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Abstract This paper analyzes, from Immanuel Wallerstein's Analysis of the World – System, an introduction, the emergence of the modern world – system, the permanence of the colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system from a decolonial approach. It examines how the center – periphery structure has determined the economic, political and epistemic dynamics at the global level. Through this approach we study how coloniality has influenced the construction of knowledge. It also analyzes the impact of this structure on the recognition of States and the negotiation of international treaties, showing how Western power has conditioned the legitimacy and autonomy of peripheral nations. It also addresses the persistence of the center-periphery logic in local relations, as well as in gender and racial inequality, highlighting the role of anti-systemic movements in the struggle against these structures. It concludes that, although colonial dynamics continue to operate through debt, extractivism and the imposition of political models, decolonial perspectives offer tools to make visible and resist them. Introduction This paper will analyze the dynamics of the current international system based on the work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System” by Immanuel Wallerstein. In it, Wallerstein (2005) argues that the modern capitalist world-system has structured the global order since the 16th century, consolidating a hierarchical division between the center and the periphery. This division has not only shaped economic and political dynamics but has also established patterns of domination and dependency that persist to this day. The colonial expansion of European powers not only guaranteed access to resources and markets but also legitimized a system of exploitation based on racism and the hierarchization of colonized peoples. The decolonial perspective of Walter Mignolo (2013) will be adopted, which posits that this is a political and epistemic project aimed at dismantling the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity. From this framework, the article will analyze how colonial logic continues to operate in the capitalist world-system through the economic and political subordination of the peripheries. It will also examine the impact of the colonial worldview on knowledge production during the 18th and 19th centuries, as well as the reproduction of the center–periphery dynamic in the recognition of states during the 20th century and in the negotiation of international treaties during the 21st century. Likewise, it will address how this dynamic manifests not only internationally but also within local structures, perpetuating inequalities expressed in labor, gender, and racial relations today. This work seeks to provide a critical perspective on the persistence of colonial logic in the modern capitalist world-system, emphasizing the need to rethink power structures from a decolonial perspective that makes visible and vindicates the subaltern voices that have been historically silenced. Development Colonial Logic in the Capitalist World-System In his work “World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction – The Rise of the Modern World-System”, Wallerstein seeks to understand the structure and dynamics of the world-system, taking the 16th century as the starting point —a period when the conquests of the territories we now know as the Americas took place. The colonial period clearly illustrates the core–periphery dynamic (Wallerstein, 2005), as the Spanish, British, and Portuguese empires engaged in the extraction of resources from their colonies, while colonized peoples endured oppression and racism to which they would be condemned for centuries. This oppression brought significant benefits to the modern world-system, as it enabled massive capital accumulation — but exclusively in the core. This was because the colonial process built peripheral economies around the needs of the core, forcing them into subordination to the interests of the global market, generating dependency and underdevelopment. Quijano and Wallerstein (1992) argue that “[…] ethnicity was the inevitable cultural consequence of coloniality. It delineated the social boundaries corresponding to the division of labor” (p. 585). Due to the colonial period, the modern capitalist world-system laid its foundations and strengthened its market-based economic model through racism and hierarchization — circumstances that have legitimized the exploitation and domination of non-European peoples throughout history. Control over the resources of peripheral states by core states has endured to this day, along with the imposition of Western production and consumption models that perpetuate inequality. The colonial period’s greatest legacy remains systemic violence and subalternity. On this basis, it is important to analyze this work from a decolonial perspective. For Walter Mignolo (2013), “decoloniality is not a concept, but a practice and a political, epistemic, and ethical project aimed at disengaging from the colonial matrix of power that sustains Western modernity” (p. 21). This perspective also draws on the notion of epistemic subalternity, which refers to the experiences and knowledge of colonized and subaltern peoples that are rendered invisible, devalued, or reduced to particular cases — without being considered an integral part of the world-system (Mora, 2008). Coloniality in the Construction of Knowledge At the end of the 18th century, the modern university emerged, dividing its studies into two faculties: sciences and humanities. In the 19th century, another division took place within the humanities, opening the space for the study of social sciences, which would later also be split — on one side, those leaning toward scientism, and on the other, toward the humanistic approach. This led to the creation of new disciplines: economics, political science, and sociology (Wallerstein, 2005). These new sciences built their worldview and knowledge construction from a Eurocentric and colonialist perspective, thus assigning labels to peoples different from their own. These new sciences categorized the study of the world’s peoples into three groups. First, civilized peoples — Western nations, considered as such because they believed their social and political organization systems were the most advanced. Second, the high civilizations — India, China, Persia, and the Arab world — classified in this way because they possessed writing, religion, language, and customs. They were regarded as civilized peoples but not modern, under the previously mentioned concept. This category gave rise to orientalist scholars, with a Eurocentric and exoticizing view. Finally, the so-called primitive peoples — those who, from the colonial perspective, lacked writing, religion, language, and customs. This perception of the “uncivilized other” was used to justify colonial processes in the periphery, which even today enable the reproduction of exploitative and racist practices. Segregation in the construction of knowledge, imbued with colonial and Eurocentric thought, is based on criticizing the behavior of these peoples and on what should be changed about them (Zapata, 2008). The Eurocentric conception asserts categorically that the modus vivendi of these peoples is not appropriate according to Western standards. Although this way of thinking has evolved over time, its essence remains the same and has led Western countries to grant themselves the power to change the way of life of these peoples through invasions, neocolonial processes, and violent interventions via military force or economic interference. The Center and the Periphery in the Recognition of States As previously mentioned, Europe established a correspondence between modernity and the West; this includes the institution of the nation-state as its derived product (Zapata, 2008). From the Eurocentric perspective, for civilizations to be considered nation-states, they must possess four characteristics: territory, population, government, and sovereignty. In Public International Law, sovereign states are the main subjects of international relations, and for a state to be recognized as such, it must be acknowledged by the majority of states that are part of the international system. The center–periphery concept operates both economically and politically, which can be observed when a new state seeks recognition from members of the international system. The recognition granted by a state from the center carries more weight than that from the periphery, since states in the center, with greater political and economic capacity, influence the decisions of their allies — both within the center and the periphery. This need for state recognition has been extremely beneficial for the modern capitalist world-system, as political and economic interdependence, along with the perpetuation of power in the countries of the center — particularly those belonging to the West — ensures that they act, whether in matters of state recognition, political agendas, or economic issues, entirely to their own advantage, disregarding the interests of “the other.” From a decolonial perspective, state recognition is a Western construct designed to maintain control over who meets the imposed criteria to belong to the Eurocentric international system. These criteria clearly do not align with the social organization of all non-Western civilizations but were conceived in such a way as to subordinate them to the needs of the world-system, which inevitably serves the interests of Western core states. This can be exemplified by the case of Taiwan. In 1971, the Kuomintang lost recognition from the government of mainland China, and starting in 1985, Taiwan’s government sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with states that already recognized it and to develop relations with those that did not, with the aim of obtaining their approval (Connelly, 2014). Despite the passage of time, recognition of Taiwan as a state by core countries seems inconvenient for them, likely due to the ongoing political dispute between Taiwan and China. As a result, only 14 peripheral states recognize it as such. Despite this, the Northeast Asian country maintains unofficial relations with 47 states and the European Union, for purely economic reasons. The Modern Capitalist World-System in International Treaties It is worth mentioning that the idea of the center–periphery permeates the negotiation of international agreements. As mentioned earlier, the so-called “primitive peoples” were civilizations that, from the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, lacked writing, religion, languages, or customs. This idea persisted into the 20th century, as reflected in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which in Chapter II, Article 38, states that “the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: […] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (UN, 1945). The Eurocentric conception of a civilized nation in the postwar period was based on the type of government existing in each state. Thus, countries without a democratic political system were not considered civilized nations. This conception forced nations not to determine their own system of government, but rather to adhere to the one imposed by the Western international system in order to be accepted, disregarding their customs and traditions. A more current example of the imposition of Eurocentric ideas on systems of government is the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Mexico in 2000. Ratification of the trade agreement was conditioned on what they called the “democratic clause.” The agreement was not ratified by the Italian government until July 3 of that year, when the presidential elections resulted in the victory of Vicente Fox (Villegas, 2001). On the same day, the European Commission’s spokesperson, Gunnar Wiegand, said in his press release: “A historic vote has taken place in Mexico. The Commission congratulates the Mexican people for exercising their democratic rights in such a mature and exemplary manner” (Caracol Radio, 2000). The spokesperson’s mention of the Mexican people’s maturity refers to the notion that, in the past, the exercise of democracy had not possessed this quality — an observation made from a paternalistic and Eurocentric perspective. Had the election results been different, Mexico could have faced the possibility of the European Union “imposing sanctions as a reaction to the verification of interruptions in democratic processes, which, in addition to affecting development, constitute a threat to international peace and security” (Cordero Galdós, 2002, p. 128). The criticism of the imposition of the “democratic clause” centers on the recurring practice of requiring peripheral states to adapt to the political ideologies and economic needs of the core. The Reproduction of the Center–Periphery Dynamic at the Local Level As mentioned in the development of this work, the effects of colonialism persist across all systems and subsystems through the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, the latter of which will be addressed later. This is manifested in global inequalities, the exploitation of natural resources in peripheral countries, and the persistence of racist and Eurocentric power structures. From Wallerstein’s perspective, the world-system is a historical structure which, although in constant transformation, reproduces power relations and inequalities over time through the domination of the core and the exploitation of the peripheries (Wallerstein, 2005). Thus, the world-system has evolved in several ways; one of these is the introduction of the term semi-periphery into the analysis. During the colonial period, there were only core and peripheral nations. Over the centuries, however, semi-peripheral states have emerged — nations that not only extract raw materials or engage in manufacturing but also have the capacity to produce cutting-edge technology (Wallerstein, 2005). This positions them in a more privileged place than peripheral countries in the international system. Yet, despite appearing to have overcome the systemic oppression that once kept them in the periphery, the colonial mindset within their institutions perpetuates their subordination to the core. Good examples of semi-peripheral states in Latin America are Mexico and Brazil. Both countries were victims of the exploitation and systemic violence of colonialism. This shaped the development of their societies and economies for centuries. Even after achieving independence and building productive and economic systems that placed them in the semi-periphery, their economic progress was built on a legacy of oppression and racism that continues to reproduce the abuses described. In this way, the concept of core and periphery permeates social and family subsystems. This can be observed in labor relations, where capitalists depend on the core–periphery or superior–subordinate relationship to sustain the production model. It is also evident in social relations, which Wallerstein refers to as anti-systemic movements. Society perpetuates the core–periphery principle by placing women and racialized communities in the periphery, while men — especially white men with power — occupy the core. Anti-systemic movements paved the way for the struggle against these inequalities, giving rise, for example, to feminist and Indigenous movements. These have led to the development of theoretical perspectives such as decolonial feminism, which adds analytical variables to the decolonial perspective. According to Yuderkys Espinosa, it emerges from “[…] a subaltern, non-hegemonic voice […] anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist. […] Its aim is to question and oppose an imperial and racist rationale” (Barroso, 2014, p. 2). Conclusions The modern capitalist world-system has managed to sustain and expand itself thanks to colonial structures that, far from disappearing with decolonization processes, have mutated and perpetuated dynamics of domination and dependence. As discussed, the core–periphery logic has been key to the organization of the international system, not only in economic terms but also in the construction of knowledge, the legitimization of states, the negotiation of international agreements, and the imposition of political and social models from Western hegemony. The colonial legacy remains in the structural subordination of peripheral economies to the interests of the core, the imposition of international norms that favor core countries, and the persistence of racialized and gender-based inequalities within peripheral states themselves. This scheme has not only ensured capital accumulation in the core but has also limited the self-determination of historically colonized peoples, while normalizing their exclusion from political, economic, and epistemic spheres. At the international level, neocolonialism operates through mechanisms such as external debt, unequal trade agreements, and political interference in the internal affairs of peripheral states. In addition, extractivism and territorial dispossession continue to reproduce colonial logics, affecting both peripheral countries and Indigenous communities as well as other historically marginalized groups. In this sense, the modern capitalist world-system not only perpetuates economic exploitation but also reinforces power structures based on racism, sexism, and subalternity. However, as decolonial perspectives point out, the coloniality of power is not an immutable phenomenon. This approach questions the structures of power and knowledge inherited from colonization, seeking to deconstruct Eurocentric discourses and make visible the voices and experiences of the subaltern. Anti-systemic movements have sought to challenge these structures, reclaiming the agency of subaltern peoples and promoting the construction of alternatives that confront the colonial matrix of power. Particularly, decolonial feminism has emerged as a key critique of the intersection between patriarchy and coloniality, showing how women — especially racialized women — have been relegated to the periphery of the system. Thus, analyzing the world-system from a decolonial perspective allows us not only to understand the continuity of structures of domination but also to recognize the spaces of resistance and contestation that emerge within it. In conclusion, the decolonial perspective enables us to rethink the modern world-system from a critical standpoint, recognizing structural inequalities and the need to transform the power dynamics that perpetuate the domination of the core over the periphery. Decolonialism makes it possible to redefine notions of progress, development, and modernity from a perspective free from colonial stereotypes and hierarchies, recognizing the diversity of knowledge and worldviews of Indigenous peoples. It seeks to decentralize power by rethinking and decolonizing power relations between the core and the periphery, between the state and local communities, aiming for a more equitable distribution of resources and benefits. 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As AI accelerates, the US and China shape the global governance landscape through parallel ambitions and contrasting ideologies. Understanding their policy trajectories reveals key inflection points for potential engagement. The United States and China are the world’s leading powers in artificial intelligence (AI)—and each has global ambitions. As AI development accelerates, so too do calls to regulate it responsibly. Both countries have the capacity to shape the future of AI governance. But understanding where cooperation might be possible requires understanding how each country’s approach has evolved. While their methods and ideologies differ, and their leadership aspirations often appear at odds, two underexamined forces—infrastructure and philosophy—may create unexpected space for mutual engagement. In the US, AI governance has long been shaped by the mythology of the free market. Under President Barack Obama, that mythology was tempered by calls for pipeline diversity. President Donald Trump discarded these in favour of rhetoric about “American values,” an ill-defined phrase deployed more as a competitive cudgel against China than a coherent policy vision. President Joe Biden attempted to resurrect some of Obama’s normative commitments—launching the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, Executive Order 14110 on “safe, secure, and trustworthy AI,” and initiatives like the National AI Research Resource—but the foundations of his administration’s policies remained countering China’s influence through increased export controls and other measures. Trump’s second administration has once again changed focus away from equity and community-centredness, but the continued focus on competing with China and ensuring US “victory” in the “AI race” shows there’s more continuity than often assumed between different administrations’ AI approaches. China, for its part, has been more consistent in its governance strategy, even as it experiments at the margins. Its 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan cast AI as a pillar of national strength, and subsequent regulations on algorithms, deepfakes, generative AI, and facial recognition underscore a clear priority: balancing the “twin miracles” of economic development and social stability. Though early days of “fragmented authoritarianism” have given way to a more centralised approach with specific vertical laws, this logic remains embedded throughout the governance system. China is generally less explicit in its rhetoric than the US, with fewer exhortations about race dynamics and countering the US. In fact, it frequently invokes ideas of ethical pluralism and the language of international cooperation. This framing likely reflects a blend of genuine ideological positioning and diplomatic strategy, but it presents a challenge to US policymakers who continue to frame AI governance in moralising binaries. This is evident in two parallel AI Action Plans released in July 2025. The US released a guiding document—indicatively titled “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan”—with an epigraph from President Trump stating: “As our global competitors race to exploit these technologies, it is a national security imperative for the United States to achieve and maintain unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.” Though the Action Plan itself contains only three substantive references to China, it is built on the premise that global AI is an inherently competitive “race,” and China is clearly the US’s main competitor. A few days after the US AI Action Plan was released, China released its “Global AI Governance Action Plan.” It builds on the 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative, which seeks to portray China as a leader in the global pursuit of AI for the good of humanity and a “champion of the Global South.” The Global AI Governance Action Plan contains fewer specifics than the US AI Action Plan, but calls for “strengthening international cooperation on AI capacity building,” including supporting developing countries to design, implement, and govern AI. It also calls for building a global AI governance system through the UN and again shows the key balance of economic development and social stability: while it acknowledges the need to “jointly push for innovation breakthroughs,” it also advocates for strengthening “policy and regulatory coordination” and building an international AI safety governance framework. The US, on the other hand, is determined to cut “bureaucratic red tape and onerous regulation” while working primarily with its allies. However, recent events have called into question the feasibility of this approach. Notably, despite calls to increase export controls—and mobilise allies to do the same—the US announced shortly before the release of the AI Action Plan that it would again permit Nvidia to export H20 chips to China after previously restricting them. This was part of a trade deal in which China agreed to lighten restrictions on rare earth exports. Though seemingly counterintuitive, this deal reflects a fundamental reality of the modern AI ecosystem: the resources and supply chains enabling it are inextricably intertwined. China mines roughly 70 percent and processes 90 percent of rare earth minerals. US-based Nvidia has 92 percent of the GPU market. Both of these are critical for progress in AI. Both countries are attempting infrastructure decoupling, but the US may have to compromise on its fundamentalism to maintain access to the critical resources it needs. Meanwhile, its advanced chip dominance in turn provides leverage over China. Will this lead to broader cooperation? Geopolitical issues are likely too entrenched for each country to join hands and promote harmonious global AI governance. However, each country’s primary goal is the same: to benefit the “people.” China is claiming that its definition of “the people” is the global community—though this comes with the noted exclusion of domestic critics, including the Uighurs of Xinjiang, who are subject to AI-enabled surveillance and detention. The US’s definition of “the people” has changed from administration to administration, but currently seems to include the American people and potentially allied nations. It’s doubtful that the current administration will agree to substantive global AI governance discussions. But through its Action Plan, China has thrown down the gauntlet—engage with global AI governance or be an obstructionist. What the US will choose remains to be seen. Emmie Hine is a Research Associate at the Yale Digital Ethics Center and a PhD candidate in Law, Science, and Technology at the University of Bologna and KU Leuven. She researches the ethics and governance of emerging technologies, including AI. You can also find her byline in her weekly tech-focused newsletter, the Ethical Reckoner. Emmie holds degrees from Williams College and the University of Oxford, and previously worked as a software engineer. She’s on Bluesky here and X here. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

The BRICS meeting in Rio on July 6th and 7th gives a snapshot of the great power competition between China and the United States in different regions around the world, including Latin America. China has become the largest trading partner for many countries in Latin America, investing heavily in infrastructure and forging political alliances that further its strategic objectives. For its part, the Trump Administration of the United States issued the statement that those participating countries will face increased tariffs. The statement was the continuation of exercise and assertion of its authority for the past and present century. The positioning of various BRICS members and participating countries is particularly telling of what the great power competition means in the region and also globally. Brazil’s Lula hosted the meeting aiming to showcase its foreign policy leadership, not necessarily antagonizing the West. Russia is still going through the war in Ukraine, and Putin attended only online. India’s Modi was present as well as Ramaphosa from South Africa. No show of Xi Jinping was notable, although Premier Li Qiang was attending. Besides the BRICS core, other countries also showed promotion of their interests. Iran, for one, joined the group in 2024 and sent a ministerial level delegation to rebuke recent strikes on Iran. As the United States appears to be pulling back from its traditional leadership role in the world, China is seizing the opportunity to expand its influence and reshape global dynamics. Through a combination of state-driven development policies and active international engagement, Beijing has positioned itself as a major player in the Global South, extending its reach beyond Asia to regions such as Africa and Latin America. China’s increasing presence in the region has been mainly driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a surge in trade volumes, marking a major shift in the region’s economic landscape. Many experts point to China’s use of “infrastructure diplomacy”—financing ambitious, strategic infrastructure projects across the region—as a key factor in this rise. The numbers tell a compelling story. Trade data from the World Bank (Figure 1) shows that in the past ten years, China has overtaken the United States as the leading trading partner for much of the region, upending a dynamic that had held steady since the early 2000s. Beyond trade, China’s influence deepens through the 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that have joined the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese loans have poured in, funding major energy, infrastructure, and development projects that have reshaped local economies. China’s push isn’t just economic—it’s political too. Beijing has taken steps to strengthen cultural ties, increase academic exchanges and boost tourism in Latin America, including waiving visa requirements for travelers from some countries. This multi-faceted approach highlights China’s pragmatic mix of economic self-interest and strategic diplomacy as it works to secure resources, expand markets, and bolster its global standing. On the other hand, the United States has long been a strategic ally and key trading partner for Latin America. Agencies like USAID have funneled millions of dollars into economic and military initiatives across the region. With the recent changes in the aid policy, immigration policy, and tariff policy, Washington’s recalibration of its foreign policy are transforming the geopolitical balance in Latin America and the Caribbean. As both powers deploy their strategies — from deepening economic ties to defending national interests — the decisions of Latin American states remain critical in shaping their alignments with global powers. The ultimate outcome is still up in the air, but one thing is clear: power in the region is actively being renegotiated. The diverging approaches from China and the US have set the stage for a broader reconfiguration of power in Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, it’s essential to recognize that each country’s internal decisions and policies also play a critical role in shaping this shifting landscape. Colombia provides a case in point. Historically, it has maintained close diplomatic ties with the United States while keeping China at arm’s length. Unlike countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, Colombia has received relatively little Chinese infrastructure investment. However, with the election of president Gustavo Petro—the first left-wing president in the country’s history—Colombia has taken decisive steps to strengthen its relationship with China, presenting new challenges for the United States to maintain its strategic foothold in the country. We observe – both on political and economic dimensions – that the changes in China’s strategy, coupled with Colombia’s domestic policies, have reduced the country’s dependence on the US while increasing its desire to integrate with China. Politically, Colombia and the United States have long enjoyed a strong diplomatic relationship, as reflected in their shared memberships in international organizations, high-level dialogues, and multiple bilateral agreements. However, diplomatic tensions have emerged in recent years. Disputes between the two leaders, the change of course of USAID, and a significant drop in new bilateral agreements over the past four years have contributed to a shift in this traditionally stable partnership. Against this backdrop, diplomatic ties between China and Colombia have strengthened. In 2023 alone, both countries signed 12 cooperation agreements in trade, technology, and economic development, upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership, and Colombia’s entry into the Belt and Road Initiative during recent China – CELAC Forum in May. Colombia also joined the BRICS New Development Bank a few weeks after that Forum. Economically, the US has traditionally been Colombia’s largest trading partner, backed by a free trade agreement and significant investment. Yet, in recent years, the share of US trade has steadily declined, while China’s footprint has grown (see figure 1). Although there’s no formal trade agreement, ties have strengthened during the current administration, including the opening of a Buenaventura-Shanghai trade route in 2025. Additionally, China’s “infrastructural diplomacy” has significantly grown: over 100 Chinese companies now operate in Colombia, and major infrastructure projects like Bogotá’s Metro Line 1 and the Regiotram are underway, along with investments in mobility, technology, and health. Latin America, and Colombia in particular, finds itself at the center of a geopolitical tug-of-war with China’s calculated investments and the US’s shifting policies. While Beijing leverages trade, infrastructure, and cultural diplomacy to expand its influence, Washington’s recalibration of its foreign policy leaves room for new alliances and opportunities. Our analysis shows that power reconfiguration is not merely a product of external rivalry. It is driven by the choices each Latin American nation makes. As Colombia’s case demonstrates, the region’s destiny hinges not just on global superpowers, but on its own internal political decisions and developments. The coming years will test how Latin America navigates these shifting currents. Disclaimer This article was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York (G-PS-24-62004, Small State Statecraft and Realignment). The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Figure 1: China vs. US Import and Export TrendsDrawn by the authors using data from the World Bank.  

Over time, the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States has gone through multiple stages and transitions, reflecting both moments of collaboration and episodes of deep antagonism. At certain points, both countries have succeeded in consolidating frameworks of cooperation in specific areas, such as the peaceful resolution of the El Chamizal territorial dispute in 1967 or the promotion of academic exchange through the Fulbright-García Robles Scholarship Program. However, this interaction has also been marked by significant conflicts, most notably the war of 1846–1848. This confrontation, whose outcome was unfavorable for Mexico, culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, through which the country was forced to cede more than half of its territory. This episode left a deep imprint on Mexico's collective memory. The shared history thus reveals a complex and constantly evolving dynamic. The geographical proximity between Mexico and the United States, with a land border exceeding 3,000 kilometers, requires both governments to adjust their priorities to respond to shared challenges in areas such as security, trade, investment, migration, and other strategic issues. This border condition generates a constant bilateral dynamic, in which national priorities must be harmonized with bilateral and regional interests. From a theoretical perspective inspired by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Dr. Rafael Velázquez Flores argues that this relationship is configured as an asymmetric and multifaceted interdependence. Within this framework, Mexico seeks to expand its decision-making capacity in an environment characterized by structural power imbalances. For his part, Dr. Jorge Schiavon contends that the bilateral agenda operates within a logic of complex interdependence, in which the dense network of institutions and the multiple economic, social, and political ties restrict the ability of either country to act unilaterally. One of the most evident manifestations of the interdependence that characterizes the North American region was the signing of NAFTA in 1992, which came into effect two years later and was transformed into the USMCA in 2018 following a deep renegotiation process. This economic integration mechanism, though less ambitious than the European Union’s model, has strengthened trade and production ties in the region, generating reciprocal benefits. On one hand, U.S. companies have consolidated preferential access to inputs from Mexico, which has boosted key sectors such as automotive, electronics, and agribusiness. Through stricter rules of origin, the agreement has encouraged greater domestic production of components within the United States, protecting industries in strategic states such as Michigan, Texas, and Ohio. In this context, Mexico became the United States’ main trading partner in 2023, with imports valued at $475 billion, surpassing both China and Canada. On the other hand, Mexico regards the United States as its main trading partner, which as of April 2025 accounted for over 80% of its exports and more than 40% of its total imports. The preferential access established by the USMCA has enabled the Mexican economy to position itself as a strategic supplier of goods and services to the U.S. economy, with particular significance in sectors such as automotive, electronics, manufacturing, and agribusiness. The stricter provisions on rules of origin in the automotive sector have encouraged deeper regional integration, leading plants located in Mexico to expand their role in component production and assembly processes. Although the automotive sector captures a large share of the benefits, other industries have also experienced significant growth. As a result, Mexico has become the United States’ main agricultural supplier and has strengthened its presence in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and capital goods, including machinery, electrical equipment, and computing devices.     As shown in Table 1, the United States and Canada occupy the top two positions as destinations for Mexican exports. Based on data from April 2025, the U.S. market imported nearly $45 billion worth of goods from Mexico. Regarding Mexican imports during the same period, the United States ranked first as Mexico’s main trading partner, exceeding $21 billion, with China in second place at just over $10 billion. In this context, it is worth noting that, as shown in Table 2, Canada ranked 10th as a source of Mexican imports. This scenario highlights that the economic integration between Mexico and the United States goes beyond the exchange of goods: both countries have built an integrated and highly specialized production network that generates millions of jobs while fostering growth in the North American region.     On the issue of migration, Mexico and the United States maintain a deep interdependence that permeates the bilateral agenda not only in socioeconomic matters but also in security-related issues. In 2023, approximately 10.6 million Mexican-born immigrants were legally residing in the United States, representing 23% of the total foreign-born immigrant population. At the same time, according to the Pew Research Center, around 4 million Mexicans were living without legal status — down from a peak of 6.9 million in 2007. Thus, the Mexican presence in the U.S. continues to have a dual impact: it contributes labor and demographic stability to the American economy while also generating a steady flow of remittances and transnational ties that support regional development in Mexico and strengthen binational relations. In fact, the Bank of Mexico estimated that remittances sent from the United States to Mexico exceeded $62 billion in 2024 — far surpassing Mexican exports of petroleum products, which amounted to approximately $30 billion that same year. In the current scenario of complex interdependence between Mexico and the United States, the re-election of Donald Trump has introduced a climate of tension that has weakened traditional channels of bilateral dialogue and cooperation. The Republican administration has replaced structured diplomacy with a rhetoric characterized by threats, misperceptions, and a widespread atmosphere of uncertainty. Although President Trump’s confrontational strategy is not limited to Mexico — as it stems from the narrative that the international community has excessively and asymmetrically taken advantage of its relationship with Washington — his administration has intensified the portrayal of Mexico as a key factor behind various domestic grievances in the United States. Irregular migration, drug trafficking, and the trade imbalance have become recurring issues through which the White House channels internal demands, reinforcing a narrative of confrontation. This dynamic undermines the institutional mechanisms of bilateral understanding and places at risk the progress made in economic cooperation, security, and cross-border governance. Since the beginning of his second term, President Trump has implemented a series of unilateral actions that intensify his restrictive immigration agenda. On the very day of his inauguration, he declared a national emergency at the southern border and signed multiple executive orders that eliminated access to asylum, suspended the refugee resettlement program, and reinstated the “Remain in Mexico” policy. He also delegated border control functions to the Department of Defense and authorized the deployment of the military and National Guard to perform tasks traditionally carried out by civilian agencies. Through the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, he ordered expedited deportations, including those targeting unaccompanied minors. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has carried out mass raids, even in sanctuary cities, schools, and hospitals. This institutional offensive has intensified the criminalization of undocumented individuals, while the use of military forces in urban areas has undermined legal certainty and created an atmosphere of insecurity that fractures social cohesion and amplifies collective fear. In the commercial sphere, President Donald Trump has promoted executive orders imposing tariffs on Mexican exports of steel, aluminum, and automobiles, justifying such measures with arguments related to the trade deficit, irregular migration flows, and efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking. Although his administration has temporarily suspended some duties on products covered by the USMCA, these unilateral decisions have heightened uncertainty in the bilateral relationship by contradicting commitments made under the agreement. Constant threats to expand tariffs to goods not included in the treaty, along with the use of extraordinary powers to impose trade restrictions, have eroded the climate of trust between the productive sectors of both countries. In response, the Mexican government has pursued diplomatic actions and dialogue mechanisms aimed at ensuring the proper implementation of the USMCA and establishing safeguards to reduce the risks posed by protectionist measures that affect the stability and predictability of regional trade. In the current context, President Trump has disregarded the strategic importance of the United States’ historic allies and trade partners by adopting measures that have eroded trust not only with Mexico but also with other key partners such as Canada and the European Union. This situation has confronted the Mexican government with a complex challenge: preserving the stability of its most important economic relationship while also maintaining a strong consular protection policy. To this end, Mexico operates one of the world’s largest consular networks, with 53 consulates distributed throughout U.S. territory. The work of the Mexican Foreign Service is essential in this scenario, as it strengthens diplomatic dialogue and underscores to Washington that Mexico shares democratic and economic values with the United States. Recognizing mutual interdependence is vital: the prosperity and stability of both countries are intertwined, and a strong bilateral relationship is a key component of sustained economic growth in North America as a whole. Although it is uncertain what future decisions President Trump may make, the Mexican government must prioritize dialogue and political coordination as underlying strategies of its foreign policy, avoiding any confrontational maneuvers, as these only undermine the bilateral relationship. President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration faces the critical task of accurately identifying the priorities of the U.S. government to act proactively with clarity and consistency. Mexico cannot allow its foreign policy to be reduced to merely reacting to unilateral initiatives marked by aggressive rhetoric and uncertainty. In this context, the Mexican Foreign Service must firmly exercise its well-established negotiating capacity to consolidate Mexico’s position as a reliable neighbor and a key actor in the regional economic structure. The bilateral relationship must clearly convey that the prosperity of the United States is closely linked to Mexico’s stability and growth — an interest grounded in a shared logic of structural interdependence.

Abstract Buffeted by the headwinds of US unilateralism, Europeans and Canadians are bound together in a community of fate. As the US departs the field, Europe and Canada need to cooperate more. To avoid being abandoned, they need to avail themselves of Atlanticist power for mutual benefit. Rather than merely protecting a liberal–democratic zone of peace across the Western hemisphere, Europe and Canada need to project the power of the transatlantic security community to deter Russia from using war to precipitate a multipolar world order in which it becomes a global player. This article draws on the metaphor of transatlantic relations as a triangle: with the US, Europe and Canada at its angles. Canada is in an existentially precarious position: a more autonomous Europe would make Canada even more dependent on the American hegemon, which would heighten Canada’s risk of being absorbed by the US. Although that outcome is not in Europe’s interest, Europe and Canada have been disengaging for decades. Reversing this trajectory would come at a significant military cost but would be a political gain that would be difficult to measure, resulting in cooperation on energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. Yet, to achieve this strategic counterbalance, Europe and Canada need to protect abiding security and political interests: to keep the US in Europe and to keep the Russians out. KeywordsCanada, Europe, EU, Euro-Atlantic community, US, NATO, Energy security, Defence, Defence in depth, Transatlantic relations, Structural realism Introduction ‘Europe and Canada are trusted friends and partners. Today this relationship is more critical than ever. I look forward to working with you to defend democracy, free and fair trade, and our shared values’ (von der Leyen 2025). The words of the president of the European Commission, on the swearing in of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, identify Europe’s common priorities with the ‘most European of non-European countries’. The words reinforce a reinvigorated Schicksalsgemeinschaft, a German term that denotes a community with a common fate. After decades of distraction by ‘Asia-Pacific’ imaginaries, Europe and Canada are rediscovering the inevitability of their common fate, in the Euro-Atlantic community. Traditionally, the North Atlantic triangle has comprised an Atlanticist Anglosphere: the UK, the US and Canada. This article instead draws on an age-old metaphor coined by celebrated Canadian historian John Bartlet Brebner (1966): a North Atlantic triangle that reflects transatlantic strategic and political cultures. The angles of this triangle consist of the US, Canada and Europe writ large, as manifest in but not limited to the EU. Europe and Canada share a common strategic fate that makes them interdependent. Both stand to benefit from cultivating their relationship, while both stand to lose should Canada become even more dependent on the US. Canada’s strategic amnesia is manifest in its having forgotten the lesson of leveraging Europe to hedge against the uncertainties of US unilateralism. This is reminiscent of what Brebner called the ‘bookkeeper’s puzzle’: how can Canada best manage relations with both the UK and the US so as (a) to be able to invoke the assistance of the former against the latter’s political (and perhaps military) pressure, while at same time (b) ensuring that the British desire for an Anglo-American rapprochement does not result in any ‘sacrifice’ of Canadian interests? Historically, Canada had managed relations with the easternmost angle of the triangle, the UK, to assure its assistance against political (and possibly existential military) pressure from the US. At the same time, in the interests of its sovereignty, Canada wanted to ensure that any rapprochement with the UK would not end up sacrificing Canadian interests. An offshoot of the bookkeeper’s puzzle applies to attempts by Canada to involve its allies from NATO in an expanded triangle to counterbalance the US politically and economically (Haglund 2025). The bookkeeper’s puzzle thus reflects a real fear of abandonment: in Canada of being abandoned by Europe, and in Europe of being abandoned by the US. The key to the puzzle is for Canada and Europe to retrench and harness their interdependence. But that is easier said than done, due in part to free trade with the US, which has reinforced the shift of Canada’s organisational focus from east–west to north–south. The new North Atlantic triangle Since the founding of NATO in 1949, European countries and Canada have come to depend disproportionately on the world’s largest defence and intelligence complex for their security and have had the world’s largest economy as their primary trading partner. The US shored up its Atlantic and Pacific rims by design: a favourable trading relationship with the US allowed Europe to prosper, while the US guaranteed and underwrote Europe’s security against the Soviet threat. With the end of the Cold War, however, European allies opted to reduce their defence posture significantly. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, the US has invested US$500 billion per year more than Europe in defence (at today’s prices)—which comes to almost US$20 trillion more than Europe over 35 years. This explains why Europe depends on US capability—especially in cyber, space and intelligence. The US feels that this came at its expense: 64% of European defence is still underwritten by the US (NATO 2025), up from 52% over the past decade, nothingstanding NATO members’ 2014 Wales summit pledge to spend more on defence. Why are 340 million Americans defending 450 million Europeans? Moreover, the US perceives those allies as benefiting from asymmetric trade relations, which the Trump administration considers to be to the detriment of the US. That is, European allies have failed to heed the first purpose of NATO which, in the infamous words of its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, is ‘to keep the Americans in Europe’ (Rodman 1995). To keep ‘the Russians out’ of Europe is the second purpose Lord Ismay sets out for NATO (Rodman 1995). In line with Article 5 of NATO’s founding charter (North Atlantic Treaty 1949, art. 5), allies rely on the US as the guarantor to deter Russia from its ambition of becoming a global player in a multipolar world order, which Russia is prepared to bring about by force. France and the UK notwithstanding, only the US has the nuclear triad and second-strike capability to ensure credible extended nuclear deterrence. However, two world wars and the Cold War have shown that Europe needs Canada for defence in depth. The usual connotation of this military strategy is to contain a bad actor that has breached a layer of defence by providing a second layer of defence. In this case, it refers to Canadian territory as being a safe and like-minded industrial hinterland for resources and an industrial base for Europe to rely on in times of war, as it did during the world wars. During these, Canada provided surge capacity and defence in depth from day one, long before the US ultimately joined in. In both cases, Canada’s reliable contribution changed the outcome of the war: the Second World War might have turned out quite differently had Canada not helped the UK hold down the island fort. Along with prevailing historical, ethno-cultural, political and economic ties, Canada and Europe share geostrategic interests: in the Arctic with the Nordic countries, and in the Atlantic rim with the UK, France, Spain and Portugal. Although Canada is disproportionately exposed to the consequences of US unilateralism, for Canada, leveraging European power to counterbalance the US is controversial (Haglund 1999). Canada’s changing demographics and trade relationships have oriented Canada away from Europe as the obvious ally and partner in safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. Conversely, Europe has an interest in using its power to assure Canada’s independence so as to limit the latter’s potential overexposure to the hegemonic impulses of the American empire: given the size of Canada’s economy and population, US leverage over Canadian natural, economic and human resources would increase America’s structural leverage, over Europe and the world, by about 10% over today’s American power. Such a situation would ensure its unrivalled status as the premier global superpower, which China alone could not match. In theory then, Canadian sovereignty depends on counterbalancing the US using European power. In practice, since the Second World War, both Canada and Europe have been drafting behind the US, deepening their economic and military reliance on the US, and shifting their strategic gaze away from a Euro-Atlantic community that they have taken for granted. Fixated on the US, both parties have seemingly suffered from amnesia about their bilateral transatlantic geostrategic interdependency. As US geostrategic interests increasingly diverge from those of the EU and Canada, and the US becomes more consumed with domestic (electoral) priorities and structural shifts in geopolitical gravity towards the Indo-Pacific, the relationship between Canada and Europe stands at a cross-roads. To counterbalance the power politics of an emboldened US, Russia and China, Europe and Canada need one another to preserve and uphold the liberal–democratic rules-based international order. This is especially true since the US’s pivot in geopolitical orientation, priorities and resource allocation towards the Indo-Pacific to disrupt an expansionist China that is intent on upending the prevailing international order. The US response to China has been to secure control over critical resources and geostrategic approaches that could render it vulnerable, while ensuring that it remains the world’s largest economy. On the one hand, eyeing natural resources and critical minerals in its proximate vicinity, notably Canada and Greenland, puts the US on a confrontational course with Europe and European interests. On the other, the US is ‘rebalancing’ away from Europe, the European neighbourhood and the Euro-Atlantic community as its priorities, and resources, shift to the Indo-Pacific. As a result, the US is expecting Europe to take on (far) greater responsibility for securing its own political interests and military backyard. In response, some European leaders, notably France, have continued to advocate for greater ‘strategic autonomy’ for Europe—an approach that drew the ire of the first Trump administration and is likely to aggravate Euro-Atlantic tensions—while others, notably Germany, have favoured chequebook diplomacy. This term describes the use of economic aid and investment as a means of attraction as part of soft-power projection (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). As the least powerful of the G7, Canada has neither luxury. Without European allies by its side, Canada runs an extreme risk of being left out in the geostrategic cold, with deleterious consequences for both Canada and the EU (Nossal 2023). Within the Euro-Atlantic community, the EU and Canada have not just suffered from mutual benign neglect. In the post–Cold War era, and especially with the advent of the Global War on Terror, Europe’s value to Canada has been declining steadily. Canada’s primary strategic relationship is naturally with the US, with which it shares a continent: co-located with the world’s largest economy, which a free trade agreement has made it ever more dependent on, Canada’s economy and security have become overly reliant on the US. The EU and the vast majority of its member states are also highly—arguably overly—dependent on the security and economic umbrella of the US. The supposed ‘peace dividend’ after the Cold War made NATO members even more dependent on the US. With so great an emphasis on their strategic relationships with the US, the perpendicular Canada–EU edge of the new North Atlantic triangle has never received much attention. What was a sin of omission, is now a sin of commission, by both parties. Friends, without benefits Reorienting Canada–Europe relations—as desirable as it may be—is a tall order. However intellectually appealing and geopolitically necessary, there are many obstacles. First, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have neither prioritised bilateral Euro–Canadian relations, nor really taken note of them, whether out of disinterest or because there was no pressing need: to date, 10 EU member countries still have not ratified the Canada–Europe Trade Agreement. In both the Old and the New World, long-term thinking in politics and society is a popular topic of discussion in the salons of the capital cities, but rarely reaches the offices of decision-makers and their advisers. In the end, the untapped potential for more vital, productive and politically successful relations between Canada and Europe is inversely proportional to the actual political will and capital that elites are willing to expend, especially relative to their interest in the US. Second, realignments in international relations require not only a strategic basis but also complementary apparatuses that are willing and able to action new strategic direction. This does not bode well for either Canada or the EU. The Canadian foreign service suffers from a vast backlog of reforms in terms of its structures, vision and mission, which is indicative of a broad decline in the efficiency, effectiveness and objectivity of the Canadian civil service (Savoie 2024) and the steady erosion of the ability of Canada’s federal government to manage civil society. Former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Senate Reform resulted in the worst of both worlds: it further aggravated the struggle between Ottawa and the provinces over power and resources, and failed to generate greater capacity and interest in foreign and security policy in Canada’s upper chamber. The senators he appointed were preoccupied with domestic policy, and ideologically disinclined towards provincial rights. Recent foreign policy has resulted in six Canadian foreign ministers over the course of a decade; poor preparation and engagement by ministers who tout Canada’s ‘convening power’ but have little actual legitimacy to convene, let alone deliver; and two failed candidacies for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The foreign services of the EU and its member states, too, seem more preoccupied with themselves—notably with identity politics—than with playing a measurable, active role in shaping bilateral and multilateral external relations. In both the EU and Canada, the visibility and political effectiveness of foreign affairs instruments underperform: spending is unstructured and not optimised for strategic effect. Yet, both sides share a dogmatically defiant adherence to the legacy of a liberal rules-based international order. Indications of upheaval in the transatlantic relationship date back at least to President Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia. Realists posit the international system as anarchic, with states competing against one another and striving for survival. That world of power and interest-driven politics stands in increasingly stark contrast to Europe’s and Canada’s liberal institutionalist and values-driven approaches to the world. Third, for a realignment of the Canadian–European relationship at the political level, the impetus must not only originate from their respective civil societies, but also be accepted and actively legitimated in societies whose demographic composition is undergoing rapid change. Yet, legitimation deficits loom large. The EU’s view of the North American subcontinent remains wedded to the bilateral relationship with the US. At the same time, due to the slow implementation of the Canada–EU Trade Agreement, the potential for economic cooperation with EU institutions and member states remains largely unrealised, despite the fact that it has long been far easier for Canada and European allies to work together than for either to work with the US. For example, the extremely low international mobility rate of Canadian students, which is in the single digits, and the relatively few EU students who study in Canada, foreshadow a lack of future bilateral networks for emerging young leaders to tap into (European Commission 2020). Overly rigid certification standards in Canada for European university degrees impede broader student exchanges, labour mobility and more extensive knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, academic networks, that is, joint projects by non-governmental organisations from the EU dedicated to political cooperation with and in Canada, such as that fostered by the local EU delegation in Ottawa, portend positive developments: for example, the Jean Monnet Chairs and a centre that parlays European interest in Canadian universities, and the Europe Canada Network (EUCAnet) which facilitates transatlantic knowledge sharing among experts. Similarly, in the private sector, Canadian chief executives are in short supply in the EU, and potential candidates more often than not prefer to stay in their home country, the US or the Anglosphere, rather than invest in a transatlantic management career and the associated bilateral networks. The fourth obstacle is a direct result of the meagre transatlantic civil society: the prevailing images Canada and Europe have of one another one the one hand, and the failure to ‘bridge’ the transatlantic imaginary on the other. On the one side is Canada, the cosmopolitan, tolerant and fun subcontinent with bears, lakes, mountains and maple syrup, which—post-colonial realities notwithstanding—is considered by most Europeans to be the better North America and which, with its playful lightness, often manages to escape the critical gaze, and not only that of Europeans. On the other side is ‘Fortress’ Europe, with its sprawling bureaucracy, and myriad unmanageable regulations and trade barriers, which seemingly only feigns openness. Perception could not be further from reality. Foreign policy is driven by national interest, yet despite a trajectory of convergence among Euro–Canadian interests, especially of late, for the EU and European countries, Canada remains a low priority: Canada ranks about sixtieth in terms of priority across European states, well behind all the EU member states, and behind many other large and mid-sized powers around the world. Fifth, despite the intent to build closer ties, fundamentally different economic gravitational pulls on both sides persist: owing to bilateral free-trade agreements and globalisation, over the past 30 years, Canada has gradually become more dependent on the US, while the integrative benefits of the EU’s common market have reduced incentives for member states to invest in bilateral relations with Canada. Sobering foreign trade figures for the EU and European states with Canada hold little prospect of change in the foreseeable future: Canada barely cracks the top 10 of European export markets, whereas the EU is actually Canada’s second most important trading partner—but at barely a tenth of Canada’s trade with the US. Finally, if bilateral EU–Canada cooperation is to deepen, parliaments on both sides need to be more proactive and deliberate in transforming the relationship: while political executives, the European Commission and Canada’s government of the day set the agenda, it is the legislatures that legitimate and sustain it. The European Parliament maintains a permanent liaison office in Washington, DC as well as a European Public Law Organization in London and in every member state, but not in Ottawa. The Canada–Europe Parliamentary Association needs to fashion new formats to invigorate and promote relevant political projects among the Canadian, European and national parliaments, perhaps modelled on the robust array of activities undertaken by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Strategic friends, with benefits Its position in the new North Atlantic triangle makes Canada an attractive partner for Europe. Rich in natural resources and critical minerals, Canada has the potential to rank among the world’s most prosperous countries. Canada’s three largest export industries are oil, natural gas and agriculture, along with vast resources in potash (for fertiliser) and uranium (nuclear power). Were Canada to build more pipeline capacity to export hydrocarbons, it would have the potential to make Europe (much) more energy and critical-minerals secure, more competitive and prosperous by contributing to lower European energy prices, and less reliant on the US, the Middle East and Russia, especially for liquified natural gas. Canada has the third-largest oil reserves in the world, produces some of the cleanest natural gas and ranks among the world’s top five exporters of agri-food. Yet, Canada’s pipeline infrastructure is overly reliant on the US, which means Canada has to sell the bulk of its oil to the US at a 25% discount on world market prices. Bringing down European energy prices is the most important contribution Canada could be making in standing with Ukraine: Canada’s failure to export hydrocarbons to Europe keeps European energy prices high, which effectively amounts to Canada subsidising Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine. Europe procures negligible amounts of Canadian oil via US facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, and Canada exports no liquified natural gas to Europe at all, despite Europe now procuring 120 billion cubic metres a year, about half of which comes from the US. Besides an abundance of natural resources and critical minerals, as well as cheap, clean electricity, Canada is also rich in human resources and other intangible assets: it has a concentration of data centres and artificial intelligence infrastructure, it is home to some of the best public universities in the world, it has a more diverse and younger demography than any European ally, and its immigration strategy has historically favoured high skillsets and education. As a result, Canada has long had the most tertiary-qualified workforce among OECD countries (OCED 2022). Although Canada shares common interests, institutions (such as the North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD), a continental identity and ideas with the US, as a Westminster parliamentary democracy, its values and political culture are closer to those of Europe than those of the US (Hataley and Leuprecht 2019). Moreover, as the only country that is a member of both the British Commonwealth and La Francophonie, Canada shares key cultural–linguistic attributes with both the UK and France: within the G7, Canada thus offers a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon world. Europe also remains Canada’s second most important strategic partner, after the US. Owing to its experiences in the two world wars, Canada has a vested interest in Europe’s territorial integrity, political stability, economic prosperity and social harmony, with its like-minded European allies helping Canada to offset US unilateralist propensities. To that effect, NATO is a vital multilateral organisation for Canada; arguably, it is the most important, giving Canada a voice alongside 30 European allies and the US. Although it would be a mistake to equate counterbalancing the US with participation in NATO, Canada has a vested interest in sustaining and preserving NATO for the purpose of bandwagoning with European members to do just that (Jockel and Sokolsky 2021). For this reason, the Canadian Armed Forces has long been postured as an expeditionary organisation, with its primary orientation towards Europe. Via NATO’s external borders, Canada’s boundary with Russia stretches from its border with Alaska via a (disputed) Arctic maritime flank close to 1,000 km in length, to a 1,215 km land boundary in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe. Canada has thus sustained military commitments along much of the Russian flank. The pattern of Canada’s military deployments also shows that the country has vested interests in the Balkans, Europe’s southern flank, in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. However, in recent decades, Canada has let its military atrophy to the point where it struggles to meet basic commitments—to NATO, to NORAD and to defending its own northern interests—let alone make new ones. Yet, the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific has created an opportunity for Canada to support US and European interests by backfilling some US capacity across Europe’s central, eastern and southern flanks, thus shoring up NATO, which is of benefit and interest to all member states. Were the EU to become a more independent defence actor, this would pose a serious risk to Canadian sovereignty and Canada’s standing in the world. In theory, Europe has the industrial base and financial capacity to provide for its own defence, security and survival. This, however, comes at a cost, for which European allies have thus far proven unable to muster the political will, although the European Commission’s $800 billion ReArm Europe plan holds promise that political will may be changing. The lack of will is cause for concern in the US, since Europe’s NATO allies have been sourcing about 60% of their arms from the US market. When France tried to take the initiative to achieve greater strategic autonomy for Europe during the first Trump presidency, Trump’s then NATO ambassador promptly dispatched an aggressive cease-and-desist letter (Leuprecht and Hamilton 2020). Although the US has resisted getting entangled in alliances since its first president, George Washington, NATO offers the US important levers. Nowhere in the world does the US invest proportionately less in defence for a higher rate of return. Canada and Europe are better positioned to add value to US military, political and strategic interests, than to try to go it alone individually. As Keohane (1988) famously observed, for the US, NATO is a very efficient and effective collective decision-making mechanism, gathering 30 European countries plus Canada—including some of the world’s top spenders on defence—the UK, Germany and France. Combined, the non-US NATO members spend about US$600 billion on defence (as compared to the US$877 billion by the US). The importance of NATO as an information-sharing and coordination mechanism has grown substantially since the formulation of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which brought key partners in the Indo-Pacific into the fold, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Together, these allies and partners spent roughly US$1.7 trillion of a total global defence expenditure of about US$2.44 trillion in 2023. Of course, aggregate expenditures are an inchoate measure of military capability and commitment. While the US can necessarily exert greater pressure on any one country bilaterally, the benefits of NATO decision-making and coordination far outweigh the transaction costs for the US to do so bilaterally across three dozen countries. The reason the US spends as much as it does on its military is to preserve its freedom of action. Ultimately, being able to act unilaterally means never having to rely on others. Nonetheless, even though dispensable, allies are convenient to have as they also bring soft power, money and moral legitimacy. Greater European strategic autonomy is of little interest to the US, outside the NATO framework. The US does, however, have an interest in greater complementarity, capability and effectiveness within the organisation: it wants allies to do more together, on their own, provided they deconflict with the US. As the only other non-European NATO member country, Canada necessarily shares the transatlantic orientation of the US. Canada’s defence relations with Europe thus offer the US a mechanism to fall back on should the EU strive for greater strategic autonomy without coordinating with NATO and, therefore, with US interests. The lesson that the US drew from the Second World War was that, as a superpower, it has global interests. To this end, US unilateralism took on the trappings of a more multilateral approach to global affairs. The US collaborated with European partners and Canada to build the foundations of the post-war security, trade and monetary infrastructure: NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the Bretton Woods Accord (which laid the foundations for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). This strategic collaboration brought North America and (Western) Europe historically unprecedented security, prosperity and stability. Over time, however, both the European members of NATO and Canada have forgotten that, multilateral trappings aside, the arrangement was born primarily out of US interest. In the aftermath of the two world wars, the US learned that territorial integrity, political stability, collective prosperity and social harmony in and of Europe were in the best interests of its aspirations as a global superpower. The claim to superpower status depended on a degree of control over Europe. Russia has long understood this; the US came to this realisation in the twentieth century; and for a China with global ambitions, this is a relatively recent realisation. For the US, NATO and extended nuclear deterrence are the means to this end; which is why Russia is intent on upending NATO, as both Russia and China aspire to be global players in a multipolar world, rather than regional players under a Pax Americana. Although Canada does not have nuclear arms, its position in North America necessarily means it has a role in assuring extended nuclear deterrence. Russia’s strategic approaches to North America, by way of the Arctic, pass through Canadian airspace. Canada’s gradual commitment to and spending on Arctic security and defence, including NORAD, therefore, are not just about homeland defence, but are also an investment in NATO by means of continental defence writ large (Leuprecht et al. 2018). North American continental defence assures uncompromised latitude for sovereign decision-making in Washington as well as Ottawa. An adversary that can threaten North America with intercontinental ballistic missiles or hypersonic missiles, for instance, could effectively curtail sovereign decision-making that reflects the best interests and legitimate democratic will of Americans or Canadians. That is, an adversary could overtly threaten Ottawa or Washington with an attack if confronted with a political choice that runs counter to its interests. This matters all the more since North American continental security is the bedrock of credible extended nuclear deterrence. An adversary that is able to call the nuclear triad, and especially the second-strike capability, into question would effectively undermine the US security umbrella that spans the Atlantic and Pacific rims. The states that currently rely on US extended deterrence would thus have an incentive to resort to nuclear proliferation to ensure their own survival. Since nuclear proliferation runs counter to European and Canadian interests in regional and global stability, this is one more reason for them to be more strategic about coordinating their contribution to the triangle. Ostensibly, the US does not need Canada to provide North American continental defence: the US has the capacity, capabilities and resources to go it alone. However, cutting Canada out of North American strategic defence would significantly reduce NATO’s leverage over collective defence. Europe and European allies would be left to deal with the US alone; Canada’s currency on the continent and across the Atlantic would be greatly diminished. The coincidence of NATO’s pivot to North American Arctic defence and Obama’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific is no accident. Certainly, there is an operational requirement to coordinate with NORAD on an integrated all-domain layered Arctic defence along NATO’s entire frontier with Russia. But this change also highlighted that NATO is, first and foremost, a political—not a military—alliance. Obama’s pivot necessarily meant less US attention paid to, input and interest in NATO; thus, it was in NATO’s best interest to show the flag in America’s backyard. NATO has not one but three pillars: Europe, North America and the transatlantic area. How we imagine the third matters for how the US imagines NATO’s role in the Atlantic: either, as popularised by Walter Lippman (1917), as an ‘ocean highway’ that by geography, culture and necessity connects two continental ‘communities’; or, in a triumph of politics over geography, as theorised by Alan Henrikson (1980), as a ‘lake’ and ‘inland sea’ that unifies rather than divides. Within the North Atlantic triangle, Canada can bridge the divide of a vast ocean, making it into a much more manageable inland sea. Canada’s geographic continental co-location with the US gives Europe limited, but strategically indispensable, leverage beyond Washington through which to influence the second and third pillars of NATO, using defence and diplomacy to counter US unilateralist proclivities. Conclusion For Canada to become even more (over)dependent on the US than it already is runs fundamentally counter to European interests. The EU has a vested interest in Canada maintaining sovereign control over its resources, political decision-making and defence. Conversely, the prospect of greater European strategic autonomy in defence outside of the NATO framework poses a potentially existential risk to Canada, rendering it more dependent on the US, and thus reducing its value to allies and partners and, by extension, its standing in the world. If this were to happen, Canada would face much higher transaction costs more akin to those of its partners in the Indo-Pacific, having to invest a lot more in foreign policy and defence for greatly diminished returns. Canadian sovereignty is a Trump card that the US is now playing to maximise its power and range of unilateral action in a world where its hegemony is under threat. Europe and Canada used to be discretionary friends. Now is the time to realise mutual benefits for strategic effect. Canada can support Europe’s interests in energy security, critical minerals, defence and defence in depth. In return, the EU can bolster Canadian political and economic sovereignty. Partnering with the EU is also the most efficient and effective way for Canada to gain greater independence from the US in defence and defence-industrial capacity. Greater, more autonomous military-industrial capacity would enable both Canada and the EU to build sustainable capabilities and commit to collective defence. Such a strategy would have a dual signalling purpose: of military deterrence to Russia, and of political and economic deterrence to the US. Canada and the EU should not just protect but actually promote their military, political and economic interests. Failing to be strategic about collective transatlantic security and the Euro-Atlantic community within the new North American triangle increases the risk that Canada and Europe will be abandoned by the US. Lord Ismay had a premonition should Europe and Canada fail to shape their future: Russia in Europe, America out, under German leadership. ORCID iDChristian Leuprecht https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9498-4749ReferencesBrebner J. B. (1966). North Atlantic triangle: The interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.European Commission. (2020). 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Abstract The so-called Anglophone Caribbean has historically been an area of strategic importance for Cuban foreign policy. With more than half a century of history, Cuba-CARICOM ties constitute a successful example due to their comprehensiveness, strength, dynamism, and concrete results in terms of political coordination and cooperation. However, in a complex and changing international context, various elements constitute threats to the effective execution of Cuban foreign policy toward the subregion, mostly linked to structural difficulties facing Caribbean states and their integration into the international economy, as well as the effects of the blockade and the policy of economic suffocation implemented by the United States against Cuba, which has intensified with Trump's arrival as president. Likewise, there are opportunities that can be seized to preserve the privileged historical relationship that Cuba maintains with this subregional bloc. Introduction The Caribbean has historically been a region of strategic importance for Cuba's foreign policy, primarily because it constitutes its natural environment and setting, to which it belongs not only for geographical reasons but also due to historical and cultural ties. Cuba's connections with the so-called non-Hispanic Caribbean even predate the consolidation of the Cuban nation, considering the constant influence of intra-Caribbean migratory flows during the colonial era. This intensified with the massive arrival of laborers — mainly Haitians and Jamaicans — to the largest of the Antilles during the early decades of the 20th century, a migration flow that continued until the 1950s. Cuba shares with Caribbean nations a historical legacy linked to the tragic scourge of slavery, associated with the plantation economy. This involved, on one hand, the forced migration of a large African population, and on the other, a series of similar characteristics in terms of socio-economic structures — although the differences among the various European colonial powers present in the region should not be overlooked. After the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cuba's ties with the non-Hispanic Caribbean went through various phases, particularly since 1972, when four newly independent Caribbean nations (Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago) collectively decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba. This decision ignored the OAS agreements of July 1964, which had mandated the political, diplomatic, and economic severance of relations between the governments of the continent and the Island. It was during the 1990s and into the 21st century that the most solid foundations were laid for articulating a coherent, harmonious, and coordinated projection that acknowledges the real importance of the Caribbean subregion for the objectives of Cuban foreign policy. The results achieved thus far in terms of coordination, political dialogue, and cooperation have led several authors to describe Cuba's policy toward the Caribbean as one of the most dynamic and effective aspects of the Island’s foreign outreach in recent years. The aim of this paper is to provide an updated analysis of the Cuban government’s external projection toward the Caribbean, focusing on the threats and opportunities that, in the foreseeable future, may impact the country’s interactions with this subregion under the leadership of President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. It is important to clarify that, from a methodological standpoint, this paper focuses primarily on the group of countries that make up the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), most of which are island nations, although three are located on the mainland (Belize, Guyana, and Suriname). As noted by scholar Milagros Martínez Reinosa in her work “Cuba’s Relations with the Caribbean,” this is a “group of nations with marked differences, determined by their respective geographic and population characteristics, by the colonial powers that divided up this part of the world, and by the unique socio-economic development of each. This group, in which the so-called English-speaking insular Caribbean predominates, includes (…) different economic systems and forms of political organization, with varying levels of development, economic potential, and geographic size” (Martínez, 2011, p. 203). Development Historical Analysis of Cuba’s Foreign Projection Toward the Caribbean It is well known that, in the historical period following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, significant progress was made in the Caribbean’s decolonization processes. Gradually, and with particular characteristics in each case, several countries achieved independence: Jamaica (1962), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Guyana (1966), Barbados (1966), The Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), and Suriname (1975). Later, others followed: Dominica (1978), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Saint Lucia (1979), Belize (1981), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), and Saint Kitts and Nevis (1983). At the same time, the first steps were taken toward economic integration in the subregion, marked notably by the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. This treaty established the Caribbean Community and set the goal of creating the Caribbean Common Market, both known by the acronym CARICOM. These agreements aimed to advance economic cooperation and integration, as well as to establish a degree of coordination in foreign policy among the governments of the member states. All of this laid the groundwork for building a subregional institutional framework, giving these small states greater negotiating power and the ability to act jointly, both within international organizations and within the Inter-American System itself. One of the most representative examples of the emerging political coordination among these countries was the previously mentioned establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba by the governments of Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago in December 1972. This event marked the beginning of a new era in the foreign policy of the revolutionary Cuba, enabling cooperation and mutual support with the newly independent Caribbean states. However, in 1983, the U.S. invasion of Grenada — which was supported not only by the OAS but also by members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), along with Barbados and Jamaica — somewhat deteriorated Cuba’s relations with the subregion. Beginning in the early 1990s, a new, more dynamic and productive period began in Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean. In 1993, the Cuba-CARICOM Joint Commission was established, and throughout the decade, Cuba gradually intensified its engagement with CARICOM member states — particularly following the creation, in 1994, of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). This organization included all Caribbean island states, along with Central America, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The ACS provided a particularly favorable space for Cuba’s foreign policy outreach in the region, as it was outside the sphere of influence of the United States and offered conditions that allowed the Cuban government to assume a leadership role and promote a regional dynamic focused on cooperation. Cuba’s strategic projection toward the Caribbean reached a high point with the holding — at the initiative of the Cuban government — of the First CARICOM-Cuba Summit, held in Havana in December 2002, marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. At this historic meeting, attended by all CARICOM heads of government, common goals and guidelines were set to shape relations between Cuba and the subregional bloc. During the summit, a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed —previously negotiated two years earlier during the Joint Commission meeting in Santiago de Cuba. The agreement aimed to promote trade in goods and services, establish financial arrangements to facilitate commerce, encourage market access, foster the creation of joint ventures, protect investments, and promote information exchange. This agreement was later updated in 2006 to reflect new economic and commercial realities. From that point on, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs began implementing the so-called Comprehensive Caribbean Plan (PIC, in Spanish), which integrated all actions directed toward the region with the explicit goal of contributing to the fundamental objectives of Cuba’s foreign policy (Martínez, 2011, p. 217). In the years immediately following, ties were rapidly strengthened at the highest levels, both bilaterally and with CARICOM. Some have described as an “avalanche” the large number of official visits to Cuba by Caribbean heads of government between 2002 and 2005 (the year of the Second CARICOM-Cuba Summit), reflecting the success of Cuba’s political-diplomatic outreach in the region and the high priority the Caribbean had acquired in its foreign policy agenda. This period also saw a sustained increase in Cuban cooperation in areas such as health, education, sports, culture, and more. At the Third Summit, held in 2008, cooperation was reaffirmed as the central and leading element in Cuba’s intergovernmental relations with the Caribbean, with expanded and deepened assistance across a wide range of fields —many of them supported by the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela. At the same time, the emergence of political coordination and cooperation initiatives such as ALBA-TCP and Petrocaribe — and the subsequent inclusion of some CARICOM countries in the former — multiplied opportunities for interaction, political alignment, and regional coordination. Similarly, both sides have maintained close coordination in various international forums, including the UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, WIPO, UNIDO, FAO, WTO, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G-77+China, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). This international collaboration has been strengthened by the clear political will and the ability of both parties to resolve differences constructively. CARICOM’s solidarity with Cuba has been particularly notable in its unanimous stance against the U.S. embargo. To date, eight CARICOM-Cuba Summits have been held, the most recent one taking place in Barbados, attended by Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. On that occasion, he also made an official visit to Barbados and toured two other countries —Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada. According to recent figures, there are currently more than 850 Caribbean scholarship students in Cuba, with over 6,000 having graduated. Additionally, more than 2,000 Cuban professionals are currently providing services in CARICOM countries. Cuba’s Foreign Projection Toward the Caribbean in the Current Context: Threats and Opportunities For Cuba, maintaining strong relations with CARICOM remains a priority. From a political standpoint, it is strategically important to preserve a close and positive relationship with the countries that make up this subregional organization, as they often achieve high levels of consensus on key international issues. As a relatively large bloc in terms of membership, this often translates into an equal number of votes in international organizations. This is particularly relevant considering the transformations the international system has undergone in the 21st century — marked by the gradual decline of U.S. global leadership, the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, the shift of economic and commercial dynamism toward the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing influence of new information technologies, among other factors. These changes pose significant challenges to the Cuban government’s foreign outreach and have also influenced the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the region, on one hand, on curbing the progress of resistance movements to its model of regional domination, and on the other, on trying to counter the growing influence of extra-regional powers in the hemisphere. Currently, all independent Caribbean states maintain diplomatic missions in Havana, and Cuba does the same in each of those countries. This makes Cuba a key and prominent actor in the region and highlights the importance CARICOM member states place on their relationship with Cuba. Within the Caribbean Community there is a strong consensus on condemning the U.S. embargo and recognizing Cuba’s cooperation efforts — reflected in joint declarations across both global and regional multilateral organizations. However, economic relations between Cuba and CARICOM have significantly lagged the levels achieved in the political and cooperation spheres. Despite the existence of a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement that includes broad tariff preferences (ALADI, 2011), trade volumes remain very low and are highly concentrated in a few countries —such as Trinidad and Tobago ($57.9 million), Jamaica ($3.2 million), Guyana ($507,000), and Suriname ($84,000). Altogether, total trade amounts to approximately $61 million (National Office of Statistics and Information—ONEI, 2024, pp. 233–236). The underdevelopment of economic ties is not primarily due to a lack of willingness on either side to implement coordinated actions but rather stems from more complex causes related to the economic structures of Caribbean islands and how they are integrated into the global economy. It is also important to consider that both Cuba and most CARICOM members are classified as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), a condition that presents shared development challenges. Factors such as limited economic and geographic size, high levels of openness and dependence on the international economy, low diversification, transportation and connectivity issues, and high exposure to the effects of climate change and extreme weather events, among others, represent significant obstacles to the development of multifaceted ties between Cuba and the Caribbean — particularly in the area of economic and trade relations (Laguardia, 2022, p. 179). Threats The arrival of the Republican administration led by Donald Trump to the U.S. government undoubtedly represents a threat to Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean and, more broadly, to its foreign projection toward the region. The appointment of controversial figures closely linked to the anti-Cuban far-right in the U.S. — such as Marco Rubio and Mauricio Claver-Carone as Secretary of State and Head of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs at the State Department, respectively — forecasts an extremely difficult scenario for Cuba. This will greatly hinder the long-sought development of economic and trade ties with CARICOM, due to the tightening of the blockade, the potential implementation of additional unilateral measures, and Cuba’s reinstatement on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It is undeniable that the blockade — significantly reinforced in recent years and expanded in its extraterritorial reach — currently stands as one of the major obstacles to elevating Cuba-CARICOM economic relations to the same level as their political ties. This remains a clear objective within Cuba’s foreign policy approach to the region. Broadly speaking, the blockade and the aggressive U.S. policy prevent Cuba from operating under normal conditions in the international market by limiting access to credit and financing, disrupting financial operations, reducing export revenues, and creating an intimidating environment for potential foreign investors. All these factors have worsened the Island’s economic crisis and intensified issues such as declining export capacity and foreign currency shortages, directly impacting Cuba’s trade with the rest of the world, including the Caribbean. These challenges are compounded by logistical limitations that hinder intra-Caribbean trade. Furthermore, the lack of mutual understanding of institutional and bureaucratic systems remains a significant barrier to expanding economic ties (Marín, Martínez, & Laguardia, 2024). Nonetheless, even under current complex conditions, there are still possibilities and spaces to develop broader and deeper economic relations, based on the principle of identifying areas of complementarity and leveraging mutual strengths and opportunities. In this regard, the internationally recognized scientific achievements of Cuba’s biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, along with a wide catalog of high-quality, advanced technology products, offer a valuable opportunity to increase exports to the region while also strengthening the healthcare systems of CARICOM countries. Additionally, other biotech products developed by Cuban companies and institutions —applicable in agriculture and livestock — could contribute to CARICOM’s efforts to achieve greater levels of food sovereignty. Likewise, the emerging private sector of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Cuba has gained increasing importance in the national economy, particularly in foreign trade, and shows strong potential to help boost commercial exchange and business between Cuba and the Caribbean nations. On the other hand, another threat to Cuba’s foreign projection toward the region —particularly regarding the development of its economic relations — comes from the financial limitations caused by the inclusion of several Caribbean states on blacklists of tax havens, as well as their classification as middle-income countries. This classification prevents them from applying for development aid and other preferential financing. All of this adds to the challenges Cuba already faces because of the U.S. blockade. Another significant threat is the intensification of the effects of climate change, particularly the increasing occurrence of extreme weather events. These phenomena damage ecosystems and biodiversity, destroy agriculture, reduce tourism revenues, contribute to food insecurity, damage infrastructure, and create a constant need for budgetary spending and public debt, among other harmful impacts. Also, we also consider as a threat, — particularly over the past decade — the decline of Venezuela’s economic capacity to meet the energy demands of CARICOM countries and to support other cooperation projects in the Caribbean, especially under initiatives such as ALBA-TCP and Petrocaribe, in which Cuba played an important role. Additionally, there is the ongoing conflict over the Essequibo region, where there is strong consensus among CARICOM countries in support of Guyana’s position. This places Cuba in a complex position regarding how to approach the issue — an issue also used by the United States to exert pressure on Venezuela. Compounding this is the campaign promoted by the U.S. and its regional allies against the government of President Nicolás Maduro in the context of the Venezuelan elections and his inauguration, which has triggered a wide-ranging political, diplomatic, and propaganda offensive. While some Caribbean states have aligned with U.S. positions, it is worth noting that the majority have remained outside of this campaign. For CARICOM member states, the United States remains the primary “provider” of security. The need for cooperation and coordination in security matters with the U.S. is undeniable, especially given shared challenges such as cross-border criminal flows, the Caribbean’s status as the U.S. “third border,” economic dependency, and the need for aid and financing among CARICOM countries. This power asymmetry means that the U.S. uses security as a tool of pressure, which represents a constant threat to Cuba’s relations with the bloc — particularly under the new U.S. administration, which has prioritized migration and drug trafficking and embraces Monroe Doctrine-style views regarding inter-American relations. Another threat we identify is the weakening of regional mechanisms such as the ACS. Despite Cuba’s consistent efforts, the ACS has largely failed to meet its founding objectives since its establishment in 1994: to create a common economic space, preserve the Caribbean Sea, and promote the sustainable development of its member states – although there have been some positive experiences in cooperation on climate change mitigation and disaster risk prevention. Opportunities One key opportunity lies in the development of close coordination and the building of broad consensus on issues of shared interest and broader relevance on the multilateral agenda. This applies both within United Nations bodies and forums, as well as in platforms like the G77+China and the NAM. These spaces have demonstrated mutual support for various common demands and proposals, including: reparations for slavery; the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities regarding climate change; the reform of financing eligibility criteria; the Bridgetown Initiative as a proposal for reforming the global financial architecture; the lifting of the U.S. blockade on Cuba; recognition of Cuba’s international cooperation — particularly in the health sector; and the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, among others. Another ongoing opportunity for Cuba’s foreign policy projection lies in its respectful and diplomatic engagement, which has allowed Cuba to act as a political and diplomatic bridge between the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America. This role facilitates relationships that remain limited due to differing political and communicational frameworks, as well as stark economic asymmetries. This bridging role has been particularly evident in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), where Cuba’s efforts supported the inclusion of a permanent CARICOM representative in the organization's leadership troika and ensured the incorporation of Caribbean concerns in CELAC’s joint declarations and statements. Another external opportunity is the growing interest of global powers and extra-regional actors in the Caribbean, most notably the People’s Republic of China. China has vast potential in economic and trade relations with the region, especially considering that CARICOM countries offer several attributes attractive to Chinese investors. China’s high demand for Caribbean products has driven its interest not only in production but also in developing transport infrastructure across the region to secure supply chains and reduce costs. In this context, the membership of Cuba and several Caribbean nations in the Belt and Road Initiative presents both an advantage and an opportunity. Cuba maintains a strong, strategic, high-level political and diplomatic relationship with China and can be considered as China’s principal ally in the region. This places Cuba in a unique position to play an important role in expanding China’s political engagement with CARICOM, particularly given that five CARICOM countries — Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, and Haiti — still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In other words, Cuba could further leverage its privileged relationships with both parties to continue fostering political rapprochement, help expand economic and trade links with the subregion, and participate in various development projects with Chinese capital through a triangular cooperation. In this framework, Cuba can contribute with its expertise, knowledge, and highly qualified human capital in fields where many Caribbean nations lack capacity. At the same time, Cuba’s admission as an associate member of the BRICS represents an opportunity that opens promising prospects for cooperation, investment, and access to financing — within a framework that promotes a multipolar vision of the world, composed of several of the largest and most dynamic economies on the planet. In addition to its strategic geographic location as the “Key to the Gulf,” which facilitates access to major markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba can contribute to BRICS with an influential and privileged political relationship with Caribbean countries, built over 50 years. This could help foster a strategic partnership between BRICS and the Caribbean. Likewise, Cuba’s historical cooperation ties and its high-level political and diplomatic dialogue with the African bloc — as well as with other countries of the so-called Global South — also represent an opportunity, as they can help bridge the Caribbean with these extra-regional actors, enabling coordination on common positions in multilateral arenas and fostering economic ties. In the case of Africa, CARICOM has aimed in recent years to strengthen relations with the continent, starting with the first summit between both blocs held virtually in 2021. This goal is clearly reflected in the signing of a Partnership Agreement by 12 of the 15 CARICOM member states with the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), which has approved over $1.5 billion in investments for the Caribbean (Afreximbank, 2024). Moreover, cooperation between Cuba and CARICOM still offers a wide range of untapped opportunities, aligned with the specific needs and advantages of each party. As previously mentioned, Cuba has a highly skilled human workforce that can benefit the region. In this regard, triangular cooperation becomes a key mechanism for accessing funding from governmental and multilateral sources. The growing interest in the Caribbean by various powers — both Western and non-Western — also represents an opportunity to attract resources for key areas such as climate change mitigation, energy transition, and digitalization, where Cuba can participate with its trained professionals and developed capabilities (Marín, Martínez, & Laguardia, 2024, p. 10). Conclusions Cuba–CARICOM relations, with more than half a century of history, stand as a successful example of strategic comprehensiveness, coherence, and tangible achievements in political and cooperation matters. However, they still face the challenge of producing similar results in the economic and trade sphere, where progress has been limited. The main obstacles to achieving this goal are linked to the structural conditions and constraints of Caribbean economies and their integration into the global economy, as well as to the effects of the U.S. blockade and the economic strangulation policies implemented against Cuba. The worsening of Cuba’s economic crisis — driven by the tightening of the blockade, the imposition of new sanctions, and its continued inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list under a likely more aggressive policy by the new U.S. administration — poses a threat to the achievement of Cuba’s goals in the Caribbean. At the same time, the positive outlook generated by Cuba’s admission as an associate member of the BRICS presents an opportunity to develop a possible strategic alliance between the bloc and the Caribbean — supported by the privileged, trusting, and cooperative relationship that Cuba has built with Caribbean countries over more than 50 years. Cooperation has been the cornerstone of Cuba’s relations with the Caribbean, and despite challenges, it has remained intentional and prioritized. However, more efforts should be made to leverage other areas in which Cuba possesses expertise and highly qualified human capital. The potential of triangular cooperation, along with the growing interest of key international actors in the Caribbean, could represent a valuable opportunity for Cuba to maintain and expand its cooperation efforts in the region. References Cabrera Agudo, M. (2011). Las políticas de seguridad de CARICOM en torno al crimen trasnacional organizado: incidencia de los intereses estadounidenses de seguridad nacional (2001-2011). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.Cabrera Agudo, M. (2013). La concertación política en el marco de CARICOM: focos de ruptura y espacios para la construcción de consensos. Cuadernos del Caribe, 16(1), 67-79.Caribbean Community Secretariat. (2022). Annual Report of the Secretary-General 2022. Guyana.CARICOM Secretariat. (2014). Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community 2015–2019: Repositioning CARICOM. Turkeyen, Guyana.Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (2020). U.S. Strategy for Engagement in the Caribbean. Caribbean 2020: A Multi-Year Strategy To Increase the Security, Prosperity, and Well-Being of the People of the United States and the Caribbean. Recuperado de: https://www.state.gov/u-s-strategy-for-engagement-in-the-caribbean/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (5 de julio de 2023). Secretary Blinken’s Remarks at the CARICOM Plenary. Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-caricom-plenary/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (febrero de 2025). Integrated Country Strategies (países miembros de CARICOM). Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/office-of-foreign-assistance/integrated-country-strategies/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (16 de noviembre de 2023). Cooperación entre EE. UU. y el Caribe para detener el tráfico de armas de fuego. Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/spanish/cooperacion-entre-ee-uu-y-el-caribe-para-detener-el-trafico-de-armas-de-fuego/Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. (1 de marzo de 2024). Compromiso entre Estados Unidos y el Caribe (traducción al español). Recuperado de: https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/spanish/compromiso-entre-estados-unidos-y-el-caribe/Díaz Vázquez, J. (2017). Las relaciones económicas de China con los países del Caribe. En J. Laguardia Martínez (Ed.), Cuba en sus relaciones con el resto del Caribe. Continuidades y rupturas tras el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos (pp. 243-256). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.García Lorenzo, T. (2005). La economía y la integración de la comunidad del Caribe: Encuentros y desencuentros (Tesis doctoral). Universidad de La Habana.Girvan, N. (2012). El Caribe, dependencia, integración y soberanía. Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente.Girvan, N. (2017). El pensamiento de la Dependencia en el Caribe Anglófono. En F. Valdés García (Ed.), Antología del pensamiento crítico caribeño contemporáneo (pp. 459-499). Buenos Aires: CLACSO.Griffith, I. (1997). El narcotráfico como una cuestión de seguridad en el Caribe. En P. Milet (Ed.), Paz y Seguridad en las Américas. Chile: FLACSO.Griffith, I. (2002). Security, Sovereignty, and Public Order in the Caribbean. Security and Defense Studies Review, 1-18.Laguardia Martínez, J. (2022). La IX Cumbre de las Américas y su impacto en el Caribe. VII Conferencia de Estudios Estratégicos.Laguardia, J., Marín, C., & Martínez, M. (2024). 50 años de relaciones Cuba – CARICOM: avances, retos y posibilidades. Cuadernos del pensamiento crítico latinoamericano, CLACSO.Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información (ONEI). (2024). Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2023. Edición 2024. La Habana.Regueiro, L., & Marín, C. (2023). Consensos y disensos en la Política Exterior de CARICOM. Caribes, (9), 8-32.Romero, A. (2016). Los desafíos de la reconfiguración regional. Anuario de Integración, 65-85.Sanders, R. (2022). US-Caribbean Relations in Biden Administration. Florida: Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center, FIU.Suárez Salazar, L. (2019). Cuba y Estados Unidos en el Caribe insular y continental: misiones en conflicto. En N. López Castellanos (Ed.), Geopolítica e integración en el Gran Caribe. Alcances y desafíos (pp. 167-187). México: UNAM.Suárez Salazar, L. (2021). Presentación y Prefacio del libro: Revolución Cubana. Algunas miradas críticas y descolonizadas. Revista Política Internacional, 160-168.Suárez Salazar, L., & García Lorenzo, T. (2008). Las relaciones interamericanas: continuidades y cambios. CLACSO.

Abstract This paper examines whether the European Union (EU) can supplant the United States (US) as a benign hegemon in the contemporary international system. It discusses the concept of a benign hegemon, traditionally associated with the US, characterized by military and economic dominance exercised with liberal values, multilateralism, and the promotion of global security and prosperity.  The analysis highlights the limitations of US hegemony, including military overextension, economic challenges, and a decline in soft power, particularly in regions such as the Middle East. Conversely, the EU's global ambitions are examined, with a focus on its peace efforts, trade agreements, development aid, and multilateral engagement. However, the EU's internal divisions, lack of unified foreign and defense policy, and historical perceptions of coercion limit its ability to act as a benign hegemon. The analysis concludes with a proposition that the EU's unique nature and current constraints suggest it cannot fully assume the US's role, raising questions about the viability of benign hegemony in today's context. Key Words: SAFE, EU, US, Benign Hegemon, Geopolitics Introduction In the recent two pieces, we looked at Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and its potential consequences regarding the role and nature of the EU as a military power {link}, and Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation, highlighting its unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. {link}, This article will examine the transatlantic relations and specifically address the question of whether the EU could replace the US as a benign hegemon. According to popular sources, a "benign hegemon" refers to a dominant power that exercises its influence in a manner that is generally considered beneficial. This notion is contemporary and is almost always used referring to the United States (US). Accordingly, the US has used its influence to provide global security and stability without being overly aggressive or coercive. The concept is rooted in hegemonic stability theory, which posits that a single dominant state is necessary to maintain the stability of the international system.[i] Scholars define a benign hegemon as one that provides the necessary power to uphold the international order. This involves advancing its interests while promoting global security and prosperity through multilateral treaties and international organizations, safeguarding national sovereignty via alliance networks and the UN Security Council, and fostering unrestricted market capitalism through trade deals and bodies such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund.[ii] Moreover, a benign hegemon is typically defined as a hegemonic power that, in addition to possessing overwhelming military and economic power, utilises its influence to promote more liberal principles within the international system. This includes pursuing liberal international values such as economic development, liberal and democratic political structures, and fostering a community of civilised states that resort to war only as a last resort and never against each other. The United States, as the hegemonic power after the Cold War, is often described as benign because its influence is broadly progressive, aiming to create a liberal world order based on free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unencumbered by the state. While the US maintains traditional geopolitical objectives, it also attempts to refashion the operational ground rules of the international system itself, promoting free trade, human rights, democratisation, and a global cultural infrastructure based on US technological companies. This combination of overwhelming power and a liberal agenda is what characterises a benign hegemon.[iii] Furthermore, experts often cite the US's "liberal grand strategy" as constructing a relatively benign and highly institutionalised multilateral system based on open markets, free trade, and the provision of public goods, such as collective security and an open international trading regime.[iv] This system is viewed as enabling other countries to prosper economically in a secure environment, with examples such as the rebuilding and subsequent success of Japan and Germany. However, the concept of benign hegemon is contested, with some arguing that the US lacks the resources to be a genuine global hegemon, as noted by John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye, who suggest it cannot achieve all security, political, and economic goals alone. This argument highlights the complexity of assessing whether the US's actions are truly benign, especially given its military and financial reach.[v] Historical Context The US's role as a potential benign hegemon has been prominent since the end of World War II, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when it occupied a hegemonic position within world politics Historical instances include its leadership in establishing the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and security alliances like NATO, which aimed to stabilise the global economy and provide collective defense. The US also played a key role in democratising post-war Europe and Japan, furthering its image as a stabilising force. On the positive side, the US led through consent, with high global approval ratings and multilateral actions, such as Bush Sr.'s Gulf War coalition and Obama's Libya UN action, which are claimed to be foundational to the liberal order since World War II. On the negative side, actions like the Iraq War, drone attacks, and government overthrows in Latin America and the Middle East are cited as evidence of coercion and imperialism, undermining the benign label. Scholars focusing on the Middle East note that despite its hegemonic role, the region has experienced significant violence and instability, with US interventions such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya seen as sources of disorder rather than stability. This challenges the notion of benign hegemony, suggesting unipolarity (power dominance without ideological consensus) better explains US actions in the region.[vi] US hegemony and its limitations The concept of American hegemony has been a cornerstone of international relations since the end of World War II. However, in recent decades, the limitations of American hegemony have become increasingly apparent across military, economic, and cultural domains. Given the recent developments in the Middle East (war in Gaza and incursions between Israel and Iran), it seems logical to examine the limitations of US hegemony in the context of the region. Several factors contribute to the decline in American influence in the Middle East. Firstly, the failure of political reconstruction efforts in Iraq after the US-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein shifted America's position in the region from advantageous to disadvantaged and exposed the limits of American hegemony. Secondly, war-weariness within the United States affects the ability to sustain prolonged involvement and influence in the region. Thirdly, there is a relative neglect of the Arab-Israeli peace process, which undermines American credibility and effectiveness in the region. Fourthly, the impact of US regional policies on the influence of Iran, which has grown stronger partly as an unintended consequence of the Iraq war. Next, the emergence of a new regional power struggle between an Iranian-led bloc of mainly Shia actors and a Sunni bloc led by Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The rise of Islamist militias and political groups like Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, which were advantaged by early elections promoted by the US before adequate security and political institutions were in place. Next, the Bush administration's distancing from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process contributed to the rise of Hamas and further undermined moderate Palestinian leadership. Lastly, the diminished fear of American power by adversaries such as Iran, which refused negotiations and disregarded weak UN sanctions, and the uncertainty of America's Arab allies about the reliability of the US as a partner.[vii] Generally speaking, one of the most significant limitations of American military dominance is the issue of overextension. The US has maintained a global military presence, with bases and troops stationed across the world. However, this overextension has led to military fatigue and resource depletion. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, have strained the US military, leading to a decline in its ability to project power effectively.[viii] The rise of other military powers, particularly China, has also challenged the United States' military dominance. China's rapid military modernisation, including advancements in technology and naval capabilities, has narrowed the gap between the two superpowers. This has raised concerns about the US's ability to maintain its military superiority in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. [ix] Maintaining military dominance is costly, and the economic burden of sustaining a global military presence has taken a toll on the US economy. The high defence budget has led to trade imbalances and deindustrialisation, weakening the economic foundations of American hegemony.[x] The US economy has faced significant challenges, including deindustrialisation, financialisation, and rising competition from China. The shift of manufacturing activities to countries with lower labour costs has weakened the US industrial base, while the rise of China as a global economic powerhouse has challenged American economic influence.[xi] Globalisation has created a more interconnected world economy, reducing the US's ability to dictate economic policies unilaterally. The rise of emerging economies, particularly in Asia, has shifted the balance of economic power, making it difficult for the US to maintain its hegemony in global trade and finance.[xii] The dominance of the US dollar in the global financial system is facing challenges. The rise of alternative currencies and the increasing use of cryptocurrencies have threatened the dollar's hegemony. Additionally, countries like Russia and China are reducing their dependence on the dollar, further eroding its global dominance.[xiii] American cultural influence, once a cornerstone of its global hegemony, is facing resistance. The rise of non-Western cultural formations, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, has challenged the dominance of American media, entertainment, and values. This has led to a decline in the global appeal of American culture.[xiv] The US's soft power, which was once a key component of its hegemony, has declined in recent years. The country's unilateral policies, military interventions, and domestic challenges, such as racial tensions and economic inequality, have eroded its moral authority and global influence.[xv] What is the EU hoping to achieve as a global player? A thorough analysis of available up-to-date documents issued by the EU itself suggests several key areas of interest to the organisation as a key global player. First and foremost, the EU is committed to fostering peace, preventing conflicts, and strengthening international security. It supports a rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core, advocating for multilateralism and the rule of international law.[xvi] The EU has actively engaged in conflict resolution, such as promoting a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and supporting ceasefires in regions like Gaza.[xvii] It also invests significantly in the defence of Ukraine to counter Russian aggression, viewing this as critical to maintaining European and global stability.[xviii] As the world's largest trading power, the EU seeks to use its economic strength to boost prosperity, enhance its trading power, and foster mutually beneficial partnerships. The EU's economic influence is a key pillar of its global power strategy, as evidenced by recent agreements. In April 2025, the EU-Central Asia summit agreed on a strategic partnership aimed at strengthening economic ties between the EU and Central Asia.[xix] A month later (May 2025), the EU and Singapore signed a landmark Digital Trade Agreement, enhancing the EU's digital trade capabilities.[xx] Overall, the EU has over 40 trade agreements with 70 countries. These agreements fall into three distinct categories: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and Association Agreements (AAs). The EU also enters into non-preferential trade agreements, as part of broader deals such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).[xxi] The EU provides significant development aid, which, when including the UK, is two-thirds greater than that of the US and is mainly supplied as grants rather than loans. According to the EU, this highlights its commitment to promoting human rights and sustainable development. The EU has built a dominant position in global development. It accounts for half of all aid worldwide, but the plethora of different programmes disguises its profile in this regard. [xxii] The EU aims to establish strong, well-managed partnerships with countries and regions beyond its immediate neighbourhood, particularly with middle powers (e.g., Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia) and pivotal regions (e.g., Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia). This is crucial for maintaining its influence in a multipolar world.[xxiii] In that respect, the EU is committed to reforming multilateral institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, to ensure more equitable representation and effectiveness. It also aims to play a leading role in shaping the future of global forums, such as the G-20. Initiatives such as the "Golden Gateway" (€300 billion by 2027, launched in late 2021) and "Team Europe" for post-COVID investments are part of the EU's strategy to counterbalance China's Belt and Road Initiative and engage more effectively with developing countries.[xxiv] The EU focuses on addressing global challenges, including climate action, migration, and economic development. It wants to ensure that its climate policies, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, do not hinder the development of Southern countries and offers compensation through initiatives like the Global Gateway and climate funds.[xxv] In 2021, the EU was the top partner for 80 countries and provided 43% of global official development assistance, underscoring its commitment.[xxvi] Migration reform is another priority, with the EU aiming to facilitate legal immigration pathways, including work visas, circular migration, and resettlement schemes, to address irregular entries and support global development.[xxvii] In this respect, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024. According to the EU, "the asylum and migration pact will ensure a fairer and stronger migration system that makes a concrete difference on the ground. These new rules will enhance the effectiveness of the European asylum system and foster greater solidarity among member states. The European Union will also continue its close cooperation with third countries to tackle the root causes of irregular migration".[xxviii]   The EU aspires to be a more assertive player in global security, potentially reevaluating its role in NATO and taking on greater responsibility as a security guarantor, particularly in regions such as Africa. It recognises the need for a foreign policy that is both humble (acknowledging the need to do more to have an impact) and ambitious (aiming for strong partnerships to promote its interests and objectives). The EU faces challenges from disinformation campaigns by Russia and China, as well as historical resentment from centuries of European dominance. To address this, Brussels is scaling up its diplomatic engagement and communication efforts, including task forces for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and communication hubs like the one in Beirut (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives, citing EEAS Disinformation Speech). The EU aims to repair its image and rebuild trust abroad by positioning itself as a force for reform and a reliable partner for developing nations.[xxix] The EU finds itself squeezed between the United States and China, with its interests increasingly aligned with those of the US, yet also needing to assert its independence. The US's "pivot to Asia" has given the EU more freedom on specific international issues, but it also underscores the need for the EU to strengthen its global role.[xxx] The EU must also clarify its position vis-à-vis the Global South, ensuring that its policies are perceived as supportive and beneficial to developing nations, particularly in areas such as trade, climate, and security. Can the EU ever become a benign power? The answer to this question turns out to be negative, at least as long as we adhere to the criteria used so far. Below, the reader will find a list of reasons supporting the above-proposed statement. First, the EU is still not a unified entity, especially regarding its foreign, security, and, even more so, defence policy. It remains a collection of 27 semi-independent states, some, such as Germany, being more independent than others, notably the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Ultimately, the EU's ability to achieve its declared foreign and security objectives depends on the political dynamics and appetite for further integration among member states. For example, the latest proposed 18th package of Russian sanctions was blocked by Hungary and Slovakia, and Brussels has limited options for action, at least for now.[xxxi] The EU's vast asymmetry in power with its neighbors can lead to perceptions of dominance and coercion, even if the EU does not intend to be seen that way.[xxxii] One does not have to look far, but consider the latest (since 2015) waves of immigration. In northern Africa, as well as in some parts of the Middle East, South Asia, and South America, the EU member states are predominantly seen as former colonial powers. There appears to be a shared sense of entitlement towards the EU and its member states regarding its imperial past, which was often anything but benign. Importantly, this does not refer to central and Eastern European members of the EU.[xxxiii] While the EU remains an economic (albeit comparatively declining) and normative power (at least this is what it likes to self-identify), it lacks the military capacity to project its influence in the same way that traditional hegemons have. It is also doubtful that even if the SAFE instrument is fully realized in the next couple of years, the EU member states will have the industrial and human capacity to match the great powers, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, or, most of all, China.  A quick juxtaposition of current defense spending, population numbers, population growth forecasts, and economic output forecasts tells us all we need to know in this regard. The answer is bitter for the EU; it is likely to matter less and less. On top of that, let's look at the notion of “benign”. What does it even mean? Perhaps the term is entirely false; maybe even the US does not now fulfill the “benign” requirements, at least not in the way it has been defined (as in the introduction). Perhaps, there has never really been a “benign hegemon,” and the EU should not even try to fill these shoes. As usual, there are more questions than answers. Whatever the EU becomes via SAFE, it will probably stand for, not the first time, as new and an “undefiable animal” – sui generis (of its kind) as the EU academics usually posit. The concept of the EU as a benign hegemon is complex and contested. While the EU does promote its values and norms through various means, the extent to which its influence is truly benign is debatable. The EU's internal divisions and its neighbors' perceptions of its power dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the reality of its regional role. Can the EU become a benign power in the future? The author of this analysis is rather negative. Especially, if the EU does not address the challenges as explored here: https://worldandnewworld.com/safe-europe-military-power-3/ and https://worldandnewworld.com/ukraine-european-defence-cooperation/   [1] Although not official, some discussions suggest animals like the Golden Eagle as potential symbols due to its historical significance in Europe, including its use in the Roman Empire and modern Germany.[i]   See more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemonic_stability_theory[ii]Keay, L. (2023). Surviving the End of US Hegemony. The International Spectator. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/c05/surviving-end-us-hegemony[iii]  Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The benign superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377-399. ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[iv]   Catley, B. (1997). Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18(4), 377–399. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798354[v]Mearsheimer, J. J. (2016). Benign Hegemony. International Studies Review, 1(3). https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Benign-Hegemony.pdf [vi] Gause, F. G. (2025). Hegemony, Unipolarity and American Failure in the Middle East. POMEPS Studies, 54, 41–47. https://pomeps.org/pomeps-studies-54-america-and-the-middle-east[vii] Wittes, T. C. (2007, March 22). American hegemony: Myth and reality. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved June 26, 2025, from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/american-hegemony-myth-and-reality/[viii] Bello, W. (2024). Overextension and Globalization: The Dynamics of Hegemonic Decline. Critical Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205241266982[ix] Asuquo-Ekpo, B. (2024). China’s Economic, Military, Science and Technological Emergence in International Politics: Implications for United States’ Hegemony. World Journal Of Advanced Research and Reviews, 22(3), 804–814. https://doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2024.22.3.1791[x]Lau, J. (2023). American Imperialism (pp. 185–194). Routledge eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003121800-20[xi] Rashid, A., & Khuhro, A. A. (2023). Historical Insights of Global Power Transitions: Implications on US-China Relations. Perennial Journal of History, 4(2), 68–87. https://doi.org/10.52700/pjh.v4i2.156[xii] Cartwright, M. (2024). Embedded hegemony and the evolution of the United States’ structural power. International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178241268418[xiii] Sen, O. F. (2024). Challenges to the American dollar hegemony. https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/106100[xiv] Knauft, B. M. (2007). Provincializing America: Imperialism, Capitalism, and Counterhegemony in the Twenty-first Century. Current Anthropology, 48(6), 781–805. https://doi.org/10.1086/521415[xv] Nuridah, I., Aulia, T., Aulia Sahada, N., Rodiyah, Z., Ndruru, S., Simangunsong, W. H., Rila, E. S., & Tampubolon, Y. L. (2024). Amerika Serikat sebagai Negara Adikuasa: Pengaruh dan Dominasi dari Akhir Abad ke-20 hingga Awal Abad ke-21. 1(3), 157–161. https://doi.org/10.57251/polyscopia.v1i3.1368[xvi] A global Europe: leveraging our power and partnership. (n.d.). European Commission, A Global Europe. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/priorities-2024-2029/global-europe_en[xvii] European Commission (2025, April 14). Commission announces multiannual programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience worth up to €1.6 billion. European Commission, Press Release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055[xviii] European Union (n.d.). EU support for Ukraine. European Union. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-support-ukraine_en[xix] European Commission (2025, April 4). Joint press release on the EU-Central Asia Summit. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_983[xx] European Commission (2025, July 5). EU and Singapore sign landmark digital trade agreement. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1152[xxi] European Council, Council of the Union (2025, July 5). EU trade agreements. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/trade-agreements/[xxii] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxiii] Lehne, S. (2024, March 21). The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/the-eu-and-the-global-battle-of-narratives?lang=en¢er=europe[xxiv] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxv] Lehne, S. (2024, March 21). The EU and the Global Battle of Narratives. Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/the-eu-and-the-global-battle-of-narratives?lang=en¢er=europe[xxvi] European Commission (2022, July 18). Team Europe’s Official Development Assistance reaches €70.2 billion in 2021. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4532[xxvii] European Council, Council of the Union (2025, June 30). EU migration and asylum policy. European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/[xxviii] European Council, Council of the Union (2024, May 14). The Council adopts the EU’s pact on migration and asylum. European Council, Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/14/the-council-adopts-the-eu-s-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/[xxix] The Diplomatic Service of the European Union (2024, January 23). Disinformation and Foreign Interference: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EEAS Conference. European Council, External Action. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/disinformation-and-foreign-interference-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-eeas_en[xxx] Merritt, G. (2023, October 3). Global Europe 1: The EU’s path to super-power status. Friends of Europe. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/frankly-speaking-global-europe-1-the-eus-path-to-super-power-status/[xxxi] Vysotska, T., & POHORILOV, S. (2025, June 30). 18th package of sanctions against Russia being blocked not only by Slovakia, but also by Hungary. 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In Latin America, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are not alone in their support for Russia and its invasion of Ukraine. In many cases, support has been disguised as an interest in peace or a neutral stance towards the conflict, as seen in the cases of Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. While we find manifold diplomatic approaches toward Russia and Ukraine in Latin America, the underlying motivations can be understood in terms of support or rejection. While a majority of nations reject the invasion, considering it a threat to territorial sovereignty and self-determination, others have been reluctant to place any blame on Russia. More broadly, there has been less of an ideological bloc and more of an anti-imperialist or anti-colonial sentiment, with a few exceptions, such as Gabrie Boric from Chile who has publicly repudiated Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. His opposition is a departure from other Latin American leftist leaders like Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Gustavo Francisco Petro who have been more critical of Volodymyr Zelensky than Vladimir Putin. However, we can still identify three distinctive approaches to the crisis: 1) geopolitical, 2) economic, and 3) historical. The region has a keen interest in keeping its doors open to Russia. BRICS members like Brazil have managed to maintain their alleged neutrality in the pursuit of peace—even as President Lula has explicitly supported  Putin—while simultaneously protecting their economic interests. Others like Colombia and Mexico have shielded their unwillingness to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in an apparent push for peace. On the economic front, attitudes towards Russia are more tenuous given that Russia’s capability for foreign direct investment has been significantly reduced by the brunt of the war, along with the impact of the economic sanctions that followed their aggression. To be sure, Russia’s investments in the region have been winding down for some time, with a decreasing profile in areas such as energy, oil, and gas, as well as software and IT. However, the economic ties are more significant in the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—where they are joined more by their subjection to economic sanctions, and therefore the necessity to evade the consequences of economic isolation. There are specific areas key to this alliance: Russian fertilisers, along with oil and diesel, are critical to bypassing Western sanctions. Meanwhile, historical ties are more consequential than is commonly understood. Misinterpretations of Russia’s Soviet past by leftist-governed Latin American countries and longstanding social and cultural commonalities partially explain the continued support from diverse leaders such as Lula and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. These ties, rooted in shared anti-colonial sentiments and cultivated over decades, and regardless of ideological shifts, illustrate Russia’s multifaceted regional influence. This context underscores the fact that Russia’s regional impact transcends ideological lines, with both left and right-wing governments either explicitly supporting Russia or criticising Ukraine’s NATO aspirations to justify Russia’s aggression. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has prominent leaders of the Latin American left aligning with the new administration, resulting in significant consequences for the region. The new US administration’s criticism of Kyiv resonates with positions held by Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Despite ideological differences, their alignment emerges from a mix of political affinities, geopolitical strategies, and historical connections. Putin’s explicit defiance of Donald Trump’s negotiation efforts raises questions about Latin America’s influence over the conflict, largely due to its initial reluctance to adopt a decisive stance against Putin. The lonely voice condemning Putin’s war of attrition continues to be Chilean President Gabriel Boric, in stark contrast to Lula DaSilva and Gustavo Petro, who remain in Putin’s corner, making it unlikely they can be viewed as honest brokers in a peace initiative. Trump’s policies have prompted Brazil and Colombia to voice limited concerns about US plans for Ukraine, although still refraining from outright condemnation of Russia. This stance appears less a genuine support for Ukraine and more an opposition to US involvement in peace processes, even blaming Ukraine as partially responsible. Meanwhile, ideology alone has proven insufficient to prompt unified condemnation of Russia or widespread support for Ukraine in Latin America. Previous efforts by the Biden administration to secure regional military assistance for Ukraine were met with firm rejection and reluctance. This distancing, interpreted as tacit support for Russia, contributes to concerns about increasing authoritarian tendencies in the region, reflecting a diminished commitment to emerging democracies in crisis. Effectively abandoned by the international community, Ukraine faces negotiations with nations seeking its valuable earth minerals in exchange for protection, essentially framing it within a debt relief context. The absence of significant Latin American critique of this neocolonial approach underscores a troubling shift where sovereignty and self-determination appear increasingly disposable, contingent upon geopolitical interests and contexts. Maria I. Puerta Riera is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Valencia College in Orlando, FL., where she teaches U.S. Government and International Politics. She holds a PhD. in Social Sciences, with her research focusing on the crises of democracies in Latin America. She has a special interest in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and is currently working on the effects of the illiberal regimes of China and Russia and their use of sharp power in the region. This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Abstract The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order moving towards multipolarity. The return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine raises serious questions about US involvement in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect both that his administration is unwilling to engage productively with the EU and that it distrusts multilateral forums, preferring bilateral, nation-to-nation contacts. This article seeks to bring clarity to the future US–EU relationship by identifying some of the points of contention and offering a perspective on how the transatlantic partnership can move forward constructively. KeywordsTransatlantic relations, EU–US relations, Trump administration, EU, Bilateral relations, Multipolar world order Introduction Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new axis of power is taking form, led by Russia and China and supported by North Korea, Iran and Belarus. This shift brings a profound transformation within the global balance of power and is a direct threat to the liberal international world order. In the midst of this geopolitical recalibration, the return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine poses serious questions about US engagement with the transatlantic alliance. There are growing worries about the US’s willingness to continue to honour its Article 5 commitments within NATO and maintain an active role in the collective defence of Europe, but also about the role of the US as a supporter of Ukraine and the liberal multilateral rule-based system. State of play in the EU–US partnership During the first Trump administration, at the state funeral of former US president George H. W. Bush, the EU’s ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, was asked to stand at the back of the line-up to pay his respects, breaking diplomatic protocol (Knigge 2019). He politely acquiesced, but in the days that followed it came to light that during the first Trump administration, the US Department of State had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU in the second half of 2018 without informing the EU Delegation in Washington (Smith 2019). Beyond the failure to communicate this important diplomatic status change, which was not well received in Brussels, and in addition to the protocol issue of having a long-serving foreign ambassador downgraded on the spot at a state funeral, this sent a clear message: the Trump administration does not respect the EU, and nor does it view the Union as an interlocutor. On many occasions during his first administration, Trump’s officials clashed with the EU. In a major foreign policy speech in Brussels, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly questioned the continued value of the EU and urged European countries to reassert their national sovereignty (Pompeo 2018). As the second Trump administration begins its work with unprecedented vigour, so far the EU has hardly featured as a consideration for the president or his top officials. At the time of writing, the nominated US ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, has not yet testified (Singh and Jones 2025). In his early remarks as secretary of state, Marco Rubio has hardly mentioned the EU at all. On 29 January, the first call between High Representative Kaja Kallas and Rubio took place, alleviating some concerns about the distinct lack of US–EU dialogue taking place due to the change in administration (Liboreiro 2025). However, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the new US administration went beyond the usual call for European allies to spend more on defence. Vice-President JD Vance drove home the seismic shift underway in the US commitment to European defence and upended decades of policy (Quinville 2025). Moreover, on the European side, the attempts by some members of the Trump administration to support far-right candidates in Europe (as done by Elon Musk and Vance in Germany and Romania) bring a new level of discomfort and mistrust, as it looks like parts of the administration and Trump’s brand of conservatism, colloquially known as ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA), want to export their domestic cultural wars to Europe, thus attacking the core shared value of the transatlantic partnership: liberal democracy. A divorce or just a rough patch in transatlantic relations? Over the past seven decades, successful cooperation between the US and European institutions has helped to build the liberal multilateral world order and to uphold the UN Charter by promoting global stability and prosperity. With a combined population of nearly 800 million people, the US and the EU have the most integrated economic cooperation in the world, accounting for 43% of global GDP and 30% of global trade in goods and services (European Council 2025). President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect the Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage productively with the EU and its distrust of multilateral forums, and hence its preference for bilateral, nation-to-nation contact. The administration’s growing distrust of the EU also reflects the changing public perception of the EU among segments of the American public, such that 29% of Republicans view the EU as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’, up from 17% last year, and negative perceptions of Europe among Democrats are also slowly rising (The Economist 2025). This represents an inward turn in American society as politics becomes increasingly polarised. On the other hand, favourable attitudes among Europeans towards the US have fallen below 50%, with only around a third of Germans (32%) and the French (34%) having a positive view of the current American administration, with the least favourable views being held in Denmark, where only 20% approve (Britton 2025). Less than 100 days into his second term, at the time of writing, Trump has already broken long-standing norms and practices in US–European relations. Vance’s critical discourse at the Munich Security Conference, which harshly attacked European values, brought a major departure from traditional diplomatic language. The US vote alongside Russia and North Korea, and against traditional allies, on a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for the return of occupied territory to Kyiv further deepened concerns (Landale and Jackson 2025). Additional actions, such as the controversial Oval Office meeting between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the temporary suspension of intelligence and military assistance to Ukraine, the exclusion of Europeans from Ukrainian peace negotiations, and the disproportionate and unjustified tariffs on the EU have heightened European anxiety. These moves have raised fears of a possible end to the transatlantic partnership and a wider US retreat from global leadership. For most Europeans, the second Trump administration appears to be strategically prepared, driven not only by revenge in domestic politics, but also by a sense of retribution in foreign policy. But while distrust has never been higher, it would be a mistake to take the path of severing the relations between the US and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic partnership has suffered similar lows in the past, from vastly different perspectives on the US invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Points of tension and contentionTech On tech regulation, storm clouds are already gathering as Trump has lashed out at the EU for regulating big tech companies (Doan and Stolton 2025). During the transition, the new Trump administration has been noted for the active participation of several tech CEOs. This was most evidently on display during Trump’s inauguration, which saw the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Elon Musk (Tesla), as well as other billionaires from around the world (including TikTok’s CEO) gather to welcome in the new administration (Kelly 2025). These tech CEO supporters, not usually as prominently on display in American politics, are flocking to the new administration, which has pledged massive tax cuts for billionaires, the promotion and deregulation of cryptocurrencies, and the removal of restrictions on free speech and fact-checking (Samuel 2025). The EU’s attempts to regulate big tech companies under this new administration will be even more difficult, given their close proximity to and influence on the second Trump presidency. Energy Another likely area of divergence between the US and the EU is in their approaches to energy policy and climate policy. Trump has pledged to ‘drill baby drill’, promising to fund more fossil fuel extraction and curbing green and renewable projects. He has openly called climate change a hoax and ended US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states continue to invest heavily in renewables, with clean energy sources accounting for 70% of the bloc’s electricity demand in 2024 (Vetter 2025). The US, already trailing in wind power and investment in renewables, now risks falling irrevocably behind most of the developing world in clean energy production. Trump might find less of a market for fossil fuels in the EU as a result of its heavy investment in renewables, instead having to turn to other markets. Trade and tariffs On the campaign trail, Trump vowed that as president he would impose tariffs on everyone from China to neighbours, Mexico and Canada, to allies such as the EU. Although the initial tariffs placed on Mexico and Canada were swiftly lifted, a new wave of tariffs of 25% on foreign steel and aluminium was announced on 11 February. This move mirrors that of his first administration (Wiseman 2025). The EU was swift to respond, announcing a slew of counter-measures targeting iconic US products such as jeans, bourbon, peanut butter, whiskey and motorcycles. European steel companies could see as much as 3.7 million tons of steel exports lost as a result of US-imposed tariffs. Together, as noted above, the US and the EU account for about 30% of global trade, with deeply intertwined production and supply chains. However, this does not appear to be part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs of 20% on almost all other EU products as part of its Liberation Day plan. The proposed tariffs could affect around 70% of EU exports to the US, worth around €532 billion ($585 billion) in 2024, with potential tariffs on copper, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and timber still on the cards (Blenkinsop 2025). As the trade wars begin again, US–EU trade and economic relations will undoubtedly face difficult times over the next four years and risk undermining or limiting cooperation in other areas as a result. Responding to Trump’s announcement, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, astutely summed up: ‘The global economy will massively suffer. Uncertainty will spiral and trigger the rise of further protectionism. The consequences will be dire for millions of people around the globe’ (European Commission 2025). The EU, in addition to planning and implementing counter-measures to Trump’s tariffs, has to walk a difficult tightrope to maintain its investment ties (Casert 2025). The Arctic Trump’s approach to the Arctic in the days leading up to the transition and in his first three months, most notably his refusal to promise not to invade Greenland by force, if deemed necessary (Kayali 2025), sparked widespread condemnation from European leaders. Trump raised the idea of purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019 during his first term, and reasserted his intention to acquire the vast island, rich with rare earth minerals, on a fiery phone call with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. In response, the Danish premier garnered support among European heads of state. However, Trump’s focus on Greenland could have profound implications for the balance of power in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic is increasingly discussed in geopolitical terms, in part due to Russia’s and China’s interests in new shipping routes, it remains a zone of peace. The implications of potential NATO infighting over Greenland, and the possibility that this could accelerate Greenland’s independence, could work to China’s or Russia’s advantage and risk disrupting the balance of power in the Arctic region that has allowed peace to prevail. Defence spending The Trump administration’s renewed push for European NATO allies to spend at least 5% of their GDP on defence has reignited tensions over transatlantic burden-sharing. During his first visit to a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, US Secretary of Defense Hegseth made it clear that the US no longer sees an indefinite American presence in Europe as guaranteed (Erling 2025). While these pressures reflect Washington’s frustration over decades of unequal defence spending, they also risk undermining alliance cohesion by demanding an unrealistic increase in European defence budgets. Most European states have already significantly increased their military spending, jointly spending €326 billion on defence in 2024, an increase of 30% since 2021 (European Defence Agency 2024). And the European Commission’s recently launched ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative proposes an additional €800 billion to help EU member states fill their defence gaps and increase their military production and capacity (Gomez 2025). However, calling for a sudden escalation to 5% of GDP overlooks the political, economic and social constraints within Europe and could provoke backlash rather than cooperation. A more realistic target of 3% to 3.5% of GDP offers a more balanced and politically realistic path, consistent with strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and could be discussed as a new NATO defence commitment at the upcoming Hague Summit this summer. EU defence market The EU is developing its European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in response to the challenging new security and geopolitical reality. A key focus within the plan is strengthening the European internal market for defence, which remains heavily underdeveloped and dependent on non-EU suppliers, notably the US, which accounts for more than half of the EU’s defence procurement. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, launched in 2024 by the European Commission, proposes some ambitious objectives: by 2030, at least 50% of member states’ defence acquisitions should go to the European defence industry, rising to 60% by 2035, and 40% of these procurements should be through collaborative projects (European Commission 2024). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without challenges, as some EU member states, particularly the Eastern European countries, still favour US suppliers and see buying American defence systems as a way to foster security ties with Washington. The return of Trump, along with signs of US disengagement from Europe, has led to a renewed debate within the EU about reducing reliance on American defence capabilities and investing more in equipment ‘Made in Europe’. At the same time, the evolving US position has complicated transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. While Rubio has recently stressed the importance of continued American participation in European defence procurement, the latest EU proposals to prioritise the European defence industry have raised concern in Washington (Cook and Croucher 2025). Any move to limit access for American defence companies might provoke a political backlash, even as European leaders become increasingly worried about the credibility of the US defence commitments. Recent events such as the politicisation of US military aid to Ukraine and the unpredictability of future armament deliverables have further shaken European confidence. But despite the growing uncertainty, EU countries should remain interested in cooperation with the US, not exclusion. The challenge now is to strike a balance: to build a more autonomous and resilient European defence market while maintaining a constructive and cooperative relationship with the US. Ukraine peace negotiations The peace negotiations for Ukraine are becoming a major point of divergence between the US administration under Trump and its European allies. Trump’s main goal is to quickly end the conflict in Ukraine and position himself as a successful deal maker on the global stage. So far, his administration has shown a willingness to make significant concessions to Russia, often unilaterally and without securing reciprocal commitments from Moscow. This approach might be part of a broader strategy that includes weakening Russia’s alliance with China, securing American access to Ukrainian rare earth resources and continuing a larger US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific (Mills 2025). So far, this conciliatory ‘deal making’ has caused anxiety among European leaders, who fear that a hasty or unbalanced peace agreement might lead to a forced Ukrainian capitulation and would undermine long-term European security and stability. Therefore, European countries are insisting on being part of the discussions on defining what a just, long-standing and sustainable peace should look like, a peace that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty and deters further Russian aggression on the country or continent. In parallel, European countries are formulating their own vision for a lasting peace, independent of American leadership. Recent discussions and meetings led by the UK and France are proposing a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would send 10,000 to 30,000 troops to Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire (O’Sullivan and Khatsenkova 2025). But current plans face significant obstacles: disagreements among European states over troop commitments and mandate, fears of escalation in a direct conflict with Russia and a lack of critical defence enablers that only the US can provide. While countries such as the UK, France and Sweden are considering ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, Eastern European states, notably Poland, remain reluctant, preferring to commit to logistical roles rather than direct engagement. Moreover, European allies are seeking explicit US backstop support (logistical, intelligence and political) to enhance the credibility of the deterrence of these peacekeeping forces against future Russian aggression. The way in which the Ukraine peace negotiations unfold could be a source of further tension between the US and European partners in the months and years to come. A way forward The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order migrating towards multipolarity. A possible way forward in Euro-Atlantic relations is to adopt a pragmatic approach that preserves cooperation where possible while accepting a more interest-based partnership. Paradoxically, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s global rise, this may offer a new avenue for transatlantic rapprochement. Both the US and the EU increasingly recognise the need to address China’s more assertive economic and geopolitical behaviour, and both see the growing socio-political and security threats from the rise of this axis of upheaval formed of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. For Europeans, navigating this increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape will require clarity, political maturity and a greater sense of strategic responsibility. The EU must continue to invest in its strategic autonomy—not to disengage from the US, but to become a more equal and reliable transatlantic partner. The coming months will be vital in charting a new course for transatlantic cooperation, one that emphasises increased European defence investment, a coordinated approach to the Russian and Chinese threats, the need for a deeper EU–NATO cooperation, a responsible resolution to the war in Ukraine, and a more balanced EU–US partnership. As such, European leaders will need to make a concerted effort to build bridges with the Trump administration by focusing on areas of convergence and mutual strategic interest. What lies ahead is a period of repositioning, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship from one rooted primarily in shared norms, values and principles towards a more pragmatic and transactional partnership based on common interests and careful management of differences. While challenging, this transformation could lead to a more resilient and mature transatlantic alliance, shaped by partners on an equal footing, capable of adapting to the demands of an unstable and unpredictable multipolar world order. ReferencesBlenkinsop P. (2025). EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs. Reuters, 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/. Accessed 7 April 2025.Britton H. (2025). 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Brazil's BRICS+ presidency ahead of the summit in Rio de Janeiro Brazil is using its BRICS+ presidency in 2025 to promote a more inclusive and sustainable world order as a pragmatic mediator for developing and emerging countries and to preserve its independence in foreign policy. For Europe, this presents both challenges due to the growing heterogeneity and independence of the BRICS+ group, as well as opportunities for a strategic partnership with Brazil, for example through the EU-Mercosur agreement and joint projects in the areas of climate, health, and technology. It is crucial that Europe recognizes Brazil as an equal partner in order to jointly set global standards and actively shape the international order. The Brazilian BRICS+ presidency With the assumption of the BRICS+ presidency in January 2025, the first following the expansion of the alliance, Brazil is once again assuming a vital role on the international stage after the G20 presidency in the previous year. Under the motto "Strengthening cooperation in the Global South for more inclusive and sustainable governance", Brazil is setting clear priorities: global health cooperation, trade and finance, climate change, regulation of artificial intelligence, multilateral peace architecture and institutional development of the BRICS+ bloc. Brazil is advancing the latter, for example, through events such as the 11th Parliamentary Forum in Brasília in June 2025, which aims to deepen political dialog and parliamentary cooperation and promote the democratic legitimacy of the bloc. Between February and July, the Brazilian Presidency set a broad agenda with over one hundred ministerial and technical meetings. The selected topics reflect the interests of many emerging and developing countries and illustrate Brazil's claim to function as a bridge builder between the so-called "Global South" (a controversial term due to its vagueness and homogenization) and the established industrialized countries. Foreign policy pragmatism as a leitmotif Brazil's foreign policy has historically been characterized by pragmatism and a clear focus on national interests. For decades, the country has pursued a strategy aimed at preserving the greatest possible autonomy and not subordinating itself to the priorities of the major powers. This attitude is currently particularly evident: Brazil has not joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and voted against the inclusion of Nicaragua and Venezuela in the BRICS. Brazil's great dependence on its most important trading partner China is now also being viewed critically in parts of Brazilian politics and diplomacy. However, the government in Brasília continues to strictly refuse to be pigeonholed or categorized into a fixed camp, instead opting for flexibility and openness - a strategy that ensures maximum freedom of action. In contrast to countries such as Mexico, which is more closely tied to the USA due to its geographical location and economic ties, Brazil can balance its foreign policy between different centers of power and represent its interests with confidence. Heterogeneity and dynamics of the BRICS+ The BRICS+ group is anything but homogeneous. The member states are democracies, autocracies and dictatorships and disagree on a variety of issues. For example, whether BRICS+ should function as an anti-Western force or serve as a platform for a reformed, more inclusive world order. The refusal of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin to attend the BRICS+ summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7 highlights the internal tensions and heterogeneity of the alliance of states. If Putin could take part in the summit virtually, there is speculation in Brasília about the reasons for Xi's refusal. Is the Chinese partner annoyed by Brazil's rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative or are they bothered by India's prominent participation in Rio de Janeiro? Chinese voices justify Xi's absence with the fact that he has already met President Lula twice in less than a year, once at the G20 summit in Brazil in 2024 and most recently at the China-CELAC summit in Beijing in May. The Egyptian government also recently announced that President Al-Sisi will not be traveling to the summit due to the situation in the Middle East. Other high-ranking guests such as Mexican President Sheinbaum and Turkish President Erdoğan have also announced that they will not be traveling to Rio. An Iranian delegation has not yet been confirmed. On the one hand, the absence of the two heavyweights, Xi and Putin, could weaken the international appeal and political weight of the meeting, as the media attention and the signal effect of such a summit depend on the presence of the heads of state. On the other hand, this constellation opens up new scope for action, especially for those countries that are not clearly anti-Western - above all Brazil, India, and South Africa. These countries could use the opportunity to set their own priorities and campaign for a more pragmatic, more open orientation of the BRICS+. Brazil in particular, which traditionally pursues an interest-oriented and pragmatic foreign policy, sees itself in the role of a mediator who does not want to commit the bloc to a confrontation with the West. Rather, Brazilian diplomacy is concerned with using BRICS+ as a platform for reforming the international order without submitting to the priorities of individual major powers. The fact that Brazil has neither joined China's Belt and Road Initiative nor supported Venezuela's admission to the BRICS underlines this independent and active course of non-alignment. Within Brazilian politics, academia and diplomacy, the increasing heterogeneity of the BRICS+ group is being increasingly criticized. Although the expansion to include new members such as Indonesia and Ethiopia has increased the global reach, it has also exacerbated internal conflicts of interest. There are voices in Brasília who fear that the bloc's coherence and ability to act could suffer as a result of this diversity. At the same time, however, diversity also offers opportunities for Brazil: it enables Brazil to distinguish itself as a constructive force and promote dialog between different political and economic systems. However, it is questionable whether the current government under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) will be able to take advantage of this opportunity. Multipolarity, geography and new zones of influence The multipolar world order that is currently emerging following the end of US unipolar dominance is tending towards instability. Several centers of power are competing for influence, the complexity of international relations is increasing, and the risk of conflict is rising. In the course of these developments, the BRICS+ are also gaining relevance. We are experiencing a time in which zones of influence such as those actively pursued by the USA and Russia are once again gaining in importance - be it in Eastern Europe, the Middle East or in North and South America. In this environment, Brazil is pursuing a "hedging" strategy: it is skillfully balancing between the major powers without committing itself, thus preserving its foreign policy autonomy. A balancing act that is becoming increasingly difficult, as demonstrated by the recurring critical questions from Europe about Brazil's BRICS+ membership. Brazilian diplomatic pragmatism is difficult to reconcile with the European idea of a value-based multilateral world order and is therefore difficult for Europeans to understand. Brazil's geographical location - as the largest nation in South America, with access to the Atlantic and as a bridge between North and South - also has a major influence on its foreign policy stance. Geography plays a key role in understanding certain political actions. Its distance from the global centers of conflict allows Brazil to take on a moderate, mediating role. While many conflicts in other parts of the world are dominated by geopolitical tensions, Brazil can often act more neutrally and constructively. Brazil's wealth of raw materials and the associated potential, as well as its special geographical and strategic position, make it an important player in international diplomacy and a key player for Europe. Resources, narratives, and soft power In the 21st century, power is no longer measured exclusively in terms of military superiority. Rather, access to natural resources - especially rare earths -, economic innovation and the ability to shape global narratives are at the heart of the modern exercise of power. Soft power, i.e., influence through diplomacy, cultural exchange, and the targeted shaping of narratives, has become a central instrument of international politics. A striking example of the importance of soft power was demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic: China and Russia made targeted use of vaccine diplomacy to expand their influence in Latin America. The BRICS alliance also gained in importance and stood for cooperation in the so-called "Global South". Europe, but also the USA, on the other hand, was initially perceived in the region as cautious and concerned with its own advantage. The EU's so-called "vaccine nationalism" at the beginning of the pandemic had a lasting impact on the trust of many countries in European solidarity. This experience is still present in Latin American memory today. Brazil has made great progress in its own vaccine production in recent years and has established itself as a regional player in the healthcare sector. Nevertheless, the country is still dependent on international supply chains, particularly for the procurement of precursors and technologies. The opening up to China and Russia in the healthcare sector as a result of vaccine diplomacy has created additional opportunities for these players to strengthen their presence and influence in Brazil and the region. Opportunities for a strategic partnership with Europe It is precisely against this backdrop that Europe must seek new opportunities to put its relationship with Brazil on a future-oriented and partnership-based footing. The EU has considerable strengths: economic and technological innovation, diplomatic experience, and the ability to set international standards. With the "Strategic Compass", the EU has further developed its foreign policy instruments and focuses on the four guiding principles of "Acting, Securing, Investing, Partnering". However, in order to be successful in global competition, Europe must act faster and be prepared to meet Brazil on an equal footing and take it seriously as an equal partner. The EU should make targeted use of its economic, technological, and diplomatic strengths for sustainable and strategic cooperation. This includes the promotion of joint research projects, technology and science transfer and support for the development of local production capacities - particularly in the healthcare sector, but also in areas such as sustainable raw material extraction, digitalization, and green transformation. Especially at a time when the reliability of the USA as a partner is being questioned for good reasons, Europe and Germany can score points with reliability, transparency, and long-term commitment. In addition to the EU-CELAC summit in November 2025, another important instrument in this context would be to hold renewed German-Brazilian government consultations before the Brazilian presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2026. The conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement, cooperation on renewable energies, the promotion of sustainable agriculture, the deepening of cooperation in the defense industry and the co-design of global health standards are fields in which Europe and Brazil can jointly set standards. At the same time, it is essential for the EU to strengthen its own raw material security and secure access to key technologies and rare earths in order to maintain its own ability to act. In the long term, a close partnership with Brazil offers the EU and Germany the opportunity not only to pursue economic interests, but also to jointly develop global standards and actively help shape, reform and strengthen the rules-based international order. However, this requires Europe to respect Brazil as an independent, equal player and to recognize and consider the country's specific interests and experiences. The latter also applies equally to the other side. Symbolic gestures such as Brazilian President Lula's participation in the military parade in Moscow on May 9 to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the war are detrimental to cooperation with Europe. They hinder trusting, forward-looking cooperation between Europe and Brazil, which could bring great benefits to both sides and contribute to stabilizing the multilateral world order. Outlook: COP30 and Brazil's global agenda In November 2025, Brazil will host the UN Climate Change Conference COP30 in the Amazon region in Belém in the final phase of its two-year leadership role - a further step towards positioning itself as a global player in climate and environmental policy and acting as a mediator between the so-called "Global South" and the industrialized nations. The Brazilian agenda focuses on sustainable development, the protection of biodiversity and the promotion of renewable energies. This underlines Brazil's claim to assume not only regional but also global responsibility. The COP30 offers Europe and Brazil a further opportunity to intensify their cooperation on climate protection and related issues and to provide joint impetus for a more sustainable world order. Conclusion The emerging multipolar world order is more unstable and prone to conflict than the unipolar phase before. Brazil acts skillfully in the field of tension between the great powers and uses its resources and diplomatic flexibility to secure national interests. Europe should recognize this reality and actively shape its partnership with Brazil to its own advantage. The influence of the BRICS+ alliance should be viewed soberly - neither overestimated nor underestimated, but with a realistic assessment of its importance and potential. Only through strategic engagement and a little more pragmatism can the EU and Germany safeguard their interests and contribute to stabilizing an increasingly fragmented world. The BRICS+ summit and the upcoming COP30 are touchstones for Brazil's and Europe's ability to help shape a new, complex world order and act on an