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Defense & Security
Myanmar military coup soldiers, flag map background

Myanmar military regime enters year 5 in terminal decline

by Zachary Abuza

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The junta still holds a third of Myanmar, and two-thirds of the population, but misrule has left the regime broke. Myanmar’s military approaches the fourth anniversary of the coup d’etat that put them in power in terminal decline. The economy continues to atrophy, with even more pronounced energy shortages, less foreign exchange, and an even larger share of the budget allocated to the military. The battlefield losses are staggering, as the opposition has withstood Chinese pressure to stop their offensives, and continues to hand the over-stretched military defeat after defeat. Opposition forces now control two of the 14 military regional commands. According to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, the opposition is in full control of 95 of 330 townships, while the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta calls itself, had full control over 107 townships. By the junta’s own admission, they are only able to conduct a census and safely organize elections in 161 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. Losses on all battlefronts Having taken 15 of 17 townships in Rakhine state, the Arakan Army is now in almost total control of the key western state. They’ve surrounded the Rakhine capital of Sittwe and come up to the border of Kyaukphyu where China’s special economic zone and port are located. Although the capture of Buthidaung and Ann were neither quick nor easy, the AA was able to sustain sieges of over a month at each, and in the case of the former, tunneled beneath the last military outpost in a stunning display of grit. Having captured the southern city of Gwa, the Arakan Army has now crossed into Ayeyarwaddy, taking the fight into the Bamar ethnic majority heartland. In the north, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has shrugged off extensive Chinese pressure, and taken the strategic junction town of Mansi, which will make the overland resupply of the besieged city of Bhamo from Mandalay very hard for the junta. Fighting is ongoing in Bhamo, Kachin’s second largest city. The KIA is now in control of well over half of Kachin, including most of the resource rich regions. Although they are known for fractiousness, Chin opposition forces are now in almost full control of that state that borders India and Bangladesh, holding five of nine townships, roughly 85% of the territory. In Shan state, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) temporarily succumbed to Chinese pressure to stop their offensive in November, but they’ve neither surrendered Lashio nor ceded territory, despite airstrikes. Citing a new military offensive in Naungcho township, the TNLA, which controls nine townships, announced an end to the ceasefire on Jan. 9. In eastern Myanmar, Karenni resistance have continued to battle, despite concerted military regime efforts and airstrikes, and their acknowledged ammunition shortages. The Karenni National Defense Force and allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) militias claim to control 80% of Kayah state. Further south, the Karen National Liberation Army and allied people’s defense forces (PDFs) are slowly taking pro-junta border guard posts along the frontier with Thailand. In Tanintharyi, local PDFs have increased their coordination and are pushing west from the Thai border towards the Andaman Sea coast, diminishing the scope of the military-controlled patchwork of terrain in Myanmar’s southernmost state. Some of the most intense fighting of late has been in the Bamar heartland, including Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay. The military has stepped up their bombings, artillery strikes, and arson, intentionally targeting civilians for their support of the opposition forces. A number of PDFs have expanded their operations into the dry zone. Mounting troubles The Myanmar military regime faces severe headwinds as the fourth anniversary of the Feb. 1, 2021 coup approaches. Prisoners of war from multiple fronts have recounted that the military’s ability to resupply and reinforce troops in the field has all but broken down. They have a limited number of heavy lift helicopters, including three new Mi-17s that entered service in December. But even those are vulnerable: Some six Mi-17s and two other helicopters have been lost since the coup. In some cases, the military has tried to parachute in supplies, but those often fall into the hands of the opposition forces. Nothing demoralizes troops more than the feeling that the headquarters has abandoned them. The military has always treated Myanmar as a country under occupation, with thousands of remote outposts scattered throughout the country. The NUG claims that opposition forces have captured 741 of these through 2024, and they continue to fall. The military is increasingly short of manpower. Over a thousand POWs have been taken in recent months, more have surrendered and others have deserted. The military has now taken in nine tranches of conscripts, amounting to roughly 45,000 troops, and is increasingly dragooning men. But they are deployed almost immediately and are untrained and poorly motivated, in sharp contrast with ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and PDFs. That loss of manpower includes senior officers. The NUG claims that in 2024, 53 senior officers, ranked colonel to major general, were killed, captured or injured. The military is so broke that they recently announced that they would no longer pay death benefits to conscripts. At the same time, the military is often labeling their dead as “MIA”, rather than “KIA”, to avoid paying benefits. While the junta fumbles, the degree of tactical battlefield coordination between the legacy ethnic armies and the new PDFs is unprecedented. Every major offensive outside of Rakhine, entails cooperation between them, and even there, the AA was assisted by Chin PDFs who blocked the military’s resupply from Magway. The increased PDF operations have been made possible by increased assistance from EROs. The AA and Chin PDFs are pushing in from the west and assisting local PDFs in the Bamar heartland. The AA’s foray into Ayeyarwaddy was done in concert with local PDFs. The United Wa State Army appears to be defying China by arming and equipping the Mandalay PDF and others that are operating in Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing. In its favor, the military has finally caught up to the opposition and effectively employed unmanned aerial systems down to the tactical level. These include drones that can drop munitions, kamikaze drones, and those for intelligence gathering or for more accurate targeting of artillery. This has proven costly for the opposition and impeded some of their offensives. Nonetheless, their deployment of drones has been too little too late, and will not fundamentally alter the battlefield dynamics. The military continues to use air power. Indeed, they put their fifth and sixth SU-30 imported from Russia and three more FTC-2000Gs imported from China into service in December. It’s the economy But air power is primarily used as a punitive weapon against unarmed civilian targets, not in support of ground forces. For example, the Jan. 9 bombing in Rakhine’s Yanbye township that killed 52, wounded over 40 and destroyed 500 homes, had no military utility. Finally, the state of the economy is even more precarious given the loss of almost all border crossings. Although the SAC technically still controls Muse and Myawaddy, which links them to China and Thailand, respectively, opposition forces control much of the surrounding territory. While Karen forces have not made a bid to take Myawaddy, the main border crossing, they are pinching in along Asia Highway 1 to Yangon. On Jan. 11, some 500 reinforcements in 30 armored personnel carriers were deployed from Hpa-An to Kawkareik in Kayan state near the Thai border to keep the last main overland trade artery open. To sum it up, the junta is entering the fifth year of military rule with its power rapidly slipping away. Although they still control one-third of the country – land that holds two-thirds of the population – their mismanagement of the economy has left the military regime broke. Spread too thin across too many fronts simultaneously, it’s hard to see the SAC doing anything to arrest their terminal decline in 2025.   Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

Defense & Security
Main img

China targeted by the Turkestan Islamic Party

by Johann C. Fuhrmann

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском What is behind the threats of Uyghur Islamists from Damascus? It has long been known that the foreign militant Islamists fighting in Syria include Uyghurs from northwest China. After the fall of the Assad regime, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) issued a clear threat to China in December 2024. In a propaganda video, a masked spokesperson for the group declared: "Here in Syria, we are fighting for Allah in all cities, and we will do the same in Urumqi, Aqsu and Kashi." These cities are located in the Chinese region of Xinjiang, which the Islamist fighters refer to as "East Turkestan". This message marks an escalation in the propaganda of the TIP, which has been active in Syria for over a decade. It not only highlights its involvement in the fighting in the Syrian civil war but also emphasizes its goal of taking the conflict to China. But how serious is this threat really, and what challenges does it pose for Beijing? The controversial role of the TIP China observer Wolfgang Hirn is one of the few German-language authors to have dealt intensively with the latest developments in the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). "The party was founded in the 1990s. Its aim was to establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang and Central Asia. It had its bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan and was mainly recruited from Uyghurs who wanted to leave Xinjiang or had to leave due to Chinese persecution," explains Hirn.1 The Uyghur jihadists of the TIP pursue the goal of forcibly achieving the secession of the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang from the People's Republic of China and establishing an Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. While the TIP was primarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early years, it later increasingly expanded its activities to Syria. There it allied itself with other Islamist alliances of various militias, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Many of the Uyghur fighters and their families sought refuge in the Syrian rebel stronghold of Idlib. "The Chinese government does not use the name TIP, but ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement). It serves as a kind of collective term for all militant Uyghurs. The reason for this is probably that ETIM was listed as a terrorist organization by the USA between 2002 and 2020, which lent legitimacy to the official Chinese interpretation. The United Nations also has ETIM on a corresponding list," reports Björn Alpermann from the University of Würzburg on the LinkedIn platform.2 Background: ETIM was added to the US terror list as part of then US President George W. Bush's efforts to gain China as an ally in the US-led "War on Terror". Designated as a "terrorist organization" on this exclusion list, ETIM members and supporters were banned from entering the US.3 However, ETIM was removed from the US terror list again "because there has been no credible evidence for more than a decade that ETIM continues to exist", the US State Department announced in July 2020.4 Under pressure from the US and China, ETIM was also added to the UN Security Council's sanctions list in 2002, on which it is still listed. "China regularly blames the ETIM, also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party, for attacks and uses the group to justify its crackdown in the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang," Deutsche Welle reported in 2020.5 "Human rights groups estimate that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui or members of other minorities in Xinjiang have been sent to re-education camps. China rejects the accusations and speaks of training centers," according to SPIEGEL.6 Beijing claims that the TIP was responsible for terrorist attacks in China between 2008 and 2015, including knife attacks in public places, car bombs and suicide attacks.7 But how strong is the TIP today and what role does it play? "The TIP has always maintained good relations with the HTS and has often acted as a mediator in disputes between the HTS and other rebel groups. It was once described on Syrian television as HTS's favorite ally. The TIP troops took part in many battles alongside the HTS, for example in the liberation of Latakia, Hama and Aleppo. They are considered to be well organized and experienced. The size of the force varies," reports Wolfgang Hirn.8 In 2017, the Syrian ambassador to China at the time, Imad Moustapha, stated that there were up to 5,000 Uyghur fighters in Syria.9 However, experts estimate the number to be lower and assume that there are between 1,500 and 4,500 fighters.10 Media: Irritated reactions from China At the end of last year, the TIP intensified its propaganda activities and published numerous images of its leaders posing with their uniformed troops and showing them fighting in Syria. On December 13, 2024, The Telegraph then published a video on YouTube that deals with the history of the TIP and shows various excerpts from its propaganda videos, accompanied by epochal music. To date, the four-minute video has had more than 2.6 million views.11 The South China Morning Post reacted with unusual irritation to this reporting. In an opinion piece, columnist Alex Lo described The Telegraph's video as a "documentary-like clip" that was "practically an advertisement for the TIP", while repeating all the Western anti-China narratives "as if to justify the group's promised terrorism against Chinese. "12 Thus, "the Western-constructed genocide in Xinjiang (...) also serves as a practical justification for the militant group". The extensive dissemination of the video only led to "the Chinese having to raise the alleged TIP threat at the United Nations. "13 However, this is a grotesque claim: in New York on 17 December 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, had only made a rather coarse statement. In New York on December 17, 2024, Geng Shuang, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, merely made a rather sober statement, emphasizing that "Syrian territory must not be used to support terrorism or threaten the security of other countries. "14 The fight against the TIP was repeatedly described by Beijing's Foreign Ministry as "China's core concern in the fight against terrorism".15 Ultimately, Alex Lo's text should probably be understood as an - apparently rather emotional - appeal to "the West" not to portray or regard the TIP fighters as freedom fighters. Outlook: Strategic risks for Beijing "After the victory over Assad in Syria, the question arises as to whether the TIP fighters will remain in the region and organize their fight against China from there," says Wolfgang Hirn.16 So far, however, the TIP, which has been active in Syria for some time, has not been able to organize attacks in China from Syria. In addition to the geographical distance, the strict security precautions in China also play a role, making travel for such fighters very risky. Terrorism experts nevertheless see dangers, particularly from "online activities that lead to radicalization in China but could be organized from Syria. "17 "I sympathize with them, but their fight against China is not ours," Syria's new strongman Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of the Islamist HTS, recently said about his stance on the TIP.18 Nevertheless, the Uyghur fighters are apparently becoming increasingly powerful within Syria: Meanwhile, recent media reports that members of the TIP have been given high-ranking positions within the Syrian army are causing new concern in China. It is reported that Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, the commander of the TIP forces in Syria, has been appointed brigadier general.19 Two other Uyghur fighters are said to have been given the rank of colonel. However, a possible return of the TIP to its previous areas of retreat in Afghanistan and Pakistan is also likely to cause headaches for those in power in Beijing, as Afghanistan and Pakistan have become safe havens for terrorist groups such as ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in recent years, writes Yang Xiaotong from the Chinese think tank Grandview Institution in the Asia Times.20 The proximity to China's western borders and the weak control by the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the central government in Pakistan are exacerbating the situation. One thing is clear: China's investment in infrastructure projects and the sending of thousands of workers abroad, particularly to Pakistan, increase the country's vulnerability. In recent years, the number of attacks on Chinese citizens and assets has risen significantly, especially in Pakistan. Beijing suspects that these attacks are organized in collaboration between the TIP and ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA in order to undermine Chinese interests and investments.21 "Should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and other groups, it would pose a serious threat to China's strategic interests as its flagship project - the Belt and Road Initiative - runs through the country (...). The likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially," warns Yang Xiaotong. The TIP is "still officially part of the global al-Qaeda network and, unlike HTS, has never broken away from al-Qaeda," explains terrorism expert Hans-Jakob Schindler from the Counter Extremism Project. "The fact that HTS accepts TIP in its coalition is one of the main arguments that call into question the ideological orientation of HTS. "22 There is no question that the future of TIP is closely linked to Syria's uncertain prospects. Information The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025: What is the Turkistan Islamic Party and what are its plans?: https://www.chinahirn.de/2025/01/05/politik-i-xinjiang-i-was-ist-die-turkistanislamic-party-und-was-hat-sie-vor/, last access: 12.01.2025.  2 Alpermann, Björn 2025: Post on LinkedIn from 8.01.2025, available at: Link to the post by Björn Aplermann https://www.linkedin.com/posts/bj%C3%B6rn-alpermann-1873b38_turkistan-islamic-party-uses-video-from-syria-activity-7282380785922281472-cNKy/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop3 DW 2020: US removes China-condemned group from terror list, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/us-removes-separatist-group-condemned-by-china-fromterror-list/a-55527586, last access: 12.01.2025.   4 Ebd. 5 Ebd.6 SPIEGEL 2021: EU extends sanctions against China, available at:  https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/uiguren-eu-verlaengert-sanktionen-gegen-china-umein-jahr-a-e45ffbf6-7727-4052-8512-eb01a958f781, last access: 12.01.2025.  7 Yang Xiaotong 2024: China has cause to be terrified of rebel-run Syria, available at: https://asiatimes.com/2024/12/china-has-cause-to-be-terrified-of-rebel-run-syria/, last access: 12.01.2025. 8 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  9 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 10 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  11 The Telegraph 2024: Uyghur fighters in Syria vow to come for China next, available at: https://youtu.be/8DRzaZiI8_Q?si=kYaGco2aEk6bw5vx, last access 12.01.2025.  12 Alex Lo 2024: Is Turkestan Islamic Party a foreign proxy force to destabilise Xinjiang?, SCMP, available at:  https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3291565/turkestanislamic-party-foreign-proxy-force-destabilisexinjiang?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article, last access 12.01.2025.  13 Ebd.  14 Zhao Ziwen 2024: Syria-Xinjiang link: China warns leaders in Damascus not to threaten security elsewhere, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3291393/syria-xinjiang-link-chinawarns-leaders-damascus-not-threaten-securityelsewhere?module=inline&pgtype=article, last access: 12.01.2025.  15 Global Times 2024: Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  Combating ETIM is China's core concern in counter-terrorism and shared responsibility of intl community: FM, available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306930.shtml, last access: 12.01.2025.  16 Hirn, Wolfgang 2025.  17 Hauberg, Sven 2025: Allies of Syria's new rulers set their sights on China, available at:  https://www.fr.de/politik/verbuendete-von-syriens-neuenmachthabern-nehmen-china-ins-visier-zr-93509789.html, last access: 12.01.2025. 18 See also: Hauberg, Sven 2025.  19 SCMP 2025: Syria appoints foreign Islamist fighters, including Uygurs, to military: sources, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3292859/syriaappoints-foreign-islamist-fighters-including-uygurs-militarysources?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection?module=inline&pgtype=article , last access: 12.01.2025.  20 Yang Xiaotong 2024. 21 Ebd.  22 Hauberg, Sven 2025.

Energy & Economics
Mexico City, MEXICO - Jan 14 2025 : A post titled “Indonesia Joins BRICS Group of Emerging Economies” is displayed on an iPhone from the BRICS website.

Indonesia’s Membership in BRICS: Strengthening Emerging Economies and Elevating the Global South

by Amrita Jash

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Indonesia’s inclusion in BRICS enhances the representation of the Global South and strengthens efforts to reform global governance institutions. This move positions the bloc as a stronger platform for collaboration among developing nations. On 7 January, Indonesia officially joined the BRICS grouping. In welcoming Indonesia, the Brazilian Government issued a statement, saying: “With the largest population and economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia shares with other members a commitment to reforming global governance institutions and contributes positively to deepening South-South cooperation.” With full membership, Indonesia has become the first country in Southeast Asia to join BRICS. Currently, Thailand and Malaysia are official partners, but not full members. Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its statement said the BRICS membership is “a strategic step to improve the collaborations and cooperation with other developing nations, based on the principle of equality, mutual respect, and sustainable development.” Economically, this could mean an increase of 0.3 percent growth to GDP, and the expansion of Indonesia’s access to BRICS markets. Geopolitically, it provides Indonesia a bargaining position in the global arena as well as a platform to voice the aspirations of the Global South. For BRICS, Indonesia’s membership adds another feather to its hat by bringing in greater representation of the Global South to its multipolar vision. This makes it imperative to assess the trajectory of the grouping. What started as an acronym “BRIC,” coined by Jim O’Neill in 2001 in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” the grouping was projected in the next decade to grow significantly. Founded in 2009 by the four countries—Brazil, Russia, China, and India—the bloc’s first expansion came in 2010 with the joining of South Africa. In the last 16 years, BRICS has graduated from being a popular buzz word in international politics to a significant platform of emerging economies representing the “Global South.” What is noteworthy is that BRICS is not yet a formal multilateral organisation like the United Nations, World Bank or the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but increasingly there has been a greater demand among states (mostly developing countries) to join this club of emerging economies. Despite its informality, what made BRICS relevant in the international order was the 2008 financial crises, which raised scepticism and concerns over the dollar-dominated monetary system. This invariably challenged the effectiveness of the West-led Bretton Woods institutions given the suffering of the United States and Europe in the wake of the financial crisis. In contrast, the BRICS economies showed resilience. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, where the Joint Declaration put forward the desire of BRIC countries to develop “an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open, and transparent dialogue and cooperation” that is “conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” This was reaffirmed at the most recent 16th BRICS Summit held in October 2024 in Kazan. With the indicative expansion of its institutional framework and functionaries since 2009, the most significant outputs have been the New Development Bank (NDB), which provides developmental funds to countries; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with a resource pool of US$100 billion, which provides a mutual support mechanism for short-term balance of payments pressures, enhancing the financial safety net of member countries; and the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025 for effective integration of BRICS enterprises into global and regional value chains. A significant milestone was the call, during the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, for the expansion of BRICS by inviting new states to join. Another, in 2024, was the deliberation on the formation of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (also known as BRICS Pay), where BRICS countries would trade with each other without converting to US dollars by utilising blockchain technology and tokens to circumvent the SWIFT financial payment system. Although BRICS Pay is still only a concept, its development would seriously undermine the US dollar’s long-standing dominance. Today, the inter-governmental organisation boasts of 10 full members with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025; and has nine official partner countries—Nigeria is the ninth partner country of BRICS (admitted on 17 January 2025), joining Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Statistically put, BRICS member countries comprise about 45 percent of the world’s population, 28 percent of the global economy, and collectively they produce more than a third of the world’s crude oil. And if Saudi Arabia joins the group (which it is yet to consider the BRICS invitation), the grouping would then produce some 43 percent of global crude oil. This growth among emerging nations is set to widen the gap between BRICS+ and the G7 nations. As IMF estimates suggest, BRICS+ will account for 37.6 percent of world GDP at purchasing power parity in 2027, compared with 28.2 percent for the G7. This will signify a shift in economic power towards emerging economies, enhance intra-BRICS trade and regional networks rather than relying on G7 markets, and also lead to the creation of alternate alliances and institutions. Apart from expanding its membership, BRICS has also broadened its agenda beyond economics to include global challenges. The two main pillars of BRICS are practical cooperation in various fields through meetings of Working Groups and Senior Officials, and consultation on matters of shared interests through meetings of Leaders and Ministers of Finance, Trade, Health, Science & Technology, Education, Agriculture, Communication, and Labour, among others. The intra-BRICS collaboration now includes social welfare, intellectual property, tourism, science & technology, culture, outer space, think tanks, and internet governance and security. With BRICS+, emerging economies are establishing new standards for order making. In other words, despite its informal existence, BRICS has emerged as a strong contestant for building an alternative discourse on global governance—one that is non-western. The expansion gives BRICS a greater economic and demographic weight as well as a stronger voice to the Global South, potentially reshaping discussions in institutions like the UN and WTO. However, the long-term success of an expanded BRICS will depend on its ability to balance diverse interests and act as a unified voice on the global stage. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

Energy & Economics
DAVOS, SWITZERLAND - OCTOBER 31, 2021: Building of the Davos Congress Center, place of the world economic Forum wef

Davos 2025 as a Concentrated Expression of Geopolitical Uncertainty

by Vladislav Belov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From January 20 to 24, 2025, the traditional World Economic Forum (WEF) took place in Davos. The organizers registered approximately 2,000 participants from over 130 countries, including around 1,600 executives from major corporations, among them 900 CEOs. The political agenda of the WEF was supported by more than 50 heads of state and government. As part of the official program, about 300 sessions were held, 200 of which were broadcast live. Press accreditation was granted to 76 media companies. For official events, 28,043 square meters of space were allocated, accommodating 117 meeting rooms and 23 lounge areas. Additionally, several participating companies (such as HSBC, EY, and Cognizant) rented additional venues separately for their own events. WEF President Børge Brende, announcing this meeting, emphasized that in 2025, due to geopolitical conflicts, ongoing economic fragmentation, and the acceleration of climate change, the forum would be held under conditions of exceptionally high global uncertainty for the first time in decades. The theme of the Forum was “Cooperation in the Age of Intelligence”. On January, WEF experts presented four reports. The first one, a traditional report and the 20th edition, analyzed the most significant global risks and threats facing the international community. The study is based on a survey of over 900 experts from various fields and covers short-term (2025), medium-term (until 2027), and long-term (until 2035) perspectives. The key risks identified for these periods include the following:- in 2025 the most serious threat for most respondents is interstate armed conflicts, followed by extreme weather events and geoeconomic conflicts, including sanctions and trade measures;- by 2027 key risks include disinformation and fake news, which undermine trust in institutions and intensify social polarization, tension, and instability, as well as an increase in cyberattacks and espionage cases;- by 2035 environmental threats are a major concern, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, ecosystem destruction, critical changes in Earth's systems, and natural resource shortages. Additionally, technological risks such as the negative consequences of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies are highlighted.The authors emphasize the need to strengthen international cooperation and increase resilience to global threats. According to them, rising geopolitical tensions, climate challenges, and other risks require coordinated global action to prevent the escalation of existing issues and the emergence of new crises. The second report presents the perspectives of leading experts on the global economic outlook for 2025. They predict moderate economic slowdown, driven by geoeconomic fragmentation and protectionist measures. The most resilient economic growth is expected in the United States and South Asian countries, while Europe, China, and Latin America may face significant challenges. Inflation is projected to rise in most countries, primarily due to increased government spending and shifts in global supply chains. Most experts consider a further escalation of the U.S.-China trade war likely, along with continued regionalization of global trade, leading to the formation of more isolated economic blocs and reduced global interdependence. While experts acknowledge the high potential of artificial intelligence (AI), they emphasize the need for greater investment in infrastructure and human capital to fully leverage its benefits. The third study provides a comprehensive analysis of employment issues. The main conclusion is that ongoing changes, global trends and new technologies will cause 92 million people to leave the labor market worldwide by 2030, but will also create 170 million new jobs. One of the challenges in this regard is the need to improve skills and train for new specialties. The fourth report assesses the state of global cooperation across five key areas: trade and capital, innovation and technology, climate and natural capital, health and well-being, and peace and security. After analyzing more than 40 indicators, the authors conclude that due to heightened geopolitical tensions and instability, overall cooperation remains at the same level. However, positive trends are observed in areas such as climate, innovation, technology, and health. Davos as a Symbolic Benchmark of Switzerland Despite existing criticism, the Davos Forum remains a key platform for the annual interaction of leading figures in global politics, business, and the expert community. Without Switzerland's neutral status, the Davos Forum likely would not exist. However, it was Klaus Schwab, who founded the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 24, 1971, who played a crucial role in transforming this event and its host location into one of Switzerland’s comparative advantages in political and economic terms. Despite his advanced age, Schwab continues to be an active ideologue and architect of Davos, moderating key discussions while fine-tuning his creation and addressing annual criticism. Yet, he has his own limitations—despite Switzerland’s neutrality and his personal reputation for impartiality, Schwab once again refrained from inviting Russian representatives, even at the level of individual entrepreneurs and experts. Such a move, rather than formal attempts to broaden participation and accessibility, could have enhanced the forum’s status. The participation of a Russian delegation would have been particularly relevant in this critical year for global politics, marked by the unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump, which is set to shape most geopolitical and geo-economic processes worldwide. Including Russian representatives could have strengthened the WEF’s competitive standing, but once again, it did not happen. The Swiss leadership highly values the opportunities that the Davos platform provides, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and, most notably, foreign economic relations. In September 2024, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament—the Council of States (the smaller chamber) and the National Council (the larger chamber)—decided to continue state support for the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos and allocated budget funding for the period 2025–2027. During the discussions, lawmakers emphasized that the event strengthens Switzerland’s role as a global hub for international dialogue, while also having a positive economic impact on the Graubünden region. As the host country of the forum, Switzerland actively leverages it to advance its own interests. This year, six out of the seven members of the Swiss Federal Council (Cabinet of Ministers) attended the WEF. As part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Swiss Economy Minister Guy Parmelin signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Kosovo and Thailand, bringing Switzerland’s total number of FTAs to 37. There are also plans to adapt and update the existing FTA with China. One of Bern’s key priorities remains securing an FTA with the MERCOSUR bloc. As a result, a focal point of this year’s WEF was Argentine President Javier Milei, who, during an “exceptionally warm bilateral meeting,” invited Swiss President Karin Keller-Sutter to visit Buenos Aires in 2025. The Trump Factor The opening of the current WEF coincided with the inauguration of Donald Trump, who, in recent months, has made numerous provocative statements and promises, swiftly beginning their implementation upon taking office on January 20. The U.S. president signed nearly 100 executive orders, including the repeal of 78 regulations enacted by his predecessor, Joe Biden. Among these were directives for all federal agencies and departments to address rising living costs and to end government-imposed censorship of free speech. The most significant orders included the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border to enforce strict immigration controls. In one way or another, the presence of the “new-old” president was felt across nearly all discussion platforms at the forum. On January 23, Donald Trump addressed the participants of the Davos Forum via video conference, outlining the following agenda:- NATO defense spending: Member states should increase their defense budgets from 2% to 5% of GDP to ensure a more equitable distribution of financial burdens within the alliance.- Trade tensions with the EU: The EU and its member states treat economic relations with the U.S. unfairly. European business regulations, including tax policies, disadvantage American companies, particularly in the tech sector, prompting Trump’s call for tariffs on European imports.- Criticism of the EU’s Green Deal: Labeling it as a “new green scam”, Trump emphasized that the U.S. would ramp up oil and gas production and expand power plant construction to become the “capital of artificial intelligence and cryptography”.- Oil prices and the Ukraine conflict: Trump suggested that lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia could help resolve the Ukraine conflict and urged Saudi leadership to take necessary steps, emphasizing their responsibility in the matter.- Tariffs on companies outsourcing production: Countries whose companies manufacture outside the U.S. will face tariffs to incentivize production relocation to American soil.- China's role in Ukraine: Trump called on China to support ending the Ukraine conflict, while stating his own efforts to mediate a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine.- U.S. domestic policy shift: A large-scale deregulation program is underway in the U.S., including tax cuts and potential elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which Trump views as discriminatory.Trump’s speech elicited mixed reactions among forum participants. His focus on protectionist policies and sharp criticism of international partners raised concerns about potential consequences for the global economy, particularly among European attendees. Additionally, his stance signaled an escalation in the strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is expected to play out through potential trade conflicts, tensions in the South and East China Seas, continued arms sales to Taiwan, and other geopolitical developments. The Europe Factor   At Davos, Europe is traditionally represented by the European Union, with the United States as its primary political and economic partner. Ursula von der Leyen, re-elected as President of the European Commission and beginning her new term on December 1, 2024, addressed the forum on January 21. Her speech largely responded to challenges outlined by Donald Trump before the WEF began, setting out the EU’s key priorities for the coming years: overcoming economic stagnation, enhancing competitiveness, and further integrating the single market across all 27 member states. A central theme of her address was the “Competitiveness Compass” initiative, first introduced in late 2024. This strategy, shaped by recommendations from Mario Draghi’s influential report, aims to drive economic reform and growth within the EU. The European Commission planned to unveil the full document by the end of January. At Davos, Ursula von der Leyen effectively introduced the concept of “Europe United” as a counterbalance to “America First” and cautioned the U.S. against igniting a trade war with the European Union. She emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue on shared interests, stating: “Our priority will be to initiate discussions as early as possible, focusing on common interests and readiness for negotiations. We will be pragmatic, but we will always adhere to our principles. Protecting our interests and defending our values is the European way”. At the same time, the European Commission president highlighted the high level of interdependence between the European and American economic models. She underscored that the era of global cooperation has given way to intense geostrategic competition, stating: “The world's largest economies are competing for access to raw materials, new technologies, and global trade routes—from artificial intelligence to clean technologies, from quantum computing to space, from the Arctic to the South China Sea. The race is on”. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) emphasized that Brussels must be prepared for U.S. trade tariffs which are expected to be more “selective and targeted”, especially given the “existential crisis” facing the EU economy. She also noted that the ECB is not overly concerned about the impact of inflation from other countries, including the U.S., on the eurozone. The UK was also represented at Davos, with its delegation led by Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves. She used the trip primarily to promote Britain’s economic landscape, focusing on the country’s political and economic stability, its business-friendly environment, and recent government efforts to reduce regulatory barriers—all under the central message: “Now is the time to invest in Britain”. However, the extent to which this narrative aligns with reality remained beyond the scope of the Forum. The true assessment was left to the executives of major corporations with whom Reeves held meetings, including JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs, discussing investment opportunities in the UK's infrastructure and green projects. Additionally, the UK delegation engaged in negotiations aimed at restoring and strengthening ties with sovereign wealth funds and private investors from the U.S. and the Gulf states. The Ukraine Factor Due to the ongoing Ukraine conflict, Davos once again served as a prelude to the Munich Security Conference, which traditionally takes place in early February in Bavaria. While the war and Donald Trump’s influence shaped many discussions, Ukraine was not the central focus of the forum, resulting in a somewhat reduced emphasis compared to previous years. Ukraine’s interests at the World Economic Forum (WEF) were primarily represented by V.Zelensky, who took it upon himself to “educate” European politicians and “interpret” the signals previously sent by Donald Trump. His focus was on defense spending, emphasizing that a significant portion should go toward supporting the Kyiv regime, the presence of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory, and the need for “real security guarantees”. In the first days after taking office, the U.S. president made several key clarifications regarding his previously stated 24-hour timeline for resolving the Ukraine conflict — this period has now been significantly extended. The reason lies in the fact that, regardless of the revocation of Zelensky’s well-known decree, Ukraine must have a head of state authorized to negotiate and officially confirm any agreements or their outcomes. As of late January, no such figure was present in Kyiv, and Washington is aware of this reality. Switzerland, while emphasizing its neutral status (despite being designated by Russia as an “unfriendly state”), consistently maintains that it provides Ukraine only humanitarian aid and diplomatic support at Kyiv’s request. At the 2024 WEF, the well-known Bürgenstock Conference was announced, which later took place in the summer. However, in 2025, no similarly large-scale initiatives were introduced. Nevertheless, discussions at the Forum once again touched on the possibility of granting Switzerland the right to represent Kyiv’s interests on the international stage. Additionally, it was reported that a Swiss-Ukrainian memorandum was signed, with Ukrainian Economy Minister Yulia Svyrydenko representing Kyiv. The agreement focuses on the participation of Swiss private businesses in Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. V.Zelensky used Davos as an opportunity to meet with world leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who had recently blocked additional aid to Ukraine. However, his main competitor in Germany’s upcoming snap Bundestag elections, Friedrich Merz, was more open to the idea of support, and Zelensky also held a discussion with him. Both meetings were held behind closed doors, and no details were disclosed. Meanwhile, German Green Party leader Robert Habeck managed to avoid an impromptu conversation with Zelensky, who had attempted to engage with him on the spot. At a January 23 briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova commented on V.Zelensky’s speeches at Davos 2025, describing them, among other things, as “narcotic madness”. The Germany Factor Germany, still holding its position as the political and economic leader of the European Union, was represented at Davos by key political heavyweights: Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Economy and Climate Protection Minister (and Vice-Chancellor) Robert Habeck, and CDU/CSU Chairman Friedrich Merz. All three have been selected by their respective parties as key candidates for chancellor in Germany’s snap Bundestag elections scheduled for February 23, 2025. Given this, it was no surprise that they used the Swiss platform as part of their election campaigns. The current head of the German government had an objective advantage: he delivered a keynote speech on behalf of Germany, in which he focused on the presence of traditional standard factors (the largest economy in the EU; efficient small, medium and large businesses; government support for investments; low level of government debt), which should help to overcome the crisis. Regarding the United States, he declared his interest in maintaining close relations with the new administration, but “without false fawning and servility”. D. Trump and his team, according to him, will keep the whole world on edge in the coming years, but the German leadership will be able to cope with this. O. Scholz's main message is that constructive European-American interaction “is of decisive importance for security throughout the world and is the engine of successful economic development”. It is noteworthy that there were many empty seats in the hall and after the Chancellor's speech there were no questions for him for a long time, which greatly surprised the moderator of the session, K. Schwab. O. Scholz's closest associate, Finance Minister J.Kukis, who was appointed to this position to replace K. Lindner, who was dismissed in early November 2024, was participating in the Forum. He was unable to provide any special pre-election support to his boss during the Forum, and did not distinguish himself in any special way. Incidentally, K. Lindner himself preferred to remain in Germany and continue to fight there for the votes of voters, which are extremely necessary for the liberals to overcome the five percent barrier and get into the Bundestag. F.Merz, who is very likely the future head of the German Cabinet, and his possible future deputy R. Habeck also sought to prove their chances of winning the elections during their speeches. O. Scholz and F.Merz organized meetings with leading representatives of German business, trying to show which of them understood their problems better and was ready to solve them constructively. Despite all their differences, they were united on one issue - the need to soften the provision on the “debt brake” enshrined in the Basic Law (Constitution) and increase support for entrepreneurs. External observers considered that F.Merz was more convincing, including regarding the transatlantic economic vector. R.Habeck unexpectedly engaged in self-criticism during the podium discussion, stating that he initially believed that the difficult economic situation in the country was due to a short-term cyclical crisis, but it turned out that this was a consequence of a long-term structural crisis. Such “self-education” of the minister cost Germany dearly. During the Forum (January 22) in the Bavarian town of Aschaffenburg, an Afghan refugee subject to deportation committed a crime, killing a child and an adult who was protecting him. This event pushed the issue of migration regulation to the top of the election campaign agenda. Unexpectedly, F.Merz found himself in a sticky situation, when his parliamentary request as the leading representative of the opposition in the current Bundestag for stricter controls at the external borders of the FRG could only count on success with the support of the unpopular Alternative for Germany and the center-left Sahra Wagenknecht Union. From Davos, Olaf Scholz traveled to Paris for a meeting with Emmanuel Macron. The French president was unable to attend the Forum due to domestic political circumstances and the need to manage the situation on the ground. The two leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation between their countries in strengthening their economic and political frameworks, as well as the European Union as a whole. None of the three key chancellor candidates managed to present a clear vision for Germany’s economic and political future, one that would be based on creativity, radical progress, technological breakthroughs, and prosperity—transforming the country into an innovation powerhouse not only for Europe but for the collective West as a whole. This means that Germany risks falling behind, failing to establish itself as an economic model capable of competing on equal terms with Donald Trump’s transforming North American economic space.Under Friedrich Merz, Olaf Scholz, and Robert Habeck, Germany faces the danger of remaining trapped in the past, relying too heavily on its post-war economic miracle—Made in Germany—which was achieved through the brilliance of ordoliberal economists and engineers. Davos 2025 made it clear that leaning solely on past achievements is no longer enough to drive a radical leap toward the future. If the German political elite, represented by the “handshake” established parties, remains in such reactionary positions in relation to the need for qualitative changes in economic policy, then the German standard will have no chance to take a leading place among the world's innovation locations. Here we will briefly indicate that, according to the estimates of the authors of the global risks report, the main ones for Germany are (in descending order): a shortage of highly qualified labor, recession / stagnation of the economy, illegal migration, disinformation, and a shortage of energy resources. They are the ones that largely determine the content of the current election campaign for the German parliament. The China Factor Among the political heavyweights representing the countries of the Global South at Davos 2025, the participation of the Chinese delegation, led by Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Ding Xuexiang, stands out. In his keynote speech, he emphasized Beijing's commitment to economic globalization, which is “not a zero-sum game, but a process of mutual benefit and common progress” and declared that protectionism does not lead to success, and trade wars have no winners. Among the key messages were that China is economically attractive, does not seek a trade surplus, is ready to import more competitive and high-quality goods and services to achieve balanced trade, is open to investment from foreign companies, and is ready to solve problems faced by both domestic and foreign firms. While condemning protectionism, he emphasized the importance of multilateralism and the role of the UN. While mildly critical of the “new-old” US president, he never mentioned him by name. Ding repeatedly referred to Xi Jinping, including his initiatives on global development and security. As part of the Forum, Ding Xuexiang hosted a private luncheon with top global financiers and business leaders, including the CEOs of BlackRock, Bridgewater Associates, JPMorgan, Blackstone, and Visa. Discussions centered on China’s ongoing economic reforms, efforts to stabilize the real estate market, stimulate domestic demand, and attract foreign investment. Experts noted that global business leaders responded positively to Ding Xuexiang’s statements, signaling growing confidence in China’s economic direction. In general, he fulfilled the standard mission assigned to him: to increase the international community's confidence in China's economic policy and confirm its role as a key player in the global economy. At the same time, the Forum participants remained concerned about a slowdown in China's economic growth, especially in the context of a possible increase in tariffs by the United States. The Artificial Intelligence Factor One of the leitmotifs of the forum, along with rethinking economic growth, industrial development prospects, climate and restoring trust, were discussions on the rapid development of AI, its impact on the labor market, prospects and challenges associated with the integration of this technology into various sectors of the economy. Experts identified a few trends that will emerge by 2030. AI and automation will increase the demand of enterprises for specialists in the field of AI, big data analysis, digital marketing, and cybersecurity. About half of the current skills of such employees in these areas may become obsolete, which suggests the need for timely adaptation of secondary and higher education to such a challenge. Employees whose professions will become unclaimed due to automation, especially in traditional sectors, will have to undergo advanced training programs. Special attention in the expert sessions was given to the ethical aspects of AI application and the related problems of developing the necessary standards. Issues of international cooperation took an important place, including in the context of ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits of AI application, as well as minimizing the potential risks it generates for society (for example, possible discrimination and bias in algorithms, as well as the protection of users' personal data). In terms of geopolitical rivalry in the field of AI, the global race for leadership in this area, which has already begun between the United States, China and several EU countries, was discussed. Experts pointed out the concerns of the leaders of the latter regarding the need to strengthen the positions of European companies in this area. Strategies for government stimulation of innovation and support for businesses developing AI were discussed. In addition, the participants in the discussions considered the possibilities of using artificial intelligence technologies to achieve sustainable development goals, including combating climate change, improving healthcare and increasing resource efficiency. Examples of using AI to monitor the environment, optimize energy consumption, develop new methods of treating diseases, and improve various aspects of life were of interest. *** The World Economic Forum 2025 in Davos was predictably held under the sign of global challenges, the Ukraine conflict, and increased economic competition, set against the backdrop of geopolitical and geoeconomic changes. Børge Brende, summarizing the event, accurately noted that the current time is “a moment of serious consequences and uncertainties”. This is largely linked to the return of Donald Trump to the White House. At the Forum, the United States’ priorities in strengthening national interests were outlined, including the goal of reducing import flows. This move drew criticism from the European Union and other participants, who expressed growing concerns about the escalation of trade conflicts and the fragmentation of the global economy. The President of the European Commission highlighted the prospects for strengthening the EU’s competitiveness and increasing its independence, considering the intensifying rivalry between the American and Chinese economic spheres. In this regard, representatives of China advocated for reducing trade tensions and strengthening regional alliances, while Germany emphasized the current risks facing its economic standard, outlining the difficulties of finding ways to minimize them. The Ukrainian conflict once again became one of the central topics, but with the formal support of the leaders of the collective West, delegations from the global South showed a restrained reaction to V.Zelensky's speech and messages. Discussions about AI became quite meaningful. Overall, Davos 2025 and its participants confirmed the important role of the WEF as a platform for discussing global challenges and finding constructive answers to them. The need for collective efforts to solve the most pressing issues was noted. One of B. Borge's final messages: the only way to achieve progress in solving global problems is to work together and “find solutions that will make the world a better place”. It is evident that Russia could have significantly contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of this approach.

Defense & Security
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence during a two-day meeting of the alliance's Defence Ministers at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 14, 2023.

Where is the transatlantic relationship heading?

by Florentino Portero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Defense & Security
Greenland for sale? asks a Donald Trump doll, Denmark, January 10, 2025

4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t

by Scott L. Montgomery

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”

Energy & Economics
Selective focus of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21 or CMP 11 logo on a mobile screen stock image: Dhaka, BD- Feb 27, 2024

Ten Years After the Paris Agreement: The Tragedy of the Overshoot Generation

by Marcelo de Araujo , Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Paris Agreement will be ten years old in 2025. It is a good opportunity, then, to reassess the feasibility of its long-term goals and understand what they mean for the current and for the next generations. In a very optimistic scenario, if the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved, the climate crisis will have been solved by the end of the 21st century. In the meantime, though, the crisis will worsen, as temperature overshoot is very likely to occur by the middle of the century. During the overshoot period, our planet’s average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the threshold proposed by the Paris Agreement. At the end of the overshoot period, which could last from one to several decades, the temperature will begin to fall until it eventually stabilises at 1.5°C at the turn of the century (IPCC 2023, 1810). Expectedly, the success of the Paris Agreement would greatly benefit the “post-overshoot generation”, namely the generation that will live in the first half of the 22nd century. But to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, the generation that will live in the overshoot period – the “overshoot generation” – will have to remove an enormous amount of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) from the atmosphere. For now, though, it is unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies will be available at a scale that might enable the overshoot generation to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. To aggravate the problem, the overshoot generation will also probably have to rely on as-yet untested geoengineering technologies to promote their own survival. As we can see, conflicting interests of three different generations are at stake here, namely: (1) the interests of the current generation, (2) those of the overshoot generation, and (3) the interests of the post-overshoot generation. Given the unequal distribution of power across generations (Gardiner 2011, 36), it is likely that the current generation will tend to further their own interest to the detriment of the overshoot generation, even if, in the end, the climate policies enforced by the current generation do indeed fulfil the interests of the post-overshoot generation. The best possible world is one in which the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved. Yet, depending on the choices that we make today, the best possible world could also mean the worst possible world that human beings will ever have met on our planet. That will be the fate of the overshoot generation, squeezed between the self-serving policies of the current generation and the climate hopes of the post-overshoot generation. The implications for international relations are momentous, as we intend to show in this article. Possible pathways The Paris Agreement did not establish a concrete deadline for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 2, namely: Maintain the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. The scientific community generally understands that the Paris Agreement aims at climate stabilization at the end of the 21st century. There are two main reasons for this. The first is a constraint imposed by our planet’s climate system. The second is a constraint imposed by agreed upon principles of justice. As for the first reason, we have to bear in mind that an immediate reduction of GHG emissions would not be followed by an immediate decline of global temperature (Dessler 2016, 91). Even if all countries decided to eliminate their respective emissions today, the global temperature would continue to rise for several decades, until it begins to recede and stabilises at the turn of the century. As for the second reason, the Paris Agreement assumed that developing countries could not immediately reduce their own emissions without compromising their own development and the prospect of eradicating poverty. Thus, the Paris Agreement also established in Article 4 that each country could continue to emit GHG until their respective emissions peaked as soon as possible. After peaking, emissions should be rapidly reduced. Thus, the attempt to achieve the goals set out in Article 2 well before the end of the 21st century might turn out to prove inconsistent with the reality of our planet’s climate system and unfair towards developing countries. The problem, however, is that the Paris Agreement did not establish a specific pathway for the achievement of its long-term goals (Figure 1). There is, indeed, a multitude of pathways, but many (if not most) of them involve an overshoot period (Geden and Löschel 2017, 881; Schleussner et al. 2016). And as there are “different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C”, there emerges the question, then, as to which interpretation could do justice to the conflicting claims of the three different generations considered as a whole, namely the claims of the current generation, those of the overshoot generation, and the claims of the post-overshoot generation (Figure 2). There has been much discussion now on the concept of a “just transition”. But this debate has focused entirely on the claims that the members of the current generation can raise against each other, and not on claims that could be raised – or presumed – across the three generations referred to above. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Glossary from 2023, for instance, contains a specific entry on this topic: “Just transitions. A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon economy” (IPCC 2023, 1806). The IPCC entry ends with some considerations regarding past generations: “Just transitions may embody the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices”. Interestingly, though, the entry says nothing about the normative implications of a just transition for future generations. A 2023 United Nations document defines the concept of just transition along similar lines (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 3, 12–13). But, again, it understands “just transition” in terms of claims that stakeholders within the current generation, whether at national or international level, can raise against each other. As for the international level, the United Nations document makes the following statement concerning the concept of just transition as applied to international relations: “As countries pick up the pace of their climate change mitigation strategies, it is critical that developed countries do not transfer the burden of the transition onto developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 8). The problem, however, is that, as a matter of justice, it is equally critical that the current generation does not transfer the burden of the transition onto the overshoot generation, even if that burden, in the end, turns out to benefit the post-overshoot generation. Such an unequal distribution of burdens across three generations would certainly conflict with the requirements of intergenerational justice (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70; Meyer 2021). Overshoot generation and retroactive mitigation One might perhaps argue that no extra burden is being imposed on the overshoot generation, for the current generation is already having to face challenges that the overshoot generation, supposedly, will not have to face. The overshoot generation, one might suggest, will inherit from the current generation all the benefits resulting from the energy transition, but without having to bear the costs that the transition imposes on the current generation. The idea here is that by the middle of this century global emissions will have already peaked and will be declining at an accelerated pace, towards stabilisation at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level at the end of this century. Thus, the overshoot generation can arguably reap the benefits of green energy, as long as the current generation remains free, at least for the time being, to emit GHG further, which is necessary to finance the human and technological development that the overshoot generation will need later. This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the climate crisis – a fact that has not been given due attention in the public debate on climate policies. In a very optimistic scenario, the overshoot generation will not have the burden of reducing their own emissions because they will be able to rely on carbon-free energy. The problem, however, is that the overshoot generation will still have to retroactively mitigate the emissions of previous generations – including, of course, the emissions of the current generation. We call this process “retroactive mitigation”, for what is at stake here is not reduction and phasing out of one’s own emissions, but the removal of massive amounts of GHG, which previous generations failed to mitigate in the past. In a 2014 report, the IPCC realised that simply reducing GHG emissions would no longer be enough to preclude irreversible climate change. Removal of GHG would also be necessary (IPCC 2014, 12). The IPCC called attention to yet another problem: it was unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies, including DAC (Direct Air Capture), could be deployed on a global scale in time to avoid a climate disaster. In a 2018 report, the IPCC was even less confident about the future development and scaling-up of CCS technologies (IPCC 2018, 136). To make matters worse, two further factors must be taken into consideration. (1) Recent studies show that there are practically no pathways left for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals without the massive deployment of CCS (Smith et al. 2023). And (2) it has become increasingly probable that the overshoot generation will also have to deploy geoengineering technologies to cope with ever more frequent heatwaves (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70). It could perhaps be argued that afforestation and preservation of existing forests could be used instead of CCS technologies. However, the amount of land and water that would be necessary for the creation of new forests is probably larger than the amount of land and water available. Moreover, the attempt to create new forests on such a large scale might compromise the water and food security that the overshoot generation will need to promote their own climate adaptation (Shue 2017, 205). It is also necessary to take into account the amount of time new forests need to grow, not to mention the risk of fire. In this case, forests stop absorbing GHG and become GHG emitters themselves (Gatti et al. 2021). Implications for international relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, human being’s capacity to trigger catastrophic events at a global scale became increasingly apparent. As Garrett Hardin aptly put the problem in 1974: “No generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have” (Hardin 1974b, 561). But while even realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Herz argued for international cooperation in the face of global threats, Hardin himself advanced what he called the “lifeboat ethics”. According to Hardin, instead of engaging in international cooperation, richer states should behave like lifeboats and resist the temptation to help individuals from poorer states to cope with environmental disasters or famines. This, he argued, might undermine richer states’ capacity to secure their own survival (Hardin 1974a; 1974b). In his The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival from 1977, Hardin resumes his criticism of international cooperation to alleviate the plight of poorer states: We will do little good in the international sphere until we recognize that the greatest need of a poor country is not material: call it psychological, moral, spiritual, or what you will. The basic issue is starkly raised in a story of personal heroism that unfolded in South America a few years ago (Hardin 1977, 64). Hardin goes on to recall the 1972 Andes plane crash, turned into a feature film in 2023. Hardin suggests that the passengers who had survived the crash would not have taken the initiative to save their own lives had they not heard on the radio that the search efforts to rescue them had been called off. Hardin’s conclusion is this: “This true story, I submit, bears a close resemblance to the moral situation of poor countries. The greatest gift we can give them is the knowledge that they are on their own” (Hardin 1977, 65). Hardin, of course, does not take into consideration the extent to which richer states themselves may be responsible for the plight of poorer states. Hardin’s self-help approach to international relations is in line with political realism. But when major realist thinkers themselves addressed the question of human survival, around the same time Hardin advocated his lifeboat ethics, they came to entirely different conclusions. Authors such as Morgenthau and Herz realized that nation-states had become unable to protect their own citizens in the face of global catastrophes triggered by the depletion of the environment or the outbreak of a nuclear war. As Morgenthau put the problem in 1966: “No nation state is capable of protecting its citizens and their way of life against an all-out atomic attack. Its safety rests solely in preventing such an attack from taking place” (Morgenthau 1966, 9). In a 1976 article on the emergence of the atomic age, Herz made a similar point: “Nuclear penetrability had rendered the traditional nation-state obsolete because it could no longer fulfill its primary function, that of protection” (Herz 1976a, 101). Both Morgenthau and Herz argued for international cooperation – or perhaps even the dissolution of the system of states (Morgenthau 1978, 539) – as the better strategy to avert global catastrophic risks (Herz 1976a, 110; 1976b, 47). Herz later also theorized about the concept of “ecological threat” and argued for the development of a new interdisciplinary field, which he aptly named “survival studies” (Herz 2003; Seidel 2003; Laszlo and Seidel 2006, 2–3; Graham 2008; Stevens 2020). During the overshoot period, as heatwaves and other climate-related extreme events become more severe and frequent, people in poorer countries are likely to suffer the most. Mass migrations are likely to occur on an unprecedented scale (Vince 2022). Given the current popularity of anti-migration measures both in the United States and Europe, it is imaginable, then, that the lifeboat ethics will strike a chord with future conservative governments. That would be an error, for the assumption that governments will be protecting their own citizens by way of making their borders impenetrable to climate migrants is misleading. The “ecological threat” cannot be held back by higher walls. Lifeboat ethics will make everyone worse-off. Back in the 1960s, Martin Luther King may not have had climate change or mass migration in mind, but his words strike us as even more poignant now: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now” (as quoted by former American President Barack Obama). There is only one boat, carrying three generations of hopeful passengers with equal legitimate claims to a better climate. It is a long journey. Let us not allow our only boat to go down. Final remarks The scenario in which the overshoot generation will have to live is not an encouraging one, but it is even less inhospitable than the scenario that the post-overshoot generation will have to face if the goals of the Paris Agreement are not met. It is up to the current generation to make sure that the overshoot period is as short as possible, and that the overshoot generation will not only be in a position to adapt to unprecedented climate scenarios in the history of human civilization, but also fulfil hopes of the post-overshoot generation. Figures Figure 1: Pathways compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018, 62). FIGURE01  Figure 2: Pathways that would limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018, 160).   Acknowledgements Marcelo de Araujo thanks Prof. Darrel Moellendorf for the invitation and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the financial support. Support for this research has also been provided by the CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FAPERJ (Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation). An earlier draft of this article was presented at the University of Graz, Austria, Section for Moral and Political Philosophy, in 2024, with thanks to Prof. Lukas Meyer for the invitation. Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade benefited from financial supported provided by CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development). References Dessler, Andrew Emory. 2016. Introduction to Modern Climate Change. Second edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Gardiner, Stephen. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gatti, Luciana V., Luana S. Basso, John B. Miller, Manuel Gloor, Lucas Gatti Domingues, Henrique L. G. Cassol, Graciela Tejada, et al. 2021. ‘Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change’. Nature 595 (7867): 388–93. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03629-6. Geden, Oliver, and Andreas Löschel. 2017. ‘Define Limits for Temperature Overshoot Targets’. Nature Geoscience 10 (12): 881–82. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-017-0026-z. Graham, Kennedy. 2008. ‘“Survival Research” and the “Planetary Interest”: Carrying Forward the Thoughts of John Herz’. International Relations 22 (4): 457–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808097311. Hardin, Garrett James. 1974a. ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor’ 8 (September):38–43. ———. 1974b. ‘Living on a Lifeboat’. BioScience 24 (10): 561–68. ———. 1977. The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Herz, John. 1976a. ‘Technology, Ethics, and International Relations’. Social Research 43 (1): 98–113. ———. 1976b. The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century. New York: D. McKay. ———. 2003. ‘On Human Survival: Reflections on Survival Research and Survival Policies’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 135–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310123. IPCC, ed. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. New York: Cambridge university press. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf. ———. 2018. ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’. Edited by V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, HO Pörtner, D Roberts, J Skea, PR Shukla, A Pirani, et al. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. ———, ed. 2023. ‘Annex I: Glossary’. In Climate Change 2022 – Mitigation of Climate Change, 1st ed., 1793–1820. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.020. Laszlo, Ervin, and Peter Seidel, eds. 2006. Global Survival: The Challenge and Its Implications for Thinking and Acting. 1st ed. Change the World. New York: SelectBooks. Meyer, Lukas. 2021. ‘Intergenerational Justice’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/justice-intergenerational/. Moellendorf, Darrel. 2022. Mobilizing Hope: Climate Change and Global Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Morgenthau, Hans. 1966. ‘Introduction’. In A Working Peace System, D. Mitrany, 7–11. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. ———. 1978. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf (Fifth Edition, Revised, 1978). Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Joeri Rogelj, Michiel Schaeffer, Tabea Lissner, Rachel Licker, Erich M. Fischer, Reto Knutti, Anders Levermann, Katja Frieler, and William Hare. 2016. ‘Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goal’. Nature Climate Change 6 (9): 827–35. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3096. Seidel, Peter. 2003. ‘“Survival Research:” A New Discipline Needed Now’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 129–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310134. Shue, Henry. 2017. ‘Climate Dreaming: Negative Emissions, Risk Transfer, and Irreversibility’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8 (2): 203–16. https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2017.02.02. Smith, Stephen, Oliver Geden, Gregory Nemet, Matthew Gidden, William Lamb, Carter Powis, Rob Bellamy, et al. 2023. ‘State of Carbon Dioxide Removal – 1st Edition’, January. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W3B4Z. Stevens, Tim. 2020. ‘Productive Pessimism: Rehabilitating John Herz’s Survival Research for the Anthropocene’. In Pessimism in International Relations: Provocations, Possibilities, Politics, edited by Tim Stevens and Nicholas Michelsen, 83–98. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. United Nations Economic and Social Council. 2023. ‘Committee for Development Policy Report on the Twenty-Fifth Session (20–24 February 2023)’. Supplement No. 13 E/2023/33. Official Records. New York: United Nations. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/088/80/pdf/n2308880.pdf. Vince, Gaia. 2022. Nomad Century: How Climate Migration Will Reshape Our World. First U.S. edition. New York: Flatiron Books. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-N

Energy & Economics
Mexican exports to the United States. Mexican goods

Faced with Trump’s tariffs − and crackdowns on migration and narcotrafficking − Mexico is weighing retaliatory options

by Scott Morgenstern

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has made clear his intent to supercharge his “America First” approach to foreign policy in his second term – and Mexico looks set to be at the tip of the spear. While many of Trump’s predecessors have also followed a “realist” strategy – that is, one where relative power is at the forefront of international relations, while diplomatic success is viewed through how it benefits one’s own nation – the incoming president has displayed an apparent unwillingness to consider the pain that his plans would inflict on targeted countries or the responses this will engender. Trump’s proposed policies threaten Mexico in three key ways: First, his goal of deporting millions of migrants would put tremendous pressure on Mexico’s economy and society as the country tried to absorb the influx. This would be exacerbated by his second threat, a sharp increase in tariffs, which could devastate the critical export sector of Mexico’s economy. And third, Trump has floated the idea of using U.S. military power to confront narcotraffickers within Mexico, which would directly impinge on Mexico’s sovereignty and could generate more violence on both sides of the border. But as a scholar of Latin American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations, I see several options that Mexico could use to push back on Trump by imposing high costs on U.S. interests. Indeed, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already signaled how she may counter Trump’s policies. The most obvious tools are ending cooperation on drugs and immigration and imposing tariffs of her own. She could also revoke some of the decades-old tax and labor privileges that have benefited U.S. businesses operating within Mexico. And finally, she could play the “China card” – that is, in the face of worsening U.S.-Mexico ties, Mexico could turn to Washington’s biggest economic rival at a time when Beijing is seeking to assert more influence across Latin America. From conciliation to confrontration Of course, a worsening relationship is not inevitable. During Trump’s first term, Mexico’s then-president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, maintained a constructive relationship with the U.S. administration. In fact, Lopez Obrador was surprisingly cooperative given Trump’s at times hostile rhetoric toward Mexico. For example, he helped facilitate the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico” program for those seeking asylum in the U.S. and also accepted Trump’s demands to renegotiate NAFTA and give it a title reflecting U.S. leadership: the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. Sheinbaum, who took office on Oct. 1, 2024, started with a cautious approach to her relationship with Trump. She congratulated Trump on his victory and urged dialogue with the incoming U.S. president. “There will be good relations with the United States. I’m convinced of that,” she told reporters on Nov. 7, 2024. But Trump hasn’t been conciliatory. In addition to talk about dumping millions of immigrants across the border, he announced on social media on Nov. 24 that he would impose a 25% tariff on Mexican and Canadian goods – a move that would effectively abrogate the USMCA. That post seemingly ended Sheinbaum’s cautious approach. In a strongly worded response, the Mexican president cautioned that she would respond in kind. A trade war, she noted, would harm the economies of both countries; progress on immigration and drug trafficking required cooperation, not threats, she added. The impact of tariffs Sheinbaum has said she wants to avoid a trade war, but Trump’s threats have led her nonetheless to talk about how a trade war would begin. This trade war, plus other costs Sheinbaum could impose on U.S. investors, would also likely foment a coalition of opposition within the U.S. business community – a group that has been a key ally of Trump. Trump’s stated goal of putting high tariffs on goods coming from Mexico is to encourage businesses that currently exploit lower employment costs in Mexico to relocate to the northern side of the border. But that approach ignores the impact that retaliatory tariffs and investment controls would have on U.S.-based companies that rely on the Mexican market. It would have several negative effects. First, a tit-for-tat tariff war would generate inflation for U.S. and Mexican consumers. Second, it would disrupt the integration of markets across North America. As a result of the elimination of tariffs – a key component of both NAFTA and the Trump-era USMCA – markets and the production of goods across North America have become highly interconnected. The trade treaties severely reduced barriers to investment in Mexico, allowing significant American investment in sectors such as agriculture and energy – where U.S. companies were formerly prohibited. Further, manufacturers now rely on processes in which, for example, the average car crosses the border multiple times during production. Similarly, agribusiness has developed symbiotic practices, such that grains, apples and pears are predominantly grown in the United States, while tomatoes, strawberries and avocados are grown in Mexico. Given these processes, the U.S. now exports over US$300 billion of goods and services per year to Mexico, and the stock of U.S. investments in Mexico reached $144 billion in 2023. If Trump abrogates the trade deals and imposes tariffs, he might convince investors to spend their next dollars in the U.S. But if Mexico imposes tariffs, business taxes or investment restrictions, what would happen to investors’ farms and factories already in Mexico? Past experience suggests that any disruption to supply chains or U.S. export markets would awaken strong business opposition, as analysts and business groups have already recognized. Trump is not immune to pressure from U.S. businesses. During his first administration, companies successfully opposed Trump’s attempt to close the border, arguing that slowing the flow of immigrants also meant slowing trucks full of goods. Security and immigration On the issue of the border and immigration, while Trump has issued threats, Sheinbaum has stressed the importance of cooperation. Currently, the Mexican government expends significant resources to patrol its own southern border, not to mention dealing with the many potential migrants who gather in its northern cities. Mexico could demand more support from the U.S. in exchange for this work, plus the costs associated with welcoming back the estimated 4 million Mexicans who are currently in the U.S. without proper documentation. The deportation of undocumented immigrants that Trump has repeatedly promised will require other types of cooperation, such as processing border crossings, and Mexico could slow-walk this process. Mexico has already signaled that it will withhold processing of non-Mexicans. The two countries have a history of collaboration in addressing the illegal drugs trade – but here too there have also been tensions. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, for example, a Mexican general was arrested in the U.S. on drug charges. After a diplomatic uproar, he was returned to Mexico and released. In late November, Sheinbaum noted that she and Trump had discussed security cooperation “within the framework of our sovereignty.” But Trump’s campaign rheotric seemed less concerned with Mexico’s sovereignty, floating the idea of sending troops to the border or even deploying them within Mexico to counter narcotraffickers. That would clearly enrage Mexico, with consequences that would extend far beyond a willingness to cooperate on the issues of drug trafficking. A chance for China? One country that stands to benefit should U.S.-Mexican relations deteriorate is China – an issue that Mexico could exploit. China is now the first or second trading partner with nearly every country in Latin America, including Mexico. The value of U.S.-Mexico trade is over $100 billion a year, but the growth of Chinese imports into Mexico has been limited somewhat by rules-of-origin provisions in NAFTA and the USMCA. A U.S.-Mexican trade war could weaken or end any incentive to keep Chinese goods out. Further, if the doors to the United States are narrowed through tariffs and hostile rhetoric, China’s car parts and financial services would clearly become even more attractive to Mexican businesses. A U.S.-Mexican trade war, in short, would augment Beijing’s access to a market on the U.S. border. A coalition of the concerned? In sum, if Trump goes through with his threats, the result will be costs to consumers and businesses, plus a new opportunity for China. This is likely to foment a coalition of industries, investors, consumers and foreign policy experts concerned with China – many parts of which supported Trump’s campaign.

Diplomacy
New Zealand parliament

New Zealand Strengthens Relations with Australia

by Vladimir Terekhov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.

Diplomacy
Paper ship with flags of the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, the EU and China Concept of state relations, free trade agreement

China's Role in the Gaza Conflict: Global South Leadership and U.S. Rivalry

by Nadia Helmy

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском  Through its recent official and popular position towards the Gaza war, China seeks to define its position as a leader and defender of the so-called “global south” to pass the policy of transformation towards a multipolar international world in the face of the United States of America and its allies in the West. China seizes the opportunity to express the urgent need to reshape the global system led by the West under the leadership of Washington. Here, both Moscow and Beijing see Israel's war on the Gaza Strip as having led to directing Western military support efforts from Ukraine in the face of Russia, Beijing's close ally, to Israel, while China views the war from the perspective of its confrontation with America. As China attempts to express global and popular public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as part of a much broader Chinese strategy aimed at winning the support of the countries of the Global South to its side.    Both Russia and China are working to benefit from the war in Gaza, by strengthening their roles as supporters of the countries of the Global South, and demonstrating the failure and bias of the United States and the international system led by Washington in dealing with the grievances of that large bloc of countries in the world in the South. This also serves to realize Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of Chinese leadership of the Global South, which includes the majority of Arab countries and Palestine, which enhances Beijing’s efforts to confront Washington and its Western allies and reshape the international system in its favor. China has exploited anti-Israel sentiments globally and at home, in an attempt to strengthen its position within the framework of the Global South.  In its strenuous efforts to express world public opinion and the feelings of peoples, China is pursuing many and varied plans to support the issues of the developing global south, most notably the Palestinian cause, and to expose what China considers to be American double standards in dealing with the Palestinians compared to Israel.    China's assumption of the presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2023 comes immediately after Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” or the Gaza War in October 2023, succeeding Brazil, coinciding with the escalation of brutal Israeli military operations in Gaza. For this reason, China has risked angering Israel, as it sees broader stakes in the current conflict that go beyond the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Beijing sees the crisis as an opportunity to distinguish its position from the pro-Israel West and to enhance its reputation in the global south, many of whose countries strongly sympathize with the Palestinian cause, which serves China's image.  To this end, China has used a tough diplomatic rhetoric against Israeli crimes in the Gaza Strip, and has condemned the US position, especially the obstacles created by the US by voting against a series of Chinese and Russian ceasefire resolutions in the UN Security Council. In addition, China has supported various decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to condemn Israel and arrest its Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu”.  China used its veto power against a draft resolution proposed by the United States of America on October 15, 2023, which did not include a call for an immediate ceasefire, or a permanent humanitarian truce for the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, "Chang Jun”  justified his country's opposition to the American draft resolution, because it includes many elements that divide rather than unite, and goes beyond the humanitarian dimension, and is unbalanced and mixes right and wrong, and does not reflect a strong call for a ceasefire and an end to the violence. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations “Jun” considered that the ceasefire is not just a diplomatic phrase, but means life and death for many civilians, which Washington did not understand, according to him. China also participated in the (Cairo Peace Summit 2023), which was held on October 21, 2023 in the New Administrative Capital, with China's call during the summit to stop the war in Gaza.  China's motivation for taking an interest in the Palestinian issue after the recent Gaza war may be more related to its competition with the United States and the image that China wants to project domestically and even internationally in light of its new position as a major global power. China wants to be seen as a wise and responsible superpower interested in mediation and peacebuilding. It is also likely that Beijing seeks to present an alternative viewpoint to the United States' perspective on peace to the world order, especially in the global South, where most countries in the region support the Palestinians.   Beijing has already come a long way in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from its active support for Palestinian factions recently to their invitation to China after the recent Gaza war to complete the Palestinian reconciliation process between all the warring Palestinian factions with Chinese support.  Since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, Chinese positions and statements by officials in Beijing have carried a degree of escalation in tone towards Israel’s behavior. Beijing criticized the comprehensive Israeli bombing of civilians, condemned violations of international law, called for the implementation of the two-state solution, and called for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to allow aid to enter the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” went further, describing the Israeli bombing of civilians in Gaza as actions that go beyond the scope of self-defense.  Chinese state media have also been highly critical of Israel, and in most of their reports have cited Iranian media, with the Chinese emphasis that: “the illegal use of white phosphorus bombs by the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians exposes it to international accountability”. Chinese state media have also blamed the United States, Israel’s strongest supporter, and have been explicitly accused in Beijing, for fueling tensions in the region. China has also angered Israel by refusing to join the United States and other countries in designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, describing it instead as a Palestinian resistance movement.    In late October 2024, immediately after the Gaza war, the China Daily, a Chinese propaganda outlet, declared that: “the United States is on the wrong side of history in Gaza”. Elsewhere, Chinese state television reported that Jews represent 3 percent of the United States’ population but control more than 70 percent of its wealth. With all official and popular Chinese media keen to repeat the narratives that dominate the popular discourse in the Global South. This repetition is in line with the majority opinion in some countries of the South, and it allows China to present itself as an alternative to the image of the United States of America as a warmonger, hegemonic, hypocritical and unjust.         In July 2024, Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian factions signed a preliminary agreement in the Chinese capital, Beijing, to form a transitional government for national reconciliation, with the aim of managing Gaza after the end of the war. The same group met in the Russian capital, Moscow, in February 2024, seeking to reach a similar agreement. At the same time, China was able to bring the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas movements together at the negotiating table in Beijing in two sessions of the National Dialogue during the months of April and June 2024, in a move that reflects China’s desire to interact with the Palestinian issue in a positive way.        Chinese official media is trying to support its position before Chinese public opinion at home and their sympathy for the people of Gaza, by emphasizing China's official discourse, which seeks to confirm that Beijing has made proposals to stop the war on Gaza, brought together the Palestinian movements Hamas and Fatah inside China, and called on the UN Security Council to calm the conflict. China also seized the opportunity of its meetings with Arab and Gulf foreign ministers to reaffirm the multiple peace plans it had previously proposed in favor of resolving the Palestinian issue. With the Chinese envoy to the Middle East “Zhai Jun” , confirming, with Palestinian and Arab officials, China's immediate call for an immediate ceasefire and providing humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.   As for the most prominent Chinese academic and research analyses of the Gaza war, Chinese Professor “Yan Shutong”, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at China's Xinhua University, described the matter as: “The Israel-Gaza war will reduce the global political influence of the United States. This has become very clear, because even its allies will have to distance themselves from it on this issue, and with the undermining of the United States' strategic relations with other major powers, the strategic balance between China and the United States will shift in China's favor”. Professor “Wang Yiwei”, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, also said: “China is now in a better position than the United States to help resolve conflicts, whether between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Russia and Ukraine, or Israel and the Palestinians”.  In this context, Professor Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, asserts that: “Beijing’s policy in the Middle East has been paralyzed by the conflict, given that the United States, which strongly supports Israel, is involved in this crisis, whether directly or indirectly. Who would listen to China?”. A report by the (international human rights organization Freedom House) described a wave of anti-Semitic sentiments on the Chinese Internet and Chinese media, especially popular ones related to Chinese social media, such as: the widely-used Chinese WeChat program, Weibo, QQ, and others. The Freedom House report confirmed that: “With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Chinese government has long promoted a narrative that places the blame squarely on Israel”. In light of the growing global and internal Chinese popular sympathy for the Palestinians, and the unprecedented spread of its manifestations within Chinese society via Chinese social media, and the holding of limited demonstrations in light of China’s sensitive internal policy towards popular demonstrations, decision-makers in Beijing find themselves facing a challenge to maintain a balanced position between the crimes committed by Israel against civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the position of the Palestinians in the Strip.   As an expert in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party in China, and constantly informed of all reports of Chinese think tanks and research centers, especially those related to the Middle East, it is noted that a number of Chinese analyses adopt a trend, vision, and perhaps another theory or school for the war in Gaza, namely the “theory of war between wars”, which later became clear to a large extent to be correct, meaning: that the war that was limited to the Palestinian Hamas movement and Israel, and Israel's practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will expand to include a conflict between Israel and Iran, but through its agents in the region, which means waging wars on different fronts at the same time, namely the war of Israel against Hamas, targeting Palestinian resistance elements in the West Bank, confronting Hezbollah on the southern Lebanese front, confronting the threats of the Houthi militia in Yemen, fighting the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and waging confrontations against Iran, which leads the axis of resistance.    To this end, China seized the opportunity of the 10th China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to be held on May 30, 2024, with the participation of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” and a number of Arab leaders, most notably Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”, to reflect the common desire to discuss aspects of China-Arab relations and ways to enhance them, deepen consensus between China and Arab countries, raise questions about the position of Gaza in China-Arab discussions, the limits of China's role in helping to stop the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and support the return to the path of political settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, leading to the two-state solution supported by major powers, most notably China.  Here, the Arab Summit, which was held in the Bahraini capital, Manama, on May 16, 2024, adopted the necessity of calling for an international peace conference that would contribute to restoring the negotiating track. This call intersects with the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call to hold an international peace conference during the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum, where he stressed in his speech before the forum on May 30, 2024, that Beijing wants to strengthen its relations with Arab countries to be a model for global stability, calling for an international peace conference aimed at ending the war between Israel and Hamas, noting that Beijing is ready to work with Arab countries to resolve issues related to hot spots in ways that support the principles of fairness and justice and achieve peace and stability in the long term. Xi Jinping stressed that war cannot continue indefinitely, justice cannot remain absent forever, and the two-state solution cannot be arbitrarily overthrown.     Based on the previous analysis, we reach the conclusion that the Chinese trend towards interacting with the Middle East issues and the recent Gaza war represents one of the pillars of the escalation of the Chinese role at the global level and among the developing countries of the Global South led by China. This trend coincided with the vision of the United States of America to limit its ties to the interactions of the Middle East, due to its high cost and to move eastward to confront the growing Chinese influence in Asia.