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Spain is suffering a prolonged drought, sparking water rationing in some parts of the country because of depleted reservoirs, causing the wildfire season to start months earlier than usual and destroying crops or farmers deciding not to plant them, which could push up food inflation (13% in April).  April was abnormally hot. The state meteorological agency Aemet said temperatures were between 7ºC and 11ºC above the average, making that month the hottest since records began in 1961. The temperature at one point in Andalusia reached an unprecedented 38.8ºC in Córdoba, underscoring Spain’s vulnerability to climate change. The temperature cooled down in May, but there was very little rain.  Spain’s dramatic situation came as the World Meteorological Organisation predicted that annual average temperatures will most probably break records again in the next five years.  So desperate are people for rain that parishioners in the Andalusian city of Jaén held a procession this month, bearing aloft a statute of Christ known as El Abuelo and calling for the first time since 1949 for the Lord to open the heavens and bring rain.  The Socialist-led coalition government announced an unprecedented €2.2 billion package of measures, including increasing the availability of water by building desalination plants and doubling the proportion of water reused in urban areas. Olive oil production –Spain accounts for 45% of the world’s supply– could be more than halved this year. The government also announced legislation that will ban outdoor workers when the meteorological office issues high temperature alerts. This followed the death of a Madrid street sweeper during last July’s heatwave.Drought is not a new phenomenon in Spain, but this one is something extraordinary. Spain has not had ‘normal’ levels of rain for three years. Just 12 litres per square metre of rain fell in the first three weeks of April, one-quarter of the normal amount. In early May, 27% of Spanish territory was in either the drought ‘emergency’ or ‘alert’ category, creating a tinderbox. Blazes ravaged 54,000 hectares of land in the first four months of the year, three times the amount in the same period of 2022, according to the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS).  Spain’s last severe drought was in 1993-96 when around one-quarter of the population was subject to water restrictions. Some towns in Andalusia had supplies cut off for more than 15 hours a day. In 2008 a prolonged drought forced the authorities to bring in water to Barcelona via boat to guarantee domestic use. Catalonia is again one of the most affected regions. Restrictions in many areas have been in force since March, including limiting showers to five minutes, banning the cleaning of cars and the watering of gardens. At the town of L’Espluga de Francolí (population 3,600), water supplies are turned off for nine hours during the night. The Sau reservoir, a key drinking water source, is so low that a medieval village, flooded when the reservoir was created in the 1960s, has emerged.  Rain is very unevenly distributed in Spain. The areas with the highest water abundance per surface unit are in the north and Galicia (known as the ‘wet’ Spain), much more sparsely populated than in the south, in particular, with values higher than 700 mm/year. A popular saying among Galician farmers –la lluvia es arte– (‘rain is art’) was once turned into a tourism slogan. In the rest of the country (the ‘dry’ Spain), water availability does not exceed 250 mm/year. The lowest water availability in Spain occurs in the Segura basin, where it does not reach 50 mm/year (around 20 times less than in Galicia and five times lower than the national average).  In the late 1970s the Spanish government turned Murcia, Alicante and Almería in the south-east –an area where water is minimal and none of the major rivers flow– into ‘Europe’s market garden’ by transferring water from the Tagus through the 300km Tajo-Segura Trasvase, a system of pipelines and an aqueduct. This feat of hydraulic engineering was originally planned during the Second Republic in 1931, built during the Franco dictatorship and put into service after the dictator’s death.  In a country with 17 regional governments of different political colours, as of the 1978 Constitution, water management is a sensitive issue that crosses boundaries and inflames sentiments. One of the major providers of water for the trasvase is the vast reservoir at Buendía in the region of Castilla-La Mancha, where I have long had a house. Farmers there feel aggrieved when they are restricted in using ‘their’ water because it is needed elsewhere. The trasvase has long been embroiled in disputes over how much water should or should not be transferred through it.  Farmers in the south-east benefiting from the trasvase, who produce around 70% of Spain’s vegetables and a quarter of fruit exports, are up in arms over the plans of the Socialist-led minority national government to raise the minimum level of the Tagus at source as this will result in less excess water being transferred. The level needs to be increased in order to remain in line with EU regulations on river water levels, following court rulings. Ecologists say the Tagus is at risk from overexploitation by agriculture and climate change. The plan aims to increase the river’s flow from 6 cubic metres per second to 8.6 cubic metres by 2027.  Without sufficient water, 100,000 jobs are at risk, according to the farming association SCRATS. The father of the novelist Antonio Muñoz Molina, who had a market garden in Úbeda, Andalusia, used to greet ecstatically the year’s first rain with the following words: Es lo mismo que si estuvieran cayendo billetes verdes (‘It’s as if it were raining green banknotes’, in reference to the 1,000 peseta notes at the time).  The politics of the trasvase are complicated: the Socialists control the region of Castilla-La Mancha and back the national government; Valencia, which Alicante forms part of, opposes the plan, despite being also governed by the Socialists, as does Andalusia, where Almería is located, and Murcia, both of them regions run by the conservative Popular Party (PP).  Farmland surrounding the Doñana national park, Europe’s most important wetland and a UNESCO World Heritage site, has been particularly prone to illegal wells. The authorities have long turned a blind eye. Virginijus Sinkevičius, the EU’s environmental chief, attacked a plan last month by the government of Andalusia to increase the amount of irrigable land around Doñana by 800 hectares. This would be tantamount to an amnesty for the strawberry farmers who have already sunk illegal wells there. He said the bloc would use ‘all the means available’ to make sure Spain complied with a 2021 European Court of Justice ruling condemning it for breaking EU rules on excessive water extraction in Doñana.  Farmers switched some years ago from olives to strawberries and other berries, which consume more water. Close to half of Spain’s aquifers are already in poor condition. Before 1985, groundwater was treated as private property and thus not subject to any regulations.  In another part of Andalusia, near the city of Malaga, the Civil Guard arrested 26 people in raids on illegal wells. The Guard’s environmental crimes division identified 250 infractions by fruit farmers. Spain is Europe’s biggest producer of tropical fruit.  Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called the drought ‘one of the central political and territorial debates of our country over the coming years’. Resolving the water problem will require a national political consensus, something that is woefully lacking in so many other areas.

Moscow-Beijing: combat coordination is growing. Powerful cold currents from the West determine the political atmosphere of the planet. Efforts are being made to counter them with warm currents from the East. Only the synergy of actions between Russia and China prevents the the consolidated camp of hegemony from entering the "final and decisive battle" against each of these recalcitrant powers individually. We are well aware of the situation on the western front of the global Cold War. However, on the eastern front, where there is no Ukrainian-scale conflict yet, tensions are approaching critical levels. Defense-related Chinese trade publications have published some very disturbing material in recent weeks. ... To destroy the latest American nuclear aircraft carrier Gerald Ford and the battle group accompanying it from a cruiser and 5 missile frigates, 24 hypersonic missiles without nuclear warheads were enough. In a computer simulation, rocket launches were carried out from 6 different areas, including even the Gobi Desert in Northwest China. Considered unsinkable, the carrier group was completely destroyed by a series of launches of distracting and damaging missiles. The Chinese took into account the capabilities of both the standard set of anti-aircraft weapons and the latest American SM-3 anti-missiles. According to the scenario described in the Chinese-language Journal of Test and Measurement, the American armada entered the waters of the South China Sea and continued to move in a menacing course, despite warnings. Similar scenarios play out regularly near Chinese shores. Another Chinese publication spoke about the mortal danger of such actions. The South China Morning Post, published in Hong Kong in English, reported that the war between China and the United States could begin in the South China Sea. On January 5, 2021, three US Navy anti-submarine aircraft searched for Chinese submarines near the Dongsha Qundao (Pratas) archipelago. Reconnaissance aircraft, as always, dropped electronic buoys and tracked the routes of Chinese submarines that were participating in major exercises. However, one plane flew too close to China, and Chinese fighters flew in from there. The Chinese regarded the situation as a huge threat to national security. There was a possibility of an armed conflict, and the Americans, taking into account the unfolding actions of the PRC Air Force and Navy, began to prepare for the worst and even destroyed expensive buoys with top-secret equipment. The description of the conflict in the Chinese specialized magazine Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures does not give details of the confrontation. However, everything was very, very serious. No wonder the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Mark Milley, made a phone call to the Chinese Minister of Defense a couple of days later, assuring him that the Pentagon had no intention of provoking a real war. He even promised to inform his counterparts in Beijing in advance about the intentions of policymakers in the event of a critical situation. These two sensational publications did not appear by accident. One can only guess how many dangerous situations arise on the line of contact between the military of China and America in the Asia-Pacific basin. But, as the Chinese proverb says, “Heaven proposes, Xi Jinping disposes.” The Supreme Commander, acting at the strategic level of planning and decision-making, is responding to Washington's growing aggressiveness by demonstrating readiness for retaliatory actions on the battlefield and intensifying combat coordination with Russia. Planned for April, Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow was postponed to the end of March, and negotiations with Vladimir Putin lasted a total of 8 hours. Even not so much the published documents as the subsequent events showed qualitative changes in the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. The time has come for all-round combat coordination. It began with hours of face-to-face talks between the two supreme commanders. Soon, Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu came to Moscow. After the visit of an experienced and energetic military commander, Chen Wenqing, curator of internal and external intelligence services, arrived in Moscow. Reports of his meetings with the secretary of our Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, showed the resolute attitude of the chief intelligence officer of the Celestial Empire towards the West. For its part, the Kremlin decided to reinforce the dynamics of combat coordination with a "volley of the main guns." A delegation of high-ranking officials and business leaders headed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin headed to Beijing, unprecedented in size and level. The visit was prepared in a hurry and took place under the vigilant eye of the Western intelligence services. Therefore, the number and quality of signed agreements disappointed the optimists. But the bilateral meetings of officials, bankers and experts of the two countries that took place on the sidelines advanced the ongoing negotiations on strategic areas of cooperation and prepared serious deals. During the visit, influential publications noted the mutual interest of both countries in the accelerated growth of trade. Thus, the Global Times, which is close to the CCP Central Committee, noted the synergy of the two trends. Russia needs to increase the export of raw materials, especially energy. Against the backdrop of a rapid economic recovery, China needs to expand imports of the same oil and gas, agricultural products and other types of raw materials. The development of China's relations with the West repeats the history of the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West. The sanctions already imposed on China will be tightened. Access to sources of raw materials and markets will become a priority for Beijing for the foreseeable future. We should not turn a blind eye to the reaction of some Chinese experts and blogosphere activists to the arrival in Beijing of Mikhail Mishustin at the head of a thousandth army of the Russian elite. The emphasis is not even so much on the vital need for Moscow to receive income from trade with China as on the desirability of not offending the West, leaving the door open for relations with America. However, after 40 years of Chinese-American marriage of convenience, it would be naive to expect a quick change of shoes. There does not seem to be any improvement in relations between America and China, despite Biden's hints and the visit of Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao to the United States. Overcoming the pathological hatred of politicians for China, business people in Washington continue to do business even in the most adverse conditions. In 2022, bilateral trade reached an all-time high of $691 billion. At the same time, the Americans were able to sell their goods to the Chinese for less than 154 billion. The reduction or abolition of duties, which President Trump began to introduce back in 2018 and President Biden is increasing, could help improve the quality and further increase trade. They cost each American family $1,000 a year. However, the prospects for curtailing the trade war are very illusory. The White House and both houses of the US Congress are on the warpath. Any attempt to improve US-China relations ends in scandal—Pelosi's scandalous trip, the big white ball... The same fate awaits current hopes. The visit of Pelosi's heir, Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy to Taiwan is being prepared. At the G7 summit in Tokyo, there was a military coordination between NATO and Japan. China, along with Russia, is designated in the final documents as the main enemy. The bloc's regional headquarters is to be opened in Tokyo. It is impossible to get rid of historical parallels. Similarly, in 1936, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, directed against the Soviet Union. A few months later, the emboldened Japanese began an all-out war against the Celestial Empire, capturing Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Nanjing in 1937. Only the diplomatic, military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union prevented the capitulation of the Republic of China along the lines of France. Stubbornly resisting China, in turn, prevented Tokyo from attacking the USSR at the already appointed time - August 29, 1941. Then there were two fronts - Soviet and Chinese. Now the situation is repeating itself. The Chinese were not patient. They were defending then. Now, relying on a reliable Russian rear, they launched a counteroffensive. Thanks to Beijing's 12-point peace plan for Ukraine and Xi Jinping's phone call with Zelensky, China is destroying the Yellow Threat stereotype at minimal cost in the European theater and strengthening its image as a peacemaker. There is competition with America. The first study trip to Kyiv, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Moscow of Special Representative Xi Jinping, Ambassador Li Hui, has just ended. It was preceded by trips of "heavyweights" - Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, foreign policy curator on the party line Wang Yi, Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Another area of China's global counteroffensive is to prevent the West from filling the strategic vacuum in Central Asia. That was the task of the summit of the five countries of this region and China in Xi'an, the ancient capital of several Chinese dynasties. This also meets the strategic interests of Moscow. The combat coordination of the two mighty powers of the Eurasian continent is gaining momentum and taking on new forms. How can one not recall that in March, Xi Jinping, when saying goodbye to Vladimir Putin on the steps of the Grand Kremlin Palace, said: “Now there are changes that have not happened in 100 years, and we are driving these changes.” Putin's answer was short but meaningful: "I agree."

The meeting of the G7 in Hiroshima has become a new symbol of the combat coordination of the Western and Eastern fronts of the global cold war. These two fronts are designed to pincer Russia and China, to prevent them from continuing to create a world order that rejects the "rules" invented in Washington. On the Western Front, stretching from Finland to Turkey, a continuous chain of military bases has already been created and an open military conflict has been provoked in Ukraine. NATO, which has been preparing for a clash with our country for several decades, has played a key role in coordinating the countries and armed forces of the West against Russia. On the Eastern Front of the Cold War, the same scenario is repeated, but with a time lag of several years. After the failure of hopes for the “constructive involvement” of the Celestial Empire, an open confrontation with it began to unfold in 2018, when a trade, a “color    revolution” in Hong Kong and a massive pumping of weapons in Taiwan began. By that time, the US had military agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, but there was no coordinating organization like NATO. Therefore, Washington began to demand that the bloc's "zone of responsibility" be extended to the Indo-Pacific region. In the meantime, the military bloc AUKUS (Australia, Great Britain and the US) was urgently created and the military-diplomatic organization QUAD (Australia, India, the US and Japan) was activated. The successes achieved and the next tasks in building up the front of the anti-Chinese forces of America, Europe and Asia should have been the topic of discussion at the Hiroshima summit. AUKUS and QUAD, in turn, were going to demonstrate a new level of coordination during Biden's trip to Australia to meet with the leaders of the member countries of the two organizations. But something went wrong, and the US President did not fly to Canberra. Among the explanations, the most plausible seems to be Indian leader Modi's unwillingness to draw his country even deeper into Western bloc structures. The triumphal march was not performed upon returning to Washington, not only because of this discrepancy. With regard to “decoupling” with China, different approaches appeared in the ranks of the G7, which were reflected in the final communiqué. A real "divorce" with its largest trading partner does not suit the European members of the G7. The desire to “sit on two chairs” and maintain profitable ties with Beijing without violating the requirements of Euro-Atlantic discipline at the same time is obvious. This is a line of high-ranking visitors seeking a meeting with Xi Jinping, and the words of the communique, designed to be understood by Beijing leaders: “Our political campaigns are not designed to harm China or slow down its economic progress and development.” The communiqué also notes that the G7 does not engage in "divorce" and does not "lock inward." Washington's desire to strengthen the Eastern Front was not crowned with complete success also thanks to Beijing's own "counteroffensive" on the Western Front. The new "counteroffensive" was the mission of China's special envoy, Ambassador Li Hui. He should clarify the official position of the parties to the Ukrainian conflict and talk about different scenarios. Beijing emphasizes that Li Hui should collect information, and not offer ready-made solutions. Therefore, in addition to Kyiv, he will visit Warsaw, Paris, Berlin, Brussels and complete this first trip in Moscow. Prior to Li Hui's tour, China's Vice President Han Zheng, party foreign policy curator Wang Yi, and Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Europe a few weeks before Li Hui's tour. Even Xi Jinping got involved, talking to Zelenskiy on the phone. Beijing launched this "counteroffensive" in response to the "offensive" of NATO. The bloc's area of responsibility has already been officially extended to the Indo-Pacific region, and a regional headquarters is to be opened in Tokyo. The Chinese may well draw a parallel of the ongoing events with the accession of Japan in 1936 to the Anti-Comintern Pact. A year later, the emboldened Japanese began an all-out war against the Celestial Empire, capturing Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Nanjing in a few months. Only the diplomatic, military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union prevented the capitulation of the Republic of China along the lines of France. China, in turn, prevented Tokyo from attacking the USSR at the already appointed time - August 29, 1941. The Imperial Headquarters did not dare to fight until the end of the "Chinese incident" simultaneously with China and the Soviet Union. Then, for the first time, two interconnected and mutually beneficial strategic fronts emerged. Now the situation of "two fronts" is repeated. Russia's military successes coincided with the G-7 summit in Hiroshima. The Western Front again supported the Eastern. Now the Pentagon will once again analyze the plans for operations around Taiwan. The "combat coordination" of Russia and China began to pick up increased pace after the visit to Moscow of President Xi Jinping. The agreements of the two commanders-in-chief are now being implemented by other leaders. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu and Party curator of China's special services, secretary of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP Chen Wenqing visited Moscow. In turn, Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Mishustin and several hundred heads of ministries and departments, leading entrepreneurs went to Beijing. Although it is unlikely that all of them will be able to achieve a breakthrough on their tracks in a couple of days in the Middle Kingdom, even a short stay in Beijing and Shanghai will help you see the “Chinese miracle” with your own eyes and be convinced in detail of the importance of interaction. After all, the “turn to the East” should take place in the minds of our politically shaping elite, which has not yet got rid of the illusions about the possibility of returning the “good old days” with the West. The China-Central Asia summit, which took place on May 18-19, 2023 in the ancient capital of the Silk Road, the city of Xi'an (Chang'an), can also be considered part of the Chinese "counteroffensive" in response to the "containment" by the collective West. Ahead of us are new summits of NATO and the Group of Seven, new meetings of the leaders of the SCO and BRICS. All of them fit into the logic of the formation of a new global architectonics. A key role in preventing the concentration of Western forces against one or the other of the main competitors - Russia and China - is played by the "combat coordination" of the two countries. It meets the national interests of both nations and therefore will only grow.

A single European Union cleantech manufacturing capacity target should be based on an understanding of the situation in each cleantech sector. Securing a competitive edge in cleantech manufacturing has increasingly come to be seen as a priority for Europe. China’s dominance of this sector and the subsidies offered under the United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (Kleimann et al, 2023), compelled the European Commission in February 2023 to publish a Green Deal Industrial Plan with the goal of boosting the European cleantech sector and speeding up the transition towards climate neutrality (European Commission, 2023a). The industrial plan’s regulatory pillar is the draft Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which includes a target for the European Union by 2030 to have the capacity to manufacture at least 40 percent of its cleantech deployment needs (European Commission, 2023b). Assessing Europe’s cleantech manufacturing capacity Meanwhile, basic facts on the status of cleantech manufacturing in Europe are missing from the discussion, which has so far been mainly about global shares of cleantech manufacturing capacity (Figure 1). When looked at from a high-level perspective, China is dominant but this perspective does not allow the situation in Europe to be captured fully. Figure 1: Regional shares of manufacturing capacity of selected clean technologies, 2021  To address this, we provide an overview of Europe’s current cleantech manufacturing capacity and compare it to current cleantech deployment levels. This assessment is useful for two reasons. First, it allows for a better appreciation of the scale of the EU’s manufacturing capacities. Second, it shows that adopting a one-size-fits-all 40 percent manufacturing target, as proposed under the NZIA, may make little sense considering the very different situations of different clean technologies. A caveat is here important. A significant share of European cleantech production is currently destined for export and not the EU domestic market. We ignore this trade dimension and compare only domestic cleantech manufacturing capacities to deployment levels, thus taking an approach that is similar to the NZIA and its 40 percent headline target. Our analysis covers the manufacturing and deployment levels of five technologies pinpointed by the NZIA: solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, wind turbines (onshore and offshore), electric vehicle batteries, heat pumps and electrolysers (Figure 2). A variable picture Figure 2 shows the limited scale of the EU solar PV industry. EU countries installed 41.4 GW of new solar PV capacity in 2022, while EU manufacturers only produced 1.7 GW of wafers, 1.37 GW of cells and 9.22 GW of modules (SolarPower Europe, 2023). In other words, EU solar manufacturers, had all their output been deployed in the EU, would have met only 4 percent, 3 percent, and 22 percent of solar deployment needs, respectively. For wind turbines, however, Europe is well placed. In 2022, EU countries installed 19.2 GW of new wind power capacity in 2022: 16.7 GW onshore and 2.5 GW offshore (Wind Europe, 2023). In 2021, for onshore wind capacity, EU manufacturers produced 17 GW worth of turbine blades, and more than 11 GW of nacelles and towers (Wind Europe, 2023), equivalent to 102 percent and 71 percent of the deployment needs of the following year. For offshore capacity, they produced blades, nacelles, and towers equivalent to 2.9 GW, 6.7 GW and 7 GW respectively (IEA, 2023), or the equivalent of 116 percent and 286 percent of the deployment needs of the following year. Meanwhile, over 90 percent of clean energy transition-related additions to battery capacity in the EU in 2021 were related to electric vehicles (Bielewski et al, 2022). European electric vehicle sales in 2021 amounted to 2.3 million units, roughly equivalent to a battery capacity of 156 GWh. But domestic battery manufacturing capacity hovered around 60 GWh, or the equivalent of about 38 percent of the domestic deployment needs (but currently representing only about 7 percent of global manufacturing capacity) (IEA, 2022). Heat pumps produced in Europe mostly serve the domestic market. In 2021, global heat pump production capacity (excluding air conditioners) was 120 GW. The EU contributed about 19 GW and accounted for 68 percent (Lyons et al, 2022) of Europe’s 2.18 million newly installed heat pumps. China supplies most compressors for air-air pumps, while Europe remains the main source for air-water and ground-source pumps. Finally, water electrolyser manufacturing capacity in Europe stands currently between 2 GW and 3.3 GW per year (Hydrogen Europe, 2022), many times more than the current installed capacity, which is equal to 0.16 GW (European Commission, 2023c). The wide disparity between the current manufacturing capacity and deployment is explained by delays between investment decisions and operational deployment, lack of hydrogen demand compared to supply capacity, and regulatory bottlenecks. It is noteworthy that EU electrolyser manufacturing capacity is still far from the 17.5 GW/year target set for 2030. Too easy for some, too hard for others One implication of this analysis is that applying the same 40 percent manufacturing target to each cleantech sector as set out in the NZIA proposal, may make little sense considering the very different situations of different clean technologies. For solar panels, reaching this target would be very challenging and likely very costly, while it would be much easier (and even too conservative) for other technologies, including wind turbines and batteries. It is also unclear to what extent the target would apply to the components and materials used in the identified clean technologies. This is a crucial issue, because access to these components is often a major bottleneck for domestic manufacturing in Europe (Le Mouel and Poitiers, 2023). Instead of setting cleantech production targets, the EU would better focus on facilitating private sector investment in cleantech by providing the right enabling framework conditions. That is the only course of action that might ultimately secure Europe a competitive edge in cleantech manufacturing.

Zelensky’s European tour has won critical support for Ukraine’s counter-offensiveAs the war in Ukraine intensifies, President Volodymyr Zelensky has concluded a series of successful visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London to shore up support from key allies. The timing of Zelensky’s visit is critical for Ukraine’s efforts on the battlefield and beyond. It has allowed the Ukrainian presidenta and his main European allies to coordinate their approach on the economic and diplomatic fronts of the war as well, which will be equally decisive in determining how this war will end, and when. Military support from his allies has been on top of Zelensky’s agenda during his whistle-stop tour of Europe. And finally, it seems that Ukraine’s European allies are following in Washington’s footsteps and moving beyond their earlier hesitation to provide Kyiv with more equipment for its upcoming counter-offensive in Bakhmut. On Saturday, May 13, ahead of Zelenskiy’s arrival in Berlin, Germany announced a further €2.7 billion (£2.35 billion) of support, including much-needed quantities of artillery ammunition. In addition, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall confirmed a joint venture with Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom to build and repair tanks in Ukraine. On Sunday, May 14, Zelensky secured promises in Paris from the French president, Emmanuel Macron, for new armoured vehicles and air defence systems. On Monday, May 15, British prime minister Rishi Sunak agreed to provide Ukraine with hundred of attack drones, in addition to the Storm Shadow cruise missiles that have already been delivered to strengthen Ukraine’s air defences. These commitments are important for providing Ukraine with the ammunition, equipment, training and repairs the country needs against a Russian adversary that has significant manpower advantages. This does not guarantee a sweeping success of the anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive, but it will make serious gains on the battlefield more likely for Kyiv. And it signals a commitment by its western partners to back this offensive with more than encouraging noises.The sanctions gameThe war in Ukraine is not only fought, and can not only be won, on the battlefield. From the beginning, the western approach was twofold: strengthen Ukraine and weaken Russia. The latter was achieved through unprecedented sanctions, with the EU now on its tenth sanctions package since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The EU is now discussing the eleventh sanctions package, this time with a focus on enforcing existing sanctions and closing loopholes by imposing secondary sanctions against countries, companies and individuals deliberately circumventing the existing sanctions against Russia. Sanctions will also be discussed at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, from May 19 to 21. Further measures are expected to target the Russian energy sector and place more limitations on exports to Russia. The four European countries Zelensky visited in the past few days – France, Germany, Italy and the UK – are all members of the G7, while the EU attends as an observer. Including other members the US, Japan and Canada, the G7 represents some of Ukraine’s most powerful partners who will send an unambiguous message to Russia concerning sanctions and their enforcement. This will not break the Russian war machine, but it will make it more costly, including for Russia’s few remaining allies, to sustain the war effort in Ukraine at the current level. Seen from this longer-term perspective, it also makes Ukrainian gains in any counter-offensive more sustainable by limiting Russia’s capabilities to mount any offensives in the future.The third front: diplomacyMeanwhile, Chinese envoy Li Hui is beginning his tour of European capitals, including Moscow and Kyiv, to explore a political settlement for the war in Ukraine. This made it important for Zelensky to be sure that his red lines are clearly understood, accepted and communicated by Rome, Berlin, Paris and London. The support from these European capitals is no longer in doubt. And neither is support from Brussels. Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg was clear in his message at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit on May 15: he expects the alliance to commit to a multi-year support programme to help Ukraine move towards Nato military standards. This will be discussed at the Nato summit in Vilnius in July. The EU is considering a new China strategy, including how it can engage with China on the war in Ukraine. The union is open to such an engagement and has cautiously welcomed China’s position paper in this respect. But it is a major win for Zelensky that the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, backed Zelensky’s peace plan which, among other things, rules out any territorial compromises. Zelensky’s visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London are part of an ongoing positioning of the major allies in this war. For the Ukrainian president, it was critical to make sure that he keeps the west united behind his efforts to defeat Russia. His apparent success in doing so indicates that he presented his European counterparts with a credible plan and realistic requirements for support. Yet it is also clear that Kyiv and its partners in Europe and beyond realise that there will eventually come a point at which they will have to negotiate an end to the war with Russia. The evident strength of western unity and commitment that has transpired over the past few days is as much a message of support to Ukraine as it is one of deterrence for Russia and caution to China. The way it will be received there will determine how soon a negotiated settlement will be possible that restores Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Canada will commit only minimal resources to ensuring collective security. At a time of war in Ukraine, and high alert in NATO, such promises are unwelcome and deeply dismaying to all others who have committed to minimum spending goals.  It’s hard to know what’s worse from the Canadian perspective: the fact that the Discord leak revealed that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were writing about Canada’s military capabilities in a less than positive light or the fact that the Washington Post picked up on the leaked memo and ran it as an exclusive story. The memo refers to an apparent statement by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at a recent NATO meeting that Canada would never meet NATO’s benchmark defence spending goal of 2 percent of GDP. What is remarkable is not so much what Trudeau said, but the fact that he said it. Canada’s failure to come close to NATO’s 2 percent goal is longstanding. The fact that the government anticipates being in that position for some time is also not a surprise. To tell close allies that we never intend to get there is something different. The memo makes clear that Canada’s allies, including and perhaps most especially, the United States are unhappy about this, using words such as concern, strain, frustration, and disappointment. More worrying still, the memo states that Canadian military leaders “perceive that politicians do not care about supporting them.” A military struggling to fulfill its obligations in the face of financial stricture is one thing. A military struggling under financial constraint while feeling politically unsupported is quite another. In response to the Post article, the prime minister stressed that Canada is a “reliable ally.” He and other officials pointed to Canada’s commitments and roles on the international stage, including the deployment of approximately 700 Canadian troops to Latvia, where they lead a NATO battle group. But this isn’t about the roles Canada plays. It’s about what it doesn’t do. And what it doesn’t do, and hasn’t done for many years, is to prioritise or even maintain military spending at a level that ensures its own capacity for basic defence, and also its capacity to support allies in a way commensurate to their commitment to us. The memo revelations are unlikely to shame the Canadian government into change. Indeed, if the Canadian people were going to see a change, one of the most likely recent opportunities was in the government budget of April 2022. At that point, and against great odds, the Ukrainians had successfully pushed the Russians out of the north of their country and were making gains in the south. Canada is home to the largest Ukrainian population in the world outside of Ukraine and Russia. Canadians of Ukrainian heritage are deeply entrenched in every aspect of Canadian society, including at the highest levels of government. Beyond the diaspora, Canadian public support for the Ukrainian cause, and dismay at the violation of territorial boundaries, is strong and widespread. If ever there was a moment when the Canadian government could have announced a major increase in defence spending, that was it. It did not happen. At NATO’s core is the Article 5 collective security guarantee, the certainty that each will come to the other’s defence. The iron clad nature of that commitment is central to the organisation’s strength, as witnessed by President Joe Biden’s warning to Russia of the commitment to defend “every inch” of NATO territory when Russia began its advance into Ukraine. It’s what keeps the organisation together and makes states like Finland and Sweden want to join. Saying Canada won’t meet the 2 percent target is not the same as saying Canada won’t come to the defence of its allies if needed. It is, however, the equivalent of saying Canada won’t even try to match the commitment everyone else has made to a baseline of preparedness. The attention on Canada’s dismissal of the 2 percent goal reflects a larger issue – that Canada’s military capacities are limited; that it is incapable of more than one major commitment at a time; that its support for its allies is thus also limited, and that this situation is unlikely to change in the near to medium term. Although allies have been suitably diplomatic in their responses to the memo’s revelations, to say Canada has no intention of meeting the 2 percent goal is a signal of disrespect that has surely not been missed by them. Canada is in a unique position geopolitically. Canada and the US share the longest undefended border in the world. The second largest country on the globe, more than 80 percent of Canada’s population lives within 150 kilometres of the US border. Canada makes a vital contribution to US national security by its simple presence on the US northern border, not just as a firm ally, but as a total non-national security threat. The reverse is also true. Much of the explanation as to Canada’s approach to defence spending can be found in those facts. Canada minimises its defence spending because it can, because it knows that any serious threat to its own territorial integrity will be seen by the United States as an equivalent threat to its own territorial integrity. This implicit “free ride” on defence is both a fact and a choice. And, it is all the more reason to do more, or at least to aspire to do the minimum. So why put up with it? Canada’s strong international reputation has its historical roots in the two world wars. In each case, Canada raised a military that was among the strongest of the allies, and its performance on the battlefield exceeded all expectations. NATO allies know that in a crisis Canada will do its best to support them. The problem is that its best won’t be as good as it could be without sustained and truly substantial increases in defence spending.

In the given article, the focus will be on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a defining organization of collective security policy, representing the Western Hemisphere in the Black Sea region. The article will discuss the objectives and strategies of the organization, taking into account the role of Russia as one of the most significant actors in the region.  After the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, NATO began expanding eastward. Countries such as Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members of the organization. During the time of the Cold War and the conflict with the USSR, some new members joined the NATO alliance, such as the Warsaw Pact countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland) and other post-Soviet states, including the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). These actions irritated Russia, especially when the NATO enlargement process continued in the Baltic region. Accordingly, to these events, excitement has followed the representatives of Russia’s Duma. The officials demanded the deployment of troops to ensure security and to enforce the idea of adding additional forces to the region in line with established parameters. However, one important detail is that despite the deployment of troops, several aerial and special operations were carried out in the region of the Baltic Sea, which included disrupting the line of command in the region and affecting the established procedures. An interesting thing that happened in 2009, during NATO expansion in 2009, the Kremlin did not go against the accession of Albania and Croatia, there were indirect statements from officials that the enlargement of NATO on the European continent is disturbing and undermines the security of the continent.  Accordingly, taking into account that each stage of NATO's expansion was exciting for Russia, and this stemmed from the fact that the very idea of this expansion was the formation of a united and strong Europe, which was also a prerequisite for the elimination of Russian influences, official Russia did not take pro-aggressive steps to exclude its proximity to the organization.  Despite Russia's warning that NATO should not expand to the East, this process continued. In 2008, NATO announced (at the Bucharest summit) that Ukraine and Georgia would become members, which Russia saw as a strategic threat, especially when Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Republic, was promised that NATO would not go East. The main reason why Russia reacted so strongly to the expansion was due to the geopolitical aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, which it believed would affect the country's security and strategic interests.  The Black Sea region has always been of great interest to NATO, this basin is a connecting link between the Caspian, Mediterranean, and Aegean seas, it is at the same time a very strategic corridor to connect with the Middle East, which doubled the interests of the great powers in the region, among them NATO. After the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region is in the interest of the USA and there were 3 specific reasons for this; The spread of democracy, cooperation in the field of security, and third and most important for the US, the diversification of energy resources. On the other hand, the democratic development of the independent states represented in this region and the convergence with the standards of the West and NATO turned out to be critically incompatible with the interests of Russia. It was also unacceptable for Moscow to develop energy projects on the European continent using the Black Sea region without him. Therefore, Russia, in order to prevent the countries of the region from achieving their goals and hindering their Euro-Atlantic integration, created and/or maintained control over the conflict centers in the region, which it then used for manipulation and coercion. In short, regardless of the variety of conflicts in the Black Sea region, each of them was and is being managed under Russian interests, be it the conflicts of Karabakh, Abkhazia-Tskhinvali, or Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  There are several reasons for the tension between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea region, the first of which is the concentration of a large number of Russian military forces in the region and the resulting conflicts. Second, the region is a kind of springboard where Russian and NATO military forces have to interact closely, which is also a source of constant tension.  On the other hand, It is rather interesting that despite the fact that in many cases NATO member states are driven by common interests, it happens that they have formed different visions for developing tactics to deal with existing challenges. One of the reasons why NATO is not properly represented in the Black Sea is Turkey and its recent policy. For example, in 2001, a multinational military-naval organization named "Blackseafor" was created on the initiative of Turkey. (BlackSeafor(2001). The member states of the organization were; Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. By creating this model, Turkey tried to increase its role by weakening NATO's representation in the Black Sea region, it even worked at some level, and one of the reasons why NATO's flank is currently the weakest in the Seven Sea region is the above-mentioned event. However, Turkey has a tense situation with Syria and it needs NATO defense systems, so it has to find a balance in the direction of cooperation between Russia and NATO in order to ensure the security of the region.  However, it should be noted that after joining NATO, Romania becomes an important springboard for the organization. At the Warsaw summit, it was Romania that came up with the initiative to create the NATO Black Sea Fleet, which received positive evaluations both in Berlin and in the NATO headquarters and Washington. Bulgaria used to be more restrained in the Black Sea, thus avoiding provoking Russia too much. But after the war between Ukraine and Russia, the policy has changed, since 2021, Bulgaria has been the head of the NATO naval training operations in the Black Sea, the name of the operation is "Breeze" and it was last held in July 2022, where 24 combat and support boats, 5 military aircraft, 4 helicopters, and up to 1400 soldiers participated. There were several goals and reasons for conducting these exercises, one of which was stated above to increase the alliance's interests in the Black Sea region, and the other was to at least weaken Russia's dominance and maritime monopoly.  The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the events taking place in the Black Sea are directly connected and affect the European security system. It should be noted that before the Warsaw Summit, NATO did not have a proactive plan regarding its role in the Black Sea region (2016). An agreement was reached at the Warsaw Summit, thus highlighting that improving the defense capabilities of partner countries is in direct interest with NATO's interests, which will ultimately strengthen European security. That is why the strengthening of Ukraine's military potential is considered to strengthen the eastern flank of the organization. But until the war is raging and the future/outcome of this conflict is still uncertain, it is rather impossible to speak clearly about the very future of the organization.

The UK is reportedly planning to officially designate the Russian mercenary firm Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. This would put Wagner on a list with 78 other groups, including ISIS, al Qaeda and newer white supremacist organisations. The UK has had lists of “proscribed organisations” for decades, previously including groups in the Northern Ireland conflict, and then creating a more global list in the early 2000s. Once an organisation is listed, it becomes a criminal offence to belong to the group or support the group – with a punishment of up to 14 years in prison. Dozens of other countries have similar lists. The UK’s proscription of Wagner could be an important global signal – the UK would be among the first to label Wagner a terrorist group. This could encourage other countries to do the same, and possibly discourage countries from working with Wagner in the future. The home secretary has the discretion to proscribe a group if it is involved in terrorism, defined generally as violence to influence the government or intimidate the public for some political or social goal. The minister takes into consideration both the nature of the organisation, and “the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism”. Wagner appears to have used terrorism in Ukraine and beyond. For example, two men who reportedly worked for Wagner admitted to killing hundreds of civilians, including dozens of children. The group is also implicated in massacres of hundreds of civilians in Mali, according to Human Rights Watch and other non-governmental organisations. The UK and its allies are supporting Ukraine in its defence against the Russian invasion. As a result, the UK government is within its rights to proscribe the group. But should it? There are some reasons to question whether proscription is the best course of action. It would be somewhat unusual to include Wagner – a company, a for-profit enterprise – with groups like al Qaeda or Boko Haram, which are motivated by radical ideologies more than profits. For this reason, it seems, the US has labelled Wagner as a transnational criminal organisation, and imposed sanctions usually used on organised crime. Wagner also stands out because it works for the Russian state, so it is less of a “non-state actor” (and arguably not one at all) than traditional terrorist groups. However, the UK already proscribes a variety of groups that receive state support, such as Hezbollah. Including state actors alongside non-state actors on a terrorist list can blur the distinction of what is a “terrorist”, and open such lists up to endless expansion, but it has been done before.A symbolic designation It’s questionable how much of an effect UK proscription would have on a group operating thousands of kilometres away. However, the government has expressed suspicion about Wagner transferring money from the UK after financial sanctions were placed on Russian oligarchs. Such actions would become illegal with proscription. Any support for the group, by any person or institution in the UK, would be criminalised. Additionally, my own research suggests that proscription can reduce terrorism when the group operates in a country (like Ukraine) aligned with the proscribing state. International cooperation on counterterrorism is essential. Another study I worked on with Hyeran Jo and Joshua Alley shows that proscription is more likely to be effective when used on groups that depend on funding from private donations, for example from a diaspora community. Making it illegal to associate with or fund a group means their support is quickly eroded, as are their capabilities to carry out attacks. This raises questions about how much proscription would hurt Wagner, which is mostly funded by the Russian state. Proscription might be a helpful addition to the economic sanctions already placed on Russia. But we shouldn’t expect it to have major financial effects on its own on the group’s activities, since Wagner gets most of its resources from Russia. More than direct material consequences, proscription could be important for symbolism. Declaring Wagner a terrorist organisation would further signal international disapproval of the Russian invasion, and it would be a mark of shame for Wagner, which is trying to expand its global footprint. Countries like Mali that hire Wagner might look for alternatives if the group is widely recognised as a terrorist organisation. Negative consequences It is important to note that there can be negative consequences of terrorist proscription. Scholars have shown that it can make it more difficult to end wars. Governments become more hesitant to make a deal with a legally-designated “terrorist”, and third parties are slow to facilitate negotiations for the same reason. However, this might not directly matter for the Wagner case, since Ukraine would negotiate with Russia, not Wagner. There are also reasons to believe that proscription can have negative economic effects. Humanitarian organisations have warned that proscription can create a “chilling effect” on charity donors, non-governmental organisations and other important actors who may want to support civilians affected by these situations, because of concern about inadvertently funding a terrorist organisation, or being accused of doing so. The UK government should keep these concerns in mind and try to mitigate negative unintended effects of proscription. Overall, terrorist proscription might not be the ideal policy tool for Wagner, since the group is a business and not a traditional ideological group. And it’s not clear proscription would affect the group much in the short term, since most of its money comes from the Russian state. However, proscription could be an important global signal, and it could deter potential support for an entity that has clearly used terrorism.

Russia’s annual Victory Day holiday on May 9, when the country marks the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, was expected to be a fairly low-key affair this year. Just three days before the festivities, which included a military parade on Red Square, only one high-ranking guest was due to attend: Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov.  On the eve of the parade, however, it emerged that the presidents of four other Central Asian nations had also arrived at the last minute, along with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. For over a year now, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last February, the Central Asian leaders have tried to avoid the issue of the war. So why have they now risked both their reputations and their safety (after all, there were drones flying over the Kremlin the week before the parade) to attend Moscow’s military festivities in what is being seen by many as a gesture of support for Russia? Even before the war, the Central Asian presidents preferred to celebrate May 9 in their own countries: any holiday that unites the nation is seen as a way of strengthening their relatively young statehood. Some also tried to use the Soviet-era holiday to make the point that the major victory of the 20th century had not been achieved by Russia alone. Each of the Central Asian capitals held its own military parade and competed with Russia and among themselves to stump up the most lump-sum payments for veterans. Sometimes their leaders still attended the parade in Moscow – that was never a problem. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed everything. Russian President Vladimir Putin began to use Victory Day to justify his aggression, comparing Russia’s historic fight against the Nazis to its current so-called “special operation” against the Ukrainians.  This year’s parade inevitably resulted in images of the Central Asian leaders sitting alongside Russian troops who have been fighting in the war and applauding Putin’s speech about a “sacred struggle for the motherland.” Those images will make it much harder to insist that the countries of Central Asia do not support Russia's aggression against Ukraine. This conclusion was, of course, perfectly clear to those involved, which is why the Central Asian presidents did not initially intend to be there, as evidenced by official statements. Two weeks before the parade, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced that on May 9, he would commemorate those killed in World War II in the capital Astana, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev ordered a fireworks display in Tashkent on May 9, with the clear intention of attending himself. Nor did Moscow itself even intend to invite anyone at first. On April 24, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that since it was not a big anniversary this year, no “special invitations” had been sent to anyone. Only Japarov’s visit was planned in advance: both the itinerary and the makeup of the impressive official delegation were made public. It seems, therefore, that everything in Russia is now conducted like a special operation – even invitations to a parade. “Special invitations” were issued one after another just a few days before the parade in the form of phone calls from Putin, as reported on the websites of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon on May 5 and Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov on May 7. Mirziyoyev and Tokayev’s attendance, meanwhile, was announced with photographs of them exiting their planes in Moscow. In all likelihood, with the exception of Japarov, the Central Asian presidents initially managed to politely decline the invitation to Moscow. But when Putin called them, it became not only difficult to do so, but also dangerous. All of the Central Asian nations are proud of their multi-vector foreign policy, and relations with the West are just as important to them as with Moscow or Beijing. Now that Russia and the West are on the verge of war, it has become far trickier for Central Asia to maintain its partnerships with both sides. The last few years have shown that when the West imposes sanctions against a country, they are observed by everyone, including China. Accordingly, since the invasion, Central Asia’s leaders have tried to strike a balance. None of them have recognized the territories annexed from Ukraine as part of Russia, but nor have they publicly criticized Putin or condemned the war. They have all agreed to comply with sanctions, yet have made no real efforts to stop Russia from using their territory to circumvent the restrictions. It’s a precarious balance. Much to Moscow’s annoyance, Western delegations have repeatedly traveled to Central Asia to advise local authorities on sanctions compliance, and have threatened secondary sanctions for failure to comply. Moscow has responded with veiled and asymmetrical threats, such as halting exports of Kazakh oil to Europe or prohibiting the import of products from Eurasian Economic Union countries, supposedly over GMOs. Central Asia’s leaders are left to decide for themselves how much of this is coincidence, and how much a response to their statements and actions. Therefore, the deciding factor in the presidents’ visit to Moscow was likely that the West’s actions are predictable, while Moscow’s are not. Quite simply, taking part in Moscow’s Victory Day celebrations may have looked bad, but Washington and Brussels were unlikely to impose sanctions simply for attending a parade, while the potential consequences from Moscow of refusing to attend were hard to predict. There were also pragmatic reasons for visiting Moscow. Contrary to expectations, far from severing ties with Russia, Central Asia actually drew closer to it in 2022. The reality is that it can be profitable to be located next door to a giant, isolated economy and diplomatic pariah. Firstly, Central Asian companies have made record profits from the disappearance of Western imports from the Russian market. Exports from all five Central Asian countries to Russia soared in 2022. Secondly, Central Asia is becoming a financial hub for Russians moving their savings out of Russia. Last year, more than $770 million was transferred from Russia to Kazakhstan – an almost sevenfold increase from 2021. Transfers to Uzbekistan, meanwhile, more than doubled to $17 billion. Thirdly, Central Asia is now the focus of far more international attention than ever before, with Western countries trying to persuade the region not to help Russia in any way, and Moscow trying hard to stop it from drifting away. Recognizing that this attention is largely the result of their proximity to Russia and will not last forever, Central Asia’s leaders are trying to milk the current situation for all it is worth. Accordingly, individual actions should not be interpreted as either definitive support for Russia or a move to sever relations with it. Central Asia’s political elites view the invasion of Ukraine through the prism of their own interests, top of which is the preservation of their own regimes. For this reason, they will continue to show loyalty to Putin, attending parades with him and periodically praising Moscow in public speeches. It might look like an attempt to have it both ways, but this is the survival strategy the Central Asian regimes consider most likely to work.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned neighboring Moldova into a tinder box. Its border with Ukraine stretches for over 1,200 kilometers, and Russian missiles have entered Moldovan airspace on more than one occasion. Moscow has threatened to prevent Moldova from becoming another “anti-Russia,” while making fearmongering accusations that the Ukrainian army has plans to seize Moldova’s breakaway region Transnistria. The direct military threat to Moldova, however, receded after the Ukrainian army defeated Russia in Kherson, and the Moldovan government appears to have successfully adapted to the new situation and restored relative stability. Despite historically strong pro-Russian sentiment, the vast majority of Moldovans now agree that cooperation with Moscow has become too toxic, while the allure of EU integration—such as the opportunity to work there—is more tempting than anything Russia has to offer. Chisinau is accordingly taking increasingly decisive measures in its fight against Russian interference.  A state of emergency has been in effect in Moldova ever since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, affording the government and law enforcement agencies additional powers. So far, the authorities have not resorted to radical measures, but the fact that the state of emergency is extended every two months shows that they are seriously concerned about the threat of destabilization. Throughout the past year, Chisinau has condemned Moscow for the war, but avoided direct confrontation, and was initially reluctant to actively oppose Russian interference. Moldovans welcomed Ukrainian refugees, but declined Kyiv’s requests to sell it six MiG-29 fighter jets, which was a bitter pill for Kyiv to swallow, considering that the Ukrainian army had thwarted Russia’s attempts at the start of the war to carve a corridor through Ukraine to Moldova’s Moscow-backed breakaway region, Transnistria. If it were not for Ukraine’s counterattack, then Moscow would likely have already taken control of Moldova and installed a pro-Russian president there: Russia’s rhetoric about the illegitimacy of the current Moldovan leadership is getting louder and louder. It is unlikely that Moldova, neither a large nor wealthy country, would have been able to put up much of a fight. Chisinau’s caution is understandable: after all, there are 1,500 Russian troops stationed in Transnistria, both as peacekeepers and as guards for Soviet-era arms depots. Moldova only joined anti-Russian sanctions this spring. Before that, the government demurred, citing the country’s dependence on the Russian economy, even though Moldova’s main trading partner has long been the European Union. Last year, almost 60 percent of Moldovan exports went to the EU, while less than a quarter went to the entire Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia. And while exports to the EU increased by a third in 2022, those destined for Russia decreased by about the same amount. Even Moldova’s long-standing and almost complete dependence on Russian gas supplies has significantly weakened during the past year, largely due to the actions of Russia itself. Last October, Russia’s Gazprom reduced gas supplies to Moldova from 9 million to 5.7 million cubic meters per day in a payment dispute.  Moscow also reduced gas supplies to Transnistria, which almost left Moldova without electricity, since until 2022 up to 70 percent of electricity supplied to the rest of Moldova came from Transnistria and its regional power plant, which runs on Russian gas. The rest was supplied by Ukraine. Due to the reduction in gas supplies, Transnistria stopped selling electricity to Chisinau, while Kyiv also stopped exports due to the Russian missile strikes against its energy infrastructure, which had caused severe energy shortages across the war-torn country. Soon afterward, Chisinau reached an agreement with Tiraspol, Transnistria’s de facto capital. Chisinau agreed to send its own Russian gas supplies to Transnistria in exchange for the resumption of electricity supplies from the latter. To meet its domestic requirements, Moldova began buying gas from the EU, which by January 2023 had enabled it to save $330 per 1,000 cubic meters compared with Russian prices thanks to the relative stabilization of the European gas market.  In the spring, Ukraine resumed electricity exports, and the Transnistria power plant returned to its prewar capacity. The energy crisis hit Moldovan consumers hard, but prod Chisinau to establish alternative gas suppliers, including Romania and Greece, with plans to add Azerbaijan to that list. This energy diversification has strengthened the Moldovan government’s position in its relationship with Moscow. By this spring, following the resignation of the government and a subsequent reshuffle, Moldova had begun to toughen its stance on Russia. New Prime Minister Dorin Recean was previously a national security advisor and interior minister, and his appointment was a signal that security issues are Chisinau’s top priority right now. A few days before the reshuffle, President Maia Sandu said that Ukrainian intelligence had intercepted a Kremlin plan to organize a coup in Moldova through opposition protests and the involvement of foreign mercenaries. It’s hard to verify the claims, but what is certain is that Russia has always had extensive influence in Moldova, and has traditionally enjoyed the support of about half the population. Even now, polls show that while the majority of Moldovans condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, about 30 percent still admire Putin. Since last fall, the Shor party has been leading Moldovans in anti-government protests, officially against high utility prices. Russian propaganda portrays the protests as anti-European and nationwide, and describes the party’s head, the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, as the leader of the Moldovan opposition. But in reality, the protests only attract a couple of thousand people, and those participants do not hide the fact that they are paid to attend.  Ilan Shor fled to Israel after being sentenced to fifteen years in prison in Moldova for his role in laundering $1 billion in three Moldovan banks. A change of regime in Chisinau to a pro-Russian government would allow him to avoid prosecution and return to Moldova. Many believe that the Kremlin has offered him precisely these guarantees. The Moldovan government was concerned by the protests, but did not dare to take tough action: the Shor party has six seats in parliament, and freedom of assembly is enshrined in the constitution. But the reports of Kremlin plans to destabilize Moldova, and then the emergence of a document titled “Strategic Goals of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova,” which spelled out a plan for regime change, forced Chisinau to act more decisively. The new Moldovan cabinet has appealed to the Constitutional Court to declare the Shor party illegitimate for promoting the interests of a foreign state. Meanwhile, in response to the opposition rallies, Sandu has called on Moldovans to assemble on Chisinau’s main square on May 21 in support of EU integration. About 60 percent of Moldovans are in favor of their country’s accession to the European Union. The reshuffled government has also stopped the broadcasting of Russian TV channels, and stepped up its efforts to publicly refute dubious Russian claims, such as that Ukraine is preparing to occupy Transnistria. The powers of the Information and Security Service, Moldova’s main intelligence agency, have been expanded, and a number of Russian officials—including President Vladimir Putin—have been banned from entering the country. Chisinau’s position on Transnistria has also become tougher. In February, the Moldovan parliament amended the law to make separatism an offense punishable by jail time, prompting outrage in Tiraspol. Chisinau insists that the amendments will not be applied retrospectively: only to future manifestations of separatism. Still, it is not yet clear how the new law will work in practice, so for now, Transnistrian officials prefer not to be seen in Chisinau. Russia’s actions have also prompted a public discussion in Moldova about the country’s armed forces, which will not be able to put up much resistance to a serious security threat. At the Munich Security Conference in February, Sandu asked NATO countries to provide Moldova with air defense systems. The government has not yet abandoned neutrality, but is making it clear that it is ready to turn to NATO for help in the event of an escalation. Chisinau’s course toward more resolute resistance to the Kremlin doesn’t mean that the country will be able to rid itself of its dependence on Russia overnight, of course. Nor will Moscow relinquish its foothold inside the country without a fight. Most likely, the Kremlin will continue to interfere in Moldovan political life by financing pro-Russian parties, portraying NATO as a threat, and accusing Sandu of trying to drag Moldova into the war. It’s possible that the pro-Russian forces will be able to take advantage of the country’s socioeconomic problems to put in a decent showing in the next elections. Even that scenario, however, will not result in fundamental changes to Moldova’s foreign policy. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is helping to consolidate Moldovan society in favor of EU integration and emancipation from Moscow. No matter who ends up leading the country in the future, they will not be able to ignore that consensus.