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Diplomacy
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Tensions over Kashmir and a warming planet have placed the Indus Waters Treaty on life support

by Fazlul Haq

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In 1995, World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin warned that whereas the conflicts of the previous 100 years had been over oil, “the wars of the next century will be fought over water.” Thirty years on, that prediction is being tested in one of the world’s most volatile regions: Kashmir. On April 24, 2025, the government of India announced that it would downgrade diplomatic ties with its neighbor Pakistan over an attack by militants in Kashmir that killed 26 tourists. As part of that cooling of relations, India said it would immediately suspend the Indus Waters Treaty – a decades-old agreement that allowed both countries to share water use from the rivers that flow from India into Pakistan. Pakistan has promised reciprocal moves and warned that any disruption to its water supply would be considered “an act of war.” The current flareup escalated quickly, but has a long history. At the Indus Basin Water Project at the Ohio State University, we are engaged in a multiyear project investigating the transboundary water dispute between Pakistan and India. I am currently in Pakistan conducting fieldwork in Kashmir and across the Indus Basin. Geopolitical tensions in the region, which have been worsened by the recent attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, do pose a major threat to the water treaty. So too does another factor that is helping escalate the tensions: climate change A fair solution to water disputes The Indus River has supported life for thousands of years since the Harappan civilization, which flourished around 2600 to 1900 B.C.E. in what is now Pakistan and northwest India. After the partition of India in 1947, control of the Indus River system became a major source of tension between the two nations that emerged from partition: India and Pakistan. Disputes arose almost immediately, particularly when India temporarily halted water flow to Pakistan in 1948, prompting fears over agricultural collapse. These early confrontations led to years of negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.   Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has long been hailed as one of the most successful transboundary water agreements. It divided the Indus Basin between the two countries, giving India control over the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – and Pakistan control over the western rivers: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. At the time, this was seen as a fair solution. But the treaty was designed for a very different world. Back then, India and Pakistan were newly independent countries working to establish themselves amid a world divided by the Cold War. When it was signed, Pakistan’s population was 46 million, and India’s was 436 million. Today, those numbers have surged to over 240 million and 1.4 billion, respectively. Today, more than 300 million people rely on the Indus River Basin for their survival. This has put increased pressure on the precious source of water that sits between the two nuclear rivals. The effects of global warming, and the continued fighting over the disputed region of Kashmir, has only added to those tensions. Impact of melting glaciers Many of the problems of today are down to what wasn’t included in the treaty, rather than what was. At the time of signing, there was a lack of comprehensive studies on glacier mass balance. The assumption was that the Himalayan glaciers, which feed the Indus River system, were relatively stable. This lack of detailed measurements meant that future changes due to climate variability and glacial melt were not factored into the treaty’s design, nor were factors such as groundwater depletion, water pollution from pesticides, fertilizer use and industrial waste. Similarly, the potential for large-scale hydraulic development of the region through dams, reservoirs, canals and hydroelectricity were largely ignored in the treaty. Reflecting contemporary assumptions about the stability of glaciers, the negotiators assumed that hydrological patterns would remain persistent with the historic flows. Instead, the glaciers feeding the Indus Basin began to melt. In fact, they are now melting at record rates. The World Meteorological Organization reported that 2023 was globally the driest year in over three decades, with below-normal river flows disrupting agriculture and ecosystems. Global glaciers also saw their largest mass loss in 50 years, releasing over 600 gigatons of water into rivers and oceans. The Himalayan glaciers, which supply 60-70% of the Indus River’s summer flow, are shrinking rapidly. A 2019 study estimates they are losing 8 billion tons of ice annually. And a study by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development found that Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Himalayan glaciers melted 65% faster in 2011–2020 compared with the previous decade. The rate of glacier melt poses a significant challenge to the treaty’s long-term effectiveness to ensure essential water for all the people who rely on the Indus River Basin. While it may temporarily increase river flow, it threatens the long-term availability of water. Indeed, if this trend continues, water shortages will intensify, particularly for Pakistan, which depends heavily on the Indus during dry seasons. Another failing of the Indus Waters Treaty is that it only addresses surface water distribution and does not include provisions for managing groundwater extraction, which has become a significant issue in both India and Pakistan. In the Punjab region – often referred to as the breadbasket of both nations – heavy reliance on groundwater is leading to overexploitation and depletion. Groundwater now contributes a large portion – about 48% – of water withdrawals in the Indus Basin, particularly during dry seasons. Yet there is no transboundary framework to oversee the shared management of this resource as reported by the World Bank. A disputed region It wasn’t just climate change and groundwater that were ignored by the drafters of the Indus Waters Treaty. Indian and Pakistan negotiators also neglected the issue and status of Kashmir. Kashmir has been at the heart of India-Pakistan tensions since Partition in 1947. At the time of independence, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was given the option to accede to either India or Pakistan. Though the region had a Muslim majority, the Hindu ruler chose to accede to India, triggering the first India-Pakistan war. This led to a U.N.-mediated ceasefire in 1949 and the creation of the Line of Control, effectively dividing the territory between Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since then, Kashmir has remained a disputed territory, claimed in full by both countries and serving as the flashpoint for two additional wars in 1965 and 1999, and numerous skirmishes. Despite being the primary source of water for the basin, Kashmiris have had no role in negotiations or decision-making under the treaty. The region’s agricultural and hydropower potential has been limited due to restrictions on the use of its water resources, with only 19.8% of hydropower potential utilized. This means that Kashmiris on both sides — despite living in a water-rich region — have been unable to fully benefit from the resources flowing through their land, as water infrastructure has primarily served downstream users and broader national interests rather than local development. Some scholars argue that the treaty intentionally facilitated hydraulic development in Jammu and Kashmir, but not necessarily in ways that served local interests. India’s hydropower projects in Kashmir — such as the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams — have been a major point of contention. Pakistan has repeatedly raised concerns that these projects could alter water flows, particularly during crucial agricultural seasons. However, the Indus Waters Treaty does not provide explicit mechanisms for resolving such regional disputes, leaving Kashmir’s hydrological and political concerns unaddressed. Tensions over hydropower projects in Kashmir were bringing India and Pakistan toward diplomatic deadlock long before the recent attack. The Kishanganga and Ratle dam disputes, now under arbitration in The Hague, exposed the treaty’s growing inability to manage transboundary water conflicts. Then in September 2024, India formally called for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, citing demographic shifts, energy needs and security concerns over Kashmir. The treaty now exists in a state of limbo. While it technically remains in force, India’s formal notice for review has introduced uncertainty, halting key cooperative mechanisms and casting doubt on the treaty’s long-term durability. An equitable and sustainable treaty? Moving forward, I argue, any reform or renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty will, if it is to have lasting success, need to acknowledge the hydrological significance of Kashmir while engaging voices from across the region. Excluding Kashmir from future discussions – and neither India nor Pakistan has formally proposed including Kashmiri stakeholders – would only reinforce a long-standing pattern of marginalization, where decisions about its resources are made without considering the needs of its people. As debates on “climate-proofing” the treaty continue, ensuring Kashmiri perspectives are included will be critical for building a more equitable and sustainable transboundary water framework.

Energy & Economics
Nottinghamshire, UK 03 April 2025 : Attitudes of UK broadsheet newspaper after Trump unleashes Liberation Day Tariff announcement

The EU at the Crossroads of Global Geopolitics

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. March 7 2025. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement/[30] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[31] "The paradoxical relationship between the EU and China'. Eastminster: a global politics & policy blog, University of East Anglia. http://www.ueapolitics.org/2022/03/29/the-paradoxical-relationship-between-the-eu-and-china/[32] Vasselier, Abigaël. "Relations between the EU and China: what to watch for in 2024". January 25 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/relations-between-eu-and-china-what-watch-2024 [33] Benner, Thorsten. "Europe Is Disastrously Split on China." Foreign Policy, April 12 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/[34] Chen, D., N. Godehardt, M., Mayer, X., Zhang. 2022. "Europe and China at a Crossroads." 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads.[35] Sharshenova, A. and Crawford. 2017. "Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China's Countervailing Influences, Powers and Impact." Central Asian Survey 36 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2017.1372364.[36] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[37] See more at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council[38] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know"… op. cit.[39] Malaponti, Chiara. 2024. “Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential.” https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/.[40] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[41] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[42] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

Diplomacy
Nayib Bukele durante una visita al CECOT - Casa Presidencial

CECOT: Bukele’s mega prison where 'the only way out is in a coffin'

by Devin B. Martinez

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The alliance between Trump’s expanding deportation campaign and Salvadoran President Bukele’s carceral authoritarianism has major implications for human rights and the future of democracy. In February 2023, the Salvadoran government released drone footage of thousands of shirtless men with shaved heads, shackled and crouched in tight formation, being herded into a newly built prison called the Center for the Confinement of Terrorism – CECOT.  The high-tech mega prison was constructed at breakneck speed under the rule of President Nayib Bukele, as he declared victory in the so-called “war on gangs” in the country.  As the largest prison in the world, CECOT can hold up to 40,000 people. However, plans to double the mega prison’s capacity (80,000) are already underway, with the US expected to “send enough to fill it,” as reported by the Wall Street Journal.  From state of emergency to state of exception The year before CECOT’s inauguration, President Bukele declared a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights like due process, legal defense, and freedom of assembly, and allowing measures like mass arrests, and indefinite pretrial detention.  “CECOT is nothing more than an extermination prison for the poor,” says Marisel Ramírez, a member of the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, a coalition of Salvadoran trade unions, civil society groups, and political organizations. “The regime invests in mega-prisons instead of health, education, or structural reforms.” Today, El Salvador’s detention rate has outpaced that of the United States – the former world leader in incarceration by far. 1 in every 57 Salvadorans is now incarcerated, triple the rate of the US.  In March 2025, various human rights organizations in El Salvador, such as Human Rights Institute of the Central American University (IDHUCA); Foundation for the Study and Application of the Law (FESPAD); Passionist Social Service, among others, produced a report compiling documented cases of mistreatment, torture, and the inhumane conditions of detainees over the three years of the “state of exception.” Their findings include: • 85,000+ people have been detained by the state during this period• 6,889 cases of human rights violations have been filed by human rights organizations• 52% of detainees are 19–30 year-old men• 265–375 deaths in state custody have been verified by different data agencies Their report demands the repeal of the “state of exception,” reparations for the families and victims of human rights violations, and independent investigations of all human rights abuses. Welcome to CECOT Many of CECOT’s prisoners are denied due process. Visitation is prohibited. Communication with family, friends, and even lawyers is prohibited. Inmates are also completely stripped of privacy. Cells are packed with up to 80 people for 23.5 hours a day. They share metal bunks and an open toilet, under constant surveillance by prison guards. There is no form of education or recreation offered at the facility. Letters and reading material are prohibited. And there are no reports of any inmates being released. CBS News reported El Salvador’s justice minister saying, “the only way out is in a coffin.” In fact, Google Earth images and videos have recently circulated social media showing a CECOT courtyard that appears to be stained with blood.  CECOT has become a symbol of a global trend towards militarization, mass incarceration, and political repression under the pretense of “domestic security.” As Trump’s offshore detention of migrants in CECOT shines an international spotlight on Bukele’s policies, urgent questions are arising: 1. How far will the US go in utilizing Bukele’s repressive infrastructure for its own agenda?2. How did a self-described “dictator” rise to power in El Salvador?3. How are communities in El Salvador responding? The US – Bukele alliance While CECOT was built for domestic repression and incarceration, it is now a site of international collaboration between extreme-right-wing governments. Bukele’s prison has been openly endorsed – and now directly funded – by the US government.  On March 15, in an unprecedented move, the Trump administration deported roughly 250 Venezuelan migrants to CECOT prison in El Salvador, ignoring a federal judge’s order to halt the deportations. Invoking the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) of 1798 against Venezuelan nationals accused of being part of the gang Tren de Aragua, Trump attempted to pave a “legal” pathway for his policy of mass deportations. Yet a report from CBS News claims that the majority of those deported have no criminal record in the US, and human rights and advocacy groups have rejected any legal basis for Trump’s use of the AEA.  One of the deportees, a Maryland resident and union worker named Kilmar Abrego Garcia, has become a central figure in the broader legal and political crisis surrounding Trump and Bukele’s authoritarian alliance.  The case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia Kilmar was born in El Salvador and holds protected status in the US, where he has lived for over 14 years. The Trump administration admitted he was deported in error and the Supreme Court has ordered the US government to facilitate his return. Nevertheless, Trump has defied the order, and Bukele refuses to release Abrego. Recently, Trump has accused Abrego of being part of the Salvadoran gang, MS-13, without evidence or due process. Since the day CECOT was inaugurated, the government has used social media to promote positive ideas about the prison and Bukele’s iron-grip approach. Far-right politicians and YouTube influencers are regularly welcomed to tour CECOT, posing in front of groups of detainees for their online audiences. However, Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen was denied entry to the facility on April 16, when he traveled to El Salvador to advocate for Kilmar’s release. In the late hours of April 17, the senator was finally able to meet with Abrego off-site from the prison. In a press conference held on April 18 in Dulles International Airport, the Senator told reporters that the Maryland father is not being held at CECOT but is still being illegally detained in a different Salvadoran prison. “The reason they relented is pretty clear — they were feeling the pressure,” said the senator. Kilmar’s wife credited the growing movement for justice for the small win in a statement released by the advocacy group CASA:  “Now I know that my husband is alive…Thank you to everyone, including Senator Van Hollen, my CASA family, all our Union’s, faith leaders and community for continuing this fight for my family to be reunited.” The USD 15 million deal behind CECOT The detention of migrants in El Salvador’s prison system has faced heavy criticism. Many are asking, why is the Salvadoran government continuing to hold migrants at CECOT without any evidence that they have committed a crime? During his visit to El Salvador, Maryland Senator raised this very question to Vice President Félix Ulloa in regard to Abrego Garcia, who said that the Trump administration is paying El Salvador to keep migrants like Garcia at CECOT. The Trump administration has reportedly agreed to pay El Salvador USD 6 million to house hundreds of migrants deported from the US for up to a year. In Van Hollen’s press conference on April 18, he told reporters that the deal between Trump and Bukele may be for as much as USD 15 million. “Homegrowns are next” Migrants are not the only ones being targeted for deportation to CECOT. During Bukele’s White House visit on April 14, Trump was recorded saying he wants to send US citizens to CECOT too. The “homegrown criminals” are next. “You’ve got to build about five more places,” he said. To which Bukele responded, “we’ve got space.”  Legal experts and human rights organizations have asserted that the offshore detention of US citizens is illegal, but Trump confirmed later that “We are looking into it, and we want to do it.” The US – Bukele alliance represents a convergence in the growing international authoritarian trend. But this alliance didn’t emerge overnight. It is the result of a deliberate political project that Bukele has been advancing for years. But to understand how the country got to this point, we have to look back at how Bukele transformed El Salvador into, as he calls it, a dictatorship.  The world’s “coolest dictator” For years, El Salvador faced one of the highest homicide rates in the world, driven by the extortion practices of gangs, like MS-13. The gang started in Los Angeles, California, initially to defend Salvadoran immigrants from other established gangs in the area, but became more structured and violent over time. After mass deportations in the 1990s, MS-13 expanded throughout Central America, gaining a high level of territorial control in El Salvador. Communities were often caught in the crossfire, with widespread insecurity and little trust in state institutions to protect them. Bukele rose to power promising an end to the violence, using harsh anti-gang rhetoric and militarization to appeal to the widespread fear and frustration, ultimately winning popular support. However, according to organizers with the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, Bukele’s security policy is based on a pact with the gangs – not a war on them. They explain that while the president claims there are 80,000 gang members and terrorists in prison, the National Civil Police only reports the seizure of 4,000 weapons, 20,000 cell phones, and USD 4 million. There have been no arrests of top gang leaders, nor have those who have committed crimes in the US been extradited to that country.  Suppression of the left Movement leaders describe Bukele’s rise as one of clear authoritarianism – cloaked in anti-gang rhetoric, backed by the US, and enforced through mass repression. He enjoys popular support “because people perceive improved security, and he has imposed the idea that traditional parties were corrupt and waged a war that led to tragedies.” Activists assert that eliminating the left in the country as a viable political option has been a deliberate goal of Bukele’s “business clan.” They say Bukele has specifically targeted the FMLN, a former guerilla group that led the armed struggle against US-backed dictatorship in the 1980s, and later helped secure key democratic reforms through the Peace Accords.  “The FMLN is a victim of a smear campaign by the regime…whose influence in the state and society has significantly diminished. After governing for 10 years, the FMLN has no presence in the Legislative Assembly and no longer governs any mayoralties,” reads a statement by the Bloc. To better understand how Bukele consolidated power and suppressed his opposition, activists point to key moments in recent history. Here is a brief timeline of Bukele’s regime: 2019 – Bukele elected president• Breaking with the two dominant parties (ARENA and FMLN), he formed the party Nuevas Ideas, and presented himself as a young, social media savvy reformist.  2020 – Bukele storms Legislative Assembly with military• Flanked by heavily armed soldiers and police, Bukele enters the Legislative Assembly to pressure lawmakers to approve a USD 109 million loan, in order to militarize his police and soldiers to allegedly combat gangs. • International human rights groups condemn the action, while activists draw connections to El Salvador’s history of military dictatorships. 2021 – Removes Constitutional Court judges, adopts Bitcoin• Replacing judges in the Constitutional Court with loyalists, and removing the Attorney General, Bukele gains unchecked control over all three branches of government.• El Salvador becomes the only country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as a legal tender, despite mass protests.• Bukele’s new court rules that presidential reelection is now legal, ignoring a constitutional ban. Bukele announces his intent to run for reelection in 2024. • The US government applies some pressure on Bukele to maintain legal appearances.• Critics argue that a major part of Bukele’s propaganda is the idea that he’s “changing the country,” using symbolic gestures, minor public projects, and some changes to the state like reducing the number of provincial and municipal governments.  2022 – “State of emergency” declared• Following a spike in homicides, Bukele declares a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights, and launching a so-called “war on gangs.”• Mass arrests without warrants begin. Many are detained without evidence or due process. Activists call the state of emergency a “mechanism of social containment.” They report popular leaders being targeted, generating fear and limiting popular protests. 2023 – CECOT prison unveiled• The 40,000 person-capacity mega prison is inaugurated with a propaganda blitz displaying prisoners in dehumanizing ways.• Bitcoin investment loses over 50% of its value, costing El Salvador hundreds of millions.• Irregularities around public procurement connected to the Bukele family arise. The public procurement law is practically repealed, limiting public access to details about government spending and contracts.• Political opposition in government has been practically eliminated. 55/60 representatives are from Bukele’s party, NI. 43/44 mayoralities are controlled by NI and its allies. The majority of the population rejects the FMLN and even the traditional, non-governing right parties.  2024 – Bukele wins reelection• Despite a constitutional ban on reelection, Bukele runs for president and wins. He is backed by his courts and military, amid a climate of fear and mass imprisonment justified by “domestic security” rhetoric.• The US government supports his illegal reelection.• Investigations reveal that the Bukele family has significantly increased their land holdings during Nayib Bukele’s presidency (USD 9.2 million in value), placing them among the top 2% of large coffee producers in El Salvador.• Bukele reverses a landmark ban on metal mining, sparking a nationwide protest movement. Today, Bukele’s “state of exception” continues indefinitely. Reports of torture, disappearances, and political arrests grow. Meanwhile, the Salvadoran President is promoting himself worldwide as a model far-right leader and enjoying a lucrative alliance with the US government.  As the repression intensifies, so too does grassroots resistance. People’s movements for the freedom of political prisoners, and against the “state of exception” continue to build, the most important of these being the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc.  Salvadoran resistance The Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc is an organization of 35 social organizations from various sectors of society: students, women, peasants, unions, professionals, and more.  Marisel Ramírez, an organizer with the Bloc, told Peoples Dispatch: “These organizations came together in January 2021 to denounce the major setbacks we have suffered since the Bukele business clan took office, and to demand an end to the government’s repressive policies.” Explaining the Bloc’s strategies and tactics, Marisel said that “the organizations that belong to the bloc act according to their own demands, highlighting the serious human rights violations committed under the state of emergency.” In her words, the resistance doesn’t take just one form – it plays out across a range of interconnected fronts. Here are just a few examples: 1. Movement of Victims of the State of Emergency (MOVIR)• Families of the detainees mobilize their communities and protest the arbitrary arrests, demanding justice and freedom for their loved ones. 2. Salvadoran Student Force• Students are consistently fighting back against the arrests of university students under the state of exception. 3. Feminist Resistance • Women are organizing and mobilizing around the economic, emotional, and familial impacts of the arbitrary arrests of innocent people, as well as the abuse of power by the military and police.These forces, Marisel said, “demand ‘sexual favors’ in exchange for ‘benefits’ – not taking people away, expediting judicial processes, and access to personal hygiene products.” 4. The Confederation of Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Federations (CONFRAS)• Mobilizes peasants and farm workers and denounces the shortage of agricultural labor caused by the high migration triggered by the state of exception. Despite Bukele’s iron-grip approach and mass incarceration campaign, resistance in El Salvador is growing – led by families of the detained and disappeared, student organizers, feminist collectives, and peasant unions who refuse to be silenced. Their struggle aims to demonstrate that CECOT is not just a prison – it is a weapon of political power aimed at the poor and fueled by international complicity.  What’s becoming increasingly clear is that the US is seeking to expand its deportation machine and outsource incarceration and repression to third countries like El Salvador. As these transnational policies develop, urgent questions remain: To what extent will Trump bulldoze legal obstacles in order to utilize this repressive model? Will US citizens begin facing deportation and detention in CECOT? And, how will the people in the US respond to this deepening authoritarian alliance? Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

Defense & Security
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ISIS After Assad: Reshaping Its Presence in Syria’s Power Vacuums and the Challenges of Regional Deterrence

by Mohamed Nabil El-Bendary

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

Defense & Security
Double exposure of Sudan flag. Symbols depicting the Civil War. The civil war between Sudanese government forces and the paramilitary

Sudan’s war isn’t nearly over – armed civilian groups are rising

by Mohamed Saad

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sudan’s war, now entering its third year, has taken another unexpected turn. In March 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), also known as the Janjaweed, withdrew from Khartoum, abandoning the presidential palace and airport. This retreat marks a significant contrast to the paramilitary group’s earlier victory when troops stormed the capital in April 2023. The fall of Khartoum is a turning point. But, based on my research into Sudan’s political turmoil over the past three decades, I don’t believe recent developments mark the war’s final chapter. What began as a power struggle between two military factions is now transforming into a much wider conflict, marked by deepening fragmentation and the rise of armed civilian groups. Across the country, new militias are emerging, many formed by civilians who once had no part in the war. The army encouraged civilians to fight, but now it faces a growing number of independent armed groups. In cities and rural areas alike, civilians have taken up arms. Some are fighting alongside the army, answering calls from the military leadership, including army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to defend their neighbourhoods and families. Others have formed self-defence units to protect against looting and violence. Some have joined breakaway militias that have their own agendas. These groups don’t share a single goal. Some fight for self-defence, others for political power. Some for revenue and wealth. Others are seeking ethnic control – Sudan’s population has 56 ethnic groups and 595 sub-ethnic groups. This is what makes Sudan’s war even more dangerous: fragmentation is creating multiple mini-wars within the larger conflict. How the Rapid Support Forces lost Khartoum Several key factors forced the RSF to retreat from Khartoum after it claimed control of the Sudanese capital city two years earlier. • Internal fractures: The RSF, built on tribal loyalty, struggled to hold together as the war dragged on. Many factions felt sidelined by its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. • Civilian resistance: The RSF’s reliance on brutality backfired, alienating even those who might have supported them. Instead of consolidating control, they turned civilians into enemies. The RSF relied on terror – looting, mass killings and sexual violence. Instead of gaining control, they provoked fierce resistance. Armed civilians, originally taking up arms in self-defence, have become an informal militia network working against the RSF. • Foreign intervention: Reports suggest Egyptian airstrikes and tactical support helped the army take Khartoum. Additionally, Turkish-made Bayraktar drones weakened RSF positions. With supply lines cut, the RSF had no choice but to retreat. Khartoum was not just a battlefield defeat for the RSF. It was a turning point in how the war is fought – it’s no longer a military struggle but a battle involving armed civilians across Sudan. Based on reports from humanitarian organisations, conflict monitors and local testimonies, a clearer picture has emerged of a growing number of armed groups operating across Sudan. These groups have formed in response to the escalating conflict. Recent analyses highlight that arms trafficking and intensified community mobilisation have accelerated within the past two years. Neighbourhood defence units have emerged in urban areas like El-Gezira in central Sudan, El-Fasher in North Darfur, Al-Dalang in South Kordofan, El-Obeid in North Kordofan, Babanusa in West Kordofan and Khartoum. They were initially formed to protect residential zones from the RSF but have since expanded their roles and increasingly operate outside the oversight of the army. Tribal and regional militias have also become more prominent, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan. In these regions, entrenched ethnic and political rivalries have intertwined with the current war. Some of these militia groups have aligned with the army. Others remain independent, pursuing their own agendas, which include securing territory. In Darfur, growing anger at Hemedti’s favouritism towards his own tribe (Rizeigat) led to defections. Internal divisions within the RSF have played a major role in its recent losses. Some former RSF fighters have formed their own militias. The RSF was never a unified force, but a tribal alliance dominated by the Dagalo family and Rizeigat elites. Initially, gold revenues secured loyalty, but as the war has dragged on, internal fractures have deepened. Another ethnic-linked group is the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North. It has expanded its control in Kordofan and Blue Nile, two resource-rich regions in southern Sudan. The group allied with the RSF to push its own agenda, which includes securing greater autonomy for these regions and promoting a secular political framework that challenges Khartoum’s Islamist-leaning governance. Other ethnic militias also operate in eastern Sudan, supported by neighbouring countries such as Eritrea, further escalating the situation. Islamist-linked militias are also on the rise. The main example of these groups is El Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, which emerged as a key player supporting the army against the RSF. Reports link the group to remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime (1993-2019) – the dissolved Popular Defence Forces. This was a paramilitary group established in the mid-1980s to defend Arab tribes and support the military. It flourished under the al-Bashir regime. What next? While the RSF’s retreat from Khartoum is a major victory for the Sudanese army, it doesn’t mean stability is returning. Instead, Sudan is now facing a dangerous new reality: the rise of civilian militarisation. If not reined in, these groups could evolve and establish de facto warlord-run territories where local commanders wield unchecked power. This would undermine any prospects for centralised governance in Sudan. With militias multiplying and no clear political solution, Sudan risks becoming a battlefield of warring factions. Meanwhile, international mediators are struggling to find a solution while foreign interference continues. The United Arab Emirates, a major RSF backer, still supports Hemedti financially, ensuring he remains active in Sudan’s gold trade.

Diplomacy
Salva Kiir, president of semi-autonomous South Sudan, waits to receive Omar al Bashir on his visit to the southern capital Juba. File:Kiir awaits - Flickr - Al Jazeera English.jpg

Is South Sudan’s Peace Deal Falling Apart Again?

by Akshit Tyagi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском South Sudan’s fragile peace deal is unravelling as political tensions flare and violence resurfaces. More than a broken trust is the cause, and the nation’s leaders will need to be pressured into peace.  South Sudan is once again on the edge of a civil war. In March 2025, Vice President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest by President Salva Kiir’s government. His party, the SPLM-IO, quickly declared that the 2018 peace deal, the agreement that ended five years of brutal conflict, had effectively collapsed. The United Nations has warned that the situation looks dangerously similar to the lead-up to South Sudan’s past civil wars. Armed clashes between rival groups have already broken out. Kenya sent former Prime Minister Raila Odinga to mediate the crisis, but so far, tensions remain high. South Sudan has been here before. After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, it quickly plunged into civil war just two years later. What began as a power struggle between Kiir and Machar turned into a deadly ethnic conflict. By the time a peace deal was signed in 2018, more than 400,000 people were dead, and millions had been forced to flee their homes. The 2018 peace agreement, formally known as the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), was meant to end that war for good. It brought Machar back as vice president and called for national elections, the integration of armed forces, and the formation of a permanent constitution. It looked promising at first. But six years later, many of its key promises remain unfulfilled, and the country is once again on the brink. What went wrong with the 2018 deal? The biggest problem with the 2018 deal is that it focused too much on power-sharing between Kiir and Machar, and not enough on the root causes of the conflict. It brought the two rivals back into government but did little to heal the ethnic divisions or build trust between their followers. Most importantly, it failed to fully integrate their armed forces. Instead of one national army, South Sudan still has multiple rival groups loyal to different leaders. This failure made the peace fragile from the start. Without a unified army or a functioning justice system, violence could return at any moment, and now it has. The deal also suffered from constant delays. Elections that were supposed to happen in 2022 were pushed to 2024 and have now been delayed again to 2026. The transitional government has been slow to draft a new constitution or set up key institutions. Critics say Kiir’s government has little interest in real democratic reform. Why is the crisis escalating now? Machar’s house arrest was the breaking point. His party accuses the government of undermining the agreement, and reports suggest that fighting has already started in some areas, including Unity State and Jonglei. The UN has expressed alarm, and several foreign governments have urged South Sudan to de-escalate before the violence spreads further. The government, meanwhile, claims Machar is supporting local militias, a charge he denies. This growing distrust is making it harder to bring both sides back to the negotiating table. Kenya has stepped in to help mediate, but with little progress so far. Odinga’s visit is a positive step, but the situation on the ground remains volatile. Could this lead to another civil war? Unfortunately, yes. All the warning signs are there. Armed groups are mobilising. The central government is cracking down on political opposition. And most of the peace deal’s reforms have stalled. If full-blown war breaks out, the humanitarian consequences will be devastating. South Sudan is already struggling with hunger, flooding, and mass displacement. Millions rely on humanitarian aid, and new fighting would make it even harder for that aid to reach those in need. South Sudan’s youth, who have grown up knowing little but war, risk losing any hope for a peaceful future. Many feel abandoned by leaders who promised peace and delivered more political games. The international community played a big role in securing the 2018 peace deal. But since then, global attention has faded. While donors continue to fund humanitarian work, they’ve largely backed away from holding South Sudan’s leaders accountable for delays and violations. That needs to change. The African Union, IGAD, the UN, and Western governments still have influence, if they choose to use it. They can apply diplomatic pressure, impose sanctions, and demand real reforms. More importantly, any future deal must include voices beyond Kiir and Machar: civil society leaders, women, youth, and religious figures who understand what peace means at the community level. What does South Sudan need now? South Sudan doesn’t need another temporary fix between two politicians. It needs deep, long-term change. That means building a functioning government, creating a unified army, and setting up systems that can hold leaders accountable. The country also needs truth and reconciliation. Thousands of families are still waiting for justice, and no peace deal will hold unless those wounds are addressed. Ordinary South Sudanese citizens must be part of this process, not just political elites. At its heart, this is a story of broken trust. South Sudan’s leaders promised to end a war and build a country. Today, those promises are in ruins. But the future isn’t written yet. With the right pressure, the right leadership, and the right voices at the table, a peaceful future is still possible. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Energy & Economics
Workers install an electric power windmill during the construction of a wind farm by the Kazakh company Samruk-Energo in cooperation with China's PowerChina Corporation. Kazakhstan, April 7, 2022.

Why is China investing in renewable energy in Kazakhstan?

by Nurbek Bekmurzaev , Brian Hioe

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском China is simultaneously the world's biggest polluter and the global leader in renewables This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice Fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Kazakhstan’s transition to renewable energy (RE) has seen a significant surge in recent years. This rapidly growing green transition has allowed the country to meet its interim RE targets. By 2030, the country aims to generate 15 percent of its total energy output through renewables and increase this share to 50 percent by 2050. Moreover, Kazakhstan has committed to reaching carbon neutrality by 2060.  The biggest partner in this endeavor has been China, whose role in the RE transition has grown and diversified over the years. For Kazakhstan, the benefits of this partnership are clear: industrialization of its economy and, more importantly, decreasing carbon emissions and improving air quality and public health. For China, the benefits go beyond mere lucrative investments and exporting its RE technology and include gaining soft power and offsetting its environmentally destructive footprint in Kazakhstan.  Harnessing renewable energy to combat air pollution In addition to rich oil and gas resources, Kazakhstan has vast renewable energy potential, thanks to its large territory and abundance of wind and sunny days. It is the ninth largest country by area and holds 77 percent of Central Asia’s solar potential and 90 percent of the regional wind potential.   The presence of wind corridors in vast Kazakh steppes with wind speeds of more than five miles per second, which is present in all regions, makes Kazakhstan ideal for the operation of wind turbines. Additionally, at least 50 percent of Kazakhstan's territory is suitable for installing solar panels.  Most of the RE potential remains untapped, with Kazakhstan still relying on Soviet-era energy infrastructure built to utilize fossil fuels. In 2024, 66 percent of the country’s electricity was generated through coal, 21 percent via natural gas, 6.6 percent from hydroelectricity, and only 6.4 percent from renewables.  Air pollution is a nationwide problem in Kazakhstan. In 2025, 35 cities spread across the country faced significant air pollution, according to the National Hydrometeorological Service of Kazakhstan. A major source of this pollution pandemic is coal burned by thermal power plants, industrial complexes, and households.  The list of adverse effects of air pollution is long. According to Kazakhstani doctor Denis Vinnikov, who has researched air pollution’s effects on health, long-term exposure to polluted air increases the risk of developing cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, such as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). In addition, air pollution increases the likelihood of almost all types of cancer and tumors. One of the most polluted cities in Kazakhstan, Almaty, is one of the national leaders with the highest cases of COPD.  Kazakhstan’s recognition of the adverse effects of its coal-intensive energy sector on the environment and public health has pushed the government to ramp up renewable energy production in the last decade. China’s multiple roles in renewables The Kazakh-Chinese green energy endeavors are part of China's wider bilateral cooperation, covering energy, agriculture, machinery, and mining, among other areas. China is one of Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partners. In 2022, the countries signed a permanent comprehensive strategic partnership. Between 2005 and 2023, China invested over USD 25 billion in Kazakhstan.  The two sides also work closely within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global connectivity project focusing on energy, trade, and transport infrastructure in global majority states. Between 2013 and 2020, China invested USD 18.5 billion in Kazakhstan within the BRI framework. China has participated in Kazakhstan’s green transition from the very beginning. In an interview with Global Voices, Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project, described China as the “first-comer” to Kazakhstan’s RE sector. Yana Zabanova, a research associate at the Research Institute for Sustainability, said in an interview with Global Voices: China has been the main technology supplier to Kazakhstan's renewable energy sector, both in the solar PV and increasingly in the wind sector, and Chinese companies have also served as important investors and EPC [engineering, procurement, and constuction] contractors for renewable energy projects in the country. China’s role grew exponentially starting in 2018 when the government launched renewable energy auctions, which gifted government contracts to the lowest bidder. Since 2018, a single private Chinese company, Universal Energy, has built 10 RE plants, three solar and seven wind, with a total capacity of 630 Megawatts by winning government tenders.   Additionally, state-owned Chinese companies have secured contracts via intergovernmental negotiations. There are several examples of this, such as the Zhanatas and Shelek wind power plants (WPP), which are already operational, and five more RE plants in the development stage with a total capacity of 2.6 GW.   In an interview with Global Voices, Ainur Sospanova, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Qazaq Green RES Association, provided her expert assessment of China’s share in Kazakhstan’s RE sector: In the solar energy sector, it is almost 100 percent because it is impossible to compete against Chinese solar panels. In the wind energy sector, it is at least 70 percent and continues to grow. Thus, since 2018, China has expanded its role to project developer and financier through loans issued by Chinese banks and equity financing.  China's share in Kazakhstan’s renewable projects is set to grow even more upon the completion of two Chinese plants that will localize the production of energy storage systems and components for WPP. Gaining soft power and improving its image Paradoxically, China is simultaneously the biggest polluter in the world and the global leader in renewables. While China is constructing two-thirds of the world's wind and solar projects, 93 percent of global construction from coal power took place in China in 2024. This paradox is also present in BRI projects, including those in Kazakhstan.  China frequently touts its solar and wind energy projects as part of the BRI. At the same time, one-fourth of coal-fired power generation in the world is financed through the BRI. Though China Power International Holding and Kazakhstani Samruk Energy have agreed on solar and wind projects to develop renewables, deals are also inked to develop oil, gas, coal, cement, and steel industries in Kazakhstan, which adversely affect the environment and the well-being of local communities. Sharifli explained: When we look at the global discontent with China’s presence, we see two worries: debt trap and environmental pollution. So renewable energy is very important in this context. China’s investments in renewables are aimed at tackling these worries by gaining soft power and improving its reputation. This benefits not only China but also the BRI. Chinese companies that have invested in RE in Kazakhstan, such as Risen Energy, Universal Energy, and Power China, put the BRI at the heart of how they frame their companies. Chinese think tanks also suggest that the Chinese government welcome RE development overseas despite concerns.   In contrast to the Chinese-built oil processing, steel, and cement plants in Kazakhstan, RE projects have thus caused no controversy and helped China improve its reputation in Central Asia. Sharifli noted that since 2021, public attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan have started becoming more positive, partially due to Chinese investments in RE, according to a survey conducted by the Central Asia Barometer.  “Renewable energy plants are usually located in the steppe, far away from the settlements, they don’t interfere with the daily lives of people and look idyllic. There is no trash, there is no pollution, there is no dirty water or soil,” said Zabanova, who has visited multiple RE plants in Kazakhstan as part of her research.  China’s investments in renewables in Kazakhstan serve as an example of how solar and wind energy projects are used in diplomacy. They not only allow Chinese companies to export their excess capacities to profitable foreign markets but also help China mask its environmental damage and create a favorable perception abroad.

Defense & Security
world map of ethiopia and bordering countries sudan kenya somalia and eritrea

Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions: Power Dynamics and Extra-Regional Actors in the Red Sea Region

by Federico Donelli

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Diplomacy
El presidente de la República Daniel Noboa Azin mantuvo una entrevistas con Telemundo en Guayas, 12 de enero de 2024 - 9

Clear Victory for President Noboa

by Johannes Hügel

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ecuador shows the red card to a possible return of the Correísmo. Daniel Noboa remains president of Ecuador. The young head of state won the run-off election for the highest state office against his left-wing populist challenger Luisa González by a surprisingly clear margin of over eleven percent. The refusal of the loser to acknowledge her defeat once again demonstrates the great polarization in the country. After a peaceful election, this division into two camps is one of the biggest challenges facing the winner of the election, alongside curbing organized crime and the complicated economic situation. When the National Electoral Council announced an "incontrovertible trend" in favor of President Daniel Noboa just a few hours after the polling stations closed on 13 April, his supporters erupted in jubilation. This was particularly great, as the victory of 55.65% to 44.35% after more than 99% of the votes had been counted was much clearer than all the polls had predicted. The expected close election result had given rise to general concern that the election could have unpleasant repercussions in the form of electoral disputes, which would be detrimental to Ecuadorian democracy. The strong result for incumbent Daniel Noboa is beyond question but should not be read as total approval of Noboa's policies by the electorate. Rather, it clearly shows that, despite all the criticism of the government, Ecuadorians do not want to return to the "socialism of the XXI century" and its Ecuadorian figurehead Rafael Correa, from whose all-consuming shadow the defeated presidential candidate Luisa González was unable to emerge. Correismo's resistance to recognizing the election result on election night seems more than questionable given Noboa's clear lead of more than one million votes. The election campaign While Noboa was clearly committed to retaining the dollar as a means of payment, a further opening towards the USA and a relentless fight against organized crime in the run-up to the run-off election, González stood for a completely different course. She questioned the dollarization of Ecuador, proposed recognition of the Maduro regime in Venezuela with the resumption of diplomatic relations and, with regard to the fight against drug-related crime, wanted to follow the example of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, whose policy of "abrazos, no balazos" ("hugs, no bullets") was more of a sham pacification and a modus vivendi with the drug gangs than a real approach to the issue. Businessman's son Daniel Noboa, who has only been in power since November 2023 thanks to an extraordinary election following the end of former President Guillermo Lasso's government, has been characterized by a pragmatic approach in his brief time in office since November 2023. His government prioritized concrete and high-profile measures, particularly in the fight against crime, over ideological discourse. However, due to his short time in office, many of his actions were characterized more by campaign tactics than strategy. In contrast, Luisa González attempted to link her program to the legacy of former President Rafael Correa but made certain nuances and strategic distancing. In particular, she was critical of the Communications Law (also known as the "muzzle law"), which had been used as the basis for the persecution of journalists and the media during Rafael Correa's time in office (2007-2017). In the weeks leading up to the run-off, the focus of the election campaign was on the economy, security, and organized crime. There was no shortage of mutual accusations and all too often polemics took precedence over arguments. In view of the continuing catastrophic security situation, in which people are losing their lives in violence every hour and kidnapping rates in the country have risen by 73.9% between 2023 and 2024,[i] concepts are urgently needed. Clever marketing After the young electorate between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the 37-year-old Noboa in the first round of voting, this time the older population groups also appear to have voted for the president. The general voter turnout was 83.76%, around two percentage points higher than in the first round of voting. In a country where many people have lost confidence in politics and its representatives, Noboa still seems to represent their hopes of overcoming the grievances, the outdated elites and the Correísmo. With his presence in the social media and a renewed self-presentation with giant papier-mâché figures distributed throughout the country, he once again managed to achieve a strong public presence. People of all ages and social classes could be seen roaming the streets of the capital Quito, for example, taking selfies with the papier-mâché Noboas, which were then shared millions of times on social networks. With such marketing tricks, his determined and youthful appearance and the fear of large parts of Ecuador of a return of the Correísmo, Noboa was able to extend his lead compared to the virtually undecided first round of elections on February 9 and win five provinces that had previously gone to Luisa González - El Oro, Guayas, Imbabura, Orellana and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas. Major construction sites For Ecuador and its old and new president, however, Noboa's election victory means only a brief respite in a situation that remains tense. The challenges remain enormous. The new National Assembly elected in February is divided into two large blocs that support Noboa and González (or Correa). There are also a number of smaller blocs and individual deputies, on whose support Noboa will be dependent due to the lack of a majority of his own. Noboa will have to demonstrate his ability to act and make convincing political proposals in order to achieve governance that serves the common good. The future of the country will depend on how well it manages to identify points of consensus and tackle the structural challenges. In this context, technical and non-partisan initiatives that manage to bundle the country's national priorities offer an opportunity. A national deficit of more than five billion US dollars, high foreign debt, and too few sustainable sources of revenue for the state will make governing difficult. Debt repayments and difficult renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund regarding the granting of further loans are also on the cards. The new government must therefore also aim to create jobs and get people into regular employment. Around 70 percent of the population still lives from the informal sector. In other words, only around 30 percent of the population work in the context of a formal employment relationship and pay taxes regularly. The president must also develop a coherent strategy for restructuring the energy system in order to avoid the hours-long power cuts that plagued the country last year. A supply system that is dependent on hydropower, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of diversification in the energy mix hang like a sword of Damocles over the president and could soon earn him the displeasure of the population. Last but not least, the Noboa government must get to grips with the enormous security problem associated with organized crime and various forms of illegal economic activity. The support of the USA and international cooperation in general will play a significant role in this. However, a clear and sustainable strategy for anti-mafia legislation on the part of the government is also needed. Concrete proposals are also needed to remove criminal elements from organs of the partly infiltrated state security apparatus. Outlook For Europe and Germany, Noboa's victory and the associated four-year term of office represent a fantastic opportunity to tackle the phenomenon of organized crime in a structured and targeted manner through coordinated cooperation with international allies. Noboa wants to bring his agenda closer to the USA, particularly in the areas of security and trade. As far as the European Union is concerned, strengthening cooperation and investment in areas such as the environment and energy could also be crucial for his government's future positive multilateral orientation. One sign of hope is Noboa's clear support for the port security initiative launched by EUROPOL as well as EU projects to promote comprehensive prison reform and the fight against the mafia. Cooperation on trade, economic and security issues could make Ecuador a stable partner in the Andean region in the face of left-wing authoritarian systems such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This is particularly important in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, especially in view of the fact that over 70 percent of all cocaine exports reach Europe via Ecuadorian ports. However, without a clear ethical awareness among Europeans of the drama and the effects of drug trafficking in Ecuador and Latin America, the situation in the Andean country will not improve, but rather worsen due to the demand effect, with all the social and violent consequences for the population. A litmus test for Daniel Noboa's ability to act could be his promise to start a new constitutional process. Ecuadorian institutions are still hampered by the authoritarian legacy of Rafael Correa's constitution, which is still in force. A transparent process with the participation of civil society could give Noboa legitimacy and help the country to leave the Correa legacy behind for good.  References [i] Un asesinato por hora desde el 1 de enero: Ecuador vive el inicio de año más violento desde que hay registros.

Energy & Economics
South America Map with Shown in a Microchip Pattern. E-government. Continent Vector maps. Microchip Series

Polyglobalization, Big Tech, and Latin America, or what happens to the digital periphery when the center shifts.

by Carina Borrastero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском So far in the 21st century, we are witnessing the consolidation of an international division of labor in which the levers of economic, political, and technological power are increasingly decoupled from local capacities for the vast majority of nations and relocated to the international arena. The cooperative competition among oligopolistic forces vying for control of key assets to secure global hegemony—energy, finance, digital technology, logistics, military, and space—is one of the fundamental vectors of this framework. The constant expansion of these forces is rooted in the constitutive interaction between giant corporations in strategic sectors and the core states of the new poly-globalization—namely the United States and China—whose geopolitical rivalry is intrinsically linked to the success of the accumulation regime. The oligopolies and their centers of origin appropriate the market and innovation rents generated by the new productive map, accumulating a structural and relational power (in Susan Strange’s terms) that is quickly and markedly outpacing the rest. In this way, both companies and states outside these core zones are being pushed into increasingly dependent positions regarding the technologies, goods, and basic services produced by the winning oligopolies. They are, we might say, being shifted to the new extended periphery. How does this happen? What role does technology play, and where is Latin America in this story? GEOPOLITICS Today, the United States and China sit at the center, while the rest of the world occupies the periphery. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebecca Grynspan (2023) describes the novel emergence of “centers within the periphery” as part of a process she calls poly-globalization: both China’s rise to the top ranks of global power and the consolidation of highly productive and commercial hubs in other parts of Asia challenge the sustainability of the post–Cold War unipolar world and the traditional North–South divide. Within this framework, historical peripheral dependency does not disappear, but rather changes in form and geography—especially considering that a growing number of developed countries are becoming productively and technologically dependent on countries like China, more so than the reverse (a case in point is Germany in the automotive industry; Zhang & Lustenberger, 2025). However, the periphery is not a homogeneous entity, and not all regions and countries have the same capacities or room for maneuver within this scheme, where starting points significantly shape long-term trajectories. Developed countries (formerly located at the center) remain better equipped than developing countries to face the challenges of their new condition. We can conceptualize the peripheral configuration as tiers or peripheral rings: there is no “semi-periphery”, but rather tiers or rings within the periphery. From this perspective, we might say that Western Europe constitutes a first peripheral ring (1st tier periphery), and industrialized Asia a second ring (2nd tier periphery). Latin America, in this framework, occupies a third ring: it possesses certain accumulated productive capabilities, but due to being more "distant" from the center in terms of the criticality of its production, it receives fewer benefits from integration into major global value chains in terms of investment and technological learning (as Evolutionary Economics and Latin American Development Theory have long pointed out, producing semiconductors, AI, or green hydrogen technology —as in Taiwan, India, or Germany, respectively— is not the same than assembling automobiles as in Mexico and Argentina). In this scenario, the Latin American region—historically subordinated to a single center (the North-Center)—is now subordinate to two. China has been rapidly tightening its economic ties with the region, primarily through trade and financial assistance (Dussel Peters, 2021; Ugarteche & De León, 2020; Villasenin, 2021). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, rose from less than 1% of the region’s total FDI in 2012 to 10.8% in 2019 (although it still lags behind investment from the US and the European Union) (Dussel Peters, 2022). The Asian giant is already Brazil’s main trading partner, is rapidly deepening its ties with Mexico, and an increasing number of countries across the continent have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, including Argentina since 2022 (the other two major Latin American economies have not joined so far). However, the benefits of these relationships for the region remain ambivalent: on the one hand, they have reduced financial dependence on the US—a significant achievement—but they have not yet translated into higher value-added development such as export diversification or upgrading. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce the trend toward re-commoditization of local economies (Wainer, 2023; Alami et al., 2025). DIGITAL ECONOMY The current dynamics of the tech industry are particularly illustrative of the broader landscape described above, and for that reason, we take it as a focal point of observation. Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei—the flagship tech giants of the US and China, commonly referred to as Big Tech (BT)—operate collectively as a global oligopoly. This formation increasingly relegates Latin America to the role of data provider and accelerates the shift of other industrial powers from technology innovators to adopters—that is, to a position of subsidiarity. To this picture we must add Nvidia, the Musk ecosystem, and DeepSeek, among other firms whose products and executives carry significant weight in the global chain of technological decision-making, beyond even their specific market shares. No country outside of the US and China has leading firms in AI, cloud computing, advanced chip knowledge, or 5G champions (with the exception of Ericsson in the latter sector, which remains Swedish. It’s worth noting that Nokia is not included here, as although its production and brand profile are still centered in Norway, the largest shareholding stake belongs to BlackRock). An example of an interesting yet ultimately failed challenge to Big Tech dominance in large-scale projects is the European federated cloud initiative Gaia-X (European Association for Data and Cloud AISBL, https://gaia-x.eu/about/). Originally promoted by the Ministers of economic affairs of Germany and France, Gaia-X is a non-profit international association that brings together companies, state agencies, and third-sector organizations involved in European industrial and technological development (such as SAP, Siemens, the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, or Luxembourg’s National Data Service, alongside hundreds of SMEs). Its aim is to pool capabilities in order to create a large shared cloud infrastructure that allows companies and public bodies to store and develop applications securely—that is, independent of servers located outside the continent that fail to meet European data protection standards. In short, the goal is to enable competition with US tech giants and ultimately establish a “gold standard” in data security that tends to exclude them—driven by European governments’ stated concern over the region’s digital sovereignty. The conceptually appealing strategy of combining the complementary capacities of local companies of different sizes on a single platform and offering joint products, initially acted as a carrot for the industry (over 300 members joined, up from 22 at the beginning). However, over time, even the governments most vocal about sovereignty declined to adopt Gaia-X as a primary provider: Germany, for instance, signed a €3 billion agreement with Oracle Cloud (a strategic partner of AWS, Microsoft, and Nvidia) to provide cloud services in 2024. To this day, US tech giants continue to control 70% of the European cloud market (Gooding, 2024). Gaia-X remains a valuable project with over five years of development, but with frankly limited real-world reach—also, it must be said, due in part to the tech giants’ own offensive, as they increasingly offer services aimed at the “territorialization” of data (e.g., https://www.oracle.com/cloud/sovereign-cloud/what-is-sovereign-cloud/). As things stand, the European industrial powers do not control the supply, circulation, or demand of digital technologies, and major Asian players—such as India or Taiwan—occupy intermediate links in the value chains of either the Western bloc or China, depending on the case. This kind of displacement is not so surprising when we consider the oligopolistic dynamics that currently govern the global economy, involving the leadership of core countries across all strategic sectors. Particularly in the digital economy. Oligopoly is a market structure in which a small number of firms control the supply of certain goods and/or services—that is, a large-scale market dominated by a few major sellers, who are often interconnected. Oligopolies are everywhere (in oil, automotive, telecommunications, and more), but in certain sectors, structural traits such as the hyper-scale at which production is viable and profitable, the pace of innovation required for sectoral expansion, or the relevance of brand reputation drive the formation of so-called natural oligopolies (NOs): markets in which open competition (several smaller actors producing the same and rotating their market shares over time) would tend to hinder efficient production. In these markets, the number of firms capable of minimizing total industry costs is “naturally” low, due to the high entry barriers that are established. Each NO actor holds considerable market power, allowing it to develop productive and technological capacities in a privileged way over long periods. As a result, the minimum threshold for joining the oligopoly becomes increasingly difficult for outsiders to overcome. This is the case in sectors such as the extraction of scarce and critical natural resources (like lithium), energy generation and supply (e.g., wind farms), large physical and cyber-physical infrastructure for logistics (commercial ports and oceanic bridges, 5G, or submarine internet cables), or transversal digital technologies (like AI, big data, or cloud computing). All of these require massive upfront investments, accumulated know-how, strong commercialization capacity, and the ability to retain rents—which includes “artificial” legal barriers such as intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and various mechanisms to capture innovation rents. It’s not the same to have oil reserves in your territory and develop or invite companies to exploit them (which several countries do, with companies of varying sizes) as it is to develop powerful AI models using 20 years of data from the entire public internet (which only OpenAI-Microsoft of the US originally achieved with ChatGPT, even though the data came from millions of people around the world). In fact, comparable AI capabilities have only been reached by Google’s Gemini and the open-source DeepSeek model recently developed in China following US sanctions on Nvidia chip acquisitions. In a technological oligopoly, the ability to invest and innovate at scale grants companies significant prospective power: they can pour enormous sums into R&D and start-up acquisitions to develop innovations that will pay off a decade later—after numerous failed attempts costing millions—thus shaping future markets in the process (Google, for example, has heavily invested in AI development since the 1990s and has, at times, acquired one start-up per week). Additionally, NO actors actively exclude potential competitors outside the oligopoly through more questionable mechanisms such as collusion or lobbying, among others (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). Today, given the broad productive and geographic scope of global value chains and the extreme concentration of investment capacity typical of financial capitalism, more and more markets are becoming structured as natural oligopolies. Especially in digital technologies. Only Amazon, Microsoft, Alibaba, and Google together dominate 75% of the global cloud computing market (with respective shares of 47.8%, 15.5%, 7.7%, and 4%, according to Gartner, 2024), a sector whose relevance is crucial for the development of technologies such as generative AI. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft also became owners or lessees of more than half of the world’s submarine bandwidth capacity—a market historically controlled by states and large telecommunications companies like NEC, Alcatel, and Fujitsu, which still make up the backbone of global data traffic infrastructure (Business Research Insights, 2025). Huawei is the world’s largest supplier of telecommunications equipment, particularly for 5G networks and smartphones, holding a 28% share of the global market and over 4,000 patents (Merino et al., 2023). This helps explain Donald Trump’s insistence on making it both a material and symbolic target in the US-China trade war. The fact that Big Tech companies share technological and market domains—beyond specializing in particular niches—fuels an intense internal competitive race that, unlike monopolies, drives continuous innovation. This means that, in addition to competing to outdo one another, these firms also cooperate extensively to maintain their global leadership far ahead of the rest of the market: each company develops interoperability features to ensure their apps function properly on others’ platforms, and they share open source projects on GitHub (now owned by Microsoft), for instance. Microsoft has contributed significantly to the development of AI in China through its Microsoft Research Asia lab in Beijing and collaborations with Chinese institutions such as the National University of Defense Technology (Hung, 2025)—efforts that neither the US nor Chinese governments have blocked. Long before the current reloaded geopolitical confrontation emerged, core-country governments had already been promoting initiatives aimed at the expansion and globalization of their tech firms, such as China’s Digital Silk Road (Borrastero, 2024) or Silicon Valley itself in the US (it bears repeating just how much state R&D funding is packed inside an iPhone; Mazzucato, 2013). And what each state has done to strengthen its own technological base has ended up, in some way, benefiting the other. Consider, for example, that what China’s customs agency classifies as “foreign-invested enterprises” are mostly US-based companies, which control three-quarters of the country’s most advanced high-tech products. These include large-scale electronics exports that often involve importing key components from the US, assembling them in China via foreign companies like Foxconn (which builds Apple’s iPhones), and then exporting them. At the same time, private Chinese firms have also expanded their role in these core exports, going from virtually zero in the 1990s to over 20% today (Kenji Starrs, 2025). The offshoring of US tech production has helped the US continue leading by producing more cheaply, and has helped China learn how to lead too. As can be seen, the actors of a Global Technological Oligopoly (GTO) are deeply interdependent. To this picture, we must add the increasingly blatant symbiosis between dominant governments and individual stakeholders, as exemplified by the Trump-Musk case. We are no longer simply talking about "public-private complexes", "revolving doors" or "intimate relations". These notions describe very close ties, but between separate entities. What we are seeing now is a kind of fusion (or confusion) between a tiny handful of public and private actors who are able to govern strategic global value chains and set the rules of the game for the rest of the world. In China’s case, the country is characterized by what Weber and Qi (2022) describe as a “state-constituted market economy”: a strong state deeply intertwined with a fundamentally marketized economy, resulting in a political-economic balance that differs somewhat from Western models but still yields a global power that is difficult to challenge. In sum, we are witnessing a competition scheme designed for the very few, that generates a spiraling cycle of leveraged success in which core states play a crucial role. LATIN AMERICA A scheme like this reinforces Latin America's historic peripheral condition. GTO companies operate directly within the territory (setting up data centers, having subsidiaries, providing services, among other things), but they also rely on regional actors to amplify the generation of indigenous data, the large-scale paid consumption of BT’s technological infrastructures, and the global dissemination of their business models. The free domestic use of email applications or social networks enables data capture, but not the monetization of digital assets, whose massive volume comes from services provided to businesses and governments (as someone aptly put it, Amazon is famous for its store but rich from its servers; Lacort, 2021). In Latin America, there is a handful of large technology companies – the so-called 'tecnolatinas' – that replicate the e-marketplace, fintech, or cryptocurrency development models characteristic of the BT, managing to stand out as champions in the regional league far ahead of the rest. However, they continue to be dependent users of the fundamental technologies produced by the GTO. Mercado Libre, originally from Argentina, is the largest and most widely used digital platform on the continent, the one with the highest market value, and the first to be listed on Nasdaq. Modeled after Alibaba, it is a marketplace with an integrated online payments and credit system, technology development and service divisions, and an extensive ground-based logistics infrastructure. For its data storage and management, Mercado Libre is a client of Amazon Web Services (AWS): it processes over 40 purchases per second across 18 countries and has migrated more than 5,000 databases to Amazon DynamoDB (AWS, 2021). As of 2024, it was using nearly a dozen services from the tech giant with which it had signed an agreement to reduce its data computing costs by 13% (AWS, 2024). The other two regional champions, both Brazilian in origin, also maintain strong ties with the BTs: the marketplace Magazine Luiza runs on Google Cloud; and the fully digital bank Nubank (of Nu Holdings) is an AWS client, has received investments from Warren Buffett, Tencent Holdings and Sequoia Capital, and many of its executives have worked at Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Alibaba. The following chart illustrates the stark imbalance in market value and profits between the GTO firms, other global tech giants, and two of Latin America's top champions, in descending order: Source: Own elaboration based on data from Forbes Global 2000 (2024).* Originally in Borrastero & Juncos (2024).** Magazine Luiza is not publicly traded.  Regional firms, in turn, capture data from countless Latin American users, acquire local start-ups, participate in scientific research networks, and work with governments to access tax and especially regulatory benefits—mechanisms that enable their gradual “giantization” (Borrastero & Juncos, 2024). In short, they are part of this kind of stratified oligopoly led by Big Tech, which tecnolatinas help sustain while securing their regional slice of the pie. Far from being a marginal arena, despite Latin America’s relatively low share in global cross-border data flows compared to Asia or Europe (UNCTAD, 2021), the region represents a key market to conquer. This includes sectors with crucial resources for Big Tech’s vertical integration strategies, such as lithium. For instance, Tesla is one of the main buyers of Arcadium Lithium, which operates in the salt flats of northern Argentina, and along with other tech moguls like Bill Gates, is planning new direct investments and investments in companies developing technologies related to extraction (such as Lake Resources, which works on reducing freshwater usage in lithium mining) (López King, 2025). Big Tech companies form true global ecosystems for resource capture and the monetization of informational assets, supported by states and firms across the globe. SYSTEMIC RISKS One of the main problems of the dynamics described so far is the deepening of the international division of learning which—already highly unequal—continues to grow at breakneck speed, while technological learning becomes increasingly fundamental to value creation, and peripheral states are less and less equipped to deal with ever-larger corporations. In this context, peripheral countries risk becoming mere providers of informational raw material for platforms developed in the global centers, and end up having to pay for the digital intelligence extracted from them. Meanwhile, industrial hyper-concentration makes it increasingly difficult for the market to address these structural issues on its own. Rent refers to income derived from control over a scarce and strategic asset. The oligopolistic control of such rent-generating assets by central countries drives an endogenous concentration of rent in the central regions, and the result, in terms of income distribution both between and within nations, is a deepening of inequality at all levels (UNCTAD, 2021; Milanovic, 2019; Torres and Ahumada, 2022). Another major issue stemming from the scale reached by dominant actors and the penetration of their digital infrastructures is how difficult it has become to reverse the technological path — in terms of how to generate and provide services in a different way, while maintaining the reach and quality. Just imagine, for example, trying to establish alternative global data traffic routes or to produce world-class AI for diagnosing and treating rare diseases, without at some point relying on the technological resources of the oligopoly. The key question is how societies across the globe can harness these accumulated technological capabilities for collective purposes, without depending so heavily on heteronormative political and market-driven decisions. The list of systemic risks is a long one, and there isn’t space here to delve into the broader political dimensions of the issue. But it is worth highlighting these two particular risks tied to the current techno-economic order, given their impact on the very possibility of building concrete alternatives. LOCAL INITIATIVE Latin America enjoys neither structural power (that is, the ability to shape the rules of the game in terms of production, finance, security, or the global control of knowledge and culture), nor relational power in relation to other regions with accumulated techno-productive capacities (the ability to influence other actors into doing something they otherwise wouldn’t, following Strange’s 1988 classification). This essay may lean more toward pessimism of the intellect than optimism of the will when it comes to the global order within which Latin America must forge a new place.  Yet it is clear that the continent holds bargaining potential, rooted in the fact that it remains a highly coveted region for all the reasons discussed above—and many more (including the fact that it is, for now, a territory free of military wars). In the context of a “divide and conquer” logic typical of today’s intensified inter-core battles, strategies of absolute alignment with any single power are far from the wisest. The global oligopolistic economy will only deepen Latin America’s peripheral status if countries in the region fail to adopt a solidary non-alignment—or poly-alignment—approach, one that allows them to consolidate minimum thresholds of technological sovereignty. From dependent adoption to sovereign adoption (deciding what and how to adopt in order to learn), and from there to emancipation (integrating and developing what is needed for the people’s well-being). In Brazil, multiple state-led projects are underway to develop a sovereign data economy in collaboration with small and medium-sized enterprises and the academic sector (Gonzalo & Borrastero, forthcoming), along with large-scale initiatives to build national tech and energy infrastructures by leveraging the techno-productive capabilities accumulated over decades by Petrobras, BNDES, the national research council, and public venture capital funds (Alami et al., 2025). Mexico and Colombia are currently undergoing political processes inspired by the ideals of a “common home” and the care of virtual lands, advocating for continental unity on the one hand and strict regulation of Big Tech on the other (BBC News Mundo, 2025; Forbes Central America, 2025; Government of Colombia, 2024; Colombian Presidency, 2025; Wired, 2025). Argentina has a range of digital development projects based on policy frameworks designed to autonomously leverage the productive capacity the country has accumulated since the 1940s (Gonzalo & Borrastero, 2023)—though these efforts have been obstructed by the pro-Trump government of Javier Milei. EPILOGUE As these lines are being written, stock markets around the globe are tumbling amid the tariff war unleashed by the United States, forcing everyone else to adjust. Even the “Magnificent Seven” (Google, Apple, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla) have lost billions in just a few days. This raises the question of whether we are witnessing the birth of a new international economic order. Whether this is a true turning point or merely another heightened episode in the ongoing geopolitical rivalry remains to be seen. What we can already observe, however, is that global control over strategic assets for development places the GTO and core economies in a structurally advantageous position to lead long-term value chains. At the same time, the polycrisis opens up opportunities for marginalized regions to seize the momentum and assert their own demands. In financial capitalism, not everything is determined in the marketplace, and amid widespread and persistent instability, self-determination remains, without a doubt, one of the most powerful antidotes. References Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Rolf, S. & Schindler, S. (2025). The New Frontline. The US-China battle for control of global networks. In Transnational Institute, State of Power 2025. 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