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Türkiye has firmly opposed any harm to civilians and innocents in Gaza and Israel. Despite keeping with his unwavering support for Palestine and maintaining a close relationship with Hamas, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not want the conflict to hinder the process of normalising relations with Israel.   Türkiye has delicately navigated both sides of the Israel-Hamas conflict while pursuing its own interests, including drawing international attention away from Türkiye’s military action against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliated militant groups in Syria and Iraq. During the 1990s, Türkiye and Israel developed a quasi-alliance marked by robust security cooperation over shared objectives and concerns, including mutual apprehensions regarding Syria, arresting the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and deepening intelligence sharing. This approach persisted during the early years of Erdoğan’s leadership, exemplified by his 2005 visit to Israel alongside a sizable delegation of corporate representatives. During this visit, Erdoğan proposed to mediate peace between Israel and the Arab world while seeking a resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Regrettably, this proposal did not yield positive results, and a series of events unfolded between 2008 and 2010 that impaired the Türkiye-Israel relationship, including the Israel-Gaza conflicts, a heated exchange between Erdoğan and the Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos forum in 2009, the visit of Hamas leader Khalid Mashal to Türkiye, and the Mavi Marmara Incident.   In 2016, Israel and Türkiye tried to reconcile their strained relationship. However, this attempt faltered following the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s condemnation of Türkiye’s military campaigns in north-eastern Syria in 2019. Türkiye also sheltered Hamas leaders, further upsetting Israel and deteriorating the bilateral relationship until Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s state visit to Türkiye last year.   For now, Türkiye finds itself in a dilemma. If Erdoğan does nothing on the Palestinian issue and the current conflict in Gaza, his loyal voters, particularly the Muslim conservatives, will abandon his ruling coalition in the upcoming local elections on 31 March 2024. Moreover, his Islamist and moderate conservative rivals like Ahmet Davutoglu, the former prime minister, have shown considerable support for Palestinians along with some critical figures inside the coalition, like Devlet Bahçeli. These groups have called for active intervention in Gaza with a potential success in attracting the Muslim conservatives, presenting a challenge to Erdoğan.   However, if Türkiye fully supports Hamas, such an endorsement will cause Türkiye more harm than good. The rapprochement with Israel would disappear, and the relationship with the US and other Western allies would dilapidate, exacerbating economic conditions and national security. On both fronts, Ankara believes that rapprochement with Israel can persuade the Jewish lobbyists and pro-Israeli, cross-party groups to support Türkiye in securing the sale of F16 fighter jets on Capitol Hill, modernising its air force. Moreover, Israeli investments and possible bilateral cooperation in the energy sector can contribute to improving the economic conditions in Türkiye. These efforts will come to nought if Erdoğan expresses solidarity with Hamas. Its NATO allies and Israel would further suspend cooperation in other security areas, such as addressing Ankara’s insecurity along its south eastern border close to Kurdistan in Syria and Iraq, and intelligence sharing, leaving Türkiye more isolated in the international community.   Domestically, Turkish nationalists, the king-maker of the last Turkish presidential election, have criticised Hamas’ actions and the Arab people for chanting support for Hamas and Palestine in Türkiye. Meral Akşener, an opposition leader in Türkiye, denounced Hamas’ actions as terrorism during her party’s group meeting. Meral argued that the Syrian refugees should go and fight themselves instead of chanting for the sending of Turkish military forces to Gaza.     The MetroPoll further shows that a majority of the Turkish voters want Erdoğan to be either neutral (34.5 percent), play a role in mediating the conflict (26.4 percent) or keep a distance from Hamas while expressing his solidarity with Palestinians (18.1 percent). It is notable that few are asking for direct support for Hamas or Israel. Although the country is highly divided, a clear majority want their government not to support Hamas and upset Israel.   To be sure, these results put Erdoğan and his coalition in a dilemma on how to appease religious conservatives, moderates, Turkish nationalists, and the people who want their government not to support Hamas but can express solidarity with Palestinians simultaneously. If Erdoğan cannot secure the continued support from Turkish nationalists and religious conservatives, then these voters are expected not to support Erdoğan in the upcoming local elections amid having a profoundly fragmented opposition. This risk remains even if these voters choose to back his allies in the MHP, as it could erode Erdoğan’s standing within the ruling coalition.   For now, Erdoğan has been able to minimalise the damage to Türkiye-Israel relations. He has opposed the attacks and killings of civilians in both Israel and Gaza, and has decried the humanitarian situation in Gaza, while also advocating for creating a free state of Palestine amid a two-state solution. Erdoğan has also spoken with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Palestinian/ Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas in expressing his proposal to allow Türkiye to be a mediator.  Furthermore, Erdoğan has called for dialogue and mediation between Israel and Palestine while distancing himself from supporting Hamas, but calling Israeli behaviour a war crime during the “Great Palestinian Meeting” in Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport last Saturday. The attempt to mediate conflict may perhaps be a bridge too far for Türkiye given Erdoğan’s speeches and the close relationship with Hamas. Regardless of its apparent lack of potential, this approach has received endorsement from the Turkish nationalists while not displeasing the religious conservatives.     In the meantime, Erdoğan has taken full advantage of the Israel-Hamas conflict by attacking the PKK in northeast Syria and Iraq. The 1 October terrorist attack in Ankara targeting the headquarters of the Turkish National Police has triggered massive counterterrorism operations across the country and the neighbouring states conducted by the Turkish military force and the Interior Ministry. Ankara, following the attacks, immediately began its military operation, striking the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) ‘s military camps in north-eastern Syria and Iraq, destroying critical energy infrastructure.   The ongoing Israel-Hamas Conflict has now placed Türkiye and its relations with the United States in a challenging position. This situation is further compounded by recent events, such as the US jet shooting down a Turkish drone in Syria and Türkiye’s reluctance to impose sanctions on Russia. Nonetheless, the Israel-Hamas Conflict has effectively redirected international attention away from Türkiye’s actions in Syria and Iraq, easing some of the pressures on Ankara.  While the conflict presents President Erdoğan with a dilemma, it could offer a unique opportunity to pursue his national and regional political aspirations and strategic objectives, including winning the 2024 local elections by a significant margin and working towards Türkiye’s goal of becoming a leading state in the Middle East and South Caucasus.  

Developed Chinese-Israeli Relations… However: China’s diplomatic relations with Israel began in 1992. Beijing has believed that its relations with Tel Aviv would help improve its image in the West and enable it to obtain Western military technology, where bilateral trade reached about $24.4 billion in 2022. However, it has been proven to China, on several occasions, that Israel is not completely immune to US pressure, as it has faced several difficulties in implementing some Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in the port of Haifa. It was prevented from winning a bid to operate the Sorek desalination plant for 25 years, because it is adjacent to the Palmachim Air Base, where US forces are stationed, and is near the Nahal nuclear research facility. Israel has also terminated an arms deal with China and was forced to pay financial compensation, etc. The Israeli position on the Russia-Ukraine war and the Western alliance against Moscow, has reinforced China’s belief that Israel is aligned with the US-Western powers, and that Israeli calculations may change if Western powers decide to take more hostile steps against China, for it’s a fact that the US openly declares that Beijing is its next most dangerous enemy. Furthermore, Israel’s participation in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project that Biden announced on the sidelines of the G20 summit in New Delhi on 9–10/9/2023, linking India to the Middle East and then into Europe via Israel, and which Netanyahu hailed, have given negative indications. For China sees it as an alternative project to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and that it aims to challenge it. China is seeking to enhance stability in the region for the sake of the BRI projects. It has been working on political initiatives, the most prominent of which was the Saudi Arabia-Iran announcement to resume diplomatic relations, which came following Chinese-brokered talks held in Beijing. However, the US, in partnership with Israel, are working to threaten Tehran and maintain its conflict with regional countries, which counters China’s endeavors, destabilizes the region and harms China’s strategic projects. The Position on Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the Aggression Against Gaza From the onset of the Ukraine war, China has increased its interest in the region, especially Palestine. This was evident following the 20th Communist Party Congress in October 2022, the subsequent summits held by the Chinese President in the Gulf and Arab region, the quiet rapprochement with Hamas and its invitation to visit China, and China’s offers to mediate between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. On the internal level, a small segment of the Chinese elite has shown admiration for the Israeli model and sympathized with it as modern and advanced. However, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood dispelled these illusions and revealed Israel’s bloody racist nature and showed that the West, which established international law and imposed it on the world, does not abide by it, but rather uses it selectively. This has united the Chinese popular and elite position, which considers Israel an occupying state obstructing the two-state solution, and supports the Palestinian people in obtaining their rights. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood strengthened the Chinese conviction of the importance of the region to the Chinese strategy, and the importance of its relationship with Hamas in the Palestinian context, which is consistent with the Russian stance—China’s undeclared ally—regarding the region and the Movement. This consistency in positions was demonstrated in the Russian-Chinese diplomatic support of Hamas, albeit indirectly, and refusing to classify it as a “terrorist” movement. The official Chinese position can be summarized as follows: • Calling on all parties to exercise restraint and ceasefire. • Expressing dissatisfaction with the continued Israeli bombing of the Gaza Strip and targeting of civilians, and fear of not maintaining the minimum level of respect for life and international law. • Emphasizing the historical injustice that occurred against the Palestinian people and that it cannot continue; and stressing that the long-term stagnation of the peace process is no longer sustainable. • Using the veto power in partnership with Russia against the US proposal to condemn Hamas and label it as “terrorist.” Concerns about Western US Intervention The Chinese are concerned about the US-Western offensive and defensive military mobilization in the region (including the arrival of US aircraft carriers). They believe that such mobilization is not only related to supporting Israel in its war on Gaza, but also to controlling the regional environment in a way that prevents any force from intervening to support the Palestinian resistance. In addition, it may be intended to exploit the situation to impose Western agendas on the region, including dominating energy sources and prices, especially in light of the significant restrictions imposed by the US and its allies on Russian oil. It may be considered a direct threat to the Chinese economy that depends mainly on energy coming from the Middle East and Gulf oil, and it also threatens China’s projects and economic relations in the region. Supporting Palestine Based on Accurate Calculations It may be in China’s interest to support the Palestinian resistance, even if only politically, and to perpetuate the exhaustion of the US in the region, to reduce Western pressure on East Asia. However, Chinese policy has so far distanced itself from direct intervention in regional conflicts and from direct entry into a conflict—that has military dimensions—with Western powers. This means that China will be very reluctant to do any move beyond the political and humanitarian support of the Palestinian people, and if it is forced, it will be in the near term indirectly, and through intermediary or third parties such as Syria and Iran. However, if the conflict is prolonged and Chinese interests are severely damaged, China may review its policies to protect its interests, including strengthening its military presence and supporting its allies and friends in the region.

China’s position on the war in Gaza is controversial and ambiguous to many observers. Beijing has criticized Israel’s blanket bombardment of civilians and condemned violations of international law. President Xi Jinping waited until after the Third Belt and Road Forum to comment on the crisis, reiterating China’s long-held position that a two-state solution should be implemented and calling for a humanitarian corridor to allow aid into the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went further, describing Israel’s bombardment of civilians in Gaza as actions that ‘have gone beyond the scope of self-defence’. At the same time, Beijing avoided condemning Hamas’s atrocities against civilians. As in Ukraine, China is positioning itself as a peace-seeking, ‘neutral’ great power, in contrast to the US, whose committed support for Israel is depicted by Beijing as a destabilizing, violent influence in the region. But China’s comments on the war, and its non-interventionist stance, mean it is unable to influence events – an uncomfortable position when its interests are directly threatened by the war. That may be why Beijing is increasingly aligning with Russia on the Palestinian issue, an unprecedented development that aims to guarantee a place at the negotiating table at minimal cost to both – and undermine US influence in the region. Familiar tactics It is now clear that China is adopting the Ukraine playbook on the Israel–Hamas war, seeking to publicly chart a different course from the US and its allies and their unconditional support for Israel. Chinese officials’ diplomatic interactions with the region are strictly adhering to Beijing’s policy of balancing between the Gulf States and Iran and between the regional main powers and Israel. The rhetoric from Beijing is carefully designed to focus on the broader context, such as implementing the two-state solution, addressing humanitarian issues and preventing the conflict from turning into a regional one. It has refrained from describing the Hamas incursion into Israel as a terrorist attack but has called Israel’s retaliation ‘collective punishment’ of Palestinian civilians – signalling its opposition to an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. This is not simply the behaviour of a peace-loving, mercantilist giant. Rather, it is a structured, deliberate strategy to achieve China’s objectives in the region and beyond. ‘Anti-Western neutrality’ China does not aspire to replace the US position in the Middle East, but will undoubtedly be pleased to see the US again drawn into a conflict in the region. Chinese experts believe the more strategic non-East Asian theatres that require Washington’s attention, the more time and space China gains to assert its strategic domination in the Indo-Pacific. China has reaffirmed its historical affinity to the Palestinian cause (its policy since the time of Mao Zedong) and its policy of what might be called ‘anti-Western neutrality’ – that is, neutrality that stops short of condemning any country or force that undermines Western centrality in the global order (rather than explicitly lending support to Hamas). China also uses ‘Anti-Western neutrality’ to appeal to a densely populated and strategically important support base. Many Global South nations are sympathetic to Palestine, and the war is therefore an issue China can use to mobilize support for its leadership of developing countries. This in turn helps win backing for Chinese positions on core issues like Xinjiang and Taiwan – and for Xi’s vision of global governance, enshrined in his signature initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). China has also sought to consolidate regional unity, urging the Islamic World to ‘speak with one voice’ with China on Palestine, building on its initiative to mediate a diplomatic agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran last March – a big win for the GSI, which is based on regional countries independently taking the lead in ‘resolving regional security issues through solidarity and coordination.’ The war encouraged Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salaman and Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi to speak on the phone for the first time, something China was pleased to see. By stressing its neutral stance and its role as a voice of the Global South, China wants to check the US’s moral standing and legitimize internationalization of the issue, calling for a global conference to initiate a peace process – thereby removing Washington from its decades-long position as the unchallenged arbiter in the conflict. The ultimate objective is to degrade the US’s global standing and win the ‘discourse power’ war by capitalizing on sympathy for Palestinians worldwide. A flawed policy However, beyond the short term, China’s policy is flawed and unsustainable. While the Biden administration has failed to speak in a balanced way on the war, instead unconditionally supporting Israel, it has mobilized US diplomatic might to influence Israel’s response – preventing the conflict from spreading outside Gaza and allowing aid to reach civilians. Its committed response to the war, in fact, may put to bed the idea that Washington has departed from the Middle East, strengthening its traditional regional role. Chinese ‘anti-Western neutrality’ meanwhile, has led Israel to retaliate diplomatically by joining the UK and 50 other countries at the UN to condemn China’s policies against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, saying they constitute ‘international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.’ Like the Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas war shows that ambiguity and ‘anti-Western neutrality’ are complex acts. To be considered neutral, others must also believe it. Neutrality also prevents China from directly influencing these dangerous events in a way that favours its interests. China has significant economic connections to the region. It is the biggest trading partner with most MENA countries and almost half of its imported oil comes from the Gulf. China’s overall trade with the Arab world stood at more than $430 billion last year. These significant interests are vulnerable to regional wars and instability - but Chinese leaders can only watch events unfold from a distance. China should now understand that transactional de-escalation between regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Iran does not necessarily constitute peace. One of the key lessons of the conflict is that Iranian proxies were ready to blow up the region to impede Saudi normalization with Israel. China-sponsored integration initiatives will be no more successful at preventing another similar episode. Possessing great power capabilities is one thing. Acting like a great power is another. The US has demonstrated its continuing commitment to Israel and ability to influence Israeli policy. China has confined itself to voicing objections and calling for peace. Alignment with Russia may amplify its voice in a peace settlement. But there is a long way to go before that becomes reality. China must understand that in these crucial days, lip service diplomacy is the last thing MENA people want.

Not counting periodic cross-border skirmishes, Israel has fought three major wars against Hamas since withdrawing its forces from Gaza in 2005 – in 2008, 2014 and 2021. Each involved limited ground incursions, with Israeli soldiers in Gaza for about a fortnight. In the past couple weeks, Israel has put together a huge force to mount another ground invasion in retaliation for the Hamas cross-border attacks that killed around 1,400 Israelis on October 7. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have called up their entire armoured corps – more than 1,000 tanks. Around 360,000 reservists will also join the force’s full-time personnel of about 170,000. The operation is shaping up to be Israel’s biggest since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was aimed at driving the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from its base there. The Israelis succeeded in that objective. But an unforeseen consequence of that war was the development of the Shia militant organisation Hezbollah. With Iran’s support and tutelage, Hezbollah has become a far stronger enemy for Israel than the PLO had ever been. It’s a truism that wars have unintended consequences. And in the current conflict with Hamas, it’s not clear what the end game might be for Israel. Why a ground invasion is so risky The difficulties of a Gaza ground assault are clear enough. Fighting street to street in a confined, highly urbanised environment will be hideously difficult for Israel’s forces. Hamas also has the advantage of an extensive tunnel network estimated at up to 500 kilometres in length, enabling its militants to attack and then disappear. Israel can counter these challenges to some extent with the use of robots and drones. But night vision technology will be ineffective in the total darkness of tunnels, as these devices require faint ambient light to work. Israel has also warned the roughly 1.1 million civilians in the northern half of Gaza to move to the southern half. Altogether, the United Nations says some 1.4 million people in Gaza have been displaced so far in the conflict, with nearly 580,000 sheltering in UN shelters. It’s unclear how many people are still in the north. Israel has warned that those who remain could be classed as sympathisers with “a terrorist organisation”.  Inevitably, there will be appalling civilian casualties. Not all will necessarily be the IDF’s fault, but the default position of the region and those in the global community opposed to Israel’s action will be to blame Israel. Another challenge is the estimated 200 hostages taken by Hamas during its raid into Israel. Hamas says it has spread them around Gaza. Almost certainly, some will be in the northern war zone. Hamas claims 22 have already been killed by Israeli bombs. Some relatives of the hostages are criticising the Netanyahu government for not giving sufficient priority to freeing their loved ones. When the fighting stops: no good options What Israel intends to do if and when it has secured the northern half of Gaza is not clear. The coastal strip is already facing a “catastrophic” humanitarian situation, according to the UN. And in terms of administering the territory, there are few good options. 1) A military reoccupation of Gaza, as Israel did from 1967 to 2005. This would constitute a huge military burden and expose IDF personnel to violence and kidnapping. US President Joe Biden has warned reoccupation would be a big mistake. 2) Eliminate Hamas’ senior leadership, declare victory, then leave. Such a victory would almost certainly be short-term. Other low-level members of Hamas would take pride in coming forward to reconstitute the group. Or another group, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, might fill the vacuum. Israel would not be able to control who or what that entity might be. 3) Call on the secular Fatah party that now controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to take control in Gaza. That is scarcely viable. Fatah lost a civil war to Hamas in 2007 and there’s no indication the Palestinian Authority’s return would be acceptable to Palestinians there. Moreover, the authority’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected to a four-year term in 2005 – and is still in charge. As such, he lacks legitimacy, even in the West Bank. 4) Administration of Gaza by non-aligned local leaders. This is a pipe dream. Even if such figures could be found, Gazans would almost certainly see them as collaborators with the Israelis, given their role would be to keep the strip’s hardliners under control. 5) Administration of Gaza by a non-Palestinian Arab force. Again, this is not feasible. The leaders of potential Arab contributors to such a force, such as Egypt, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would not want to be seen as policing Palestinians on behalf of Israel. 6) Administration of Gaza by a non-Arab or United Nations force. Given the enormous risks, it’s very hard to see any non-Arab countries embracing this idea. A UN peacekeeping force would require not only Israeli approval, but a UN Security Council resolution at a time when Russia and China rarely agree with the three Western permanent members. Israel also contends Hezbollah has impeded the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon from carrying out its mandate, preventing it from stopping militant attacks. After the Hamas attacks, Israel would be unlikely to entrust its security to peacekeepers with little incentive to put their lives on the line for its sake. ‘Mowing the grass’ For too long, Israel has believed the Gaza imbroglio could be contained. However, the population has grown so large, this is no longer the case. With a growth rate of just over 2% per year, its population is expected to be three million by 2030. Gaza is also incredibly young, with a median age of 19.6, compared with the global average of 30.5. Almost half the adult population is unemployed, and Palestinians in Gaza are four times more likely to be living in poverty than those in the West Bank. This is a recipe for social upheaval and radicalisation. As two Israeli journalists, Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, noted in a perceptive analysis of Israel’s 2014 Gaza war, the Israeli military describes its assaults on Gaza as “mowing the grass” – acting to punish Hamas severely for its aggressive behaviour and degrading its military capabilities. The aim was to achieve realistic and, therefore, limited political and military goals. It was part of a long-term strategy of attrition, which would have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along the border. Eliminating Hamas altogether, the authors said, was not an “attainable military objective”. From a humanitarian perspective, this phrase is objectionable. The question, now, is whether Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu will attempt a different strategy this time. We’ll find out in the coming weeks.

Introduction The EU’s Eastern neighbourhood is now more fragmented than ever when it comes to the countries’ relations with Moscow. The Russian full-scale and genocidal invasion of Ukraine brought about a change in the EU’s relations with Ukraine and Moldova which received the candidate status. Their membership talks with the EU are expected to start soon, pulling both countries further away from Russia. Georgia, however, remains for now at the door due to democratic backsliding, although the majority of its population supports accession to the EU. Tbilisi’s relations with Kyiv have turned increasingly sour due to its more than-ambivalent reaction to the full-scale invasion. Armenia’s relations with Russia have become more ambiguous. Albeit having lost confidence in Moscow as its main security provider, it helps Russia to evade the Western sanctions. Azerbaijan, in the meantime, has gained from the EU’s re-orientation of energy imports and acted as an independent player, wishing to maximise its benefits yet not being able to present a viable alternative to Russia gas for the European markets. Belarus’ relations with Russia appear more straightforward – i.e., collaboration in the invasion of Ukraine and Minsk’s growing dependence on Moscow. At first glance, one can see that the geopolitical landscape is being reshaped. In the following, this analysis takes a closer look at what those countries’ foreign trade with Russia can tell about this evolution and the Russian leverage in the region. 1. Ukraine & Moldova: Divorcing for Good? The share that Russia used to claim in Ukraine’s foreign trade shrank radically, falling to 1.1% for exports and 2.8% for imports against 5% and 8.4% in 2021, respectively. One-fifth of those imports are linked to the energy sector and, most likely, to gas transit as Ukraine reached self-sufficiency in the winter of last year, owing to the decrease in gas consumption. At the same time, according to the SecDev Group, 12.4 trillion USD worth of Ukraine’s energy deposits, metals, and minerals have fallen under Russian control due to the occupation of the Ukrainian territory.  With the Russian blockade, Ukraine’s foreign trade has collapsed, while exports to overseas partners like China or India have shrunk.8 Ukraine has, therefore, had no choice but to turn to the European Union and find new markets to ensure its survival. Ironically for Russia, the EU member states (Poland and Romania in particular) have become by far Ukraine’s biggest trading partners. Exports to the EU reached 28 billion USD in 2022 (26.8 billion in 2021), which represented 63.1% of total exports (up from 39.4% in 2021). Imports from the EU accounted for 26.9 billion USD in 2022 (28.9 billion USD in 2021), which equalled 48.9% of the total volume (up from 39.8% in 2021). Having lost all forms of political capital and economic influence in Ukraine, Russia can only resort to the destruction and looting of its national resources. Moldova’s import indicators have remained relatively stable since 2014. What stands out from the data, however, is that the share of exports to Russia shrank from 8.8% in 2021 to 4.4% in 2022. This is partly explainable by the Kremlin’s fruit embargo on Chisinau, which used to be Moldova’s most important export to Russia. In contrast, the share of Moldova’s exports to Ukraine has risen dramatically: from 3% in 2021 to 16.6% in 2022. Its exported value to Ukraine grew from 92 million USD to 720 million USD, whereas the total value of Moldova’s exports increased by around 1.2 billion USD. Hence, Ukraine accounts for around 60% of the increased value, making it the second-largest foreign trading partner behind Romania/EU. Moldova’s main exporting sector to Ukraine is mineral fuels, oils, and distillation products (81.25% or 587 million USD out of the total of 720 million USD), which has to do with the fact that natural gas is being backhauled from the EU to Ukraine via Moldova. The European Union – and especially Romania – remains in the first place. In 2022, the EU’s share in Moldova’s exports and imports stood at 58.6% and 47.3%, respectively. Moscow can still turn Chisinau’s economic dependence into political leverage – to a certain extent – by fuelling the economic crisis through halting gas shipment and thus influencing the prices, which could provoke discontent in Moldova’s Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia in particular. Similarly, the Kremlin can employ its two main proxies – the Party of Socialists and the ȘOR Party – for the same purpose, with a view to the upcoming 2024 presidential and the 2025 parliamentary elections. Moldovan authorities are already preparing to mitigate the Russian energy leverage not only by buying electricity from Romania and requiring the distributors to stockpile natural gas but also by countering the Kremlin propaganda and aligning with EU media regulations. 2. Georgia & Armenia: Risky Strategic Ambiguity Tbilisi’s relations with Moscow are best described as ambivalent. After an initial downgrade in exports and imports following the Russian invasion in 2008, both have been growing for over a decade. Russia’s share in Georgia’s imports reached its maximum since 2005 in 2022: 15.4% and 17.1%, respectively. However, Russia’s share in Georgia’s exports has slightly dropped down to 14.2%. The European Union remains Georgia’s biggest trading partner, accounting for 20.1% of its exports and 24.4% of its imports. Russia’s use of dependencies to leverage foreign countries has been in the experts’ spotlight for a long time. Most recently, the Georgian office of Transparency International highlighted that the money coming to Georgia from Russia through remittances, tourism, and exports in 2022 was three times higher than in 2021 (mainly due to the soaring remittances). In 2022, it amounted to 14.6% of Georgia’s GDP, whereas this figure represented only 6.3% in 2021. Moreover, the Kremlin has gained new forms of leverage – e.g., through the acquisition of 49% of Petrocas Energy – since Irakli Garibashvili came back to power, reinforcing the trend of Russia’s growing share in Georgia’s foreign trade. Separately, Georgia has been trying to benefit from the war and thus intensifying its economic contacts with the Kremlin, thereby weakening the anti-Russia front and the sanction regime. The aforementioned facts help build the case for classifying the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) as pro-Russian. They are also being interpreted as the GD’s attempt to consolidate its power ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections. Regardless of the academic debate about the political nature of the government’s intentions, Georgia finds itself in a complex and risky situation of strategic ambiguity as the figures suggest.  Yerevan’s relationship with Moscow has also been quite ambivalent, especially since last year. Russia was Armenia’s first trading partner, accounting for 44.6% of its exports and 30.4% of its imports in 2022. In a long-term perspective, Armenia has been increasing its dependence on Russia for nearly a decade already. Back in 2014, the EU was still Armenia’s number one trading partner with export and import shares of 29.3% and 24.2%, respectively. Nonetheless, worth noting is a (radical) change that occurred between 2021 and 2022, especially with regards to exports. The value of exports to Russia increased from 793 million USD to 2.3 billion USD. This spike was due to re-exports to Russia from Western countries in line with the Kremlin’s “parallel imports” strategy. Not only does Armenia help Russia circumvent the sanctions but also tries to benefit from the invasion by increasing its trade, as well as attracting and facilitating the re-settlement of Russian IT businesses. For years, Armenia has been trying to balance between Russia and other partners in the context of the war with Azerbaijan. Amidst the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor and the lack of Russian engagement, Armenia finds itself in a tricky position. A huge tension remains between Armenia’s willingness to diversify its foreign policy away from Russia – towards the EU among others – and its tight relationship with Moscow that still enjoys many leverages through defence, energy, and economy. Nevertheless, Yerevan’s willingness in itself indicates that Russia has been losing traction in the South Caucasian state. Furthermore, Armenia’s recent decision to send its first humanitarian aid to Ukraine raises numerous questions as some might see it as another balancing act or a new foreign policy failure for Russia.   3. Azerbaijan: Independence from but Proximity to Russia When it comes to Azerbaijan’s foreign trade with Russia, the figures have not changed dramatically. An increase in Turkey’s share in Azerbaijan’s foreign trade is perceptible, and so are the share and value of exports to the EU (58.8% or 13 billion USD in 2021 against 65.6% or 25 billion USD in 2022). The figures, however, further indicate that Baku has also diversified its import partners. For instance, China has experienced a breakthrough. Russia remains Azerbaijan’s first import market (18.8%), followed by the EU (16%), Turkey (15.8%), and China (14.3%) within the same range. Unlike other countries in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, Azerbaijan does not depend on Russian energy for its consumption. Furthermore, Baku benefits from the war by enjoying a huge boost in revenues, owing it to the EU’s reorientation of energy trade partners after the full-scale invasion. Azerbaijan remains a key player in the region, able to shape the rules of the geopolitical competition due to its relative independence from other countries. Overall, Russia does not enjoy an economic leverage substantial enough to allow it to influence Baku’s foreign policy course. One might prefer to read their bilateral relations through the context of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Some see such a “deepening” as potentially putting Armenia, the West, and Ukraine at risk. The blockade of the Lachin corridor that has isolated and trapped around 120 000 ethnic Armenians inside Nagorno-Karabagh, with dire humanitarian consequences, speaks against any rapprochement with the West, and so does Baku’s increasing military cooperation with Moscow. The fact that Azerbaijan is forced to import gas from Russia in order to meet its obligations to Europe is another worrying development, not to mention its suspected aid to Russia to avoid sanctions. One may argue that, in 2022, Azerbaijan kept a low foreign policy profile, choosing not to vote on the UNGA resolutions condemning Russian aggression. This is in line with other signs pointing to the long-term cooperation – if not friendship – between those two countries.   4. Belarus: Extreme Dependence and Collaboration Belarus is indubitably the country where Russia managed to keep strong ties and leverages. In addition to letting Russian troops be stationed on its soil, thus opening the way for the full-scale invasion, there is evidence of Lukashenka’s involvement in the forced deportation of at least 2 100 Ukrainian children to Belarus. When it comes to Belarus’ foreign trade with Russia, the ICT database will hardly be of great use, considering the lack of reporting from 2022 and the impossibility of fully grasping what was hidden under the “Area NES” category in 2021. Furthermore, one would be prudent to doubt – to a certain extent – the official government figures in light of Belarusian officials’ tendency to conceal information, as showcased by Lev Lvovskiy. Nonetheless, by looking at Belarus’s foreign trade, one can draw the conclusion that its “multi-vector” economic policy is dead. Following the violent political repressions domestically, Western sanctions, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has lost both the EU and Kyiv as main trading partners. Minsk has lost almost all its exports to Ukraine (5.5% of Belarus’ GDP), while trade with the EU has more than halved following Russia’s invasion – third and second places, respectively. The contraction of Belarus’ trade with the West and the closure of the Ukrainian market pushed Belarus to turn even more towards Russia and, to some extent, China. Different estimates put Russia’s share in Belarus’s foreign trade within the 60% – 70% range in 2022. In fact, this might have more to do with higher prices (due to the devaluation of the Belarusian Ruble), rather than an increasing trade volume according to the Eurasian Development Bank. Furthermore, Russia made its market available to Belarusian exports and loaned 1.7 billion USD for the import substitution programme; Belarus’ debt servicing payments have also been delayed until 2027-28. Therefore, Belarus funds the efforts to mitigate recession by increasing dependence on the Russian market. Belarus’ economic stability is “directly linked to Russia’s macroeconomic standing” according to Kamil Kłysiński from the OSW. Finding economic niches in non-Western countries and rogue states is the only way for Belarus to limit its dependence on Russia. Conclusion Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its consequences are reshaping the geopolitical balance of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood region. • Ukraine has no choice but to purify itself from Russian politico-economic influence and leverage and turn to the European Union in order to survive. • The picture is clear under Moldova’s current government, which is now embracing a Euro-Atlantic course and trying to wean off Russian politico-economic influence. • The Georgian government tries to benefit from the war while dangerously sliding towards pro-Russian authoritarianism and causing an increase in tensions with both Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community due to this position. • The Georgian government tries to benefit from the war while dangerously sliding towards pro-Russian authoritarianism and causing an increase in tensions with both Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic community due to this position. • Azerbaijan is a player of its own kind that enjoys positive relations with the Kremlin and helps it to bypass sanctions, as its other South Caucasian neighbours do as well. • Belarus not only willingly paved the way for the Russian invasion and participated in many crimes Russia committed in Ukraine but also became even more dependent on Moscow. The fact that Russia managed to retain – or even increase – its more or less strong level of politico-economic clout in some of the countries and influence their economic choices highlights hardened lines of division in the foreign policy strategies of the six countries and increased fragmentation of EU’s Eastern neighbourhood more broadly.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, held a private meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The leaders then issued statements to the media. Prime Minister Netanyahu: "Chancellor Scholz, thank you for coming to Israel. Thank you for your solidarity with Israel, you, the government of Germany, the people of Germany, in these trying times. Eighty years ago, our people experienced the worst savagery in the history of humanity with the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people on the soil of Germany and Europe. I must tell you, my friend, that the savagery we witnessed perpetrated by the Hamas murderers coming out of Gaza were the worst crimes committed against Jews since the Holocaust: the decapitation of people, the shooting of little children with bound hands, the murder of children in front of their parents, the murder of parents in front of their children, the hiding of babies in the attic and the murderers who came to the attic to murder the babies, the rape and murder of women, the abduction of families, the tearing of grandmothers and Holocaust survivors into captivity, the death pits that remind of us of Babi Yar where jeeps surround the depression in the ground where they crowd young people in and they shoot them with machine guns. This is the savagery that we only remember from the Nazi crimes from the Holocaust. Hamas are the new Nazis. Hamas is ISIS and in some instances, worse than ISIS. And just as the world united to defeat the Nazis, just as the world united to defeat ISIS, the world has to stand united behind Israel to defeat Hamas. This is a part of an axis of evil: of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their goal, open goal, is to eradicate the State of Israel. The open goal of Hamas is to kill as many Jews as they could and the only difference is they would have killed every last one of us, murdered every last one of us if they could, they just don’t have the capacity, but they murdered an extraordinary 1,300 citizens which in American terms is many, many, many 9/11s. So obviously we must take action to defeat Hamas to ensure that this doesn’t happen again. But this is not only our battle, it is our common battle. The battle of civilization against barbarism. And if it’s not stopped here, this savagery will reach you very soon and reach the entire world. We have a vested interest, an abiding interest, to make sure that doesn’t happen and it can only be achieved with the solidarity of the civilized world. I hope and I believe that many, many around the world see ISIS for what it is and see Hamas for what it is, which is a reincarnation of ISIS. We appreciate the fact that you came here to stand with us in this battle for the future of civilization. Thank you, Chancellor." The Prime Minister added: "Thank you, Chancellor. I appreciate all your statements, including your last reference to protecting the Jewish community. We discussed this in our conversation as well. The question of the safety of civilians is something that is raised by Hamas' actions. Hamas is committing a double war crime. Not only is it targeting civilians with unprecedented savagery, it’s hiding by civilians, their own civilians. We are calling on the civilians to leave Gaza, go south to safe zones and Hamas is preventing them often at gunpoint from doing so. Hamas wants to keep them there as a human shield and prevent the people from leaving and getting out of harm’s way. It’s important that the entire world understands this. The responsibility for the civilians who are there, both the abducted people and both the people who are kept there at force, the citizens of our country, and the citizens of dozens of countries and the Palestinian civilians themselves, that responsibility sits squarely on the shoulders of the Hamas war criminals. They’re committing a double war crime: attacking civilians, hiding behind civilians as human shields. The entire world should condemn it and should support Israel in its just war. Thank you very much, Chancellor."

Over the past weekend, the Telegram channel “Nezygar,” closely aligned with the Russian presidential administration, erupted with posts criticizing the liberal positions prevalent among Russian exiles. The channel’s authors and experts concurred that the so-called “non-systemic opposition,” currently residing abroad, lacks both a substantial following in Russia and genuine political representation and influence in the West. The authors of these posts point out that those attempting to shape the situation inside Russia are primarily journalists and activists who lack political agency. Government-affiliated analysts emphasize that Russian dissidents abroad are “disconnected from the people,” and their opposition to the war significantly diminishes their ability to sway ordinary Russians, who have largely united behind the military. Furthermore, the authors of “Nezygar” underscore that representatives of Russian opposition entities and media abroad are heavily reliant on Western funding and, in their view, are “reliant on foreign intelligence agencies.” Nonetheless, they are not particularly sought after in the West, given their inability to impact the situation within Russia. Paradoxically, their very existence hinders the consolidation of Western society against Russia. It is evident that these allegations contain a substantial element of propaganda. However, it is impossible to ignore the genuine challenges faced by the Russian opposition when it comes to engaging with their potential audience within the country. Many of these issues are objective and unavoidable, but they are deftly exploited by the Kremlin. First and foremost, dissidents in exile are frequently criticized for their fragmentation. In practice, the opposition, with some exceptions, has been relatively successful in forming coalitions and has already demonstrated its ability to negotiate on key issues among themselves (see EDM, May 9). The problem lies in the fact that the primary issues shared by the entire new wave of political emigration, such as ending the war with Ukraine and toppling the Putin regime, are seen within Russia as a “negative agenda.” Other common principles held by most opposition movements, such as the establishment of genuine federalism and parliamentarism in Russia (Meduza, October 31, 2022), are often disregarded by the Russian majority. Consequently, external observers may get the impression that the opposition lacks a constructive agenda and a vision for the future. However, the specific vision of Russia’s future structure and individual political programs do differ among various opposition groups. This diversity is entirely natural for a democratic society, where disagreements should be resolved through compromise and fair elections. Nonetheless, these objective differences are actively exploited by propaganda to suggest that the Russian opposition lacks a shared positive political agenda. There are also disparities within the opposition regarding the methods of achieving even shared goals. For instance, some of the opposition’s representatives believe that regime change at this stage can only be accomplished through the use of force or the threat thereof. Others firmly oppose armed struggle. This division, combined with occasional competition among different political groups in the public sphere, further exacerbates the impression of disunity within the opposition. In addition, it is objectively difficult for opposition journalists based abroad to convey their viewpoints to the Russian audience. At a forum of anti-war initiatives called Russie Libertés held in Paris at the end of September, Dmitry Kolezev, the chief editor of the Republic publication, noted that information blockades, coupled with a lack of funding, severely restrict the possibilities of opposition journalism. This is especially significant given that the majority of people are not inclined to make efforts to access restricted content. Participants in the meeting also highlighted certain challenges in finding common ground with the Russian audience. For instance, the thesis that Ukraine must win the war can be met with disapproval from the Russian domestic audience. Forum participants emphasized the importance of gradually engaging with the Russian viewers, speaking to them in their language and offering more acceptable ideas. According to Dmitry Kolezev, one such idea could be the return of the mobilized from the front. Furthermore, in practice, Russian journalists in exile have limited resources for carefully tailored interaction with their Russian viewers, as “ambiguous” formulations can provoke negative reactions in the host countries. For example, one of the factors that led to the revocation of the license of the Russian opposition channel “Dozhd” in Latvia was a comment made by one of the hosts regarding the Russian army. Specifically, he referred to it as “our” army and expressed hope that after the “Dozhd” report, the number of violations of mobilized individuals’ rights would decrease (Svoboda.org, December 6, 2022). Because of this, a complex dependency is created. Russian opposition journalists in exile are dependent on their host countries—not in terms of being influenced by their intelligence services, as Russian propaganda seeks to portray, but in practical terms. People need visas and residence permits, which has become increasingly challenging to obtain amid the introduction of new restrictions on Russian citizens. These difficulties intersect with the natural need to assimilate into a new society, leading to internal identity conflicts. In turn, the Russian audience keenly feels this conflict, which is further exacerbated by the stigmatization of almost all departing activists as “foreign agents.” As sociological surveys show, against the backdrop of the “patriotic consolidation” of society, the number of people perceiving these “foreign agents” as a channel of “negative Western influence on Russia” is increasing. It has become evident that the task of the basic survival of emigrants and attempts to prove their anti-war views in the West are increasingly conflicting with the goal of systematically influencing Russian society. Of course, this does not mean that one must play along with the Kremlin propaganda to achieve the latter goal. However, it is important to develop a deliberate and not overly radical interaction strategy with the Russian audience, understanding its fundamental fears and triggers. If the West manages to create such a platform for Russian activists, it could significantly enhance the dissidents’ ability to influence the situation in their country.

The recent steps undertaken by the UK show the growing engagement with the Indo-Pacific and the clear intent to accelerate the same In March 2021, the United Kingdom (UK) released ‘The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy’, outlining its vision, priorities, and strategies for ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age.’ While it covered a broad range of areas aligned with its national objectives, two aspects stood out from a policy-reorientation perspective. One, a departure from its earlier approach of cordiality and accommodation with China; and two, its decision to deepen engagement with and play a more active role in the Indo-Pacific region. It included a separate section ‘The Indo-Pacific Tilt: A Framework’, which stressed that “we will be the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific.” The ’tilt’ framework met with scepticism, in some cases with cynicism, because the UK had remained somewhat withdrawn, in general, and peripheral to the Indo-Pacific region, in particular, in the preceding few years. There were questions about the UK’s seriousness and headroom available for resource allocation to follow through with this new strategy. Notwithstanding, the UK government started to take new steps, as well as moving forward with some earlier initiatives related to the Indo-Pacific. The big announcement in September 2021 of AUKUS (Australia, the UK, and the US), an informal security alliance focused on the western Pacific, sent the clearest signal that the ‘tilt’ was more than just a strategy paper. It also indicated that the plans “… to enhance China facing capabilities to respond to systemic challenges it poses to our security, prosperity, and values…” would be realised through partnerships and alliances. The UK seeks to contribute to deterrence against China through the AUKUS, which has taken numerous steps in the last two years to expand defence collaboration in emerging technologies and industrial capabilities. The UK’s ‘tilt’ implementation challenges were compounded by the post-pandemic economic slowdown and the Russia-Ukraine war. At the same time, there were rapid changes in the global and regional strategic environment. For the UK, these implied the continued indispensability of the US, the criticality of the EU, and the importance of the Indo-Pacific. A revised strategy articulation was accordingly done through a comprehensive document titled ‘Integrated Review Refresh 2023: responding to a more contested and volatile world’, published in March 2023. It updated the broad strategic framework across geographies, sectors, and themes and was more explicit about the China challenge. With respect to the Indo-Pacific, it outlined the progress made since the announcement of the ‘tilt’ strategy. These included FTA agreements with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. It highlighted deepening several bilateral relationships, partnership roadmaps with India and Indonesia, dialogue partner status with ASEAN, applying for joining the ASEAN regional forum and ADMM Plus, progressing negotiations to join the CP-TPP, deployments by the Royal Navy to the region, digital partnerships, and working together on green transitions. It pointed out that the Euro-Atlantic would continue to be the overriding priority, followed by the Indo-Pacific. Overall, the ‘Refresh’ document showed that the UK’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific was progressing well and that there was a clear intent to accelerate the same. The last two and a half years have firmly established the UK’s new direction, with emphasis on outcomes that are based on diplomatic and cooperative instruments. This trend is supported by a growing anti-China sentiment, increasing consensus for alignment with the Indo-Pacific framework, and a broader agreement on strengthening resilience against coercion and unforeseen events. A recent report by the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, released on 30 August, has brought out a detailed assessment of the evolution and progress of the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’ strategy. While recognising the steps taken towards implementation, it has made several recommendations. Some of these include a cross-government approach, focus on long-term objectives and outcomes, seeking to join the Quad, inviting Japan and the Republic of Korea to join AUKUS for ‘Strand-B’ activities of defence cooperation, pushing for Japan to eventually join AUKUS, campaigning to admit Taiwan to CP-TPP, dropping overcaution about offending the CCP over Taiwan, and releasing an unclassified version of its China strategy. This stems from a broad assessment that while Euro-Atlantic is the overriding priority, the long-term threat is from China. Another report on China by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK parliament, presented in July 2023, has highlighted that the Chinese approach to pursuing its global ambitions makes China a national security threat to the UK. The report covers diverse challenges emanating from espionage, interference, influence operations, and investments (the UK receives the highest FDI from China, compared to any other European country). It concludes that the response and preventive actions have been slow and inadequate, and recommends a proactive approach to counter China, with increased allocation of resources. These reports are indicative of increased political convergence on the need to take forward the plans for the Indo-Pacific and China with a sense of urgency. The coming months are likely to see increased momentum in the implementation of priorities indicated in the ‘Refresh’. In addition, delivering on the India-UK comprehensive strategic partnership and the 2030 Roadmap for India-UK future relations is being accorded high priority. It is important that this joint roadmap, the UK’s integrated review, and its plans for the Indo-Pacific are seen in sum and as mutually reinforcing. While attention is currently focused on the ongoing negotiations for the India-UK FTA—expected to come to fruition soon—it needs to be highlighted that there are many other important lines of action being pursued under the 2030 roadmap. The term ‘Tilt to the Indo-Pacific’ has also been a subject of debate since it was unveiled. To many, it seemed to suggest movement at the cost of some other important region. The ‘Refresh’ document refers to it but appears to somewhat deemphasise the term. The recent Foreign Affairs Committee report also recommends moving away from using it. While the use of ‘tilt’ in official language may fade away, the UK is likely to continue to lean heavily towards the Indo-Pacific. This priority can be expected to become more enduring, and increasingly credible in the coming years.

Mr. Vice President, Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my particular honour to address this august body. I would like to use this opportunity to congratulate you on being elected to your esteemed position and I wish you much success in your work during these challenging times. The world we live in today requires joint, global and concerted efforts as a key to success in addressing serious global crises. We strongly believe that we have to strengthen the multilateral system based on international law, and make sure it is effective and fair, able to endure and deliver results that will serve to achieve our common goals, commitments and a better future for the people and planet. We need to safeguard the role of the United Nations as the centre of global cooperation. We are also hopeful that genuine efforts will be invested in the reform of the Security Council, our main instrument for securing global peace and security. In 2015, we adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also on the basis of the consensus that to transform our world we need to realize that „sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and the peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.“ In 2023, at the mid-point in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the assessments of the Global Sustainable Development Progress Report show that the efforts to achieve that synergy so far have proved insufficient. Time to reinvigorate our political commitments to the full and efficient implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals is irreversibly running out. In the meantime, the necessary boost came with the UN Secretary-General`s vision offered in “Our Common Agenda” as an overarching roadmap in fighting the multiple crises. The Preparatory process for the next year’s Summit of the Future, along with its outcome the Pact for the Future, represents a unique opportunity to strengthen national and international governance and to make it more sustainable and resilient to future crises and shocks, safeguarding the planet for future generations. The international financial system is increasingly unable to adequately and efficiently respond to the challenges at hand. More needs to be done to update and upgrade the global financial infrastructure so it becomes more adapted to the needs of the world. Most notably, we need to scale up development and climate finance. In this sense, we support the efforts by the international financial institutions to review their structures and operating processes, with a view to reform in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Peace is not maintained by itself. Investment in conflict prevention is far more cost effective than investing in conflict resolution and recovery after the fact, post factum. This is why prevention of conflict and sustaining peace should be at the centre of the framework of the New Agenda for Peace, intertwined with a renewed commitment to multilateralism, global solidarity and trust. Croatia, as Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) for 2023, strongly advocates its strengthening and enlarging of both its geographical and thematic scope. We support the Secretary General’s call for the universality of conflict prevention and sustaining peace, and the development of national conflict prevention strategies. The PBC could review these strategies, helping to mobilize resources for their implementation when needed. The PBC should also work more closely with international financial institutions and regional actors, forming the Sustainable Peace Network. In addition to its advisory powers, the PBC could also be vested with decision-making powers, enabling it to establish UN civilian missions upon the request of countries concerned, helping to address the root causes of instability. In this regard, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals can be an excellent prevention tool by bringing prosperity and inclusion while leaving a safer place for future generations. According to the Sustainable Development Report 2023, Croatia’s performance in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals was assessed among top ranks. However, a lot of work is still in front of us. Croatia has a large natural heritage that it wants to preserve for future generations through the implementation of the SDGs. While accepting the clean energy transition, Croatia is taking a number of measures to alleviate the transition shock in the rejection of fossil fuels, and to ensure a fair transition and prevent energy poverty. With regard to biodiversity, Croatia is committed to work jointly for the development and full implementation of an ambitious and transformational Kunming-Montreal global biodiversity framework. Furthermore, we firmly believe that protecting, restoring and sustainably using biodiversity is essential for pandemic prevention and promotion of the “One Health Approach” which needs to be included in future prevention plans. We are also committed to working together to intensify cooperation in protecting the marine environment and combatting plastic pollution. If we want healthy oceans and seas, our ambition needs to be high and ocean protection stepped up significantly. Croatia welcomes the landmark adoption of the “Treaty of the High Seas” on ocean biodiversity (BBNJ). The successful negotiation of the BBNJ Agreement is the most recent proof of devoted multilateral work and presents not only a milestone in conserving marine biodiversity of nearly two-thirds of the world’s oceans, but also a triumph for multilateralism. Today, Croatia proudly joined the first tier of countries that have signed the Treaty, and commits to ratify it as soon as possible. We call on other countries to do so as well to enable its swift entering into force and to start its effective implementation. As a member State of the EU Croatia has already committed itself politically and legally to contribute in making Europe the first climate neutral continent by 2050. By further pursuing that course and by accelerating development of renewables and increasing green investments, we believe we can turn the current crisis into a new chance for our economies. Here I will mention as an example one such project that can boost new growth of the European economy based on decarbonisation and clean industry. It is the project “North Adriatic Hydrogen Valley,” which encompasses the Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Slovenia and Croatia. By putting clean energy transition in the heart of the fight against climate change on the global level, we should not forget that the most vulnerable communities, which have historically contributed the least to climate change, are often the ones most and the worst affected – both by the climate conditions and by the costs of the green energy transition as a remedy. The establishment of a Loss and Damage Fund to help vulnerable countries cope with the destructive impacts of climate change at COP27 marked a historic breakthrough in this respect. How we go about this issue at the Climate Ambition Summit and COP28 will be a true test of trust and solidarity among nations and will impact current and future generations. Creating a world of peace and security that respects human rights and promotes social progress is the very foundation of the United Nations. The amount of human rights violations and humanitarian crises around the world demonstrates that more must be done in terms of atrocity prevention and the operationalization of the responsibility to protect. Croatia is honoured to contribute to this cause by serving as co-chair of the Group of Friends of R2P in New York along with Costa Rica and Botswana. The Croatian Government remains committed to determining the fate of 1806 persons that went missing during our Homeland War in the 90s. Based on such a tragic national experience, we continue to render our unwavering support to all efforts to provide answers to those still suffering the anguish of uncertainty, anywhere in the world. We remain committed to combating hate speech, advancing the rights of women and children, protecting minorities, and the abolition of the death penalty. Gender equality is a foundation of a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. In that vein, we highlight the importance of education and equal opportunities for girls and boys. We will continue advocating against discrimination and hate speech, including antisemitism. Croatia continues to attach utmost importance to its immediate neighbourhood in Southeast Europe. Issues of the past and war legacy, like resolving remaining cases of missing persons and engaging in meaningful cooperation in handling war crimes without discrimination and in line with international standards, access to archives, as well as other unresolved and highly sensitive issues must be fully tackled. We actively support the European perspective of our close neighbour Bosnia and Herzegovina and have warmly welcomed the recent EU decision on the granting to B-H the status of EU candidate country. We continue to advocate electoral reforms that would ensure legitimate representation of all constituent peoples, in particular Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, at all levels of the Government, which is in our view essential for the future stability and prosperity of the country. We are very concerned about the latest developments in Kosovo–Serbia relations and would like to encourage measures for the de-escalation of tensions. Similarly, these two countries need to focus on the normalization of relations and deliver on their commitments and start implementing what was agreed on this year in Brussels and Ohrid. We continue to advocate universal recognition of the Republic of Kosovo and its right to existence as an equal member of the community of nations. It is in our interest to promote stability and further development of this region, as well as the process of European integration, which we believe remains crucial for the future prosperity of our neighbours, and which we are hopeful will be accelerated in the coming years. Thank you.

This fall, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is slated to lead a bipartisan group of U.S. senators to China. The planned trip, like other recent visits to China by high-ranking U.S. officials, is aimed at improving the relationship between the U.S. and China. Such efforts to ameliorate U.S.-China diplomatic relations come amid growing tensions between the two economic giants. They also run parallel to U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific countries to limit Beijing’s influence. Take, for example, President Joe Biden’s September 2023 trips to India for the G20 summit and to Vietnam, where U.S. competition with China was a focus of Biden’s discussions. While he was in Asia, Biden made several agreements in science, technology and supply chain security designed to bolster U.S. relations with India and Vietnam. “I don’t want to contain China,” the president told reporters in Hanoi on Sept. 10, 2023, shortly after meeting with Vietnam’s communist party leader. U.S. Reps. Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi echoed similar sentiments during an event held by the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York City the following day. But even if the U.S.’s stated goal isn’t to limit China’s global influence, its recent agreements with India, Vietnam and other countries may do exactly that. What US-led G20 deals mean for China The U.S. is actively looking for ways to blunt one of China’s best tools of influence: international loans. During the G20 summit Sept. 9-10 in New Delhi, the U.S. pledged to help reform the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to make them more flexible in lending to developing countries to finance renewable energy, climate mitigation and critical infrastructure projects. Biden committed the first US$25 billion to make those reforms possible and secured additional financial pledges from other countries totaling $200 billion in new funding for developing countries over the next decade. The U.S. also signed onto a deal with the European Union, Saudi Arabia and India that will help connect the Middle East, Europe and Asia through rails and ports. Characterizing it as a “real big deal,” Biden said the rail and ports agreement would help stabilize and integrate the Middle East. These plans are aimed at providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Commonly referred to as BRI, the initiative is China’s international infrastructure loan program. Over the past decade, Chinese government agencies, banks and businesses have loaned more than $1 trillion abroad, and 60% of the recipient countries are now in debt to these Chinese entities. The U.S. and other countries have long criticized BRI as “debt trap diplomacy.” One study suggests that the trillions of dollars in infrastructure loans to countries by the government and quasi-government bodies in China typically lead to debt problems that the borrowing countries can’t manage. As China grapples with a slowing domestic economy, it may become more difficult for Chinese entities to keep shelling out funding for big-ticket overseas projects. The new U.S.-led agreements that come out of the G20 could fill the coming gap. These G20 plans complement existing Western economic initiatives to compete with the BRI, including U.S. trade pacts for the Indo-Pacific region and the Americas, the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. What the US’s agreement with India means for China In their meeting on the sidelines of the G20, Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to deepen collaboration on developing critical and emerging technology, such as quantum computing and space exploration, as well as 5G and 6G telecommunications. This will help India compete with China in the technological arena in the Indo-Pacific. The telecommunications portion of a joint statement by Biden and Modi specifically mentions the U.S.’s Rip and Replace program. It is about helping smaller telecommunications companies rip out technology from Chinese companies like Huawei or ZTE and replace them with network equipment from the West that will protect users’ data. The U.S. has banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from its telecommunication networks, deeming those companies national security risks. The U.S. and India’s pledge to support Rip and Replace is a direct counter to China’s telecommunication technology expansion. What the US’s agreement with Vietnam means for China In Vietnam, Biden elevated the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expanding the relationship in everything from economics to education to technology in a country that has long counted China as its top trading partner. The enhanced partnership includes the U.S. providing $2 million to fund teaching labs and training courses for semiconductor assembly, testing and packaging. One company in Arizona and two in California have already pledged to set up semiconductor factories and design centers in Vietnam, and the U.S. artificial intelligence company Nvidia will help Vietnam integrate AI into automotive and health care systems. All these investments will make Vietnam even more attractive to U.S. and Western companies that don’t want China to be the sole source of their supply chain. As Vietnam becomes a key player in the semiconductor market, it will shrink China’s share of the market as well as its regional technological advantage. The U.S. also agreed to provide nearly $9 million to help Vietnam patrol the waters around its borders and beef up port facility security, as well as boost efforts to fight illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, or IUUF. While not explicitly mentioned, China is the target of this initiative; China and Vietnam continue to be at loggerheads over disputed claims over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and Chinese industrial fishing vessels are the largest culprits of IUUF around the globe. By inking these agreements at the G20 in India and in Vietnam, the U.S. broadened its circle of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that can help counterbalance China. Along with similar diplomatic accomplishments by Vice President Kamala Harris at the recent ASEAN summit in Indonesia; security partnerships like AUKUS, between the U.S., Australia and the UK, and the Quad, between the U.S., India, Australia and Japan; increased military sales and training to Taiwan; and the recent Camp David meeting Biden held with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. is building partnerships all across Asia. These actions are aimed at restraining China’s political, economic and military might, even if U.S. leaders don’t explicitly say that is their intention. Regardless of rhetoric, actions speak louder than words.