Armenian control since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also gained control over parts of the region. In the past, Baku was concerned that opening an embassy in Israel would arouse criticism among Arabs and Muslims, leading to anti-Azerbaijan votes in international forums, but in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War Baku achieved a decisive victory and is therefore less in need of support in the political arena. For its part, Armenia opened an embassy in Israel in 2020. Another important catalyst for the decision was the signing of the Abraham Accords and normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel last August. These developments make full diplomatic relations between Israel and a Muslim country far more acceptable than previously. Today, more than a dozen Muslim countries have full diplomatic relations with Israel, some with a high public profile. In the context of Arab Gulf states, Azerbaijan also has close relations with the United Arab Emirates. Baku’s decision also comes against the background of the growing tension between Azerbaijan and Iran. Over the last three decades, because of the large Azeri population in Iran (around 15-20 percent of the population, according to various estimates), and concerns in Iran over separatist ambitions among the Azeri minority, Tehran supported Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, although it officially declared neutrality. Moreover, Iran also covertly supports the Hussainiyoun Brigades, an organization that is opposed to the regime in Baku, although it is also careful about maintaining close ties with the Azerbaijani authorities. Tehran for its part takes a negative view of Baku’s cooperation with Jerusalem and with Washington, and has expressed this openly and explicitly.  As Iran sees it, closer relations between Israel and Azerbaijan give Israel an opportunity to expand its presence and influence in the spheres of security and intelligence, including the use of territory in Azerbaijan for Israeli activity against targets in Iran. Indeed, the outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War increased tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan because it extended their common border. Baku also has reservations about Iranian policy, particularly following the opening in October this year of the Iranian consulate in Kapan, a town located in the southernmost district of Armenia. The location of the new consulate is perceived as problematic since Azerbaijan hopes to reach an agreement with Armenia and Russia to establish the Zangezur Corridor transport route, which will enable unimpeded access from Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave, which is part of Azerbaijan. In addition, Iran’s recent military exercise along the border with Azerbaijan was deemed a threatening message to Baku. This exercise follows the exercise held last year, which was the first time since Azerbaijan’s independence that Iran carried out a military exercise along their shared border. Moreover, an Iranian spy network was captured in Azerbaijan in November. In the past there were similar cases of Iranian subversion in Azerbaijan, as well as attempts to strike at Israeli and Jewish targets in the country. Yet despite all these subversive activities, Tehran did not manage to obstruct the defense cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan or the opening of the Azerbaijan embassy in Israel.  Over the years, the leading components of the relations between Israel and Azerbaijan were the import of oil from Azerbaijan (about 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports) and the export from Israeli defense industries to Azerbaijan, as well as their cooperation on intelligence matters. Recently, with the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan began exporting grain to Israel, while an Israeli company is involved in the desalination facility in the Caspian Sea. In addition, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, some 50,000 Israeli tourists travelled to Azerbaijan each year, and Baku hopes that this number will increase. As a preliminary step to opening the embassy in Israel, in 2021 Baku opened a trade office in Israel, indicating its intention to broaden the economic cooperation between the countries. In 2020 the volume of civilian trade between Israel and Azerbaijan (excluding oil) was about $200 million. Azerbaijan is also proud that it has one of the largest Jewish communities in a Muslim country (estimates range from 15,000-30,000) and boasts of many years of religious tolerance. The Azeri community in Israel, numbering 50,000-70,000 people, is also an important bridge between the two countries.  Relations with Azerbaijan are likewise important in the context of Israel-Turkey relations. Over the years, the United States has encouraged the three countries to cooperate, and inter alia, Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel run through Turkey. The fact that both Ankara and Jerusalem are perceived as important allies of Baku and that Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War is attributed in part to the assistance received from these two countries were among the factors that contributed to the warmer relations between Turkey and Israel over the past year. Azerbaijan President Aliyev tried to mediate between Jerusalem and Ankara to normalize their relations after the crisis in 2018. Significantly, in spite of the tensions between Israel and Turkey over the past decade, Baku’s relations with Israel have not cooled – on the contrary, they have grown stronger. However, the Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle also embodies the potential for competition: Israeli and Turkish defense industries compete with each other, and this competition is likely to become more intense as Turkey’s defense industry develops more advanced products.  Support for relations between Israel and Azerbaijan crosses party lines in Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, expected to become the next prime minister, visited Azerbaijan twice as Israel’s Prime Minister – in 1997 and 2016. His visit in 2016 is particularly memorable, since at that time President Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had so far purchased military systems from Israel worth $5 billion. During the visit Netanyahu said that changes were evident in many parts of the Muslim world, and particularly in Arab states, “But I think if they want to see what the future could be, come to Azerbaijan and see the friendship and the partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan.” These words can take on added significance with the opening of Azerbaijan’s embassy in Israel, which can be interpreted as an outgrowth of the Abraham Accords.  Azerbaijan has been an important partner for Israel in recent decades as a reliable supplier of energy and in terms of security. The opening of the embassy in Israel is a welcome step from Jerusalem’s perspective, reflecting the potential to expand relations to additional fields as well. At the same time, Azerbaijan, like other countries with a Muslim majority, is sensitive to the Palestinian issue, and it is therefore not surprising that the move toward Jerusalem is accompanied by a move toward Ramallah. Turkey is also important in the context of relations between Jerusalem and Baku, and developments in relations between Ankara and Jerusalem could impact on decision making in Baku, although as the past decade has shown, they do not have decisive impact. For that reason, although relations between Jerusalem and Baku have strengths of their own, and in spite of the secular nature of Azerbaijan, they should not be considered as disconnected from Israel’s relations with the rest of the Muslim world.

Introduction:  After 50 days of the Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip (GS), it appears that the declared objectives of the Israeli occupation are still elusive, whether in “crushing” Hamas, freeing its captives, imposing an alternative governance system, or obtaining full assurances that GS will not pose a threat to its security in the future. On the other hand, despite the large number of killed and wounded, and the widespread destruction in the region, Hamas and the resistance forces, supported by popular backing, continue to demonstrate resilient resistance, inflicting significant losses on the occupying forces. They have even succeeded in imposing their conditions in the humanitarian pause and the first prisoner exchange deal. Having achieved victory on October 7, 2023, surrendering to Israeli conditions, which only aim to uproot resistance in GS or drain it of its substance, is not on the table. Consequently, the situation leans more towards a “bone-breaking” scenario and “mutual finger-biting.” This implies that the war may prolong, but to what extent remains uncertain! Key Israeli Considerations: After the fiftieth day of the war, Israeli considerations remain governed by the following: – Recovery of the security and deterrence theory, and considering the battle as “decisive” for the Israeli state, especially after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023 have struck at its core and undermined it in the eyes of many. The failure to regain a strong, secure environment would render the Zionist state project meaningless, turning it into a hostile environment. Its role as an advanced fortress for Western powers and a stabilizer for the region would also lose its significance. – Israel is haunted by the “fear of failure” in its aggression on GS and is reluctant to admit to a new strategic failure after its major setback on October 7. Acknowledging failure might embolden the resistance forces to impose their conditions, signaling the potential beginning of a countdown for the occupation. – There is a quasi-governmental and popular Israeli consensus on seeking revenge against Hamas and GS, reclaiming Israeli captives and preventing resistance forces in GS from posing a threat to the occupation and settlements in the GS envelope. However, there is a difference in opinion regarding the duration of the war and the acceptable final form. – Israel benefits from a stark imbalance in military capabilities, possessing the latest lethal weapons by land, sea and air, fueling its confidence in its military strength. – Netanyahu and the Likud party are experiencing a significant decline in popularity. Many believe that Operation Al-Aqsa Flood ended Netanyahu’s political life, potentially pushing him to continue the war in a quest for victory or a semblance of victory to rebuild his image and avoid his fate. – The international alliance led by the United States plays a significant role in influencing the duration of the war and adjusting Israeli objectives. The alliance has provided international cover for Israel’s aggression and its commission of heinous massacres, which led to having 15 thousand killed, including more than 6 thousand children and 4 thousand women. It provided Israel with weapons and money, and brought its forces to the region to show support and prevent any regional interference. However, time pressure is mounting due to ongoing massacres, increasing public discontent in the Western world, and Israel’s continued failure to achieve tangible accomplishments beyond destruction and civilian casualties. Therefore, a state of restlessness began to emerge, pushing towards more realistic goals. – Israel benefits from a weak or complicit Arab environment, incapable or unwilling to provide real military or logistical support to the resistance that could make a qualitative difference in favor of the resistance. – The increasing military and human losses for Israel push it to conclude the war. – Escalating economic losses, the costs of war, disruptions in various facilities, tourism setbacks and a loss of security present an additional pressure factor. – The failure of Israeli forces to free the captives and Hamas’ success in imposing its conditions on the occupation. Hamas and Resistance Calculations: – The resistance is banking on its significant achievement on October 7th and its readiness for a long-term battle. It relies on the quality of its fighters, numbering over 60 thousand, and the popular support rallying around it. – For the resistance, an Israeli victory and control over GS, imposing its conditions, would mean uprooting the resistance. This would drive them to fight to the end, unwilling to accept anything less than new gains for the resistance and the Palestinian people. Having demonstrated strength, efficiency, and continued field control for fifty days, the resistance remains capable of inflicting significant and increasing losses on the Israeli forces. It can still launch missiles at most areas of the 1948 occupied Palestinian territories. The prospect of its defeat in the foreseeable future becomes highly unlikely, if not impossible. – Overall, the political and military leadership structure of Hamas remains strong and cohesive, possessing high efficiency in controlling GS. This signifies a resounding failure for Israel after fifty days of aggression. – The resistance still holds the card of Israeli captives, and the military aggression has not succeeded in freeing a single prisoner. This remains a powerful card that Hamas can play in any future arrangements. – There are immense sacrifices, especially at the level of the supporting people and the level of massive destruction of homes, infrastructure, schools, hospitals, mosques and churches. However, these sacrifices have turned into fuel for the resistance and the widening revolution. They are no longer elements of submission and subjugation to the occupation. – The escalating Arab, Islamic, and international popular support for the resistance boosts its morale and puts pressure on political regimes to halt the aggression and support the resistance. – The continuation of aggression and massacres may eventually lead to an escalation of tension in the region. The situation may deviate from the norms of continuous conflict since the beginning of the war in southern Lebanon, raising concerns among regional and international powers about the possibility of it turning into a regional or global war. Conclusion: It appears that the Israeli occupation will exert every effort to extract a victory or the semblance of victory, considering it a fundamental necessity for its existence, stability, prestige and regional standing. On the other hand, the resistance aims to reinforce the victory it achieved on October 7th, and will not accept any concessions that would lead to its uprooting or subjugation, especially after the significant sacrifices made by both the resistance and its popular base. Therefore, the possibility of prolonging the duration of the aggression remains, but the resistance’s ability to continue its qualitative performance, coupled with the anticipated significant military, human and economic losses on the Israeli side, along with the escalating Arab and international public pressure and the widening conflict in southern Lebanon, will force the international alliance to lean towards more realistic solutions. This will also compel the Israel to backtrack on most of its demands. This process may take weeks, but the more intense the resistance becomes and the fewer genuine targets or pressure points the occupation has, the shorter the time frame will become. Eventually, it may resort to solutions to save face.