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Energy & Economics
NATIONAL HARBOR, MD, USA — February 20 2025: President of Argentina Javier Milei wields a chainsaw on the main stage on day 1 of the 2025 Conservative Political Action Conference.

Milei’s failed revolution: From libertarian chainsaws to a U.S. bailout

by Sahasranshu Dash

The libertarian revolution of Javier Milei, which had promised to free Argentina from the State, ended up being sustained by a bailout from the U.S. Treasury, the ultimate symbol of the interventionism he had sworn to fight. When Javier Milei took office in December 2023, brandishing a chainsaw as a campaign symbol, he promised nothing less than a libertarian revolution. An outsider to traditional politics, he declared war on an overextended Argentine state, pledging to cut ministries, privatize industries, dollarize the economy, and slash social spending to the bone. He even proposed abolishing the central bank. Many libertarians and cryptocurrency enthusiasts around the world welcomed his rise as the long-awaited dawn of anarcho-capitalism in power: a real experiment in turning radical free-market theory into national policy, inspired by Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction.” From the outset, Milei reinforced his global image. He dissolved the Ministry of Women, Genders and Diversity, threatened to remove femicide from the penal code, and attacked gender parity in politics. At Davos, he launched a fierce critique of “wokeism,” lumping together feminism, diversity, inclusion, equity, abortion, environmentalism, and gender ideology under one “woke ideology” to be fought. Mapuche women—members of one of Argentina’s largest Indigenous groups—denounced an increase in racist and misogynistic attacks. For conservatives from Washington to Budapest to New Delhi, this was electrifying. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, a propagandist aligned with Modi, praised Milei alongside Elon Musk’s failed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), seeing in both an attack on the welfare state and on the enemies of cultural traditionalism. In Milei, the global right found not just another politician but a standard-bearer of its dream to fuse libertarian economics with cultural radicalism. Less than two years later, the contradictions of his project are exposed. Reserves are depleted, household incomes stagnant, unemployment high, and public confidence eroded. Argentina remains trapped in crisis, repeating old cycles. History warns us: Carlos Menem left massive debts and unemployment despite two terms between 1989 and 1999; Fernando de la Rúa resigned amid collapse; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner governed with growing subsidies and controls; Mauricio Macri faced a currency crisis in 2018 despite IMF support. In remarkably similar fashion, Milei’s political standing has weakened. His party’s defeat in Buenos Aires provincial elections in September, coupled with corrupt allegations against his sister and closest adviser, has undermined his authority. Congress overturned one of his vetoes and is preparing to challenge others. The peso, already fragile, brushed up critical levels as it approached breaking the IMF’s stipulated currency band. On September 17, it crossed that threshold, trading at 1,475 per dollar, forcing the central bank to spend nearly $1 billion in reserves to defend the currency. Country risk soared, and fears of collapse grew. Then came an extraordinary intervention. On September 22, minutes before markets opened, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent wrote on X: “Argentina is a systemically important ally for the United States… all stabilization options are on the table. Argentina will be great again.” He suggested Washington might use swap lines, direct currency purchases, or the Exchange Stabilization Fund to buy Argentine debt. Markets responded: Argentine bonds rose six cents to 71 cents on the dollar, the peso strengthened 4%, and stocks climbed 6%. Panic gave way to relief. Days later, at the UN General Assembly in New York, Milei appeared alongside Trump and Bessent. Trump praised him for “cleaning up Argentina’s mess” and hinted at support for 2027, though he downplayed the idea of a bailout. For Milei, it was vindication: ideological affinity with Trump translated into tangible backing. But the irony was striking. A president presented as an anarcho-capitalist crusader was rescued not by markets but by the most interventionist state actor of all: the U.S. Treasury, through a classic government bailout. This echoed how Musk’s DOGE and chainsaw rhetoric ended in farce—like Liz Truss’s mini-budget in the UK or the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Milei’s libertarian revolution increasingly resembles a recycled continuation of Argentina’s old failures. Like his predecessors, he burns through reserves, begs for Washington’s support, and claims credit for temporary inflation drops. His promise of “creative destruction” has not rebuilt the productive base, spurred innovation, or repaired the social fabric. It has merely redirected Argentina’s dependence outward, making the country once again reliant on foreign sponsorship. Trump’s support adds another paradox. For a leader who proclaims, “America First,” rescuing Argentina seems inconsistent. But geopolitics explains it. With Washington straining ties with middle powers like India and Brazil, and regional powers like Colombia leaning toward Beijing or Moscow, Argentina stands out for aligning firmly with the United States. Milei has echoed Trump on Cuba, Venezuela, and U.S. wars abroad, even calling for the demolition of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Palestine — the third holiest site in Islam — “to bring the Messiah.” In return, he receives dollars and political backing. What is presented as libertarian solidarity is, in reality, a geopolitical transaction. But the deal only postpones the inevitable. Argentina faces midterm elections on October 26, and Milei’s weak performance in Buenos Aires suggests a possible Peronist resurgence. Investors are uneasy not only about the elections but also about his longer-term prospects in 2027. Some problems are structural, such as Argentina’s chronic dependence on the U.S. dollar. Anchoring the peso creates a dual economy — one domestic and one dollarized — that leaves the currency overvalued and prone to collapse. Abandoning the peg has proved just as destabilizing. When Milei briefly allowed the peso to float, confidence collapsed, inflation surged, and recession deepened. He soon had to revert to a peg-like scheme, defended with borrowed reserves. Argentina remains trapped: pegging drains credibility and reserves, while floating exposes the economy to immediate collapse. Inflation has fallen under Milei, from nearly 300% in 2024 to around 30% today. But at an enormous cost: sharp cuts in education, infrastructure, and welfare have driven poverty higher, while professional classes, shielded by an overvalued peso, enjoy cheap vacations abroad. Poverty in Argentina rose to 52.9% in the first half of 2024, up from 40.1% a year earlier, reaching its highest level in more than two decades. In the end, Milei’s experience underscores the limits of libertarianism in power. Libertarianism thrives in opposition, with its rhetoric of freedom and chainsaws. But in government it collides with three immovable forces: markets that demand safety nets, citizens who require protection, and political institutions that resist dismantling. Milei’s struggles show that libertarianism cannot escape the state: it only reshapes its dependencies, often in contradictory and self-defeating ways.

Defense & Security
Two special forces soldiers close-up, military anti-terrorism operations concept

The Utilitarian paradox of the War on Terror: Afghanistan and beyond

by Tabinda Sabah

Abstract The War on Terror (WOT) initiated after the September 11, 2001, attacks has been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back it dignifies the idea that the global war on terrorism was an aggression frustration response of US towards the 9/11 attack of 2001. As it not only created a dense overlapping financial burden on the US but also the cost of the invasion was never in favor with US peace and conflict policies. Many scholars argue about the utility of WOT with other ethics of war and conflict mediating techniques along with using the paradigms of realist and liberal theories. But now when the NATO alliances withdrawal enacted the end of a 20-year constitutive war. As the NATO withdrawal marked end of WOT without a remediate response, it enacts a dispersed or iconic philosophical thought that was the WOT was a success or utter failure? This article will foreshadow the events of WOT, NATOs withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Introduction Afghanistan is a multi-diverse state situated in the central south Asia. Its borders are tied by mountain ranges and trading ports submerge in southern and eastern parts of Asia, Europe & the Middle East. The geography of Afghanistan has been a frontier for colonial reign for centuries. From being occupied by the from the USA – USSR post -cold war struggles till the US invasion in Afghanistan in the WOT. Afghanistan has struggled to maintain a monopoly of economy, governance, infrastructural and parental isolation of Taliban within their own boundaries. The WOT was launched by the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The attack became one of the most contentious military and foreign policy actions in contemporary history. The war which initially aimed to dismantle terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda eliminate the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and secure global peace has lasted over two decades involving not only the USA but also the NATO forces. The centrality of military intervention and counter terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions has been met with both support and intense criticism particularly regarding its humanitarian consequences, effectiveness and long –term strategic outcomes. The complex history between the United States and Afghanistan, particularly form the Soviet- Afghan War 1979-1989 to the 9/11 attacks, offers a case study of how international relations, realpolitik, and the principle of utility (central to utilitarianism) can guide state behavior. By examining the role of foreign of U.S. policy in terms of net benefit or harm to global security and human welfare, especially when applying the principle of utility, which aims to maximize well-being and minimize suffering for the greatest number. This article seeks to explore the WOT through the principle of utility, a central concept in utilitarian philosophy. The principle of utility rooted in the works of philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, posits that actions should be judged based on their ability to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people [1]. By applying this principle, the review critically examines the ethical dimensions of the WOT, NATOs involvement and the humanitarian violations that have occurred throughout the conflict. The article is organized into the following sections: 1. Theoretical foundation of utilitarianism along with US and USSR influence in Afghanistan 2. US foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT. 3. NATOs overall assessment of the WOT under the principle of utility. In each section, the analysis will assess the actions taken by the US, NATO and other actors exploring whether the outcomes align with the utilitarian ideal of maximizing overall well-being. 1. Theoretical foundations: the principle of utility in war Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory that holds that the right course of action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or wellbeing. It evaluates actions based on their outcomes rather than their intrinsic moral qualities. This framework is particularly useful in the context of WOT. The principle of utility can be applied to assess whether the human, financial and political cost of the War were justified by the benefit of greater security, freedom from terrorism and regional stability. While NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has been framed as strategic realignment, it has also triggered a range of human rights violation, most notably the treatment of civilians, the resurgence of the Taliban and plight of women and minorities. This research will critically examine the interplay between the WOT, NATO withdrawal and human rights violation that emerge exploring this issue through primary lens of utilitarian paradox in international political theory. Utilitarian calculus in war: US relations in Afghanistan (1950-1970) The utilitarian calculus involves comparing the benefits of military intervention (such as the defeat of terrorist organizations the promotion of security and the establishment of stable democratic government) against it cost (including civilian causalities, economics expenditure and long-term social destabilization). As the WOT unfolded, the decision –making process in the US and NATO appeared to prioritize short -term security gains over long term humanitarian outcomes. For instances, the US began engaging with Afghanistan as part of its boarder strategy to contain Soviet expansion during the Cold War. The Helmand Valley Project aimed at modernizing the Afghan agriculture, and US aid under King Zahir Shah and Muhammad Dauod Khan government were early manifestation of US interest in Afghanistan. However, Soviet influence also grew particularly through infrastructure projects like the Salang Tunnel. The competition between the US and Soviet Union for influences in Afghanistan explains the context of utility of benefits in a realist perspective where states act primarily acts to protect and expand their own power for the greater benefit of good for the greater number of people. (Morgenthau, 1948). Also, the key challenges in applying the principle of utility to the WOT is determining who benefits and who suffers. for instance, the US and NATO countries may have gained security by weaking terrorist groups, but the Afghan and Iraqi population have borne significant cost in term of civilian causalities, displacement and economic destabilization of the Middle East and growth of radicalization, complicates any simplistic utilitarian evaluation. Under the presumptive analysis of utility: Any war or WOT occurs where there is an imbalance in the collapse of the monopoly of the inter-state relations among the rivalry. Furthermore, from a utilitarian perspective, the US & USSR interventions aimed to protect national security and detain the expansion of the rival superpower. However, the long-term consequences of such competition particularly the US focus on the military aid and covert actions led to the instability, civil war and the eventual Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The overall outcome – while achieving short term strategic gains in containing the Soviet influence ultimately disrupted Afghan society, leading to the widespread maximizing welfare for the Afghan people or for the global peace in the long run, as they contributed to a power struggle that further destabilized Afghanistan. Utilitarian critique of preemptive war Utilitarianism also directly critiques the preemptive war doctrine espoused by the George W. Bush administration. The Invasion of Iraq in 2003, based on the belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) illustrated a problematic application of utilitarian reasoning. Critics argue that the invasion was not only morally unjustifiable but also inefficient as it caused massive human suffering without achieving its purported goals. According to the utilitarian philosophy such as Peter Singer’s the catastrophic outcomes of the Iraq War – millions of displaced, the loss of thousands of lives and destabilization of regions – far outweighed by any potential benefits in term of preventing future threats to US security. Also, the US influence deterred the rise of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan which was aligned with the soviet interest. This led to the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 intended to prop up the PDPA government. The US response was to support the Mujahedeen Rebels providing them with military aid (including stinger missiles) & funding through intermediaries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Thus, this covert operation was seen as a part of broader Cold War strategy to undermine Soviet influence in the region. In the long run, the intervention was a justified action and response to Soviet expansionism. According to Hans Morgenthau’s principles of international politics states act based on their national interest which in this case was to counter Soviet influence. The US built alliances with the Islamism groups in Afghanistan which while supporting US geopolitical goals led to the creation of radicalized Islamist network, contributing global terrorism. The creation of this network, with groups like Taliban and Al-Qaeda exemplifies the unintended consequences for foreign intervention that may maximize short term strategic benefits but lead to a long–term instability and suffering. The soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan in a state of chaos. The Mujahedeen factions, funded by the US turned against each other, leading to the rise of the Taliban in 1996. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden, who had been in Afghanistan during the Soviet conflict, founded Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s rise the Taliban support for them would set the stage for 9/11 attacks. While on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, orchestrated the terrorist attack on the United States. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people and led to the Taliban regime that harbored it and prevent further attacks. Utilitarianism and long-term consequences From a utilitarian viewpoint the US role in fostering Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan can be seen as contributing to a greater global harm in the form of terrorism. The short-term goal of defeating the Soviet Union led to the rise of extremist group that would go on to inflict severe harm globally, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. The utilitarian perspective here emphasizes that although the US successfully countered Soviet expansion, the long–term consequences – including the development of Al-Qaeda and its attacks on the US and other countries – created a greater global security threat. These consequences starkly illustrate the limits of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long–term impacts where interventions create unforeseen global risks. Also, the immediate benefits of the US invasion were clear: the removal of Taliban and the disruption of Al-Qaeda’s operation in Afghanistan reduced the immediate threat of global security. However, the long-term consequences – including the loss of civilian lives, economic costs, and the rise of new insurgencies – raised questions about whether the intervention truly maximized global well-being. The humanitarian cost of War, including the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians, the destabilization of the country and the ongoing conflict must be weighed against the benefits of preventing further terrorist attacks Moreover, the prolonged US military presence in Afghanistan until their withdrawal in 2021 led to the significant economic and social costs that have yet to be fully realized in terms of global welfare. 2. US Foreign policy and military strategies during the WOT The US action during the WOT was justified under the assumption that eradicating terrorism and ensuring national security would promote greater good, both domestically and internationally. However, the application of the principle of utility raises important ethical concerns about the methods used and their long-term impacts. The WOT initiated by the United States in the aftermaths of September 11, 2001 attacks, fundamentally reshaped international relations and military strategy, particularly in Afghanistan. These interventions, characterized by the use of military force, under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) aimed to eliminate Al-Qaeda and dismantle the Taliban regime that harbored them. The US was soon joined by NATO allies in what was labeled operation enduring freedom and later operation led to significant human, political, and humanitarian costs. The Bush administration’s approach to security The Bush administration response to the 9/11 attacks was fundamentally shaped by realist principles of international relations, which emphasize the pursuit of national interest, power, and security in an anarchic international system. Under a realist paradigm, states must act in their own self-interest, often using force to ensure their survival and dominance. This is especially evident in offensive realism, as articulated by scholars like John Mearsheimer, which suggest that great powers seek to maximize their influence and security, often through coercion and military intervention. Under President George W. Bush the primary rationale for the WOT was the principle of self-defense and the protection of citizens from the threat of terrorism. The US government invoking the Bush Doctrine adopted a policy of preemptive military strikes, aimed to maximize the safety for the greatest number of Americans by neutralizing terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda and dismantling the Taliban support for such groups. However, the application of preemptive military force led to significant civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Amnesty International the US military use of air strikes drone attacks and ground operation led to thousands of civilian deaths raising questions about whether the benefits of eliminating immediate terrorist threats justified the loss of innocent lives. Noam Chomsky and other scholars had argued in the past that the Iraq War, in particular, was a costly endeavor that not only failed to eliminate terrorism but also contributed to the rise of groups like ISIS exacerbating the global security threat in the long-term. This outcome from a utilitarian standpoint challenges the initial justification for the WOT as the human cost seemed disproportionate to the benefits achieved. According to UN reports and media outlets like Al-Jazeera, the conflict resulted in the loss of over 100,000 lives, including both civilians and military personnel. These humanitarian issues, however, were often sidelined in favor of military objectives and maintaining control over Afghanistan’s strategic importance. The principle of utility in military intervention: benefits and harm The principle of utility, central to utilitarianism, seeks to maximize overall well-being and minimize harm. From a utilitarian perspective the effectiveness of military intervention like the WOT can be evaluated by examining whether the benefits – such as the elimination of terrorist threats outweigh the harm caused to civilians, the humanitarian crises and regional instability. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks the US & NATO military actions were justified on the grounds of protecting the lives of American citizens and global security by dismantling Al-Qaeda and ousting the Talban, in utilitarian terms these goals seemed to promise a net benefit: by limiting al-Qaeda safe haven the intervention could potentially prevent future terrorist attacks on the US and its allies thereby protecting millions of lives. The humanitarian costs and the questions of net utility However, from a utilitarian viewpoint, the long-term harm caused by the intervention, including civilian deaths, displacement, and the destabilization of Afghanistan, must also be factored into the equations. According to various reports including the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan caused widespread civilians being killed or injured. Additionally, the war exacerbated poverty, displacement, and psychological trauma for millions of Afghans. These humanitarian factors, especially when weighed against the limited gains in terms of security, question the net utility. Furthermore, the war led to prolonged instability in Afghanistan, which has seen a resurgent Taliban and the growth of new extremist groups like ISIS-K. This indicates that the intervention did not lead to long-term stability and may have contributed to further global security. The continued suffering of the Afghan people and the rise of new threats to global security (such as the Taliban’s return to power in 2021) suggests that the long-term consequences of the intervention might outweigh its initial benefits, thus failing the utilitarian criterion of maximizing overall well-being. State-building efforts and the decline of utility The US and NATO also pursued the strategy of state-building in Afghanistan which was intended to create a stable democratic government. The hope was that a New Afghan Government would prevent the country from becoming a heaven of terrorists, however, despite significant investment in democratic institutions human rights and social justice the central goal of security remained elusive. The inability to create a functioning state in Afghanistan, coupled with the increase of violence and corruption, indicated that the state-building efforts were not successful in improving the long-term welfare of Afghan population. While the US & NATO intervention in Afghanistan may have been justified through the lens of realism – to secure national interest and protect against terrorism – the utilitarian evaluation of the intervention reveals that the human and geopolitical cost likely outweighed the benefits, calling into question the true utility of the war and its outcomes. Further interventions must weigh these long-term consequences more carefully and seek to maximize the well–being of both local populations and global security. Obama’s counterterrorism strategy: drone warfare The Obama administrations sought to reduce ground troop deployment and shift to a strategy of targeted killings, particularly through the drone strikes, while distancing itself from the controversial Iraq War. This approach not only aimed to minimize US causalities while addressing threat posed by the groups like Al-Qaeda and Taliban. While drone strikes targeted high valued terrorists, like ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Taliban, they also crated collateral damage along with deaths of civilian in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia while achieving the primary interest of assonating Osama bin laden. The approach of Obama’s administration emphasized the pursuit of national interest, security and state sovereignty in an anarchical international system. Realism often holds the ideal that a state acts in their self-interest, often through military force to ensure their survival and to maintain power relative to other states. Under Obama the core objective of the US foreign policy remained the same: to eliminate terrorist threat to the US and its allies particularly from Al-Qaeda. Also, the decision to continue the Afghanistan War while pulling back from Iraq was largely framed as a more focused, efficient approach to combat terrorism by selective military actions and intelligence, instead of fugitive prolonged war. This principle prioritized the effectiveness of military power over ideological or humanitarian goals. A key feature of the Obama’s realist approach was the unilateral actions the US took to pursue its objectives, particularly in the case of Operation Neptune Spear – the Navy Seal Operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011. The operation, conducted in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was not coordinated with Pakistani authorities which led to significant tension between the US and Pakistan. From a realistic standpoint the unilateral actions can be understood as a pragmatic use of military power to neutralize a direct threat to US security. In a world of anarchy, where no global authority can enforce laws, the state must often take matters into their own hands. By conducting a covert operation without seeking Pakistan’s approval, the US acted out perceived self –interest taking actions to eliminate a high valued target who posed an ongoing threat to American citizens and interests. However, Pakistan's sovereignty was violated in this instance, which raised significant international law concerns. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the use of force by one state on another is prohibited, except in cases of self-defense. The U.S. justified the operation as a self-defense measure, arguing that Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan was a direct threat to U.S. security, and that the operation was an act of preemptive self-defense against terrorism. From a realist perspective, this is a reasonable justification for intervention, as the preservation of national security often supersedes concerns about sovereignty. From a utilitarian perspective, Obama’s drone strategy presents a moral paradox. While it may have successfully neutralized terrorist leaders and prevented attacks on US soil it also caused significant harm to local populations, violated international law and arguably contributed to anti-American sentiment in affected regions. In this case the benefits to US security were weighed against the moral and human cost of innocent lives lost raising question about whether the outcomes were truly in the service of the greater good. Utilitarian analysis of the Obama administration’s WOT: maximizing security and minimizing harm. The Obama administration’s approach to WOT can also be observed by its ability to maximize overall security and minimize harm both to the US and to civilians of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The idea is to assess whether the benefit of military actions, such as the elimination of high valued targets, outweighs the costs including civilian casualties, displacement of population and the destabilization of the region. One of the key successes of the Obama’s administration was the target killing of Osama bin Laden. The operation provided a sense of closure to the 9/11 attack, which is benefit from the perspective of US public security and national pride. The death of Bin Laden was framed as a symbolic victory over Al-Qaeda, and this may be seen as a positive outcome because it removed a key figure head of terrorism, which could reduce the perceived threat to global security. However, the humanitarian cost of the broader WOT – which included the use of drone strikes and special force operations – were substantial. While drone strikes allowed precise targeting of terrorist operatives, they also led to numerous civilian causalities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Drone warfare has been heavily criticized for the lack of transparency, the risk of collateral damage, and the psychological impact on local populations. In the case of Pakistan, the unilateral nature of the Bin Laden’s operation not only undermined Pakistan’s sovereignty but also caused political fallout that weakened the US-Pakistan relationship. The operation demonstrated that US actions even when taken in interest of self–defense could have serious long-term geopolitical consequences, such as the erosion of trust and cooperation between states. From a utilitarian perspective, the broader costs – including the destabilization of US relations with Pakistan particularly when it comes to larger goal of regional stability – outweigh the perceived benefits of the operation. The ethics of targeted killings The increasing use of targeted killing, especially through drone strikes also raised significant ethical concern from a utilitarian perspective. While these operations may have been effective in neutralizing specific terrorist threats, the long-term consequences, including the moral hazard of using covert killings without oversight, can lead to escalations of violence and increased instability in the regions already plagued by a conflict. The principle of utility requires a careful balance of costs and benefits. In many instances, targeted killings have resulted in collateral damage, including the deaths of innocent civilians, which diminishes the overall moral benefit of these actions. Ultimately while the Obama administration efforts had eliminated specific threats and achieved short term gains, the long-term impact of the regional stability and international relations suggest that the utilitarian cost benefits analysis of the WOT points to a more complex legacy. Further interventions must carefully consider both the military objectives and humanitarian cost, to better align actions with the ultimate goal of global security and human flourishing. Trump’s “America First” approach and the cost of withdrawal Donald Trump’s first administration continued the WOT with a focus on unilateralism and reducing US military involvement aboard. The Doha Agreement (2020) negotiated between the Trump administration and the Taliban was a significant shift in the US policy, aiming for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. While this decision aligned with Trump “American First” philosophy, which prioritized US interest over global obligation, the execution of the withdrawal was chaotic, leading to the rapid resurgence of the Taliban significant humanitarian crises. From a utilitarian perspective the withdrawal decision can be seen as an effort to end a costly and unproductive military engagement that was producing diminishing returns. However, the aftermath of the Taliban returns to power accompanied by the collapse of Afghan government and widespread humanitarian suffering – raises significant doubts whether this decision ultimately maximized the welfare of the Afghan population or the global community. The decision to abandon NATO allies and the Afghan government, left a power vacuum, creating conditions for renewed conflict and humanitarian suffering thus failing to achieve the greater good in the long run. Paradoxically, Trump sought to reduce US involvement in long standing conflicts like Afghanistan which he viewed as a dent on American resources with minimal return in terms of national security. His decision to withdraw NATO forces from Afghanistan reflects this approach, emphasized the reduction of military expenditures and prioritizing domestic issues over international commitments. Trump’s decision to withdraw NATO forces can be viewed as an attempt to minimize the costs of prolonged military engagement while attempting to safeguard American lives. The moral benefit of withdrawal lies in the relief of American soldiers from the ongoing conflict and allowing the US to refocus its attention on the issues perceived as more pressing like economic revitalization & domestic infrastructure. However, the humanitarian consequences of such a move were severe. The Doha Agreement signed in 2020, aimed to facilitate the US withdrawal in exchange for Taliban assurances failed to deliver on key promises such as the protection of human rights and the creation of legitimate Afghan government. The agreement, while offering the possibility of peace did little to address the internal division in Afghanistan or to ensure the long-term stability of the country. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 resulted in a swift collapse of the Afghan movement, marking a humanitarian disaster as the Taliban took over Kabul, triggering widespread violence displacement and violation of human rights, particularly women rights. The decision to withdraw without securing a lasting peace agreement resulted in a net negative outcome for Afghanistan civilian population. While the US may have minimized its military risk the benefits of withdrawal were offset by the harm inflicted on the Afghan people. The Doha Agreement and peace talks. The Doha Agreement (February 2020) reflected Trump’s aims of ending the “forever war” in Afghanistan. The agreement led to US-troop reduction in exchange for Taliban promises not to harbor terrorist organization and a commitment to negotiating with the Afghan government. From a utilitarian perspective, the promise of peace talks was intended to maximize overall stability by ending the cycle of violence. However, the exclusion of the Afghan government from the peace talks and the continued violence by the Taliban during that period – undermined the utility of the agreement. The lack of inclusivity in the talks created a perception that US was abandoning its Afghan allies and supporting a regime that had a long history of human rights violation. The net benefit of the Doha Agreement therefore can be seen as limited, as it failed to bring about the desired peace or long-term stability in Afghanistan, while the Taliban rapidly retook the power once the US troops began their withdrawal. Biden’s commitment to ending the WOT Biden decision to proceed with the US withdrawal was framed as a continuation of a long-standing policy of ending the war. Biden argued that the US mission had evolved from counter terrorism to nation-building and that the Afghan government was not capable of holding power without US military support. In his view, the war had become a strategic quagmire, consuming trillions of dollars and thousands of lives without clear, sustainable outcomes. Biden’s decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation. The human cost of the disorganized withdrawal, the Taliban resurgences and the human right abuses that followed outweigh the short-term benefits of US troop withdrawals. From a utilitarian perspective, Biden decision to withdraw aimed at minimizing the harm to American soldiers and the financial burden of the war. However, the immediate humanitarian impact of the withdrawal was catastrophic. The rapid fall of Kabul in August 2021, months ahead of the scheduled withdrawal, led to scenes of chaos and desperation, as thousands of Afghan Civilians – including those who had assisted US troop withdrawals. While Biden justified the pullout as a necessary step for ending the war, the immediate aftermath suggested that the overall utility of the withdrawal was minimal, as the Taliban’s return marked a return to an authoritarian rule, with increased repression of women, journalist and other civil society groups. Biden’s foreign policy and NATO’s role Biden’s administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position, as they were forced to evacuated personnel and citizen alongside US forces. The dis-orderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances, as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision–making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint, the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. On one hand, it removed NATO forces from an increasingly unpopular and costly conflict, thereby reducing the risk for Western nations. On the other hand, it undermined the credibility of NATO as a security alliance, casting doubt in US commitment to collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and creating a vacuum within the EU and NATO that was quickly filled by the resurgence of the Taliban. 3. NATO’s role and withdrawal from Afghanistan NATO roles in Afghanistan were to assist in stabilizing the country after the initial US invasion and to ensure that Taliban could not regain power. However, NATO efforts through significant in terms of resources and manpower were ultimately undermined by the persistent instability corruption and a lack of clear political resolution in Afghanistan. However, the Biden administration faced significant criticism for its handling of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. The collapsing Afghan government left NATO allies in a difficult position as they were forced to evacuate personnel and citizens alongside US forces. The disorderly nature of the withdrawal strained NATO alliances as many European countries felt sidelined by the US decision-making process. From a utilitarian viewpoint the US withdrawal had a dual impact on NATO. As it undermined the credibility of collective defense under article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the EU and NATO allies faced the challenge of reassessing their own defense strategies as they were left to cope with the vacuum created by the US pullout and the resurgence of the Taliban. The Utility of NATO’s Intervention was framed as a collective security mission aimed preventing terrorism and fostering a stable democratic Afghanistan. From a utilitarian perspective NATO goal was to promote peace and security for the Afghan people while supporting the broader international community fight against terrorism. NATO actions contributed to civilian casualties raising ethical concern about the cost-benefit ratio of the intervention. The chaotic withdrawal in 2021 mirrored under President Biden was another critical juncture in the WOT. The sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban swifts return to power raised questions about the utility of NATO long-term involvement in Afghanistan. The withdrawal did not produce a greater good as the human cost of Taliban resurgence, and the subsequent humanitarian crisis significantly outweighed the benefits of the mission. Regional geopolitics and the Taliban’s return to power The Taliban’s rapid rise to power was followed by international recognition from China, Russia, and Pakistan, all of whom were keen engage diplomatically with the new regime. China’s BRI initiative showed interest in Afghanistan’s strategic location, while Russia and Pakistan sought to maintain their regional influenced. From a utilitarian perspective, this shift in regional power dynamics presents mixed outcomes. On the positive side, the Taliban’s reassertion of control over Afghanistan could potentially reduce terrorist activities within the region if the Taliban adheres to the assurances it made to foreign powers regarding counter-terrorism efforts. However, the humanitarian costs, especially for the Afghan population – remain severe. The Taliban’s treatment of women, freedom of speech and other fundamental rights represent a serious human cost that undermines the utilitarian justification for withdrawal. For neighboring countries like Pakistan, the Taliban rise creates a security dilemma as it may embolden domestic insurgents like the Tehreek-e-Pakistan (TTP). This could lead to spiral of violence that destabilizes the entire region, potentially leading to further refugee flows, terrorist activities, and cross conflict. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, under both Trump and Biden was driven by the goal of minimizing the costs of prolonged military engagement, which from a realist perspective, could be justified as a necessary step in re-orienting US foreign policy. However, from a utilitarian standpoint the humanitarian consequences of the withdrawal including civilian suffering, regional instability, and the empowerment of the Taliban, have largely outweighed the short-term benefits. 4. Humanitarian consequences and civilian casualties and the use of force One of the most striking aspects of the WOT and particularly the US and NATO actions in Afghanistan and Iraq is the humanitarian violations that have accompanied military operations, the principle of utility demands that the human cost of war be carefully considered and yet civilian casualties during the WOT have been significant. According to estimates, more than 200,000 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan alone with additional fatalities in Iraq and other regions affected by the conflict. The extensive use of drone strikes air raids and ground operation against the Taliban’s Al-Qaeda targets has resulted in numerous instances where civilians were killed in the process. While these actions may be justified as targeting terrorist the humanitarian consequences raise question about whether the WOT strategic objective were worth the cost incurred. Utilitarian philosophers like Rosa Brooks argue that this violation which may have been undertaken in the name of security failed to maximize the well-being of those affected, particularly the victims of torture. The collateral damage in terms of civilian suffering and the loss of moral credibility further diminishes the utilitarian justification of these actions. Bush administration: the use of force without legal protection The Bush administration’s labeling of Al- Qaeda as a terrorist organization allowed for the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists with many denied the rights of prisoners of war (POWs) as outlined in Geneva Convention article 3. The US government’s treatment of captured militants, including the decision to not grant them POW status, was a direct violation of international law. The lack of judicial trial, along with the use of military commission to try detainees, highlighted the absences of fair trial guarantees and violated basic principles of justice. Detention and torture: Guantanamo Bay The detention of suspects at Guantanamo Bay and the torture inflicted on prisoners there, became a significant violation of international human rights law. Detainees held in indefinite detention without trial were often subjected to enhance interrogation techniques, which included waterboarding, stress positions and other forms of psychological and physical abuse. These actions violated international conventions, including the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), both of which prohibit torture and inhumane treatment. From a utilitarian perspective, these actions fail to justify the moral harm they caused. The human suffering of detainees at Guantanamo, along with the damage to the US international reputation, cannot be outweighed by the perceived benefits of gathering intelligence. While some argue that torture may have produced vital information, the overall harm caused to human dignity, individual rights and the rule of law suggest a net negative utility. Drone strikes and civilian casualties Drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been another controversial aspect of the WOT. These strikes, which were often conducted with minimal oversight and without regard for sovereignty of countries, resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. In many cases non-combatants, including women and children were killed in mistaken strikes or when their proximity to a target was deemed insufficient to prevent harm. From a utilitarian standpoint, drone strikes can be seen as a high–risk, high-reward strategy. The argument made by proponents of drone warfare is that it minimizes American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing American causalities and prevents terrorist attacks, therefore maximizing national security. However, collateral damage and the disruption of communities in targeted countries can lead to the problem. This creates a vicious cycle, while the US attempts to reduce the immediate threat the long-term harm to global stability and human lives is profound. For instance, the 2010 incident in which 23 civilians were mistakenly killed in a drone strike is a clear example of this negative utility. The mistaken targeting of civilian buses underlines the lack of precision and accountability in the US strategy, which when weighed against the loss of innocent lives, cannot be justified under the utilitarian principle of minimizing harm. Obama administration and violation of IHL Under Obama’s administration, the drone strikes campaign intensified with the goal of targeting high valued terrorist and leadership figures within Al- Qaeda and the Taliban. While the strikes may have helped eliminate specific threats, they were often conducted without proper regard for international humanitarian law, particularly distinction (the principle that combatants and civilians must be distinguished) and proportionality (the requirement that military actions must not cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage). For instance, Obama’s Operation Neptune Spear, which targeted Osama bin laden in Pakistan, while celebrates as a success in eliminating a key terrorist figure, raised significant legal questions. The operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty and was conducted without prior consent, in clear breach of the UN Charters provisions against the use of force on foreign soil without permission. A utilitarian may argue that the elimination of bin Laden may have offered short-term benefits in terms of counterterrorism, the long-term consequences – the violation of international law, the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations and the potential for escalated conflict – suggest that the operation caused more harm than good. 5. The economic and social cost of the WOT The financial cost of the WOT was astronomical. According to the US Department of Defense, the total military expenditure in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2020 was around $ 955 billion with estimates that the total cost of the WOT, including related costs, could reach $2 trillion by 2024. This enormous expenditure, while it supported military and intelligence operations, could arguably have been better utilized from a utilitarian argument, for domestic priorities like health care, education, and infrastructure. Furthermore, the opportunity cost, the benefits that could have been derived from using the resources elsewhere, undermines the utilitarian arguments for continuing the war, particularly given the lack of tangible success in achieving long-term peace and stability in the regions affected by the war. The human cost The human cost of the WOT was profound. Thousands of US soldiers, tens of thousands of Afghan civilians and hundreds of thousands of people in the broader region lost their lives. Many others faced psychological trauma and displacement. The US military emphasizes on counter insurgency and drone strikes, while designed to protect American lives, resulted in widespread civilian casualties and displacement in the countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, further destabilizing the region. Discussion The WOT initiated after September 11, 2001, attacks have been one of the most consequential and complex military and political campaigns in modern history. Looking back there are several key reconditions and conflict mediation on how it could have been handled differently to achieve better outcome, reduced unintended consequences, and hold international law and human rights Applying the principle of utility to assess the overall effectiveness and morality of the WOT reveals a complex picture. While the US and NATO achieved some military successes, including the eliminations of key terrorist leader and the weakening of organizations like Al-Qaeda, these gains were accompanied by profound humanitarian costs. From a short- term utilitarian perspective the WOT may have been justified in terms of protecting US national security and neutralizing immediate threats forms of terrorism. However, when considered from a long-term perspective the human, financial, and strategic costs - especially the rise of radical groups like ISIS, the displacement of millions, and the destruction of entire societies - raised serious doubts about whether the WOT truly maximized global well-being. The ethical implications of the civilian casualties, torture and human rights violation further complicate the utilitarian evaluation. From a utilitarian perspective the WOT appears to have been a failure , the short term benefits such as eliminating terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden – do not outweigh the long-term harm caused by the war including: humanitarian violation (torture, extra-judicial killing, drone attacks), financial burden (trillions of dollars spent, with little to show in terms of lasting peace or security), social and psychological costs (widespread of causalities in Afghanistan and Pakistan), and erosion of international norms (the violations of the Geneva Conventions, particularly the treatment of prisoners, contributed to the decline of international humanitarian standards). Conclusion The WOT and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and the humanitarian violations that accounted for the military intervention provided a rich case to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign policy through the lens of utility. While the WOT was initially justified on the grounds of maximizing security and protecting national interest in the long-term, consequences including civilian causalities, regional instability and the erosion of human rights suggest that the ultimate outcome were far more ideal. Although the utilitarian studies enacted some tactical victories in the WOT, the overall utility in terms of human rights, financial cost and global stability was negative. As a result, the strategy failed to create sustainable peace and instead resulted in a cycle of violence that ultimately undermined the very values it aimed to protect. Consequently, NATO may have failed to achieve greater good, causing more harm than benefit to both the people in the regions affected and the broader international community. In retrospect, instead of heavy reliance on military interventions the US and its allies could have focused more on intelligence gathering, law enforcement and international cooperation to disrupt terrorist cells before they could act. In short, focused on intelligence and law enforcement, not just military force Moreover, engaging more deeply with moderate Muslim –majority countries and regional allies to counter extremist ideologies and promote development and political stability in the Middle East and beyond would be a good idea. The WOT often alienated large segments of Muslims worlds furling resentment and contribution to the efforts of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. A focus on diplomacy, addressing underlying grievances, and building local political and economic structures would have been more sustainable. Similarly, avoiding overuse of force in Afghanistan and Iraq would have helped. The US-NATO forces could have employed more targeted operations including special forces counter insurgency tactics and precision air strikes, rather than large-scale military invasions and occupations, because these onset of wars accounted for the increase of causalities, which allotted disruption to the laws of wars amendments Furthermore, to ensure lasting peace, it was essential to promote nation building and reconstruction. Military intervention efforts should have focused more on this aspect. Equally important was better adherence to Human Rights and International Law. The WOT should have adhered more strictly to international laws, including the Geneva Conventions and upheld human rights standards to prevent practices like torture, indefinite detention and extraordinary renditions. Actions and unlawful detentions tarnished rage moral authority of the US and its allies and violated human rights standards. This approach not only harmed individuals but also damaged global support for the WOT, leading to accusations of hypocrisy and fueling anti-Western sentiment. The WOT should have been framed as a global problem involving broad cooperation with international organizations like the United Nations and regional coalitions. Finally, addressing the root causes of terrorism - poverty, education, and political grievances -was crucial. Public diplomacy and soft power should have been used more effectively; the US should have relied more on cultural programs and soft power to counter extremist narratives and build goodwill in Muslim-majority countries. References 1. Amanullah Haidary Azadany. 2016. How Would a Realist Explain the Civil War in Afghanistan? Vol 12. European Scientific Journal file:///C:/U s ers /admin/D ow nloads /7171 -A rticle%20Text - 20870 - 1 -10 -20160330%20(1).pdf 2. Emily Stewart. (2021). the history of US intervention in Afghanistan, from the Cold War to 9/11. https://www.vox.com/world/22634008/us-troops-afghanistan-cold-war-bush- bin-laden 3. Mohammed Ahsan Zia. (2000). An Analysis of Peace-building Approaches in Afghanistan. https://asiasociety.org/analysis-peacebuilding-approaches-afghanistan 4. Trevor Blond in. (2015). Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, the Saur Revolution, and the Cold War. Volume 2, (2). The Undergraduate Historical Journal at UC Merced. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5qx01820 5. Julie Lowenstein. (2016). US Foreign Policy and the Soviet-Afghan War: A Revisionist History. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=applebaum_award 6. Sergey Kyree. (2004). G George Lisa Gee Liska's Realist Alliance Theory s Realist Alliance Theory, and The, And the Transformation of Nato. file:///C:/Users/admin/Desktop/George%20Liskas%20Realist%20Alliance%20Theory%20And%20The%20Transformation%20Of.pdf 7. The U.S. War in Afghanistan. (1991-2021). https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war- afghanistan 8. Prabhash K Dutta. (2021). “20 years of 9/11: From Terror to WOT to Return of Terror”. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/20-years-of-9-11-from-terror-to-war-on-terror-to-return-of-terror-1851656-2021-09-11 9. Bill Calcutt. (2011). “just war theory and the WOT”. Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism. Research gate publishers. file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/Justwartheory-JPICTV6N2-Oct11.pdf 10. Ruairidh Wood. 2020 “Promoting democracy or pursuing hegemony? An analysis of U.S. involvement in the Middle East”. Vol. 6, No. 2. Journal of Global Faultlines’ pp. 166-185. Published by: Pluto Journals. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.13169/jglobfaul.6.2.0166.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7b9ad0d28602a07b5febbc678c780c26 11. Md. Mizanur Rahman. (2018). “The US State-building in Afghanistan: An Offshore Balance?” Vol. 23(1). Pp: 81_104.Jadavpur Journal of International Relations. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0973598418804292 12. Timothy Hoffman. (2015). “Realism in Action: Obama Foreign Policy in Afghanistan”. Political analysis Vol.16. article 6 https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=pa 13. Brett Campbell. (2014). “Realist or Liberal? Theoretical Interpretations of the Obama Administration’s Counterterrorism Strategy”. file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/B_Campbell%20(2).pdf 14. Luis E. Chiesa & Alexander K.A. Greenawalt. (2012). “Beyond War: Bin Laden, Escobar, and the Justification of Targeted Killing”. https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1343&context=journal_articles 15. Alexander J. (2013)."The Killing of Osama Bin Laden" Law School Student Scholarship. 308. https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/308 16. Meghan McGee. (2020).” Europe Needs to Push Back against Trump: Disastrous and erratic policies demand a stronger response. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/10/trump-europe-nato-transatlantic-push-back/ 17. Grant Farr. (2020).” The Afghan Peace Agreement and Its Problems”. Published at International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/04/06/the-afghan-peace-agreement-and-its-problems/ 18. Aljazeera. (2021). “Inside Story: How will US troop withdrawal affect Afghanistan?” https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/4/14/how-will-us-troop- withdrawal-affect-afghanistan 19. Furqan Khan. (2021).” The Afghan Conundrum: Taliban’s Takeover and the Way Forward”. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2759350/the-afghan- conundrum-talibans-takeover-and-the-way-forward/ 20. Vilde Skorpen Wikan. (2015). “How Has the Human Rights Regime Been Affected by 9/11 and the ‘WOT?”. https://www.e-ir.info/2015/08/30/how-has-the-human- rights-regime-been-affected-by-911-and-the-war-on-terror/ 21. Human Rights Watch. (2004). “Enduring Freedom”: bourses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan”. Vol. 16, No. 3(C). https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0304.pdf 22. Jean-Marc Piret. (2008).” The war against terrorism », international law and the growth of unchecked executive power in the U.S.” carin. Info. Vol: 60. https://www.cairn.info/revue-interdisciplinaire-d-etudes-juridiques-2008-1-page-59.html 23. Hilde Eliassen Restad. “The WOT from Bush to Obama: On Power and Path Dependency”. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/142735/NUPI-WP-798-Restad.pdf 24. Christopher Paul Kailani Medeiros. (2013). “Neither Legal nor Justiciable: Targeted Killings and De Facto Immunity within the War on Terror”. https://gsj.global.ucsb.edu/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.gisp.d7_gs-2/files/sitefiles/Medeiros.pdf 25. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission: “Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan Practices of Concern and Example Cases”. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/471f4a500.pdf BBC news. (2021).” Afghanistan: What has the conflict cost the US and its allies? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821

Defense & Security
Hybrid warfare concept. Illustration with information and icons. Notepad and stationery on an office desk.

Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone: Russia’s Strategy of Ambiguity in Europe

by World & New World Journal

Introduction In the past few years, international tensions have intensified across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to rising frictions between China and Taiwan. These conflicts cannot be fully explained through traditional military or diplomatic frameworks. Instead, they reveal the emergence of a new strategic model: hybrid warfare, a method that blends military, economic, technological, and informational tools to achieve political goals without open war. Closely related is the concept of the gray zone, a sphere of competition that exists between peace and full-scale conflicts, where states use ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates how hybrid warfare operates in practice. Russia’s combination of cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and drone warfare shows how modern conflicts blur the boundaries between combat and politics. Low-cost technologies such as drones have further revolutionized this form of warfare, enabling small actors to inflict significant damage and minimizing direct risk at the same time. What is a Hybrid warfare and gray zone Gray zone The concept of hybrid war is often covered in media as a synonym for the gray zone. However, within the academic field, the gray zone is considered more of a competing term2 It is suggested that the terms are not synonymous, and the gray zone is defined as a space of competition short of war. Hybrid warfare, in this context, is viewed as an operational solution to achieve political objectives in the gray zone, though it is not limited to it. Although both terms have a quite similar approach, the gray zone is considered more physical in comparison to hybrid war. A state’s operation in this area may clearly not cross the thresholds of war due to its ambiguity. For instance, an invasion of drones in the European Union might serve as an example of such a gray zone action. It is difficult to consider such actions as a threat of war, allowing the predatory state to operate near a border and keep itself safe through ambiguity. Simply put, the gray zone is a territory in politics where it is hard to clearly identify aggression, and the aggressor acts ambiguously, finding legal loopholes to gain advantages without necessarily provoking a military response. Historically, there are numerous examples of such gray zone tactics. Russia used these tactics multiple times before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is one of the particular reasons why the world’s reaction to the Crimea annexation and Russian actions prior to 2022 was low-key and had little impact. A gray zone conflict demonstrates a fundamental change in the rules-based international order. By weaponizing ambiguity, one state seeks to undermine norms and erode democratic institutions from within. Interestingly, Philip Kapusta argues that the gray zone might be beneficial. The ambiguity that makes gray zones vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. It is crucial in international relations when one state tests the waters with gray zone activities to determine the potential strength of domestic or international commitments to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. Briefly saying, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars. [1] [2] What is a hybrid war? While gray zone competition describes the ambiguous environment between peace and war, hybrid warfare refers to the methods used within that environment to achieve political aims. In other words, the gray zone sets the stage, and hybrid warfare provides the playbook. The new concept of hybrid warfare and its correlating hybrid threats can be explained as a wide range of means, not necessarily violent, and a concept that is quite distant from traditional military power. Through non-violent means, a state can achieve a political effect without being embedded in an armed conflict. This term was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman, who described the warfare model as a collection of different strategies and models, including conventional capabilities, violence, coercion, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. This definition stressed the importance of combining traditional military force with the use of new technologies. [5] However, several scholars question whether hybrid warfare truly represents a new paradigm. Analysts such as Michael Kofman and Lawrence Freedman argue that the term simply rebrands long-standing practices of covert and irregular warfare under a modern label. From this perspective, hybrid tactics—combining propaganda, subversion, and limited military action—were already evident in Soviet “active measures” and Cold War proxy conflicts. Still, the scale and technological sophistication of Russia’s recent operations suggest that hybrid warfare has evolved in scope and impact, even if its core logic is not entirely new. [13] Key characteristics and elements of hybrid warfare include: Fluidity and Ambiguity Debates on hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 brought attention to the new term. The fluidity and ambiguity of hybrid threats and warfare helped Moscow to achieve a relatively non-violent political shift in Crimea. To escape a power balance, Russia used a creative underdog strategy. [4] Non-State Actors For some scholars, hybrid war and its actors are a new breed of non-state actors (likely sponsored by the state) who replaced the traditional concept of terrorists. They retain ties with the population and devote themselves to the propaganda of the deed. Diverse Definitions The definition of hybrid warfare differs between the West and Russia. For Russians, hybrid war is a new way of dealing with a conflict that avoids the traditional battlefield, utilizing economic, political, and socio-cultural methods. [6] Tactical Methods and Synchronization It is hard to clearly identify hybrid threats of warfare due to their ambiguous nature. However, most of the literature defines it by tactical methods. It is the synchronized use of several operation methods, and due to its unclear nature, the victim state may not be able to identify these multiple instruments. [5] Calculated Ambiguity Similarly to nuclear deterrence, hybrid warfare is full of calculated ambiguity. It is a key factor that makes it reasonable and effective; it is essential. [12] Thus, due to the gray zone's ambiguity, it is hard to indicate hybrid threats until they escalate into warfare. And even in such a case, one cannot necessarily say that hybrid warfare actually happened. Currently, there are high possibilities that Russia has used hybrid threats in several Baltic countries as well as Eastern Europe. So-called pro-Russian parties were critically close to winning presidential or parliamentary elections numerous times Comparison Hybrid war vs Gray zone Since gray zone conflict in its essence can incorporate traditional methods and unconventional tactics, and a complete reliance on unconventional techniques is likely to be less effective at fully and rapidly compelling a relatively strong opponent, states engaged in a gray zone conflict are likely to use hybrid techniques. To clearly illustrate the key notices from this comparison, the following table is provided. As Table illustrates, the primary difference lies in the level and ambition of each concept. The Gray Zone Conflict is a higher-level concept that operates at the strategic level and is directly tied to global and/or regional revisionist ambitions. Hybrid Warfare, conversely, generally pertains only to the operational and tactical levels. [3] Key distinctions between two concepts are Duration and Symmetry and Conventionality of Operations Duration and Symmetry Gray Zone Conflict is characterized by protracted engagement and is used under both symmetric and asymmetric conditions. Hybrid Warfare, however, may be protracted or short and is largely used under asymmetric conditions. Conventionality of Operations In Gray Zone Conflict, non-conventional military operations may be used standalone or alongside conventional operations8. In contrast, Hybrid Warfare treats non-conventional operations as auxiliary tactics used alongside conventional operations. This reinforces the idea that the Gray Zone is a large strategic territory of competition, while hybrid warfare is an operational solution frequently used within it. Drones as a tool of Hybrid warfare Drones' Impact on the Modern Battlefield Nowadays, conflict in Ukraine has proven the role of drones in modern battlefields. Drones now account for approximately 70% of total casualties from both sides. Moreover, it is hard to find actual troops in the war zones; most of the time, there are drone controllers rather than typical soldiers. Thus, in Ukraine, drones act as key actors in modern conflict. Throughout the war, it was clearly shown that drones are very useful against much more expensive and massive military equipment like tanks and planes. A drone that costs less than a thousand dollars can destroy a million-dollar tank, and what's even more terrifying, it is unmanned, meaning the fight will have fewer casualties. By using such drones, Ukraine was able to defend its borders without a further escalation of the conflict to the western part of the country. By using cheap and easy-to-use AI-powered technology, Kyiv was able to fight back against a state that is 28 times bigger. Drones in Ukraine and the Context of Russian Hybrid Warfare The role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) remains complex: in direct combat, Ukraine uses drones not strictly as a hybrid weapon but as a fully powered kamikaze to destroy local goals, functioning as a conventional weapon. However, the nature of these drones is inherently dual use. Some drones used in war can be purchased through commercial websites. For instance, the drone previously used by Ukraine, the «DJI MAVIC», can be purchased online, with a price range starting at $500. Such drones are modified on the field and used as small bombs. In comparison to Russians, some Ukrainians have even spent their own money on new ammunition or drones, creating an emerging civilian-led military supply market in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine is multi-dimensional with blurred lines between the kinetic use of military force and the non-kinetic use of strategic assets. Through the simultaneous use of political, technological, and military measures in achieving its policy objectives to design an ambiguity, Russia deliberately exploited its power to secure consensus for subsequent military actions. Russia has employed all three parameters of ambiguity in hybrid warfare, leaving Ukraine no other option except to fight. Hybrid war in EU? Russia's Strategy: Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Tactics Since the US established its dominance in the global stage, Russian involvement in the Baltics, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine since 2007 has been characterized as grey zone and hybrid warfare. Russia employs these tactics against EU and NATO participants, using several methods of cyber-warfare to challenge the military alliance. In Ukraine’s Crimea, for instance, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using non-state proxies to supplement a military deficit. In Eastern Europe, Russia relies on economic tools, cyberspace to harm infrastructure, as well as non-state actors. For example, Gazprom canceled a gas discount agreement with the Yanukovych administration. Subsequently, when Ukraine refused to accept Russian hegemony, the power grid was attacked and disabled a large portion of the country's infrastructure. Such incidents, includes alleged election interference in Romania, when in November 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled results of first-round presidential election. Romanian intellegence agencies presented that Russian-linked cyber operations (social media campaigns with AI-driven misinformation and alleged cyberattacks) distorted the electoral process in favour of the far right candidate. In March 2025, investigative reporting detailed pro-Russia groups using Telegram to recruit EU-based individuals for sabotage, vandalism, arson and influence operations across NATO countries. [14] As the Russian economy is strained, the frequency of similar incidents appears to increase. [7] Across the period, the lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity continued to blur. Intrusion sets historically distinguished by TTPs’ level of advancement. conducted activities, or assessed objectives increasingly shared toolsets and modus operandi. This was notably exemplified by hacktivist-led DDoS waves by pro-Russia groups around electoral events, where increased activity was often observed as typical FIMI-aligned behavior to associate disruption with aspects of information operations. A prominent facet of this trend is faketivism, where state-aligned intrusion sets leverage hacktivist personas and activities. Notable examples include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, associated to Russia-nexus Sandworm39, and the CyberAv3ngers group linked to Iran’s IRGC Hacktivists, seeking funding and visibility, embraced ransomware beyond DDoS and defacements. CyberVolk, operating in line with Russian interests, has used and promoted multiple strains—AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano, as well as LockBit and Chaos—since May 20244. KillSec, originally a pro-Russia hacktivist brand aligned with Anonymous, debuted its platform in June 2024. Drone Incursions: Testing Defenses and Undermining Support Russia has adapted new drone technologies and is now using them to test and threaten the European Union. For Europe, the usage of drones differs from the frontlines. Most incidents involve UAVs allegedly used for espionage or as a distraction mechanism. The possibility exists that drones sent into EU airspace are meant to frighten Europe and consequently pressure them to reduce military aid to Ukraine. Some argue that Russia uses this as a "carrot and stick" approach to force the EU to cut off military support. [8] Drones in the EU serve as one element of hybrid warfare: they are low-cost, deniable, and intentionally ambiguous. Russia's ambiguous attacks and hybrid threats, according to reports, might leave Europe's energy consumers vulnerable, especially during the winter. Economic Constraints and the Strategy of Exhaustion The financial strain on Russia does not diminish its ambitions. Such economic limitations directly shape Moscow’s strategic calculus. While the Central Bank attempts to manage the economy, the cumulative effect of sanctions and military expenditures is challenging the Kremlin's ability to cover its costs. Russian citizens and businesses are demonstrating creativity in navigating sanctions, but continued war and higher expenses are highly likely to destroy the economy. To maintain spending, the government is already seeking additional revenue sources by increasing taxes and fees on imports and making cuts to non-military budgets. [9] The consensus among experts is that a direct military conflict with NATO is highly unlikely, primarily due to Russian economic struggle. Russia simply cannot afford another large-scale war. [9] Even to sustain a major conflict with NATO, the state would first need to consolidate its forces by ending the war in Ukraine. Escalation Risk and European Resilience The latest drone attacks pose a severe threat to European energy and critical infrastructure. Even though recent drone incidents were relatively far away from key energy assets, they still represent a significant and deliberate risk. Reports suggest a potential disruption in energy supply, especially with winter approaching, could lead to price increases and higher heating costs, impacting not only the economy but also social stability. For instance, drone activity temporarily closed airports in Denmark, increasing the overall atmosphere of unease across EU countries. The Gray Zone attacks in Europe, including drone incursions, regular cyberattacks, and election interference, are part of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy aimed at testing Europe's resilience and preparedness. As international expert Christo Atanasov Kostov suggests, the Kremlin hopes to exhaust the West, not conquer it. This strategy aims to win in Ukraine by weakening the West—using hybrid tools to sow doubt over EU and NATO's ability to prevail and to cause domestic hardship that makes supporting Ukraine politically unattractive. [10] However, some scholars like Mark Galeotti argue that Russia’s hybrid campaigns have reached their limit: they can destabilize but not dominate resilient states. [15] It is very unlikely that Russia will cross the line of hybrid warfare and actually commit conventional forces against EU/NATO, as it is financially and politically untenable. The challenge for Europe is clear: to resist fatigue and demonstrate resilience, not fear. Moscow will likely continue its hybrid attacks, but Europe needs to be prepared through deterrence, technological and political autonomy, and collective defense. [11] Conclusion Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force and non-conventional forces to achieve a strategic political objective. Russia's campaign in Ukraine in 2014 successfully exploited the ambiguity of this hybrid warfare model to capture the initiative and secure political and military gains, particularly in Crimea and Donbas. Through drones, cyber operations, and economic pressure, Moscow continues to challenge European security while remaining below the traditional threshold of conflict. These actions show that hybrid warfare is not an alternative to war but a constant state of confrontation carried out through indirect means. For Europe, this reality creates serious strategic and financial challenges. Responding to low-cost and deniable attacks with expensive defense systems is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the main priority for the EU is to adapt its deterrence model, strengthen technological and informational resilience, and reduce dependence on external energy supplies. The evolution of hybrid warfare proves that modern conflicts no longer begin with formal declarations or visible invasions. They emerge through ambiguity, disinformation, and the silent use of technology. As Russia continues to exploit these gray areas, the stability of Europe will depend on its ability to recognize such operations early and respond collectively before the next stage of escalation begins. All we can conclude is that Putin himself is unlikely to stop the war until his maximalist ambitions are satisfied. He will continue to use any method, including the destruction of European stability through hybrid attacks, to exhaust the West. For the EU, the suggested course of action remains to diversify energy sources and demonstrate resilience against hybrid attacks to minimize security and economic challenges. References [1] Damien Van Puyvelde, ‘Hybrid Warfare – The Continuation of Ambiguity by Other Means’, European Journal of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/hybrid-warfare-the-continuation-of-ambiguity-by-other-means/1B3336D8109D418F89D732EB98B774E5 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [2] U.S. Special Operations Command, Operating in the Gray Zone: A Strategy for Success, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [3] David Carment and Dani Belo, War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare, Webster University, October 2018, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25994.98249 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [4] Nathan K. Finney, ‘A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare’, Irregular Warfare Initiative, 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-full-spectrum-of-conflict-design-how-doctrine-should-embrace-irregular-warfare/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [5] Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [6] Steven Woehrel, Russia: Strategic Economic and Energy Interests, Congressional Research Service, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42006.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [7] European Youth Portal, ‘How Romania’s Presidential Election Became the Plot of a Cyber Thriller’, 2024, https://youth.europa.eu/news/how-romanias-presidential-election-became-plot-of-cyber-thriller_en [accessed 17 October 2025]. [8] BBC Russian, ‘Как Россия готовится к выборам на фоне войны и цензуры’, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cm2zp2xl62mo [accessed 17 October 2025]. [9] Reuters, ‘Imported Cars Face Higher Fees as Russia Plans Domestic Production Boost’, 30 September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/imported-cars-face-higher-fees-russia-plans-domestic-production-boost-2024-09-30/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [10] Stefan Wolff, ‘Russia’s Permanent Test Is Pushing Europe to the Brink of War – Here’s What Moscow Actually Wants’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/russias-permanent-test-is-pushing-europe-to-the-brink-of-war-heres-what-moscow-actually-wants-266826 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [11] Stefan Wolff, ‘Putin’s “Forever War” Against the West’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/putins-forever-war-against-the-west-267679 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [12] Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?’, PRISM – National Defense University Press, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1979787/countering-hybrid-warfare-so-what-for-the-joint-force/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [13] Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts’, War on the Rocks, 11 March 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [14] European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, 2025, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2025 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [15] Mark Galeotti, Trouble at Home: Russia’s Looming Demobilization Challenge, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, June 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Mark-Galeotti-Trouble-at-Home-Russias-looming-demobilization-challenge-GI-TOC-June-2025.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025].

Diplomacy
Aerial view Panama Canal, third set of locks, water shortages, maritime traffic, water reuse vats, summer drought.

What CK Hutchison told us in the Panama Case?

by Wallace Loo

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

Defense & Security
01/07/2020 Mumbai. India. three warships of the Indian Navy anchored in Mumbai

India-China Rivalry After Galwan: Is the Maritime Front the Next Flashpoint?

by Muhammad Salman , Muhammad Umar Nasir

The Galwan Valley clash (Reuters, 2024) of 15 June 2020 pushed South Asian strategic thinking: competition with Beijing is no longer a single-theatre rivalry. Having pressed advantage on land where it achieved asymmetric leverage, Beijing is increasingly pressing seaward —expanding capability for naval reach and overseas logistics and calibrated “grey-zone” maritime tools —and India must consider the Indian Ocean (Bhatt, 2024) as an equal front of competition if it is to prevent everyday coercion at sea from becoming the region's next crisis. From the Ridge to the Reef: Why the Shift Matters Galwan was a tactical clash whose political and strategic reverberations were felt far beyond Ladakh. New Delhi's post-Galwan posture has not only involved fortified mountain deployments but also renewed emphasis on the Indian Ocean. Beijing's investments in port development, logistics, and longer-range naval capability augment its capacity to influence sea lines of communication that India depends on for trade and energy. Analysts have documented China's growing dual-use presence and stronger commercial ties in littoral states —a geo-economic underpinning to expanding naval reach. China’s Maritime Toolkit: Militia, Coast Guard, and Overseas Access At sea, Beijing prefers calibrated coercion. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), the China Coast Guard, and the PLAN all operate together to create facts on the water, remaining below the threshold of conventional war. Open-source research shows an increase in militia vessels (CSIS, 2024) linked to Hainan frequent coast guard harassment in contested seas, while overseas logistics and basing (from Djibouti to commercial port arrangements) potential to sustain persistent presence and surge capacity all represent separate components of modern grey-zone strategy. According to the theory of irredentism, China's approach is not unprecedented. In the South China Sea, Beijing has mixed coast guard surveillance, militia swarming, and slow incremental land reclamation to generate facts on the ground and created continued friction with Vietnam (the Paracel and Spratly Islands) and with the Philippines (the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff). These examples show how calibrated maritime coercion can cumulatively shift the status quo without descending into outright war. India’s Response: Deterrence, Presence, and Partnership New Delhi has not been idle. The Indian Navy has stepped up its ship and submarine building program, increased patrols of chokepoints, and participated in enhanced joint exercises with partners to signal that it is serious about maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean (Maqbool & Sharma, 2025). It has also modernized the Coast Guard and MDA networks on the Indian side of the Indian Ocean while developing diplomatic engagement with littoral states to present choices in preference to unilateral submission. Taken together, these actions demonstrate an appreciation that presence matters, as do allied cooperation and indigenous capability. Moreover, India’s maritime capabilities face significant constraints. Its defence budget is far smaller than China’s (India: ~$72 billion vs. China: ~$224 billion in 2023) (Tian, Lopes da Silva, Liang, & Scarazzato, 2024), and its naval share of the defence budget has declined in recent years. India continues to depend heavily on foreign arms imports—Russia alone supplies over 45% of India’s major arms purchases. Additionally, India lacks a network of overseas logistics facilities comparable to China’s “String of Pearls,” (Devonshire-Ellis, 2009) which includes Djibouti, Gwadar, and Hambantota. These vulnerabilities limit India’s ability to sustain prolonged operations far from home ports. Regional Dimensions (ASEAN) While ASEAN as an institution often struggles with consensus on China, its member states—such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines—share India’s concerns about grey-zone coercion. Building issue-based coalitions with these countries could complement Quad initiatives, especially in areas like coast guard training, joint patrols, and legal capacity building. How Maritime Competition Can Become Dangerous The ocean's crowded and invisible environment creates acute risk: commercial shipping, fishing boats, coast guards, and naval vessels can operate close together, so what would be an ordinary event raises the stakes into a crisis risk when a coordinated actor exerts calibrated pressure. The ongoing investigations and research writing often discuss militia swarms, Automatic Identification System (AIS) (United States Coast Guard US Department of Homeland Security, s.f.) shutdowns, and coast guard shadows that result in risky close-quarters interactions—where a collision, boarding, or injury can simply become a theatre of escalation to a strategic crisis (VOA, 2023). India is already seeing episodes of this type, and if there is no recognition of what is happening, they risk becoming normalized tactics compared to an episodic problem. Policy decision: Prepare, Partner, Penalize A maritime Galwan—where an ordinary event becomes an escalation to strategic crisis—needs three conditions: improve detection and attribution, broaden regional engagement to build resilience, and deliver credible costs for repeat coercion. Preparation (detection & attribution): India needs to integrate naval, coast-guard and civilian surveillance into a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) (IMO, s.f.) architecture that uses spaceborne and underwater sensors, development of standard incident reporting, and speedier protocols for attribution. Preventing or stopping massing of vessels, or identified AIS-indoctrination, is self-deterrent: it removes ambiguity and allows for calibrated, defensible legal responses. This is clear from the RAND’s local security claim —where robust MDA remains the first line of defence in grey-zone contests. Partner (regional resilience): Operationalize partnerships (the Quad, IORA, and bilateral frameworks) to provide coast-guard capacity building, legal assistance, and situational awareness support to vulnerable island and littoral states, and reduce the pool of permissive ports, and strengthen partner enforcement to deny coercive actors easy safe havens, and build diplomatic coalitions so they can be publicly isolated. Penalty (raise costs): India should lead a regional initiative to criminalize deliberate AIS disabling, ship ramming, and state-backed commercial harassment and develop rules with targeted diplomatic and economic penalties for repeat offenders. Purposeful, independently verified documentation of incidents will make penalties credible and raise the political cost of grey-zone campaigns. Operational Measures Specific operational measures include increased coast-guard rapid-response flotillas; more pre-positioned mobile logistics to reduce reliance on distant basing; institutionalizing joint exercises designed to practice non-lethal harassment and gather evidence; and creating a regional maritime incident task force to investigate and publicize coercive acts. These operational measures will raise the expense of coercive campaigns without necessitating an extraordinary expansion of fleets. Conclusion Galwan has imparted a painful lesson to South Asia that rivalry can jump sectors and cause true damage, when states over-reach. In the maritime domain, Beijing can exploit some ambiguity to use coercive measures that are lower cost. India must likewise extend its vigilance and monitoring from the Himalayas to the high seas. However, this is not simply a story of vulnerability: India can use strong Maritime Domain Awareness, increasingly engage with ASEAN and Quad partners, and implement selective measures to raise the costs for coercion to tilt the opportunity to develop norms in the region. The challenge is serious, but the sea does not have to be the next flashpoint or crisis, with alliances and adapting strategy in mind. References Bhatt, P. (2024, 06 16). From the Mountains to the Seas: India-China Competition in the Wake of Galwan. Retrieved from Stimson: https://www.stimson.org/2024/from-the-mountains-to-the-seas-india-china-competition-in-the-wake-of-galwan/ CSIS. (2024, 12 12). Behind the Curtain: An Update on Hainan’s Maritime Militia. Retrieved from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: https://amti.csis.org/behind-the-curtain-an-update-on-hainans-maritime-militia/ Devonshire-Ellis, C. (2009, 03 18). China’s String of Pearls Strategy. Retrieved from China Briefing: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china%E2%80%99s-string-of-pearls-strategy/ IMO. (n.d.). Maritime Domain Awareness. Retrieved from International Maritime Organization: https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/pages/maritime-domain-awareness.aspx Maqbool, R., & Sharma, A. (2025, 01 15). India’s navy launches submarine, warships to guard against China’s presence in Indian Ocean. Retrieved from AP News: https://apnews.com/article/india-navy-submarine-warships-launch-69c138048bb4202a1a409b0b2353a2f4 Reuters. (2024, 10 25). What was the India-China military clash in 2020 about? Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-was-india-china-military-clash-2020-about-2024-10-25/ Tian, N., Lopes da Silva, D., Liang, X., & Scarazzato, L. (2024, 04). Trends in world military expenditure, 2023. Retrieved from SIPRI: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf United States Coast Guard US Department of Homeland Security. (n.d.). Automatic Identification System (AIS) Overview. Retrieved from Navigation Center: https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/automatic-identification-system-overview VOA. (2023, 05 09). Chinese Militia Boats Cross Indian, ASEAN Warships Exercising in South China Sea. Retrieved from VOA: https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-militia-boats-cross-indian-asean-warships-exercising-in-south-china-sea-/7085847.html

Defense & Security
Letter tiles, Chinese Yuan bank notes and national flags on a word map. A Belt And Road Initiative concept.

Blocking the Belt and Road: Activation and deactivation of conflicts to contain China

by Alonso Ronald Ortiz García

Introduction Contemporary geopolitical competition has moved away from traditional paradigms of direct military conflict, giving way to more sophisticated forms of strategic rivalry. In this new landscape — where the lines between peace and war are increasingly blurred — the control of critical infrastructure and trade routes has emerged as a fundamental element of national power. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — conceived by Beijing as the most ambitious geoeconomic project since the Marshall Plan — seeks to reshape the Eurasian trade architecture, positioning China as the central node of an integrated connectivity system. However, the events of 2025 reveal that this project does not operate in a strategic vacuum; rather, it faces a coordinated response from rival powers that have developed sophisticated strategies to limit, fragment, or condition its expansion. This article examines the indirect containment strategies directed against the BRI, focusing on one particular dimension: the deliberate activation and deactivation of conflicts as a tool of geoeconomic blockade. Through the analysis of two paradigmatic cases, it illustrates how rival powers can employ geoeconomic methods to block, fragment, or constrain large infrastructure projects by strategically manipulating regional conflicts. Two seemingly disconnected but strategically linked events will be examined — both of which have redefined the struggle for control over Eurasian trade routes. On one hand, the military escalation between India and Pakistan in the southern sector, specifically in the Rajasthan–Sindh–Southern Punjab Corridor; on the other, the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which revived the Zangezur Corridor Project, now under U.S. control. Both events represent concrete manifestations of a new form of great power rivalry centered on the instrumental use of conflicts to systematically obstruct the BRI. Geoeconomics as a Theater of War Geoeconomics, understood as an analytical discipline, examines how geographic, economic, and political factors intertwine to determine the relative power of states within the international system. Within this framework, connectivity infrastructures transcend their technical or commercial nature to become strategic assets capable of altering the regional balance of power. At its core, the BRI represents China’s attempt to create a network of economic dependencies that enables it to project political influence across Eurasia. This network includes both land and maritime corridors connecting East Asia with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, establishing China as the central node of an integrated commercial system. However, the interconnected nature of this system also generates specific vulnerabilities: the disruption of critical segments can produce cascading effects that compromise the functionality of the entire network. Containment strategies, therefore, do not need to dismantle the BRI entirely to be effective. It is enough to introduce points of friction, uncertainty, or external control in key segments to alter participants’ cost-benefit calculations and reduce the overall attractiveness of the Chinese system. This logic of “selective blockade” allows rival powers to exert disproportionate influence with limited resources. In this context, the strategic activation and deactivation of conflicts emerge as a particularly refined tool. Unlike direct blockades — which require a permanent military presence and entail significant political costs — the manipulation of conflicts enables the introduction of instability indirectly, leveraging preexisting tensions to generate disruptions along critical BRI corridors. Thus, the temporal simultaneity of the India–Pakistan crisis and the resolution of the Caucasus conflict does not constitute a geopolitical coincidence but rather the manifestation of a deliberate geoeconomic containment strategy that employs the selective activation and deactivation of conflicts to block the fundamental pillars of the BRI. Case 1: Activation of the Indo-Pakistani Conflict The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) stands as the flagship project of the BRI in South Asia. With an estimated investment exceeding $60 billion, the CPEC aims to connect China’s Xinjiang region with the Port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, providing China with an alternative trade route that bypasses strategic straits controlled by rival maritime powers. The fundamental vulnerability of the CPEC lies in its dependence on Pakistan’s territorial stability—particularly in the southern provinces, where both critical infrastructure and the energy resources that sustain the project are concentrated. This is precisely where the strategy of conflict activation reaches its fullest expression. Following the escalation recorded in May 2025, intelligence analysts suggest that the timing and intensity of the Indo-Pakistani crisis indicate a deliberate activation of preexisting tensions with specific geoeconomic objectives. The impact of a hypothetical Indian incursion into the Rajasthan–Sindh–Southern Punjab belt would not necessarily aim for the permanent occupation of Pakistani territory, but rather for a demonstration of capability to disrupt the territorial continuity of the corridor. This interdiction strategy through conflict activation operates across multiple dimensions simultaneously. On the physical level, temporary control over this belt would effectively sever the connection between southern Pakistan and the routes leading to China, forcing costly detours or temporary suspensions of operations. On the economic level, the mere threat of disruption would significantly increase security and insurance costs for Chinese investments, thereby reducing the projected profitability of the corridor. More importantly, on the psychological level, a successful demonstration of interdiction capability through controlled escalation would create lasting uncertainty about the security of Chinese investments in the region. This uncertainty would not be limited to the CPEC, but would extend to other BRI projects that depend on the stability of strategic partners. The implicit message is clear: China cannot guarantee the security of its trade corridors against the strategic activation of conflicts by rival powers. The temporal dimension of this strategy is particularly sophisticated. The activation of conflicts makes it possible to generate immediate disruptions in the functioning of the corridors, while their eventual deactivation — once the strategic objectives have been achieved — avoids the long-term costs of a prolonged confrontation. This modulation of conflict intensity transforms regional tensions into precise instruments of geoeconomic policy. Access to the hydrocarbon reserves in southeastern Sindh adds an additional layer to this activation strategy. By temporarily controlling these resources during periods of escalation, India would not only obtain direct economic benefits but would also deny Pakistan and China the revenues that could otherwise be used to finance and expand the CPEC. This logic of “resource denial through conflict” is particularly effective in infrastructure projects that rely on sustained revenue flows to justify their initial investments. Case 2: Deactivation of the Armenian–Azerbaijani Conflict The second case illustrates the complementary side of this strategy: the use of conflict deactivation as a mechanism to gain control over critical infrastructure. The Zangezur Corridor, renamed the “Trump Corridor for Peace and International Prosperity” (TRIPP), represents a paradigmatic example of how a major power can insert control points into connectivity networks through the instrumental resolution of conflicts. In August 2025, U.S. mediation in the Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict allowed Washington to obtain exclusive development rights over this corridor for 99 years, effectively transforming what could have been a component of the BRI into an asset under Western control. This maneuver is particularly ingenious because it uses conflict resolution — seemingly a global public good — as a tool for broader geoeconomic objectives. The conflict deactivation strategy operates under a logic that is different but complementary to activation. While activation seeks to generate immediate disruptions in existing corridors, deactivation enables lasting control over critical segments of the connectivity network through the establishment of new contractual and regulatory frameworks that emerge from the peace process. The TRIPP occupies a crucial strategic position within the Eurasian connectivity network. As part of the Trans-Caspian Corridor (the so-called “Middle Corridor”), it provides a direct land route between Central Asia and Europe that bypasses both Russia and Iran. For China, this corridor represented a vital alternative to reduce its dependence on routes controlled by rival powers. However, by securing contractual control over the TRIPP segment through the instrumental deactivation of the conflict, the United States effectively introduced a strategic bottleneck in the middle of this network. The effectiveness of this strategy lies in its ability to condition the use of the corridor without explicitly prohibiting it. Washington can employ a variety of regulatory, tariff, and security instruments to make the transit of Chinese goods more expensive or cumbersome, rendering the route less attractive to traders and investors. This form of “administrative friction” can be as effective as a physical blockade, but with far lower political costs and reduced risks of escalation. Moreover, control over the TRIPP allows the United States to modulate its policy toward the BRI according to its broader strategic needs. During periods of bilateral tension, it can tighten restrictions on the corridor as a form of pressure; during periods of détente, it can ease such measures as a gesture of goodwill. This flexibility transforms the corridor into a permanent bargaining instrument in Sino–American relations. Integrated Logic: Activation and Deactivation of Conflicts as a Containment System The true sophistication of the analyzed cases becomes evident when one understands that the activation and deactivation of conflicts are not isolated tactics, but rather components of an integrated system of geoeconomic containment. The effectiveness of each element is amplified when they operate in coordination, creating a dynamic that maximizes pressure on the BRI while minimizing costs for the implementers. The activation of conflicts generates immediate disruptions and heightens the perception of risk associated with Chinese projects. Simultaneously, the selective deactivation of other conflicts allows rival powers to establish alternative control frameworks that channel trade flows toward systems under their own influence. This combination produces a “push-and-pull” effect: pushing trade away from routes controlled by China through the creation of instability, while pulling it toward alternatives managed by rival powers through the creation of selective stability. The temporal dimension of this integrated strategy is crucial to its effectiveness. Cycles of activation and deactivation can be calibrated to maximize the impact on long-term investment decisions, generating sufficient uncertainty to discourage future commitments — without creating levels of instability that would undermine the broader interests of the implementing powers. Systemic Dynamics The strategies of conflict activation and deactivation go beyond their immediate tactical objectives to generate broader systemic effects on the BRI and on global geopolitical competition. These effects operate across multiple levels and time scales, creating dynamics that can fundamentally alter the strategic calculations of all actors involved. First, these strategies introduce an element of structural uncertainty deeper than that produced by conventional forms of interference. While direct blockades or sanctions are predictable in their application, the manipulation of conflicts introduces elements of volatility that are far more difficult to anticipate and mitigate. International connectivity depends on the predictability and reliability of trade routes, but when those routes become subject to the unpredictable dynamics of strategically activated conflicts, investor and trader confidence in the system as a whole is eroded. Second, the alternation between activation and deactivation creates a pattern of cyclical instability that complicates long-term planning. Investors must consider not only the current state of stability in a region but also the likelihood that latent conflicts may be activated in the future for geoeconomic purposes. This additional consideration translates into demands for higher returns to compensate for perceived risk, thereby increasing the cost of capital for future BRI projects. Third, the strategy of activation and deactivation can generate demonstration effects that shape third countries’ perceptions of the BRI’s viability. When these countries observe that middle powers can effectively disrupt segments of China’s system by manipulating local conflicts, they may feel empowered to adopt more assertive positions in their own negotiations with Beijing. This dynamic can gradually erode China’s position as a preferred partner for infrastructure projects. Finally, these strategies create dangerous precedents for the stability of the international system. If the activation and deactivation of conflicts become normalized as tools of geoeconomic competition, other actors may adopt similar tactics, fostering a more volatile and unpredictable global environment. China’s Counterstrategies The strategies of conflict activation and deactivation do not operate in a strategic vacuum; rather, they generate adaptive responses from China that can alter their long-term effectiveness. Beijing has developed a variety of counterstrategies specifically designed to reduce the vulnerability of the BRI to this kind of indirect interference. One of the most important responses has been the development of mediation and conflict-prevention capabilities. Recognizing that many of the conflicts which can be strategically activated have roots in genuine, unresolved disputes, China has significantly expanded its involvement in international mediation. This approach seeks to address the underlying causes of instability that could otherwise be exploited by rival powers. At the same time, Beijing has intensified efforts to build early warning systems that enable it to anticipate the imminent activation of conflicts in regions critical to the BRI. These systems combine traditional intelligence with big data analysis and predictive modeling to identify patterns suggesting the external manipulation of local tensions. China has also pursued a more systematic geographic diversification of routes and corridors, developing multiple pathways to the same destinations to reduce dependence on any single segment of the network. This strategy of “planned redundancy” increases system costs but also enhances resilience against selective blockades caused by activated conflicts. A third line of response has been the development of specialized financial and insurance instruments for projects in high-risk regions. These tools allow China to maintain the economic viability of BRI projects even in unstable environments, thereby reducing the impact of conflict activation strategies. Future Projections The analysis of conflict activation and deactivation strategies directed against the BRI reveals the growing sophistication of contemporary geopolitical competition. The examined cases demonstrate that rival powers have developed effective methods to condition, fragment, or disrupt large-scale infrastructure projects without resorting to direct military confrontation, instead employing the strategic manipulation of conflicts as a tool of containment. These strategies represent an evolution of traditional forms of containment operating within the geoeconomic domain, using the interdependence of connectivity systems and their vulnerability to regional instability as vectors of strategic influence. Their effectiveness lies not necessarily in their ability to dismantle the BRI entirely, but in their capacity to introduce cyclical frictions and structural uncertainties that diminish the overall attractiveness of the Chinese system. However, the adaptive nature of geopolitical competition suggests that these activation and deactivation strategies will generate countermeasures and counter-countermeasures that continuously reshape the balance of advantages. China’s capacity to develop alternatives and redundancies, combined with its growing mediation and conflict-prevention capabilities, may eventually limit the effectiveness of these containment tactics. In the long term, competition surrounding the BRI will likely evolve into even more sophisticated forms of geoeconomic rivalry, where the ability to create, control, and protect connectivity networks — as well as to manipulate or resolve the conflicts that affect them — will become a fundamental measure of national power. This dynamic will have far-reaching implications not only for the main actors involved but also for the international system, which will need to adapt to an era in which the strategic activation and deactivation of conflicts has emerged as a central tool in great-power competition. The growing sophistication of these strategies suggests that the future of geopolitical competition will be marked by an increasing instrumentalization of regional conflicts for global geoeconomic objectives, creating new challenges for international stability and requiring the development of normative and institutional frameworks adapted to this new reality. References Chatham House. (2025). India-Pakistan ceasefire remains shaky; relations unlikely to return to status quo. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/india-pakistan-ceasefire-remains-shaky-relations-unlikely-return-status-quo Consejo Previsional Mundial (WPC). (2025). Informe sobre la brecha de infraestructura en Asia y el impacto de la BRI. La división de los BRICS y la guerra que estamos ignorando entre India y Pakistán. (2025, 8 de mayo). Navarra Confidencial. https://www.navarraconfidencial.com/espana/la-division-de-los-brics-y-la-guerra-que-estamos-ignorando-entre-india-y-pakistan/ La iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta es un proyecto de cooperación internacional presentado por China en 2013, con enfoque en infraestructura, comercio y conectividad. (2025, 1 de septiembre). Lisanews. https://www.lisanews.org/internacional/iniciativa-franja-ruta-que-es-objetivos/ Le Grand Continent. (2025, 10 de agosto). Al firmar un acuerdo de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán, EE.UU. desplaza a Rusia en el Cáucaso Meridional. https://legrandcontinent.eu/es/2025/08/10/al-firmar-un-acuerdo-de-paz-entre-armenia-y-azerbaiyan-ha-desplazado-trump-a-putin-del-caucaso-meridional/ Ministerio de Defensa de España. (2025). La visión estratégica de la República Popular China en la nueva era: Análisis del Libro Blanco sobre Seguridad Nacional. https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/-/ieee/la_vision_estrategica_de_la_republica_popular_china_en_la_nueva_era_analisis_del_libro_blanco_sobre_seguridad_nacional_2025 Nedopil, C. (2025). Países de la Iniciativa del Cinturón y la Ruta (BRI). Green Finance & Development Center. https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/ Reuters. (2025, 7 de agosto). EE. UU. asegura un corredor de tránsito estratégico en el acuerdo de paz Armenia-Azerbaiyán. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-secures-strategic-transit-corridor-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal-2025-08-07/

Energy & Economics
Ex KGB FSB secret police agent using mass propaganda technology tools on laptop to influence population minds. Russian spy silencing online opposition voices using notebook device

Life of youth in sanctioned Russia: VPN, rebranding and copycats

by World & New World Journal

Will sanctions create a more inward-looking generation, or will VPNs and parallel imports keep Russia’s youth plugged into global culture anyway? 2010s in Russia – The “Peak of Freedom” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent severe economic, political, and cultural changes. Previously blocked by the iron curtain, Russians suddenly found themselves exposed to Western influence. In the early 2000s’, Russia was culturally and economically thriving. Nowadays, it is hard to imagine controversial artists such as drag artists, t.A.T.u. and others performing on the national stage, when back then all of this was broadcast across the country. For citizens of border cities such as Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad, this was a period of frequent travelling abroad. Trips to neighboring countries to buy products or visit relatives have become part of normal life. Russia seemed more democratic, integrated, and culturally alive. The 2010s’ marked the beginning of sanctions. Yet for most Russians, daily life hardly changed. Even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, people continued to travel, buy “sanctioned” goods, and enjoy global events. Russia even hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2018, which was a moment of international recognition that contrasted with the West’s growing political distance. Сергей Ильницкий / EPA This changed drastically in 2022, when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This time, the sanctions were sweeping and deeply felt in everyday life. Major international companies announced their departure from the Russian market. According to Russian claims, U.S. companies lost more than $300 billion as a result, while the Financial Times reported that European firms lost over $100 billion in just 18 months. It has now been more than three years since major international brands officially “left” Russia. McDonald’s, Adidas, Zara, IKEA, and many others appeared to vanish from Russian market. On paper, they exited what many call a rogue state. In reality, most of them never truly left. Adaptation Under Sanctions By early 2023, Russia’s consumer market was full of “new-old” brands. While some companies left outright, the majority transferred stocks to local managers, often at discounts of up to 70%. As a result, there was a strange marketplace with familiar stores but unfamiliar names. At the same time, Ukrainian observers note a different reality. Forbes reported that many foreign revenue leaders in Russia, including Philip Morris, Pepsi, Mars, Nestlé, Leroy Merlin, and Raiffeisen Bank never left Russia at all. According to B4Ukraine, these companies together paid over $41.6 billion in taxes, equivalent to roughly one-third of Russia’s annual military budget. Back in 2023 Philip Morris International confirmed that it would “rather keep” its Russian holdings than sell them at a discount to local investors. For example, L’Occitane simply transliterated its name into Cyrillic, while Spanish corporation Inditex sold its stocks to Daher, and brands like ZARA, Pull&Bear, Bershka were replaced by alternative brands like Maag, Ecru, Dub. Thus, authentic ZARA’s clothing still can be easily found on internet marketplaces, such as Lamoda. Food and beverage: Starbucks transformed into Stars Coffee, McDonald’s into Vkusno i Tochka. Coca-Cola was sold to a Russian businessman and rebranded as Dobryi Cola. Yet, many shops still sell original Coca-Cola imported from neighboring countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Poland. Finnish company Fazer Group sold Khlebniy Dom (major bread and pastry company) to “Kolomenskyi” holding, keeping the same legal structure, representatives, and recipes. Consumer goods and toys: Lego returned as Mir Kubikov (“Cubic World”), offering identical products under a new name. German holding Henkel became Lab Industries, selling the same products under Cyrillic labels. Earlier this year Daher Group claimed that Adidas would reopen stores by November 2025, though details remain unclear. Nike, meanwhile, continues to operate in Russia under the abbreviation NSP — Nike Sport Point. For Russian youth, these “copycat” and alternative have a mixed reaction. On social media platforms like Telegram, Instagram and TikTok memes mocking the awkward logos and uninspired renamings were circulating. Young consumers still crave original products, especially iPhones, brand clothes and cosmetics, which are often purchased through parallel imports, friends, albeit at inflated prices. Polls confirm such trend. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (RPORC), 94% of Russians believe that Western brands will eventually return, and 68% think it is only a matter of time. About 60% of the population continues to buy sanctioned goods; for 28%, it has become a habit. Two-thirds of respondents say they would prefer national brands only if the price were equal. This dual reality for young Russians means living in a consumer world that is both familiar and fractured. Economic Challenges Despite adaptation, Russia’s economic outlook remains mixed. Polling by RPORC suggests that while many Russians believe the economy is worsening, a growing number also describe it as “stabilizing.” As RPORC explained: “Businesses and people were able to adapt to new conditions. Not everyone succeeded, but economic catastrophe did not happen.” © Тимур Ханов/ПГ The Levada Center found similar resilience. Half of respondents said their lives had not changed in recent years, or that they had even found new opportunities. One in five, however, admitted to abandoning their old lifestyle or struggling to adapt. Two-thirds reported feeling confident about the future, most of them relying on wages and pensions, with fewer depending on savings or secondary income. Economic indicators, however, tell a more fragile story. The Consumer Sentiment Index fell to 110 points in August 2025, down from 117 in June. Assessments of current living conditions dropped sharply, while expectations for the future also declined. Businesses face ongoing challenges. According to the Bank of Russia’s September monitoring, companies reported weaker demand, especially in manufacturing, alongside persistent cost pressures from labor shortages and rising expenses. Inflation has moderated to 8.2% year-on-year, but expectations of higher prices remain. In response, the central bank cautiously lowered its interest rate from 18% to 17%. While this move was intended to encourage funding and investment, it came with warnings. High rates had already limited capital investment and strained both households and firms. For younger Russians, this translates into expensive loans, delayed purchases of homes or cars, and fewer stable jobs. Small firms are especially vulnerable, and larger companies hesitate to commit to long-term investment in Russia. The October 24 monetary policy meeting is expected to clarify whether further rate cuts will follow, but for now, the message remains one of “cautious easing amid a fragile economy.” For Russian youth entering the workforce, the environment is uncertain. Jobs in international firms are disappearing, wages struggle to keep pace with inflation, and credit is harder to access. Their career paths are increasingly shaped by state-owned companies or sanctioned industries rather than by global opportunities. Government Restrictions Sanctions are only half the story. Alongside them, the Russian government has tightened internal restrictions, from healthcare to social media, touching nearly every aspect of citizens’ lives. On September 1, 2025, a wave of new restrictions and laws came into force. In healthcare, paramedics and obstetric nurses were legally authorized to provide emergency care in the absence of doctors, while health and dietary supplements (“БАДы”) became subject to stricter regulation. Additionally, a new federal list of Strategically Significant Medicinal Products was introduced to encourage full domestic production of essential drugs. This move aims to reduce Russia’s dependence on imported medicine and support local firms. Beyond healthcare, other laws targeted digital life and education. Advertising VPNs was banned, along with advertising in prohibited apps. While internet users faced growing difficulties with messaging platforms, the government launched a new app called Max, a Russian equivalent of China’s WeChat, while simultaneously restricting access to competitors such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Viber. Although text communication remains possible, audio and video calls are increasingly blocked. According to the Levada Center, 71% of Russians recently reported problems accessing the internet on mobile phones, and 63% experienced issues with messaging apps. Public opinion is split: 49% support Roskomnadzor’s decision to block voice calls on WhatsApp and Telegram, while 41% oppose it. Support varies by age and education level: younger people and the highly educated are far more likely to oppose restrictions, disapprove of Putin’s presidency, and favor a ceasefire in Ukraine. Education has also come under tighter state control. New quotas for universities, stricter graduation requirements, and the exit from the Bologna education system are expected to make it harder to pursue higher education abroad. For Russian youth, this means growing up in a system where schools and universities serve not only as centers of learning but also as instruments of political loyalty. Closing Reflection Older generations of Russians remember both the Iron Curtain and the sudden openness of the 2000s. Today’s youth, Gen Z and Gen Alpha, are growing up in a very different environment. Born into a Russia that once promised travel, global brands, and open media, they now face a country of copycat stores, patriotic lessons, and state-controlled apps. Their world is paradoxical: connected through VPNs, Telegram, and imported iPhones, yet isolated by censorship, propaganda, and restricted travel. They can mock “Vkusno i Tochka” on Telegram but cannot easily study abroad or see global TikTok trends without additional tools. This contradiction defines Russian youth today. They adapt quickly to new changes and even mock fake brands, find ways around bans, and stay tuned to global culture. But they are also growing up in a system that narrows horizons, imposes loyalty, and tries to shape them into a generation of compliance. Thus, the question remains. Will sanctions and state policies succeed in creating a more conservative, obedient generation? Or will Russian youth continue to find creative ways to remain connected to the wider world? Their choices will shape not only the future of Russian consumer culture, but the political and cultural direction of the country itself. References https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/02/18/1092830-amerikanskii-biznes-poteryal https://b4ukraine.org/what-we-do/corporate-enablers-of-russias-war-report https://www.ft.com/content/656714b0-2e93-467b-92d6-a2d834bc0e2b

Defense & Security
This paper explores how Russians’ fears have evolved from 2014 to 2025—shifting from war and repression to economic hardship and social control. It reveals how political pressure, sanctions, and digital isolation have reshaped everyday anxiety and public

Fears and concerns of russians

by World & New World Journal

If you ask the average person in any country about their concerns, their answers would likely be very similar. Across the globe, people are generally most worried about the uncertainty of the future, particularly regarding their finances. This holds true whether you're in the United States, China, or elsewhere. However, does this trend remain the same for a country in a state of war?2014: The Sochi Olympics & The Annexation of CrimeaThe year 2014 was significant for Russia, both economically and politically. It was marked by two major events: the Sochi Winter Olympics and the annexation of Crimea.The 2014 Winter Olympics were held in Sochi, a Russian resort city. To host the games, the government spent an enormous amount of money, over $50 billion, on transportation infrastructure and new sports complexes. In recent decades, the Olympics have been seen as a way for nations to exert "soft power," and there were even speculations in 2010 that Russia may have paid its way to host the games. Despite the celebration of the event's successful conclusion, this period was immediately followed by a major political decision.During late 2013 and early 2014, Ukraine's internal political situation was highly unstable. Many Ukrainians were unhappy with their pro-Russian government's policies, believing that President Yanukovych was a "Russian puppet" who had denied the country a chance to join the European Union. Yanukovych's suspension of a key pact with the EU sparked mass protests and eventually a revolution.While the world's attention was focused on the Olympics and the political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia swiftly moved its troops into the Crimean Peninsula. With military and political pressure, the Crimean government held a referendum, after which the majority of citizens voted to join Russia. This move led to massive international sanctions against Russia, which put its rapidly rising economy under immense pressure.Russian Concerns in 2014This period of political and economic pressure was reflected in the concerns of ordinary Russians. According to a Levada Center survey from May 2014, the top concerns for Russians were:Illness or death of relativesPoverty or job lossWorld warCrimePolitical repressionPublic humiliationHealth threatsHowever, the trends in these fears showed some notable changes compared to the previous decade (1999–2014). Excluding health concerns, these trends indicate that Russians became increasingly worried about the country's political and economic situation. The fear of war also increased due to the instability in Ukraine and the repercussions of their president's actions on the lives of ordinary citizens.2018-2019: The World Cup, Pension Reform, and Shifting Public ConcernsThe period of 2018 to 2019 was a abundant in all the aspects time for Russia, marked by a contrast between a successful international event and a significant domestic political turmoil. The main events of this year were the presidential election, the FIFA World Cup, and a highly questionable reform.Political Discontent and Public ProtestsIn the run up to the 2018 presidential election, Vladimir Putin, in order to secure his presidential spot banned all possible candidates from joining the race. One of the prominent opponents of Putin was Alexey Navalny, who was massively supported by younger generation. Along with allegations of widespread election fraud and a controversial pension reform, it acted as a major catalyst for public protests. Critics argued that with a low average life expectancy (66 years for men), many Russians would not live long enough to collect their state pensions.These events, combined with a documentary by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation exposing government corruption, fueled significant public demonstrations and damaged government’s image. Tens of thousands of people across Russia joined in these protests, leading to a major surge in political anxiety. Authorities responded with a lockdown, arresting many participants and detaining even more people. Educational institutions reportedly pressured students to not participate, threatening them with dismissal. Navalny himself was repeatedly arrested.Despite the size of protest, there were no results, nothing has changed.The Impact of the FIFA World CupIn stark contrast to the domestic political turmoil, the 2018 World Cup provided the government with a platform for soft power and a temporary boost in national image. While not considered an economic success, and costing over $14 billion with a minor economic benefit, the tournament significantly increased global attention on Russia. This international spotlight, along with a more stable economic situation, created a sense of national pride and momentarily overshadowed the public's grievances.Changing Public Fears (2014 vs. 2019) Data from the Levada Center highlights how Russians' concerns shifted between 2014 - 2019. The two periods show a marked increase in fears related to political instability and government repression. The most significant changes were in political concerns. The fear of "abuse of power" saw the largest jump, increasing by 18 percentage points to 33%. Along with the fear of a "return to repression" and a "tightening of the political regime", which increased by 15 pp and 13 pp, respectively. These statistics underscore a growing public distrust and disbelief in the government, fueled by the 2018 pension reform, “rigged” election and protests. As an expert, Denis Volkov, explained, "People decided that the authorities violated their obligations, deceived them," which directly links the pension reform to the surge in political anxiety.Despite these growing fears, a different Levada poll from late 2019 showed a slight increase in confidence in the government. This could be attributed to the successful staging of the World Cup and a powerful state propaganda campaign aimed at "reconciling people with reality." However, the long-term trends clearly indicate a population increasingly concerned with their political rights, personal freedom and security.2025: Economic Struggles and New Public RestrictionsFollowing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has faced harsh sanctions and economic challenges. While the government has responded with tight control over public discourse, these policies and their consequences have significantly altered the concerns of ordinary citizens.Russian public opinion has evolved throughout the conflict. Initially, there was a surge of patriotic sentiment, but as the war continued, public anxieties have shifted. While the fear of war remains a concern, the focus has increasingly moved toward domestic issues, such as the economy and social tensions. 2025 polls indicated that a majority of Russians supported peace negotiations to end the war, rather than continuing military action. This change is likely correlated with a growing economic impact of the war, as well as drone attacks and their damage on Russian territory, which brought the conflict’s sclale closer to home for many of Russians.  Economic and Social ConcernsEconomic stability has long been a top concern for Russians, and the current situation has only amplified these fears. Since the invasion, government spending on the military has skyrocketed, leading to a massive budget deficit. In an effort to stabilize the economy and combat rapid inflation, the Central Bank, under the leadership of Elvira Nabiullina, implemented a policy of extremely high interest rates, at one point reaching 21%. While this was a logical, albeit painful, economic maneuver to slow down inflation, it had a harsh effect on ordinary citizens, making things like mortgages and loans prohibitively expensive. This has led to a major rise in public concern over the country's economic future, with a significant portion of the population now worried about the state of the "cold" or stagnant economy.Another major concern is the issue of immigrant labor. Russia's aging population and the war have created a severe labor shortage, which is being filled by migrant workers, primarily men from Central Asian countries. These migrants often take low-paying, difficult jobs that Russians are unwilling to do. Despite their essential role in the economy, particularly in industries like construction, their presence has led to social tensions. Public fear, often fueled by nationalist sentiment and concerns over crime, remains a major issue. While some younger Russians may be more tolerant, the general atmosphere is a complex mix of necessity and xenophobia.Public Restrictions and Digital IsolationThe government has also tightened its control over public life and information. Laws restricting dissent and free speech have escalated, with hundreds of people being jailed under new repressive measures. Many journalists and activists have fled the country, and critical discussion is now largely impossible.A major part of this ban has been on internet and digital communication. Following the 2022 invasion, many social media platforms left Russia, forcing users to rely on VPNs to access sites like Instagram and Facebook. Further restrictions have been implemented, including limitations on popular messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. These measures were officially justified as a way to minimize fraud, but they have also been seen as a way to promote state-sponsored apps and control communication. For many Russians, especially the youth, this digital isolation has become a significant source of frustration, with reports of internet slowdowns and service outages becoming more common.How these concerns differ within age groups?While many fears are shared across generations, their intensity and focus vary significantly by age.  For all age groups, the fear of illness of loved ones remains the strongest emotional anchor, symbolizing the dominance of private, family-centered values in contemporary Russian life. Additionally, the fear of war unites all age brackets, suggesting a collective awareness of geopolitical instability and the lasting psychological effects of military conflict.Generational PatternsRecent data [1] reveals distinct generational patterns of fear and anxiety. While most citizens share concerns about security, stability, and well-being, the intensity and content of these fears vary sharply across age groups.Younger Russians (18–30) display the highest levels of anxiety about political instability and future uncertainty. Nearly one-third fear a civil war (32%), and about the same proportion express concern about migration (29%) and environmental threats (27%). These fears reflect their heightened sensitivity to social unrest and global crises, likely influenced by online political discourse.Middle-aged groups (31–60) tend to focus more on economic and social pressures. Concerns about rising prices and impoverishment (up to 29%), interethnic conflicts (29%), and terrorist threats (30%) dominate their worldview. This generation, responsible for families and careers, appears most affected by inflation, inequality, and the broader sense of insecurity in everyday life.In contrast, older respondents (60 and above) prioritize personal health and family safety over political or economic fears. For this group, the focus shifts inward, from collective or national threats to the vulnerabilities of aging and declining health.This progression from systemic to personal anxieties suggests that as individuals age, their fears become less ideological and more existential, mirroring the broader transformation of Russian society.ConclusionOver the past decade, Russian fears have evolved with political shocks, economic turbulence, and social change, yet in many ways, they remain strikingly universal. Like people in most countries, Russians fear illness, poverty, and war above all else. What distinguishes Russia is not the content of its fears, but the context that amplifies them: authoritarian governance, prolonged sanctions, and ongoing conflict.The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2018 protests, and the 2022-25 wartime restrictions each reshaped the emotional landscape of Russian society. Political repression and economic instability deepened existing anxieties, turning collective uncertainty into a defining feature of everyday life. Still, beneath these structural pressures, the same human concerns remain love for family, fear of loss, and hope for security.Ultimately, Russia is not an exception, but a reflection of the modern world: a nation where political fear overlays universal human vulnerability, and where personal and national uncertainty continues to define what it means to live in the 2020s.Note[1] It is important to acknowledge that the FOM is a state-funded organization, and the accuracy of its results may be subject to scrutiny.

Diplomacy
Sharm El Sheikh Summit for Peace: Agreement to End the War in Gaza, 13 October 2025. Photo by Roman Ismayilov. President.az, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Gaza Peace Plan: End of war, or A beginning of occupation?

by Muhammad Abdullah

On 29 September 2025, President Trump held a press conference along with his counterpart, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and issued 20 Points detailed peace plan for the war-torn Gaza, though he claims that the plan was backed by prominent Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and some other’s. By and large these Muslim states also welcomed the Plan, most importantly Palestinian political body which is Palestinian Liberation Organization also called the plan an opportunity to end the war on Gaza. Some significant points of the peace plan. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. (Gjevori, 2025)Role of ArabsSince the start of Trump’s tenure  and the new American administration Arabs were making efforts to stop the long running Gaza War, they propose alternatives to Trump’s Gaza Rivera plan and so on. (Jazeera, 2025) Now, when eventually Gaza Peace Plan announced by Trump, they (Arabs ) not only endorsed the Plan but also Nations like Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye take part in negotiations with Hamas and Israel, along with envoy to Middle East Steve Witkoff, and finally brought some relief for Gazans like (ceasefire and immediate supplies of aid) which is very crucial for the starving people Gaza. (Irish, 2025)Proposed Governance ModelGaza would be governed by technocrats, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day public services and municipal functions in Palestine. The committee would be composed of qualified Palestinian and International experts. They will be overseen by a body called the Board of Peace. There would be a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). To oversee security in Gaza during transition. (Walsh, 2025)Parties response to the plan.Hamas, which is the military body of Gaza has also issued a response to Trump’s Plan, in which they accepted the demands like hostage release, and to hand over the administration of Gaza to independent Technocrats, but they clearly stated that they want to negotiate over some points through mediators.PLO which is Political body of Palestine, welcomed the ceasefire but they are opposed to hand over Gaza’s governance to foreign actors, as Nasser al- Qudwa, a prominent Palestinian and Nephew of Yasser Arafat, has warned against foreign governance of Gaza post-Hamas, (Newspaper, 2025) stressing that leadership must be rooted locally rather than imposed from abroad. The statement highlights the potential opposition and undermines the credibility of the plan.The Israeli Prime Minister called the plan as their victory and fulfillment of their objectives, as they want to decommission Hamas, they will achieve this once the plan is implemented. The tunnels which were in Gaza and which caused Israel unbearable damage, especially in early days of war. (Bronner l., 2025) They are also going to get rid of them by Hamas exclusion and their deradicalization and development of infrastructure by independent actors. The most favorable point for Israel is Trump's statement that “if Hamas does not accept the plan then you [Netanyahu] are allowed to finish the job in Gaza and destroy Hamas completely”. (Griner, 2025) Which I think is a very provocative statement and can cause more bloodshed of innocent civilians. which may end up in complete occupation of the Strip.  Since the day Trump’s plan for Gaza was announced, the Israeli military did not slow down their advancement in the strip, instead they continued with their actions against civilians which reflect their intentions clearly.But for the implementation of the so-called peace plan and to further discuss over its terms both parties take part in negotiations in Egypt. With the mediation of Qatar and Egypt, these negotiations continued for days and then concluded with the statement made by Donald Trump that Israel and Hamas have agreed to his peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli military says that a ceasefire in Palestinian territory took effect on Friday 10th. And that it has begun to withdraw from parts of the Strip as per plan. The first phase of Trump's plan is expected to see the release of all 20 living Israeli hostages in exchange for around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza. Increased amounts of aid will also enter the Strip. (BBC, 2025). On October 13th, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. (BBC, 2025) The same day, in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt, an international peace summit was held, attended by representatives from various nations, - including Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, among others – but notably excluding Hamas and Israel representatives. The summit focused on humanitarian access to Gaza and mechanisms to monitor the proposed ceasefire, aiming to end the two-year war. The outcome was the signing of a joint declaration by Egypt, US, Qatar and Türkiye. Despite these recent developments, the Plan gave the UN only a minimal role, limited to the supply of aid. Although the UN was created to maintain world peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, when we see the plan, Trump did not assign any role to the peace keeping body, instead he appointed Tony Blair [former British PM, who invaded Iraq in 2003] as head of the Board of peace, which is an international Transitional body whose responsibility is to supervise the apolitical Palestinian committee (responsible for day to day running activities in Gaza). AnalysesThe future of the 20 Points Plan is quite uncertain because it neither has a security guarantee for Palestinian nor any durable provisions about the existence of Palestinian state. The plan calls for an ISF (International stabilization Force) which will be deployed in Gaza immediately for ensuring peace, but the fact is the world does not have a pool of experienced peacekeeping force for this purpose that can handle the situation.  Furthermore, the Israeli PM made it clear that there is no meaningful withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza anytime soon.Moreover, the Plan prohibits Israeli annexation of Gaza, but it does not address the issue of the West Bank. Annexation there is opposed by present and potential Abraham Accord States. But I think soft annexation there would be continued through expansion and establishment of settlement. (weller, 2025)ConclusionWhile the world is admiring Trump’s 20 Points Peace Plan, how can we think of peace anywhere, without an army, and most importantly without recognizing the place as a sovereign State with demarcated borders? Although the Plan has some appealing aspects like immediate ceasefire, entry of aid, development of infrastructure in Gaza and exchange of prisoners, it lacks in terms of security from future Israeli aggression, and it also has no provision about the Palestinian state with borders of before 1967 with East Jerusalem as its Capital. Furthermore, if the plan is implemented Palestinians will be governed by the people of other countries, who will govern them as per the policy devised by the committee, (whose members probably belong to West and other States) not according to the needs and opinion of Palestinians. Which may add more to their misery. So, for a short span of time the Plan may seem like the end of war, but in the long run if more reforms like the recognition of Palestinian statehood and its existence will not be made, then this is just a start of a new occupation. References BBC. (2025, october 9).  BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o.ampBBC. (2025, october 14). BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c740jx07vz0oBronner, L. (2025, september 30). Le Monde.  https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/30/netanyahu-accepts-trump-s-gaza-peace-plan-under-pressure-but-sets-conditions_6745930_4.html?utmGjevori, E. (2025, sep 29). al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/9/29/heres-the-full-text-of-trumps-20-point-plan-to-end-israels-war-on-gazaGriner, A. (2025, oct 3). AL Jazeera. from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/trump-issues-sunday-deadline-for-hamas-to-accept-gaza-peace-proposal?utm_sourceIrish, J. (2025, october 8). Reuters. from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/europeans-arabs-meet-flesh-out-next-phase-trump-gaza-plan-2025-10-09/?utm_sourceJazeera, A. (2025, feb 21). Al Jazeera. Arab leaders hold a meeting and discuss alternatives to GazaNewspaper, T. T. (2025, october). the times.  https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/nasser-al-qudwa-gaza-hamas-palestine-israel-news-vl7xmgct9?utm_sourceWeller, M. (2025, oct 2). Cathom house. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed?utm

Diplomacy
Bimstec summit banner or poster concept. 2025 summit held in Bangkok, from April 2-4. Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan

SAARC is Dead: BIMSTEC the Way Forward?

by Darshit Thakar

The combined population of South Asia is around 2.09 Billion while the world is around 8.24 Billion. When we compare GDP data, South Asia’s GDP is 5.2 Trillion USD, while the entire world is around 115 Trillion USD. South Asia despite having ¼ of the world population contributes only around 4.5% to the world's GDP. If we dig deeper in the data, India contributes to around 86% of South Asia’s GDP; approx 4.5 Trillion USD.Now let's talk about South Asia’s Eastern Neighbours. If we look at the picture in that region, there is a stark contrast. The population of that region is around 701 million, approximately one quarter of South Asia's population but its entire GDP is about 4 Trillion USD. This GDP is spread across all nations. Why this big turn in this region? It was because of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN provided a platform for all these countries to work together.Similar efforts were made by South Asian Countries. In 1985, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) was established. It included member states of South Asia. But this organisation isn't as effective as ASEAN, despite having nearly four times population than ASEAN, the GDP of ASEAN is approximately three-quarters that of SAARC and when we compare global exports; SAARC exports goods and services worth $900 Billion while ASEAN exports $1.9 Trillion.Why was SAARC unable to succeed?The majority of South Asian countries were once part of the British Empire. They obtained their independence from Britain during the late 1940s. But since independence, there has been political instability in almost all countries of South Asia. Besides this there have been conflicts within and among these countries. India & Pakistan, two largest countries of South Asia, fought four wars and many skirmishes since their inception due to the dispute over the region of Kashmir, the dispute has also caused Insurgency in Kashmir. Afghanistan and Pakistan’s entire border is disputed which resulted in minor skirmishes between both nations and Insurgency in the border regions. Nepal has faced political instability, recent incidence of GenZ protest being the best example. Bangladesh has faced dozens of military coups and last year Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power, with elections planned for 2026. Sri Lanka had brutal civil war, after the end of civil war, there was some political stability but due to Government mismanagement there were protest and Rajapaksha was ousted from power in 2022.The problem even continues beyond Conflicts. South Asia suffers from weak physical connectivity, there is poor cross-border rail, road, and energy networks that prevent the flow of goods and people. Tariff and non-tariff barriers remain high, discouraging regional trade. Smaller states also fear Indian dominance, leading to mistrust. And unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks strong institutional mechanisms to enforce agreements making cooperation more symbolic than concrete. In short, National Politics and Mistrust among nations are the key drivers behind SAARC's inefficiencies. When we compare the workings of ASEAN and SAARC, we find big differences. In ASEAN, there is a system called ASEAN Minus X. It is a decision-making principle used by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to enhance flexibility in regional cooperation, particularly in the field of economic integration. It allows a subset of ASEAN member states to proceed with specific agreements or initiatives, without requiring unanimous participation from all 10 members. The member states can join later on, once they're ready. Unlike ASEAN, SAARC lacks a similar mechanism. Their strict consensus rules often lead to paralysis (e.g., SAARC’s stalled summits due to India-Pakistan tensions). ASEAN Minus X’s flexibility is a key reason for ASEAN’s success.Since the early 1990s, ASEAN members created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) lowering tariffs across the region. The grouping fostered regional supply chains which has helped in linking production networks between Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. ASEAN has also promoted tourism and easier labor mobility through visa exemptions. By comparison, SAARC’s South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which was signed in 2006 has failed to meaningfully boost trade because of weak implementation.BIMSTEC: A Pragmatic Solution?While SAARC remains mired in political deadlock, a promising alternative has emerged known as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Launched in 1997 and revitalized by its 2022 Charter, BIMSTEC unites seven nations—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand—spanning 1.73 billion people and a $5.2 trillion GDP. By excluding Pakistan, it dodges SAARC's veto traps and channeling energy into practical sectors like transport connectivity, Regional Trade, Energy, Counter terrorism and so on. This setup positions BIMSTEC as a bridge to ASEAN, with intra-regional trade at ~7% but poised for growth. Recent 2025 momentum, including summits on sustainable development, signals political will to avoid SAARC's pitfalls—focusing on economic development and regional cooperation.Yet challenges persist. BIMSTEC remains under-resourced having a small secretariat and limited funding compared to ASEAN. Its Free Trade Agreement negotiations which were launched in 2004 are still incomplete. Member states often look to India for leadership but this reliance can also breed mistrust because of India's Size & Strength. Without flexible mechanisms like ASEAN Minus X, BIMSTEC risks repeating SAARC’s rigid consensus traps. ConclusionSouth Asia’s demographic weight holds immense economic potential, yet SAARC’s rigid consensus and political disputes, particularly India-Pakistan tensions have stalled integration limiting intra-trade to 5% against ASEAN’s 25%. BIMSTEC, bypassing these hurdles offers a pragmatic path with initiatives like the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity (2022-2028) and interregional ASEAN ties. To succeed, South Asia could revive SAARC with sub-regional frameworks like BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) or empower BIMSTEC with Minus X-style flexibility for trade and energy grids. Shared challenges like climate change, digital economy could unify efforts, leveraging India’s IT sector ($210B exports) and Bangladesh’s garments ($50B). By 2030, a reformed SAARC or robust BIMSTEC could transform South Asia’s demographic strength into global economic clout, rivaling ASEAN’s success and changing the region’s narrative from potential to power. Sources·         Worldometers - Southern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/southern-asia-population/·         Worldometers - World Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2025) https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/SAQ; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/IND/GBR·         World Bank South Asia Development Update (April 2025)·         ClearTax World GDP Ranking (2025)·         Worldometers - South-Eastern Asia Population (2025) https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-eastern-asia-population/·         IMF World Economic Outlook (ASEAN GDP, 2025)·         Wikipedia SAARC (Exports)·         ASEAN Key Figures 2024 (Exports)·         Wikipedia BIMSTEC (Population, GDP) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/BIMSTEC·         BIMSTEC Secretariat - 6th Summit 2025·         World Bank Trade in South Asia (SAARC intra-trade)·         ASEAN Stats Bulletin (ASEAN intra-trade, 2024)·         Reuters Nasscom Report (India IT exports, 2025) https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-tech-sector-seen-growing-51-fy25-nasscom-says-2025-02-24/·         Bangla News Garment Statistics (Bangladesh garments, 2025)  https://inews.zoombangla.com/bangladesh-garment-export-statistics-2025-what-the-numbers-say/·         Diversifying Global Supply Chains: Opportunities in Southeast Asia – McKinseyhttps://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/sas/south-asia/exportshttps://oec.world/en/profile/international_organization/aseanhttps://bimstec.org/event/190/bimstec-charter-enters-into-forcehttps://bimstec.org/event/247/thailand-hosts-the-6th-bimstec-summit-in-bangkok-on-04-april-2025-https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/ https://www.stimson.org/2024/why-bimstecs-maritime-transport-agreement-is-essential-for-india/