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I. Introduction In late December 2025, mass protests erupted across Iran, driven by public anger over the deepening economic crisis. Initially led by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Tehran, the demonstrations quickly spread to universities and major cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad, becoming the largest unrest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Over time, the movement expanded beyond economic demands to include calls for freedom and, in some cases, the overthrow of the regime. Protesters chanted anti-government slogans such as “Death to the Dictator”. [1] In response, since late December 2025 Iranian state security forces have engaged in massacres of dissidents. The Iranian government has also cut off internet access and telephone services in an attempt to prevent protesters from organizing. The Iranian government has accused the United States and Israel of fueling the protests, which analysts suggest may be a tactic to increase security forces’ willingness to kill protesters. A Sunday Times report, based on information from doctors in Iran, said more than 16,500 people were killed and more than 330,000 injured during the unrest. The Interior Ministry in Iran verified 3,117 people had been killed in protests. [2] The Iranian protests, the largest in the Islamic republic’s 46-year history, appear to have subsided for now in the face of a violent government crackdown. US President Donald Trump has threatened to “hit very hard” if the situation in Iran escalates, reigniting concerns about possible American intervention in the region. Even Trump called Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “sick man” in an interview with Politico on January 17th, 2026, and said, “It’s time to look for new leadership in Iran.” It appeared to be the first time Trump had called for the end of Khamenei’s rule in Iran. [3] Despite having repeatedly threatened to attack Iran if the regime were to start killing protesters, Trump has held off on any immediate military action against the Islamic Republic. While the US reportedly sent the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the Middle East on January 15th, 2026, President Trump has not specified what he might do. However, on January 28th, 2026, Trump posted on social media: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran... It is a larger fleet, headed by the great Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln, than that sent to Venezuela. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.” Saying that time is running out, Trump demanded that Iran immediately negotiate a nuclear deal. He also suggested his country’s next attack on Iran could be worse than last year’s. However, US allies in the Gulf are known to oppose such US attacks on Iran. On January 14th, 2026, the New York Times’s headline “Trump’s Gulf allies don’t want him to bomb Iran” caught people’s attention. Earlier, The Wall Street Journal also reported the previous day that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are lobbying the Trump administration against attacking Iran. Those Sunni Muslim countries have long felt threatened by Shiite Iran. Particularly, Saudi Arabia is the leading country of Sunni Islam and has long competed with Iran, the leading nation of Shia Islam, for regional dominance in the Middle East. Then a question arises: Why Sunni Arab countries, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? This paper deals with this puzzle. It first explains the relationship between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and then examines why Suni Arab countries are against US military strikes on Shiite Iran. II. The relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law. Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Islam’s dominant sect of Sunni majority, As Figure 1 shows, the Sunni majority, which approximately make up 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates. Figure 1: Branches of Islam (source: CFR) Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist”, a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between religious scholarship and political leadership. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini claimed that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams. [4] Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but they did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions. The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is largely defined by geopolitical rivalry and sectarian competition, primarily between Iran and Saudi Arabia, playing out in proxy conflicts (Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq) and political influence, fueled by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and historical Sunni-Shia Islamic differences. This rivalry exploits religious narratives to gain regional hegemony, supporting opposing sides in regional conflicts and influencing domestic politics in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles, particularly in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Saudi Arabia closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia minority, and deployed its military forces, along with other Gulf countries, to suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. It also assembled a coalition of ten Sunni countries, backed by the US, to fight Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. The war, fought mostly from the air, has exacted a high civilian toll. Saudi Arabia had provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in Syria, while Iran had allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop up Shia Assad government in Syria and had trained and equipped Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight in Syria. [5] The relationship between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries is summarized as follows: A. Key players of Shia and Sunni Muslim world are as follows :  Iran (Shia): As a Shia-majority theocracy, Iran seeks regional influence.  Saudi Arabia (Sunni): As a key US ally and the leading Sunni nation, Saudi Arabia promotes Wahhabism.  Other Sunni nations: Egypt, UAE, and Jordan generally align with Saudi Arabia against Iran. B. Key drivers of tensions between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries are below:  Geopolitical struggle for dominance: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for leadership in the Middle East, seeing the other as a main threat.  Religious divide (Sunni vs Shia): Iran’s Shia theocracy challenges Sunni-led countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world.  The Iranian Revolution in 1979: The Iranian revolution created a revolutionary Shia nation, alarming conservative Sunni monarchies and intensifying regional power struggles. C. The rivalry is expressed as follows:  Proxy wars: Iran supports Shia military groups (e.g., Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon), while Saudi Arabia backs Sunni factions and governments, leading to conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.  Sectarian polarization: Both Iran and Saudi Arabia use sectarian narratives to mobilize support, while Saudi Arabia marginalizes Shia minorities in Sunni countries and exacerbates internal conflicts.  Regional alliances: Sunni countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, facing a mutual threat from Iran, have increasingly normalized ties with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords for regional security. III. Why Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran? Sunni Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, oppose US military strikes against Iran due to fear of potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption, regional instability, and concerns about expanding Israeli influence. Despite geopolitical rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries, these Sunni countries prioritize national security, avoiding a full-scale conflict that could devastate the Gulf region. 1. The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout & disruption. A. Fear of Retaliation Sunni-majority nations fear that if the US attacks Iran, Iran will retaliate against them, damaging critical oil infrastructure and causing economic devastation. The Gulf states’ primary short-term concern is a potential Iranian retaliation targeting strategic infrastructure on their territory, including symbols of governance, oil and gas production facilities, desalination plants, and military bases, in particular those hosting US forces. Another major concern is Iranian action to disrupt shipping lines near the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately a quarter of global oil and gas traffic passes. [6] In addition, any harm to Iran would also affect the economies of the Gulf states that maintain trade relations with it, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Iran’s principal trading partner in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Qatar in June 2025 was a reminder of the vulnerability of infrastructure in the Gulf, even though Iran reportedly provided advance warning. Indeed, reports indicated that Iran conveyed messages to its Gulf neighbors urging them to persuade the US to refrain from attacking Iran, while warning that such an attack would trigger retaliation against military bases on their territory. Moreover, Iran could also activate its regional proxies - by putting pressure on the Houthis not only to target Israel but also to renew disruptions to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and potentially even carry out strikes on the Gulf states themselves. [7] Unlike Israel, the Gulf states are geographically very close to Iran and have more limited military capabilities. Most of their population, economy, and infrastructure are concentrated along narrow coastal strips exposed to the Gulf shoreline. They experienced firsthand Iran’s drone and missile attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in 2019 and learn a simple lesson: Even a “limited” Iranian attack can be devastating. In line with this threat perception, several Gulf states reportedly are acting to prevent a US military strike on Iran through mediation and facilitation. [8] The Gulf states oppose a US strike on Iran not because they believe such a move is unjustified in principle but rather because they are convinced that they would bear the immediate cost. Their opposition may also reflect the concern that the attack plans would not, in their view, produce the desired results. Accordingly, behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar and Oman, has led quiet efforts to persuade the US to avoid military intervention, warning that regime collapse or military escalation would shake oil markets and endanger their stability. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman have focused on preventing the use of escalatory rhetoric and military steps that could lead to miscalculation and escalation. Strikes against the Gulf states using drones, missiles, maritime sabotage, or regional proxies are readily available and familiar options for Iran. For the Gulf states, an Iran-US confrontation constitutes a direct threat to their internal, economic, and security stability. Mediation, therefore, is a defensive tool from their perspective - an attempt to keep the battlefield away from Gulf territory, even if this does not resolve the root causes of the confrontation. It is also possible that reports about efforts to prevent a US strike are intended to allow time to improve defensive preparedness with US assistance, particularly against missile attacks. In any case, the image of the Gulf states as opposing a strike against Iran and seeking to prevent it serves their interest in reducing tensions between themselves and Iran. B. Economic fallout & disruption A violent confrontation between Iran and the Gulf states could prompt serious economic consequences. “If Iran decides to block trade routes, for example, this would have a significant effect on the economies of the Gulf states,” Pauline Raabe from the Middle East Minds think tank in Berlin said. [9] Iran could block passage in the Persian Gulf by closing the Strait of Hormuz. “We have already seen what this means to international shipping when the Houthi rebels, a proxy group of Iran, fired on vessels in the Red Sea,” she explained, referring to the attacks on shipping in what the Houthis claimed was in support of Hamas in Gaza. Such a development in the Persian Gulf would, of course, have enormous economic consequences “first for the Arab countries, but then for the global economy as a whole,” Raabe said. An economic shock wave with catastrophic global implications would have immediate impacts on the temporary or prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with global energy markets suffering the most from such repercussions, triggering a significant disruption in international gas and oil supplies worldwide. The economic damage would be especially significant for regional economies. As Figure 2 shows, the Gulf countries, whose economies heavily depend on gas and oil exports, would experience an immediate and significant decline in their main sources of income. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Saudi Arabia earned $237 billion in oil export revenue, while Iraq earned $110 billion, and the United Arab Emirates $98 billion. Figure 2: Net Oil Export Revenues 2024 Widespread economic contraction and hardship, severe budget deficits, and currency devaluations would be some of the immediate consequences of these revenue declines, potentially triggering widespread political and social instability. Ironically, Iran, the country most likely to consider such a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would also suffer severe economic repercussions. As Figure 2 shows, in 2024, Iran earned $51 billion in oil export revenue. Its oil revenues, which are vital and driving forces for its fragile and struggling economy, would be halted, and its ability to import necessary goods, such as food and refined petroleum products, would be significantly restricted, thereby causing further instability for its regime. The top priority for the Arab Gulf states, without a doubt, is the uninterrupted export of their oil without the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Data from Kpler and Vortexa show that in recent months, Iran has accumulated about 166 million barrels of floating storage near Chinese waters. Even if Iran’s oil loadings were disrupted for a while, this stockpile could sustain sales to China for three to four months. By contrast, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or any attack on tankers in the Persian Gulf would be extremely damaging for Arab producers, particularly because Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even with alternative pipelines, can protect only about half of their export volumes, while Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain have no alternative export routes. Eckart Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs in Hamburg, also notes that the Gulf nations are keen to avoid any disruptions as they are currently focused on their economic transformation processes. “Saudi Arabia wants to reposition itself economically with its ‘Vision 2030’ and any unrest would be a major hindrance,” he told DW, a German television network. This also applies to more traditional industries, such as the extraction of natural resources, especially oil. “Any uncertainty is detrimental to these industries, as they depend on trust and functioning supply chains. Both are prerequisites for the economy in the Gulf states,” Woertz said. [10] 2. The second reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. A. Regional instability and insecurity: There is a strong preference for diplomatic solutions to avoid a chaotic, uncontrollable conflict that could engulf the entire Middle East. Just as an Iranian strike against targets in the Gulf states constitutes a tangible threat, the Gulf states also fear that a US campaign in Iran could precipitate a rapid collapse of the regime in Tehran. They do not view the swift fall of the Islamic Republic as a desirable outcome as it could trigger widespread instability, including succession struggles within Iran, the disintegration of governing institutions, the empowerment of extremist actors, potential waves of refugees, and, above all, the loss of a clear address for crisis management. Dr Karim Emile Bitar, a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po Paris noted that the Saudi leadership is particularly apprehensive about chaos and fragmentation in Iran, whether from a sudden collapse of the Iranian Islamic Republic or US-led war-induced regime change. Officials in Saudi Arabia are especially concerned about domestic security, including the potential for unrest among Shia communities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. “Any escalation might empower radical groups, embolden opposition movements throughout the region, and exacerbate sectarian polarization,” added Dr Bitar. [11] Such turmoil also raises the specter of separatist movements in Iran’s peripheral areas that are home to the country’s minority ethnic groups with their own histories of secessionist drives, such as ethnic Arabs, Kurds, or Baluch people. Such developments would pose acute security risks for countries like Pakistan and Turkey. From this perspective, the danger lies not only in Iran’s internal fragmentation but in the wider regional contagion that would follow. In turn, the Gulf states have a vested interest in maintaining stability in the region even though authoritarian structures continue. Woertz, director of the German Institute of International and Security Affairs, argues that “the leaders of the Gulf states apparently prefer to rely on the familiar old regime rather than getting involved with a new, potentially unknown faction,” although they still have strong reservations about the Iranian regime. [12] In simple words, most regional actors approach the prospect of escalation through a lens of risk aversion rather than ideological alignment. The prevailing judgment among leaders in most regional countries is that escalation is strategically irrational, while maintaining the status quo remains the least dangerous option. In recent years, the Gulf states have taken significant actions to improve relations with Iran as part of a policy of détente, which, in their view, has proven effective. “They don’t want to jeopardize that.” Woertz notes. From their perspective, “the devil they know” is preferable to the instability that could spill over into the Gulf, generate waves of refugees, and disrupt trade. The Arab Spring may also serve as a reference point, demonstrating that regime collapse does not necessarily bring clarity and stability but rather prolonged instability. [13] Iran is a known actor; its red lines, internal constraints, and regional patterns of behavior are familiar. By contrast, a post-Islamic Republic Iran-especially one emerging from a protest movement that is not monolithic-could be much less predictable. Moreover, the monarchies in the Gulf states fear a “contagion effect,” namely the possibility that the collapse of the Iranian regime and the emergence of a democratic-liberal political system in its place would inspire waves of protest in the region (as could have happened following the 2009 protests in Iran and the subsequent development of the Arab Spring). Finally, the collapse of the Iranian regime could also lead to a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power and a significant strengthening of Israel. Iranian hostility toward Israel, even at the rhetorical level, helps preserve a familiar equilibrium in the region. 3. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about expanding Israeli influence: If Iran collapses or weakens, US-backed Israel’s influence in the Middle East could rapidly increase, posing a threat to Arab countries in the region. Arab governments that once tolerated the idea of US-led regime change in Iran now urge restraint, recognizing that Israeli expansionism has become the region’s main threat. Only a few years ago, many Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf, may have viewed a US attack on Iran for regime change favorably. For decades, they regarded Iran with deep suspicion, often treating it as the region’s main threat. But now, as US President Donald Trump reportedly mulls exactly such an attack, Arab leaders, including Gulf rulers long at odds with Iran, are lobbying the US administration not to carry out military strikes on Iran. Even Gulf governments that have engaged in indirect conflict with Iran — such as Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia — do not support US military action there, according to analysts who study the region. That is partly because the monarchies of the Gulf worry that the ripple effects of escalating US-Iran tensions, or possible state failure in Iran, would harm their own security, undermining their reputation as regional safe havens for business and tourism. But it is also because some Gulf governments have come to see Israel, Iran’s archenemy, as a belligerent state seeking to dominate the Middle East. They believe that Israel could pose a greater threat to regional stability than an already weakened Iran does. In the wake of 7 October 2023 when the Hamas attacked Israel, Arab states have increasingly regarded Israel, not Iran, as the foremost threat to regional stability. “Ever since the US essentially lifted all restraints on Israel during the Biden administration, regional players have started to see Israel’s aggressive foreign policy as a direct and unmanageable threat. Israel has bombed seven countries in the region since 7 October 2023,” Dr Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told TNA. “Bombing Iran goes against the calculus and interests of the Arab Gulf States,” said Bader al-Saif, a history professor at Kuwait University. “Neutralizing the current regime, whether through regime change or internal leadership reconfiguration, can potentially translate into the unparalleled hegemony of Israel, which won’t serve the Gulf States.” Yasmine Farouk, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula project director at the International Crisis Group, argues that Gulf countries are worried about “the chaos that a regime change in Iran would cause in the region” and how Israel might use “that vacuum.” For 27 months since 7 October 2023, Arab leaders have watched Israel’s rampage throughout the region, in pursuit of its “Greater Israel” project, an expansionist biblical vision for territory spanning from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Nile River in Egypt. To this end, Israel has significantly expanded its illegal occupation of Arab lands. Not only has Israel carried out genocide in Gaza and indicated its plans to take the territory over, but it has also deepened its hold in the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon. Perhaps most alarming for Arab leaders, after months of Netanyahu openly declaring his expansionist ambitions, was Israel’s unprecedented assault on Qatar, a US ally, in September 2025. That escalation had been preceded only a few months earlier, in June 2025, by Israel convincing the US to bomb Iran in an assault aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities and ensuring Israel remains the region’s sole nuclear power. The Israeli strike rattled Gulf governments not only because many have been courted by Israel as potential allies (signing the Abraham Accords) in recent years, but also because they, like Israel, had long regarded the US as their main security guarantor. “If the alliance with the US does not protect you from what these countries see as Israel’s designs for regional hegemony, then you will need a new coalition to balance against Israel,” Yasmine Farouk added. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have moved in this direction. Soon after the Israeli attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, signed a security pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. Though Iran is not officially part of this coalition, it does serve as a buffer against Israel. Chaos in Iran - or a pro-Israeli puppet being installed in Iran - is seen as a very dangerous blow to the effort to balance against Israel’s increasingly aggressive regional posture.” In short, Israel’s aim of absolute regional hegemony has never been clearer, and a US strike on Iran would represent both an extension of Israeli aggression and an expansion of its regional power. This is the structural shift at the heart of Arab opposition to a potential US attack on Iran. Moreover, it is also worth noting that Arab countries have themselves moved diplomatically closer to Iran in recent years, in part because of Israeli aggression and expansionism. The Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023 and moved closer after Israel’s attack on Qatar in September 2025. Iran’s relationship with Egypt has also improved. Recent events, and in particular Israel’s unchecked aggression and territorial expansion, have forced a structural shift in how Arab states assess regional threats. Gone, at least for now, are the days when Saudi Arabia viewed Iran as its foremost enemy, when Qatar saw Saudi Arabia as its principal threat, or when Egypt treated Qatar as the chief source of regional instability. Increasingly, Arab regimes, with perhaps the exception of the UAE, now view Israel as the region’s most destabilizing force. Israeli expansionism, its willingness to strike across borders without regard for accepted international norms, and its open pursuit of regional hegemony have fundamentally changed how Arab leaders assess risk. IV. The positions of major Gulf countries on US attack on Iran In early 2026, the strategic landscape of the Middle East is shaped by a striking convergence: while many regional governments deeply distrust Iran’s intentions and regional behaviors, there is a near-universal assessment that a US military intervention would be profoundly destabilizing. Across the Gulf, the Levant, and Turkey, leaders increasingly see war with Iran not as a solution to regional insecurity, but as a catalyst for economic shock, domestic unrest, and long-term strategic degradation. [14] The specific reason why a specific country opposes US military attacks on Iran is as follows. 1. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s position reflects a decisive shift from confrontation toward risk management. Saudi Arabia has signaled a refusal to facilitate US strikes, including denying the use of its airspace, driven primarily by vulnerability rather than sympathy for Iran. Iran maintains the capability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and to target Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure — most notably Abqaiq, Khurais, and Ras Tanura — with missiles and drones, as demonstrated in 2019. Even limited retaliation would disrupt global energy markets and severely undermine ‘Vision 2030’, which depends on foreign investment, tourism, and the perception of internal stability. Saudi leadership also assesses that a regional war would divert financial and political capital from other priorities, including regional diplomacy and post-Gaza reconstruction efforts that Saudi Arabia increasingly frames as part of its leadership role rather than a purely humanitarian endeavor. 2. Qatar For Qatar, the risks are existential. Qatar shares the world’s largest natural gas field with Iran, making sustained stability in the Gulf essential to its economic model. Any conflict that disrupts production, shipping, or joint field management would directly threaten state revenues. Compounding this exposure is Qatar’s hosting of Al Udeid Air Base, which would almost certainly be viewed by Iran as a legitimate retaliation target. Qatari strategy has long relied on diplomatic mediation as a form of deterrence; a US intervention would collapse this posture and force Doha into a conflict it has consistently sought to avoid. 3. United Arab Emirates (UAE) The UAE maintains a public stance of strategic neutrality, but this reflects calculated self-interest rather than ambiguity. Abu Dhabi’s leadership is acutely aware that its global financial hub status, logistics networks, and tourism economy are predicated on regional calm. A conflict with Iran would endanger shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, threaten port infrastructure, and likely trigger capital flight from Dubai. Despite ongoing tensions with Iran and security coordination with Israel, Emirati planners judge that the economic costs of war would far exceed any prospective strategic benefit from weakening Iran. 4. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman The smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman view US intervention in Iran primarily through the lens of exposure. Kuwait faces strong parliamentary and public resistance to involvement in another regional conflict. Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet, recognizes that its territory would be among the first targets in any Iranian retaliation. Oman, which has long positioned itself as a neutral intermediary, sees military escalation as incompatible with its foreign policy identity and economic resilience. All three countries fear that war would inflame sectarian tensions, disrupt trade, and undermine already fragile domestic social contracts. 5. Egypt Egypt’s opposition is rooted in regime insecurity and economic fragility. The Suez Canal remains Egypt’s most critical source of foreign currency, and any regional conflict that disrupts Red Sea or Gulf shipping would have immediate fiscal consequences. Egyptian leaders also fear that war with Iran would energize domestic protest movements and Islamist networks, exploiting anti-US sentiment amid existing economic hardship. For Egypt, a US–Iran conflict represents a high-impact destabilizing event rather than a distant strategic concern. 6. Jordan Jordan’s position reflects chronic vulnerability. Jordan is already under severe economic strain and hosts a large refugee population relative to its size. Regional war could disrupt trade routes, risk spillover violence, and inflame public opposition to both Israel and the US. Jordanian authorities assess that even limited escalation could translate into disproportionate domestic instability, undermining the monarchy’s balancing act between internal legitimacy and external alignment. 7. Turkey Turkey’s concerns center on displacement and strategic autonomy. Turkey fears that conflict in Iran could generate large-scale refugee flows toward its eastern border, exacerbating domestic backlash against existing refugee populations. Turkey also relies on Iranian energy imports and has invested heavily in maintaining a flexible posture between Iran, NATO, and Russia. A US intervention would collapse this balancing strategy, impose economic costs, and complicate Ankara’s efforts to position itself as a regional diplomatic actor, including in post-Gaza reconstruction initiatives. 8. Israel Israel remains the sole regional actor publicly supportive of weakening or dismantling the Iranian regime. Privately, however, Israeli security assessments are more cautious. After prolonged military operations across multiple fronts, the Israeli Defense Force faces resource constraints, personnel fatigue, and growing concerns about air defense sustainability. Israeli planners increasingly judge that a US intervention would not be likely to produce rapid Iranian regime collapse and more likely to trigger a prolonged multi-front conflict involving Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other Iranian-aligned actors. There is also recognition that external attack could consolidate Iranian domestic support for the regime rather than fracture it. V. Conclusion This paper explained the relationships between Shiite Iran and Suni Arab countries and why those Sunni Muslim nations, which do not feel favorable toward Iran, oppose US military strikes against Iran. This paper explained that Sunni Muslim nations oppose US military strikes against Iran for three reasons: The first reason why Sunni Arab countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about potential retaliatory attacks on their own soil by Iran and economic fallout and disruption. The second reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about regional instability and insecurity caused by US military strikes. The third reason why Sunni countries oppose US military strikes on Iran is that they worry about the Israeli influence expansion. References [1] Barin, Mohsen (31 December 2025). "Iran's economic crisis, political discontent threaten regime". DW News. [2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-president-warns-us-attack-on-supreme-leader-would-mean-full-scale-war/ [3] https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/17/trump-to-politico-its-time-to-look-for-new-leadership-in-iran-00735528?_kx=LSFywwe4GSg_lcFWo5DyId8VKdphy2F0zhlZVneJnA97jKgVYFyty4cB80GJkTHR.U5D8ER&utm_id=01KF7GKF35MAAW8BRA143VFM9M&utm_medium=campaign&utm_source=Klaviyo [4] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources. [5] https://www.cfr.org/photo-essay/sunni-shia-divide#:~:text=Saudi%20Arabia%20has%20a%20sizable,to%20Saudi%20and%20Iranian%20sources [6] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [7] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [8] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [9] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [10] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-gulf-states-are-wary-of-a-strike-on-iran/a-75593784 [11] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [12] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-middle-east-fears-us-israel-attack-iran [13] https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gulf-iran-usa/ [14] https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/why-middle-eastern-states-oppose-us-military-inter vention-in-iran/

On January 25, 2011, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in mass demonstrations demanding freedom, social justice, and the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, who had held office since 1981. Just 18 days later, on February 11, 2011, newly appointed Vice President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Omar Suleiman announced on state television that Mubarak was stepping down as president and transferring power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to celebrate the victory of the revolution and the beginning of a new chapter in the country's history. However, within months, the general euphoria gave way to the realization that the "new republic" faced serious political and economic challenges. The dramatic events of early 2011 marked the beginning of a long, complex, and at times painful process, the consequences of which can still be seen today. As the fifteenth anniversary of the revolution approaches, Egypt has managed to maintain internal stability and demonstrate sustainable economic growth, but at the same time, the country faces several complex internal and external challenges in politics, economics, security, and other areas. From revolution to counterrevolution Having taken the reins of power in February 2011, the Military Council immediately declared itself no alternative to a civilian government, and by late June 2012, power was transferred to the first president elected since the revolution, Mohamed Morsi, a candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood*. Having received 51.73% of the vote in the second round of the presidential election, Morsi narrowly defeated the last Mubarak-era prime minister, Ahmed Shafik, and became the first president in modern Egypt without a military background. However, the now-deceased Morsi, who came to embody the rise and fall of political Islam in Egypt, was not destined to remain in power for long. Just a year later, on July 3, 2013, he was ousted by Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi amid mass demonstrations. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood* considered the incident a military coup, while el-Sisi, who later became president, repeatedly repeated that the army intervened only after mass demonstrations against Morsi. Morsi's ouster provoked diametrically opposed reactions among regional players. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE quickly became key external donors and allies of the new Egyptian authorities, relations with Qatar and Turkey (the main sponsors of Islamic political movements in the Middle East) deteriorated sharply. Relations with the United States, Egypt's key ally since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, also cooled somewhat. Following the dispersal of a Muslim Brotherhood* protest in Cairo in August 2013, then-US President Barack Obama canceled joint US-Egyptian military exercises, declaring that traditional cooperation could not continue as usual. The allocation of $1.3 billion in annual US military aid has repeatedly become a subject of political bargaining. Strengthening relations with Moscow Against this backdrop, Egypt has moved toward some rapprochement with Moscow. Since 2014, el-Sisi, first as Defense Minister and then as President, has made a series of visits to Russia, attending two celebrations marking the anniversaries of Victory over Nazi Germany in 2015 and 2025. Furthermore, el-Sisi participated in two Russia-Africa summits in Sochi in 2019 and St. Petersburg in 2023, and attended the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024. In December 2025, the second Russia-Africa ministerial conference was held in Cairo, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with whom el-Sisi met. However, relations with Russia were seriously tested by the terrorist attack on board a Kogalymavia (DBA Metrojet) Airbus A321 on October 31, 2015, en route from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg. As a result of the incident, Russia completely suspended direct air service to Egypt for several years, dealing a painful blow to the country's tourism sector. Meanwhile, Egyptian authorities steadfastly refused to classify the incident as a terrorist attack, hold those responsible for negligence accountable, or provide appropriate compensation to the families of the victims. Nevertheless, the positive dynamics in Russian-Egyptian relations have now been fully restored. According to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia (ATOR), Egypt has once again become one of the top five most popular foreign destinations for Russians, behind Turkey, China, and the UAE, having welcomed over 1.4 million Russian tourists in the first nine months of 2025, a 36.8% increase compared to the same period in 2024. By effectively exporting Egyptian services to the Russian market, tourism offsets the imbalance in the two countries' trade balance, which traditionally skews heavily in Russia's favor. Furthermore, Russia contributes to the food security of Egypt, the world's largest wheat importer, accounting for over 60% of its total imports. Egypt, in turn, is also actively increasing its agricultural exports to Russia — oranges, mangoes, and other Egyptian origin agricultural products are increasingly found on the shelves of Russian retail chains. The flagship project of Russian-Egyptian cooperation is, without a doubt, the construction of the first nuclear power plant, El Dabaa, in the Matrouh Governorate on the Mediterranean Sea, which is being carried out by the Russian state corporation Rosatom. In terms of scale, this project is often compared to the Aswan High Dam, built with Soviet support in the 1960s. Relations with external players Gradually, el-Sisi succeeded in restoring allied relations with the United States. "My favorite dictator," Trump described el-Sisi during his first term. Following the summit in the Saudi city of al-Ula in early 2021, which marked the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, Cairo followed its Arabian partners in quickly restoring relations with Doha. In November 2022, photos of a meeting between el-Sisi, Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup in Doha circulated around the Arab world. This trilateral meeting marked the starting point for the normalization of relations between Cairo and Ankara. Regarding relations with Israel, el-Sisi continued the unpopular rapprochement, openly praising the success of the Egyptian-Israeli peace model. EgyptAir's national carrier began flying to Tel Aviv under its official livery, rather than under the brand of its subsidiary Air Sinai, as it had previously. However, the national carrier's direct flights to Israel were suspended in October 2023 amid the escalation between Israel and the Palestinian movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the energy sector, Egypt is actively purchasing natural gas from Israel's Leviathan field offshore the Mediterranean. Consolidation of power by al-Sisi In terms of domestic policy, el-Sisi has managed to significantly consolidate power in recent years. In 2019, Egypt held a referendum on constitutional amendments allowing el-Sisi to remain in power until 2030. el-Sisi has positioned himself as a leader who successfully confronts domestic and external challenges. Under his leadership, major national projects have been implemented, including the expansion of the Suez Canal, the construction of a new administrative capital, and the country's first nuclear power plant. Following the purge of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, Egyptian authorities have moved to tighten control over the most influential media outlets. Recent years have seen the rise of the media holding company United Media Services, which is believed to be affiliated with the General Intelligence Service. Founded in 2016, the company has now grown into one of the largest media giants in the Arab world, encompassing over 40 subsidiaries, including approximately 15 television channels. Economic challenges Post-revolutionary Egypt faced several economic challenges amid political instability and a deteriorating security situation. To secure new IMF loan tranches, el-Sisi implemented a series of unpopular measures that Mubarak had resisted, including a gradual increase in fuel and electricity prices. In 2024, a decision was made to quadruple the price of even subsidized bread, a staple food for the poor. Given the importance of subsidized flatbread in the diet of the poor, Egyptian authorities had resisted raising the price for three decades, which stood at just five piastres (about 0.1 cents at the current exchange rate). However, even constant IMF tranches and financial assistance from the Gulf monarchies failed to help Egypt avoid a deep economic crisis amid declining tourism revenues, a population explosion, and a high degree of dependence on external factors. Following the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, the economic situation was exacerbated by regular shelling of ships in the Red Sea by Yemeni Houthis, which led to a more than halving of Suez Canal revenues. According to Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati, Egypt's total losses from shelling of ships in the Red Sea as of October 2025 amounted to $9 billion. Amid constant political and economic turmoil, the Egyptian pound was gradually devalued from 5.6 pounds per dollar in 2010 to 47 pounds per dollar by early 2026. At its peak, the US currency exceeded 50 pounds per dollar. The discovery of new large gas fields (particularly the Zohr field offshore the Mediterranean) allowed Egypt to increase its liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to 3.5 million tons by 2019. However, amid a population explosion and growing local consumption, this positive effect quickly faded, and by 2023, Egypt had abandoned gas exports during the peak summer season and transitioned to a model that combines exports and imports depending on seasonality. In advance of peak consumption during the hot summer season, in early 2026, Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase 24 LNG cargoes from Qatar. Despite significant challenges, a significant influx of investment from Gulf countries (particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia) is helping to keep the Egyptian economy afloat. Qatar has also steadily increased investment in the Egyptian economy in recent years. The main sources of income for the Egyptian economy are exports, tourism, the Suez Canal, and remittances from Egyptians abroad. According to the World Bank, Egypt consistently ranks among the top ten countries in the world by this last indicator. And according to the Central Bank of Egypt, in the first 11 months of 2025, Egyptians transferred $37.5 billion to their homeland, a 42.5% increase compared to the same period in 2024. According to the World Bank, Egypt has demonstrated steady economic growth year after year, measured by nominal GDP, which amounted to approximately $389 billion by the end of 2024. The country consistently ranks among the fifty largest economies in the world. Based on GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), the picture looks even more optimistic — Egypt is among the world's twenty largest economies. However, constant natural population growth negates the potential positive impact of economic growth on well-being. Per capita GDP by the end of 2024 was only approximately $3,300 (158th place in the world). Social inequality remains a separate and acute socioeconomic challenge for Egypt. According to official data, 29% of Egyptians live below the poverty line. Meanwhile, according to the international consulting firm Henley & Partners, Egypt is home to 14,800 dollar millionaires, 49 individuals with a net worth exceeding $100 million, and 7 billionaires. Given the discrepancy between macroeconomic indicators and per capita well-being, demographics pose a distinct challenge for Egypt. Thus, Egypt's population grew from 91 million in 2011 to 118 million in 2025 (13th in the world and first among Arab countries), posing a serious challenge to social infrastructure, healthcare, education, and the labor market. However, according to the Ministry of Health, a slight slowdown in population growth and a decline in the fertility rate from 3.5 children per woman in 2014 to 2.41 in 2024 are expected recently. External challenges In terms of security, Egypt remains hostage to a number of destabilizing external factors, such as hotbeds of tension along virtually its entire border amid the de facto split of Libya and Sudan, as well as dubious prospects for sustainable peace in the Gaza Strip. In developing its foreign policy stance in the region, Egypt is forced to perform diplomatic feats, balancing its own interests with the often-conflicting interests of key partners in the Gulf and the United States. However, it should be acknowledged that Trump's ceasefire initiative in Gaza allowed Cairo to strengthen its status as a key mediator in the Middle East at the Sharm El Sheikh Peace Summit last November, where Trump, el-Sisi, Al Thani, and Erdogan signed a peace agreement on the Gaza Strip. A separate and serious external challenge for Egypt remains the Blue Nile Renaissance Dam, commissioned by Ethiopia, which threatens to deplete the country's water resources. However, abundant rainfall in Africa in recent years has mitigated this issue and even led to floods in Sudan in 2025. *** The main outcome of the 15 years since the Egyptian revolution of 2011 is the restoration of a political system in which the army and security forces act as the de facto guarantors of statehood. Egypt has demonstrated a high level of political resilience compared to other countries engulfed by the events of the Arab Spring, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In the economic and security spheres, Egypt remains vulnerable to external factors that directly impact Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and foreign investment. Despite steady nominal GDP growth, the past 15 years have not led to an improvement in the overall well-being of the population. However, Egypt has succeeded in developing infrastructure and new cities, as well as in implementing major national projects such as the new administrative capital and the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant, which could become drivers of economic growth and further development in the medium term. The declining birth rate creates the preconditions for eliminating the imbalance in the ratio of the working-age to non-working-age population, which will also contribute to balanced growth in the long term. In the absence of major internal and external shocks, Egypt can be expected to enter a trajectory of sustainable growth and consolidate its status as a key political and economic player in the region. * The organization was recognized as terrorist in Russia by a decision of the Supreme Court.

Upon gaining independence from British colonial rule on 26 June 1960, Somaliland received full recognition from 35 states, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council. On 1 July 1960, it merged with Italian Somalia. After a decade-long armed struggle, Somaliland withdrew from the union and unilaterally restored its sovereignty. Following the dissolution of Somalia’s central state in early 1991, all communities in Somaliland voluntarily entered negotiations, ceased hostilities, and ultimately forged an inclusive democratic state. Between 1991 and 1997, seven major peace conferences were held across Somaliland. All key decisions, except for the selection of the president, were reached by consensus. Somaliland’s peace and state-building trajectory was entirely locally driven, with no external involvement in the political process. By contrast, Somalia became an UN-led experiment in Post-Cold War peace and state-building. Despite – or perhaps because of – the extensive external intervention that shaped Somalia’s externally driven process, repeated efforts to construct a viable and legitimate state have failed. The first municipal elections since the 1960s were held in Mogadishu earlier this year. Even these were highly contested, confined to the capital, and boycotted by the opposition. In contrast, since 2001 Somaliland has conducted four free and fair multiparty general elections, characterized by peaceful transfers of power. In early 2024, a memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia was announced, granting the latter access to the Red Sea in return for formal recognition of the former. Reigniting hopes for recognition, prominent Republicans have expressed support for Somaliland. Notably, on 14 August, U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz released a press brief urging President Trump to recognize Somaliland. For Cruz, recognizing Somaliland – a close ally of Taiwan – is vital to counter China’s influence. On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announcing that Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords. While the specific details of the deal between Israel and Somaliland remain unclear, it is unlikely that Israel’s actions are driven by a desire to reward Somaliland’s democratic record. More plausibly, Israel is motivated by concrete geostrategic interests, such as securing a foothold in Somaliland from which it could counter the threat posed by the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen. Israel’s move also fits a broader trend in which global and regional powers prioritize security competition and project influence beyond their borders. Somaliland sits in the Horn of Africa, boasts an 800-kilometer coastline, and possesses proven oil reserves and deposits of rare minerals. Although Somalia has condemned Israel’s move as a violation of sovereignty and international law, it has itself entered an oil and gas exploration agreement with Turkey and hosts a major Turkish base. According to sources in Somaliland, additional countries are expected to follow Israel in formally recognizing Somaliland. Although the United States has yet to issue a definitive statement, U.S. military and diplomatic delegations are currently in Somaliland, and Washington has long shown interest in establishing a base in the port city of Berbera. Some commentators argue that recognizing Somaliland could destabilize the Horn of Africa, undermine counterterrorism efforts, and encourage separatist movements across the continent, rather than positively contributing to Somaliland’s development and stability. These claims, however, do not withstand scrutiny. Numerous Muslim and Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, have developed strong economic and diplomatic ties with Israel without experiencing a surge in extremism. The absence of terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab and ISIS in Somaliland is principally due to the presence of a functioning state. Al-Shabab continues to control large portions of southern Somalia, making it imprudent for Mogadishu to sever ties with the United States in retaliation for recognizing Somaliland or for supporting Israel’s move. In reality, there is little Mogadishu can do beyond issuing condemnations. The claim that recognizing Somaliland would embolden secessionist movements across Africa overlooks the fact that Somaliland enjoyed de jure recognition of sovereignty prior to merging with Somalia. Recognizing Somaliland is therefore a restoration of the borders established during colonial rule, making Somaliland a unique legal case. Commentators have asserted that China has previously sought to destabilize Somaliland due to its pro-Western and pro-Taiwan strategic orientation. Meanwhile, Egypt, Turkey, and Djibouti have voiced strong support for Somalia, condemning Israel’s move. Djibouti, which controls a near monopoly on the import and export trade for over a hundred million landlocked Ethiopians through its ports, faces a strategic challenge from a recognized Somaliland. Additionally, Djibouti wields considerable influence in Somaliland’s far western region, home to the Issa sub-group, which also dominates the political landscape in Djibouti. In sum, Israel’s move to spearhead the re-recognition of Somaliland is a watershed moment that marks a potential point of no return in Somaliland’s quest for de jure sovereignty. However, Somaliland faces both immediate and long-term challenges that will be critical to how its recognition efforts unfold. In the short term, it must carefully balance the pursuit of diplomatic recognition with deterring hostile external meddling. In the long term, it will face the consequences of having alienated China and the potential Security Council and recognition roadblocks this may signal.

The Israel-Hamas War has calmed down. The events that preceded it – including the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack against Israel and the taking of Israeli and other hostages – and that resulted from it will be remembered for decades to come, especially the dead and wounded, the trauma and pain, the destruction of dreams and property. If there is any lesson to be learnt, it is that better ways must be found to resolve conflict. There is deep concern now that the West Bank is increasingly reaching a critical point. The weak governing structure of the Palestinian Authority, the contraction of the Palestinian economy, settler violence, and much more are causing serious distress and instability. What is preventing conditions from spiraling out of control are Israel’s strict security measures and Palestinian fear that the West Bank will turn into Gaza, even though both regions are different. Years of diplomatic inertia have been counterproductive. The status quo is untenable. Much is at stake and indecision is costly for all concerned. Why continued conflict? Israelis and Palestinians have become victims of their own exclusive national narratives and are speaking past each other. Many on each side are unable to go beyond their zero-sum mentality. They selectively highlight the rightness of their own cause, accuse the other side of bad intentions or misconduct, and fail to realize how their own rhetoric and acts cause aggravating conditions. While the obstacles in the way of progress to peace are numerous and real – power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians, one state reality with Israel dominant over the Palestinians, hardening of attitudes in Israel and Palestine, relative weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps, Israeli settler radicalization, Palestinian anti-normalization stance, terrorism – these must not delay or prevent the search for opportunities and positive outcomes. In this regard, simple facts present themselves. First, Israelis and Palestinians are neighbors forever. Their present and future are intertwined whether they choose this reality or not. Second, the longer Israelis and Palestinians wait to negotiate, the more complicated the issues become and the less room there will be for an agreeable peaceful solution. Third, the core issues that separate Israelis and Palestinians – borders, the separation wall, security, Israeli settlements, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, water – are well-known, thoroughly debated, and resolvable. The challenge is to initiate negotiations and negotiate in good faith. Fourth, Israelis and Palestinians have proved to be both incapable and unwilling to restart negotiations on their own. The United States thus must go beyond managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to taking the lead to resolve it. It is indispensable for the promotion and sustenance of peace negotiations, as was recently shown in the diplomatic intervention to stop the Israel-Hamas War. Fifth, the inclusion of regional and international actors becomes key as peace requires assurances, follow-up, and support to take root and grow. As Gershon Baskin argues, “Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and confidence require external mechanisms to verify implementation of the agreements, to ensure compliance, and to offer external dispute resolution” (Baskin, 2025). The prerequisites for peacemaking (e.g., context and timing, leadership and political will, societal strength and resilience, process, and content and creativity) are known (Kurtzer, 2020). US diplomacy must be credible, intentional, sustained, and transformative. This comprises not only making peace a priority, but also acting accordingly. The situation on the ground must change. A realistic plan and process of peacemaking must be prioritized. Israelis and Palestinians must be held accountable for their actions and inactions. The vital policies of Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords (especially United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) and others that mediated (that is, United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey) or attended the Gaza “peace conference” in October 2025 should impel them to motivate Palestinians to make hard decisions to end conflict and reach a peaceful settlement. Israel needs to reciprocate. Circumventing the Palestinian issue or wishing it away will not advance Israel’s strategic goals, especially in the long run. Initiating unilateral moves and thinking of the Palestinian issue as a security matter only without addressing its political and territorial dimensions will not enhance Israel’s defense. If anything, they will continue to rile the Palestinians, particularly the youth among them. The two-state solution, the official United States policy since 2002, has become increasingly less viable. This is at a time when 157 out of 193 Member States of the United Nations have already recognized the State of Palestine. On July 28-30, 2025, a High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution was held at the United Nations. The conference, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, committed “not only to reaffirm international consensus on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine but [also] to catalyze concrete, timebound and coordinated international action toward the implementation of the two-state solution” (United Nations, 2025a). Follow-up work took place on September 22, and the commitment was made to continue the implementation of the conference’s outcomes. The US’s plan (Trump, 2025) to demilitarize the Gaza Strip and to reconstruct it for the benefit of its inhabitants is a good start, and the plan’s “Phase 2” was even endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17, 2025 (United Nations, 2025b). However, resolving all aspects of the Gaza issue will take years. Meantime, it is essential for the US to take a leading role in endorsing again the two-state solution, as it is in the best national interest of Israel, Palestine, and the US. Moreover, the US can facilitate the solution by urging Israel and the Palestinians to seriously consider the idea of confederation, which adjusts or introduces important modifications to the two-state solution. While there have been more than a dozen confederation models over the years – with some specific only to Israel and Palestine and others that encompass Jordan as well – a main goal of confederation, according to the proponents of the Holy Land Confederation (me included), is not to totally separate the Palestinians from the Israelis living in the Holy Land, i.e., “divorce,” but to empower them to “cohabitate” in the two respective sovereign states (Holy Land Confederation, 2025). This cohabitation would allow for greater cooperation and movement between them. “If properly implemented, confederation would enable Palestinians to advance their search for freedom, independence, and statehood without being anti-Israel, and it would enable Israelis to have their security and wellbeing without being anti-Palestinian” (Beilin and Sarsar, 2022). The Gaza crisis must be solved. However, the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian relations must be broken as well. If past negotiations are any indication, there is middle ground between the positions of Israel and Palestine. The US possesses the vital capabilities to move both parties to take the necessary political risks by compromising and engaging in unavoidable tradeoffs on the path to peace. References - Baskin, Gershon. (2025) “Monitoring agreements and verifying implementation.” October 18, https://gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/monitoring-agreements-and-verifying. - Beilin, Yossi and Sarsar, Saliba. (2022) “Israeli-Palestinian confederation is a way forward for peace.” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696830. - Holy Land Confederation. (2025) “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution.” Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_hlc. - Kurtzer, Daniel C. (2020) “The Ingredients of Palestinian-Israeli Peacemaking.” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring): 5-16. - Trump, Donald J. [@RapidResponse47]. (2025, September 29). “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.” X. https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1972726021196562494. - United Nations. (2025a) “High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution,” July 28-30, https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025/. - United Nations. (2025b) United Nations Security Council, November 17, https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2803(2025).

As international order evolves in the 21st century, strategic competition is increasingly shaped by technological frontiers and emerging domains of power. Unlike the unipolar moment following the Cold War, the contemporary landscape is defined by multipolarity, where major powers vie for influence across space, cyberspace, and biotechnology. Outer space has emerged not only as a frontier for exploration but also as a potential arena for resource acquisition and military projection, raising novel challenges for international law, security policy and cooperative governance. Examining interstellar phenomena in this context underscores the importance of preparedness, coordination, and risk management, even without assuming the presence of extraterrestrial intelligence, yet acknowledging the unprecedented nature of events that are pushing the boundaries of human observation. Humanity is gradually entering an era in which technological progress is reshaping our conception of cosmic exploration. As advancements in rocket propulsion, materials science, and observational astronomy accelerate, the prospect of humanity departing Earth towards other worlds becomes less a distant dream and more an inevitable chapter in our long-term evolution. The future of our species increasingly appears to be tied to the potential terraforming of new planets and celestial bodies, alongside the development of aerospace technologies capable of carrying us deeper into the cosmos. Within this transformative horizon, the Fermi paradox or the Dark Forest theory gains renewed relevance, challenging humanity to consider the existential filters that civilizations must surpass to survive, expand and potentially encounter other life forms. Yet, while such milestone may unfold centuries from now, the foundations of that future are being laid in the present. In the 21st century, specifically by the year 2026, humanity will become more capable of observing its immediate cosmic neighborhood. Modern telescopes and space-based observatories allow us to detect objects that for centuries have likely passed through our solar system unnoticed. Only within the brief span of our scientific maturation have we acquired the tools to identify interstellar objects, bodies originating beyond the solar system whose physical properties and trajectories challenge our existing frameworks. These objects, often catalogued as cometary in nature, possess characteristics that warrant careful study. Their unusual shapes, compositions, and velocities offer insights into environments beyond our interstellar cradle and, in some cases, raise questions about their natural origin or even the possibility of artificial extraterrestrial technology. As our detection capabilities improve, the arrival of each interstellar visitor represents not only a scientific opportunity but also a critical data point for understanding planetary security and defense. Consequently, their study urges nations to evolve towards a more serious and coordinated international framework capable of addressing the strategic, scientific, and existential implications of interstellar encounters. The emergence and Relevance of Interstellar Objects The scientific understanding of interstellar objects (ISOs) has evolved rapidly in recent years, propelled by technological advances and the unexpected discovery of bodies crossing the solar system on hyperbolic trajectories. Before 2017, the existence of such objects was largely theoretical, supported by models of planetary formation and stellar dynamics that predicted the ejection of debris during the early stages of planetary system evolution. These models implied that the Milky Way should contain vast populations of wandering fragments- comets, asteroids, and potentially more complex bodies such as extraterrestrial debris moving freely through interstellar space. Yet observational confirmation remained unattainable due to instrumental limitations. This changed with the detection of the first confirmed interstellar object, 1/Oumuamua, whose physical properties departed radically from known solar system bodies. Its non-gravitational acceleration, lack of a visible coma, and elongated shape challenged established models of cometary activity and asteroidal composition (Meech et al, 2017). The subsequent discovery of 2I/Borisov, a more conventionally cometary object, confirmed that the solar system is indeed exposed to material originating from other stellar environments (Jewitt & Luu, 2019). The contrast between both objects highlighted a key insight: ISOs are highly diverse, and their properties may reveal mechanisms and materials absent from our own planetary system. Advances in wide-field surveys, high-resolution instrumentation, and automated sky- monitoring systems have significantly expanded humanity´s capacity to detect and track ISOs. The increasing sensitivity of these tools marks a transition toward a new observational era in which interstellar detections may become more frequent. As a result, we are now able to observe the behavior of bodies entirely foreign to the solar system-objects whose trajectories, compositions, and signatures often defy established expectations and expose gaps in existing theoretical frameworks. This expanding observational capability not only advances scientific knowledge but also underscores the urgency of early warning detection. Because ISOs are typically identified within narrow observational windows, delayed characterization can lead to the loss of critical scientific and strategic information. Consequently, the growing presence of ISOs calls for enhanced global coordination, standardized protocols, and a more serious international approach to monitoring and interpreting near-Earth interstellar encounters. The Impact and Arrival of 3I/ATLAS The discovery of 3I/ATLAS, the third confirmed interstellar object entering our solar system, marks a significant milestone in modern astronomy. Unlike 1/Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov, whose observational windows were limited and partially constrained, 3I/ATLAS has provided a comparatively longer period for systematic study. Its hyperbolic trajectory, unusual photometric behavior, and non-standard luminosity variations have made it an object of exceptional scientific interest. While early observations suggest that while 3I/ATLAS shares key characteristics with known cometary bodies, its behavior reinforces broader findings that interstellar objects often display physical and dynamical properties that do not fit neatly within exiting taxonomies of solar system objects (Jewitt, 2023). The media response to 3I/ATLAS has been unprecedented. As with Oumuamua, the object rapidly became the subject of public fascination, sensational claims, and speculative narratives. News outlets, online forums, and social media ecosystems proliferated interpretations ranging from exotic physics to extraterrestrial probes. While much of this discourse lacks grounding in empirical evidence, its widespread circulation reflects a broader sociological trend: interstellar phenomena increasingly operate not only as a scientific event but also as catalysts for public, imagination, cultural anxiety, and geopolitical attention. As Kaku (2020) notes, humanity approaches a technological threshold where cosmic discovery intersects directly with public consciousness, provoking both curiosity and apprehension. From a scientific standpoint, researchers such as Loeb (2021) have emphasized that anomalous behavior in interstellar visitors should not be dismissed lightly. Although 3I/ATLAS currently appears consistent with a natural origin, its unique features-and the difficulty in categorizing ISOs-underscore the need for serious, methodical investigation. Loeb argues that humanity must abandon its complacency regarding the unknown nature of interstellar technologies or civilizations and instead adopt a posture of preparedness, open inquiry, and systematic risk assessment. In his view, phenomena like 3I/ATLAS are reminders that humanity is not isolated, and that contact-whether intentional or incidental—with non-human intelligence represents a real possibility with profound implications. The arrival of 3I/ATLAS has also highlighted the potential consequences of extraterrestrial technological encounters. Even in the absence of direct evidence of artificial origin, the mere ambiguity of such objects can trigger global destabilization through speculation, misinformation, or geopolitical competition. Historical examples such as the economic collapses of 1929 and 2008, the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global tensions surrounding major wars demonstrate how uncertainty-especially when amplified by media-can generate widespread instability. In this context, an interstellar object exhibiting unexplained characteristics could easily become a flashpoint for international tension, economic turbulence, or strategic miscalculation. Thus, beyond its scientific significance, 3I/ATLAS has brought renewed attention to the vulnerabilities and responsibilities of a species becoming increasingly aware of its cosmic environment. The object serves as a practical reminder that humanity must develop not only more advanced observational systems but also coordinated international frameworks for managing unexpected astronomical events. As we confront the possibility of encountering technologies or life beyond Earth, the world must adopt a more mature, structured approach to detection, interpretation, and global communication. This moment sets the stage for next critical dimension of the discussion, the implications of interstellar objects for planetary security and defense, and the urgent need to assess humanity’s readiness for cosmic contingencies. Toward a Multiplanetary Security Architecture Planetary security has grown increasingly complex as scientific capabilities expand toward detecting and characterizing interstellar objects whose origins and physical attributes lie beyond conventional astrophysical categories. Within the United Nations framework, existing mechanisms-such as COPUOS, the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN), and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) provide the foundational structure for global coordination on natural impact hazards (UN COPUOS, 2014). However, these institutions were established under assumptions limited to solar system derived natural threats, leaving them poorly equipped to address unknown interstellar phenomena. The Outer Space Treaty and subsequent conventions introduced broad principles on cooperation and peaceful use, but no anticipated scenarios involving technologically anomalous interstellar objects or potential artificial extraterrestrial artifacts, resulting in a significant global governance vacuum. These mechanisms are designed primarily for probabilistic, natural impact scenarios, not for interstellar objects exhibiting anomalous trajectories, non-gravitational accelerations or uncertain technological signatures. Recognizing this gap, recent scientific proposals-most notably those advanced by Loeb (2023)-have called for the development of a dedicated international coordination mechanism under the United Nations system for the study and assessment of interstellar objects. Rather than proposing a fixed institutional blueprint, these contributions emphasize the need for a structured platform capable of integrating scientific analysis, risk assessment, and transparent diplomatic communication in cases involving anomalous interstellar phenomena. Such proposals should be understood not as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward as a definitive institutional prescription, but as forward-looking reference points for the type of governance architecture of international community must begin to contemplate. As humanity´s observational reach extends beyond the boundaries of the solar system; this governance gap becomes increasingly consequential. Interstellar objects introduce forms of uncertainty that existing planetary defense regimes-designed around predictable, solar system-derived threats were never Intended to manage, underscoring the need for flexible and adaptive legal frameworks capable of integrating scientific uncertainty into decision making processes. Within this emerging landscape, conceptual assessment tools have gained relevance as mechanisms to structure uncertainty rather than eliminate it. One illustrative example is the Interstellar Threat Assessment Scale (ITAS) proposed by Loeb (2024), which offers a simplified framework for evaluating interstellar detections based on observable characteristics rather than speculative intent. As its lower levels, the scale categorizes objects that behave consistently with natural interstellar debris, such as comet-like bodies exhibiting predictable physical and dynamic properties. Higher levels correspond to increasing degrees of anomaly-such as unexplained non-gravitational acceleration, unconventional trajectories, or geometries inconsistent with known natural formation processes. While the scale is not explicitly designed to identify extraterrestrial technology, it intentionally encompasses characteristics that fall outside established natural baselines. This design allows it to function across multiple scenarios, from rare or poorly understood natural phenomena to detections that may warrant closer scrutiny due to their atypical behavior. In this sense, the framework remains agnostic regarding origin, yet adaptable enough to support both conventional astrophysical analysis and precautionary assessments under conditions of elevated uncertainty. Importantly, it does not assert hostile intent or artificial origin, rather it operates as a risk-management tool that helps differentiate levels of scientific uncertainty and potential planetary relevance. Approached in this manner, such frameworks contribute to the evolution of international space governance by providing a shared analytical language for policymakers, scientific institutions, security agencies and statecraft-oriented decision-makers. By standardizing how uncertainty is assessed and communicated, they reduce fragmented national interpretations, limit reactive or militarized responses, and promote cooperative, evidence-based decisions. Decision-making under conditions of incomplete information. This process reflects a broader need for international space law to evolve dynamically. However, the governance of interstellar risk cannot rely solely on conceptual models or isolated scientific initiatives. It requires a genuinely planetary response that integrates the full spectrum of contemporary technological, institutional, and political capacities. International legislation governing outer space must be adaptive and evolutionary, capable of responding to emerging scientific realities. Artificial intelligence, real-time global surveillance networks, and autonomous detection algorithms must be incorporated into a unified planetary architecture capable of identifying and characterizing interstellar objects far earlier than current capabilities allow. Equally important is the sustained collaboration among major space agencies-including NASA, ESA, CNSA, ISRO, Roscosmos, and JAXA- alongside private actors such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and emerging aerospace enterprises, whose technological capabilities and rapid innovation cycles are increasingly central to space governance. Equally critical is great-power cooperation. From a realist perspective, the international system remains defined by competition, power asymmetries, and strategic mistrust. Yet planetary defense represents a rare domain in which shared existential vulnerability can partially override zero-sum logic. The detection of an anomalous interstellar object must never become a catalyst for geopolitical rivalry or strategic miscalculation, but rather an opportunity for transparent scientific collaborations and coordinated global response. In an international order strained by power competition, planetary security stands as one of the few areas where shared survival interests necessitate shared responsibility. Ultimately, interstellar objects compel humanity to transcend political fragmentation and adopt a forward- look global strategy. Building a resilient planetary security architecture requires the integration of scientific expertise, adaptive international governance, technological innovation, and coordinated commitment of state and private actor alike. Whether future interstellar encounters prove benign or reveal unprecedented anomalies, preparedness is not speculation, it is an essential step in the evolution of humanity´s role within the cosmos. References - Jewitt, D., & Seligman, D. Z. (2023). The interstellar interlopers. Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 61, 197–236. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-astro-071221-054221 - Jewitt, D., & Luu, J. (2019). Initial characterization of interstellar comet 2I/2019 Q4 (Borisov). The Astrophysical Journal Letters, 886(2), L29. https://doi.org/10.3847/2041-8213/ab530b - Kaku, M. (2018). The Future of Humanity: Terra­forming Mars, Interstellar Travel, Immortality, and Our Destiny Beyond Earth. Doubleday. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/555722/the-future-of-humanity-by-michio-kaku/ - Loeb, A. (2021). Extraterrestrial: The first sign of intelligent life beyond Earth. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. https://openlibrary.org/books/OL31850155M/Extraterrestrial?utm_source=chatgpt.com - Loeb, A. (2024). The interstellar threat assessment scale. Medium. https://avi-loeb.medium.com/ - Meech, K. J., et al. (2017). A brief visit from a red and extremely elongated interstellar asteroid. Nature, 552, 378–381. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25020 - United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS). (2014). Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its fifty-first session. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/stsc/2014/index.html

Fighters aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, raised their flags in the provinces of Hadramout and Marah in early December. The seizures mean the STC now controls all eight of the provinces that make up the south of the country. The new status quo looks like a fait accompli for the creation of a separate southern state. It has left Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), squeezed between a pole in the south and a state run by the Iran-backed Houthi militia in the north. The STC taps into memories of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen which, until 1990, gave southerners their own state. Yemen’s 1990 unification produced one flag, but many people in the south never felt they joined a shared political project. These grievances led to a brief civil war in 1994. This war ended with northern victory, purges of southern officers and civil servants, and what many in the south still describe as an occupation rather than integration. Yemen unified in 1990, with Sana'a as its capital. FANACK, CC BY-NC-ND By the mid-2000s, retired officers and dismissed civil servants in the south were marching for pensions and basic rights. Those protests turned into al-Hirak al-Janoubi, a loose southern movement running from reformists to hardline secessionists. And when the 2015 Saudi-led intervention began against the Houthis, which had seized the Yemeni capital of Sana'a the previous year, southern fighters were folded into a campaign to restore a “national” government that had never addressed their grievances. The STC was formed in 2017 to try and give this crowded field in the south a recognisable leadership. It has a formal president, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, and councils. But in practice it sits at the centre of a web of armed units, tribal groups and businessmen. Through sustained financial and material backing for the southern armed groups, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerged as the midwife of the organisation’s creation. Against the backdrop of widespread failed governance in Yemen, the STC project seems to deliver relatively well on security and public services. In April 2022, several years after the STC’s formation, the PLC was created to unite the forces fighting the Houthis. Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-based president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, resigned and handed his powers over to an eight-member body backed by Riyadh. The PLC was designed to bridge the various tribal, ideological and political divides in the country. It also aimed to create a platform to coordinate governance and statecraft with a view to engaging the Houthis through diplomacy. But as it mixes northern and southern leaders, including those from the STC, the PLC has never emerged as a viable hub to merge competing agendas. The inability of the PLC to deliver on its promise to consolidate governance across Yemen has incrementally eaten away at its legitimacy. A Gulf proxy war Yemen has turned into a quiet scorecard for two Gulf projects. Saudi Arabia intervened to defeat the Houthis, rescue a unified Yemeni state and secure its own borders. The UAE went in to secure reliable partners, access to ports and sea lanes and control of resources as part of its regional policy. A glimpse at a map of Yemen today shows it is the UAE whose vision seems to have been realised. Through the STC and a web of allied units, the UAE has helped stitch together a power base that runs across nearly all of former South Yemen. STC-aligned forces hold the city of Aden, sit on much of Yemen’s limited oil production and control long stretches of the Arabian and Red Sea coasts. Pink or blue shaded areas depict territory controlled by the PLC or allied forces, yellow or orange depict territory controlled by the STC or allied forces, green depicts areas controlled by the Houthis. NordNordWest / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA Key national infrastructure in southern Yemen is now guarded by men whose salaries, media platforms and external ties flow through Abu Dhabi. In return, the UAE enjoys a loyal surrogate on the Gulf of Aden and the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab strait. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has been left propping up a fragile PLC. The Houthis remain the nominal enemy for everyone. But, in reality, UAE-aligned units have poured more bandwidth into sidelining Saudi-backed rivals in southern Yemen than engaging the insurgent-turned-state in the north. The UAE now holds leverage over Yemen’s crown jewels in the south, while Saudi Arabia shoulders the burden of the narrative of a “united Yemen” with few dependable allies inside the country. Two-and-a-half Yemens For decades, neighbours Saudi Arabia and Oman as well as most foreign capitals have sworn by a single Yemeni state. The UAE-backed STC project cuts directly across that line, with an entrenched southern order making a formal split far more likely. If Yemen is carved in two, the Houthi structure in the north does not evaporate; it gains borders, time and eventually a stronger claim to recognition. That would cement a heavily armed ideological authority at the mouth of the Red Sea, tied to Tehran and Hezbollah and ruling over a population drained by war and economic collapse. Yet, confronted with the multilayered network created by Iran and the UAE in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has few cards to play. It may eventually be forced to concede to a UAE-backed government-in-waiting in the south while the north settles into Houthi rule and territory held by the PLC gets increasingly squeezed. Oman keeps arguing for a shared table that brings all parties – including the Houthis – into one system. But every new southern flag raised undercuts that goal. For outside powers, a southern client that keeps ports open and hunts Islamist militants is tempting. The price is to freeze northern Yemen as a grey zone: heavily armed, ideologically rigid and wired into regional confrontation. That outcome cuts against the very unity project Saudi Arabia and Oman have endorsed for years. What is left today are two-and-a-half Yemens – with the half, territory administered by the PLC, looking the least sustainable moving forward.

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. The War Zone (TWZ). https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-creates-new-military-branch-dedicated-to-drone-warfare Amazon. (2023). Prime Air: The Future of Drone Delivery. Amazon Corporate Publications. Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Age of Drones. Council on Foreign Relations. Deloitte. (2022). Drones in Industrial Operations: Transforming Asset Inspection and Performance. Deloitte Insights. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2023). Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System. U.S. Department of Transportation. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2025). Drones. https://www.faa.gov/uas Fischer, S. (2020). China’s Military–Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Washington. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kania, E. B. (2020). Learning Warfare from the Laboratory: China’s Progress in Military Innovation. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Kesteloo, H. (2025, September 29). Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). (2023). Autonomous Delivery Networks and Future Logistics. Wing Technical Publications. Zipline. (2022). Operational Impact of Automated Medical Delivery by Drone. Zipline International Case Studies.

Introduction Technological innovation is accelerating at an unprecedented pace, reshaping how societies generate energy, transport people and goods, produce food, fight disease, and explore space. Across multiple sectors, groundbreaking solutions are emerging in response to global challenges such as climate change, public health threats, energy insecurity, and resource scarcity. This article examines seven transformative technologies — from wireless electric-vehicle charging roads and regenerative ocean farming to graphene applications and disease-eliminating robots — each demonstrating how science and engineering are redefining sustainability, resilience, and human capability in the 21st century. 1. Wireless Electric Vehicles Charging Roads Electric Vehicles (EVs) have become key technology to decarbonise road transport, a sector that accounts for over 15% of global energy-related emissions. The increase of their sales globally exceeded 17 million in 2024, and it is forecasted to surpass the 20 million units by 2025. (IEA, 2025) Source: IEA analysis based on country submissions and data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO), EV Volumes and Marklines. Despite this growth, several concerns continue to slow down their widespread adoption. Limited charging infrastructure, battery-related autonomy issues, high purchase costs, slow charging times, and the environmental impact of the battery productions remain major obstacle. The broader EV industry, however, is actively developing new technologies to overcome these challenges. (Automotive Technology, 2025) In this context, one of the most pressing challenges is energy supply – specifically, the need for better batteries and more accessible charging points. To address this bottleneck, a promising new trend has emerged: wireless roads capable of charging EVs while they drive. This technology could fundamentally transform the charging experience and significantly reduce dependence on stationary chargers. The idea is simple, a system that supplies power to EVs while driving, using embedded inductive coils (wireless charging) or conductive rails on the road, in other words a dynamic or in-motion charging on the road. In fact, this technology already exists and there are several examples worth mentioning: - South Korea: introduced in 2013, the first road-powered electric vehicle network, in which electrical cables were buried below the surface and wirelessly transfer energy to the electric vehicles via magnetic resonance. An electrified road has the advantage of eliminating the plug-in infrastructure and vehicles usually require a smaller battery, reducing weight and energy consumption. In 2009, KAIST introduced the OLEV (online electric vehicle), a type of EV that uses wireless dynamic charging through inductive coils embedded in the road. The OLEV public transport buses were later used in the 2013 first electric road in the city of Gumi, which consisted of a network of 24 km, by 2015 the number of OLEV buses increased to 12 (Anthony, 2013) and another bus line was launched in Sejong that same year. (SKinno News, 2021)- Sweden: a 1.6 km road linking Stockholm Arlanda airport to a logistic site outside the capital city was a pilot project achieved in 2016. (The Guardian, 2018), (Carbonaro, 2022) However, the Swedish government didn’t stop there and by 2020 they built a wireless road for heavy trucks and buses in the island city of Visby, and they are planning to expand it to the 13-mile E20 highway – logistic hub between Hallsberg and Örebro – and even have a plan of further 3,000 km of electric roads in Sweden by 2035. (Min, 2023), (Dow, 203)- USA: a quarter mile (400 m) section of road through the Corktown area of Detroit was changed to a wireless electric road. Electreon was the company in charge of the project. (Paris, 2024), (6abc Philadelphia, 2025)- France, Norway and China: Electreon – a leading provider of wireless charging solutions for EVs – has partnered and gained projects for wireless highways in France – a section of the A10 highway (Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure, 2023) –, Norway – evaluation of wireless charging for AtB’s BRT routes in Trøndelag (Foster, Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway, 2023) – and China – not wireless but in an 1.8 km electrified highway in Zhuzhou. (Foster, China demonstrates electrified highway, 2023) While all these examples show a “tendency” to switch into wireless roads, it is important to highlight three points to keep that are decisive and have slowed down the transition: in first place, these wireless roads are being targeted mainly for freight trucks and buses, the second point is the initial cost of the infrastructure is high and third point is the technology that should be added to the EVs. 2. Fire Suppression Using Sound Waves Seth Robertson and Viet Tran, engineering students from George Mason University in Virginia designed a fire extinguisher that uses sound waves to put out flames. Their device emits low-frequency sound waves that disrupt the conditions necessary for a fire to sustain itself, meaning that no foam, powder, chemicals or water are needed to extinguish a fire, just sound. In order to understand how it can be possible to extinguish fire with sound it is necessary to remember that a fire needs heat, fuel and oxygen to survive, if one of these elements does not appears, there is no fire, under this principle, Robertson and Tran’s prototype uses sounds to separate the oxygen from the flame, as a result, the fire extinguish. The interesting part is that the sound must have the right frequency, specifically between 30 to 60 Hz – low frequency sounds. The sound waves will act as pressure waves moving the air molecules back and forth, and in the right frequency, the movement will disrupt the flames’ structure, separating the oxygen molecules and the fire will simply die out with the lack of these molecules. Potential applications include small kitchen fires or small fires, while unfortunately, large-scale structural or wildland fires still remain a challenge, mostly due to the environmental factors, like wind, air density and flame intensity, that can be a hurdle in uncontrolled environments. Moreover, the generation of low-frequency sound waves powerful enough to suppress fires requires a significant amount of energy. Nonetheless, an early prototype consists of an amplifier to generate low-frequency sound and a collimator to focus the sound waves directly on the fire, and as mentioned before, one limitation is that specialized equipment is required to produce the high-pressure sound waves. Still, research has been carried out recently and it is expected that this technology could be a non-destructive and less damaging method for firefighters soon. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM 3. Regenerative Ocean Farming Regenerative ocean farming is a climate-friendly model of aquaculture where seaweed and/or shellfish are grown in a way that requires no freshwater, feed or fertilizer, as the crops naturally filter nutrients from the water and capture carbon and nitrogen. This farming model can benefit coastal ecosystems and communities by increasing food security, creating jobs, improving water quality, protecting coastlines, supporting ocean justice (Urban Ocean Lab, 2023) and most importantly, mitigating climate change. Ocean farming can rely on a polyculture system – cultivate a mix of shellfish and seaweeds – or just a single species system. While the climate conditions determine the species to grow, it does not affect the system itself. The system follows a vertical layer farming way, in which farms use ropes that extend vertically from the surface to the seabed, in addition to the use of different levels and cages for scallops, oysters or clams, for example, as shown in Figure 2. Other species like kelp, abalone, purple sea urchins or sea cucumbers can also be harvested. Figure 2: Ocean farming diagram. Source: Urban Ocean Lab The big advantage is the maximization of the ocean space, producing more food in a smaller footprint, in addition to the use of the benefits of the species – seaweed and shellfishes – which are both natural filters that help to clean the water and absorb excess nutrients, combating ocean acidification and reducing marine pollution (Hassan, 2024) naturally. Moreover, the versatility of these species allows them to use them in other areas, such as biofuels, soil fertilizers, animal feed or cosmetics and not only for human food. Around the world, there are several projects that have adopted this methodology (Hassan, 2024): 1. GreenWave (USA): increased biodiversity by 50%, reduced nitrogen level in water by 20% and created sustainable job opportunities for locals.2. Ocean’s Halo (Ireland): annual harvest of 500 tons of kelp, creation of 20 jobs in rural areas and carbon footprint reduction by 30%3. Kitasaku Marine (Japan): Nori production increased by 25%, coastal water quality improved by 15% and local support of 50 locals.4. Catalina Sea Ranch (USA): harvested 1 million pounds of mussels annually, increased local biodiversity by 20% and created 10 new jobs.5. Blue Ventures (Madagascar): harvested 146 tonnes of red seaweed, plus they have created a sea cucumber market with a value of $18,000 and 700 farmers have been trained to farm in the ocean. (Blue Ventures Conservation, 2015)6. Havhøst (Ocean Harvest) (Denmark): they are growing seaweed, mussels and the European flat oyster in 30 communities along the Danish coast. In addition, they focus on educational activities to introduce ocean farming to more people. (Waycott, 2022) Overall ocean farming creates a positive environmental impact; it provides a sustainable food source and economic opportunities for the local people and the industry. Of course it faces challenges, but it has become a way to mitigate climate change and protect the ocean. 4. Wave Energy Generators There are two types of waves. Surface waves are generated by a combination of wind passing over the sea’s surface raising up water and gravity pulling it back down. In a technical way, warm air rises and expands, creating areas of low pressure compared to places with cooler air. Air then moves from high-pressure areas to low-pressure areas. This movement of air is wind and when it rushes across the surface of the Earth it creates waves in oceans. (Lumley, 2025) On the other hand, underwater waves are sound waves produced by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions; these waves travel by compressing and expanding the water. (Kadri, 2025) In both cases temperature variations and other factors can affect the nature of the waves. For instance, wave energy or wave power harnesses the ocean’s waves to generate energy by converting a wave’s kinetic energy into electricity. Wave power is a form of renewable and sustainable energy which has potential cost benefits over solar and wind but faces technological challenges limiting its large-scale adoption in electricity generation and water desalination. (Lumley, 2025) The nature of the waves makes wave energy the world’s largest source of energy with a potential of annual global production of 29,500 TWh, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012). In addition, it works well in tandem with other renewables such as wind. (Ocean Energy Europe, s.f.) In terms of technology itself, wave energy has relied on the next devices: 1. Point absorbers: floating buoys that capture the vertical movement of waves, which then is harnessed through a cable anchored to the seabed. The vertical movement of the waves is subsequently transformed into electricity via converters (alternators, generators or hydraulic systems). These are usually mounted on the seabed in shallower water and are connected to the floating buoys.2. Oscillating water columns (OWCs): a partially submerged, hollow structure connected to an air turbine through a chamber. These devices use the rise and fall of the waves to compress air, the air is forced to move back and forth in the chamber and creates a strong air flow that powers the turbine, generating electricity.3. Overtopping devices: a floating structure made of segments linked together, which lifts up and down with the waves. These devices harness wave energy by allowing waves to flow into a reservoir, which then releases the water through turbines to generate electricity. Design, flow dimensions, turbine efficiency and structural elements influence their efficiency. Source: BKV Energy Despite its huge potential and considering it as a clean energy source with no GHG emissions, the main concern related to wave energy is the marine life affectation – including habitat alteration, noise pollution or collision risks for marine life. On the other hand, high costs, complex design, maintenance and technological constraints also have become a problem, still, the potential of this continuous energy is huge compared to the more limited wind energy, for example. (Lumley, 2025) Despite all that, there are some active projects being developed in different parts of the world, for example: Azura Wave Power (tested in Hawaii), Anaconda WEC (UK’s prototype), CalWave (in California), CETO (tested in Australia and expected to be tested in Spain too), Crestwing (tested in Denmark), HiWave-5 (Swedish-based tested in Portugal), the Wave Energy Program (in India) or the Ocean Grazer WEC (developed in The Netherlands), among many others. (Wikipedia, 2019) 5. SpinLaunch SpinLaunch is a spaceflight technology development company working on mass accelerator technology to move payloads to space. This innovative space company is known for their Meridian Space and their Suborbital Accelerator. The Meridian Space is a low-cost, highly differentiated LEO satellite communications constellation which offers speed, reliability and flexibility (SpinLaunch, 2025). The company has partnered, and investments have been achieved in order to launch 280 satellites (Berger, 2025) as part of their satellite constellation, which will satisfy the needs in any area needed such as maritime, national security, communications, corporate networks, aviation, military, etc. The highlight of these satellites is their mass that is only 70 kg, and its facility to be launched in one or two rockets. On the other hand, SpinLaunch is aiming to build a kinetic launch system that uses centrifugal force instead of traditional rockets and spins a rocket around at speeds up to 4700 mph (7,500 km/h) before sending it upward toward space. At 60 km or so altitude, the rocket would ignite its engines to achieve orbital velocity. To achieve this, they have built a Suborbital Accelerator prototype, in Spaceport America, New Mexico. This prototype is a 33-meter vacuum chamber that can launch payloads from 800 to 5000 mph. Several tests have already been carried out, being the 10th the latest on September 27th, 2025. (Young, 2025) SpinLaunch hopes to have a 100-meter Orbital Lauch system by 2026. The engineering behind these systems is as follows: both systems are circular accelerators, powered by an electric drive that uses a mechanical arm to sling payloads around in circles to reach incredibly high speeds of up to 5,000 mph. They then release the payload through a launch tube and spaceward. (Young, 2025) The company claims that their method is cheaper as it eliminates 70% of the fuel compared to the traditional rocket launch, in addition, the infrastructure is less, and it is more environmentally friendly than the traditional methods. However, the limitations are seen in the payload weight (no more than 400 kg per payload) and their resistance (payloads must be able to withstand up to 10,000 G’s of force during the centrifugal acceleration process) Source: SpinLaunch. 6. Disease-Eliminating Robots “Disease-eliminating robots” encompass a diverse set of robotic and AI-driven systems designed to prevent, monitor, and treat infectious diseases while minimizing human exposure to risk. These technologies operate at multiple scales — from environmental disinfection in hospitals to microscopic interventions inside the human body. Environmental disinfection robots are among the most established applications. Devices such as Xenex and UVD Robots utilize pulsed ultraviolet (UV-C) light to destroy viral and bacterial DNA, effectively sterilizing hospital rooms within minutes (UVD Robots, 2023; Xenex, 2024). Others deploy vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) to disinfect enclosed environments like train carriages and operating rooms (WHO, 2022). These systems substantially reduce hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) and cross-contamination risks. In medical and clinical settings, robotics contribute to precision and safety. Surgical robots such as Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci and Ion platforms enable minimally invasive operations with reduced infection risk and faster recovery times (Intuitive Surgical, 2024). At the microscopic level, nanorobots are under development for targeted drug delivery, capable of navigating the bloodstream to deliver chemotherapy agents directly to tumor sites, thereby minimizing systemic side effects (Lee et al., 2023). Meanwhile, biofilm-removing microbots are being engineered to eradicate bacterial colonies on medical implants and dental surfaces (Kim et al., 2022). Automated systems are also emerging for precise injections, such as intravitreal therapies for ocular diseases, helping reduce clinician workload and human error (Zhou et al., 2024). Beyond clinical contexts, robots support public health surveillance and disease prevention. Prototypes like MIT’s “Luigi” sewage-sampling robot autonomously collect wastewater data to monitor community-level infections and anticipate outbreaks (MIT News, 2025). In precision agriculture, AI-guided robotic systems detect infected crops early, controlling plant disease spread and protecting global food security (FAO, 2023). Collectively, these robotic systems demonstrate the increasing convergence of automation, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence in safeguarding human and environmental health. By taking on tasks that are dangerous, repetitive, or biologically hazardous, disease-eliminating robots represent a pivotal advancement in the global strategy for infectious disease control and public health resilience. 7. Graphene Graphene is the world’s thinnest material, consisting in a single layer of carbon atoms arranged in a hexagonal honeycomb lattice. Despite its thinnest it is stronger than steel and diamond. In addition, graphene is flexible, transparent, conductive, light, selectively permeable and a 2D material. In summary it is a versatile material with many different applications and that has gained attention since its isolation in 2004 by Russian and Nobel prize scientists Andre Geim and Konstantin Nocoselov. (Larousserie, 2013) The characteristics of graphene make them an important player in the energy, construction, health and electronics sectors. In a deeper analysis, its high conductivity is valuable for battery life, autonomy and energy efficiency. Its lightness is suitable for manufacturing drone batteries, which reduce their weight, and the drone’s weight too. Graphene’s transparency and flexibility could be used in screen devices including cell phones, televisions or vehicles – Samsung already produced a flat screen with graphene electrodes. In addition, its high resistance and excellent heat and electric conductivity make them valuable for the light industry. Other sectors that are beneficial from graphene include the construction and manufacturing sector. For example, adding 1 g of graphene to 5 kg of cement increases the strength of the latter by 35%. Another example refers to Ford Motor Co., that is adding 0.5% of graphene to increase their plastic strength by 20%. (Wyss, 2022) Graphene has become a promising material, and it has been studied and tested to be used as a replacement or equivalent of silicon in microelectronics. It has been used in sports, like tennis rackets made by Head or in electric cars concepts like BASF and Daimler-Benz Smart Forvision. Bluestone Global Tech partnered with mobile phone manufacturers for the first graphene-based touchscreen to be launched in China. (Larousserie, 2013) Paint with graphene for a better thermal regulation in houses; bones, prosthesis, hearing aids or even diagnosis of diseases could also rely on graphene. (Repsol, 2025) Nowadays, its costs are high, but the graphene is going through a moment of intense academic research that surely in some years will end up with even more promising results and applications. Conclusion Together, these seven emerging technologies form a powerful snapshot of the future. Their diversity — spanning transportation, renewable energy, aquaculture, aerospace, robotics, and advanced materials — reflects the multi-sectoral nature of today’s global challenges. Yet they share a common purpose: to create more sustainable, efficient, and resilient systems capable of supporting a rapidly changing world. Wireless charging roads challenge the limits of mobility; ocean farming and wave energy reimagine how we use marine ecosystems; SpinLaunch and graphene redefine what is physically possible; and disease-eliminating robots transform public health. These innovations are still evolving, but they show that the solutions to some of humanity’s most pressing problems already exist — they simply need investment, scaling, and political will. By embracing these technologies and continuing to pursue scientific discovery, societies can accelerate the transition toward a cleaner energy future, safer communities, healthier ecosystems, and a more equitable and technologically advanced world. References 6abc Philadelphia. (2025, Juky 11). Electric vehicle tech: The rise of wireless charging roads. 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