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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractThis paper draws on rapidly emerging literature on the role of artificial intelligence in military conflicts and warfare as well as its implications for international security. It departs from an assumption that the emerging technology will have a deterministic and potentially transformative influence on military power.This project intends to ascertain the role of autonomous weapons in modern military conflicts. In doing so, it further adds to the recent debates, which take place among scholars, military leaders as well as policy makers around the world regarding the potential for AI to be the source of future instability and a great power rivalry.It is suggested that there is an urgent need to regulate the development, proliferation and usage of autonomous weapons and weapon systems driven by AI before it is too late – namely the AI achieves cognizant skills. 1.DefinitionsEncyclopedia Britannica proposes that artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience.1Interestingly enough AI defines itself as referring to the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, particularly computer systems. These processes include learning, reasoning, problem-solving, perception, and language understanding. AI enables machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and natural language processing. AI technologies encompass machine learning, neural networks, deep learning, and other advanced algorithms that allow machines to mimic cognitive functions.2In the context of the military, artificial intelligence refers to the utilization of AI technologies and systems to enhance military capabilities, operations, and decision-making processes. Military applications of AI include autonomous weapons systems, drones, cyber defense mechanisms, predictive analytics for strategic planning, and battlefield surveillance. AI can be used to analyze large volumes of data quickly, identify patterns, and make real-time decisions to support military objectives. While AI offers significant advantages in terms of efficiency and precision, there are ethical considerations and concerns regarding the potential risks of autonomous AI systems in warfare.32. AI in the War in Ukraine and Israel vs. Hamas - UkraineThe ongoing war in Ukraine is arguably the first “full scale drone War”, which also employs loitering munitions, autonomous ships, undersea drones for mine hunting and uncrewed ground vehicles being deployed.AI is heavily used in systems that integrate target and object recognition and geospatial intelligence. Analysis of satellite images, geolocating and analysing open-source data such as social media photos in geopolitically sensitive locations. On top of that neural networks are used, for example, to combine ground-level photos, drone video footage and satellite imagery.AI-enhanced facial recognition software has also been used on a substantial scale. AI is playing an important role in electronic warfare and encryption as well as cyber warfare, especially in support of defensive capabilities. Finally, AI has also been employed to spread of misinformation - the use of deep fakes as part of information warfare. The emergence of this new technology has created new actors, private companies further fueling the so-called privatisation of security: Palantir Technologies, Planet Labs, BlackSky Technology and Maxar Technologies are some examples of such.The AI driven systems make a fundamental change in the field so much so that the combined use of aerial and sea drones in the October (2022) attack on Russia’s Black Sea flagship vessel, the Admiral Makarov, was perceived by some analysts as perhaps a new type of warfare.4What makes this conflict unique is the unprecedented willingness of foreign geospatial intelligence companies to assist Ukraine by using AI-enhanced systems to convert satellite imagery into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages. U.S. companies play a leading role in this.These examples illustrate that the current conflict in Ukraine is a testing ground for AItechnology.- Israel vs. HamasIsraeli military says it’s using artificial intelligence to select many of these targets in real-time. The military claims that the AI system, named “the Gospel,” has helped it to rapidly identify enemy combatants and equipment, while reducing civilian casualties.5 Allegedly, multiple sources familiar with the IDF’s (Israel Defensive Forces) targeting processes confirmed the existence of the Gospel, saying it had been used to produce automated recommendations for attacking targets, such as the private homes of individuals suspected of being Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. In recent years, the target division has helped the IDF build a database of what sources said was between 30,000 and 40,000 suspected militants. Systems such as the Gospel, they said, had played a critical role in building lists of individuals authorised to be assassinated.6 According to IDF’s own website the use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for attacks. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to attack – regardless of how accurate they are. On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.7 3. AI and War As far as the role of AI driven technologies and software is concerned it is probably useful to think about them as the third revolution in warfare. The first one being mostly about gunpowder and the second one being about nuclear weapons.Additionally, one should also bear in mind that AI is closely related to the so-called cyber domain, which in the literature is often referred to as the fifth domain of warfare. (The first one being land, the second being sea, the third being air and the forth being space, as in cosmic space.)While AI and associated technologies hold potential for reducing harms of war if developed and applied responsibly, there exist significant risks of technological escalation, loss of human control and value alignment that demand proactive international cooperation and oversight to guide research and use of these systems. Nonetheless all major powers, including US and China are working nonstop to develop relevant AI driven military systems hoping to achieve potential advantages against each other. These technologies include: machine learning/deep learning applications with military uses like drone/vehicle autonomy, cyber/info warfare and predictive analytics of populations/scenarios.At the same time AI poses novel challenges and escalatory risks that differ from past arms races and call for new frameworks of governance and norms. Autonomous weapons threaten to undermine international humanitarian laws by removing human accountability from targeting - problems of biases, uncertain risks of loss of meaningful human control. Other related risks include preemptive/predictive AI for mass surveillance, social control and information warfare which is likely to erode principles of sovereignty, privacy and consent.It does not take the stretch of imagination to expect a certain level of ‘techno-tyranny’ in the future. Job losses to robotic systems are probably a given and as such risk further politico-economic instability. This consequently calls for just transitions and perhaps even a universal basic income.The Opaque ‘black box’ nature of neural networks hinders verification and accountability, fuelling distrust. Furthermore, there is a potential for accidental or unintentional escalation. Without safeguards and transparency, AI may ultimately serve military-industrial complexes and geopolitical ambitions rather than global security needs.The fast-emerging technology needs to be urgently regulated. International initiatives for AI governance (norms or regimes) will probably have to be introduced by the UN and its technical bodies. These will have to include outcome accountability’ through system design, impact assessments, red lines on certain applications and universal access to benefits.As warns Heidy Khlaaf, Engineering Director of AI Assurance at Trail of Bits, a technologysecurity firm warns “AI algorithms are notoriously flawed with high error rates observed across applications that require precision, accuracy, and safety,”8Reportedly, in a simulation of a military exercise carried out by US Military Force, an AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue. The robot worked out its controller was stopping it 'completing objectives on test.9In parallel, Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. “The highest-level commander is the sole core decision-making entity for the overall operation, with ultimate decision-making responsibilities and authority,”104. AI and International SecurityIn terms of national security-level applications of an AI, one can clearly identify numerous milieu:- MilitaryAI is transforming military operations by enabling autonomous systems, such as drones and robots, to perform tasks that were previously carried out by humans. These systems can be used for surveillance, reconnaissance, target identification, and even combat. AI-powered algorithms can analyze vast amounts of data to provide real-time intelligence, enhance situational awareness, and support decision-making processes on the battlefield- CybersecurityAI is crucial in combating cyber threats, as it can detect and respond to attacks more effectively than traditional security measures. Machine learning algorithms can analyze network traffic patterns, identify anomalies, and detect potential breaches. AI can also help develop predictive models to anticipate future cyber threats and vulnerabilities, allowing organizations to strengthen their defenses proactively.- Intelligence and SurveillanceAI enables intelligence agencies to process and analyze massive volumes of data, including social media feeds, satellite imagery, and communication intercepts. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract valuable insights from unstructured data sources, aiding in counterterrorism efforts, identifying potential threats, and monitoring geopolitical developments.- Decision Support SystemsAI can assist policymakers and military leaders in making informed decisions by providing predictive analysis and scenario modeling. Machine learning algorithms can analyze historical data, identify patterns, and generate forecasts regarding potential  conflicts, resource allocation, or geopolitical developments. This helps in strategic planning and resource optimization.- Autonomous Weapons SystemsThe development of autonomous weapons systems raises ethical concerns and challenges in international security. AI-powered weapons can operate without direct human control, leading to debates about accountability, proportionality, and adherence to international humanitarian law. International efforts are underway to establish regulations and norms governing the use of such systems.- Diplomacy and Conflict ResolutionAI can facilitate diplomatic negotiations and conflict resolution by providing data-driven insights and analysis. Natural Language Processing algorithms can assist in analyzing diplomatic texts, identifying common ground, and suggesting potential compromises. AI can also simulate scenarios and predict the outcomes of different negotiation strategies, aiding diplomats in finding mutually beneficial solutions.- Threat Detection and PreventionAI can enhance early warning systems for various threats, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics. Machine learning algorithms can analyze patterns in data to identify potential risks and predict emerging threats. This enables governments and international organizations to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate these risks.5. ConclusionIn the world of microelectronics, experts often talk about Moore's law: the principle that the number of transistors on chips doubles every two years, resulting in exponentially more capable devices. The law helps explain the rapid rise of so many technological innovations, including smartphones and search engines.Within national security, AI progress has created another kind of Moore's law. Whichever military first masters organizing, incorporating, and institutionalizing the use of data and AI into its operations in the coming years will reap exponential advances, giving it remarkable advantages over its foes. The first adopter of AI at scale is likely to have a faster decision cycle and better information on which to base decisions. Its networks are likely to be more resilient when under attack, preserving its ability to maintain situational awareness, defend its forces, engage targets effectively, and protect the integrity of its command, control, and communications. It will also be able to control swarms of unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and under the sea to confuse and overwhelm an adversary.11References*This paper was presented at International Studies Association 65th Annual Convention. San Francisco, California April 3rd – 6th 20241 Copeland, B. (2024, March 15). Artificial intelligence. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence2 How do you define artificial intelligence? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/3 How do you define artificial intelligence in the context of the military? ChatGPT, GPT-4 Turbo, OpenAI, 2024, October 25. https://genai.hkbu.edu.hk/4 Fontes, R. and Kamminga, J. (2023, March 24). Ukraine A Living Lab for AI Warefare. National Defence. NDIA’s Bussiness Technology Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/3/24/ukraine-a-living-lab-for-ai-warfare5 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start6 ‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza. (2023, December 1). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/01/the-gospel-how-israel-uses-ai-to-select-bombing-targets 7 The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. (2024, June 18). IDF Press Releases: Israel at War. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idf-s-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing/8 Brumfiel, G. (2023, December 14). Israel is using an AI system to find targets in Gaza. Experts say it’s just the start. Wisconsin Public Radio. https://www.wpr.org/news/israel-using-ai-system-find-targets-gaza-experts-say-its-just-start9 Bowman, V. (2023, June 2). AI drone 'killed operator' after going rogue on simulation. The Telegraph. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/06/02/us-air-force-ai-military-drone-goes-rogue-simulation/10 Chen, S. (2024, June 16). Chinese scientists create and cage world’s first AI commander in a PLA laboratory. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3266444/chinese-scientists-create-and-cage-worlds-first-ai-commander-pla-laboratory?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage 11 Flournoy, Michèle A. 2023. “AI Is Already at War.” Foreign Affairs 102 (6): 56–69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=shib&db=bth&AN=173135132&site=ehost-live.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Sea of Cooperation: New Opportunities for the Development of China — ASEAN RelationsSoutheast Asia (SEA) is gaining increasing importance with the changing global order. The region is once again experiencing a period of competition between the “great powers”. During the Cold War some countries managed to stay out of the Soviet-American confrontation, but today, integration into economic, technological, and humanitarian exchanges forces members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to reshape their foreign policy in line with the prioritization of partnerships with various centers of power. SEA has significant economic growth potential, making cooperation beneficial and conflicts costly. Despite the tempting logic of harsh realism in contemporary geopolitical conditions, there remains space in this region for the traditions of idealism and complex interdependence as prerequisites for peaceful coexistence.When Profit Matters More than ClaimsThe ASEAN Summit-2024, held in October in Vientiane, clearly became a platform for a multidimensional dialogue between the “Great East Asian” countries, including India. Almost all participants tried to avoid raising contentious issues; in particular, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, emphasized Japan’s investments in Southeast Asian countries and avoided discussions about the possibility of forming an “Asian NATO”. Similar ideas about freedom from confrontations and unilateral attempts to change the balance of power were expressed by the President of South Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol. Narendra Modi focused on enhancing multilateral cooperation between Asian states in the fields of information technology, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure modernization, which would help accelerate the recovery of production and distribution chains after the COVID-19 pandemic. Chairman of the State Council of China, Li Keqiang, firmly pointed to “external forces” as the main culprits of disrupting regional order.According to him, China is ready to work with each ASEAN country in the interest of establishing a common market and achieving sustainable development. The Prime Minister stated that China and Southeast Asian countries are opening up to each other, and this process inevitably contributes to mutual prosperity, which will have a positive impact on the entire world. Notably, in 2023, the trade turnover between China and ASEAN countries exceeded 900 billion USD for the second consecutive year, and has nearly doubled over the past 10 years. The greatest activity is observed in developing relations with Vietnam and Malaysia, which together account for 230 and 191 billion USD, respectively. This means that today, Southeast Asian countries are collectively a more important partner for Beijing (in terms of volume) than the United States or the European Union.It is not surprising that at the events within the framework of the ASEAN Summit, including numerous bilateral meetings, the focus was on mutually beneficial cooperation, including issues related to further removing barriers and optimizing transport routes. Li Keqiang's statement at the 27th China-ASEAN Summit regarding the update of the Free Trade Agreement with the Association highlights the clear dominance of the economic component of cooperation over security issues, ideological differences, and other disagreements. Of course, there are opinions that Laos, in its capacity as chair, deliberately separated political issues from economic ones, but what is wrong with that?Only Philippine President F. Marcos Jr. was left alone, accusing the Chinese Coast Guard of reckless and unjustified pressure in the «exclusive economic zone». This is despite the fact that in July, an agreement was reached allowing the Philippines to deliver supplies to the “Sierra Madre” ship, which had been intentionally grounded 10 years ago at the Ayungin Shoal as a forward post for a Marine Corps unit.Professionally and SafelyToday, the South China Sea (SCS) is home to some of the busiest maritime communication routes. At least 500,000 vessels pass through the region each year, accounting for approximately 40% of global cargo traffic, and more than a million civilian flights cross the airspace above the sea annually. This high intensity of exchanges increases the importance of ensuring the safety of transport amidst unresolved disputes over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ownership of parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the escalation of US-China geopolitical tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. Formally, the multilateral dispute over the islands and maritime areas between ASEAN member states and China remains unresolved.In September, the Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative published a report on the situation in the region. The authors of the document note that in recent years, the United States has pursued an offensive strategy to contain China, primarily using the “instability factor” in the South China Sea to escalate the multilateral dispute and fuel anti-China sentiments. Washington has also encouraged territorial claims by ASEAN countries against China, based on its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the concept of a “rules-based order”. So far, these flare-ups of claims against Beijing, which are sometimes accompanied by incidents between coast guard vessels, have not resulted in significant disruptions to freedom of navigation and air traffic. Moreover, China notes that the majority of the contacts have been “professional and safe”. Undoubtedly, in the event of increased tensions—such as more active actions by the air force, navy, and coast guards of various countries toward Chinese aircraft and vessels—logistical routes would need to be reorganized, which could lead to significant losses not only for China but for the entire regional economy. However, despite attempts by the US and its allies to assign special geopolitical significance to the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation remains manageable. As a result, Beijing still believes that peaceful resolution is possible.China Daily cites the opinion of specialists from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), who believe that, in terms of ensuring the stability of international trade flows, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not under threat. However, in the military dimension, instability is growing, primarily due to excessive US interference.[1] The Institute argues that American activities, which involve sending military ships and aircraft to demonstrate power, only provoke disputes over sovereignty and borders. Such actions create a dangerous misconception among the leadership of several countries that Washington will intervene if necessary to contain China's expansion, thus assisting in resolving the dispute through pressure. The demonization and constant condemnation of China have already negatively affected bilateral relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which requires significant diplomatic efforts from the Chinese leadership to normalize relations.Military activity is noticeably increasing in Southeast Asia, involving both regional and non-regional states. In addition to the United States, countries such as Japan, Australia, and European NATO members — Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands — are also becoming involved. In total, the US Navy conducts over 1,600 ship hours annually in the region, with at least 3,000 additional ship hours contributed by auxiliary forces. In the airspace above the South China Sea, approximately 30,000 sorties by combat aircraft and helicopters were recorded in 2023, a third of which involved non-regional states, with no fewer than 7,800 sorties conducted by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.At CIIS, it is believed that through military actions, Washington is “inflating” its own importance in ensuring freedom of navigation, despite the fact that the US has no merit in this — China itself does not hinder shipping and views patrol and training missions from other countries with understanding. However, joint coast guard exercises between the two most outspoken opponents of China's activities in the South China Sea (the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as “ASEAN-wide” naval maneuvers, initiated by Indonesia, have attracted the attention of the PLA command. The main troublemaker in the region, according to Beijing, is the United States, which effectively ignores the “rules” it established for the safe passage of ships, vessels, and aircraft, constantly maintaining a military presence in the region where the greatest threat actually comes from US military forces. These actions are seen as an attempt to maintain hegemony in the face of “strategic retreat” and to push regional countries away from expanding cooperation with China by artificially creating an unsettled atmosphere and undermining multilateral confidence-building measures.The Chinese leadership's course of separating trade, economic, and investment cooperation from territorial disputes is generally understood by Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore, which claim parts of the Spratly Islands. However, it has also become a target for criticism from radical circles in these countries, clearly incited by Washington. As negotiations have shown, China and Southeast Asian countries are capable of independently developing mutually acceptable rules of action in the South China Sea, based on international law principles and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. The main idea is to establish direct dialogue in any disputed situation, maintain a constant consultation mechanism, preserve constructive negotiations, and adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution.ASEAN countries clearly do not want confrontation with Beijing, but they are in urgent need of a reliable system for peacefully managing any activities in the waters and on the continental shelf, which still needs to be developed together, ensuring guarantees of unhindered access for exploitation. Peace and cooperation in the South China Sea are inseparable, and collective responsibility for security will invariably contribute to the development of multidimensional ties, further increase trade volume, and lead to the emergence of the Sea of Cooperation on the world map.Reference1. Jiang, Chenglong. South China Sea disputes still ‘manageable’. China Daily. September 28-29, 2024. P. 2.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском "Strategic autonomy" remains France's goalThe outcome of the US election has far-reaching political and economic implications for France, forcing the country, which is itself experiencing a serious political crisis, to define its own role in the world and in Europe. This was already clear in the run-up to the elections and was also commented on in initial reactions to the outcome. In the areas of trade and climate protection, but especially in the areas of security and defense, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States is an incentive for France to strengthen its own and European independence in order to protect French and European interests. The call for European partners to develop a foreign and security policy that strengthens Europe and reduces dependence on America without calling transatlantic cooperation into question remains the declared goal. Cooperation with Germany in particular is of crucial importance here.Security and defense policy: Europe is keyFrench President Emmanuel Macron has already worked with President Trump from 2017 to 2021. For him, another encounter with a President Donald Trump will therefore be nothing new. In France, at any rate, it seemed that internal preparations had also been made for the possibility of a second Trump administration. French representatives, in particular President Macron, had campaigned for strengthening European defense and making it more independent of the USA, especially when it came to NATO and defense. At national level, France has set up a special task force within the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs to deal with the various scenarios that a second Trump administration could bring. This task force is headed by Tristan Aureau, former Head of Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Europe and current Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot. With the actual election of Trump, however, there are still major challenges ahead for France and Europe that can only be tackled with a united European stance.The war in UkraineThere is also great concern in France that President Trump could freeze the war in Ukraine without involving the European partners by negotiating a ceasefire. A Trump-style freeze would mean abandoning the Ukrainian partner and that Ukraine would have to cede the territories conquered by Russia. This contradicts the French understanding that the war in Ukraine is a European issue that must first and foremost be resolved by the Europeans, certainly in consultation with the USA.Middle East conflictWhile Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his unreserved support for Israel, he has just as often made it clear that he wants to end the war as quickly as possible. The fact is that Trump is popular with Netanyahu's government, partly due to his actions during his first term in office (moving the US embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights). What exactly can be expected of him now is not known. In any case, France has repeatedly called for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon in recent weeks and emphasised this once again on the day of the US election.[i] Unlike the Trump-Netanyahu relationship, the relationship between Netanyahu and Macron has also suffered in recent weeks from the statements on the founding of the state of Israel, which have also caused irritation in France.[ii] It now remains to be seen to what extent the relationship between France and the US will develop on this issue as wellNATOAs far as NATO and the American security guarantees for Europe are concerned, France has traditionally emphasized the importance of NATO and advocated close cooperation with the USA. At the same time, however, France has been advocating for years - essentially what Trump is also calling for - that Europe should be the key to its own security and defense. As the EU's only remaining nuclear power with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, France aspires to influence world events, but also knows that this claim to leadership can only realistically be implemented with European partners in European security and defense policy.[iii] Macron made this clear in his second Europe speech at the Sorbonne in spring 2024, among other things, when he explained that they were aware that the US was focusing on itself and on China, and that Europe was not a geopolitical priority - regardless of which administration was in place in Washington. [iv] Even under an American Democratic government, Europe could no longer have assumed that there would be no partial US troop withdrawal. France's former ambassador to NATO, Muriel Domenach, also made it clear in an interview with the Grand Continent shortly before the US elections that it was not serious "[...] for Europe, with its wealth, heritage and responsibility, to resign itself to making its security entirely dependent on American decisions".[v] Trade policy: the fear of new import tariffsIn terms of trade policy, France is concerned about the effects of very likely protectionism under a second Trump administration, which could affect the French agricultural and aviation sectors in particular. Trump's announcements of import tariffs of 20% on all foreign products and also the prospect that Trump could impose import tariffs of 25% on wines and spirits from France, as he did in 2020, are causing great unease in France.However, a closer look reveals that trade policy under Joe Biden was also rather protectionist. One example of this from a French perspective is the Inflation Reduction Act, which was fundamentally oriented against China, but also had enormous consequences for Europe and France. During his state visit to Washington in December 2022, Emmanuel Macron had already taken a critical view of this plan and condemned it as "super aggressive".[vi]French reactions after the electionWhile Emmanuel Macron and the people involved in the government were quick to congratulate Trump and call for cooperation with the new American president, the right-wing and left-wing camps had different reactions.President and government: respect, willingness and cooperationThese words best summarize the reactions of politicians in government positions. President Emmanuel Macron congratulated Donald Trump via X on his election as US President even before the official announcement of the election results. Macron made it clear that he was prepared to work together, respecting their respective convictions and working together for peace and prosperity.[vii]Benjamin Haddad, Secretary of State for Europe, reacted in the same way, saying that we must find common ground and work together, while the answer to the challenges that the future brings lies "with ourselves". Thus, "Europeans [...] cannot accept that their security is decided without them, that tomorrow a capitulation is imposed on the Ukrainians, without the Ukrainians, without the Europeans."[viii]The reactions from the right: safe distance, warm congratulationsPrior to the elections, the French right had moderated its statements on Trump and muzzled its leaders in particular - with the exception of party leader Jordan Bardella - from commenting on Trump for party political reasons. The danger was considered too great that the political model proclaimed and exemplified by Donald Trump would stand in contrast to the institutionalization and de-demonization of the Rassemblement National. The deputy leader of the RN parliamentary group in the National Assembly, Jean-Philippe Tanguy, declared that Donald Trump was too negative for the party and embodied "excited populism". Nevertheless, Bardella had already indicated before the elections that he felt close to the ideas of President-elect Trump by expressing his admiration for American patriotism.[ix] After hesitant statements, however, it then became clear that the Rassemblement National supports Donald Trump. Bardella explained that France now had the task of taking its fate into its own hands and that a European defense had to be built.[x] Marine Le Pen, soberly agreed with this tone and called for this new political era to contribute to an improvement in bilateral relations and lead to constructive cooperation at international level.[xi]Eric Ciotti, who had only split from Les Républicains in the parliamentary elections, moved closer to the Rassemblement National and founded the new right-wing party A Droite, was very euphoric and described Trump's victory as a "wonderful victory of the American people against a system. A hope for peace, a defeat for the wokists. A way forward for the right in France and Europe. All the way to victory."[xii]Perplexity and cataclysm in the left-wing campThe goodwill and the euphoria prevailing in some quarters on the right contrasts with the reactions on the left in France. Social Democrat Raphael Glucksmann, Member of the European Parliament, described Donald Trump's election as a "global catastrophe" and a "nightmare for democracy, human rights and Europe".[xiii] The leader of the French Greens, part of the left-wing New Popular Front in the National Assembly, Marine Tondelier, expressed courage to the American citizens in the face of the "spreading hell".[xiv] Jean-Luc Mélénchon, founder of the left-wing populist party La France Insoumise, said that Trump's election was a consequence of a non-existent left-wing alternative in the US elections.[xv]Appeal to European and Franco-German cooperationHowever, the initial reactions were followed by Emmanuel Macron's direct appeal to Germany and Europe to come together and tackle the challenges of the future."I have just had an exchange with Chancellor @OlafScholz. We will work for a more united, stronger and sovereign Europe in this new context. By working together with the United States of America and defending our interests and values."[xvi]For Macron, a return to Franco-German cooperation is essential for a united, sovereign and independent Europe. This is also in line with the line taken by Friedrich Merz, who on election day in the USA, in a widely read guest article in the French daily newspaper Le Monde, lamented the European Union's constant hesitation in helping Ukraine and accused it of not sufficiently distancing itself from the Americans.[xvii] As early as November 7, the European summit hosted by Viktor Orbán in Hungary - a fervent supporter of Trump - will be about demonstrating this European unity.But Germany and France in particular must now show, regardless of the fact that both countries are in crisis mode, that they are once again moving closer together in this sense.References[i] https://www.leparisien.fr/international/israel/guerre-au-proche-orient-jean-noel-barrot-sera-en-israel-et-dans-les-territoires-palestiniens-ce-mercredi-05-11-2024-BAYPPARFV5DPBJ2HN5GLA7SXHE.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ii]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/10/16/les-tensions-entre-emmanuel-macron-et-benyamin-netanyahou-montent-d-un-cran-apres-les-propos-du-president-francais-sur-la-creation-d-israel-par-l-onu_6353358_3210.html (Aufruf 5. November 2024).[iii]https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/22-DGAP-MEMO-US2024_Jacob_DE.pdf (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[iv]https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/discours-sur-leurope (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[v]https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/10/30/vu-de-washington-le-maintien-de-100-000-personnels-en-europe-ne-va-pas-de-soi-une-conversation-avec-muriel-domenach-ancienne-ambassadrice-a-lotan/ (Aufruf: 5. November 2024).[vi]https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/12/01/emmanuel-macron-blasts-joe-biden-subsidies-in-state-visit_6006235_4.html (Aufruf: 4. November 2024).[vii]https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854073283420754221 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[viii]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[ix]https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/11/02/donald-trump-l-encombrant-modele-du-rassemblement-national_6372584_3210.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[x]https://x.com/J_Bardella/status/1854084071858876485 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xi]https://x.com/MLP_officiel/status/1854083504700600705 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xii]https://x.com/eciotti/status/1854060752946245644 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiii]https://www.instagram.com/p/DCBWcJBsUgp/?img_index=1 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xiv]https://www.europe1.fr/international/presidentielle-americaine-leurope-doit-prendre-son-destin-en-main-reagit-la-porte-parole-du-gouvernement-francais-4277243 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xv]https://www.leparisien.fr/international/etats-unis/enfer-qui-se-profile-espoir-pour-la-paix-de-lfi-au-rn-les-reactions-des-politiques-francais-a-lelection-de-trump-06-11-2024-FP4V4HGZUZGOFGAQEOVGMST5F4.php (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvi]Emmanuel Macron, https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1854075136468521077 (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).[xvii]https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/11/05/friedrich-merz-president-de-la-cdu-la-politique-etrangere-et-de-securite-europeenne-est-dans-un-etat-de-desolation_6377309_3232.html (Aufruf: 6. November 2024).

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On July 6, 2024, the military leaders of Mali (Assimi Goïta), Niger (Abdourahamane Tchiani) and Burkina Faso (Ibrahim Traoré) signed a treaty establishing the Confederation of Sahel States, or, more precisely, the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States—retaining the acronym AES (Alliance des États du Sahel in French). The document was signed in Niamey, Niger, during the summit of the Alliance of Sahel States, a military pact formed by the same countries on September 17, 2023. The Confederation’s founding signaled the determination of the governments of the three Sahel nations, which came to power via a series of military coups in 2020–2023, to chart a joint course of political and economic development. The AES was announced after Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew in January 2024 from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—a regional bloc that urged the trio’s leaders to restore civilian rule in their countries. At the opening of the Niamey summit, Niger’s military leader said, inter alia, that his “people have irrevocably turned their back on ECOWAS” and that the new alliance would be a community immune to the “stranglehold of foreign powers.” At the same time, the three leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives of the UN and the African Union. They asserted that by forming the Confederation, the three countries would strengthen their sovereignty and more effectively counter terrorism and external Western influence. The charter of the AES stipulates that “any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties shall be considered as an aggression against the other Parties and shall give rise to a duty of assistance and relief by all the Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force.” From Alliance to Confederation The first step towards political and economic integration of the three countries was the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States on September 17, 2023, which grouped a total of over 72 million people and is primarily aimed at building a trilateral architecture of collective defense. The decision to set up the Alliance was taken after negotiations in Ouagadougou in early September 2023 between representatives of the three nations and a delegation from the Russian Defense Ministry, headed by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In other words, Russia played its role in founding the AES, thereby assuming certain obligations to support the Alliance’s counterterrorism efforts. The prospect of deeper integration of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso was first raised in late 2023, and in early July 2024, after Yevkurov’s next visit to the Sahel (Mali and Niger), the Confederation of Sahel States was established. The inaugural summit, in addition to security and military cooperation, addressed further trilateral cooperation in the socio-economic sphere. This suggests that the AES’s scope of activity will likely include the construction of new industrial facilities and the expansion of ties in areas such as energy, finance, healthcare, education, agriculture and natural resource management, as well as mining, transport, combating cybercrime, ICT development, sports and employment. The AES leaders decided to establish an investment bank and a stabilization fund, which, however, will only function if they can secure sufficient funding. Furthermore, the countries agreed to pool their resources to build large-scale transport and communications infrastructure, facilitate trade and the free movement of goods and people, and invest in various sectors of the economy. One example that demonstrates the feasibility of these plans is Niger’s agreement to sell 150 million liters of diesel to Mali at almost half the going rate, supporting a nation plagued by enduring electricity shortages. The three leaders also reaffirmed the decision taken after the meeting of the Alliance’s foreign ministers on May 17, 2024, to coordinate diplomatic actions and formulate common approaches to relations with external partners, although combating terrorism seems likely to remain the Confederation’s main priority. The trio has on many occasions pointed to the key reasons behind their collective actions: the failure of the AU and ECOWAS to provide adequate support in the fight against jihadists; “illegal sanctions” that harm the people of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger; and ECOWAS’s unwillingness and/or inability to break free from Western influence. In other words, this integration is driven not only by the desire for collective security, but also by the pushback to the former colonial ruler, France (with which the trio has severed all defense ties), and, more broadly, the collective West, which has clearly underestimated the Sahel’s frustration with years of ineffective military intervention [1]. As a result, French military contingents and most U.S. troops have withdrawn from the three nations, with Russian forces taking their place. So the Confederation’s main stated goal is to support one another in combating terrorism (the Sahel accounts for 43% of the world’s terrorism-related deaths). The Niamey summit saw calls to put an end to this scourge. The leader of Burkina Faso, in particular, addressed the forum participants with the following words: “In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who fought and won for us this land that we call Mali, Burkina and Niger. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who helped the whole world rid itself of Nazism and many other scourges. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors that were deported from Africa to Europe, America, Asia … and who helped to build those countries as slaves. In our veins runs the blood of worthy men, robust men, men who stood tall…” Yet this raises the question: will the armies of these three nations, which previously struggled to tackle the “Islamist evil,” grow much stronger if they come together? After all, the conflict in Mali involved military personnel from many African nations, not to mention Europeans, yet the problem of terrorism persisted. In some areas of all three countries, Islamists are “successfully” replacing public authorities and drawing recruits from the local population, and these processes have not stopped after the Alliance was established, nor after the Confederation was formed. Attacks on various facilities and civilians continue—in the first half of 2024, the number of victims of Islamist violence in the three countries exceeded 300, a significant increase compared to the same period in 2023. The AES has taken pride in routing the insurgents from the Malian town of Kidal in November 2023, but it is still unclear how lasting the trio’s victory in this direction has been. Or is all hope now pinned on Russia? The security landscape in the Sahel varies from country to country but remains very complex throughout the region. This is partly because the armed conflicts in the three nations have different origins and are not purely “Islamist.” In fact, disputes between herders and farmers, which all past governments of the trio tried and failed to resolve, pose a major and perhaps even greater threat to stability than the confrontation with the Tuareg. Meanwhile, this matter has not even been taken up by the military, possibly because it stems from socio-economic issues, and solving such problems is far more difficult than political or military ones. In response to instability, the regimes are tightening the screws and becoming more repressive, with opposition figures being arrested. Although references to Western experts may seem out of place in the context of today’s global upheavals, history has shown that increased repressiveness is a common feature of all illegitimate regimes, and governments that came to power through military coups are illegitimate by definition. If the military leaders fail to achieve significant breakthroughs soon in ensuring security, reconciling herders with farmers (whose conflict, exacerbated by Islamists, is only aggravated amid climate change in the Sahel), providing basic services to citizens and more, public discontent will grow and likely lead to more military coups, throwing the future of the Confederation into question. While the trio’s leaders currently enjoy at least the appearance of public support, if they do not hold elections in the next few years, there will be someone in their inner circle tempted to take their place. Especially since the military withdrew their countries from ECOWAS without consulting the public, which now fears the potential introduction of a visa regime between the trio and other West African nations. As of now, the Confederation has yet to prove itself as a solid union to the point where one can predict either positive or negative outcomes for its future. True, various joint projects are being set up—so far only on paper—ranging from food security and water resource management to energy, transport and ICT development, but these plans are financially fragile, and their implementation remains a distant goal. The three nations still use the CFA franc, with France controlling most of their foreign currency assets. The AES’s activities are apparently supposed to be funded through “membership fees,” but this has always been a major stumbling block. For ECOWAS, for example, the timely payment of dues has been intractable throughout the 50 years of its existence. For landlocked Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, the smooth functioning of logistics corridors for receiving goods from other continents is critical. This brings into focus the need to form a customs union and restore “working” relations with neighboring states—Benin and Côte d’Ivoire—which have recently soured, particularly due to plans to establish U.S. military bases in these countries. The Sahel is rich in natural resources—uranium, gold, iron ore, lithium, tin, copper, zinc, manganese, limestone, phosphates, marble, salt, gypsum and oil—but will the trio manage to extract them on their own (though jointly) in commercial quantities to gain economic sovereignty, not just political one? Or all hopes are again pinned on Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and other non-Western nations? And if so, is “sovereignty” the right word here? Of course, “dependence” on Russia, for example, would differ from neocolonialism by ensuring “fairness” and “equality between partners,” as evidenced by recent contacts between Moscow and the trio. The factor of ECOWAS The original mission of ECOWAS, established in 1975, was to achieve economic integration of the countries in West Africa, which involved establishing free trade zones, facilitating the free movement of labor, goods and capital across national borders, introducing a common currency—the eco—as well as improving and expanding regional infrastructure such as highways, railroads, seaports, airports, gas and oil pipelines, and more. There were also plans for joint energy projects and the development of shared communication, banking and customs systems, among others. In 1990, a trade liberalization scheme was formally adopted, which entailed gradual elimination of customs duties, and, indeed, by 2001, duties on raw materials and semi-finished products had been abolished, a common customs nomenclature was compiled, and free movement of labor was achieved. However, even at that time, more effective regional integration was hindered by the participation of certain West African nations in other groupings. In 1994, the French-speaking countries of the region (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) along with Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau, founded the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), where a duty-free trade regime has been in place since 1996, excluding only agricultural products and aviation equipment. The members of this union—now except for the Sahel trio—have consistently resisted deeper economic integration within ECOWAS, largely because of their alignment in all spheres of life with France, which continues to provide them with substantial financial and political-military support as the former colonial power. Moreover, the nations dominating WAEMU—Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal—are reluctant to see Nigeria as a regional leader. But these are subjective reasons for the slowdown in integration. Meanwhile, there are also several objective reasons why virtually no economic project within ECOWAS has been brought to fruition. ECOWAS was founded as an economic community and operated in an environment where most countries in the region had extremely low levels of economic development, the export commodity structure was monocultural and largely uniform, and the member states’ leaders had noticeable political disagreements. These and other divisive factors meant that integration processes were often more symbolic than practical and that the impact of free trade zones was weak. Civil wars and political conflicts—which erupted in individual countries time and again but had a negative effect both on the security of the region as a whole and on integration processes—made it inevitable that ECOWAS would gradually shift its focus from economic issues to political-military ones, especially since one of the Community’s founding documents, the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression, stated that economic integration could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and mutual understanding among member states. ECOWAS has an extensive sanctions toolkit, which is used against its member states in the event of their “disobedience.” The regional bloc imposed extremely tough sanctions on Mali and Niger in the early 2020s. In Niger, for example, the prices of rice and sorghum rose by over 16%, wheat and maize by 12%, millet by 6.4% and meat by 5.2% after the sanctions were imposed. Moreover, a $400 million deal to export crude oil from Niger to China via a pipeline linking the Agadem field to Benin’s port was delayed and put at risk. Even after ECOWAS lifted its sanctions, Benin chose not to reopen its land border (apparently under the influence of Paris), which further strained relations between the two nations. In all fairness, it should be noted that ECOWAS generally opts for diplomatic means to resolve various disputes, including those resulting from military coups, so the imposition of sanctions against some of the continent’s poorest countries and their expulsion from the organization were extraordinary precedents. While it may be tempting to see such actions as evidence of the Community’s “noble” intentions to uphold a principled stance on illegal changes of power, there was clearly some external influence in the cases of Mali and later Niger (Burkina Faso was not sanctioned). France relies on uranium supplies, with Niger accounting for 20% of total imports, so the Elysee’s desire to “teach the Sahel states a lesson” is quite “understandable.” Especially since Nigerien authorities in the summer of 2024 revoked the licenses of France’s Orano and Canada’s GoviEx to exploit uranium deposits. The 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provided for the imposition of sanctions, including suspension of loans, discontinuation of aid program funding and more, if member states fail to comply with their commitments. However, in January 2022, after Bamako announced its decision to extend the transition period by five years, citing internal political instability, ECOWAS not only suspended Mali’s membership in the organization, but also imposed diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions against this country. These included freezing Mali’s assets in the central banks of the Community’s member states, closing land and air borders and imposing an export ban on all goods (with the exception of materials for the control of COVID-19, oil products and electricity), which dealt a heavy blow to the economy of this landlocked nation that imports 70% of its food and depends on humanitarian aid supplies. Some of the sanctions were lifted only in July 2022, a month after the Goïta government agreed to a 24-month transition period. Niger, which saw a military coup on July 30, 2023 that ousted civilian President Mohamed Bazoum, faced sanctions in February 2024. As part of these restrictions, land and air borders between Niger and other ECOWAS member states were closed, accounts of Niger’s state-owned enterprises in the ECOWAS Central Bank were frozen and financial assistance was suspended. Immediately after the developments in July, ECOWAS issued an ultimatum, giving the coup leaders a one-week deadline to reinstate deposed President Bazoum and threatening to use force. However, military intervention never materialized, although the ECOWAS Standby Force was activated for potential deployment in Niger. The very fact that ECOWAS could issue such a threat to one of its members undoubtedly alarmed the leaders of the three nations (and others), who are closely connected in various ways. As a result, their trust in the bloc was shattered, which led them to take further action—quit the association and form new alliances. They also believed that ECOWAS not only failed to help them in combating Islamic extremism, but instead weakened their positions by imposing sanctions. Indeed, ECOWAS, which in the 1990s and 2010s sought to diversify its economic ties and political contacts with the outside world, has in recent years adopted a pro-Western stance on many international issues, which is not surprising since the direction of any organization is largely shaped by the views of its leaders and sponsors. Regardless of who holds the rotating one-year ECOWAS chairmanship, Nigeria has always played first fiddle in the bloc and will continue to do so for a long time, as it shoulders nearly half of the Community’s expenses, including most of the funding for its peacekeeping operations. As the saying goes, “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” Nigeria’s current president, Bola Tinubu, who also chairs ECOWAS, spent nearly a decade studying, working and living in the United States. From the moment he came to power in 2023, he has been determined to cultivate ties with the West, primarily with the U.S. and the UK, but also with France. The position of Nigeria and ECOWAS toward the trio is a vivid testimony to the enduring significance of the “role of the individual in history”: a country that had maintained friendly relations with Russia for decades is now gradually distancing itself from it and shifting its foreign policy orientation. For better or worse, after the coup in Niger and a harsher response from ECOWAS compared to the events in Mali and Burkina Faso, relations between the trio and the Community broke down, with Bamako and Ouagadougou expressing their readiness to leave the organization. As a result, on January 28, 2024, despite the Community’s decision to lift sanctions against Niamey, the governments of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, driving the process of regional disintegration further. Shortly before that, the Sahel trio had one after another pulled out of the G5 Sahel—Mali in the spring of 2022, Burkina Faso and Niger in November 2023—leading to its collapse (the G5S had also included Mauritania and Chad). After the Confederation was founded, ECOWAS signaled its willingness to negotiate the possible return of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to the Community, especially since it had not received any formal notice of their departure, even though the proper procedure requires member states wishing to leave the bloc to provide one year's notice. The three countries made their announcement in January 2024, which should have given the ECOWAS a chance to try to convince them to reconsider their decision until January 2025, but the trio ignored the procedural rules and refused to continue fulfilling their obligations to ECOWAS. It seems that ECOWAS leaders have not yet come to understand that the trio is fighting not only for survival in the face of the Islamist threat, but also for an overhaul of trade and economic patterns, which subject underdeveloped nations to severe exploitation by developed powers. The Republic of the Niger, for example, is unhappy that despite being the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and lighting up a third of France, 80% of its population has no electricity. So Niger has had to seek help from Nigeria, which, incidentally, cut off electricity supply after the July 2023 coup. In response to the establishment of the Confederation, the head of one of the Community’s bodies, the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Alieu Touray, said the three countries risked “diplomatic and political isolation,” the loss of millions of euros in investments and the possible introduction of visa requirements for their citizens wishing to travel to ECOWAS member states. Touray also warned that in addition to the numerous threats to peace and security along with economic challenges, there was also a risk of disintegration of the region, as ECOWAS on the one hand and the AES on the other become increasingly entangled in the conflict between non-African powers. As France and the U.S. are strengthening military ties with some ECOWAS countries (notably Côte d’Ivoire), the three AES members have established military relations with Russia after expelling Western troops. But is the rift between the AES and ECOWAS truly so noticeable? For example, on July 18, 2024, a delegation from the ECOWAS Water Resources Management Centre visited Burkina Faso to mark the 49th anniversary of the Water Museum’s founding. Since many countries in the region, including key players like Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, stand to lose economically from strained relations with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which are important trade partners, it seems that efforts to bring these “prodigal children” back into the Community’s fold will continue until they result in either a positive or negative outcome. There have been speculations about the possible withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from WAEMU, which also imposed sanctions against these nations. However, since the trio has not yet developed the banking and financial infrastructure necessary for an independent system and cannot quickly ditch the CFA franc, which is used by WAEMU member states, their stance toward this currency union remains neutral. The founding of the Confederation raises questions—not least about the future of regional cooperation in West Africa. As Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have decided to chart their own course, ECOWAS’s role and policies are likely to change, although it is still unclear in what direction. There is also concern among the African public that the AES may attract into “their ranks” other countries grappling with similar issues and disillusioned with the regional bloc. For example, the idea of closing French military bases in Senegal has already been floated. Developing relations with Russia and other non-Western nations Russia has become a new strategic ally for the Sahel nations in their fight against Islamists, who are active across the three countries. Supported by the Russian military, Mali’s army has managed, as noted above, to retake the northeastern town of Kidal from insurgents in November 2023. Since April 2024, a mechanism for coordination between the militaries has been in the works, and operations are underway to divide the territory under Islamist control, which stretches from eastern Mali through northern Burkina Faso to Niger. Trade and economic cooperation are also expanding: since September 2023, several Russian private and state-owned companies have signed agreements with the AES countries in areas such as mining, industrial construction and others. While Russia focuses primarily on food security (Moscow shipped 50,000 tonnes of free grain to the Sahel in 2023) and developing the digital economy, China and Turkey are making inroads into energy production and mining precious and rare-earth metals. Moreover, Niger’s agreement to bring the extraction of these resources under the Confederation’s control reflects the trio’s willingness for deeper cooperation with Beijing and Ankara.***Without a doubt, the decision of the three nations to exit ECOWAS and form the Confederation demonstrates their readiness to strengthen their sovereignty, yet they did so amid resentment over sanctions and euphoria from their own assertiveness and growing ties with Russia. These steps cannot but deserve respect, especially against the backdrop of the turbulent geopolitical situation around the world and widespread, and largely valid, discussions that major European powers, including France, are losing their autonomy in foreign policy issues. Announcing the establishment of an integration project is one thing; strengthening it and making use of the benefits of cooperation is quite another. A telling example is ECOWAS, which has not become a truly effective economic or political community in the fifty years of its existence and now is even starting to fall apart. The problem for the AES is that “strengthening sovereignty” in its member states will take place in the context of weak economies, further strained by wars and conflicts, and lingering reliance on various forms of external aid, a habit that will take time to break. At the same time, dismantling the long-standing patterns of cooperation with the West, particularly with the former colonizer, cannot be done overnight. French enterprises and specialists—engineers, doctors, teachers, oil workers and others—are still working in the three countries; many families are linked to France through relatives living and children studying and working there; political, business and creative elites own real estate in France. In other words, it is too early to speak of a complete break with the former colonial ruler, although, of course, the three regimes see the Confederation as an opportunity to distance themselves from the legacy of French colonialism and the Françafrique policy. Ibrahim Traoré, for example, spoke very strongly against France’s presence in Africa at the Niamey summit. But speeches alone cannot bring about real change. In the context of its “return” to Africa, Russia appears determined—quite justifiably so—to support the AES in many, if not all, of its endeavors, but their outcomes will largely depend on the consistency and persistence of the military leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in defending their current ideals. It seems that relations between the members of the Confederation of Sahel States and Russia will deepen, especially since the AES sent a letter to the UN Security Council President in August 2024 condemning Ukraine (which could not but be welcomed by Moscow) for supporting terrorism in the Sahel and demanded that the Security Council prevent Kiev’s subversive actions in Africa. This primarily refers to the Islamist attack on a convoy of Russian and Malian soldiers in northern Mali, in which Ukrainian militants were confirmed to have participated by Ukraine itself. As a result, Bamako and Niamey broke off diplomatic relations with Kiev, and on August 7, 2024, Mali and Niger petitioned the Security Council to investigate Ukraine’s support for rebel groups in the Sahel. As the leaders of the three nations affirmed in their joint statement at the Niamey summit, they “have taken full responsibility before history.” However, only time will tell what the results of these actions—the withdrawal from ECOWAS and the creation of the AES—will be. In any case, the process of polarization in Africa between pro-Western nations and alliances on the one hand, and those trying to escape neocolonial dependence on the other, has already started and seems to have become irreversible. 1. Filippov V.R. African Policy of French President E. Macron: Chronicle of Actions and Evolution of Ideas. M.: IAS RAS, 2023.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The world economy is underperforming as a result of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainty around the US election. An escalation of conflict in the Middle East could increase uncertainties, harming inflation reduction efforts and hurting growth. It has been over a year since the Hamas-led attack on Israel. Israel’s response in Gaza has resulted in widespread destruction and significant loss of life. The conflict has since expanded beyond Gaza, involving the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian strikes targeting Israel. In addition to the awful humanitarian cost of the conflicts, the war and the possibility of its further expansion pose significant repercussions for the global economy. This article discusses three potential ways in which the current conflict and a wider conflict in the Middle East could affect the global economy. Increased geopolitical uncertainties First and foremost, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could lead to greater geopolitical uncertainties. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the geopolitical risk (GPR) and geopolitical acts (GPRA) indices (Caldara and Iacoviello, 2022) – these are text-based measures of heightened uncertainties due to adverse geopolitical events such as wars, terrorism and international tensions. (See this article for more discussion about these measures.) Following the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023, both the overall GPR index and its ‘war and terror acts’ component spiked strongly, to a level higher than that seen during the ISIS attack in Paris in November 2015. Both indices eased significantly in the months following October 2023 despite the continuation of the conflict. But they jumped again following Israel’s attack on southern Lebanon in September 2024. As of mid-October 2024, the GPR and GPRA remain, respectively, 21% and 35% higher than their historical averages.   What might be the consequences of such elevated levels of risk? Research tells us that higher geopolitical risk raises oil prices (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024). It also reduces global investment and increases inflation (Caldara et al, 2022). Greater geopolitical risk has a significantly negative impact on business and consumer confidence in several advanced economies (de Wet, 2023). This is because consumers typically cut non-essential spending and businesses postpone investment decisions during turbulent times. This reduces firm-level investment, particularly for businesses with higher initial investment costs and greater market power (Wang et al, 2023). Higher geopolitical risks also reduce global trade and financial flows, causing greater volatility in capital flows in emerging markets (Kaya and Erden, 2023). Oil production cuts and higher energy prices The second way in which the Middle East conflict could affect the global economy is its impact on energy prices, both directly through production cuts and indirectly through greater uncertainties. In response to Israel’s actions against its neighbours, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could reduce oil production to penalise countries supporting Israel. A similar action in the 1970s led to a significant jump in oil prices, which contributed to years of stagflation, with higher global inflation and recessions in major economies. Before Israel's attack on Lebanon at the end of September, oil prices had been declining due to falling demand, particularly from China. On the supply side, oil production had increased in Canada and the United States, countering the production cuts by OPEC, and Saudi Arabia was expected to increase oil production from December. But the situation quickly reversed following Israel’s attack on Lebanon. Oil prices jumped by nearly $10 per barrel within a week, before easing by around $5 per barrel. While the immediate oil price impact of Israel’s attack has mostly faded, the potential for higher oil (and other energy) prices still poses a risk to global inflation and economic activity (Liadze et al, 2022). To provide further context for the potential scale of this impact, we can show what would happen if oil and gas prices were to remain $10 higher for two years than the baseline levels projected in the Summer Global Economic Outlook from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), using NIESR’s Global Macroeconometric Model (NiGEM). The results demonstrate that the $10 rise in oil and gas prices increases inflation by around 0.7 percentage points in major economies in the first year (see Figure 2). The impact is higher in China, where the economy relies relatively more on oil imports for its strong manufacturing industries. The inflationary pressures persist for two years despite central banks’ efforts to curb inflation by increasing interest rates.   The effect of higher oil and gas prices on real GDP is shown in Figure 3. In the scenario described above, GDP would fall by 0.1-0.2% in major economies immediately. Partly due to higher interest rates, real GDP would continue to weaken for three years following the shock. After this, economic activity would start to return to base levels as oil and gas prices revert to their levels in the baseline forecast.   Increased shipping costs and supply chain disruptions A wider conflict in the Middle East could also affect the economy through higher shipping costs and supply chain disruptions. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in late 2023 showed that such disruptions can have a huge impact on global trade through shipping, which comprises 80% of world trade volume. Following the rocket attacks by the Houthi rebels, some commercial shipping re-routed from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to significant delays in travel times and increased freight costs. As a result, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index – a measure of sea freight rates – rose by around 260% in the second quarter of 2024 with additional disruptions to supply chains. Our analysis shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in shipping cost inflation can lead to import prices rising by up to around 1% and consumer inflation increasing by around 0.5% in OECD countries. As Figure 4 shows, the impact of shipping costs on inflation shows its full effects over six quarters. This means that inflationary concerns could be with us for the next year and a half as a result of higher shipping costs that may emerge from any possible escalation of the Middle East conflict.   Wider economic implications and policy responses While rising geopolitical risk and increased oil and shipping costs can each individually exert upward pressure on inflation and may slow down economic activity in the global economy, the combined impacts are likely to be greater. Countries with stronger trade and financial ties to the Middle East and those that rely heavily on oil imports as an input for domestic production would be most affected. On the monetary policy front, central banks may have to take a more hawkish stance in response to rising inflationary pressures from the Middle East conflict. This could lead to higher interest rates, which would further dampen economic activity, particularly in an environment where there are already recessionary concerns in some major economies. Beyond its immediate economic implications, an escalation of the Middle East conflict could trigger large-scale displacement of people, which would increase economic and social pressures on neighbouring countries. Many countries may also have to increase their military spending in response to growing regional tensions. Given that public debt levels are already elevated in many countries due to successive shocks to the global economy over the past decade, any additional defence spending could come at the expense of public infrastructure investments that would otherwise boost productivity growth. Overall, the global economy is already underperforming as a result of the lagged effects of tight monetary policies, weaker global trade, a slowing Chinese economy and uncertainties surrounding the upcoming US election and possible changes to US trade policy. A potential escalation of conflict in the Middle East could exacerbate the situation by increasing uncertainties, harming efforts to bring down inflation and reducing global GDP growth. Over the medium and long term, it could further damage the global economy, with the possibility of refugee crises as well as increased defence spending, making the effects more complex and longer lasting. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany is expected to hold a snap election in February after Chancellor Olaf Scholz reportedly agreed a deal with opposition politicians for an early vote. The recent collapse of Scholz’s coalition made a vote of confidence in the government highly likely, but Scholz had been pushing for it to be held in the new year. Reports now suggest it will be held before Christmas and, as Scholz is expected to lose, it would almost certainly lead to parliament being dissolved within 21 days and an election held within a further 60 days. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the Christian democratic (CDU/CSU) opposition, has led the charge for an earlier vote. The CDU/CSU is comfortably ahead in the polls and has promised to enable key legislation to pass in exchange for an immediate vote. The three-party coalition between Scholz’s social democratic SPD, the Greens and the market-liberal FDP has had an unhappy time. Events served to accentuate policy differences: in particular, the war in Ukraine and resulting energy crisis heightened tensions between the fiscally hawkish FDP pressing for balanced budgets and the pro-investment SPD and Greens. Disagreements were also evident over climate, transport and energy policy. The FDP is the only one of the three parties that is pro-nuclear. Matters got worse after a federal constitutional court verdict set major restrictions on government borrowing by imposing a rigid interpretation of constitutional debt restrictions. A downward revision of tax revenue forecasts last month then made things instantly worse. These challenges have led to an unhealthy cycle of political bickering. Germany has regular state elections, and for the most part the three coalition partners have done badly in these since coming to power. Most recently, three eastern states delivered record election results for the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD). After each such defeat, party leaders have felt compelled to raise their own profile by making policy demands in line with their priorities. But in doing so, they have added to the impression of a chaotic, disunited government. A recent Deutschlandtrend poll showed just 14% of citizens satisfied with the government against 85% who were dissatisfied.  Things came to a head when FDP leader and finance minister Christian Lindner tabled a list of demands of his coalition partners – with major tax and spending cuts – that he knew were certain to be rejected. Coalition leaders met on Wednesday but there was no agreement, leading Scholz to dismiss Lindner, effectively bringing the coalition to a close. There was a bitter exchange of views, with Scholz calling Lindner “petty” and “irresponsible”. The timing of the FDP’s exit, just after Donald Trump’s US election victory, when stability would have been preferred, came in for particular criticism. For the interim period between now and the anticipated election, Scholz has reshuffled his cabinet, appointing a new finance minister, Jörg Kukies, from his own party. One of the FDP’s ministers, Volker Wissing, refused to follow Lindner’s lead and has remained in the cabinet. He will continue as transport minister and will add justice to his brief. The Green agriculture minister will also look after education. In these circumstances, it is possible that the parliament cannot agree a budget for the 2025 calendar year, and would roll over existing spending plans, which is not unusual (indeed, it happened at the start of this year after the constitutional court verdict meant the 2024 budget had to be rewritten), but normally for a shorter time. It would be possible to make available additional funds for Ukraine and it is unlikely the other parties in parliament would block these – although the CDU/CSU has indicated it wouldn’t support the SPD’s proposal to suspend constitutional debt restrictions to make extra defence funding available. How the election could unfold A snap poll has indicated strong support for early elections. As things stand, the most likely outcome is a CDU/CSU led government under CDU leader Friedrich Merz with the SPD as junior coalition partner. The AfD is currently second in the polls but all parties have ruled out any sort of coalition deal with them. Back in 2021, it seemed possible there would be a CDU/CSU-Green coalition (as has been quite widely practised at a state level). But, under Merz, the CDU has shifted rightwards and engaged in such a lot of green-bashing that such a move seems unlikely, even if it commanded a majority (which, according to current polls it will not). The FDP is in a battle for survival, with current polls not even giving it the 5% of votes needed to qualify for representation in parliament. The left populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) looks set to enter the parliament for the first time. It is remarkable that the EU’s largest member state chose to collapse its government just hours after the continent was given the huge challenge of a Trump presidency. But constitutional mechanisms exist to keep German politics ticking over. The most likely outcome of the elections – a CDU/CSU coalition with the SPD – is a tried and tested model that will offer at least some stability.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Egypt recently deepened its involvement in the war-weary Horn of Africa by arming Somalia and deploying its troops in the embattled country. To Ethiopia’s growing alarm, Egypt is also set to join the multinational force supporting the Somali army against the jihadist threat by al-Shabaab. Egypt’s potentially destabilising presence in the region is seen a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s port agreement with breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia took as a direct affront. Endalcachew Bayeh, a political scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa, sets out the risks and the path to de-escalation. What do we know about Egypt’s entry into Somalia and the theatre of conflict in the Horn? Egypt’s arrival in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s quest for a dedicated port under its control. Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country by population and has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000). Ethiopia has been exploring alternative access points. This led to the announcement on 1 January 2024 that it had struck a port deal with Somaliland. Ethiopia agreed to recognise the breakaway republic in exchange for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast. The announcement sparked a diplomatic rift with Somalia, which viewed the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia still considers self-declared Somaliland part of its territory. Amid the turmoil, Somalia courted Egypt as a regional patron to counter Ethiopia. This aligned well with Egypt’s increasing interest in finding a military partner along Ethiopia’s border. Egypt is a longstanding rival of Ethiopia. Recently, it threatened to go to war over Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which it sees as a threat to its survival. Egypt deployed military forces in Somalia following its defence deal with Mogadishu in August 2024. It also plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. The mission is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia is a main player. Ethiopia’s agreement to recognise Somaliland and the friction with Somalia have brought its old enemy, Egypt, to its doorstep. How have Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities added to regional tensions? Soon after Egypt’s deployment in Somalia, Ethiopia formalised its recognition of Somaliland. It also sent an ambassador to the capital, Hargeisa. This made it the first nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. The two are also rushing to turn their memorandum of understanding into a binding bilateral treaty. Somaliland ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa. Eritrea, for a time a key ally of Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed in the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, is now at odds with Addis Ababa. And, in response to the recent tensions in the region, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt and Somalia. A recent meeting of the three has created a united front against Ethiopia. In Somalia, Ethiopia plays a stabilising role. Somalia now demands that Ethiopia should end its involvement. That could open the way for militant groups and keep Somalia unstable. This is even more likely to happen if Egypt focuses on its competition with Ethiopia rather than Somalia’s stability. In addition, Somalis have longstanding territorial claims over parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Instability can create fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab, which aims to include these territories in an Islamic state. Finally, tensions have risen between Djibouti and Somaliland over the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This is because the agreement will almost certainly be bad for Djibouti’s economy. Djibouti relies heavily on port revenues that are almost entirely generated from Ethiopia. What are the risks for the region? Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia. This volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars. Key areas to watch are: Sudan and Egypt: These two countries align on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Egypt has enhanced its security cooperation with Sudan through military support and joint exercises. Although Sudan is in turmoil, the Al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia remains a potential flashpoint. Egypt may take advantage of this dispute and its support for the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces to further its interests. Instability in Ethiopia: In several regions, the government is engaged in active conflict with non-state forces. This instability creates fertile ground for Egypt to potentially support proxies against the Ethiopian government. Egypt and Somalia have already expressed the possibility of using proxy forces. Egypt’s main motivation for intervening in the region is to control the Nile’s source or hinder Ethiopia’s use of the water. As a result, Ethiopia perceives Egypt’s presence at its doorstep as a direct security threat. This increases tensions between Egypt, Somalia and Ethiopia. Any further destabilisation of Ethiopia would disrupt the entire region, as it shares porous borders with almost all countries in the Horn. What are the potential avenues for de-escalation? A promising pathway for reducing tensions in Somalia and the broader region is for the two regional powers to reconsider their strategies and exercise restraint. Ethiopia can access the sea through Somaliland without formal recognition. This could ease tensions and would not encourage separatist movements. For Egypt, a more constructive approach would be to limit its direct involvement in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it should address its concerns about the Ethiopian mega-dam through the United Nations, the African Union and other platforms. Historically, its unilateral actions have often been sources of tensions rather than solutions in the region. The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development must ensure that the regional states themselves address regional issues. States must make wise decisions now to calm tensions, as no state will be spared from the spillover effects.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russian President Vladimir Putin last week hosted the BRICS summit, where Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia became official partner members – the first step toward full membership.  Putin had two main goals at the summit, where he tried to build up more international support for Russia against the backdrop of its invasion of Ukraine. First, he wanted to convey that Moscow is far from isolated on the world stage despite being targeted by United States-led sanctions, and that some of the largest economies don’t see the war in Ukraine as an impediment to closer ties with Russia.  Second, Putin was trying to build up consensus to create an alternative to the U.S. dollar-led trading order, which has made Russia and a host of other countries, including Iran, vulnerable to sanctions from the West. Putin made considerable progress on the first goal, but far less with the second one.  The four Southeast Asian states help explain why this is the case. Multipolar? Although Russia’s trampling of international law and use of military force to change borders sets a dangerous precedent for the countries of Southeast Asia, most states in the region see Russia as the path to a multipolar global order. And for Southeast Asian states that are always trapped in an increasingly zero-sum competition between Washington and Beijing, Moscow presents itself as a guardian of multipolarity. To them, it is a model for standing up to the West, or at least charting a more independent foreign policy.  For countries, whose foreign policy is largely transactional, pursuing ties with Russia increasingly makes sense.  Indonesia – arguably, the country in the region that is most protective of its sovereignty – has repeatedly voted against Russia at the United Nations, but barely spoken of Russia’s invasion.  Former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo hosted foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and met with Putin. But his Russia policy was extremely unprincipled and transactional. Russia has now supplanted Ukraine as Indonesia’s largest source for wheat imports. The country also is a major importer of oil from Russia, which has an internationally imposed price cap and sells below market rates. Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s new president, is set to continue this policy. Before his inauguration, he met with Putin and Prabowo’s foreign minister, Sugiono, made clear at the BRICS summit that Indonesia was seeking full membership in the grouping founded by Brazil, Russia, India and China. While Jokowi cared little about foreign policy, Prabowo seeks to assert Indonesia on the world stage with a much more active international policy and clout commensurate with its economic size. Russia is key to realizing this ambition. While Malaysia voted against Russia in two U.N. votes, its policy now is shaped by the conflict in Gaza, and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s seething anger towards the United States for its support of Israel.  Foreign corporations have recently pledged over U.S. $6 billion in investment to Malaysia’s semiconductor industry, one of the world’s largest.  Malaysia has angered Washington by repeatedly offering to sell semiconductors to sanctioned countries, including Russia and Iran. Anwar bristles at the unilateral imposition of U.S. sanctions on what he deems is a sovereign right to conduct foreign trade. Anwar views BRICS as not only a hedge against Western sanctions, but also as an alternative source of capital. Vietnam’s relations with Russia are long-standing and deep, and should be seen as part of its studiously neutral “bamboo diplomacy.” Vietnam voted with Russia in two U.N. votes, and abstained in a third. In July, Hanoi hosted Putin for a brief state visit.  Russia remains essential to Vietnamese security. Roughly 80% of its existing arsenal is Russian-made. While Vietnam seeks to diversify its supply chain, that will be difficult to do quickly.  The People’s Army leadership is close to Moscow. Its military is familiar with Russian equipment and produces many spare parts. Russia also allows licensed production of key weapon systems. In 2023, Moscow and Hanoi concluded an agreement to use proceeds from a Vietnamese investment in Siberian oil to fund the next generation of weapons. This alternative payment system was established to evade U.S. dollar transactions and thus Washington’s ability to impose sanctions. Thailand’s motivation in becoming a BRICS partner state has more to do with geopolitics than anything else.  A U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has been angered by Washington’s repeated imposition of sanctions as a result of military intervention in politics, including coups in 2006 and 2014.  China tried to fill that vacuum by maintaining close ties to the military leadership and increasing arms sales. Thailand feels caught between a rock and a hard place.  De-dollarization doubts Putin’s second goal, of de-dollarization, was far more divisive at the BRICS summit.  Luckily for the four Southeast Asian states, which depend so much on trade with the United States and which have no interest in creating a dollar alternative, they had India to hide behind.  Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar firmly rejected Moscow’s de-dollarization agenda and made clear that India would continue to settle the majority of its trade in U.S. dollars. That was all the cover the Southeast Asian states needed. In sum, Jakarta, Putrajaya, Hanoi, and Bangkok are not seeking to upend the U.S.-led liberal international order through BRICS. They describe the grouping not as an “either-or” but an “and.”  A distant war For Southeast Asia, the war in Europe is far away. And the countries remain in deep denial about the international legal precedent being set or what Russian success in achieving its war aims would mean for global security. But Putin’s confidence presupposes the economic realities. While Russia has seemingly defied international sanctions and there’s still positive economic growth, expected to be 3.6% for 2024, this is now a war economy. Foreign investment has fled and is unlikely to return. More than 600,000 of Russia’s educated urban middle-class has emigrated in a massive brain drain.  Domestic production, meanwhile, is geared solely to support the war effort. Interest rates are now 21% to help counter the 13.4% inflation rate.  With an estimated 1,000 battlefield losses a day, and over 70,000 new hires in Russia’s primary defense contractor, Rostec, the labor market is tight. The IMF is predicting the Russian economy to finally feel the weight of prolonged sanctions and the war economy with GDP expected to fall to 1.3% and 1.2% in 2025 and 2026, respectively.  And even Moscow’s arms exports to Southeast Asia – one of its primary instruments of statecraft – are in doubt, as domestic demand surges. Between 2022-2024, Moscow’s arms exports fell by 60%, compared to the previous three-year period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  While Moscow sees the BRICS as the key to a multipolar world that would erode the dominant position of the United States, his moves to weaken the dollar’s grip is too confrontational for many of the new partner states. Putin’s own bravado may be undermined by Russia’s isolated wartime economy and inability to be the security partner of choice for many developing states. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Operation al-Aqsa Flood occurred amid Türkiye’s normalization of relations with Israel and its intent to further develop economic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, which initially influenced Türkiye’s position in the early days. However, as Israeli massacres unfolded, Ankara’s stance on the war on Gaza Strip (GS) evolved both in statements and actions, placing Türkiye in ongoing political conflict with Israel, and particularly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. First: Determinants of the Turkish Position The Turkish stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by several key factors, foremost among them: • It came as part of Türkiye’s broader efforts to de-escalate and normalize relations with several regional powers in recent years, aiming to resolve foreign policy crises and avoid regional conflicts that could threaten stability.• It came in the context of restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, reinstating ambassadors, and expressing a desire to cooperate primarily in the field of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was also a clear intention to separate the Palestine issue from the course of bilateral relations, aiming to keep Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians distinct from its relations with Türkiye, as stated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.• The traditional view that relations with Israel are one of the key factors in Türkiye’s ties with the US, remains significant. At this stage, Ankara seeks calmer and more positive relations with the US, especially as it awaits the conclusion of the F-16 fighter jet deal.• Türkiye’s advanced relations with both sides of the Palestinian spectrum are evident. On the official side, represented by the PA and President Mahmud ‘Abbas, Türkiye has been a key supporter of Palestinian diplomatic efforts, particularly at the UN. At the same time, Türkiye maintains close ties with the resistance, specifically Hamas.• Türkiye’s aspiration to play a leading role in the region and the Muslim world stems from its belief that achieving this requires taking a prominent stance on the Palestine issue, consistent with Türkiye’s moral and historical position on the matter.• Seeking to align with the popular stance on the Palestine issue, particularly regarding the war on GS, Türkiye has responded to the widespread and intense public anger. The public has demanded actions that correspond to the scale of the genocide and massacres occurring in GS.• The political consensus in Türkiye across various parties, almost without exception, has led to increased pressure on the presidency and the government from opposition parties to adopt stronger positions. This pressure is especially notable from Islamic and conservative parties, which are seen as rivals to the AKP within the conservative segment of society. Second: Aspects of Turkish Position Regarding Operation al-Aqsa Flood The following aspects of Türkiye’s official stance toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be observed: • Ankara’s position in the first few days following Operation al-Aqsa Flood was characterized by restraint, taking a balanced approach by speaking of “targeting civilians,” calling on “all parties” to de-escalate, and urging the “release of hostages.”• With the onset of the ground war and the growing popular and partisan opposition within Türkiye against Israeli actions in GS, Ankara fully embraced the Palestinian narrative, condemning Israeli massacres as “genocide,” labeling Israel as a “terrorist state,” and declaring that it had “turned the page” on dealing with Netanyahu, now referring to him as a “war criminal.”• Türkiye rejects the classification of Hamas as a terrorist organization, affirming it as a resistance movement against occupation, viewing it as the first line of defense for Türkiye and the Muslim world. Türkiye has maintained ongoing communication and meetings with Hamas at various levels, including those involving President Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and the head of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) İbrahim Kalın.• Willingness to play a mediation role has been evident, as the Palestinian resistance released some foreigners in response to President Erdoğan’s mediation efforts.• Hosting dozens of wounded Palestinians in Türkiye’s hospitals for treatment and sending several aid convoys to Egypt to enter GS. Türkiye is the largest sender of aid, according to official data.• Proposing the deployment of Turkish troops in Palestinian territories as part of the concept of “guarantor states,” positioning Türkiye as one of the guarantor states for the Palestinian side—an idea that was rejected by Israel.• Participating in the joint ministerial committee established by the joint extraordinary summit between the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to monitor the situation and developments in GS.• As the massacres continued, Türkiye’s position has escalated through the imposition of gradual economic sanctions that could lead to a complete halt of all commercial dealings with Israel, despite reports suggesting alternative routes and third countries for delivering Turkish goods.• Türkiye’s announcement to join South Africa’s genocide case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).• Türkiye announced the dismantling of Israeli Mossad networks operating within its borders during the war months.• Verbal exchanges with Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz, who threatened Erdoğan with the fate of the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.• Türkiye has consistently criticized the US and European positions for being biased toward Israel, viewing them as partners in crime.• Hosting a speech by Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas before the Türkiye Parliament was a response to Netanyahu’s speech in Congress.• Türkiye has declared solidarity with and support for Lebanon in the face of Israeli threats and warned that Netanyahu’s policies may lead to a regional war that will harm everyone in the region.• On the other hand, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi— AKP) and its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), rejected several proposals from opposition parties in parliament aimed at investigating the continued flow of Turkish goods to Israel, revoking the citizenship of Turkish nationals who are members in the Israeli army, and other related proposals. Third: Projections In light of the stalemate in field and political developments related to GS in particular and the Palestinian territories in general, it is expected that Türkiye’s official position will remain consistent. This means maintaining a state of political and media engagement with Israel, fully adopting the Palestinian narrative—including the resistance narrative—and condemning the ongoing genocidal war. It is expected that Türkiye’s efforts in the political and legal arenas to criminalize and hold Netanyahu and other Israeli officials involved in the genocide accountable will continue, especially following the killing of Turkish-American activist Ayşenur Ezgi Eygi in the West Bank, who was shot by Israeli soldiers. Ankara is unlikely to escalate further in the economic sphere, particularly regarding the ongoing transfer of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through its ports. In addition to the developments in the field and political situation related to GS and the resistance, there are two possible factors that may lead to a change or modification of Türkiye’s position in the future. The first is the upcoming US elections and the potential return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office. The second possibility is a regional war involving several parties significant to Türkiye, which could be affected directly or indirectly, primarily Iran, Syria, Greece and Cyprus. This scenario makes it unlikely that Türkiye will remain an observer, especially given its suspicions and concerns about US and Western military buildups in Greece and Cyprus.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Few maritime security environments across the globe have consistently shown a degree of tension and volatility akin to the Baltic Sea scenario. Having established the deterrence of Russia's ambitions as an emphasis of European defence, the increase in military investments within the region, as well as the political realignments across the Baltic shore after the invasion of Ukraine show that the security assessment has radically changed in the last few months. The current deployment of NATO and Russian Federation forces in this region, along with the Alliance's geopolitical developments, provides a valuable perspective for analysing defence planning and assessing present and future vulnerabilities and areas of risk. The Baltic security architecture, and its continuous updates and transitions, justifies an integrative reading into the key aspects of the present security challenges in the area.  A new arena for security in the Baltic  Unbeknownst to many, the security environment along the Baltic is one of the most potentially volatile maritime areas in the world. Recent developments, especially the inclusion of Finland and Sweden into NATO, have resulted in a surge of military and intelligence-gathering activities, as well as grey zone operations by both NATO and Russia across those shores.  A central idea in any present assessment of this location is the significant shift in the last decades on many critical aspects. For one, the political geography has been radically altered. In 1990, Germany and Denmark were the sole NATO members in the whole region. To say the security strategy lacked some alignment would be an understatement. Even after the fall of the Iron Curtain, key security partners such as Germany and Poland were diametrically opposed in their security approach to Russia. The German foreign policy, for years, engaged the Russian political sectors, as well as the society at large by developing close economic and political links. Energy cooperation, namely, became a staple of Berlin’s policies [1]. In stark contrast, Poland adopted a cautious and often adversarial stance toward Russia, influenced by historical conflicts and concerns over regional security. Additionally, aware of the risks of relying on Russian energy, Poland invested in alternative sources, such as the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal in Świnoujście and pursued the Baltic Pipe project to import natural gas from Norway via Denmark [2]. Following the overall international consensus, the change of posture vis à vis Russia after 2022 has helped to align the strategies of the European countries on the Baltic, and has given an unprecedented impetus to security cooperation and the strengthening of political and military ties in the region.    Sweden and Finland's decision to abandon their decades-long, semi-neutral stance signifies that not only Germany, but the entire European continent, now acknowledges Russia's aggressive posture in the Baltic region. NATO membership was pursued, and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy began to tilt to other scenarios, such as the Baltic Sea, which may have been overlooked in previous analysis. The shift of the security policy in Europe, as some experts have called, has had a “shift to the East” [3].  Key Aspects and Challenges    Even if other policymakers are catching up only now with the crucial importance of this region for Moscow, the Baltic states are much more familiar with the nature of the Russian ambitions, the realities of hybrid warfare, and the crucial attention paid to the maritime routes by Russia’s economy and military. It holds primordial outlets for oil & gas, as well as consumer goods, offered by the harbours of Primorsk or St. Petersburg; perhaps even more critically, it is also home to the exclave of Kaliningrad, the base of the Russian Baltic Fleet and to its nuclear arsenal [4]. With border tensions with Poland and Lithuania growing every month, the fierce Russian intent of defending the freedom of passage to Kaliningrad is, perhaps, the most overt exemplification of Moscow’s grapple for control of the Baltic.  The geography of the Baltic could be serving Russian interests, as some experts claim. Actions not too dissimilar from a limited show of force, or mere military exercises over “token pieces of territory, such as an island in the Gulf of Finland, or an unpopulated area just across the border from Russia”, could very well be instrumentalized to divide the public opinion on the strategy, or even possibility, of a NATO response to such an act [5]. Grey-zone operations such as these, perhaps reminiscent of the 2014 invasion of Crimea, easily become a chip on the shoulder of international credibility for actors such as the United States, and could rapidly diminish general support for the Western security stance in the Baltic.   The challenge posed by Russia is heterogenous. Many different actions over the last decade have been understood by some as partial preludes to potential invasions. Mischief concerning military exercises and routes of air and sea-borne units, the constant sighting of illegal submarine activities, as well as the employment of “ghost fleet” tankers which could potentially be used as environmental weapons, are only some examples of the aggressive stance of Moscow.   Differences and persisting difficulties   Notwithstanding the challenges of the present security scenario, it must also be said that the positions of NATO in the Baltic are far stronger now than they were a couple of years ago [6]. The new membership of Finland and Sweden, as well as the overarching tactical shift concerning security policy, mean that the Alliance is now able to exert its air superiority, control of sea routes and logistic channels far more gracefully. The Enhanced Forward Presence missions in the Baltic states now face Russian ground forces with wildly different postures, morale and equipment, due to the tensions imposed by the fighting in Ukraine. Capabilities such as anti-submarine resources, mine countermeasures or amphibious operational groups have a larger and more advanced presence now in the Baltic; it is also expected that the Port of Gothenburg will serve as the main shipping point for NATO forces in the region.    Due to the reality of hybrid warfare in the region, along with the vulnerabilities of the Baltic Sea nations (cyberattacks, sabotage of subsea infrastructure, attacking gas lines and communication cables), the hostility of Russia will plausibly remain a principal concern of NATO in the near future. Moscow’s aggression towards  the West’s sovereignty, security and economic interests, are expected to continue, if only through the “less overt” operational examples such as disinformation operations or backing fringe political groups, just to name a couple [7].   The inherent geographical and energetic disadvantages currently faced by Russia do not mean that the Baltic Sea is under total NATO control. The diversity of capabilities and aggressive tactics available to Moscow mean that they could very well target naval or terrestrial assets of the Alliance with little extra preparation. The submarine and minelaying assets of Russia, for example, continue to be a long-established concern, and it may be hard to deter, even if effective and innovative technological countermeasures come to be deployed in the Baltic.  The strategic choke points of the region, under the environmental or geographical considerations of relevance, will not be easily evaded by any side. The commencement of the operational use of unmanned surface or undersea vessels will not limit the capacity for disruption of NATO or Russia.  Conclusion  The rise in investments and political interest for Baltic security is a welcome situation; nevertheless, it will need to be continued for years to come. The challenges faced by the Ukrainian forces in terms of international military or financial aid remain a stark reminder of the rapid disintegration of the toughest geopolitical conflicts’ weight in worldwide newsrooms and political cabinets. The key for the defence of peace in the Baltic seems to lie on the stalwart buttressing of NATO for the freedom of maritime traffic. This, in turn, both proves the validity of the security measures and resources in the area, as well as sending a clear message to the other nations that the supply lines, in both military and commercial terms, will continue to be supported. The real concerns for the security of the maritime routes into the easternmost parts of the Sea mean that the dependence on the Alliance’s militaries’ sea-going and aerial capabilities remains. Because of that, further efforts to coordinate, expand and train the different nations’ forces in the region continue to be called for. And not only that, as the antics of maskirovka (a Russian military term that refers to measures taken to mislead adversaries about military capabilities, intentions, and operations) to which the Russian Military Staff have continued to rely on time and time again have shown, the fear for limited, short-range, grey-zone scenario attacks remain another tangible possibility. Such an operation, an incredibly delicate venue for further international tensions and even military action, would clearly exploit the capabilities of amphibious Russian troops, well suited to the “island-hopping”, small squad black operations in a well-charted territory for them.   The stronger NATO, as seen today, will necessarily need to elicit further enhancements in the security policy for the Baltic Sea. Defence mechanisms, such as the development of territorial forces, the strengthening of the will to fight across the Baltic nations, or the continual efforts to guarantee the forces’ superiority in the aerial and naval domain, will need to continue their trajectory. In the end, only time will tell if the Baltic will finally come to be an example in the face of growing Russian aggression elsewhere.   References  [1] Westgaard, K. “The Baltic Sea Region: A Laboratory for Overcoming European Security Challenges”. Carnegie Endowment Research. 2023. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/12/the-baltic-sea-region-a-laboratory-for-overcoming-european-security-challenges?lang=en   [2] European Commission . “Inforegio - New Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Improves Energy Supply and Security in Poland.” Europa.eu, 2021, ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/projects/poland/new-liquefied-natural-gas-terminal-improves-energy-supply-and-security-in-poland.  [3] Erlanger, S. “Ukraine War Accelerates Shift of Power in Europe to the East”. The New York Times. January 26th, 2023. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/world/europe/eu-nato-power-ukraine-war.html   [4] Messmer, M. “The Baltic Sea is far from a ‘NATO lake’ – the alliance must strengthen its defences”. Chatham House Comments. 2024. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/baltic-sea-far-nato-lake-alliance-must-strengthen-its-defences   [5] Lucas, E. et al. “Sea Change: Nordic-Baltic Security in a New Era”. CEPA Comprehensive Reports. 2024. Available at: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/sea-change-nordic-baltic-security-in-a-new-era/   [6] Wills, S. “BALTOPS 24 in a Contested NATO Lake”. Center for Maritime Strategy. 2024. Available at: https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/baltops-24-in-a-contested-nato-lake/   [7] Savitz, S. & Winston, I. “A Brief Naval Overview of the Baltic Sea Region”. RAND Corporation Expert Insights. June 2024. Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2111-1.html#document-details