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IntroductionEurope is confronting twin energy crises resulting from the impact of climate change and its energy dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Addressing these crises will require the European Union (EU) and its member states to engage in nothing short of an energy revolution that will decarbonise Europe’s energy usage and end dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has focused transatlantic attention on the importance of energy security and ending energy reliance on Russia. While the EU and US are now both taking immediate steps to reduce consumption and reliance on Russian supplies, some of these steps may result in increased emissions or will lead to greater reliance on other autocratic suppliers. To address the twin challenges of climate catastrophe and Russian aggression, significant action will be needed on the energy transition front in the short, medium, and long term.  Estonia, like other EU (and NATO) members is therefore at an energy crossroads. Unlike many of its EU fellow member states, it has not been highly dependent on Russian energy supply and is relatively energy secure. Domestically produced oil shale accounts for 55% of Estonia’s domestic energy supply (as of 2020).While, prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, Estonia received roughly 93 percent of its natural gas from Russia, natural gas accounts for less than 8% of Estonia’s overall energy consumption.Furthermore, the imports of the Russian gas came to an end as a result of steps taken by the Estonian government, in response to Russia’s aggression, and were replaced by liquified natural gas (LNG) from other suppliers. However, oil shale is very carbon-intensive, while increasing reliance on natural gas will do little to decarbonise energy system in the long-term. In order to meet Estonia’s climate commitments, embedded in the EU’s Green Deal and “Fit for 55” goals, Estonia will need to develop alternative sources of energy but will encounter manifold challenges in this transition. As the climate crisis deepens, the failure to meet climate targets could also have significant reputational costs internationally. Moreover, the effort to “electrify everything” – from cars to heating – will likely lead to increased demand for electricity. This will require not simply swapping out energy sources but producing more electricity with the goal of having an abundance of energy. Additionally, an abundance of cheap and clean energy will be necessary to support carbon removal projects, such as through direct carbon capture and storage technology. Thus, no matter the technological developments in other energy types, there will be demand for an abundance of clean energy. Furthermore, while there have been significant advances in renewables, there are also concerns about intermittency – when the sun is not shining, or wind is not blowing – as well as space needed for deployment. One potential zero carbon technology for Estonia to consider is new advanced nuclear technology in the form of small modular nuclear reactors (SMR). Developing a small modular reactor could contribute to enhancing regional energy security within the EU and to achieving the EU’s climate objectives. A decision to adopt nuclear energy, however, has implications not only for the national energy system or broader climate objectives. It is a sensitive area that intersects with geopolitical and national security considerations. Its pursuit means new opportunities for deepening strategic partnerships, and cooperation in nuclear energy technology is often an effective vehicle to enhance not only commercial and technological interactions but also security and foreign policy ties between countries. This is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek the greater involvement of main allies such as the US, UK, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter geopolitical pressure from Russia and China. The United States stands out as a pivotal ally, but the US “footprint” in Estonia remains small compared to what it could be. Also, Estonia’s foreign and security policy is currently heavily tilted towards diplomatic, military and cyber aspects when it comes to engaging the US, while energy security and energy technology receive far less attention. Nuclear energy cooperation would create new opportunities for enhancing US-Estonia ties.  At the same time, any efforts of Estonia to have “more US” in the region – particularly in such sensitive sector as nuclear energy, but also across the board – may encounter resistance. Some of it would inevitably arise from Russia and its geopolitical confrontation with the West, but it would also stem from the notions of “European sovereignty” as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations, structural issues in national energy policies, and diverging geopolitical perspectives of some key countries in the EU. These aspects must be factored in when considering the geopolitical prospects of nuclear energy in Estonia and the highly appealing transatlantic dimension of these aspirations.1. Estonia’s Energy Security and Nuclear Energy OptionThe Estonian government is yet to make its decision regarding the adoption of nuclear energy for electricity generation. There is an inter-agency nuclear energy working group established to analyse the issue and articulate recommendations by 2024.The electricity prices crisis of late 2021-early 2022 drew attention and elicited many favourable assessments from various public figures. The government even decided to expedite decision-making on the matter. Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and the then Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure Taavi Aas indicated their support to possible adoption of nuclear energy. Political leadership of major parliamentary political parties both in the governing coalition and opposition are mostly in favour, while only the Greens, who do not hold any seats in the parliament, are opposed. Public opinion polls conducted in early 2022 also showed high public support to nuclear energy, with 59% of the respondents being in favour. At the same time, some officials emphasize that Estonia need to carefully follow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines on national nuclear energy programme deliberations, limiting how much decision timelines could be compressed.The political decision-makers might also decide to put the option for a vote in a referendum. Estonia, by some accounts, has a strong anti-nuclear undercurrent in society, stemming from the negative experiences of Soviet-era environmental mismanagement and the civil nuclear disasters of Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. If Estonia is to adopt nuclear energy, this sentiment would have to be engaged and mitigated well before any further practical steps are made, which opens opportunities for hostile disinformation operations by malignant actors. Currently, there is only one clear proposal on the table – by Fermi Energia which also has Swedish Vatenfall as a minority shareholder and expects more investors to join soon. Fermi Energia assesses that it can ensure, within a framework of a long-term contract, supply of electricity at the price of €55 per MWh for 15 years, which is about half or even one third of the current market prices in NordPool spot market in early 2022. Given that price volatility is likely to continue and even worsen, while pressure to accelerate decarbonisation will only increase, as Estonian electricity production is the most greenhouse gas-intensive in Europe, this could be seen as an economically attractive and competitive proposition. In addition, there would be heating supply available to nearby municipalities at a very competitive price compared to natural gas option. Theoretically, Estonia could, instead of developing own nuclear power, join as an investor and participant in a larger project (e.g., in Poland). However, the lead times of such projects are often too long and compound various risks, as illustrated by the recently cancelled Hanhikivi-1 project in Finland.Estonia also has a very negative experience from the Lithuanian Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project debacle that led to failure of Lithuania to launch a regional NPP project agreed with the other Baltic states and Japan’s Hitachi in 2011-12, while the option of buying into one of the upcoming Polish projects might not be very appealing to Estonia.In the view of some Estonian energy executives and policymakers, Polish energy needs would likely supersede those of any other participating country’s when allocating the output, and many small investors are not of high interest to nor needed by the Polish companies behind Poland’s nuclear projects. There is, however, room for cooperation in training, regulatory capacity building, R&D and similar aspects, much of which could be undertaken in the framework of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), where the US has a leading role. Even in construction, if it takes place in parallel, some common pooled purchases could be undertaken.  Thus, should there be an affirmative decision by the government, Estonian developers are leaning towards having a national solution, even though remaining open and even actively courting participants from neighbouring countries as investors, thus in reality turning it into a regional project. Latvia is among the priorities and shows a clear interest, as demonstrated by discussions between Fermi Energia and state-owned energy corporation, Latvenergo (in this case, if Latvenergo joined the project, Estonia would deploy four SMR units instead of two). There are also ongoing talks with Finnish Fortum as a potential investor into the Estonian project, as the Russian electricity trade embargo enacted by the Kremlin – possibly in response to Finland’s application to join NATO – and the failure of the Hanhikivi-1 venture prompted Finland to seek new sources of supply in the region to satisfy future electricity demand.Thus, the company leading the Estonian project sees it as a regional one, just without the governments being in the lead. On the other hand, some officials insist that governments would inevitably come to play an essential role in such a project of strategic importance not only to Estonia, but also to the wider region. The Estonian project developers have already chosen BWRX-300 by GE Hitachi, a joint US-Japanese venture. So far, it appears that BWRX-300 will be the only reactor type that might be fully licensed – by Canada – and could obtain license in Estonia by 2030. This date is a crucial milestone for Estonia due to the plans to close oil shale-based power generation plants and the need to make further and faster progress towards fulfilling Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments – the pace of which is strongly criticised by the civil society – without losing domestic generation capacity necessary to provide stable baseload which the rapidly growing but intermittently performing renewables would not be able to ensure. At the same time, some of Estonia’s energy policy stakeholders insist that, come 2030-40, the renewable sector will possibly have addressed, through technological innovation in grid storage and other areas, the intermittency problem and, given especially the offshore wind potential in the Baltic Sea, might make introduction of nuclear energy with all the attendant complexities and societal stigma unnecessary altogether. Indeed, the government's decision in August 2022 to accelerate the energy transition to 100% renewable electricity consumption in Estonia as early as 2030 indicates the abundance of optimism about such innovation. Others, however, believe that renewables and nuclear energy can successfully co-exist and point to Finland as an example, but there are views that an Estonian SMR could be ready by 2040 at the earliest. If Estonia decides to adopt nuclear energy and given that the company leading the project selected GE Hitachi SMR, its deployment can be expected to be a high priority in US-Estonia and Canada-Estonia cooperation and possibly the highest value business engagement for the period of 2024-35 until the reactors have been deployed and operate routinely. The US would be the main partner on maintenance services, training, and education. According to the Fermi Energia executives, GE Hitachi would be the design supplier, which includes all technical drawings, equipment specifications, safety studies, and personnel training, as well as the supplier of final fuel elements, fuel assembly services, instrumentation equipment and software, turbines, generators and more. Canada, as the first-of-a-kind (FOAK) deployment nation for this type of SMR, would be important in personnel training and supply chain management, with very significant supplies such as reactor pressure vessel (RPV), primary steam piping, RPV internals, valves, pumps, and uranium being provided by the Canadian suppliers. French Orano, 51% owned by the French government, could have a significant role in fuel cycle by providing the uranium enrichment and spent fuel recycling services, thus mitigating potential French objections to more US tech in Europe as contravening European “tech sovereignty” notions. It is likely that companies and export credit agencies from Sweden, Finland, France, US, Canada could be important investors and creditors. The envisaged capital expenditures (CAPEX) breakdown would be roughly as follows: in the US – 30%; in Canada – 30%, other countries – 10%; in Estonia – 30% (local suppliers of construction materials, services during the construction, etc). In addition, given its nuclear competence, very close economic ties with Estonia, and Vattenfall’s investments, Sweden would also be an important partner, especially in personnel training. Estonia’s success could also provide know-how and a point of reference to countries such as Lithuania, where there are already some voices calling for deploying SMRs as a solution to achieving energy independence, a goal of its national strategy.The fact that Estonia is “nuclear naïve” at the moment does not seem to put off potential investors; quite to the contrary, it makes Estonia’s lack of legacy baggage more interesting to partners from Sweden, Finland or Canada. However, it is the political sentiment and geostrategic considerations in the US and EU – both in the EU institutions and among key member states – that will be of paramount importance if Estonia goes forward with nuclear energy and selects an SMR solution of US origin.2. The US Policy and InterestsThe United States has a strategic interest in increasing European energy security, particularly in the Baltic region. Washington has long been concerned about European dependence and reliance on Russia for its domestic energy. Throughout the previous decade, US administrations have opposed the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline and have pressed Europe to diversify its energy supply away from Russia. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US and Europe sought to increase pressure on the Russian economy, and Russia’s energy sector which accounts for about 45% of Russia’s total exports became one of the key targets of comprehensive sanctions. Admittedly, the US also has its own parochial reasons to push Europe away from Russian gas. Over the last decade, America has undergone its own energy revolution, becoming a major producer of natural gas with fracking technology. It has become a major exporter of LNG and has encouraged Europeans to expand their LNG infrastructure to take advantage of American supplies. There are major US political stakeholders that have an interest in expanding US LNG exports to Europe and see an opportunity in the current crisis to increase market access for US exports, which would justify increasing investment to expand domestic production. However, LNG is not the only game in town when it comes to the US interests. Nuclear energy sector is increasingly becoming a pivotal area of geoeconomic competition with such rivals as Russia and China. SMRs and their potential market are viewed as an important aspect of US efforts to regain a share of the global nuclear reactor market and are a feature of both US commercial marketing and diplomatic outreach. The establishment of the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) programme in April 2021, which Estonia joined in January 2022, is indicative of the US government’s focus on SMRs in its near-term nuclear export strategy. Market research organisations estimate the SMR market to grow by 15% and reach roughly $19 billion by 2030. The United States began considerable investment in SMR development in 2012 with the US Department of Energy’s establishment of the SMR Licensing Technical Support Program. Since that time, a wide variety of SMR designs have been under development and are in various stages of licensing. The twin geopolitical and geoeconomic interests have seen the United States become a major proponent of the 3SI. This initiative was launched by the Presidents of Poland and Croatia in 2015 with the goal to develop north-south infrastructure, particularly relating to energy infrastructure. The United States views the 3SI as a way to expand LNG imports to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas, as well as provide a potential counter-balance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its 16+1 format. There is strong US support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). For instance, President Donald Trump attended the 2017 Three Seas Annual summit. In November 2020, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan resolution “expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security” (H.Res. 672, 116th Congress). In December 2020 the US approved a $300 million investment in the 3SI Investment Fund, “primarily for projects focused on energy security.” This investment was enabled by the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which eased restrictions on investing resources for energy infrastructure projects in higher-income countries, such as the European Union. In February 2021, a bipartisan group of members of congress urged the new Biden Administration to continue the previous Administration’s pledged financial support for the 3SI and to finalise its approved $300 million investment. While the 3SI has drawn significant attention, its projects are largely supported by European, not US, investments and several pre-existing projects were simply rebranded as part of the 3SI. Nevertheless, 3SI has focused attention on the need for north-south infrastructure within Europe. For instance, 3SI is supporting a gas interconnection between Poland and Lithuania, thus connecting the three Baltic states and Finland to the European gas network. Of note, however, is that this project was funded through EU and member state contributions. The United States is a secondary player when compared to the EU in terms of infrastructure investment. For instance, three-fourths of the funding to desynchronise Baltic states from the Russian grid and synchronise them with the continental comes from the EU, with the US playing a much smaller financial role. Nevertheless, the pressure from Congress on the Biden administration to make investments in European energy security will likely increase due to Russia’s aggression. Congress will be especially focused on expanding LNG infrastructure. The Ukraine supplemental funding bill, which passed congress in March 2022, urged the administration to create a “Baltic Security and Economic Enhancement Initiative.” The purpose of such an initiative is to provide the Baltic states with security assistance, bolster “physical and energy security needs,” look for opportunities for US foreign direct investment, and improve “high-level security and economic cooperation.” Congress has also called on the administration to send high-level representatives to the Baltics at least twice a year and attend trade, energy, and business fora.How and whether this initiative will be implemented by the Biden administration remains to be seen. But there is now significant funding being made available to the administration for security assistance and energy financing. Pressure will therefore increase on US agencies to show support for the Baltics and Eastern Europe, leading US agencies to scramble to identify sensible projects and investments. Should Estonia pursue American SMR technology, there will be immense US support for the project from the US congress and the Biden administration. It is increasingly visible that the US government has already identified the Trimarium region as one of the priority directions for advancing nuclear energy through the so-called Partnership for Trans-Atlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation (P-TECC) – an international platform initiated by the US Department of Energy. This nuclear energy strand of a broader effort to improve energy security and resilience across the region clearly checks a lot of boxes for US government agencies: It serves a strategic purpose of expanding European energy supply, it promotes American businesses, and develops new zero carbon technology. Thus, there would be strong support from within the US government for stronger bilateral engagement in this area. This is illustrated by a recent P-TECC meeting that focused on nuclear energy in the Central and Eastern Europe. The Estonian SMR project, if pursued, would likely become a show-piece project for the US government, and the US officials would take great interest in its success. For instance, one major topic on the agenda during the visit of Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, Elliot Kang, to Estonia was SMR technology. There is little doubt that proceeding with a climate-friendly energy project that has geopolitical ramifications and is based on cutting-edge US technology would help to deepen diplomatic relations with the United States. It would also further bolster Estonia’s image in the United States as an incredibly capable and cutting-edge ally that punches above its weight within the transatlantic alliance.3. Security Dimension of Nuclear Energy and Cooperation with the USThe evolution of the bilateral security cooperation agenda that is likely to take place as a result of Estonia’s choice to pursue nuclear energy based on the US SMR technology largely depends on what security risks result from this choice and how the US government could assist Estonia in addressing those risks.Traditionally, US security assistance to help protect and secure nuclear facilities has been largely focused on countering the threats posed by terrorism – whether preventing terrorist attacks against the plant itself or addressing the proliferation threats to ensure nuclear materials do not fall into the wrong hands. However, the war in the Ukraine has made clear that nuclear power plants are also national strategic assets and therefore potential military targets. Moreover, the hybrid threat environment in which Estonia finds itself means that its SMR project could be exposed to the use of various vectors of attack (e.g. cyber, disinformation, etc) applied by hostile state powers seeking to advance their interests through the medium of so-called “grey zone” conflict. Interaction between the US government and Estonian authorities in monitoring and countering such risks would form an important strand of bilateral security cooperation. 3.1 Conventional Military ThreatRussia’s invasion of Ukraine provides important lessons for Estonia to consider when assessing whether to proceed with an SMR. This war has created an unprecedented situation in which nuclear power plants have been in the crossfire of war. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that an SMR would be a potential target for Russia, whether in a conventional military operation against Estonia or in conducting asymmetric or grey-zone operations to weaken or undermine the government in power. For instance, Russia in 2015 targeted Ukraine’s power sector through a cyberattack, successfully shutting off the power for 200 000 Ukrainians before Christmas. Similarly, during the war in Ukraine, Russia has also launched cyberattacks against Ukraine’s power grid. The targeting and seizing of power plants in Ukraine means that Estonia must consider the likelihood that Russia will target an SMR in a potential conflict. In a conflict with Estonia, Russia’s military objectives may also differ significantly than its objectives with Ukraine. Russia has appeared intent on changing the regime in Kyiv and occupying the country and has therefore allowed plants to continue operating. But in an attack against Estonia, Russia may have more destructive ends that would resemble the aims of its large-scale strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy system since Autumn 2022. Hence, instead of seizing and operating power plants, Russia may simply seek to destroy the SMR and deprive the country of significant source of electrical power. Thus, the construction of an SMR, which if built, would likely provide Estonia with an important portion of its power supply and potentially provide power to Latvia as well, would be a prime target for Russia in the event of a military conflict. 3.2 Cyber, Espionage, and Terrorist TargetAn SMR, especially one tied to the United States, would also be a prime target for Russian cyber and espionage campaigns. Developing robust cyber security standards would be a must, as would maintaining extremely careful security protocols for staff. Power plants and power grids have been major targets for Russian cyber operators in the past. For instance, Ukraine’s electrical grid was taken offline in December 2015, with the attack impacting more than 225 000 Ukrainian customers. Russian intelligence and cyber hackers would likely see the plant as a key target both to disrupt operations at the plant, as well as to conduct industrial espionage to improve Russia’s nuclear industry. Lastly, an SMR or any high-profile critical infrastructure must be seen as a potential target for terrorist networks. 3.3 Disinformation TargetThe impact of malignant disinformation campaigns on political processes and national security is well understood by the US and Estonian governments, as is the role of hostile state powers in orchestrating such campaigns. Given the societal sensitivities about nuclear energy, disinformation is one of the most serious challenges that an SMR project would face in Estonia, especially during the public debate on adopting nuclear energy and then during the project’s implementation. In 2006-12, Lithuania’s intentions to build an NPP together with Latvia and Estonia would have significantly changed the current picture of electricity generation in the Baltic region, but Russia’s actions designed to negatively influence the public debate contributed to the suspension of this project. Similar actions should be expected to target Estonia.4. Headwinds and Tailwinds from Other PlayersFrom the geopolitical standpoint and as far as diplomatic strategy concerns, three fellow EU member states and NATO allies – Germany, France, and Poland – stand out for Estonia when considering embracing US nuclear technology and cooperation. The former two have historically formed the most important tandem in shaping the direction of the EU, while the latter has emerged as an important hub for the Trimarium. All three are highly important security and defence partners for Estonia and other two Baltic states. They are, however, positioned on different points of two axes – anti-/pro-nuclear axis and transatlantic/Eurocentric axis – and thus pose different, if somewhat overlapping, sets of challenges. When it comes to the nuclear part, France and Poland are natural allies in making a continued case in favour of nuclear energy’s role in future climate neutral world. Poland also would be an important partner whenever collaborative efforts are required to maintain and benefit from the US involvement in nuclear energy development in the region. Due to the scope of its nuclear ambitions, Poland may come to dominate the US attention and thus diminish the potential political benefits for Estonia, particularly in terms of visibility. Inevitably, Tallinn will have to be very careful and specific about which aspects of practical nuclear cooperation with Poland are desirable – for example, pooled training, specialist mobility, R&D, etc. – and which ones are not. It would be important for the Estonian government, ministerial and commercial actors, as well as civil organisations, such as think-tanks and academic organisations, to establish regular and institutionalised consultations with their Polish counterparts in SMR deployment. A consistent, shared legal, regulatory and standards framework, if possible, would seem highly desirable, to simplify cooperation for decades hence. However, it is important to understand that, although the Polish SMR deployment – just as in Estonia – is more an industry-initiated and led endeavour with state support, the overall Polish programme specifically focuses on large-scale reactors. Germany’s policy, on the other hand, continues to be dominated by anti-nuclear sentiment and “renewables-only” perspective about future energy supply, which is unlikely to change due to the structural and ideological forces at play in German economy and society. Contrary to Estonia’s already strong emphasis on and commitment to renewables, such as offshore wind, Estonian nuclear aspirations are therefore likely to be unpopular in Berlin and will possibly draw continuous criticism. This criticism would lack credibility, given the complete failure – in geopolitical and energy security terms – of the German energy policy, exposed by Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, unlikely as it is to do much significant damage to the overall bilateral relations in foreign and security affairs, Berlin’s anti-nuclear stance – given the sheer lobbying weight of Germany – may still dampen the enthusiasm in the Baltic region and, more importantly, in Brussels over the long-term prospects of nuclear energy industry in the EU. Furthermore, reliance of the Estonian programme on the US may kindle the anti-American instincts in those sections of the German political establishment and policy community that have long sought to balance out the US role in the European security order through energy relations with Russia and industrial relations with China. There will also be growing geoeconomic competition between Germany and the US over the shape of energy policies and the attendant commercial opportunities in the Trimarium, with the former advocating for more alignment with the philosophy of global energy transition, or Energiewende, and with the latter emphasizing the need for nuclear power in the energy mix as a pathway to energy security of the region. Tallinn will have to invest diplomatic efforts into cultivating the transatlanticist policy stakeholders in Berlin and highlighting the strategic benefits of the US involvement in energy security of the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. Estonia’s constructive role in maintaining German interest in building synergies and complementarities with the US contribution to the region’s energy security – including through the 3SI framework – rather than competing with the US would be beneficial to all sides. It might even help Berlin offset some of the loss of political capital and credibility in the Trimarium, incurred by the NS2 saga and then its ambivalence regarding the extent, speed, and nature of support to Ukraine during the war with Russia. Reliance on the US in a nuclear energy programme, however, may prove more problematic in the geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis of Paris. Its agenda of pushing forward European sovereignty means that extensive technological dependence on the US may not be viewed very favourably in some quarters, especially as France continues developing its own SMR for sales in international markets. Estonia should expect that France will make a persistent case for cooperation on the European SMR and will highlight that the EU framework already provides sufficient range of security cooperation instruments to address the risks associated with the adoption of nuclear energy. Some of the potential political opposition from France can be defused by integrating its nuclear industrial base into the supply chains of the Estonian nuclear energy programme, even after choosing the US SMR as the proposed project intends, but this will be hardly sufficient to avoid the optics that Estonia is not supportive of strengthening the EU’s sovereignty aspirations in practice. Estonia will have to be prepared to make a strong case to Paris that dependency on the US – be it in energy technology or military technology – is not contrary to Europe’s interests but rather conducive to greater cohesion and strength of the collective West. The EU has been playing a pivotal role in pushing for and coordinating common responses to the climate crisis and Russia’s use of energy as a tool of geopolitical coercion. Policy instruments and strategies agreed by the member states, such as the EU Green Deal and RePowerEU, advance the diversification of energy sources, promote the energy transition to climate neutrality, and provides for greater coherence, solidarity, security, and closer integration of national energy systems.Although choices concerning national energy mix remain the prerogative of the member states, the overall policy direction undertaken by the EU and the general sentiment in Brussels about the approaches of individual member states clearly matter in assessing the risks and opportunities for Estonia related to nuclear energy. At the end of 2021, the Commission finally completed an extended process that culminated with a decision to include nuclear energy – and natural gas – in its Green Finance Taxonomy (often referred to as simply “green taxonomy” in most discussions), established under the Union’s Green Deal. On the upside, the pro-nuclear decision can be considered a victory for science- and data-driven policy against green-populism, with crucial input made by various scientific studies on the climate impact of nuclear energy. The EU Commission’s decision primarily represents an acknowledgement of the reality that nuclear energy is, de facto, the only scalable solution to reliable base-load carbon-free generation that can displace coal – and eventually natural gas – and does not require the installation of massive, generalizable grid-scale storage, as does an over-reliance on variable renewables. With such popular and ideological forces in favour of the 100%-renewables-and-no-nuclear-model, only the appearance of significant difficulties with this model motivated the Commission and ministerial actors to weather the formidable shaming of “green washing” to open new opportunities for nuclear energy.ConclusionThe United States remains of pivotal importance to Europe’s and Estonia’s security, and this importance was further underlined by its role in countering Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as well as strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank (or “eastern front,” as it is increasingly referred to). Its continued bilateral and, through various cooperative formats such as 3SI, minilateral engagement in the Baltic region is vital foreign and security policy interest of Estonia. Maintaining this engagement will be increasingly difficult because the US repeatedly seeks to pivot to the Asia-Pacific, as the great power competition dynamics in that area of the globe requires its strong focus on countering the long-term challenge of increasingly assertive China, while European – let alone Baltic or Estonian – security concerns will often struggle to remain among the strategic priorities in Washington. Adding civil nuclear energy cooperation to this continuous engagement is a unique opportunity, available both because of alignment with the bi-partisan pro-nuclear sentiment in energy policy of the United States and the need for the US companies to regain their competitive edge in the international nuclear energy market with novel technology to counter China. It also provides a useful vector for increasing US contribution to the energy security of Estonia and the entire Baltic region that goes beyond the present-day focus on LNG supply – a focus that will diminish in importance due to the temporary “bridging” role of natural gas in energy transition towards “zero carbon” future. In the long-term, it would also help to create a competence base in Estonia enabling country’s integration into the US SMR technology chains, thus further strengthening the bilateral partnership. Full exploitation of this opportunity, however, is clearly contingent on Estonia being among the first movers in adopting the American SMR and thus positioning its programme to be a showcase of the successful adoption of the new generation US nuclear energy technology.

With the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the close ties between President Assad and his Turkish counterpart, Erdogan, were severed. Recently, more than a decade later, there have been increasing statements on reconciliation coming from Ankara – albeit coinciding with threats of a new military campaign. The Turkish President must thus choose – normalization or escalation. Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation? In mid-August 2022 widescale protests erupted in dozens of towns controlled by the Syrian opposition in the Idlib and Aleppo provinces in northwest Syria. The demonstrations featured the slogan of “We won’t reconcile,” in response to the surprising statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister on August 11: “We need to bring the opposition and regime together for reconciliation somehow, or there will be no permanent peace otherwise.” The Foreign Minister also announced that he had met his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Belgrade in October 2021. Residents of the north were outraged at the statement, criticized Turkey harshly, and accused it of seeking “public normalization” with the Syrian regime. Indeed, on August 19 Erdogan even stated that “Turkey will need to take ‘higher steps’ with Damascus to end the ‘games’ being played in the region.” The antagonism generated by the Turkish statements should be seen in light of the history of Turkish involvement in Syria. A few months after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, when it became clear that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not intend to implement significant reforms, Turkey became one of the harshest critics of his regime. More than once Erdogan called him a murderer and called on him to resign. From the perspective of the rebels in Syria, peace between Turkey and Syria is tantamount to betrayal. Over the years, Turkey has supported and assisted various Sunni opposition organizations with funding, logistics, and arms. At the same time, Ankara viewed with concern the strengthening of the Kurds and the expansion of the territory run by them in northern Syria, resulting in part from their persistent and successful campaign against ISIS. Ankara was especially unhappy with the dominance of the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground in the area, and feared the creation of contiguous Kurdish control along the Turkish-Syrian border. To forestall this situation, Turkey embarked on three military operations in 2016-2019, which led to Turkish control of several areas in northern Syria. In February 2020, in the wake of attacks by Syrian forces on Turkish army positions in which 34 Turkish soldiers were killed, Ankara embarked on Operation Spring Shield in the Idlib enclave. In March, a ceasefire agreement was signed between Turkey and Russia in Idlib; the agreement included the creation of a secure corridor around the M4 highway, and joint patrols by Russian and Turkish forces. Some 8,000 soldiers from the Turkish military remain in the region and lend military and logistical backing to the organizations operating there, primarily the Syrian National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army) and the Salafi jihadist organization Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is a highly-charged issue, both politically and economically. A significant majority of Turks do not want Syrian refugees to remain in the country, and this occasionally leads to acts of violence against refugees and expressions of racism. Today 3.7 million Syrian refugees who arrived in the wake of the civil war live in Turkey; most live outside refugee camps. As of March 2022, according to the Turkish Interior Minister, Turkey granted citizenship to 200,000 Syrians who entered its territory, while some 500,000 Syrians “voluntarily returned” to Turkey’s controlled territories in northern Syria. In May 2022 Erdogan declared that the Turkish government was formulating plans to resettle approximately one million Syrian refugees in Syrian territory. Turkey is interested in aid from external parties to help fund the building of residential complexes for refugees, and claims that areas under its control in northern Syria are safe enough for them. Over the last few years processes of Turkification have been underway in these territories, and Turkish influence and presence in the Idlib enclave has also expanded. Turkey invested in improved transportation links to the border crossings between the two countries and connected some of the electrical grids in northern Syria to the Turkish grid; Turkish cellular providers operate in these areas; Turkey set up more than ten Turkish postal offices in northern Syria; it pays public employees in the regions under its control in Turkish currency; and the Turkish lira is the primary currency in northern Syria. The Turkish language is taught in schools in these regions and cultural centers for teaching the Turkish language to adults were also opened. Clerics assigned by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, are stationed in mosques that Turkey opened or refurbished. In Idlib, Turkish influence is more limited than in regions under Turkish control in the north, but it is increasing there as well. In addition to military and logistical support for rebel groups, Turkey’s penetration of everyday life is apparent. For example, since 2018, Turkey began to play a more prominent role in the local economy and use of the Turkish lira became common. Turkey offered jobs and led development projects for rebuilding infrastructure, including dams, electric facilities, and roads. Over the past year Turkey has worked on building residential complexes for displaced people living in temporary camps in Idlib. Non-governmental Turkish organizations are also working on development in the province, including projects in housing, energy, culture, and finance. Normalizing Relations: Interests and Obstacles Turkey’s recent conciliatory tone and references to normalizing relations with Syria, while representing a 180-degree turn for Turkish foreign policy, may serve Erdogan in two main ways. First, they are perceived as active steps in managing the refugee problem and a first stage in sending refugees back to Syria. In addition, dialogue with Assad is seen as necessary in light of Russian pressure in this context, as expressed in recent meetings between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of broad negotiations between Ankara and Moscow. In light of the pattern of Turkification, it seems that the likelihood of Ankara withdrawing from the Syrian territories is low. At the same time Russian, Iranian, and American opposition to another Turkish broad-scale ground operation in Syria, as well as growing connections between the Kurds and the Assad regime in order to prevent such an operation, make it difficult for Turkey launch an operation on the scale that it would prefer. On the other hand, a limited military operation will only result in a slight boost to Erdogan’s popularity in Turkish public opinion. In parallel, over the past two years the Syrian regime has sought to rebuild its regional status and return to the heart of the Arab world. In this context, Syria normalized its relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Recent calls have also been heard to readmit Syria into the Arab League, from which it was expelled early in the civil war. Normalizing relations with Turkey may be part of this trend, and no less important, may lead to cessation or reduction of Turkish support for rebels and thus allow Assad to deal a crushing blow to the remaining opposition to his regime. However, reconciliation between the Assad regime and Ankara may be perceived as relinquishing Syrian territory and legitimizing Turkey’s presence there; Assad would like to regain sovereignty in all Syrian territory. The Syrian Foreign Minister declared that the country has not set preconditions, but normalization with Turkey will be achieved only when Ankara meets three demands: withdrawal from Syrian territory; an end to support for opposition organizations; and non-intervention in internal Syrian affairs. An additional impediment is the need to formulate an “Adana II Agreement.” In 1998, after Syria expelled the Kurdish underground leader from its territory, Syria and Turkey signed the Adana Agreement stating that Syria would declare the Kurdish underground a terror organization and not allow it to operate on Syrian territory. Annex IV of the agreement even stipulates that if Syria does not fulfill its commitments, Turkey may enter up to five kilometers into Syrian territory to operate against Kurdish underground activists. In order to rebuild the trust between the two states now, there must be either a new agreement between them, or at least a clarification that Syria remains committed to the Adana Agreement. It is doubtful, however, whether the Assad regime will be committed to this goal and whether it will be able to provide the security assurances demanded by Ankara. For the Syrian rebels in the north, Ankara’s reversal is a major blow to their standing, given that they had seen Turkey as a major ally and source of military and logistical support. In practice the Turkish presence is the major obstacle to attempts by the regime, with Russian and Iranian backing, to renew its control of the Idlib province. The population of the region has not given up on the values of the Syrian revolution and its principal aim of bringing down the Assad regime. Residents of northwestern Syria also fear that a political process will be imposed on them that does not address their needs. But the rebels do not have the means to convince Turkey not to change its policy, other than presenting scenarios of chaos in the event of an escalation in Idlib and the arrival of another million refugees to Turkish soil. In conclusion, the path to normalization between Turkey and Syria will not be smooth, but Erdogan and Assad may both gain from initial steps in this direction. Erdogan can present even a limited compromise, while taking strong military steps against the Kurdish underground in northern Iraq and northern Syria, as a signal to the Turkish public that he is doing what is necessary to deal with both Kurdish terror and the refugee problem. On the Syrian side, Assad can gain from normalization with Turkey as part of his efforts to reestablish Syria’s regional status, and as a means of distancing Turkey from the rebel organizations and neutralizing the most significant remaining pocket of resistance in the country.

Migration flows from South Asia to Western Europe have a long history, the origins of which can be traced in the colonial development of the states of this region.  The end of British colonial rule in India in 1947 was accompanied by the split of the once unified territorial space of Hindustan into two national entities - India and Pakistan. During the first decades after independence, there were intense migratory movements from the former colony to the former metropolis. British migration policy determined the direction and intensity of migration flows from the Hindustan Peninsula to the United Kingdom. The first post-colonial migration flows were based on the following reasons: Britain's interest in the influx of additional labor force, mostly of low qualification; the practice (which existed before 1947) of free human movements from the colonies to the mother country; features of the immigration policy of the United Kingdom, which allowed citizens of the countries of the British Commonwealth to choose their country of residence and even have their own companies in the UK. The vast majority of migrants from India were Sikhs, people from a peasant environment (mainly middle-class farms), who served in the colonial army and police units, as well as their relatives, who did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to leave. Prior to the adoption of The British Commonwealth Immigration Acts 1962 and 1968 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, indians, as Commonwealth citizens, had unlimited rights to enter the territory of the former metropolis. Many of the new arrivals settled in industrial centers such as Leicester or Birmingham. Newly arrived migrants were employed in the textile and service industries. A significant part of them were employed in the services of Heathrow Airport in west London. The 1962 Act, which restricted the freedom of migration to the British Isles from the Commonwealth countries, actually already encouraged immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to settle on British territory. Soon their family members joined them. By the mid-1960s, most Indians arriving in the UK were listed as "dependants", as British government statistics described them. Dependents made up 75% of immigrants in 1965 and 80% in 1966. Migration flows from India to the former metropolis peaked in 1968, when the number of arrivals in the United Kingdom exceeded 23 thousand people. Migration flows from India intensified sharply between 1995 and 2005. Data from population censuses shows that the number of Indian migrants actually tripled between 1961 and 2001, from 166,000 to 470,000. To be fair, we note that the British, who were born in India, were also immigrants. In 2001, the Indian community in the United Kingdom numbered about 1 million people, with about a fifth of its composition coming from South Africa and former East African colonies. In 2007, the number of Indians in the UK increased to 1.3 million people. Until the early 1990s, the former metropolis remained the main haven for Indian migrants, but gradually their influx began to spread to Western and, to an increasing extent, Eastern Europe. For the period 1995–2005 about half of the migrants from India heading for Europe ended up in the UK. The rest preferred other EU countries, primarily Germany and Italy, which accounted for 18 and 12% of Indian migrants respectively. During the period under review, there was an increase, albeit slowly, in the number of Indians moving to Belgium and Sweden. Approximately 1,000 settlers per year settled in France, where the Indian community, which by the mid-2000s was about 65,000 people, largely consisted of ethnic Indians from Madagascar, the Seychelles, Reunion and Mauritius. For a better understanding of the reasons for the intensification of migration flows from India and other countries culturally related to this country, it is worth recalling the policy deliberately pursued by a number of European governments, the meaning of which was to invite skilled and relatively inexpensive labor from the “largest democracy in the world”. Thus, the temporary “green card” migration initiative that operated in Germany from 2000 to 2005 was initially focused on attracting Indian information technology specialists. In Italy, the Indian community was formed from those who initially entered the Apennines illegally, and subsequently received legal grounds for staying in the country. The vast majority of Indian migrants in Italy are from Punjab, working on dairy farms and other agricultural sectors. The development of information technology and related industrial clusters in India, the high-quality professional training of graduates from Indian institutes of technology - these and other factors predetermined the interest of the United States, Western Europe, and Australia in attracting skilled labor from India. Already in 2000, at least one third of migrants in the field of information technology in the UK represented India. In 2000–2004 more than 245 thousand migrants of this profession settled in the USA. In this kind of "migration competition" India was second only to Mexico, China and the Philippines. In the UK, in October 2004, a program was adopted to "naturalize" successful Indian students (as well as representatives of other Commonwealth countries) in the specialties: physical sciences, mathematics and engineering. The naturalization program has become an additional source of attraction to the United Kingdom of future specialists in the field of natural sciences and exact sciences from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. At the same time, this program has become a tool for managed migration to the UK. This practice is followed by the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, as well as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Demand for foreign labor with a high share of added intellectual value is ultimately determined by the characteristics of the socio-demographic structure of the population of Western European countries. The rapid “aging” of the workforce in the countries of the historical “core” of the current EU encourages the governing bodies of this organization to use such tools to attract future workers in the “knowledge economy” as educational fairs. At the same time, the use of foreign “intellectual production proletarians” is conceived as the provision of appropriate services without staying in a Western European country on a permanent basis. The movement of human capital from India and South Asian countries to Western Europe, in the understanding of local elites, has a twofold goal: 1) to increase the competitiveness of Western European economies in the world economy and at the same time 2) to deprive the countries of the South Asian region of independence in choosing national models for the development of the information technology industry. There are also restrictions even for this type of migration: the EU authorities are seriously afraid that the massive import of labor from India and other (not only South Asian) countries with a high share of added intellectual value may in the future undermine the reproduction of national scientific schools in Western European countries employed by developments in the field of information technology and their application in the economy. Finally, a group of political factors is of no small importance in the formation of the migration policy of the EU countries, in particular, dissatisfaction with the “substratum of other civilizations” in the Western European cultural environment on the part of forces supporting national populism. A significant proportion of Pakistani migrants to the UK originate from the Mirpur district in Azad Kashmir (area now under Pakistani control). The county has a long history of emigration. So, people from Mirpur worked as stokers on British ships, whose home ports were Bombay and Karachi. Subsequently, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some of them settled in the United Kingdom. Post-war Pakistani migrants in the British Isles took jobs in the textile factories of Lancashire, Yorkshire, Manchester and Bradford, in the car factories of the West Midlands and its largest city of Birmingham, filled the light industry development zones in cities such as Luton and Slough. Among other groups of migrants from Pakistan, it is customary to single out Punjabis who settled mainly in Glasgow, Birmingham and Southall, an area of west London that is often called “little Punjab”. The main migration flows from Bangladesh to the British Isles occurred in the first half of the 1970s. They were a reaction to civil unrest in the newly formed state and affected primarily the Sylhet region in the north-east of the country, located directly near the Bangladeshi-Indian border. Initially, Bangladeshi migrants were employed in steel mills and textile mills throughout the UK, but after the closure of these enterprises due to the economic crisis, Bangladeshi migrants rushed into small businesses, primarily in tailoring and catering, including restaurant business. Many people from Bangladesh actively joined the network of Indian restaurants, which was rapidly developing in those years, and subsequently took over a significant part of it. The first migration flow from the relatively developed Sri Lanka (before 1972 - Ceylon) to the UK, modest in size, falls on the 1960s-1970s. Migrants arriving from the former colony were employed in the UK National Health Service, as well as in other areas of the economy where white-collar workers work, becoming employees, administrators, managers, etc. For the most part, the migrants who arrived in the British Isles were from wealthy families and well-educated. They quickly found a use for their abilities in the United Kingdom. The second wave of Sri Lankan migration to the UK occurred in the 80s and was a product of the civil war that swept the island at that time. A significant number of wealthy Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge in the former metropolis. The migrants of the second wave were not as well-born as their predecessors, however, like many refugees to the West, they did not belong to the "lower classes" of society. Sri Lankans are employed in the traditional segment of the service sector: in shops and restaurants, and some of them even managed to open their own business. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS OF 2015 Significant adjustments to the intensity of the movement of people from the territories of the “global South” to the space of the “historical North” were introduced by “truncated globalization” (which further exacerbated the contradictions between the leaders of the world economy, primarily the United States, Western Europe, Japan, with on the one hand, and the rest on the other). It gave rise to both active (“passionary” anti-globalization movements and projects) and passive (intensification of migration flows towards the original “core” of the EU) response of transitional societies – the main part of the ecumene. It is believed that the main migration “corridors” from transitional societies to industrialized countries will retain their main direction in the future, especially since demographic processes in the “global South” will continue to exert migration pressure on future generations in the coming decades. India (and South Asia in a broad sense) remains the territory of origin of the largest number of international migrants: 17.5 million Indians live abroad. For the countries of South Asia, a region with significant labor surpluses, migration eases labor market strains while contributing to poverty alleviation through remittances. It is therefore not surprising that the countries of the South Asian region remain the largest recipients of remittances in the world: in 2018, in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances from abroad exceeded 5% of the GDP of these states. It is also worth noting the factor of internal migration in the countries of South Asia: for the period 2001–2011 the urban population of these countries increased by 130 million people, which became an additional incentive for external migration. The most desirable destination regions for illegal migrants from South Asia are Western Europe, North America and Oceania. Demographers note that South Asian migrants bound for Western Europe are smuggled to their destination mainly through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, but also through the Middle East towards the Western Balkans. Finally, South Asians are driven to move to Western Europe and the Gulf region by the constant risk of natural disasters, which primarily affect Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Obviously, the most socialized and adapted groups of the urban population of South Asia are ready to change their way of life. As of 2019, the largest migrant groups in the United Kingdom were immigrants from India, Poland and Pakistan. In the UK, France and Germany, there is a positive correlation between the high quality of human capital among migrants and their innovative activity. Migration flows are expected to influence the activation of the forces of national populism in Western Europe. Thus, after the migration crisis of 2015, the influence of the respective parties is rapidly growing, winning back positions from the centrists and social democrats. “People's parties” are becoming more and more successful, uniting various segments of the population, including those who are dissatisfied with the growing influx of “other civilizational substrate” into the countries of Western Europe. Thus, the policy of "traditional" parties contributes to the growth of the influence of the forces of national populism. Traditional parties justify their policy of accepting migrants by the need to integrate the labor market in the face of a growing shortage of skilled labor. According to traditionalists, the integration of the labor market has an inevitable consequence of strengthening the economic viability of society and increasing the viability of its political institutions, as well as the feeling of new arrivals of their belonging to the host society. The problem of socio-economic (as well as cultural) adaptation of migrants in the societies of Western Europe remains acute: in 2017 in the EU, the unemployment rate among migrants was 13.3%, while among the autochthonous population it did not exceed 6.9%. The coronavirus pandemic has made significant adjustments to the intensity of migration flows. As a result of the pandemic, the IMF blog writes, “migration flows suddenly stopped. The Great Lockdown is temporary, but the pandemic could reinforce general sentiments of insularity and disbelief in opening up to the outside world and have a more lasting effect on countries' propensity to accept migrants. Decline in immigration and high unemployment in destination countries will have a negative impact on the situation in its origin countries, especially the poorer ones, which are heavily dependent on the remittances that migrant workers send home”. The costs of migration also include the need to overcome geographical and linguistic barriers. Integration into the economic system of the host country implies a thorough mastery of its language, which is a precondition for the adaptation of migrants in a different cultural and social environment. So, immigrants from Bangladesh adapted well to the Apennine Peninsula because they were able to master the Italian language, which is difficult for the inhabitants of South Asia. As the Italians believe, people from Bangladesh are more industrious and less pretentious than Indians, and are ready to work in the most adverse conditions. Finally, migration from Bangladesh is economically beneficial for Italians: migrants with skills in light industry are welcome “guests” in the Apennines, since they make up a significant part of the staff of textile enterprises that manufacture products with the “Made in Italy” identification label especially valued by foreigners. Other dangers await the settlers. It is worth remembering that migrants to the West often find themselves in a “poverty trap” due to insufficient funds to pay the costs associated with migration. Nevertheless, experts believe that a one percentage point increase in migrant influx relative to total employment increases output by almost 1% by the fifth year of the resettlement in a new place. The desire of South Asians to move to Western Europe may be due to the fact that in the case of immigration to countries with emerging markets and transition societies, such a positive impact of labor productivity growth is not observed, primarily due to the difficulties of adapting to the conditions of local markets of underdeveloped countries. Migration can also create problems in the area of income distribution in the host society, since in some segments of the labor market, local workers (or people from Eastern and Central Europe who have already settled down in Western Europe) may suffer material damage, at least temporarily. Modern migration and migration policy in Western European countries continue to be influenced by the experience of previous decades. Thus, post-war migration to Western Europe from the former colonies was structured both by centuries of experience in moving along the route of the colony-mother country, and by a significant demand for relatively inexpensive labor for the needs of modernizing the economies of Western European countries after World War II. And some former colonial powers, such as the Kingdom of the Netherlands, were engaged in the movement of labor from their eastern possessions (Indonesia) to South America (Suriname). Historical memory is also invisibly present in the migration policy of France. So, in the 30s, almost a third of the population of this country was in the status of migrants, mainly they were immigrants from the countries of Southern Europe. Memories of the past, coupled with the migratory consequences of imperial existence, gave rise to the phenomenon of anti-immigrant political parties. The growth of the influence of the forces of anti-migrant populism was already observed in the 90s. Then the “National Front” quickly gained influence. As if responding to the challenge of anti-migrant populism, the right-wing government headed by E. Balladur is taking tough measures to limit the migration flow to the maximum and minimize emigration for political reasons. Subsequently, migration reforms were somewhat relaxed, but entry into France was strictly controlled, and the labor market was tightly regulated. The authorities of another colonial empire, Great Britain, acted in approximately the same way, pursuing a liberal line in relation to highly qualified migrants and implementing strict restrictive measures against refugees for political reasons. When assessing the prospects for resettlement of immigrants from India and other South Asian countries to Western European countries, it is necessary to take into account the EU factor, which has become a central element in building a new migration space in the unity of institutional rules for the movement of migrants and patterns of movement of peoples in the vastness of this integration association. It is important to keep in mind that migration is not a long-term solution to the demographic problems of the developed countries of Europe. It is assumed that most EU members, with the exception of France, Ireland and the United Kingdom, are doomed to a serious reduction in working-age populations in the coming decades. In addition, according to experts, labor markets in the EU countries are more inert and less flexible in relation to changing circumstances than in the US. Potential resettlers have to reckon with growing migration concerns in the EU's leading countries. At the same time, the attitude of receiving countries towards migration varies from country to country. Thus, in the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, Portugal), a “permissive” political culture that does not condemn migration is still influential. It is no coincidence that almost half of the migrants who have arrived in the EU since 2000 began their journey to Europe from Spain. However, even in Spain, new arrivals are viewed by public opinion not only as a socio-economic challenge, but also as a threat to cultural and ethnic identity. Since the early 1990s, the UK has been implementing a policy aimed at limiting the number of refugees and migrants as much as possible. Sometimes the authorities of the United Kingdom resort to frankly everyday motivation for their anti-migration actions, referring to the aggravation of the housing problem and the growth of social tension in London and southeast England. Nevertheless, the UK remains one of the preferred destinations for migration to Western Europe. Moreover, the very policy of the Western European states remains contradictory. On the one hand, the desire to appease public opinion results in uncompromising rhetoric against irregular migration. On the other hand, the desire to attract the skilled labor force necessary for the economy dictates an emphasis on the temporary nature of migration, which does not imply the granting of citizenship or residence permits. Nevertheless, since 2002, the number of people entering the EU has been an impressive figure - from 1.5 million to 2 million people. In other words, the conflict between the principles of the functioning of the nation-state and the guiding principles of multiculturalism defended by the settlers (as a method of managing interethnic relations in the host society) is becoming an integral part of the political development of many European countries. From now on, the confrontation between the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism becomes the axis of the entire socio-political development of the West. Until recently, multiculturalism had a strong influence on the attitude towards migrants in the Scandinavian countries, while assimilation has become clear in Greece, Austria, Poland, and Hungary. However, within the EU, the “multicultural consensus” is being increasingly tested for strength, in particular in Sweden. Similar trends are observed in the UK, France and the Netherlands. The sheer number of migrants can sometimes be misleading. Thus, the largest number of immigrants is recorded in large countries (Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom), while their highest proportions are noted in small states (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland), which has an inevitable projection on the sphere of political relations. In addition, many countries do not keep statistics on the religious affiliation of the population, which is done in the name of the sacred principles of secularism. However, the situation is starting to change. Thus, in the UK in 2001, they began to take into account the confessional identity of the population, primarily to control migration flows from India and South Asia. At the same time, in the censuses in France and Germany, religious affiliation is not yet recorded. By the ratio of the principles of multiculturalism and assimilation, it is customary to single out several groups of European states. States that do not officially recognize the fact of multiculturalism (Germany, France, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Ireland). At the same time, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Ireland practice bilingualism in relation to compact national minorities that have been living in these countries since ancient times. This principle does not apply to migrants. States that have delegated “linguistic powers” to several languages (Spain, Switzerland, Belgium). The envisaged status for French and Flemish in Belgium and the similar legal status for Catalan and Basque in Spain are intended to stop separatist tendencies in these societies and do not apply to the linguistic means of communication of migrants. States where multiculturalism has historically existed (United Kingdom, comprising England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), but its principles do not apply to migrants. States with a detailed policy towards migrants on a secular basis (Sweden, Norway), which is subjected to extensive criticism by various socio-political forces. States that initially accepted multiculturalism but subsequently rejected it (Netherlands). On the one hand, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the largest centers of multiculturalism, special services for helping migrants have been preserved. On the other hand, the main socio-political forces of the country and the parties expressing their interests are strongly opposed to further external migration, and not only from the “global South”. The attitude towards the principles of assimilation and multiculturalism is also manifested in the life attitudes and practical activities of various social forces. Thus, liberals and social democrats prefer the discourse of multiculturalism, while conservatives present themselves as the guardians of the values of the nation-state, Christian ethics and national culture. However, the above dichotomy acquires important clarifying characteristics and nuances when the analysis program includes the contradictory position of trade unions, on the one hand, belonging to the left side of the political spectrum, and on the other hand, forced by the logic of internal political development to counteract the migration of foreign labor and the adaptation of migrants in the host country. The attitude towards migration of the business community, conservative in its cultural orientations and attitudes, and at the same time interested in the import of foreign labor as a factor in “compensating” the insufficient demographic potential of an “aging society” and an instrument of economic growth within a particular Western European country, is also distinguished by a considerable originality. The initial unfriendly reaction of the local population to the new arrivals was dictated by fears of an exclusively economic nature, that is, the unwillingness to financially support migrants. Settlers were not then seen as a threat to national culture and national identity. However, as refugees settled in a new place, their families increased, religious buildings were built, and European politics were actively involved, the attitude of Europeans towards migrants began to change. The “clash of civilizations” (SP Huntington) in Europe intensified. The “racial riots” of 1958 in Great Britain can be considered the historical starting point for the escalation of conflicts on a civilizational basis. In this country, most migrants had the status of subjects of the British Empire, which definitely facilitated their entry into the arena of political life. Race remained at the heart of the issue of multiculturalism in the UK until at least the late 1990s. At first, no serious significance was attached to the factor of religion as a fundamentally different model of behavior in Western Europe. The spread of Islamist radicalism and terrorism, rooted, as some politicians now argue, in the Islamic value system, has become a kind of watershed. The essence of their ideas boils down to the fact that Islam is allegedly in a state of “permanent war” with the West in general and with Christianity and democracy in particular. This kind of sentiment is supported by a part of the Western European press, which regularly publishes anti-Islamic stories coming from the Middle East and Central Asia. Shifts in the positions of political parties in Western European countries on migration issues can be summarized as follows:  - there is a strengthening of the motives of national culture, the principles of assimilation and loyalty to European political values; - control over migration processes is being tightened, including increased attention to political refugees;  - the “horizontal” interaction of the migration authorities of the interested European countries in the field of control over the movement of foreigners to the EU countries is being strengthened;  - there is an actual refusal of the political elites of Western Europe from the principles of multiculturalism, as well as from the concept of "universal values";  - attempts are being made to introduce “rational” (that is, deliberately complicated) concepts of migration policy into the life of the EU countries;  - organizational resources and political powers of organizations supervising migration processes are increasing.  Such steps by the Western European elites, which do not formally abolish the principles of racial equality and the practice of religious rites by migrants, actually exclude the further development of the principles of multiculturalism. The situation of migrants is also complicated by the unwillingness of orthodox Muslim activists to compromise with the authorities of the host country in the sphere of religious rites, which undermines the position of supporters of multiculturalism in Western Europe. In the current conditions, militant opponents of multiculturalism are turning for support not only to Western European lumpen and outcasts, but also to a significant part of the middle class and anti-migrant parties that advocate Christian values. For their part, members of the Muslim community believe that the "war against terror" in the West, started in 2001, has escalated into a "war against Islam." In the smaller EU countries, fears of being “absorbed” by a foreign culture are constantly fueling radical, anti-immigrant sentiments.  It can be assumed that the events of the beginning of this century (September 11, 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorist attacks in the countries of Western and Southern Europe, etc.), as well as the European migration crisis of 2015–2016 laid the foundation for shifts in the public consciousness of the population of the EU leaders that are unfavorable for migrants. The dominance of multiculturalism was replaced by the idea of the nation-state as a community bound by the unity of interests and the norms of Christian culture. At present, in the broad sections of the population of Western Europe, the idea of the ongoing erosion of the fundamental principles of the life of society, which undermines its integrity, is being strengthened. In the current reality, even highly educated migrants are beginning to be seen as a threat to the national unity of society. Such mindsets are constantly fueled by the systemic economic crisis, which calls into question the once stable notions of multiculturalism as a force capable of simultaneously ensuring the prosperity and security of Western society. CURRENT TRENDS IN MIGRATION FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE EU The migration crisis of 2015–2016 turned the problem of migration into a central political issue in the internal life of the leading Western European countries. In the new conditions, socio-political forces and parties that advocate tough restrictive measures against the influx of migrants of other cultures into the EU receive more and more significant support in the new conditions. However, the resettlement of immigrants from South Asian countries to Western Europe continues, which is confirmed by the example of the Netherlands and Italy. Migration from India and other South Asian countries to these two countries is mostly “productive” in nature: for the Netherlands, an influx of quality labor in the information technology sector is important, while Italy needs a “demographic dividend” in the agro-industrial complex. In the Netherlands, where there is a need for qualified personnel for a rapidly growing information technology cluster, educated migrants from India have benefited from the liberalization of migration policy in important segments of the economy. True, in this country, a kind of Damocles sword is suspended over the problem of migration: the murder of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a native of North Africa stimulated the growth of anti-migrant sentiment in the Netherlands, which traditionally had a reputation as a “home of tolerance”. Note that the need for skilled workers in the Netherlands is higher than the EU average (by 10%). Here, as in other countries of Western Europe (primarily in the UK), expat Indians represent the most dynamically growing group of migrants. In the Netherlands, this community includes workers with the necessary professional training in the fields of information technology, consulting services, engineering, and enterprise personnel management. Significant Indian migration to the Netherlands began in the 1980s. By the beginning of the 2010s, about 22 thousand Indians lived in the country (compared to 9 thousand in 1996). The Kingdom attracts Indian migrants, first of all, with a favorable living environment, a high standard of living, the widespread use of the English language in the country, a tolerant attitude towards foreigners, etc.  Young educated Indians find themselves in the Netherlands in several ways. In addition to the traditional recruitment practices of Dutch companies, the factor of expanding the activities of Indian companies in the kingdom is becoming increasingly important. Thus, currently more than 200 companies from India, mainly from the information technology sector, are active in this country. It should be taken into account that the information technology sector, on the one hand, is a powerful driving force for economic growth in India, and on the other hand, this segment of the national economy accounts for more than 45% of all exports of services from India. Another way of delivering Indian labor to the Netherlands is the activity of transnational companies (TNCs) operating in the country, interested in attracting from India the profile workforce of the required quality. The reluctance of some Dutch people to perform certain types of activities in the information technology segment also plays a role. In this case, English-speaking and law-abiding Indians are perhaps the best candidates for high-paying positions in this sector. In other words, the Netherlands attracts skilled, expensive labor to the country, the price of which (as of the beginning of 2019) starts at 4.5 thousand euros per month and 3.2 thousand euros per month for people under 30 years old. In turn, the Italian economy is experiencing a need to increase the volume of dairy production, which opens up opportunities for the Indian labor force, primarily from the northern state of Punjab. Many migrants from India arrived in the Apennine peninsula without an accurate understanding of the nature of the Italian labor market and the peculiarities of Italian society. Some migrants have joined families of relatives who have already arrived in the EU. Arriving in the Apennines, Indian settlers from the Punjab countryside quickly adapted to northern Italy, an industrial zone that lacks quality labor for the agricultural sector. However, this was more a happy coincidence than the result of the successful functioning of the labor market due to the competent intervention of Italian government departments. Indian migrants have recently turned their attention to Italy. Thus, in 2003, the total number of Indian migrants to the Apennine Peninsula was fixed at around 35.5 thousand people, while by 2018 it had more than quadrupled to 151.7 thousand peoplef. As a result, India has now moved from 10th to 6th place in the list of the main “suppliers” of migrants to the EU countries (and to 5th place among non-EU countries). The configuration of the main concentrations of Indian immigrants to Italy has also become somewhat different. If in 2003 the Indians settled unevenly in the central subregions of northern Italy and in Rome, then at present the contours of settlement have become more dispersed: the Indians live mainly in ten provinces, and their largest concentration is in Brescia (14 thousand people per 200 thousand of the local population). Unlike the Netherlands, migration to Italy is often carried out on an unplanned basis - as a result of a situational shortage of labor in a particular segment of the labor market or as a situational reaction of the Italian migration system to migration flows from non-Western societies. It should be noted that in Italy the majority of Indians are engaged in low-skilled labor outside the agro-industrial complex, in particular in industry. In terms of the share of employment in this segment of the national economy, immigrants from India do not stand out among migrants who came from non-Western societies. The agricultural sector, being the area of activity of 28.6% (2016) of migrants, remains the main area for the application of labor skills for Indian migrants (24.1% of the total labor force from outside the EU countries). Even among self-employed workers who came from countries outside the EU, the share of Indians (7% in 2016) has increased almost sixfold since 2007. It should be noted that agriculture is a relatively small and ever-shrinking segment of the Italian economy, accounting for no more than 2% of the country's GDP and in which wages are only half of the total level in the national economy. However, when assessing the potential of the agro-industrial complex, nuances are important. Thus, with the declining role of agriculture, agricultural production in Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto tends to increase - not least due to the hard work of Indian immigrants. The dynamic dynamics of development in these regions is shown by dairy production. An illustrative example is Cremona (population - about 75 thousand people), the administrative center of the Italian province of the same name. The resettlement of Indians began in the first half of the 90s with the use of tourist visas. Dairy production in the region was affected by the technological modernization of this sector, which began in the 60s and sharply reduced the demand for labor in Italian agriculture. However, the reduction in the supply of labor in the dairy sector was so significant that it was necessary to attract skilled labor from abroad, and this was a historic opportunity for hardworking Punjabis. A particularly significant contribution of Indian migrants was to the preservation of the cheese industry in the province of Cremona. In other words, the traditions of working on the ground were in demand in the north of Italy, where climatic conditions and temperature conditions almost perfectly match those of the Punjabi. Finally, the hard work of the Indians, their willingness to work on weekends and holidays, as well as overtime, are invariably noted by Italian employers. However, the interest of Indians to work in Italy has its own practical reasons. On the one hand, overtime work allows you to earn up to 3 thousand euros per month, receiving part of the payment “in an envelope” (a procedure common in Italy). Thus, the total income increases, which allows not only to send part of the proceeds to Punjab, but also to invest in the future - to invest savings in various sectors of the Italian economy. On the other hand, living on farms at work allows Indians to avoid the vicissitudes of the housing market in Italy, including discrimination against newcomers. In addition, employers highly appreciate the role of family ties among Indians as a stimulant of productive work. It is significant that employers have a positive attitude towards such qualities of Indians as internal balance, punctuality in the performance of official duties, enthusiasm for work, and note their lower predisposition to conflicts (both with the employer and with colleagues), which favorably distinguishes Indians from, for example, Egyptians and Moroccans. However, it should be taken into account that the Punjabis are a historically formed community of high-quality labor force. Their qualifications are highly valued far beyond the borders of India, whose national economy clearly lacks professionally trained workers capable of performing modern production operations. European migration crisis in 2015–2016 made significant adjustments both to the routes of movement of immigrants, and to the intensity of the human flows themselves from the “global South” to the “historical North”. India and other countries of South Asia remain one of the main sources of migration activity in the world. The examples of the Netherlands and Italy show that there is a “demographic dividend” in the South Asia region that can be used to benefit economic growth and development in industrialized countries. Both the Dutch and the Italians use the services of India's competitive populations. This experience, perhaps, should be used by Russia, which is in need of importing a “demographic dividend”. However, it is advisable to remember that the Indian authorities, conducting relevant negotiations with the Russian leadership, offer labor with low qualification characteristics for export. Defending national interests in such a specific area of bilateral relations will contribute to a better understanding by the Indian side of our real needs in the import of human capital and will confirm Russia's serious attitude towards multidisciplinary cooperation with the "largest democracy in the world." 

IntroductionDuring a break in the COVID-19 pandemic, the foreign ministers of China, Russia, Japan and the United States boosted Mongolia into international headlines. Returning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Moscow, for instance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stopped in Ulaanbaatar (15–16 September) with a message: Do not take sides with China’s competitors if Mongolia wants to rely on the Chinese economic powerhouse. Within the week, Mongolian Foreign Minister Enkhtaivan Nyamtseren was invited by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to meet on short notice. Even though the ministers jointly announced the finalization of a treaty on the permanent comprehensive strategic partnership, the Kremlin showed its will to lead trilateral economic projects (such as a gas pipeline) with China and impose the Eurasian Economic Union agenda on Mongolia. Then on 29 September, the United States Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced the inclusion of Mongolia in his trip to visit allies in East Asia—Japan and the Republic of Korea.2 Although the trip was ultimately cancelled due to an outbreak of COVID-19 cases among White House officials, Pompeo talked by telephone with President Battulga Khaltmaa and highlighted their shared commitment to democracy and regional security. A few days later, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, considered a key insider of then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s geopolitics, flew to Ulaanbaatar. In addition to updating the strategic partnership plan until 2022, the Japanese Foreign Minister’s interests centred on Mongolia’s inclusion in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Mongolia has declared strategic partnerships with each of these great powers and is thus entering a complicated geopolitical setting. It is not entirely new. A similar scene occurred in the summer of 1991. Chinese President Yang Shangkun, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and the United States Secretary of State James Baker each visited Mongolia within a month’s time. China wanted agreement to non-interference in its internal affairs, whereas Japan and the United States imposed non-reversal conditionality on Mongolia’s democratic transition to receive much-needed economic assistance. The primary difference then was the absence of Russia. This policy paper discusses the renewed geopolitical rivalries of the great powers, explains Mongolia’s challenges to manoeuvring in this tough geopolitical terrain and then proposes pursuit of a pragmatic, neutral foreign policy option similar to Finland’s strategic concessions to its neighbouring great power, the Soviet Union.Renewed geopolitical rivalriesThe great power competition also is nothing new. Even after the Cold War, China, Japan, Russia and the United States were watching each other suspiciously while avoiding unnecessary tension. In the 1990s, policymakers and academics in Japan, Russia, and the United States debated over the China threat and the consequences of China’s economic rise. Russian leaders, such as Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and President Vladimir Putin, sought ways to balance with the United States and to integrate into the European economic and security framework. It was not a surprise when Putin hinted at Russia’s inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because the country was already supporting American military operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, in 2000, the United States Congress mandated its Defense Department to report annually on China’s security strategy and military development. China and Japan had similar outlooks. China was wary of the United States, whereas Japan remained vigilant of both China and Russia. In the mid-2000s, all these countries reassessed their long-term geopolitical and economic objectives as the geopolitical setting began to shift. With similar geopolitical concerns about American strategies, China and Russia advanced their partnership by conducting an annual joint military exercise (Peace Mission, beginning in 2005) and even demanded the withdrawal of American forces from Central Asia. When the United States proposed another round of NATO’s expansion into Ukraine and Georgia and new missile defence systems in the Czech Republic and Poland, Russia quickly reacted. This resulted in a brief military conflict with Georgia in 2008. Following the breakdown with Europe, Russia began pursuing policies to reassert its influence in former Soviet republics through the Eurasian Economic Union as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. China and Russia jointly strengthened the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and created a new bloc with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa (BRICS) for collaborating on major geopolitical issues. From 2012, the great power rivalries intensified. Chinese President Xi Jinping renounced the “hide and bide” principle of Deng Xiaoping by pledging that China would take an active role in global politics. A year later, China unveiled a new grand strategy, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to invest in infrastructure that increases global connectivity. Chinese leaders explained that the BRI is a “win–win” developmental initiative. The ambitions and ambiguity of the BRI, however, immediately raised geopolitical concern from all the great powers, as if China was about to reshape the global and regional order for its geopolitical advantage. For example, building on its earlier strategy (Pivot to East Asia), the United States launched a series of measures to contain China. It endorsed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s quadrilateral security dialogue (for the alliance of Japan, India, Australia and the United States) and strengthened ties with India, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam, all of whom are cautious of China’s economic and military powers. Meanwhile, in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and intervened in Eastern Ukraine, based on its geopolitical concerns for Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO. Then, in 2015, Russia deployed its military to Syria to check the United States’ interventions while declaring its strategic partnership with China. In response, the United States cited China and Russia as the biggest threats in its National Defense Strategy (2018), which is the country’s long-term strategic defense document.6 The American Defense Department released its Indo–Pacific Strategy Report, and the State Department defined its Free and Open Indo–Pacific vision. Both documents prioritized containing China’s growing economic and military power in the Indo–Pacific region. In addition to sanctions against China and Russia, the United States pressured its allies to ban Chinese telecommunication companies from participating in the development of the 5G network. In contrast, Russia welcomed the Chinese telecommunication giant—Huawei—to develop its 5G network and pledged to develop Chinese missile defence capabilities. This new round of great power rivalries is changing the geopolitical setting for a small State like Mongolia.Challenges for MongoliaThe primary challenge for Mongolia is to maintain its sovereignty. For centuries, geography has dictated the country’s fate as a classic buffer State between two expansionist and rival great powers—China and Russia. While serving the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests from 1921 to 1986, Mongolia gained United Nations membership and its independence from China. During this period, Mongolia remained under close control of the Kremlin and became a militarized buffer State whenever Russian geopolitical interests were threatened. The Kremlin deployed its military three times: in 1921, 1936 and 1960. Following the Sino– Soviet rapprochement and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia normalized its relations with China and developed new ties with the United States and its allies. In the 1990s, Mongolia did not experience any geopolitical pressure from the great powers and firmly declared a series of neutrality policies. At the time, Mongolia’s two neighbours were preoccupied with maintaining their domestic matters and also coping with security concerns elsewhere. The United States and Japan focused on Mongolia’s political and economic transition while explicitly avoiding developing security ties. In that period, Mongolia adopted a series of neutrality policies: the constitutional prohibition on foreign military transition and basing, a non-aligned foreign policy stance, declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone and bilateral treaties with all the great powers, with a “against no third party” principle. In this favourable geopolitical context, Mongolia increased Its engagement with international and regional organizations and sought ways to attract the interests of so-called “third neighbours”. The most important endeavour was its military deployment in support of American operations in Iraq, when China and Russia were strongly opposing the United States war in Iraq. Then, Mongolia deployed its military to Kosovo and Afghanistan. This military contribution resulted in close political and defence ties with the United States and NATO members as of 2003. The other endeavour was the conclusion of an investment agreement with Anglo–Australian mining giant Rio Tinto and Canadian Ivanhoe Mines to develop the Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposit. These endeavours triggered reactions from China and Russia. China’s security experts cautioned Mongolia’s inclusion in the American “strategic encirclement” of China, whereas Russia was wary of losing its geopolitical privileges in Mongolia to NATO members. China and Russia jointly pressured Mongolia to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As a result, Mongolia became an observer in 2005. Since then, Russia has taken assertive action to secure its geopolitical and geo-economic interests in critical areas such as railway construction, the energy sector and uranium mining. To be clear, neither China nor Russia attempted in this period to influence Mongolia’s domestic politics, especially its elections. Now all these great powers want to include Mongolia in their competing geopolitical visions. China declared a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2014 and included Mongolia as one of six economic corridors of the BRI. Beijing leaders hope that Mongolia will join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to fulfil its regionalization strategy of Central Asia. They also want Mongolia to commit to non-intervention in its internal affairs, especially in matters related to Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia, in return for economic assistance and market access. In 2019, Russia quickly upgraded its strategic partnership with conclusion of a permanent treaty, which imposed Mongolia’s adherence to the Russian geopolitical agenda. Specifically, the treaty prioritizes bilateral consultations, renews defence technical cooperation and requires Mongolia’s adherence to the 1,520 mm (Russian standard railway gauge) for the railway extension. As hinted by some Russian officials, the Kremlin even dreams of Mongolia’s inclusion in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, considering how Mongolia is traditionally wary of Chinese expansion. The United States and Japan have included Mongolia in their Free and Open Indo–Pacific strategy because Mongolia shares similar values (democracy, human rights) and security concerns regarding China and Russia. Interestingly, the American Pentagon’s Indo–Pacific Strategy (June 2019) identified Mongolia as a “reliable, capable and natural partner of the United States,” while designating Mongolia’s two neighbours as the biggest security threats: China as a revisionist power and Russia a revitalized Malign Actor. The American State Department’s Free and Open Indo–Pacific visionary document highlights Mongolia as one of the beneficiaries and supporters of its strategy. Japan also included Mongolia in its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), a developmental assistance alternative to China’s BRI, and designated a new international airport and railway flyover (Sun Bridge) in Ulaanbaatar as PQI projects. Like many small States, Mongolia’s challenge is determining how to manoeuvre in this round of great power competitions without compromising its sovereignty and undermining its institutions of democratic governance.Options for MongoliaIdeally, the best option for Mongolia is to maintain friendly ties with all the great powers and to benefit economically as it sits at the merging point of different geopolitical strategies. In fact, this has been the case to a certain degree. Mongolia’s nuclear weapon-free zone status has been endorsed by all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The country’s peacekeeping efforts, whether military deployments or hosting training events, have been supported by all the involved great powers. Both China and Japan have aided in road development, such as with the Chinese-built Moon Bridge (BRI funding) and the Japanese Sun Bridge (PQI project) in the capital city. At the moment, China and the United States are assisting to improve the capital city’s water supply and infrastructure. Hopefully, China and Russia will construct a natural gas pipeline through Mongolia, which would increase trilateral economic cooperation. Current trends, however, force a consideration of the likelihood of consequences in the worst- and best-case scenarios. The most likely worst-case scenario has China alone or together with Russia entering into conflict with the United States. This circumstance would force Mongolia to limit its relations with the United States and even to stand with its neighbours against the United States and its allies. The other worst-case scenario, which is less likely at the moment, is the emergence of Sino–Russian geopolitical tension. This would create the direst situation, in which Mongolia could easily fall into the control of either neighbour or become a battleground. The best-case scenarios are also possible and would create a favourable overarching setting for Mongolia to manoeuvre and maintain its sovereignty. The best-case scenarios have all the great powers seeking strategic stability because they are intertwined with domestic challenges or geopolitically distracted elsewhere. In all these scenarios, the primary objective for Mongolian leaders would remain the same—to maintain sovereignty and independence. However, Mongolia’s options to maintain its sovereignty are limited. First, it is a regionless country. Therefore, it cannot rely on any regional security alliance, such as NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The only close alliance is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but Mongolia is wary of jeopardizing its sovereignty if it joins. Second, it is impossible for leaders in Ulaanbaatar to gain security guarantees from one or several of the great powers, with the possible exception of Russia. Leaders in Washington and Tokyo are not likely to make any such deal as with the Philippines or Taiwan. Mongolia is too cautious of losing its sovereignty to Russia and provoking China by renewing the mutual defence clause with Russia. Lastly, Mongolia is too economically poor to build its defence capabilities in a way that is similar to Singapore, Switzerland and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Therefore, the most suitable option would be to make strategic concessions to the great powers following the example of the Finnish experience during the Cold War. This option requires that Mongolia avoid joining in the security alliance of any great power, just as Finland avoided joining NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In this sense, Mongolia should not attempt to upgrade its current level of confidence-building security defence relations with members of NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and, potentially, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (if it turns into a regional security organization). In regard to the Free and Open Indo– Pacific, Mongolia should limit its security cooperation to specific areas: peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and defence diplomacy. This type of neutrality policy would also require Mongolia to abstain from taking any stance on controversial matters related to its neighbours and their geopolitical competitors. Such avoidance would help Mongolia to promote itself as a neutral place for all great powers to negotiate, such as the Finnish model of the Helsinki process. At the same time, Mongolia should strengthen its democratic governance: the parliamentary system, civil society and the rule of law. Democratic governance would distinguish Mongolia’s identity within the authoritarian great powers and ensure self-rule free from those great powers. One of the downsides of this type of neutral, pragmatic strategy, however, is its limit on participation in foreign policy decision-making processes. This requires that only professional diplomats handle foreign policy matters while encouraging informed public discourse. In return for this neutral policy, Mongolia would expect the great powers to respect its sovereignty and restrain any actions to influence its policies.ConclusionWhen the foreign ministers of the great powers gave some attention to Mongolia in the fall of 2020, Mongolia reacted with proactive diplomacy amid the pandemic. On 29 February, Mongolian President Battulga became the first foreign dignitary to visit China during the pandemic and extended a gift of 30,000 sheep as a goodwill gesture. On 21 June, the Mongolian airline, MIAT, conducted a long-awaited flight to North America and delivered more than US$1 million worth of assistance and 60,000 personal protective equipment to the United States. On June 24th, despite Russia having the second highest number of coronavirus cases, the Mongolian military marched in the Victory Day Parade, marking the 75th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, in which Mongolia stood as a close ally. As with the proactive diplomacy, the renewed geopolitical tensions among the great powers will require unity, patience and deft diplomacy from Mongolian leaders to steer through the rough sea.

Another important event on the international agenda was the Second Forum of Think Tanks "China + five countries of Central Asia", organized by: the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the CASS, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Republic, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The connecting link for all forum participants was the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) with the support of the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the CASS, the Secretariat of the Council of High-Level Think Tanks of the CASS and the All-China Association for the Study of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The two-day program of the forum, which was held in a hybrid mode with a central communication platform in Beijing, included speeches of the heads of the above-mentioned structures, diplomatic missions, foreign ministers, the Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, who considered the most important issues on the “agenda” dedicated to the search for new ways and formats for joint development. The experts focused on various topical aspects, presenting their vision of how China's relations with each of the states of Central Asia and the region as a whole should develop at the present stage. As for our country, the rector of the Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, Djumamurad Gurbangeldiyev, spoke about the state and prospects of Turkmen-Chinese cooperation, in particular, noting that the peaceful foreign policy successfully pursued under the leadership of President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, gaining momentum, contributes to the achievement of new frontiers in the system of international relations by Turkmenistan. In the modern era, the whole world respects the legal status of Turkmenistan's neutrality with great respect. Among the priority areas of the peace-loving policy and diplomacy implemented under the leadership of the head of state, a special role is given to relations with the states of the Asia-Pacific region. The People's Republic of China is one of the friendly partner states of Turkmenistan. The Turkmen and Chinese people are connected by historical, spiritual and cultural ties that originate from the depths of centuries. These common historical roots, the bonds of friendship that go deep into history, form the basis of the Turkmen-Chinese interstate cooperation, in which a special place is given to interaction in the scientific and educational sphere. An important role in the formation of new approaches of the parties to topical issues of international relations and cooperation between the states of the region with China is played by the accumulated experience in this area and the First Forum of Experts of Analytical Centers "China + Five Central Asian Countries" held in November 2021. The broad horizons for the development of partnership that are currently opening in accordance with the realities of modernity form new areas of cooperation between Turkmenistan and China. This is clear evidence of the success of our country's foreign policy strategy. The head of the Higher School of Diplomacy of Turkmenistan also focused on the fact that Hero-Arkadag, in his speech at the China + Five Central Asian Countries Summit held in January 2022, emphasized that it is the heads of states of Central Asia who are widely promoting strategically important proposals and initiatives for issues of world politics. In this context, it was emphasized that Central Asia is a region that attracts the attention of the whole world due to its huge natural resources and advantageous geographical location. In the system of international relations, the importance of the Central Asian region is growing due to the presence of large reserves, especially energy resources, favorable geopolitical and geo-economic advantages. At the end of the 20th century, the number of states interested in including the countries of Central Asia in the orbit of cooperation increased. This is confirmed by the fact that in the last 20 years the phrase "Central Asia +" has become widely used in political terminology. And the People's Republic of China, one of the first states that showed interest in this format, has the largest economy in the world, a great influential force in world geopolitics. The head of the Turkmen university, noting the features of the main directions of China's policy, emphasized that the foreign policy of the Celestial Empire, aimed at becoming a developed state of the world and based on ancient Chinese principles, implies the interest of this country in increasing influence in the world through cooperation. In supporting the international initiatives of the Central Asian countries aimed at ensuring peace, security and sustainable development in the region, the political assistance of China, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is very necessary. The states of Central Asia are cooperating in the field of consolidating efforts in the field of security and countering terrorism with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established at the initiative of China. The speech also noted that the partnership of the countries of Central Asia with the People's Republic of China in the effective implementation of the new philosophy of the Hero-Arkadag "Dialogue is a guarantee of peace" in international life, aimed at eliminating the mutual distrust that has spread today in international relations, was of particular importance. It is no coincidence that energy is the key vector of the partnership between China + the five countries of Central Asia. As you know, a powerful Chinese economy requires a significant part of its energy capacities to be imported from outside. China attaches particular importance to Central Asia in providing its rapidly developing economy with guaranteed energy sources. In this context, a great success of Turkmen and at the same time Chinese diplomacy is the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project, built on the initiative of Hero-Arkadag in a very short time - just over two years - has become another clear evidence of Turkmenistan's commitment to the principle of using its energy resources for the benefit of all mankind. The development of the transport sector is also important. If China stands at the origins of the creation of the Great Silk Road, then Turkmenistan is its heart, the driving force. Within the framework of cooperation in the "China + five countries of Central Asia" format, given the new geopolitical, geo-economic reality of the III millennium, great importance is attached to the revival of the Great Silk Road. The project of the Hero-Arkadag "Revival of the Great Silk Road", designed to give a powerful impetus to the economic development of Eurasia, is closely interconnected in its philosophy and geo-economic content with the all-China project "One Belt - One Road". The already implemented and ongoing multilateral transport and transit projects coincide with the interests of the China + five countries of Central Asia interaction format. Continuing the topic related to the “China + five countries of Central Asia” format as a factor of strategic and regional stability, ensuring the sustainable development of friendly states in the new conditions, I would like to recall that at the beginning of the 2000s, many similar platforms for interaction appeared and took shape in the world. Nevertheless, in my opinion, as time and the realities of life have shown, today the China + Five Countries of Central Asia Project is one of the most famous, authoritative, multilateral formats with great prospects for development. And this is natural and logical, since the ties between the peoples of the Central Asian region and China have a long history. In the process of their long communication, a huge and unique experience of interaction, good neighborliness, exchange of knowledge and achievements in all areas of human life was accumulated. The Great Silk Road passed through the territory of Central Asia from China, which, by developing trade relations between countries, already then demonstrated the possibility of maintaining an atmosphere of calm and stability to the world, including in the territory of present-day Central Asia. And today we can say with full confidence that it was the reliance on this outstanding heritage, the continuity of historical destinies, that was embodied when the countries of the region, having gained independence, resumed active all-round relations with the People's Republic of China. Without a doubt, the current cooperation of all the countries of the region has a noticeable constructive impact on the provision of global peace and stability. It is based on the closeness and coincidence of approaches to fundamental issues on the global agenda. Together we stand for equality and justice in international affairs, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states, for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, we support the measures taken by the world community to effectively counter international terrorism, extremism and other challenges. Not so long ago, the states of the region celebrated the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations with China. 30 years of mutual trust, friendship and close cooperation have shown that by adhering to the basic principles of mutual respect, good neighborliness, friendship, mutual assistance and mutual benefit, China and the countries of Central Asia have been able to build healthy and effective interstate relations of a new type. Today, the world is undergoing changes not seen in a century. The structure of international politics and economics is undergoing profound changes and needs to be adjusted. Geopolitical conflicts, disordered global governance create new challenges for development both globally and regionally. Under these conditions, the presence of objective mutual interests of the Central Asian countries and China in line with the China + Five Central Asian countries partnership format on a practical basis opens up additional opportunities for increasing the pace of effective cooperation. Using their huge potential, the countries of this alliance set a course for the modernization of the mechanism of mutual cooperation in the format "China + five countries of Central Asia". It from the moment of its appearance as a specific body for the comprehensive rapprochement of the Central Asian countries, has been and remains an important factor in the stable development of the region. Further cooperation within its framework will improve the well-being of the peoples and significantly raise the standard of living. I am sure that all the states of the region, using their authority and established cooperation mechanisms, will be able to make an important joint contribution to establishing a new agenda of peace and trust in international affairs, reducing tension, de-escalating conflicts, moving to dialogue and negotiation methods for resolving disputes and contradictions based on the UN Charter.

As Russian troops withdraw from occupied Ukrainian villages and towns in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions, the military, forensic experts, and the world media are being shown the extent of Russian war crimes. In the 21st century, the Kyiv suburb of Butscha takes on a creepy meaning that was set for Auschwitz in the 20th century. Since April 2022, "Butscha" has not only become synonymous with the planned systematic extermination of people because of their membership in the Ukrainian community, but has also served to expose the cynicism of European elites who, over the past two decades, have turned a blind eye to the nature of the Russian regime and the practices of modern Russian statehood. Bluff about "civilized country" and "threat from the West" In February 2007, before the expiration of the second (as it turned out, not the last, although the Constitution of the Russian Federation did not provide for this) presidential term, Vladimir Putin sharply criticized the unilateral power politics of the United States at the Munich Security Conference. He said that the use of force in international relations is possible only on the basis of the UN Charter. He insisted that energy sources must not be used as weapons or means of extortion against consumers. He promised to create a free and open market economy in Russia, primarily with the help of Germany. At the same time, Putin denied that the opposition in Russia is brutally repressed; he did not admit that the rights of people in Chechnya are systematically violated through torture, murder, and kidnapping; he denied involvement in the transfer of missile technology to Iran and support for its nuclear program. All of this gave the impression that Russia's leadership wants to build an open and democratic country that pursues responsible and predictable policies and is ready for profitable, multi-billion dollar economic cooperation with its European neighbors. In return, Putin wanted "very little." First, the transformation of NATO from a defense alliance into a political organization in which European countries would conduct their policies independently of the United States. This is because, according to Putin, it is the United States that, by stationing its troops on the territory of countries that became NATO members after 1991, is fomenting a threat to Russian sovereignty and tensions throughout Europe. Second, Putin did not want European states to make the development of relations with Russia dependent on their assessment of the democratic or authoritarian character of the Russian regime. His assistant Vladislav Surkov even invented a special term - "sovereign democracy" - to justify Putin's authoritarianism and seduce Europeans with the prospect of Russia's slow democratic "evolution". Respect, equal treatment and security: demands of an autocrat In short, Putin demanded respect, equal treatment, and security. Aren't these the same principles on which NATO and the EU are based! By successfully manipulating these values and profitable economic deals, Putin achieved his goals. By February 24, 2022, many European politicians either shared the opinion that Russia was trustworthy because it was developing and liberalizing economically. Or they argued that Russia had a reason for threats and a show of force to protect its borders from NATO expansion. Putin forced European governments to turn a blind eye to the murder of tens of thousands of Chechens in 1994-2007. He managed to avoid condemnation and punishment for open aggression against Georgia in 2008. Even in 2014, he managed to get France and Germany to recognize his role as a "peacemaker" in the self-created "Ukraine crisis" and the hybrid war in the Donbass. In fact, the facts indicated that Russia began to move toward autocracy when Putin came to power. However, it was not even a party autocracy as in China, which provided for internal competition and relied on an extensive network of technocratic managers who adopted Western standards in this way or another. Putin, as president, began to restore the vertical of the KGB - the Soviet secret police and intelligence service that throughout its history viewed the democratic world as an existential enemy and a target for destruction. As a KGB apprentice, he naturally wanted revenge for the collapse of the USSR, which he considered his defeat. When Putin promised to build democracy and a market economy in Russia, he was bluffing. His calculation was based on the idea of the instability and corruption of the European political and business elites, who, for the sake of high and stable profits, will be willing to justify the "excesses" of the authorities and the "weakness" of Russian civil society. Neglecting his country for a perfidious vision When Putin pointed to the threat posed by NATO, he sought only a justification at home for constantly increasing spending on the army and defense industry, while neglecting the modernization of social and transport infrastructure in most regions of Russia. In foreign relations, Putin rewarded leaders and governments that were slow to implement common goals within NATO or promoted their national interests as opposed to pan-European or U.S. interests. This may explain how politicians as diverse as Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, Gerhard Schröder, Robert Fico, and Viktor Orbán managed to build long-term alliance relationships with the Kremlin. Despite the shock over Russia's lies and crimes that accompanied the aggression against Ukraine, Putin continues to actively use the old bluff about "normal Russia" and threatens retaliation for violation of "Russian security," which means control over Ukrainian territories. Putin's bluff is his declaration of occupied Ukrainian territories as Russian and the corresponding threat to defend them with nuclear weapons. Russian troops are fleeing the Kherson and Donbass regions with no sign of preparation to use weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, if Putin has to choose between withdrawing from Crimea and risking losing everything in a nuclear confrontation, he will choose to withdraw and retain his power. This is because Crimea is the same "integral part" of Russia as Kherson and Kharkiv oblast, from which the Russians are withdrawing as a result of military defeats. Putin, however, could be heading down a dangerous path of escalation if voices continue to be raised in Europe that his conquests must be recognized by the conclusion of a cease-fire. The Kremlin's calls for a willingness to negotiate are aimed at spreading uncertainty among European leaders about Russia's goals. This maneuver is being carried out to force everyone to suddenly turn a blind eye to mass executions, torture camps, and the bombing of peaceful Ukrainian cities in order to sow doubt that Russia is waging a war aimed at destroying an entire European nation. Putin again offers to believe that secure relations with the Russia he leads are possible if his demands are heeded. If the debate in Europe is resumed according to the logic imposed by Putin, he will use all means of terror to divide the continent and within individual states into the camps of "uncompromising" and "moderate". And without solidarity in Europe, it will be much easier for Russia to continue the war with impunity and ruthlessness. Even far beyond Ukraine. Russia hybrid means to divide Europe.At stake is trade in oil, coal, and natural gas. Since early 2021, Russia's Gazprom refused to supply gas to Europe beyond contracted volumes, artificially contributing to stock market speculation and price increases. This had a painful impact on household spending on municipal services. It also led to higher consumer prices due to more expensive electricity generated by burning Russian gas and fuel oil. Against a backdrop of public discontent, Russian intelligence services mobilized the Russian diaspora into spectacular protests in Germany and the Czech Republic and put forward the thesis of the "harmfulness" of anti-Russian EU sanctions. And such actions have a political impact. In France, Marine Le Pen actively criticized the renunciation of Russian energy sources and promised to maintain the purchase of oil from Russia if elected. In Italy, the "Lega" and "Forza Italia!" parties, which became part of the governing coalition, also opposed sanctions that hurt Italian industry. In Germany, the opposition parties "Alternative for Germany" and "The Left" expressed even more open theses about the need for "understanding" with Russia, for the sake of energy sources. The Kremlin is watching such processes closely, and they convince it that such a policy of division will bring the desired results. Russian efforts will be especially dangerous this winter. The ideology of the "Russian world" and the myth of the "Great Victory".Every year since the attack on Ukraine in 2014, the Russian president has justified his aggressive policy of conquest on the basis of Russia's special historical mission. It consists in restoring historical justice - the borders of the Russian state, which should unite all bearers of "traditional Russian values." These are the Russian language, the Orthodox faith, education in the traditions of Russian culture and literature. The Kremlin calls this bizarre combination the ideology of the "Russian world." Considering the fact that the Russian diaspora is currently manifesting itself very actively throughout Europe, from Italy and Germany to Latvia and Finland, this creates, in the view of the Russian leadership, a sufficient legitimate reason to spread measures of direct and hybrid aggression against new countries. And Putin constantly talks about the inevitability of a "multipolar world" in which Russia will be one of the "poles". While the fate of Europe, in his opinion, will be ruined by excessive American influence. That is why he often refers to the Yalta Conference in 1945, which made Stalin's Russia the owner of half of the European continent, while the other half was controlled by the Allies led by the United States. In relations with Europe, Putin wants to see himself not only as a "veto player," the leader of a "great power" that belongs to a narrow circle of its peers (the United States and the PRC) that have a decisive influence on world politics, but as a hegemon. As the ruler of a victorious state to which the others are grateful for their security and existence. Therefore, despite the defeats in Ukraine, he continues to say, "We haven't really started it yet." Obviously, Hitler and Stalin could have said the same thing when they invaded and divided Poland in September 1939 and prepared for new conflicts. So far, this history has a slim chance of repeating itself. 

Delivering Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine takes the war to a new level. Trying to look past the fog of war can help to predict how things might play out The decision of Germany and other NATO states to supply modern battle tanks and other armoured infantry vehicles to Ukraine takes the West’s involvement in the war to a new level. Presumably, in the further course of the war, the numbers mentioned so far will not be enough; the decision to provide tanks immediately sparked an international debate on delivering fighter planes as well. We are also hearing initial calls for NATO troops to be deployed to Ukraine as a ‘deterrent’, which would mean NATO becoming embroiled in the war. However, the discussion about the objectives in the Ukraine war mustn’t be muddied, even if clarifying these leads to a fierce dispute both within and amongst the NATO states. There is just too much at stake. The American and German governments indicate that they want to enable Ukraine to hold the frontline which it has fought for so far and liberate more areas wherever possible. All occupied territories, including Crimea, would probably be regained through a strategic approach of lengthy negotiations under the pressure of overwhelming Western sanction packages. This objective comes with the broader demand that Ukraine be enabled to reconquer its entire territory through military counterattacks, something also put forward by the Ukrainian leadership. The serious risks of escalation associated with this must be thoroughly analysed, which has largely been skirted around in the discussions so far. The fog of war prevents us from predicting how things will play out. All professional military policy experts are aware that their analyses, evaluations and forecasts are clouded by this; there are always bound to be frictions and surprises. However, looking at various scenarios can help us refine our assessments of what might be on the horizon. We will attempt to assess the potential effects of the new tank deliveries to Ukraine, using two scenarios that look ahead to the early summer of 2023. In both scenarios, it is assumed that the Ukrainian army will gradually receive about 100 Western battle tanks, most of the Leopard model, and around 100 largely German and American infantry vehicles by early summer 2023. The thirty-one M1 Abrams tanks previously promised are unlikely to be delivered by this point. Two tank battalions and two tank grenadier battalions – roughly equivalent to a brigade – will be equipped with the new heavy weapons systems by the early summer under both scenarios. Another assumption is that the widely anticipated Russian spring offensive, targeting the Luhansk or Donetsk area, will begin around the end of February or March. Very few Western battle and infantry vehicles, if any, are likely to be used, in what are expected to be highly intense battles with severe casualties. It is assumed with some uncertainty that the more professional and mobile Ukrainian defence can ward off larger operational gains from the major Russian units. These two scenarios look to the early summer after the Ukrainian army has taken delivery of the tanks from the West. Scenario 1: tank battle on the southern front, with limited Ukrainian territorial gainsBy the late spring, it becomes clear that the Ukrainian military intends to push hard towards the south from the area east and southeast of Zaporizhzhia. The goal is to advance over about 100 km to the Sea of Azov and cut the Russian troops off south of the river Dnieper and, more than anything, to stop Crimea from being supplied via the land bridge. The terrain in this area is mostly open and flat – highly beneficial to tanks – and, with the exception of the town of Melitopol, is only dotted with small villages. In the early summer of 2023, Ukraine makes bold advances south under favourable weather conditions, targeting the Sea of Azov coast. This results in the first major tank battle of the war, which sees German Leopards and Marders deployed at the front, as well as the American Bradleys and Strikers. With their better armour, agility and weapon effect, they clearly come out on top in a head-to-head battle. Ukrainian commanders, however, struggle to master the complexity of mixed-weapons combat, in which battle tanks, armoured infantry vehicles with tank grenadiers, artillery, sappers and air support must work together in close coordination to achieve the full force of impact. Heavy Russian tank and infantry forces withstand the advancing units. The Ukrainian counterattack progresses for about 30 km but then gets bogged down in the huge defensive firing, after Russian mechanised units succeed in pushing into the flank of the Ukrainian tank formations, jeopardising their supply. Soldier and material losses are severely high again on both sides. Pictures of destroyed Leopard tanks are plastered across the internet. German television channels and online media increasingly draw parallels with historical footage of German tanks during the Second World War in the same region. From a political and strategic perspective, attrition warfare has been consolidated in this scenario, despite tactical gains on both sides. Russia still has about 10 to 12 per cent of the Ukrainian territory under its control. The extensive exhaustion of weapons systems, spare parts and ammunition from the German and American armies is increasingly running down the operational capability and perseverance of the NATO forces on both sides of the Atlantic. As production capacity remains limited, there is increasing support for an agreement between the US, Ukraine and Russia to bring an end to the war. In Ukraine, the devastating losses are affecting more and more families, leading to political demands for a ceasefire. Opposition politicians demand that their president publish the actual losses incurred since the war began. Scenario 2: tank battle on the southern front, with the Ukrainian army advancing to the Sea of AzovScenario 2 is identical to scenario 1 up to the Ukrainian army’s counterattack from the area east of Zaporizhzhia. But in this scenario, operations are proceeding as planned by the Ukrainian General Staff. Kyiv has deployed forces equipped with Western tanks and infantry vehicles to the heart of the battlefield. With the superior firepower, armour and agility of the Leopard 2 tanks, they advance towards intermediate targets northeast of Melitopol after a few days. Leadership, fighting strength and motivation are once again proving weak amongst Russian ranks, while the Ukrainian troops’ command of mixed-weapons combat is better than initially expected by Western military experts. Leopard spearheads reach villages just off the coast, opposite Crimea. As Ukrainians advance, American-made HIMARS rockets destroy the new Russian bridge near Kerch in some places, rendering it unusable for supplying Crimea. Russia responds with the most intense air raid ever launched on Kyiv, with numerous casualties reported and electricity supply destroyed. The Russian president makes a brief statement following a stage-managed press conference with his General Staff. Putin first states that the Russian Federation now considers the NATO states that supplied heavy weapons to Ukraine as direct opponents in the war, regardless of any fine details in international law. The ongoing attack on Russian-occupied Crimea could only have come about through the massive involvement of Western states. The war has now created an existential dimension for the Russian Federation. As far as Russia is concerned, the entire war zone now extends to the territory of the Western states supporting Ukraine. He refrains from verbal warnings of nuclear war because his earlier threats were not taken seriously. Putin says he has ordered his Defence Minister and General Staff to supply some of the nuclear-capable missile troops with the nuclear warheads stored in depots. If the blockade of supplies to Crimea via the land bridge is not removed, Russia must use force through its tactical nuclear weapons. Russian bloggers report that the course of the war has brought unity to Kremlin leaders and only made them more determined to see it through, but this cannot be verified. A few hours later, American satellites pick up Russian convoys beginning their journey from the nuclear weapons storage facilities to the nuclear missile battalion deployment areas. This secret intelligence becomes public across the world. In a widely unexpected twist, China announces the largest mobilisation of its naval forces ever in the Strait of Taiwan. Its first fleet of warships has already set sail. The US and its NATO partners are now on the verge of a nuclear face-off that has escalated faster than many had believed, with consequences unimaginable for the whole of Europe. Western governments, the NATO Council and Military Committee, as well as the UN Security Council, meet day after day. Commentators can’t help but compare it to the height of the Cuban crisis. But NATO leaders clash on their assessments of the situation and their approach. In Berlin, huge demonstrations are held calling for an immediate end to the war, with the slogan ‘Stop the madness’. Of course, more optimistic scenarios can also be envisaged in which the Kremlin hands back Crimea without nuclear escalation. The powers that be, including those in Berlin, Washington and Paris, have so far held firm on their objective of not stepping into the grey area of getting directly involved in the war. But the danger of slowly and unintentionally sleepwalking into what would be the biggest catastrophe for the whole of Europe is growing and growing. Unexpected twists and turns (sometimes referred to as black swans or wild cards) can also create dynamic developments that are likely to be extremely difficult to control and contain. As more German tanks are sent to Ukraine, Germany’s share of responsibility for the course that the war takes – and the consequences thereof – increases and ultimately so does its right and need to influence the leadership in Kyiv.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Novak has announced that Russia’s production and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) rose by almost 9% to around 33 million tonnes (c. 46 bcm) in 2022. Most of the Russian LNG was produced at the Yamal LNG project (c. 20 million tonnes), whose main shareholders include Russia’s Novatek (50.1%), France’s TotalEnergies (20%) and China’s CNPC (20%) and the Silk Road Fund (9.9%). Nearly 15 million tonnes from this project went to Europe (up 14% y-o-y), and around 5 million tonnes were shipped to China. In addition, more than 10 million tonnes were produced in the Gazprom-controlled Sakhalin-2 project in the Russian Far East, an increase of 2% year-on-year. The main customers for this gas were Japan (the Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi are shareholders in the project) and China. According to Chinese customs data, a total of 6.5 million tonnes of LNG were shipped to the PRC from Russia in 2022, up from 5.7 million tonnes a year earlier. LNG is also being produced in two small-scale projects in the Leningrad region in the Baltic Sea. The Novatek-owned Vysotsk terminal produced around 700,000 tonnes and the Gazprom-owned Portovaya LNG produced around 350,000 tonnes. Gas from both projects was supplied to the European market. The deputy prime minister also asserted that Russia intends to deliver on its ambitious plans to double its LNG production in the next few years, and increase its LNG exports to 100 million tonnes in 2030 as a result. This would be achieved mainly through the development of Arctic LNG projects, including the Novatek-owned Arctic LNG 2. This expansion has been promised even though Russian production may decline in 2023 due to planned maintenance work on two (out of four) Yamal LNG production lines. CommentarylLNG was the only Russian fuel whose supplies to Europe increased in 2022. Consequently, the importance of LNG has increased both with regard to Russia’s exports (LNG accounted for 25% of all Russian gas supplied to the EU) and the EU’s imports (less 20% of the EU’s total LNG imports).lIt will be very difficult, if possible at all, to realise Russia’s ambitious plans for a robust increase in LNG production in the years to come. Forecasts from the Russian Ministry of Energy published in May 2022 showed that LNG production will be much lower than previously assumed. Under the current baseline scenario, LNG exports are projected to reach almost 31 million tonnes in 2023 and 35.7 million tonnes in 2024, compared to the previous target of over 50 million tonnes. lAs a result of sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s LNG sector has been cut off from the Western technology and equipment which played a key role in the development of this sector. Many foreign companies (German, French, Spanish and others) have withdrawn from cooperation with Russia in this area; for example, one of the shareholders in Arctic LNG 2, France’s TotalEnergies (10%), has stopped investing in the project and started the process of completely withdrawing from the venture, which should be finalised in the first half of 2023. Nonetheless, the Russian authorities are insisting that they will manage to complete the construction of the first Arctic LNG 2 production line by December 2023 (about 90% of the work had already been done when the sanctions were introduced), and that the next two lines will also be put into operation according to the original schedule, that is, in 2024 and 2026. Leonid Mikhelson, the CEO of Novatek, has affirmed that the corporation has managed to purchase the necessary equipment by cooperating with companies from countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Russian companies are also working on developing their own gas liquefaction technologies. At present, these are inefficient (the production lines are capable of producing a maximum of 1 million tonnes per year) and often fail. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to fully replace Western technologies and equipment by circumventing the sanctions or developing its own solutions. Indeed, the effectiveness of such efforts so far proven to be limited.  

Russia has been at war with Ukraine for more than 10 months, with no end in sight and with just as little prospect for direct negotiations between the warring parties. These were last broken off mutually on 17 May 2022. Since then, there have been repeated calls in Germany, whether in opinion articles or open letters, for more diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities. Such calls were often combined with demands for the federal government to cease arms deliveries to Ukraine: when all is said and done, peace is achieved not with arms, but with a truce, the argument goes. And continuing the war with the already unrealistic goal of a Ukrainian victory and the recapture of all the territory occupied by Russia would only mean useless bloodshed. These calls are all too understandable given the horrific images of suffering and destruction that reach us daily from Ukraine. Even so, it would be wrong right now to urge Ukraine to negotiate – or even give up parts of its territory and the people living there. Surely, no one wants the guns to go silent more than the Ukrainians themselves. They are the victims of this war. It is their hospitals, kindergartens and schools that have been destroyed by Russian missiles and drone attacks. Many have lost their homes. When the air raid sirens sound, it is they who sit in the shelters and who go without heating, electricity or running water, often for hours or days on end. The exact number of soldiers who have died at the front is unknown; US estimates put the count at up to 100,000. And yet, the Ukrainian government wants to continue the fight against the Russian aggressor – and only negotiate directly with Russia if and when the Kremlin first answers for its war crimes before an international tribunal and withdraws all troops from Ukraine, including from the illegally annexed areas. In this,  the government is supported by the vast majority of the Ukrainian population.Putin wants total control of UkraineIt is clear to the Ukrainians that the Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in finding a way for a secure coexistence with a sovereign and independent Ukraine that can determine its own future.  He wants it gone. In his view, today's Ukraine is nothing more than a ‘colony with a puppet regime’, an externally controlled and hostile ‘anti-Russia’, set up against the ‘real cultural, economic and social interests of the people and the true sovereignty of Ukraine’. For Putin, Ukraine and Russia are ‘one people’.  A Ukraine that is independent of Russia and wants to open up to Europe along the lines of its central European neighbours is unacceptable because it calls into question the very foundations of the Russian imperium, which Putin is determined to prevent from falling apart. The repeatedly expressed assumptions that Russia is ultimately only concerned with preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, or only has geographic interests in the Donbas, are wrong. In truth, Moscow wants Ukraine to relinquish much more: its freedom, its identity, its self-determination, its culture. The destruction of Ukrainian life, Ukrainian art and Ukrainian statehood, together with repressions – from murder to rape to abduction – in the occupied territories are clear demonstrations of this. So far, there is no reason to believe that Putin's thinking has changed in recent months. On the contrary, with every further step, Putin makes clear that he is not ready to make concessions. Although he and other members of the Russian government regularly mention the word ‘negotiations’, they have so far not presented a concrete option. As recently as the end of December 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeated the call for the ‘demilitarisation and denazification’ of Ukraine and described the illegally annexed areas of Ukraine as Russia’s ’new territories’. Clearly, Putin has not abandoned his goal of complete political control over the country but has merely adjusted his approach and timeline. Because Russia was not militarily successful, the devastating airstrikes on the Ukrainian civilian population and the energy infrastructure are now intended to break the population's will to resist and to wear down the country – until Russia is able to launch a new offensive in the spring. Putin is also counting on the fact that the western supporter states – also under pressure from their populations – will soon tire and run out of weapons, ammunition and money for Kyiv. If the West were now to press for a ceasefire or peace negotiations, perhaps with the threat that it would otherwise end support for Ukraine, that would signal to the Kremlin that its method is working and that all it has to do is wait until we lose patience. So far, none of the advocates of an imminent ceasefire have been able to convincingly explain how Putin can be persuaded to make concessions without exerting further military pressure on him.Preventing Russia from dictating peaceWe Germans, in particular, have for years been repeating the mantra that ‘there is no military solution’ to this or that conflict. Unlike Vladimir Putin: in Georgia, the Crimea and Syria, he has learned that he can very successfully use military force to achieve his political goals. In the current conflict, therefore, only Ukraine's military successes prevent such a dictated peace from happening. In other words, Russia must first be stopped and pushed back militarily before there can be any chance of real diplomacy. It's about enabling Ukraine to hold its own against the Russian invasion and showing Putin that even a new military offensive in the spring has no chance of succeeding – and that this won't change over time. The West itself has a paramount interest in Putin not making any gain from his war of aggression. His ambitions are a danger to all of Europe. If he gets away again with using force and nuclear blackmail to bring parts of another state under his control, this invites repetition elsewhere, be it by Russia or another state. The goal of an overall revision of the European security order, which is essential for peace and prosperity also here in Germany, was announced by Russia in the treaty texts of December 2021. The decision by Germany, the US and France to now also supply Ukraine with armoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles is therefore logical. It emphasises that the major military powers of the West will not force Ukraine into an unacceptable deal with Russia.  Of course, the danger of escalation must always be kept in mind when providing military support. However, the reactions after missiles fell on the Polish-Ukrainian border in particular has shown that the West is aware of this and is reacting prudently and is capable of risk management. Real negotiations will only begin again when both Russia and Ukraine come to the conclusion that there is more to be gained from a truce than from fighting on. Perhaps the cards will be reshuffled after spring — if the ’hot autumn’ and the ’winter of fury’ in Europe fail to materialise, if the western democracies continue to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine and if a new Russian offensive proves unsuccessful. What is certain is that any negotiations and compromises will reflect the resulting balance of power between the parties. Our goal must therefore be to get Ukraine ready as well as possible for this point in time and to prepare together with Kyiv for the moment when the window for diplomacy indeed opens.

Introduction: The Culmination Points The war in Ukraine has been raging for 19 months and is yet to exhibit a conclusive imbalance of forces and means. This is good news for Ukraine, who was expected to surrender within days, and an unprecedented embarrassment for Russia, who planned for a Crimea 2.0. What we are witnessing today is undoubtedly the result of a cluster of Russian intelligence failures, both in terms of reconnaissance and operational support. A lot has been written about the general errors in autocratic intelligence management, as well as Russia’s resistance to modern tactical realities such as crowdsourcing open-source intelligence (OSINT), but few have considered the overall weakness of the underlying strategic intelligence assets. For Russia, a loyal collaborator network, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and certain advanced cyberwarfare were central to preparing the ground for a quick surrender. All of these, however, reached their culmination points after the initial intervention in Ukraine 8 years prior. The culmination point of attack is a well-known Clausewitzian military concept describing the inevitable equilibrium reached as a result of the defender’s counterbalancing activities and the attacker’s consequent loss of initial superiority. At this point, the attacker is still able to hold the defence, yet continuing the offensive in the same manner would mean defeat. In Russian doctrine, the same laws apply to a clandestine battlefield, where the culmination point is reached with the exposure of one’s true goals, means, and methods. Intelligence operations that fail to adapt to the operating environment and enemy responses naturally become counterproductive to the attacker’s strategic goals. The annexation of Crimea was an example of a successful deployment of clandestine means at the height of their strategic influence. The operation has been described as a clever adaptation of tactics after being cornered by the failure of Russia’s original active measure campaign in 2013. However, the aftermath of that operation brought the remaining Russian influence assets to their culmination point, thus calling for a clear change of strategy. The Kremlin’s political-strategic goal – ever since Ukraine’s declaration of independence – has been to subordinate it to Moscow’s will. In pursuit of that, Moscow has attempted to instal various puppet entities into Ukraine’s political system, starting with the illegitimate “Donbas people’s republics” in 2014. Eight years and two Minsk Agreements later, the Kremlin had not achieved the desired results and decided to extend the puppet network into Kyiv’s central government. Similarly to Crimea, a successful power transfer merited a quick (and preferably bloodless) surrender of the government. Setting the stage for a Crime-type power transfer was, therefore, the venerable goal of the Russian intelligence services in the leadup to the invasion. The Federal Security Service’s (FSB, Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) 5th Directorate – tasked with combatting dissent in Russia’s “near abroad” – carried the heaviest weight in preparing Ukraine for invasion. Some western security officials would even hold the FSB accountable for the trickle-down failures of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU, Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie) and Russian military intelligence, who were forced to work with flawed base information regarding the potential for Ukrainian resistance. Adding to this the obsoleteness of Russia’s agent network, Orthodox authorities, and cyberwarfare upon which its success largely relied, the invasion was doomed to fail from the start. 1. A Network Without Collaboration The primary covert asset – required for a swift occupation of Ukraine – was a reliable Russian agent network on the ground to provide strategic intelligence and prepare the information conditions enabling a smooth power transfer. Such a cultivation of the soil for a Russian takeover started already in the 1990s, eventually unleashing a competition for the most impactful ground presence among the Russian intelligence services. According to Bellingcat’s lead investigator, Christo Grozev, Russia’s internal security service and military intelligence, in particular, have been competing to set up the most far-reaching fifth column in Ukraine. In pursuit of that, both the FSB and the GRU have targeted not only Ukrainian politicians, activists, and security officials but also the judiciary, journalists, and former Yanukovych associates. By 2014, Russia’s agents of influence had provided enough leverage to convert existing political divisions, weak institutions, and high- levelcorruptionintoaquicksurrenderof Crimea and Donbas. Researchers from the Estonian Academy of Military Sciences identified the saboteur network’s systematic spreading of panic and propaganda as a key factor enabling Russian success in Donbas. It entailed fake news that alleged heavy Ukrainian casualties and the untrustworthiness of the government in Kyiv. Separatist collaborators, together with professional Russian intelligence officers, stood at the centre of these information operations. Such officers would, for instance, arrive at conflict hotspots, alongside the “journalists” specialised in propaganda, and fabricate the developments to appear unfavourable to Ukrainian resistance. It meant that by the start of the physical confrontation in Donbas, the region had been thoroughly primed for Russian intervention and that incoming troops had no trouble convincing Ukrainians to surrender entire settlements without resistance. Weeks prior, a similar scenario had unfolded in Crimea, with the collaborator network enabling deep deception and fast evolution of events on the ground. At the height of that unprecedented operation, the appearance of Russian troops without insignia made it difficult for Ukrainian counterintelligence to diagnose and respond to the situation, not to mention the paralysing confusion in local civilian masses. The covert operation ran smoothly, owing its success to widespread collaboration from the local police, security service, political, and criminal elites, whom the Russians had managed to infiltrate and corrupt. The efficient informational cover and timely intelligence provided by the collaborator network allowed Russian forces to swiftly seize key strategic positions on the peninsula and thus deny grassroots resistance by deception. However, what the Kremlin may not have realised in 2022 was that underlying the success in Crimea were extremely favourable political conditions and the complete novelty of the chosen approach, which could not be replicated in other operations. Moscow’s human intelligence (HUMINT)-enabled and deceptive diversion operation in Ukraine, therefore, reached its culmination point in 2014. At that moment, Russia still retained enough plausible deniability to avoid direct proportional consequences, but the opposing security communities became hyper- focused on the “hybrid” elements in Russian offensive operations, thereby suggesting exposure of the Kremlin’s covert methods. The operation’s political technologist, Vladislav Surkov, was sanctioned by the US immediately after the annexation, despite the frantic efforts of his aides to deny his involvement to the Western public. Experts interpreted Surkov’s careless reaction as a mere bluff. Notwithstanding the evident exposure of the covert operation, Russia’s game plan for a successful military intervention in 2022 remained unchanged. As the most comprehensive post-mortem of the intelligence failure details, the Russian asset network was meant to paralyse the Ukrainian state and condition Ukrainian officials to accept a pro-Russian course; the next step would be provoking mass protests against the government’s sudden inability to serve Ukrainian national interests. The systematic spreading of false narratives regarding the protests would help fracture Ukrainian resistance and provide a moral justification for an invasion. Analogous to the 2014 operations, Moscow’s agents on the ground were supposed to maintain pro-Russian sentiments in the contested territories until Russian forces secured critical strategic positions. The main goal of the GRU’s ground network was to ensure the physical passage of Russian troops and members of the FSB’s planned puppet government. A principal role in this was to be played by one of the GRU’s most crucial assets and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, Andriy Derkach, recruited in 2016. By the time of the invasion, Derkach and his assistant Igor Kolesnikov had been put at the centre of the entire network. However, at the final preparatory and initial active stages of the invasion, multiple malfunctions occurred, signalling a premature burnout. • The first setback was the sanctioning of Andriy Derkach in 2020 for his interference in the 2016 US presidential election. In addition to provoking mass protests and misleading Ukrainian counterintelligence, Derkach was to lead the dissemination of disinformation about the dangers associated with Ukrainian nuclear energy production – all of which failed to materialise after his landing on the blacklist. Complete exposure of Russia’s intended psychological operations became clear weeks prior to the invasion when the UK and US had strategically declassified comprehensive intelligence about Moscow’s plans to politically subvert Ukraine. Remarkably, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy) had apparently been aware of the Derkach network – and allegedly neutralised it at the beginning of the invasion by detaining Kolesnikov, identified as the key manager of funding. • The second setback partly followed from the first. Such public and attributed disclosure of Russian psychological operations gained superiority for the Ukrainian narrative and mobilised a resolute international alliance (even though Ukrainian officials had been initially denying the possibility of a Russian attack). Moreover, in the face of Russian aggression, domestic public opinion was uniformly in favour of EU and NATO integration. This should have been interpreted as a clear sign that the lack of societal cohesion and international support no longer formed a weakness to exploit. Unlike in 2014-15, there were indicators that the West would intervene. However, the FSB chose to conduct its own polls, overseen by a former Yanukovych aide in charge of sleeper agents, and then interpreted the numbers to support the armed intervention. As RUSI researchers have explained, the invasion was likely based on the premise that those institutions in which the population showed the most trust – i.e., the military and the civil society organisations – could also be easily neutralised by the Russian network on the ground in Ukraine. Battlefield success during the initial stages of the invasion, therefore, relied on similar influence and diversion tactics as in 2014. In grave contrast to the former, the invading troops instead found the local population in the contested territories assisting the Ukrainian intelligence services to sabotage Russian positions. Hence, sticking to the methods of 2014 was counterproductive for the agent network of 2022. • This led to the third setback: the questionable loyalty of Russian junior agents and informers in Ukraine. The FSB’s strengths in the Ukrainian theatre came with a considerable expansion of its operations and the establishment of a “curator system,” whereby over 120 FSB curators would manage around 5-10 asset relationships. It involved a shift from targeting exclusively the highest- ranking officials in 2014 to virtually everyone associated with influential people, down to their service personnel in 2022. A key characteristic of this approach was that assets were recruited on a flexible, temporary, and project basis, which sometimes did not align with their professions and, therefore, took a toll on the assets’ quality and loyalty. In the words of the SBU’s reserve Major General Viktor Yahun, the expanded spy network in Ukraine was corrupted by its own structure. As assets got tangled in a “circle of responsibility” to cover comrades and improve their own results, the intelligence reaching the decision- makers at the top was being tailored to support the illusion of an easy Russian victory. The status of Putin’s favoured service, earned by the successes of 2014, also deepened patrimonialism within the curators themselves, whose tool to advance one’s career was to validate the Kremlin’s pre-decided policies. The GRU was facing the same problem: most of the influence agents they had recruited would not cooperate directly with their curators after “D-Day,” suggesting that they may have never been supportive of an operation of this kind. In this regard, Christo Grozev brings a noteworthy example of an asset inside the SBU that the GRU had to execute to preserve its credibility among other collaborators. The structure and modus operandi of the Kremlin’s agent network in Ukraine, therefore, suggests that it was expected to behave similarly as did in 2014 – i.e., to condition both the authorities and the local communities to surrender without resistance. However, as one puts all the setbacks together a clear picture emerges: once a functioning asset network had been reduced to ashes by the start of the invasion. 2. A Church Without Faith The collaborator network was interconnected with the ROC – a de-facto state institution that, in the words of Russian religious scholar Sergey Chapnin, “less and less resembles a church in the traditional understanding of this word.” It is rather a multifaceted influence asset of the Russian state that has prematurely culminated first on the strategic and then on the operational level. The ROC attains its strategic significance from its special status as a formally depoliticised extension of the state’s hand – its main function ever since Peter the Great’s imperialistic reforms. Stalin’s revival of the church during WWII and the recruitment of its priests as the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD, Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del) agents set up a patrimonial security structure that outlasted the collapse of the USSR. Up to date, Patriarch Kirill, the current leader of the ROC, continues to emphasise the close relationship between the church and the state. A deep dive into its history shows that in 1992, the church’s public discourse began to glorify Russian combat soldiers as saints. Indeed, in the context of war, there is no asset as useful as one that can justify and encourage dying en masse for the Motherland. However, events took a downturn for the ROC on the eve of the Crimean annexation. Leaked emails from the operation’s leading architect, Vladislav Surkov, revealed that the ROC had failed its grand strategic mission already in the leadup to the Ukrainian Euromaidan, making the annexation the last resort rather than a demonstration of power. This happened as the Kremlin sought to use the church as a tool to steer Ukrainian public sentiments towards “Eurasia” but, after various propaganda campaigns, found all the Orthodox churches in Ukraine still formally favouring integration with the EU. Having failed to influence the general direction of Ukraine, the ROC, nevertheless, maintained substantial social authority in the target country. The FSB’s polls found that ahead of the invasion, the church was still highly regarded by over half of the Ukrainian population. The deep intelligence infiltration of the Moscow Patriarchate’s domains allowed the church to remain the main cover organisation for Russian operations since the 1990s. The ROC’s impact was the most visible in Ukrainian domestic politics, where its presence secured Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory by cultivating a “religious nationalist” political faction, promoting the narrative of inherent religious unity between the two nations. Drawing on this uncontested institutional authority, the real value of the ROC was in enabling the Kremlin to uphold an elected pro-Russian representation in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine throughout multiple election cycles. What was left of the ROC’s strategic influence on Ukraine’s political and religious divisions peaked just before the start of the conflict in 2014. The culmination point was reached with the annexation of Crimea when the church first came under fire. Yet, it was still able to escape blame and distance itself by portraying the Russian intervention as a religious dispute within the context of a “Ukrainian civil war.” Since no creative adaptations to the strategy followed, the increasing public questioning of the ROC’s loyalties after the annexation took a toll on its influence, eventually leading to a formal secession of the Ukrainian church from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019. It delivered a fatal blow to the ROC as its main reason for existence had become the “one Orthodox nation” myth used to maintain control over Ukraine. Whereas the ROC’s central strategic narrative had simply failed to make an impact before the occupation of Crimea, after the annexation, it was outright swept out of existence. Beyond political strategies, the ROC also had an operational role in capturing Ukraine. In the 2014 battles, for instance, priests were found fighting among separatist ranks in Donbas and operating torture chambers on the premises of religious facilities. Paramilitaries with a distinct Orthodox identity made a significant contribution to the separatist war effort, especially wing to the participation of local “Kazak” units familiar with the landscape. In the ongoing war, Estonian Foreign Intelligence recognised the ROC’s provision of multifunctional safehouses to be a critical constituent of the Russian ground network. Even more importantly, it was the ROC’s associates who provided the most valuable HUMINT if compared to the otherwise underperforming network. Naturally, the church’s special status as a religious institution, with a mandate to oppose the Kremlin, grants it the most auspicious position to conduct social network analysis and gather overall situational awareness. Christo Grozev also admits that church associates constitute a pool of trustworthy pro-Russian “spies and gunners” who assist with the actual conduct of hostilities. In continuation of the 2014 efforts, ROC priests were again among the most important local agents promoting the invaders and reporting the non-conformists to the Russian occupant forces. The ROC’s operational community manage- ment duties maxed out during the initial phases of the occupation in 2022, with the loss of plausible deniability regarding its involvement. Following the secession of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church during Poroshenko’s presidency, the ROC’s positions began to deteriorate, while the reach of malicious Russian networks and influence tools embedded in it was reduced. It had, nevertheless, enjoyed relative immunity up until the invasion due to the Ukrainian government’s political fear of limiting religious freedom and offending the remaining Ukrainian patriots among the ROC’s followers. However, uncovering the extent of Russian war crimes during the Ukrainian counteroffensive left the ROC no more room for denial and resulted in a systematic targeting of the church and its associates. It was at this point that the maintenance of the ROC as an operational asset became counterproductive. Ukrainian counterintelligence soon confiscated its physical property and made sure to expose all suspicious findings to the media. Statistics show that most believers consequently began to see Russian Orthodox priests primarily as intelligence agents; a tectonic shift in formal allegiance to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has occurred, thereby dealing a final blow to the ROC’s legitimacy in Ukraine. 3. Attack Without Leverage The final asset – crucial to shaping sentiments on the ground and complementing Russian military strikes – was state-sponsored cyberattacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. One particular GRU cyber unit named “Sandworm” was the prime actor associated with this task since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. After hacking various news and government websites to spread disinformation and encourage the population to surrender to occupation authorities, the GRU’s cyber strategy culminated with a large-scale attack on Ukrainian critical infrastructure in December 2015, leaving thousands of civilians without power for a prolonged period. This was another classic attempt to undermine societal trust in Ukraine’s capabilities to withstand aggression and provide for its citizens. For external observers, Sandworm’s attack constituted both an escalation from previous disruptive incidents and the first successful sabotage of a state’s energy infrastructure by a covert cyber campaign. The West – while acknowledging the campaign’s highly sophisticated and systematic nature – was left dumbfounded by Russia’s technical capability and fearful of Moscow’s potential to politically subvert Ukraine. That ominous precedent exemplified to multiple stakeholders and observer states the necessity of securing their power grids from hostile foreign state actors. The 2015 attack became Sandworm’s culmination point: Ukraine was severely affected but recovered fast amidst the international attention. The GRU managed to hit the target’s weakness in a highly unexpected manner while initially retaining an umbrella of deniability, plausible enough to avoid legal repercussions. In theoretical terms, a retreat – or change of strategy – at that point was warranted to avoid burnout. However, the GRU approached the attack rather as reconnaissance by combat – i.e., a subtype of reflexive control aimed at gaining intelligence on the target’s capabilities and potential responses by way of attack. Having witnessed Ukraine’s inability to resist or respond to such incidents, Sandworm carried out occasional attacks in the following years. Continuing the cyber campaign without any modifications became counterproductive when private companies and other external entities entered the game on Ukraine’s side. By 2022, highly capable private actors such as Microsoft had already pre-emptively intervened and offered real-time assistance to Ukraine in countering Russian cyberattacks throughout the invasion. Likewise, the Starlink communications technology not only derailed Russian attempts to disturb Ukrainian command and control but became a lifeline for civil resistance. In a direct affront to Russia’s cyber campaign’s goals, the donated Western technology enabled sophisticated intelligence collection and fire support operations capability for the Ukrainian forces. The turn of tables became apparent with two main events. • First, in the beginning, stage of the invasion, Sandworm launched large- scale wiper attacks on Ukraine’s critical digital infrastructure, with Viasat, a military communications provider, among its targets. As in the old playbook, the goal was to undermine Ukraine’s political will and collect intelligence on all levels. While significant tactical complications for the target followed, the attack failed to affect Ukraine’s societal and military morale as planned. On the contrary, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to leverage the public for intelligence value, further strengthening societal resilience. • Second, reassured by the 2015 experience, Sandworm attempted another ambitious cyberattack on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant a few months into the invasion, aiming to leave millions without energy. However, this time, the aid provided by Ukraine’s private supporters enabled a complete denial of the fatal attack or any force-multiplying effects to entail. Furthermore, the resemblance of the offensive software to the 2015 attack facilitated a faster neutralisation of the cyberweapon. Russia’s efforts again failed to account for the greatly enhanced resilience that Ukraine’s digital infrastructure would display after learning from the initial shock attack. The Ukrainian side, on the contrary, demonstrated an understanding of the GRU’s modus operandi and gained silent battleground superiority by capitalising on the initial exposure of Sandworm. Conclusion: The Common Denominator There was one common denominator between Andriy Derkach, the ROC leadership, and Sandworm: they were all products on the Kremlin’s covert action shelf whose expiry date had passed almost a decade ago (although they may still often come up to describe Russia’s hidden strategy to condition Ukraine into a quick surrender). What started as a markedly successful leveraging of covert assets in support of territorial gains and political concessions in 2014 culminated with a complete strategic blunder that was the 2022 invasion. A premature culmination of those three strategic assets is one way to explain the outcomes. After the successful annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Donbas, the FSB expanded its Ukraine operations but failed to realise that the loyalty and public sentiments that triumphed in 2014 would not be the default in 2022. The GRU’s efforts against Ukraine were exposed both on the ground and in cyberspace, which helped Ukraine gain external support and build up resilience against the two types of subversion. In the meantime, the FSB and the GRU were heavily relying on the ROC, which had been gradually losing all leverage in Ukraine after the 2019 schism and the 2022 exposure of its direct involvement in the conflict. On the one hand, the turn of events suggests that Russia’s tools and theories of hybrid warfare may be neither as sophisticated nor effective as feared after the annexation of Crimea. The flip side of this implies that the current war will rely more on Russian biomass and hard power, especially now when assets of influence and non-military subversion have been exhausted. On the other hand, our understanding of Russia’s performance in this regard may be somewhat biased since we are, by definition, only able to analyse intelligence failures – not achievements. Another aspect to consider is the continuing revelations of Russia’s successful meddling in democratic political processes abroad, which suggests that some Russian covert assets outside of Ukraine may yet reach their culmination points. The central questions are if and what the Kremlin learns from the strategic failures in Ukraine, as well as whether it becomes more open to the structural improvements needed.