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한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français What is required of member states between now and the Alliance's anniversary summit in Washington D.C. from July 9 to 11 75 years after its founding, NATO is facing an unprecedented set of challenges. The global security landscape is changing rapidly - from the ongoing war in Ukraine to crucial elections on both sides of the Atlantic. The summit in Washington D.C. will not only be a celebration of the past, but also a crucial marker for the future direction of the Alliance.  NATO is in troubled waters ahead of its 75th birthday - on the one hand, it is not 'brain dead' but offers protection to new members - on the other hand, the challenges are enormous in view of the war in Ukraine.  In the third year of the war, the military situation in Ukraine is serious. The military is coming under increasing pressure and European partners are delivering too little and too slowly.  Western support must be stepped up in order to influence the outcome of the war - Russia's future behavior towards its neighbors also depends on this.  Elections will be held on both sides of the Atlantic in 2024 - the US presidential election in November will be particularly decisive for NATO.  Two thirds of NATO member states are well on the way to meeting the two percent national defense spending target - Germany in particular must ensure that this target is met in the long term.  Now it is up to the leadership of larger countries such as Germany, France and Poland to develop traction in European defense in order to present a future US president with a resilient burden-sharing balance sheet and not leave Ukraine - and the European security order - in the lurch. Return to the core mission In the 75th year of its existence, the North Atlantic Defense Alliance has returned to its core mission: deterrence and defense against a territorial aggressor. NATO defense planning will be reviewed for its resilience before the NATO summit in Washington D.C. from 9 to 11 July 2024. What challenges does the Alliance face in its anniversary year and what needs to happen between now and the NATO summit to make the summit a success? The state of the Alliance ahead of the summit NATO is in difficult waters ahead of its 75th anniversary. On the one hand, it has proven since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression that it is capable of acting and not brain-dead. The two new members, Finland and Sweden, have given up their decades of neutrality because their populations are convinced that they are better protected against Russian aggression within the 30 allies, despite the excellent condition of their military. On the other hand, the admission process has taken much longer than was to be expected given the high level of interoperability of both countries with NATO standards. It took a good twenty months since the application was submitted for both flags to fly on the flagpoles in front of NATO headquarters in Brussels - the internal blockade by Turkey and Hungary is an expression of the Alliance's challenge to maintain a united front against the Russian threat. The Vilnius decision of 2023 to adhere to the previous two percent target for annual defense spending as a percentage of national gross domestic product (GDP) as a minimum figure in future and even to strive for additional spending beyond this is an enormous effort for the members of the alliance - and the biggest point of criticism from its sceptics. The implementation of this goal goes hand in hand with the further development of the defense posture, which was also decided in Vilnius. This includes new regional defense plans that provide for more combat-capable troops that can be deployed more quickly. The Washington summit will show how far the Alliance has come in this respect in a year - gaps between targets and actual capabilities would consequently have to be covered by investments that go beyond the two percent GDP contributions. There are also a number of other important events and factors that will influence the summit. Ukraine's military situation In the third year of the war, the military situation in Ukraine is serious. The fighting has largely turned into a war of position, with high casualties on both sides. The sluggish supply of support from the West means that the Ukrainians have to make do with significantly less than their defense needs. The European Union has failed to meet its promise to deliver one million 155-millimetre shells within a year (by March 2024), while the Russian war economy is producing supplies in multiple shifts. This imbalance is making itself painfully felt in the Ukrainian defense - due to the material deficit, nowhere near enough Russian positions can be eliminated and Russian attacks repelled, and Ukrainian personnel on the front line are depleted. President Volodymyr Zelensky is coming under increasing pressure to mobilize fresh forces for the front. As a result, the Ukrainian military is having to give up some of its terrain in order to conserve material and personnel and take up the most sustainable defensive position possible for the coming weeks and months until relief hopefully comes. comes.1 The Czech initiative to procure half a million rounds in 155 millimeter caliber and 300,000 rounds in 122 millimeter caliber on the world market for Ukraine by June 2024 is urgently needed - but it does not change the fact that Europe and the West are delivering too little and too late, despite the efforts that have been made so far and must continue to be made.2 Even if the US and Europe were to produce at full speed, it would only be half of what Russia produces and receives in support from its allies. Western support therefore urgently needs to be ramped up, as it is of crucial importance for the outcome of the war - and for Russia's future behavior in its neighborhood. Upcoming elections A series of landmark elections will take place on both sides of the Atlantic in the run-up to the summit. The US presidential elections in November 2024 will be of the greatest importance for the future direction of NATO. To date, the USA has been the largest single supporter of Ukraine in the military field; in addition, the USA has decisive weight in the coordination of concrete support from NATO countries - the German Chancellor has repeatedly oriented himself towards US arms deliveries when it comes to the question of German support or even made this a condition for his own commitments.3 While the Democrats in the US Congress continue to support aid packages to Ukraine, the Republican Party is dominated by voices around presidential candidate Donald Trump calling for this "European war" to be left to the Europeans and for domestic challenges to be addressed instead.4 This has led to a months-long blockade of further aid amounting to 60 billion US dollars in the US House of Representatives, which is led by a wafer-thin majority of Republicans. Ukraine urgently needs these supplies to avert shortages in ammunition and air defense. At the time of publication of this Monitor, a release of the funds is not in sight. In terms of foreign policy, there is a bipartisan consensus that the real danger for the USA lies in a systemic conflict with China. Among Republican supporters, impatience with the continuation of the war is increasing, while approval for further support for Ukraine is decreasing. The mood among the general population is similar: between April 2022 and September 2023, the view that the US is doing "too much" for Ukraine increased (from 14% to 41%).5 On the European side, the most important milestone for further support for Ukraine is the election of the new European Parliament from 6 to 9 June 2024. Since the outbreak of the war, approval ratings in the EU for support for Ukraine have been remarkably stable.6 Even in the face of a sometimes difficult economic environment in the 20 eurozone states, approval ratings for the continuation of aid to Ukraine have only fallen slightly in a few EU states - starting from a high level. While the broad center of the EP groups (EPP, S&D and Renew) are united in their support for Ukraine and the transatlantic alliance, the foreign and security policy positioning of the far-right parties of the ECR and ID groups and the non-attached groups is not always clear. According to Nicolai von Ondarza and Max Becker from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), while the ECR parliamentary group "largely plays a constructive and compatible role" in foreign and security policy, including with regard to NATO and Ukraine, parts of the ID parliamentary group such as the French Rassemblement National (RN) or the German AfD either voted against resolutions critical of Russia in parliament or abstained.7 According to Olaf Wientzek from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, both the ECR and ID can expect significant seat gains in the upcoming EP elections.8 In terms of numbers, the ID and ECR groups are competing with Renew to be the third strongest force behind the EPP and S&D - according to current estimates, they all have between 80 and 90 seats. It would be conceivable for the currently non-attached Hungarian Fidesz (currently 13 MEPs) to join both the ECR and ID. In view of the increasing co-decision role of parliament - including for further Ukraine support packages - it is important for the EU how these parties and party alliances position themselves in terms of foreign and security policy.9 In fact, parties in the ID faction represent Russian propaganda within Europe in order to exert influence through disinformation, subversion and mobilization and thus undermine the social consensus with regard to Ukraine and NATO.10 This may also become apparent in individual elections, such as in the eastern German states in September 2024. Economic pressure - prioritizing defence? Global inflation averaged 6.2% in 2023. Current forecasts assume falling inflation rates in the Euro-Atlantic region over the course of 2024 to 2026.11 At the same time, however, global economic growth of 3.1% (2024) and an expected 3.2% (2025) compared to the previous year is well below the projections for the post-pandemic recovery.12 The combination of higher consumer prices and slower economic recovery continues to pose the risk of declining approval for strong support within the populations of the European Ukraine-supporting states. Protests in the face of announcements of cuts in various policy areas have demonstrated this in Germany and Europe over the past year. This does not make it easy to prioritize defence spending from a national perspective for the coming years. In the case of Germany, the defense budget is competing with all other departments in the budget negotiations for 2025, which are calling for an increase in social spending and investments in view of the current burdens on the population.13 At the same time, inflation does not stop at military procurement. As early as 2022, Germany therefore had to cancel a number of planned procurement projects due to increased costs.14 The cost increase also affects the maintenance of existing equipment and personnel. Even if Germany nominally reaches the two percent target in 2024, the increases in national defense spending within the Alliance will actually be lower when adjusted for inflation. Systemic threat from China The increasing systemic confrontation with China is not only identified in the US national security strategy; for the first time, China was classified as a concrete threat by NATO in its Strategic Concept of 2022. China is threatening to annex the democratically governed island of Taiwan to its territory, possibly by military means.15 This would have enormous global escalation potential and far-reaching effects on important international sea routes. Concerns about free trade routes are leading to a convergence of threat perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic. As a result, many European partners are rethinking their relations with China - as is Germany in its China strategy. China's global ambition to restructure the existing multilateral order according to its own ideas does not only affect Taiwan's independence. China's supremacy in key technical and industrial sectors as well as critical infrastructure, rare raw materials and supply chains would lead to a deepening of existing dependencies. Because the USA sees China as a systemic threat to international order, freedom and prosperity, it has been refocusing its efforts since President Obama took office. European NATO partners are therefore expected to invest in Europe's security themselves. Only greater burden-sharing by the Europeans would enable the USA to focus its attention more strongly on the Indo-Pacific. Challenges in new dimensions In addition to the geopolitical challenges outlined above, NATO designated space in 2019 as an additional battlefield to the existing fields - land, air, sea and cyberspace - due to its increased importance.16 In recent decades, China has rapidly expanded its presence in space in both the civilian and military sectors.17 The war in Ukraine has once again underlined the importance of satellite-based intelligence and the significance of connected weapons for combat. In addition, the effects of man-made climate change, which also have an impact on security in the Euro-Atlantic alliance area, have recently become increasingly apparent. At the 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, the Alliance set itself the goal of becoming a leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the effects of climate change on security.18 To this end, it adopted the "Climate Change and Security Action Plan". The NATO countries' homework A successful NATO summit in the anniversary year 2024 would send an important signal of the unity and defense capability of the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the face of Russia's breach of international law in a time of systemic competition. NATO member states are confronted with a complex threat situation ahead of the next summit in Washington D.C.. These give rise to various requirements: More NATO members must reach the two percent target In financial terms, the Washington summit will probably be considered a success if a substantial number of member states reach the two percent target. In 2023, this was the case for eleven countries (Poland, USA, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Latvia, UK, Slovakia).19 In February 2024, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on the sidelines of a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group in Brussels that 18 countries would reach the target by the summit.20 Germany, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Denmark, Albania and North Macedonia are the countries that have recently reached the target.21 The newest NATO member, Sweden, increases the number to.19 Achieving the two percent target for defense spending is not an end in itself. The discussion within NATO as to whether one should deviate from the numerical contribution target and instead assess the actual capabilities contributed by the individual member states is not a new one. Amounts of money to measure collective defense remain the simplest way to approximate burden-sharing within NATO - and until all countries have achieved this, it will remain the relevant metric in the political discussion. From NATO's perspective, the gap between the desired capabilities listed in the defense plans and the troop contingents registered by the member states has widened steadily of late. In reality, there is no way around increased defense spending in order to adequately equip the required personnel, who would have to be subordinate to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) in an emergency - from a military perspective, the demand is therefore increasingly being made that two percent should be the minimum target. In order to achieve all the required capabilities, larger contributions are needed from all nations. Due to the threat situation and political pressure, it seems possible that 21 countries, i.e. two thirds of the member states, will meet the two percent target by the NATO summit in Washington. In addition to the 19 countries mentioned above, these are France22 and Montenegro.23 Turkey wants to achieve the target by 2025,24 although this commitment is uncertain in view of the poor economic situation. Italy wants to spend two percent within the next two years25, while Norway should reach the target by 2026 according to Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere26. Slovenia has set 2027 as the target date for meeting the commitments27, while Portugal, Spain and Belgium have set 2030 as the target date. Canada (1.38%), Croatia (1.79%) and Luxembourg (0.72%) have not provided any information. Reduce bureaucracy, speed up procurement In material terms, the main aim is to convert the increased defense spending into "material on the farm" in a timely manner. To achieve this, the planning and procurement processes in many European countries need to be accelerated, made less bureaucratic and at the same time better coordinated. The common European defense will require massive improvements in the coming years. Some announcements have already been made during the pre-election campaign for the European Parliament; here, too, what counts is how the announcements are implemented after the election. Progress must also be made in the area of research and development in order to invest scarce resources in state-of-the-art systems. The question of joint development versus off-the-shelf procurement of available equipment will also have to be decided in many cases. A rethink in European procurement is essential for this. This is primarily the responsibility of the European nation states: long-term contracts with the arms industry must be concluded urgently, cooperation initiated and loans granted for production. Strengthening EU-NATO cooperation and NATO partnership policy NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass show a strong convergence in threat analysis. The EU has effective starting points and tools, particularly for cross-cutting challenges such as combating climate change, the threat of hybrid attacks and the protection of critical infrastructure. With the European Peace Facility and other instruments, a concrete institutional framework has been created to strengthen the European pillar in NATO and contribute to fairer burden-sharing on both sides of the Atlantic. The EU and NATO should further intensify the exchange on common challenges and utilize the strengths of the respective forum. In addition to the partnership with the EU, the member states should continue to promote NATO's partnership policy. 2024 marks the 25th anniversary of NATO's eastward enlargement and the 30th anniversary of NATO's Partnership for Peace program. In view of a global confrontation with Russia and an increasingly aggressive China, it is worth taking a look at the instruments that were devised during the Cold War with a view to 'like-minded' partners outside the Alliance. NATO's partnership policy - adapted to the new circumstances - is an ideal instrument for forging close ties with democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific that share NATO's interests and values.28 Investing in interoperability NATO must continue to act as a "guardian of standards" in favor of military interoperability. This year's major exercises as part of "Steadfast Defender 2024" and "Quadriga 2024" will show, among other things, which weaknesses still exist in the various dimensions of interoperability in practical tests. In addition, care must be taken to ensure that military innovations from pioneers within NATO do not leave the Alliance's other allies behind in technical terms. This does not mean that technological progress is slowed down in a race to the bottom; instead, member states with lower expenditure on research and development must be enabled to catch up more quickly - especially in areas such as space technology and the use of artificial intelligence in warfare, it is becoming increasingly important to avoid the technological gap between the members of the alliance. What does this mean for Germany? The Federal Chancellor's announcement on February 27, 2022 that the establishment of the 100 billion euro special fund heralded a turning point in Germany's security policy was seen everywhere in Germany and within the Alliance as the right decision in view of Russia's aggression. In his speech, Olaf Scholz emphasized that Germany was not seeking this expenditure to please allies. The special fund serves national security. However, the acute threat to European security remains and although the NATO target will be reached in 2024, the future of Germany's defense budget is anything but certain. However, investment in the Bundeswehr's defense capabilities is essential to contribute to credible deterrence. The foundation for securing sustainable defense spending in Germany's medium-term financial planning must be laid now, otherwise two percent - depending on the spending status of the special fund - may already be unattainable in 2026, when the regular federal budget is once again used as the basis for calculating the NATO target. As the budget for 2025 will not yet have been decided at the NATO summit in July 2024, the Chancellor will need to make a credible commitment to the allies that Germany will not fall behind. The Bundeswehr will also have to stretch itself enormously in order to achieve the troop levels announced for the new defense plans. The number of servicewomen and men is currently stagnating at just under 182,000. 29 In order to be able to provide the brigade in Lithuania in addition to the nationally required forces and to meet the division commitment for 2026, the Bundeswehr must come significantly closer to the target figure of 203,300 active servicewomen and men by 2027.30 The questions of how many of the 182,000 soldiers available on paper are also willing to become part of the brigade in Lithuania and how many of the total number are actually deployable in an emergency have not even been asked at this point. What counts now - political leadership The security situation in Europe is serious and NATO has no shortage of challenges in its 75th year of existence. It is in good shape to meet these challenges and has welcomed two strong nations into its ranks, Finland and Sweden. However, it is now important not to let up in the efforts that have been agreed. A united external stance is key here, as the current NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg never tires of emphasizing. His successor will have to continue this. Even more important, however, are actual, concrete and substantial actions - the English expression "put one's money where one's mouth is" must be the leitmotif of all European NATO nations in view of the US elections at the end of the year, regardless of the outcome. Ultimately, political leadership is what counts within the alliance in virtually all the areas mentioned - and it matters now. Many smaller countries in Europe look to the larger member states such as Germany, France and Poland for leadership. This applies both in terms of sustainable compliance with the two percent target and when it comes to political agreement and cooperation in the field of armaments. Here, the larger states have a role model and leadership function that can develop traction and pressure on the Alliance as a whole. This political leadership will be more important than ever for the European representatives in NATO in 2024. At the moment, however, it seems questionable whether the current leadership vacuum can be filled before the NATO summit. Germany, France and Poland have not yet been able to develop a jointly coordinated stance that could have a positive effect. It is therefore also questionable whether the NATO summit will be able to send important signals beyond the minimum objectives. The US presidential election hangs over everything like a sword of Damocles - the erratic leadership style of another US President Donald Trump could be difficult to reconcile with the strategic goals of the alliance. Imprint This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or election campaigners or helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. Publisher: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2024, Berlin Design: yellow too, Pasiek Horntrich GbR Produced with the financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany. References 1 Reisner, Markus: So ernst ist die Lage an der Front. In: Streitkräfte und Strategien Podcast, NDR Info, 12.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/0ne7 2 Zachová, Aneta: Tschechische Initiative: Munition für Ukraine könnte im Juni eintreffen. Euractiv, 13.03.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/gofh 3 Besonders eindrücklich bleibt das Beispiel der Lieferung schwerer Waffen in Erinnerung: so rang sich Bundeskanzler Scholz zur Freigabe der Lieferung Leopard-Panzer deutscher Fertigung erst nach amerikanischer Zusage von Abrams-Panzern von militärisch zweifelhaftem Mehrwert durch. 4 Dress, Brad: Ramaswamy isolates himself on Ukraine with proposed Putin pact. In: The Hill, 01.09.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/c9ow 5 Hutzler, Alexandra: How initial US support for aiding Ukraine has come to a standstill 2 years later. ABC News, 24.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/h0z6 6 Grand, Camille u.a.: European public opinion remains supportive of Ukraine. Bruegel, 05.06.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/ipbu 7 von Ondarza, Nicolai und Becker, Max: Geostrategie von rechts außen: Wie sich EU-Gegner und Rechtsaußenparteien außen- und sicherheitspolitisch positionieren. SWP-aktuell, 01.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/a62v 8 Wientzek, Dr. Olaf: EVP-Parteienbarometer Februar 2024 - Die Lage der Europäischen Volkspartei in der EU. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 06.03.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/fv9b 9 s. Footnote 7 10 Klein, Margarete: Putins „Wiederwahl“: Wie der Kriegsverlauf die innenpolitische Stabilität Russlands bestimmt. In: SWP-Podcast, 06.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/7i5s 11 Potrafke, Prof. Dr. Niklas: Economic Experts Survey: Wirtschaftsexperten erwarten Rückgang der Inflation weltweit (3. Quartal 2023). ifo-Institut, 19. Oktober 2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/wunq 12 Umersbach, Bruno: Wachstum des weltweiten realen Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) von 1980 bis 2024. Statista, 07.02.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/5ohz 13 Petersen, Volker: Ampel droht Zerreißprobe: Vier Gründe, warum der Haushalt 2025 so gefährlich ist. N-tv, 07.03.2024, online unter: https://ogy.de/9fcl 14 Specht, Frank u.a.: Regierung kürzt mehrere Rüstungsprojekte. Handelsblatt, 24.10.2022, online unter: https://ogy.de/71z3 15 Vgl. Wurzel, Steffen u.a.: Worum es im Konflikt um Taiwan geht. Deutschlandfunk, 12.04.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/ddc1 16 Vogel, Dominic: Bundeswehr und Weltraum - Das Weltraumoperationszentrum als Einstieg in multidimensionale Operationen. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 01.10.2020, online unter: https://ogy.de/c7m1 17 Rose, Frank A.: Managing China‘s rise in outer space. Brookings, letzter Zugriff am 18.09.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/374g 18 Vgl. Kertysova, Katarina: Implementing NATO’s Climate Security Agenda: Challenges Ahead. In: NATO Review, 10.08.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/ho94 19 Vgl. Statista: Defense expenditures of NATO countries as a percentage of gross domestic product in 2023. Abgerufen am 18.09.2023 online unter https://ogy.de/wtsb 20 Neuhann, Florian: Ukraine-Kontaktgruppe in Brüssel: Eine Krisensitzung - und ein Tabubruch? ZDF heute, 14.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/rezf 21 Mendelson, Ben: Diese Nato-Länder halten 2024 das Zwei-Prozent-Ziel ein. Handelsblatt, 15.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/quiu 22 Kayali, Laura: France will reach NATO defense spending target in 2024. Politico, 15.02.2024, online unter https://ogy.de/7vdd 23 https://icds.ee/en/defence-spending-who-is-doing-what/ 24 Vgl. Daily Sabah: Türkiye’s defense spending expected to constitute 2% of GDP by 2025. 21.10.2022, online unter https://ogy.de/xtbr 25 Vgl. Decode39: Defence spending: Rome’s path towards the 2% target. 20.07.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/c0g3 26 Waldwyn, Karl: Norwegian defence chief sounds alarm and raises sights. In: Military Balance Blog, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23.06.2023, online unter https://ogy.de/8b4a 27 Vgl. Army Technology: Russian threat driving Slovenia’s defence budget increase. 02.08.2022, online unter https://ogy.de/c5y7 28 Vgl. Kamp, Dr. Karl-Heinz: Allianz der Interessen. In: IP, Ausgabe September/Oktober 29 Vgl. Bundeswehr. Stand: 31.07.2023, abgerufen am 19.09.2023, online unter: https://ogy.de/m69j 30 Bundeswehr: Ambitioniertes Ziel: 203.000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten bis 2027. Online unter https://ogy.de/3pzs

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français India, being the largest country by population, has a great responsibility and right to show global leadership. Having chaired the recent G20 summit successfully, and as a member of important global partnerships such as BRICS and Quad, India is strategically placed to play a crucial role in geopolitics in the coming decades. Being the world’s largest democracy places a responsibility on India to drive a global agenda that will foster democracy in other countries. As a member of the Quad, with three other democracies, India can play a key role in upholding a rules based international order. Today, we live in a world that is much different to the world that emerged in 1945, after the Second World War, or in 1991 when the Cold War ended. In both instances, the United States emerged as the dominant superpower. American power, relative to the rest of the world, is now in clear decline and therefore even a loose alliance of democracies that includes India shifts the tide against competing structures of governance. Economic Rise of India India is the fastest growing major economy in the world today and is set to be the third largest economy in the world by the end of this decade. Of course, an alternative way to assess India’s development may be to measure its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which is relatively low at less than US$3,000. However, the sheer size of its overall GDP and growing population gives the overall economy serious importance. India’s large population and the steady expansion of its middle class positions India as a lucrative economic ally for many countries in the world, both as a market and supplier of goods and services. It also makes India an attractive market to invest in, particularly in the current climate of de-risking and diversifying supply chains. Many global corporate powerhouses such as Facebook, Google, Apple, and Saudi Aramco have invested in India. Economic cooperation also inevitably results in stronger political relations, and it is very likely that this trend will continue. Strategic Advantages of India India’s greatest asset in terms of geopolitics and economics will be its democratic system of governance. India presence in the Quad for instance has legitimising effect. All members are democracies, but India is by far the world’s largest democratic nation. Democracy will also help India on the economic front. All advanced economies, with the exception of a few oil rich nations and city states, are democracies. That is because, as argued in a piece for the IMF in 2022, economic growth needs innovation, and innovation is better fostered in a democracy where there is free thinking and creativity. Many nations can become middle-income nations without democracy, but to transition to an advanced economy, they need stronger democratic values. South Korea and Taiwan provide examples of middle-income nations that evolved into high-income economies after a stronger transition toward democracy. Democracy together with population diversty can be a major factor that pushes India to break through the middle-income trap. Meanwhile, the median age of India, which is 32 years, is around 10 years younger than China’s. This is a strategic advantage not only in economic terms but also politically in international relations for India. This will mean an increase in the workforce which can help produce India’s industrial and services goods. A younger population will also result in a larger consumer market and will, more importantly, drive greater inward foreign direct investment. Additionally, a younger population will also result in larger tax revenue for the Indian government which can be used for development. It also results in less financial resources being directed towards an ageing population. As countries such as China, Vietnam, and Bangladesh grow, with outsourced manufacturing playing a large role in their economic agendas, India, which is weaker on manufacturing, has the advantage when it comes to services exports, such as consulting, IT-BPM, and education. India is a center for services outsourced by Western companies, with services exports anticipated to hit US$2 trillion by 2030. English proficiency in India adds to the advantage, but many other factors also play major roles. India has a large skilled workforce especially in information technology, software development, and business process outsourcing. Technology hubs around the country, such as in Bangalore where large global tech companies and startups are based, and government support, add to the scale at which India can expand this critical export in the coming decades. The software services industry, for example, has matured, resulting in sector upscaling. Interestingly, 20 percent of the world’s semiconductor design engineers are employed in India. These aforementioned attributes position India as an ideal strategic partner for many countries. Countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, European nations, Japan, Australia, Canada, and South Korea consider India a natural ally. India is also building ties in its region with the Gulf nations to its west and with the ASEAN nations to its east. India’s neighbour to its south, Sri Lanka, recently went through its worst economic crisis since independence in 1948. After defaulting in April 2022, Sri Lanka came to a standstill with no fuel for 3 weeks, 12 hour power cuts, and food and medicine shortages. It was India that came to the rescue, with US$4 billion at its most vulnerable time, giving a clear message to the world that India is a partner that will stand up for them. Talal Rafi is an Economist and Expert Member of the World Economic Forum. He is currently a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Asian Development Bank, and also a Regular Columnist for the International Monetary Fund. His work has been published by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, World Economic Forum, London School of Economics, UNFCCC, Chatham House London, Deloitte and Forbes.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Oscar Alejandro Pérez, a popular Venezuelan YouTuber who uploads travel videos, was arrested on terrorism charges on Sunday, March 31. Pérez was detained, and subsequently held for 32 hours, over a video he uploaded in 2023. In the video, he points to the Credicard Tower, a building in Caracas that hosts the servers that facilitate the country’s financial transactions, and jokingly adds: “If a bomb were to be thrown at that building, the whole national banking system would collapse.” He was accused of urging people to blow up the building, something Pérez denies. His arrest is the latest evidence of President Nicolás Maduro’s growing crackdown on human rights and civil liberties as the country prepares for presidential elections in July. Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, was a hugely popular president. While in office, he led a social and political movement called the “Bolivarian Revolution”, which aimed to address social, economic and political inequalities through a series of progressive reforms funded by Venezuela’s vast oil wealth. Then, in 2013, Chávez died and Maduro (who was then vice president) came to power after narrowly winning a special election. Initially, Maduro enjoyed the sympathy and support of many Venezuelans loyal to Chávez and his socialist ideals. But since taking office Maduro has presided over a series of economic crises. Hyperinflation, shortages of basic goods, and a deep recession have all made him increasingly unpopular. And Venezuela’s economy has contracted by about 70% under Maduro’s leadership. Consolidating power The last time Venezuelans went to the polls was in 2018. The contest was so rigged that many neighbouring countries branded the election illegitimate. Two of the most popular opposition candidates were disqualified or barred from running, and Maduro won the contest amid claims of vote rigging and other irregularities. Many Venezuelans have grown disillusioned with Maduro and have taken to the streets to vent their anger. But widespread discontent and protests have only fed more insecurity, criminality, poverty and social unrest. Now lacking support from within the Chavista political movement and the Venezuelan military, Maduro has turned to criminal groups to promote a state where illegal armed groups act at the service of the government. Maduro has consolidated power by using state institutions to silence critics, while at the same time engaging in human rights abuses and profiting from corruption. He has been accused of committing crimes against humanity, including torture, kidnapping and extrajudicial killings. And according to Amnesty International, between 240 and 310 people remain arbitrarily detained on political grounds. Unsurprisingly, around 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled repression and economic hardship at home. Roughly 3 million of those displaced have started a new life in Colombia, 1.5 million of them have migrated to Peru, while others have made their way north to the US. The Venezuelan migrant crisis has become the largest in the world, with the number of displaced people exceeding that seen in Ukraine and Syria. Silencing dissent Venezuelans will head to the polls on July 28. The arrest of Pérez is part of a wider strategy aimed at silencing dissent and strengthening the regime’s hold over its people as Maduro seeks re-election. On February 9, a prominent lawyer and military expert Rocío San Miguel was arrested in Caracas before several members of her family disappeared. San Miguel is known for her work exposing corruption in the Venezuelan army. She appeared at a hearing four days later accused of “treason, conspiracy and terrorism” for her purported role in an alleged plot to assassinate Maduro. Her arrest set off a wave of criticism both inside and outside Venezuela, including from the UN Human Rights Council. Its office in Caracas was subsequently ordered to stop operations on the grounds that it promoted opposition to the country and staff were told to leave the country within 72 hours. It is unclear whether San Miguel remains in jail. In March, Ronald Ojeda, a 32-year-old former lieutenant in Venezuela’s military, was found dead in Chile ten days after he had gone missing. He had protested against the Maduro government on social media wearing a T-shirt with “freedom” written on the collar and prison bars drawn on the map of Venezuela. His body was found in a suitcase beneath a metre of concrete. Chilean prosecutors later announced that his abduction and killing was the work of El Tren de Aragua, one of Venezuela’s most powerful criminal organisations. Don’t bank on free and fair elections The crackdown on civic society poses a dilemma for the Biden administration. In October 2023, Maduro secured a partial lifting of US economic sanctions (which have been in place since 2019) in return for a commitment to holding “free and fair” presidential elections, in addition to political reforms and the release of political prisoners. But that deal is quickly unwinding. In January, the leader of the opposition and a clear favourite in the polls, María Corina Machada was banned from holding office for 15 years. The Biden administration has since reimposed some sanctions and has threatened new ones on Venezuela’s vital oil sector if political reforms are not made. Venezuela has become a deeply corrupt, authoritarian and criminal state that shuts down dissent, forces millions of its own people to flee, and kills or abducts whoever threatens the regime. Its occasional displays of reason are motivated purely by economic gain. In many ways, Maduro’s political repression reflects his growing fear that his regime’s days are numbered, driving him to desperate measures to force a different fate. Once a dictator takes hold, it becomes very difficult to dislodge them.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français English translation of this Article was done by Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations  Sweden and Finland personified successful neutrality in international relations for decades. Does their accession to NATO mean that the policy of neutrality will no longer have any prospects in the modern world? Sweden becomes the 32nd member of the North Atlantic Alliance. As we predicted a few weeks ago, the Hungarian parliament ratified the accession protocol of this Scandinavian kingdom relatively quickly and removed the last obstacle to its official NATO membership. This ends the almost two-year story of the Alliance’s enlargement in northern Europe, which was initially expected to have a much more rapid development. Stockholm’s finish line Of the 30 member states that were part of NATO when Sweden and Finland submitted their applications in May 2022, 28 carried out domestic procedures to ratify accession protocols in a tick. But two countries – Türkiye and Hungary – had questions for the candidates. In particular, Ankara said that it was impossible to have allied relations with countries that have become “guest houses for terrorists” and impose sanctions against Türkiye. This referred primarily to Stockholm’s policy, so Finland joined the Alliance in March 2023, while Sweden was left in the “waiting room”. After twenty months of negotiations and a series of concessions from Sweden itself, as well as the USA, which agreed to unblock the deal to sell F-16 fighter jets to Türkiye, the Turkish parliament passed a positive decision on Stockholm’s application on 23 January. After that, Sweden faced the final obstacle – Hungary’s lack of ratification. In Budapest, as the speaker of the Hungarian parliament put it, Stockholm was expected to show “some respect” and prove that it “takes Hungary seriously”. As a result, in recent weeks the drama has come down to whether Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson will accept his Hungarian counterpart Viktor Orban’s invitation to visit Budapest and personally discuss all issues that concern Hungary. At first, the Swedish government responded sharply and unambiguously that its head had nothing to discuss with Orban, at least until there was a positive decision on the kingdom’s admission to NATO. In the end, however, Kristersson did fly to Budapest on 23 February. After the negotiations, Viktor Orban said that the agreements reached in the field of military-technical co-operation “help restore confidence between the two countries”. In particular, an agreement was reached on Hungary’s purchase of four new Gripen fighter aircraft and a 10-year extension of the maintenance service of 14 Swedish fighter jets already in the Hungarian Air Force. Three days later, on 26 February, the Hungarian parliament ratified the protocol on Sweden's accession to NATO: 188 deputies voted in favour and only 6 against. Thus, supporters of the Alliance’s Northern European enlargement can calmly exhale. Within days, the Swedish flag-raising ceremony is expected to take place at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It will draw a line under Stockholm’s two hundred years of non-alignment with military blocs, a period during which Sweden has become one of the most recognisable avatars of the very idea of neutrality. No country for neutrals? Sweden’s decision to end its non-aligned policy, as already discussed, can hardly be called completely spontaneous and breaking all the foundations and trends of the past decades. Indeed, it was made under the extraordinary conditions of public shock after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, but Stockholm has been slowly moving towards it for a long time. This is important to know and understand, because against the background of NATO’s North European enlargement in 2023-2024, several natural questions arise about the significance of this event in the broader international context. For example: What does Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO mean for the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment? Are the decisions of Stockholm and Helsinki indicators that place for neutrality in today’s world is shrinking? And should states that are still outside political-military blocs look closely at the example of Sweden and Finland and perhaps follow it? These questions are not just theoretical. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine and the imposition of the first anti-Russian sanctions, both in the media and from high political tribunes, the thesis began to be heard that there is no place for neutrality in the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine. At least, in this way Kyiv itself and its Western partners have formulated their position. The explanation is simple: Russia’s actions, they emphasise, must be qualified as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, which means that any form of neutral attitude to the conflict would encourage these violations and is therefore immoral and illegitimate. Based on this logic, they called on the nations of the world to condemn Moscow’s actions and join the Western sanctions regime. Since not all countries were willing to take sides in a conflict they do not consider their own, Ukraine and the West expectedly (but with varying success) used various instruments of convincing and pressure. This can be clearly seen in the dynamics of voting on war-related resolutions at the UN General Assembly. In general, the thesis “No country for neutrals” is as old as the world. It always sounds especially loud at the initial stages of large-scale geopolitical and military confrontations. This was the case, for example, in the early years of the Cold War, when the position of traditionally neutral states and leanings towards neutrality by countries such as Yugoslavia caused a harsh reaction both in the Kremlin and in the White House. Both considered them not only harmful in the fight against ideological enemies, but also deeply immoral. It is now once again difficult for small states to argue the importance of maintaining a neutral policy on the basis of their historical traditions or even their desire to help resolve conflicts; not to mention their own interests, which are not necessarily similar to those of the conflicting parties. The case of Switzerland is illustrative. Even with the naked eye one can see how difficult it is for Bern to implement its natural policy of neutrality, which, unlike Sweden, did not succumb to significant erosion either during the Cold War or after its end. On the one hand Switzerland is under enormous Western pressure, and on the other – under slightly different but also pressure from Moscow, which has been quick to include Switzerland among unfriendly states for joining some of the EU sanctions. Revealingly, in mid-2022, Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis, who was then also the country’s president, even proposed that a new concept of neutrality be enshrined in law. The idea was to transform the classic Swiss neutrality into “cooperative neutrality”. However, what exactly the new concept meant remained a mystery (although the name already makes it more or less clear), as the members of the Swiss Federal Council rejected the proposal. But the very fact that such an initiative emerged is a good illustration of the challenges that neutral states face today. The future of neutrality The Cassis initiative also suggests that neutral states will not abandon their policies easily if they consider them optimal under the specific structural conditions that define their security environment. True, they will adjust to changing circumstances and adapt their foreign policy positioning accordingly, because, unlike major powers, small states cannot independently shape their own security environment and by definition are forced to adjust, look for vague wording, and manoeuvre. But they will not simply abandon a policy that has been tested for decades or even centuries. That is, the national interest of these countries remains at the centre of everything, rather than pressure, wishes and appeals to morality on the part of the participants in certain conflicts, even if they are superpowers. This is how the cases of Sweden and Finland differ from those of Switzerland, Austria, Malta, Ireland, and other countries that continue to adhere to neutrality and/or non- alignment: they define their national interest in fundamentally different ways in the specific geopolitical conditions that are developing here and now. At the same time, a simple rule always applies in international relations. The more uncompromising and fierce the confrontation between key actors becomes, the less opportunities and room for manoeuvre neutral states have. Therefore, in Europe, these are very hard times indeed for neutrals. But in some other parts of the world, the structural conditions are different, and the incentives for non-aligned policies in many countries, on the contrary, are only growing. India is a vivid example of this. It is now a welcome guest everywhere, and the main geopolitical antagonists are literally competing in inviting Delhi to co-operate. In such a situation, it is quite natural for India to skim all the cream with the help of neutral positioning, which she successfully does. European neutrals, however, now have to fight for the right to retain as many elements of the policy of non-alignment as possible and hope that their position will soon be in demand again. In this process, the forms and methods of neutrality are inevitably evolving. One of the leading theorists of neutrality, Austrian Professor Heinz Gärtner, has estimated that there are more than 20 different types of neutral policies. There is no doubt that this list will only grow over time. From the legalistic forms enshrined in the Hague Conventions in the early 1900s, neutrality will evolve further and further towards hybrid political forms such as hedging. It is important that in any case, a neutralist policy, no matter what forms it occasionally takes, will always have a place in international relations. Especially given the level of globalisation that has been achieved, which distinguishes the modern world from the realities of the Cold War. The great powers opposing each other will themselves eventually have an interest in linkages in the form of neutral and non-aligned countries. In addition, without neutral states and non-state actors, many practices basic to international relations would be impossible. For example, it is difficult to imagine the full implementation of international humanitarian law without them.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 43 Executive Summary: • The political rigidity associated with Western reactions to Minsk has limited any positive impact and is now sacrificing the “strategic foundation of Belarus’s statehood” on the altar of “present-day concerns.” • Official Minsk has limited economic options due to Western sanctions, leading to a stronger reliance on Russian businesses and trade routes. • Whether Belarus will retain its statehood or become a Russian colony depends on how long Minsk and Moscow remain on the same side of the Iron Curtain. By all indications, Western policy toward Belarus is in need of fresh ideas. The crackdown on the post-election protests in 2020, as well as Belarus’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, has elicited stern reactions in the West to Minsk and a wholehearted embrace of the opposition. Still, the political rigidity associated with these Western reactions has limited their positive impact and is now sacrificing the “strategic foundation of Belarus’s statehood” on the altar of “present-day concerns” (see EDM, March 14). Acting on some of these concerns may be counterproductive. For example, on March 1, Lithuania closed two more Belarusian border crossings and has been questioning Belarusian migrants based on the frequency of their trips to Belarus and their stance on the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime (LRT, February 28). Such concerns limit Belarusians’ contact with the West and are used as fodder for hostile interpreters of outside actions toward Minsk. Russian historian Alexander Dyukov, in an interview with RuBaltic, notes that, until 2020, “Vilnius used to be a ‘weekend capital’ for some Belarusians. But people in expensive clothes and good cars who moved to Lithuania for permanent residence thereafter are a completely different matter.” Moreover, those newcomers appear to embrace the ideology that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, headed by Vilnius, was a proto-Belarusian state whose name modern-day Lithuania usurped (RuBaltic, March 10). Whether such an ideology is dominant among Belarusians in Lithuania remains an open question, but it is unlikely to constitute any threat to the country. Perhaps even more critical than Dyukhov’s hostile interpretation of Litvinism are the strategic implications of the semi-blockade from Belarus’s Western neighbors (Russia.post, August 30, 2023; see EDM, March 14). Some opposition-minded Belarusian commentators appear to take these implications seriously and use them to educate members of the Belarusian émigré community. In his recent weekly question-and-answer session with Zerkalo, Artyom Shraibman responded to the question: “There is an opinion that, in the event of the disappearance of the Putin regime, Russia will be too busy to care about Belarus, so the Belarusian regime will fall. However, as Russian businesses are taking over all the valuable assets in Belarus, the country is unlikely to be willing to let go of these businesses. And if so, does Belarus have a chance to not become a Russian colony in the foreseeable future?” Shraibman dispelled the notion that Russian business assets in Belarus are conducive to Belarus becoming a Russian colony. Shraibman referenced hostile takeovers of Russian holdings by Minsk, such as Belagazprombank in 2020 and the Belarusian authorities’ arrest of Russian potash company Uralkalii CEO Vladislav Baumgaertner in 2013 (see EDM, September 4, 2013). In both cases, Moscow did not retaliate. Shraibman believes it is important that Russia has become the primary buyer of Belarusian goods and that all remaining Belarusian exports are now in need of exclusively Russian transit, as Lithuanian, Latvian, and Polish transit routes are blocked. It is this sort of dependency that makes Belarusian entrepreneurs overly accustomed to Russian business practices and norms (YouTube, March 7). Whether Belarus will retain its statehood depends on how long Minsk and Moscow remain on the same side of the Iron Curtain. Developments on the other side of this new divide in Belarus are not as straightforward as they may seem. In mid-February, Elvira Mirsalimova, a Vitebsk-based ardent supporter of Russia’s war against Ukraine and of the view that Belarusians are Russians, was arrested for propagating Nazi symbols on her Telegram account. She republished a post about the “trophies of the Ukrainian army” supposedly found by Russian pro-war journalist Vladlen Tatarsky, who was killed in St Petersburg last year. These “trophies” included a flag with a swastika allegedly found in dugouts abandoned by the Ukrainian army, which Tatarsky was pictured standing on (Facebook/Mirsalimova, March 8). The irony of the situation is that both the late Tatarsky and Mirsalimova are champions of Russia’s expansionism, contrary to their “anti-Nazi” rhetoric (Zerkalo, March 5; Belsat, March 8). Valer Karbalevich of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty attributes the Mirsalimova episode to the fact that demonstrating support for Belarus-Russia integration, though officially enshrined, has limits in Minsk. Crossing these limits is fraught with punishment. Karbalevich recalls the 2016 imprisonment of three Belarusian citizens who insulted the Belarusian nation in three articles in the Russian media (Svaboda, March 11). He also notes that Lukashenka has monopolized the pro-Russian flank of the Belarusian political scene. Unfortunately, neither Karbalevich nor Shraibman acknowledges that, in Belarus itself, there are essentially two communities in one that adhere to different historical narratives, and both communities claim to represent “Belarusianness.” On the one hand, many Belarusians subscribe to the Russo-centric interpretation of Belarusian statehood; on the other hand, most of those Belarusians in the opposition abide by the “Westernizing” narrative (The Jamestown Foundation, December 20, 2019). Lukashenka claims leadership of the Russo-centric segment of society. West-friendly pollsters, however, have shown the latter segment to be numerically stronger than its counterpart (Belorusskaya Natsionalnaya Identichnost, December 2022). If this is the case, the answer to who is better equipped to protect Belarus from being absorbed by Russia is unclear. After all, while protesting the rigged 2020 election, the opposition did not favor any geopolitical orientation whatsoever. They became manifestly pro-Western when they found themselves forced out of Belarus. The opposition has little to no influence on developments within the country. Lukashenka’s track record, however, includes declarations and actions opposing Russia’s expansionism. For example, the Russian ambassador to Minsk, Mikhail Babich, was ousted in April 2019 because he appeared to confuse an independent country with a subdivision of the Russian Federation (see EDM, May 1, 2019). Ruling out the possibility of engaging official Minsk no longer makes sense for the West. Not only would such an engagement prop up Belarusian statehood, but nothing short of it can facilitate the release of Belarus’s political prisoners and limit the country’s integration with Russia.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Five months into the war, and it seems that the political and social divisions of October 6 have returned to the center stage, reshaped by issues relating to what is happening on the battlefield, the future of the war, and the fate of the hostages. This may have serious consequences for Israel’s social resilience and national security Political disputes and polarization have, of late, returned to the forefront of the public and media discourse in Israel. While one could view this trend as seemingly signaling a return to some kind of normalcy, which is a positive aspect during wartime, it also poses significant challenges to the resilience of Israeli society. A polarizing discourse harms social solidarity, undermines trust in state bodies and the decision-making process, and casts doubts regarding the motives of civil-society organizations. Considering this, policymakers and politicians in Israel should pay very close attention to the situation and try to avoid adding to the toxic and hurtful political discourse. Primarily, they should refrain from portraying sensitive issues related to the war—disagreements over which are perfectly legitimate—as polarizing political issues, such as the issue of the hostages. Over the past few weeks, the political and social disputes within Israeli society have returned to the forefront of the social and media discourse in Israel. Until then, the nation had been preoccupied with the war, creating an image of unity around the goals of the war. Recently, however, the social-political crisis within Israeli society—which was created due to the government’s attempts to advance its judicial/regime reform/revolution—has again reemerged in the public discourse over various issues, including those related directly to managing the war in Gaza. In general, these rifts manifest themselves in part in the context of the incumbent government, its priorities, and its conduct, as well as regarding civilian aspects of the war. These include, for example, the state budget that was recently approved in its first reading by the Knesset, or the amendments to the Military Service Law. This is in addition to politicians trading personal insults with each other and allegations that the prime minister wants to continue the war out of personal considerations and is not giving top priority to releasing the hostages held in Gaza, as most do not come from his traditional base of supporters. At the same time, the political disagreements have grown more extreme in terms of balancing between the goal of toppling Hamas by means of “an absolute military victory” and the efforts to free the hostages. Even the public campaign waged by the hostages’ families vis-à-vis the government has become more acute and could assume a political tone, partly because of disputes among the families that are being portrayed as political. The escalation in the political discourse on social media includes accusations of a campaign aimed to discredit the hostages’ families, as revealed in a report by the Fake Reporter organization, which alleged that social media influencers supporting the prime minister have attempted to portray the campaign of the hostage families as illegitimate and inauthentic. Similarly, the issue of humanitarian aid to residents of the Gaza Strip also has led to demonstrations at the border crossings, some of which have been violent, requiring police intervention. There has also been significant political debate regarding “the day after” the war. This includes the far-right’s proposal to resettle Gaza and debates on the feasibility of incorporating Palestinian factions into any future agreements concerning the governance and civilian management of Gaza. Research and polls have suggested that these disagreements often align with the political positions that these people had before the war. During the first weeks of the war, any extremist political discourse was widely deemed as inappropriate, with emphasis placed on fostering national unity (“Together we will win”). Even those conducting political polls were criticized, although polls have since become routine again. The resurgence of the political rifts is reflected in the resumption and spread of public protests—on both sides of the political divide and on a variety of issues. Demonstrations calling for the prime minister to resign have resumed, and many organizations—such as the Kaplan Force and Brothers in Arms—have announced their intention to intensify their protests. In this context, 56 percent of the respondents in the latest poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies on February 4 said that they were concerned or very concerned about the state of Israeli society on the day after the war.[1] The resurgence of the political discourse and protests in Israeli society could be seen as a positive sign of recovery from the paralysis caused by the collective trauma of the events of October 7. Research literature recognizes the phenomenon of “rallying round the flag”; when a crisis threatens the fundamental values of a given society, the public will join forces and unconditionally support the decisions of the political leadership regarding how to resolve that crisis. Immediately after October 7, Israeli society became unified in support of the war’s objectives and the IDF, setting aside pre-existing divisions and rifts from before Hamas’s attack. This unity, still largely maintained today, is reflected in the mainstream media. Additionally, early in the war, civil-society organizations—including those previously identified as political—joined together in volunteer efforts and, most importantly, agreed to set aside divisive political discourses. As the war shifts into a low-intensity conflict, which could last many months, Israeli society seems to be adapting to a “war routine.” This shift has resulted in a diminished need for unity, bringing the socio-political divisions back to the forefront of the discourse with renewed vigor. The reappearance of political disputes poses a challenge to the resilience of Israeli society and its capacity to endure a prolonged and strenuous war. Polarization could hinder Israel’s recovery from the crisis on several levels. The polarizing discourse erodes social solidarity, a crucial component of social resilience; solidarity enables a society to unite and work together, including through extensive civic involvement, to rebuild the ruins— both metaphorical and literal. Polarization also affects a society’s self-perception and the levels of hope and optimism, which are vital to social resilience. The return of the polarizing discourse—especially if it becomes violent—undermines the social solidarity as it places an emphasis on what divides and distinguishes different sectors in society, undermines trust in the state’s institutions, and threatens the necessary civic cooperation. An illustration of the negative impact of renewed polarization is evident in the INSS poll from February 4 (see figure 1), which showed a decline in Israel’s sense of solidarity, and therefore its social resilience for the first time since the war began. It is still true that, in most of the resilience indices, the positive trends remain and are relatively stable. Nonetheless, the data signals a concerning shift in the public sentiment, with the resumption of a toxic public discourse already causing damage.   For a society to successfully recover from a profound and severe crisis, trust in the decision-making process and the country’s leaders is essential, partly to ensure that the public will cooperate with the implementation of decisions and to bolster the general sense of security. The resumption of the divisive political discourse stains many of the decisions that are currently being made—on civic and military matters—with a political hue. For example, in the poll conducted on February 4, 56 percent of respondents claimed that they disagreed with the statement that the decisions of the political leadership regarding the hostage issue were based on relevant considerations rather than political considerations. In the same survey, 64 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that the decisions taken by the political leadership regarding the war were based solely on military considerations and not political ones (see figure 2). This is a significant increase compared to the findings of the previous poll, conducted on December 31, which asked the same questions. These percentages, reflecting a lack of public trust in the government’s decisions, should be considered along with the low level of trust that the public expressed, in the February 4 survey, in the government itself (24 percent) and the prime minister (30 percent). Further evidence of the negative impact of the politicization of the discourse can be found in surveys conducted by Kimchi and others, showing that respondents who support the government perceive resilience to be higher across all parameters: national, communal, and personal. One explanation for this phenomenon is that supporters of the government have more trust in its decisions.[2]   It should be noted that while at the beginning of the war, civil society organizations, including groups that were active in the social protests, played a central role in ensuring that the Israeli economy and society continued to function, resuming their political involvement will make it difficult for them to serve as connecting social capital, which is essential for overcoming the internal crisis, especially in the face of the government’s weakness. The more their activities become tainted with toxic political overtones, the more the genuine disputes among the public will undermine the ability of these organizations to aid any aspect of the Israeli war effort; this, in turn, will weaken social resilience. In conclusion, the resumption of the political discourse and the polarization could significantly harm the ability of Israeli society to build its social resilience needed to recover from this major crisis. To limit these negative effects, Israeli policymakers should shun toxic political discourse as much as possible and avoid deepening the rifts and the polarization that exists in Israeli society as a whole—and especially as it relates to the war. [1] The surveys were based on a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel and included 500 respondents. The surveys were conducted between October 12 to February 4, led by the Data Analytics Desk of INSS. The field work was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute and was based on internet questionnaires. The maximum sampling error for each sample is ±4 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. [2] Shaul Kimchi and others, “Research Report: The Connections Between Public Resilience, Coping Indices, and Support for the Government, Three Months After the Outbreak of the War,” [Unpublished].

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français It has long been held that embassies should be treated as “off-limits” to other nations. Yet in a single week, two governments – both long-established democracies – stand accused of violating, in different ways, the laws surrounding foreign diplomatic missions. First, on April 1, 2024, Iran’s embassy in Damascus was bombed, presumably by Israel, killing several high-ranking commanders of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Then, on April 5, Ecuadorian police forced their way into the Mexican Embassy in Quito to arrest a former vice president of Ecuador who was seeking political asylum. Both actions have led to claims of international law violations and accusations that the Vienna Convention, which establishes the immunity of diplomatic missions, was contravened. As someone with a fair amount of knowledge of embassy life – I have served as Chile’s head of mission in China, India and South Africa and coedited The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy – I believe the two incidents are of greater concern than much of the international community appears to be viewing them. Contrary to the famous quip from late businessman and presidential candidate Ross Perot, embassies are not just “relics of the days of sailing ships.” Rather, in an increasingly complex world where geopolitical conflict, mass migrations, pandemics and climate change require careful and stable diplomatic management, any incidents that erode the sanctity of embassy rules could have serious negative consequences. In short, they make for a more dangerous world. Curious indifference to embassy attack Of the two recent incidents, the Iranian embassy bombing is the more serious, as it involved the loss of life and resulted in warnings of retaliatory attacks. Yet, Western countries, leaders of which often voice concern over upholding the so-called “rules-based order,” have been reluctant to condemn the act. It was notable that the three liberal democracies on the U.N. Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – all refused to condemn the strike on Iran’s embassy when the issue came up before them. Israel, while not officially acknowledging responsibility, argued that the Iranian ambassador’s residence was not really a diplomatic venue but “a military building … disguised as a civilian building.” As such, to Israel it was a perfectly legitimate target. But by this logic, nearly all embassies would be seen as fair game. Almost by definition, the vast majority of embassies – particularly of the larger countries – are populated with significant numbers of military and intelligence personnel. To suggest that for that reason embassies should lose their diplomatic immunity and become legitimate targets for armed attacks would bring the whole edifice of the Vienna Convention crashing down. And with it would come the structure on which worldwide formal diplomatic interactions are based. Bedrock diplomatic principles The case of Ecuador, though less serious because it did not involve loss of life, is a bit more complex and demands some unpacking. At the center of the diplomatic spat between Ecuador and Mexico is former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who served four years behind bars following a 2017 conviction on corruption charges. Glas is now facing trial on different charges, prompting his December 2023 application for asylum at the Mexican Embassy. Mexico accepted the request and conveyed this to the Ecuadorian government. The latter justified its decision to send police into the Mexican embassy on the grounds that it believes Glas cannot be granted political asylum as he is a convicted felon. There is some basis to this claim: Under the Organization of American States’ Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, political asylum cannot be given to convicted felons unless the charges behind such conviction are of a political nature. But at the same time, Article 21 of the Vienna Convention states that diplomatic missions enjoy full immunity and extraterritoriality, meaning the host government does not have the right to enter an embassy without the authorization of the head of mission. Ecuador argues that Mexico abused its diplomatic immunity, leaving it no option other than to send police in. Yet, here a crucial distinction needs to be made. Diplomatic immunity and the extraterritoriality of foreign missions are bedrock principles of the Vienna Convention. Political asylum is a separate matter that should be handled on its own. As such, if the Ecuadorian government considered Glas not to qualify for political asylum, it could have attempted to legally block the move or refuse safe passage for the asylum-seeker to exit the embassy and leave the country. Mexico would have strong grounds to counter such measures, however, as according to the Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, it is up to the asylum-granting state to decide whether the case is politically motivated. Implications for the future Regardless of the merits of the asylum case, sending in the equivalent of a SWAT team to storm the embassy represents a deliberate violation of diplomatic norms. There is a long history of Latin America politicians seeking asylum who spent many years holed up in embassy buildings because governments would not grant them safe passage – the most notable being Peruvian leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who spent five years at the Colombian Embassy in Lima. Yet, with a few exceptions, not even in the darkest hour of Latin America’s military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s were police permitted to storm into embassy buildings to arrest asylum-seekers. And this highlights what makes Ecuador’s actions especially worrisome. Precisely because of Latin America’s problems with political instability and a tradition of military coup, the laws surrounding political asylum and diplomatic immunity are necessary. Undermining the Vienna Convention in the way Ecuador has risks setting a precedent that other governments might be tempted to follow. Political asylum in Latin America has traditionally worked as a safety valve, allowing deposed leaders to get themselves out of harm’s way. Weakening the diplomatic structures in place supporting asylum will make the handling of democratic breakdowns more difficult. It also risks exacerbating regional disagreements. We are already seeing this with Mexico breaking relations with Ecuador as a result of the embassy raid. Making diplomacy more difficult Of course, embassy violations are not unprecedented. Guatemala’s dictatorship attacked the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 1980, killing several asylum-seekers, including a former vice president. And Uruguay’s military government sent security forces into the Venezuelan Embassy in Montevideo in 1976 to arrest a left-wing militant who had sought asylum, leading to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But those events in the relatively distant past were widely and rightly condemned at the time as the product of authoritarian regimes with little regard for international conventions. The comparatively relaxed international attitude to the embassy violations by Israel and Ecuador reflects, I believe, a failure to grasp the significance of eroding diplomatic immunity and norms. As global challenges increase, embassies and their representatives become more important, not less so. If the takeaway from the two latest embassy incidents is that the protection of diplomatic premises can be secondary to whatever is politically expedient on any given day, then it will be of great detriment to the management of international relations. Diplomacy will become much more difficult. And given the enormity of the challenges the world faces today, that is the last thing any country needs.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français On 24 February 2022, Russian troops pushed into Ukraine from multiple fronts, bombarding cities like Kharkiv and the capital Kyiv. The invasion plunged Europe into its worst security crisis in decades and prompted a massive outpouring of military aid and economic sanctions on Russia from NATO and Western allies (Ramzy 2022). There were warning signs beforehand, as Russia had massed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders for months and issued demands to roll back NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe (Roth, Dan, David and Nana 2022). Yet the full-scale invasion still came as a shock via its violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force (United Nations 2022). From a liberal perspective emphasizing democratic norms, international law, and human rights, Russia’s actions were indefensible and morally reprehensible. However, six key realist arguments can explain Russia’s rationale for the Ukraine invasion; security dilemmas and geographical insecurity, attempt to regain a sphere of influence, implementation of an offensive realist strategy, revisionism against the U.S.-led liberal international order, diversionary war theory, and autocratic insecurity and domestic politics. Realist Theory and Core Tenets Realism is one of the leading theories in the study of international relations, originating from thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and later articulated by 20th century scholars like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz (Burchill, Andrew and Richard 2013). It posits that international politics is characterized by anarchy and a struggle for power between sovereign nation-states pursuing their own national interests (Waltz 1979). Key assumptions underpin the bulk of realism: 1. States are the primary actors and the fundamental units of analysis in the anarchic international system with no supranational authority. 2. All states possess offensive military capabilities that render them potentially dangerous to one another. 3. States can never be certain of other states’ future intentions or actions, leading to mistrust and worst-case scenario planning. 4. In this self-help system, states must look out for their own national interests and survival as the principal motive (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2014). 5. While economic and cultural factors are important, military force and power politics take primacy in realist analysis. Realism tends to view human nature as flawed and egoistic, distrustful of lofty ideals like global peace or international cooperation. It emphasizes pragmatism over moral principles and ethics, assuming states will act opportunistically when their interests require it (Carr 1964). The accumulation of military capabilities and economic power is seen as a means for states to increase their relative power and security in an anarchic, zero-sum world (Mearsheimer 2001). Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, place a significant emphasis on human nature and decision-making elites in their understanding of international relations. They argue that politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Chimni 2017). Morgenthau, in particular, has been described as one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century and one of the greatest realist thinkers of all times (Chimni 2017). Classical realists believe that their pessimistic vision of human nature is reflected in politics and international relations. In contrast, neorealists or structural realists, like Kenneth Waltz, emphasize the constraints imposed by the anarchic structure of the international system (Lobell 2017). Waltz’s neorealism, first outlined in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, argues that power is the most important factor in international relations. He posits that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system) (Waltz 1979). Within the neorealist school, there are two main schools of thought: defensive realism and offensive realism. Defensive realists, following Waltz, argue that states merely aim to maintain the existing balance of power for survival. They assert that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security. They contend that aggressive expansion upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory, thereby decreasing the primary objective of the state, which they argue is ensuring its security (Lobell 2017). On the other hand, offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer see states as persistently seeking opportunities for relative gain and hegemony when possible. Mearsheimer, in his groundbreaking work “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, argues that states seek to maximize their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony. He contends that only by creating an imbalance of power in its own favour will a state be able to maximize its security (Üstündağ 2020; Wivel 2017). The Realist Rationale for Russian Invasion of Ukraine Ukraine shares a 1,500-mile border with Russia, and its core territory was formerly part of Russia until 1991 (Plokhy 2023). From Moscow’s perspective, the prospect of Ukraine aligning with the West and integrating with NATO was an existential threat to Russian power that it could not accept (Lindsay 2022). Realists argue that a Ukraine aligned with NATO could enable the deployment of offensive weaponry close to Russia’s borders and threaten its access to the Black Sea, a warm water port it has coveted for centuries (McCallion 2023). As the core of realist theory warns, the basic structure of an anarchic and self-help system means states can never feel secure about other states’ future intentions or actions (Waltz 1979). When one state enhances its security, it undermines another’s. According to Mearsheimer, “Because no state can ever be sure that other states will not use their offensive capabilities for aggressive purposes, every state is compelled to look for ways to guarantee its own survival” (2014, 77). Seen from this perspective, Russia’s invasion can be rationalized as a pre-emptive move to neutralize what it saw as an imminent strategic threat. Closely related to arguments about great power status is the realist notion of states pursuing spheres of influence or buffer zones to enhance their security. The realist argument is that all great powers in history, including Russia, have sought to control the security dynamics in adjacent regions by maintaining relations with nearby smaller states that are aligned with their interests (Mearsheimer 2019). Ukraine, with its geostrategic position between Russia and Europe, is viewed as critically important terrain in Russia’s desired sphere of influence. Realists argue that rather than the expansion of Western liberal democracy, Russia was fundamentally motivated to invade to reestablish a favourable balance of power, security arrangements, and compliant buffer states on its periphery (Trenin 2022). Allowing Ukraine to align itself closely with NATO and host potential offensive forces was seen as a step too far by Moscow. Beyond defensively reacting to perceived security threats in the region, it can be inferred that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reflects a calculated strategy of offensive realism – persistent and opportunistic efforts to enhance its power economically and militarily to establish regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). Under this view, Putin aimed to take advantage of a window of opportunity and weakness in the West to redraw boundaries and spheres of influence in Europe. Putin is said to want to rebuild a Russian sphere of influence in eastern Europe, principally embracing former Soviet republics such as now independent Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine. He has frequently bemoaned their “loss” after the Soviet Union collapsed. Putin may also hope to demonstrate to the west (and Russians) that the country is still a superpower. (Tisdall 2022, para. 2). Related to the offensive realism interpretation, some realists frame Russia’s invasion as an act of revisionism against the U.S.-dominated liberal international order that emerged after the Cold War (Kotoulas 2022). For decades, Russia complained about perceived encirclement by NATO and about what it viewed as disrespect and disregard for its interests in relation to Ukraine and its own sphere of influence (Sakwa 2022). The realist view is that even after the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and its allies continued to expand in ways that threatened Russia’s core interests and left it feeling boxed in by the steady eastward march of NATO (Smith and Dawson 2022). From this perspective, Russia eventually decided it needed to upset the liberal order and use brute force to re-establish itself as a great power capable of exerting sway on its periphery. Russia under Putin has no intention of entering into an American-run liberal world order but instead wants a multipolar world in which Russia enjoys a blocking position if not an outright veto. This is because Putin himself is ideologically averse to western liberalism (Grant 2022). By forcefully altering borders and facts on the ground in Ukraine, the realist argument suggests Russia aimed to disrupt the Western-centric world order and assert its regional dominance. Another realist interpretation views Russia’s invasion through the lens of diversionary war theory – the idea that leaders may provoke external conflict to divert public attention from domestic turmoil or unpopular policies (Levy and Vakili 1992). There is precedent for Russian leaders using force abroad for domestic purposes, from Stalin’s invasion of Finland in 1939 to Putin’s wars in Chechnya and 2008 invasion of Georgia (Ferraro 2023). From this view, Putin faced a host of domestic challenges in 2022, from economic malaise, rampant corruption and wealth inequality, to the prospect of more anti-regime protests like those in 2020 and early 2022 (Sharifulin 2023; McHugh 2023). “The Russian invasion of Ukraine could have been an attempt by Putin to garner popularity by invoking a distorted interpretation of Russia’s history and playing on Russian nationalism” (Rogers and Yi 2022, para. 3). From the foregoing it is obvious that launching a nationalist, irredentist campaign to reconquer historically Russian lands in Ukraine may have been calculated to bolster Putin’s domestic standing and shift discussion away from internal grievances. The realist logic is that leaders will take aggressive foreign policy actions when domestic audiences become restive, to rally patriotic support and legitimacy. Finally, another related realist explanation rooted in Russia’s domestic politics is the theory of autocratic insecurity, or fear among authoritarian leaders like Putin that if they compromise or appear weak, it could undermine their regime survival (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012). This aligns with defensive realist logic, where states will act pre-emptively and uncompromisingly when core interests and stakes are their very existence. The argument is that Putin saw the 2022 events in Ukraine as an existential threat to his regime’s survival and legitimacy, given its claims to defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine (Pifer 2023). A miscalculation that resulted in losing influence over Ukraine could inflame nationalist opposition at home and tarnish Putin’s carefully cultivated strongman image. It is evident that Putin’s war is motivated by longstanding concerns that if Russia doesn’t reassert its control over the territories it traditionally dominated, his regime – along with Russia’s status as a great power – will be undermined. The autocratic insecurity thesis suggests Putin felt he had to escalate in Ukraine to ensure his own political survival and Russia’s place as a relevant great power. Counterarguments and Moral Debates While the realist perspective offers several compelling interpretations of Russia’s strategic calculations and motivations underlying the Ukraine invasion, it leaves many fundamental questions unanswered and provokes heated moral debates. First, even if Russia felt genuine security concerns or resented Western encroachment, it had many alternative foreign policy options short of a full-scale war that caused catastrophic death and suffering. Failure to pursue diplomacy or de-escalation is difficult for realists to fully explain or justify. Second, a core tenet of the Westphalian system of nation-states is that countries cannot violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of others through force or aggression. Russia’s actions obliterated this international norm, raising questions about the validity of applying an amoral, power-politics lens that glosses over legal and human rights considerations (Kampmann 2021). Just as a burglar cannot be the judge of his own cause, you cannot allow a nation to be the sole arbiter of its own interests against those of the rest of the world whenever that happens to militate against the general interest and settlements Third, a consistently neglected component in realist thought is the key role of ideological and domestic factors in shaping interests and threat perceptions. Putin’s Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) ideology views Ukraine as an artificial state and integral part of the greater Russia – a visceral belief that drove many of his decisions as much as geopolitical power calculations (Suslov 2022). The invasion thus cannot be fully explained without understanding the pseudo-historical mythmaking that permeated the Kremlin’s worldview. Finally, while providing interesting insights into Russia’s strategic cost-benefit analysis, realist arguments struggle to wrestle with the ethics and wisdom behind the invasion. Even if the goals aligned with maximizing Russia’s national interests, the terrible human costs and economic damage now suffered by Russia itself cast the decision as potentially catastrophic and self-defeating overreach. Conclusion In conclusion, the realist theoretical prism of international relations offers several potentially compelling rationales for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – security dilemmas, spheres of influence, offensive realism, revisionism against the liberal order, diversionary war, and autocratic insecurity. These arguments help elucidate how Russia assessed its strategic interests and the potential costs and benefits surrounding the attack. At the same time, the realist perspective is limited in several respects. It glosses over the war’s violation of international law and sovereignty norms. It cannot fully explain Russia’s diplomatic misfires or the moral dimensions surrounding humanitarian atrocities and the terrible destruction inflicted. And its focus on systemic incentives neglects the key role Russian domestic politics, pseudo-historical mythos, and Putin’s own ideological zealotry played in driving the conflict. Ultimately, while the realist lens provides useful analytical tools for dissecting state behaviour and interests, it is inherently amoral and therefore unsuited to grapple with complex human tragedies such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. References Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, and Richard Devetak. 2013. Theories of International Relations. Bloomsbury Academic. Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper & Row. Chimni, Bhupinder S. 2017. “The Classical Realist Approach to International Law: The World of Hans Morgenthau.” In International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches, 38-103. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107588196.004. Ferraro, Vincent. 2023. “Why Russia Invaded Ukraine and How Wars Benefit Autocrats: The Domestic Sources of the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Center for Asian Studies/ Russia & Post-Soviet Space Section, University of São Paulo (LEA-USP). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4522176. Grant, Stephanie. 2022. “Russia’s Ukraine Invasion Is Not Just about Borders or Power. For Putin, It’s about Identity.” ABC News, February 24. abc.net.au/news/russia-ukraine-invasion-borders-power-vladimir-putin-identity/100858372. Kampmann, Christoph. 2021. “The Treaty of Westphalia as Peace Settlement and Political Concept.” In International Law and Peace Settlements, edited by Marc Weller, Matilda Retter, and Attila Varga, 64-85. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108627856.005. Kirby, Jen, and Jonathan Guyer. 2022. “The Increasingly Complicated Russia-Ukraine Crisis, Explained.” Vox, February 23. https://www.vox.com/22917719/russia-ukraine-invasion-border-crisis-nato-explained. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kotoulas, Ioannis E. 2022. “Russia as a Revisionist State and the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine.” In The Russian-Ukrainian War (2014-2022): Historical, Political, Cultural-Educational, Religious, Economic and Legal Aspects, 1-10. Baltija Publishing. https://doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-223-4-6. Kuchins, Andrew C., and Igor Zevelev. 2012. “Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change.” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 1: 147-161. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.642597. Levy, Jack S., and Lily I. Vakili. 1992. “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case.” In The Internationalization of Communal Strife, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 118-146. Routledge. Lindsay, James M. (Host). 2022. “Putin’s Choices, With Michael Kimmage.” In The President’s Inbox. Podcast audio, March 29. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/putins-choices-michael-kimmage. Lobell, Steven E. 2017. “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism.” Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304. McCallion, C. 2023. “Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War.” McHugh, D. 2023. “Russia’s Economy Holds Up, but Growing Challenges Test Putin.” The Associated Press, March 13. https://apnews.com/article/russian-economy-ukraine-war-putin-sanctions-0231252b7a145040530245b58590f7f0. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5: 77-89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306. Mearsheimer, John J. 2019. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International Security 43, no. 4: 7-50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342. Pifer, S. 2023. “Russia, Ukraine and Existential War.” Stanford University, The Center for International Security and Cooperation. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/russia-ukraine-and-existential-war. Plokhy, Serhii. 2023. “Serhii Plokhy: ‘Russia Thought It Was Invading the Ukraine of 2014’.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www.chathamhouse.org. Ramzy, Austin. 2022. “The Invasion of Ukraine: How Russia Attacked and What Happens Next.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/why-russia-attacked-ukraine.html. Rogers, K., and J. Yi. 2022. “How the War in Ukraine Might Change Putin’s Popularity among Russians.” FiveThirtyEight, March 11. www.abcnews.com/538. Roth, Andrew, Dan Sabbagh, David Blood, and Nana de Hoog. 2022. “Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Where Are Putin’s Troops and What Are His Options?” The Guardian, February 14. https://www.theguardian.com/international. Sakwa, Richard. 2022. The Russia Scare: Fake News and Genuine Threat. 1st ed. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003177401. Sharifulin, Valery. 2023. “More Corrupt, Fractured and Ostracised: How Vladimir Putin Has Changed Russia in Over Two Decades on Top.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/more-corrupt-fractured-and-ostracised-how-vladimir-putin-has-changed-russia-in-over-two-decades-on-top-188761. Smith, N. R., and G. Dawson. 2022. “Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War.” Analyse und Kritik 44, no. 2. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023. Suslov, Mikhail. 2018. ““Russian World” Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of “Spheres of Influence”.” Geopolitics 23, no. 2: 330-353. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1407921. 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한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, recently stated at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives of the Diet that “…he strongly feels the need to boldly change the current situation of the ties between Japan and the DPRK,” and “…it is very important that he himself establishes (…) relations with the President of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, and continues to make efforts through different channels for this purpose”. Immediately, the KCNA agency released, in response to the statement made by the Japanese Prime Minister, a declaration from Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Director of the Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). The One in charge of the affairs related to the Republic of Korea and the United States – now it seems also with Japan – commented that she found it noteworthy that the Japanese media have assessed Prime Minister Kishida’s words as “a different position from before” regarding the issue of DPRK-Japan bilateral relations. She added that “there is no reason not to evaluate positively” the words of the Japanese Prime Minister if he shows the “true intention” to move forward the relations between the two countries “by courageously freeing themselves from the shackles of the past”. He added that if Japan abandons its “bad habits” such as unjustly violating the self-defense rights of the DPRK and stops turning the already resolved issue of abductions into an obstacle, there is no reason to prevent a rapprochement between the two countries and the day may come when Kishida visits Pyongyang. She noted that, if Japan opts for a new path to improve relations and approaches the North with “respectful and sincere” behavior, the two countries can create a “new future” together. According to Kim Yo Jong, she made her statements not from an official position, but in a “personal capacity”, something that can be questioned, as she appears as the closest collaborator of her brother Kim Jong Un, and the fact that she holds the high responsibility of being the deputy director of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the WPK, formally requires her to uphold party discipline. The most immediate antecedent to Kim Yo Jong’s remarks was when, earlier this year, as western Japan was recovering from an earthquake that killed more than 200 people and damaged tens of thousands of homes in Niigata Prefecture, the Chairman of the State Affairs of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un, sent a message of “sympathy and condolences” to the Japanese Prime Minister, which was seen as unusual and a conciliatory note, given Pyongyang’s demonstrated animosity towards successive Japanese governments and the systematic messages of grievances sent by the DPRK’s official media. Now, a month later, through Kim Yo Jong, the DPRK sends a new signal that it may be willing to improve relations with Japan. However, many observers view with skepticism the supposed show of commitment towards reconciliation with Japan because, over the decades, events raise suspicious about whether their pronouncements were sincere or not. For well-known historical reasons, the DPRK-Japan relations have never been healthy. Especially, in the last two decades when they have been distinguished by their progressive worsening. Successive administrations, especially those of Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga, have taken the nuclear threat as a pretext for their militaristic ambitions, something that has severely displeased the leadership in Pyongyang. Due to what the North Koreans call “infamous submission” to the US, expressions of disdain from high-ranking officials towards Tokyo are regular occurrences. The most controversial issue revolves around the matter of the abducted Japanese. Although in 2002, coinciding with the first visit to Pyongyang of then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the DPRK and Japan signed a historic agreement committing an early normalization of bilateral relations and leading to the return of five of the abducted Japanese, Tokyo holds Pyongyang responsible for the abduction of 17 Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, with 12 of them still believed to be in the DPRK. However, Pyongyang admits to having abducted only 13 individuals, claiming to have returned five and stating that the remaining eight had died. What is most unnerving in the eventual Japan-North Korea ties is that Pyongyang assumes the abductee issue as a “settle issue” and Tokyo keeps it as a priority on its political-diplomatic agenda. To date, Japan continues to present the abductees as a premise for talks at any level, while the DPRK considers it as already solved and furthermore, the issue of nuclear weapons and missiles has nothing to do with the improvements of bilateral ties, as Pyongyang considers it as its legitimate self-defense. Japan finds it extremely difficult to accept such conditions. The DPRK’s increasingly sophisticated missiles are constantly being projected into the Sea of Japan and have even flown over Japanese territory. Japan also perceives the possibility that, like South Korea, the DPRK will carry out preventive nuclear strike when it sees signs of real and imminent risk. And, as far as the abduction issue is concerned, all indicates that Japan is not ready to accept that it has been resolved. It is a combination of social forces, forming a critical mass that puts pressure on the Japanese government to act in favor of finding a plausible solution to the abduction issue. In this regard, the Japanese government’s chief spokesman, Yoshimasa Hayashi, stated at a press conference that Japan remains unchanged and “…intends to comprehensively resolve outstanding issues, such as nuclear energy, missiles and abductions”. It is well known that the Japanese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly appealed to its counterparts in friendly countries to the DPRK to make efforts to lead to talks with Pyongyang authorities. It is documented that these efforts have been unsuccessful due to their reluctant stance towards Tokyo. Why is the DPRK rushing to positively assimilate Prime Minister Kishida’s words now? In a previous article, we discussed how at the January 15th, 2024 session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Chairman Kim Jong Un made a decision to sever all ties with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which he called as the “number one hostile country” and indicated to constitutionally endorse a better definition of the border and physically destroy all inter-Korean symbols. We saw that the main thing was to “erase” from the Constitution what he referred to as “inherited concepts” that classify South Koreans as compatriots and likewise, the term unification, removing phrases he assessed as “deceptive” such as “3,000 miles of golden water, rivers and mountains” and “80 million Koreans”, arguing that “…it is correct to specify in the corresponding article [of the Constitution] that the Republic of Korea is firmly considered as the number one hostile country and immutable main enemy”. The above-mentioned contrast with the position that presumably highlights the expectation of an eventual improvement in relations with Tokyo, which has the same status as a major ally of Washington in East Asia, as does Seoul, and which together form a harmonious triangular anti-DPRK alliance. It is notorious that a priority of the DPRK, reinforced in recent times, has always been to fracture the US-ROK-Japan axis. It is convenient to recapitulate that, under the Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump administrations, when Pyongyang – Seoul and Pyongyang – Washington relations exhibited relative understanding and détente, the DPRK furiously attacked the Abe administration, with the same purpose of breaking the alliance. Pyongyang may find it worthwhile to engage with Tokyo under the assumption of forcing open some cracks in the recently strengthened trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. This is because under conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea has sought, with the support of the Biden Administration, closer relations, and more stable ties with Japan, including defense and intelligence information exchange, and to a significant extent, has achieved it. However, the Seoul-Tokyo-US convergence suffers from fragility, which is reflected in the appreciable differences over the shared history between South Korea and Japan, and the ongoing disputes with the former colonial ruler over comfort women and forced laborers. In addition, there is US political volatility; in both Seoul and Tokyo there are uncertainties about whether Washington would directly involve itself in a conflagration involving either of them with the DPRK, as well as whether Washington would accommodate South Korea’s nuclear aspirations and unreservedly support Japan’s abandonment of the status of its Armed Forces as self-defense forces. Still, it can be argued that, as risk management and empathy sustainer, Kishida will keep Seoul and Washington abreast of his dealings with Pyongyang. In March, he will visit Seoul and in April, Washington; these would be important indicators of alignment between the trio. Kishida will seek the blessing of the Yoon and Biden administrations, anticipating that Kim Jong Un will move toward a summit that Kishida has so often called for. Washington has moved forward in supporting Japan’s attempts to engage with the DPRK. The ROK and Japan are in close communication on any future Tokyo-Pyongyang dialogue. Meanwhile, South Korea says that any contact between Japan and the DPRK should be conducted in a manner that helps promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Conclusions We are in the presence of a new diplomatic gamble by the DPRK that illustrates the level of specialization it has reached in managing its complicated relations with the main US allies in East Asia, who, in turn, are perceived as systematically confrontational countries. A straightforward resolution of the outstanding issues for discussion (nuclear weapons, missiles, and abductions) between Kim Jong Un and Fumio Kishida is not to be expected. These are issues on which the DPRK and Japan have diametrically different positions and directly concern the comprehensive strategic security of both countries, including the recurring abduction issue, which is associated with the political gain of any Japanese government. A meeting at the Japan-North Korea summit would be one of the few pleasant surprises to be received in the context of the vicious circle of conflict associated with the DPRK. It would be attractive to see a determined understanding between Pyongyang and Tokyo. It may be foreseeable that a Kim Jong Un - Fumio Kishida meeting will take place, but the past and present history negates any prospect of success. For this to happen, both sides will have to make principled concessions that, if made, will have combined counterproductive political effects. Bibliographic references KCNA. Kim Yo Jong publica declaración con el tema de relaciones Corea-Japón. Disponible en: http://www.kcna.kp/es/article/q/cba25051838d476c95acd451a45ae8a8.kcmsf KBS WORLD Prensa japonesa: Kim Yo Jong busca desestabilizar alianza Seúl. Washington-Tokio. Disponible en: https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=s&id=In&Seq_Code=88473 Leonardo Estandarte. Corea del Norte-Japón: Kim Yo-jong plantea la hipótesis de la visita de Kishida a Pyongyang. Disponible en: https://www.agenzianova.com/es/news/Corea-del-Norte-Jap%C3%B3n-Kim-Yo-Jong-plantea-la-hip%C3%B3tesis-de-la-visita-de-Kishida-a-Pyongyang/ Kim Yo Jong dice que Corea del Norte está abierta a mejorar sus lazos con Japón. Disponible en: https://reporteasia.com/relaciones-diplomaticas/2024/02/15/kim-yo-jong-corea-del-norte-mejorar-lazos-japon/ Japón califica de inaceptable que Corea del Norte afirme que la cuestión de los secuestros está resuelta- Disponible en: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/es/news/20240216_15/ Jesse Johnson. North Korea-Japan summit push gains steam after remarks by Kim´s sister. Disponible en: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/02/16/japan/politics/japan-north-korea-summit-push/ Mitch Shin. Will Kim Jong Un Meet with Japan´s Prime Minister Kishida? Disponible en: https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/will-kim-jong-un-meet-with-japans-prime-minister-kishida/

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français The US Should Bring This Demand to the UN Security Council Washington, DC — The Biden administration should immediately demand that Ecuador release former vice president Jorge Glas from custody, and allow him to return to the political asylum that the Mexican government had granted him, said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Glas had sought political asylum in the Mexican embassy, claiming that he is a victim of persecution and lawfare by Attorney General Diana Salazar and the Daniel Noboa government. The Mexican government granted his request for political asylum on Friday; Ecuadorian authorities raided the embassy on Friday night, reportedly injuring several Mexican nationals and knocking the Mexican mission’s second-in-command — a career diplomat — to the ground in a dramatic incident caught on video. “Ecuador’s government has committed a very serious crime, one that threatens the security of embassies and diplomats throughout the world — not least those of the United States, which has threats to its embassies in much of the world,” Weisbrot said. “The international community cannot allow this to happen. The United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, should propose a resolution there as well, to force the release of the kidnapped prisoner.” The Ecuadorian government’s actions violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and pose a direct threat to the principles of asylum, of national sovereignty, and of diplomatic immunity. This clear violation of international law is the latest in a series of troubling actions by the Noboa government, which include his declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” the deployment of military forces for domestic law enforcement, mass arrests, and rampant human rights violations. The Noboa administration’s raid on the embassy has been met with condemnation from many governments in the region, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras (the current head of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC), Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Antigua and Barbuda. Colombian president Gustavo Petro says his government is seeking human rights protections for Glas. Canada criticized the Ecuadorian government’s actions. Both the Organization of American States and CELAC have issued statements rejecting the Noboa government’s actions, and have said they will each hold special meetings to address the matter. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, condemned the embassy raid, and the UN secretary-general issued a statement “stress[ing] that violations of this principle jeopardize the pursuit of normal international relations.” Weisbrot noted that such crimes as Ecuador committed on Friday are quite rare, and are taken very seriously, because of the threat that they pose to the system of international diplomacy. This is the system that nations rely upon to try and resolve conflicts without violence and war. The International Court of Justice has held that “there was no more fundamental prerequisite for relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies …” Several members of the US Congress have also condemned the Noboa government’s actions. The Biden administration’s statement, made yesterday evening, “condemns any violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” The administration has recently deepened military and security relations with the Noboa government in the midst of Noboa’s broad crackdown and rights violations. The Ecuadorian government’s actions are a grave violation of international law and norms, and pose a dangerous precedent. Embassies are considered foreign territory, and Ecuador’s raid is a violation of Mexico’s territorial sovereignty under the law. Host governments historically have avoided violating embassies even when desiring to apprehend individuals seeking refuge or asylum. The British government did not raid Ecuador’s embassy in London in the years that Julian Assange was staying there; it was only after the Ecuadorian government of Lenín Moreno revoked Assange’s Ecuadorian citizenship and evicted him from the embassy that British authorities took him into custody. Likewise, the Pinochet dictatorship and other Latin American dictatorships never violated the integrity of foreign embassies, even to apprehend wanted dissidents or political opponents. The coup government of Jeanine Áñez in Bolivia never raided the Mexican embassy where several officials from the illegally ousted Evo Morales government had sought refuge following the 2019 coup d’etat. Salazar has long engaged in a campaign of lawfare and political persecution against former president Rafael Correa and other figures from the former Correa government. The charges against Correa have been shown to have so little credibility, and the evidence is so lacking, that Interpol for years has refused to act on Ecuador’s red notice against him. Belgium has granted him political asylum, and he can travel freely to almost anywhere in the world without fear of extradition. And last year, a Brazilian supreme court judge annulled evidence against Glas after authorities admitted it may have been tampered with. “The United States is providing crucial diplomatic, military, and material support to Ecuador; and Canada is currently seeking a ‘free trade’ agreement with Ecuador,” said Weisbrot. “All of this should be suspended until Ecuador releases its former vice president, who it has kidnapped from Mexico’s embassy.”