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Diplomacy
Israel-Palestine conflict in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Political Insights (6): Determinants of the Egyptian Stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli Aggression on Gaza Strip

by ‘Atef al-Joulani

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском An opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), published on 20/3/2024, revealed that only 12% of Palestinians were satisfied with Egypt’s stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. The survey results suggest that Egypt’s handling of the situation has weakened its role in the Palestine issue and negatively impacted its image, status and regional role. Determinants of the Egyptian Official Position The Egyptian stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by various determinants and influencing factors, foremost among them: 1. The desire to uphold Egypt’s pivotal role in the Palestine issue was driven by its significance in bolstering Egypt’s regional standing and fostering ties with the US. Throughout recent decades, Egypt has aimed to monopolize influence in Palestinian affairs, thwarting the rise of Arab or regional competitors. This ambition extends particularly to managing mediation efforts between Palestinian resistance and Israel, as well as facilitating Palestinian reconciliation. 2. The Camp David Accords have yielded significant benefits, fostering advanced political, economic and security relations with Israel. These ties have notably strengthened during the tenure of Egyptian President ‘Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 3. The security concern revolves around the potential escalation of sympathetic popular movements for Palestinian resistance, in Egypt and the wider Arab region. There’s apprehension about reigniting the Arab Spring and revitalizing the Arab street, fueled by the profound inspiration from Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the belief in altering the status quo by countering the Zionist project. This sentiment is further compounded by escalating anger over Israeli atrocities in Gaza Strip (GS) and a growing discontent with Arab regimes, either due to perceived neglect of their duty towards Palestine or internal governance failures. 4. Concerns about the significant political and security impact of a potential large-scale displacement of Palestinians from GS to Egyptian territory, which could drag Egypt into conflict with Israel, jeopardize the Camp David Accords, and disrupt the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations. 5. Ideological reservations within the Egyptian government regarding the Islamic orientation of the Palestinian resistance, particularly amid strained relations with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB) movement and broader skepticism towards Islamic movements in the region. There’s a perception that Egyptian and many Arab officials are hesitant about the victory of the Palestinian resistance in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, fearing potential destabilizing effects on Egypt’s internal dynamics and the broader Islamic movement presence in the region. 6. The Egyptian official stance in the Palestinian landscape is characterized by strong alignment with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its political objectives. Egypt maintains cautious and unfavorable relations with Hamas, showing reservations towards its resistance efforts and its inclination to maintain an independent stance and political autonomy in managing relations with Egypt and other Arab and regional entities. 7. The Egyptian economy has been grappling with a deteriorating economic crisis, marked by the sharp depreciation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar. This situation prompted urgent foreign intervention to stabilize the economy. Notably, on 23/2/2023, Egypt signed a $35 billion deal with the UAE for the Ras al-Hekma development project. Further assistance came from the European Union, which announced a substantial financial support package for Egypt worth €7.4 billion for 20242027, including $2 billion in emergency funding slated for disbursement in 2024. 8. The geopolitical determinant lies in Egypt’s control over the Rafah crossing, the sole land access point for GS to the outside world. This control has served as a potent pressure tool on both Gaza’s resistance factions and its populace, contributing to the tightening of the GS siege since 2007. During Operation al-Aqsa Flood, this control exacerbated accusations against Egypt, alleging complicity in the siege, exacerbating suffering and scarcity, while Israeli aggression targets the GS population and resistance. Facets of Egypt’s Official Position on Operation al-Aqsa Flood By observing Egypt’s actions in handling Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the following facets emerge: 1. Politically, Egypt adhered to the resolutions set forth in the joint Arab and Islamic summit held in Riyadh on 11/11/2023, advocating for an end to Israeli aggression against GS and the facilitation of aid entry, although without specified follow-up mechanisms for implementation. 2. Egypt enforced the closure of the Rafah crossing and aligned with Israel’s stance opposing aid flow to GS, despite the crossing being under Egyptian-Palestinian jurisdiction, and the Israeli side has no authority over it. This marked a direct challenge to Egyptian sovereignty, as practical control over the crossing shifted to Israel, granting it sole authority over individual movement and aid entry. Egypt is increasingly apprehensive about the US decision to establish a seaport for Gaza aid, fearing it may diminish Egypt’s influence and control over aid entry via the Rafah crossing. 3. Egyptian authorities pressured Palestinian resistance movements to concede on prisoner exchange deals with Israel, pushing for exclusive Egyptian mediation while attempting to sideline competing mediation efforts, especially the Qatari mediation. Despite Egypt’s desire to monopolize the mediation, Qatar successfully entered the fray, becoming a favored mediator by the United States. 4. Egypt has actively opposed Israeli plans to displace GS residents to Egyptian territory, reinforcing security measures at the Rafah crossing. Diaa Rashwan, the chairperson of the Egyptian State Information Service stated, on 16/2/2024, that such displacement constitutes “a direct threat to Egyptian sovereignty and national security.” 5. During the initial days, Egyptian authorities permitted certain popular events condemning the Israeli war on GS. However, they subsequently enforced stringent measures to curb public protests sympathetic to the Palestinians, leading to a noticeable silence on the Egyptian streets. This repression contrasts with past instances where the Egyptian public reacted to lesser events in Palestinian affairs. Conclusion Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s political and field developments have cast a negative impact on Egypt’s role in the Palestine issue and its regional standing. Accusations have surfaced regarding Egypt’s cooperation with Israel in tightening the GS siege. There’s little indication of a significant shift in Egypt’s stance or political strategies regarding the ongoing war. Politically, Egypt is likely to maintain its adherence to the established official Arab and Islamic stance, over which it holds significant influence in shaping. It’s anticipated that Egypt will persist with its current policies regarding the closure of the Rafah crossing and tying aid entry to Israeli approval. Regarding its engagement with Palestinian resistance groups, particularly with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Egyptian authorities are expected to maintain a cautious and conservative stance. There’s little anticipation for a positive shift in Egypt’s position regarding permitting pro-resistance public events or condemning Israeli aggression against GS.

Diplomacy
Former President Rouhani in meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro

Iran's shadow in South America: the foreign policy of the ayatollahs' regime in the region

by María Gabriela Fajardo Mejía , Mario Marín Pereira Garmendia

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The events in the Middle East have the international community on alert. Iran understood the April 1st attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus as a blow to its own territory and a violation of its sovereignty. After several days of threats, on April 13th and for five hours, Iran used 300 projectiles (170 drones, more than 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles) to attack Israeli territory, 99% of which were intercepted. These movements in the geopolitical scenario can be felt in geographically distant regions such as Latin America. To interpret this new scenario, it is necessary to understand how Iran is currently positioned in this region. Its approach to the region is focused on creating ties with states that may be ideologically sympathetic. This is demonstrated by the relationship with Cuba since the end of the first Gulf War, the close relationship with Venezuela, the closeness with Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship in Nicaragua and with Bolivia since the mandate of Evo Morales. Iran has seen the leftward shifts in Latin America as an opportunity to acquire new trading partners, increase its influence in the region and carve out an increasingly important space in the US backyard. Current Iranian Minister of Defense, Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, stressed that “South American countries have a special place in Iran’s foreign and defense policy because they are located in a very sensitive area”. In this sense, we can highlight two key countries: Bolivia and Venezuela. Bolivia, Argentina, and the Triple Frontier Bolivia represents the greatest Iranian foreign policy success in Latin America. Diplomatic relations between these two states date back to 2007. With less than twenty years of friendship, the two signed in July 2023 a memorandum of bilateral cooperation in terms of security and defense that may pose a threat to the stability in the region. The agreement is aimed at assisting Bolivia in its fight against drug trafficking and supporting the state in monitoring its borders. The agreement includes the sale of material and training of military personnel. However, the details of the agreement were not disclosed because they are protected by a confidentiality clause. The Bolivian Minister of Defense, Edmundo Novillo, described Iran as a scientific, technological, security and defense example “for nations that want to be free”, despite the current international sanctions. The agreement entails benefits for both parties. Bolivia will receive weapons, will improve its cyber-operations capabilities and training of military forces’ personnel. On the other hand, Iran will have access to Bolivia’s natural resources, including lithium and gas. It would also be strategically positioned in the heart of South America, where its proxy, Hezbollah, has activities in the Triple Frontier (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and a relationship with the various cartels operating in the region, according to a report by the Wilson Center. This same report notes that the area of the Triple Frontier has for decades been the center of Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Latin America, taking advantage of the large Lebanese and Shiite diaspora communities. According to the late Argentinian special prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah established its presence in Latin America in the mid-1980s, starting in the Triple Frontier area, a relatively lawless region. Argentina and the AMIA case Two days before the Iranian attack on Israel, the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation of Argentina, the highest criminal court in the country, condemned Iran for the 1992 attacks in Argentina against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and in 1994 against the Israelite Mutual Association of Argentina (AMIA, in Spanish). This ruling proves that the attacks, carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah, were committed at the behest of the government of that theocracy. After the trial in absentia, it was ratified that those attacks constitute a crime against humanity. This implies that the crimes committed are considered imprescriptible, and the verdict describes Iran as a terrorist state. A series of events has resulted in three decades of impunity. The scandals that led to the imprisonment of the judge and prosecutors in the case, the issuance of Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) red notices against five former Iranian officials and the investigation against two former presidents, Carlos Menem (1989-99) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-15), torpedoed the process. These events, along with the death under strange circumstances of the special prosecutor for the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, hours before presenting key evidence to the Congress in 2015, explained the delay in the sentencing against Iran. Brazil and the Operation Trapiche In November 2023, the Brazilian Federal Police in collaboration with the Mossad and the FBI carried out Operation Trapiche, which led to the apprehension of three Brazilian nationals. An international arrest warrant was also issued for Mohamad Khir Abdulmajid (Syrian) and Haissam Houssim Diab (Lebanese), accused of recruiting for Hezbollah in Brazil for terrorist purposes. Operation Trapiche was carried out as part of the fight against electronic cigarette smuggling in the Triple Frontier area. The profits from this fraudulent trade were destined to finance illicit activities of the Commercial Affairs Component of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization. Following the events in the Middle East over the last two weeks and Argentina’s full support for Israel, Argentinian Security Minister, Patricia Bullrich, has expressed her concern about the security on the border with Bolivia and has denounced the presence of 700 Iranian members of the Quds forces, a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard., in this country. Bullrich believes that Argentina could be subject to retaliation by Iran. The causes of this fear include the recent ruling condemning Iran as a terrorist state for the AMIA case and the announcement by the president, Javier Milei, of the decision to move the Argentinian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Not to mention the purchase of 26 supersonic F16 aircraft from Denmark, as well as the request to NATO to add Argentina as a “global partner of the organization”. Venezuela Bilateral relations between Venezuela and Iran have been fortified through a series of agreements implemented in recent years in response to the economic sanctions faced by both states. During the visit of Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, to Caracas in June 2023, 25 economic agreements worth approximately US $3,000 million were signed. Details were not disclosed. A year earlier, in June 2022, a cooperation agreement was established for the next 20 years covering science, technology, agriculture, oil and gas, petrochemicals, tourism and culture. In the same year, Iran signed a contract for 110 million euros to repair and reactivate the El Palito refinery, located in the state of Carabobo, which has a production capacity of 146,000 barrels per day. Thus, despite the tough economic sanctions, the operation of “extraterritorial refineries” increases Venezuela’s dependence (also under economic sanctions) on Iranian crude and oil expertise. Regarding the arms sector, while the cooperation memorandum with Bolivia was being signed, an Iranian cargo ship allegedly arrived at Venezuelan shores to deliver vehicles to the Maduro regime. A few days later, Iranian fast attack vessels and anti-ship missiles were exhibited during the bicentennial celebrations of the Venezuelan Navy. Thus, Iran has made possible that Venezuela becomes the first Latin American country to have access to this technology. On the eve of the Venezuelan presidential elections scheduled for July, the Iranian regime has supported the persecution and disqualification of opponents of the Maduro regime to the detriment of the Barbados Agreement. Indeed, it is in Iran’s interest to maintain the status quo in Venezuela, whose regime publicly supports terrorist groups linked to the Ayatollah’s regime. In short, Iran’s interest in maintaining and establishing close cooperative relations in Latin America seek to create ties of dependence with nations sympathetic to the regime. While the international community is on alert for the situation in the Middle East, Iran, which has been gaining ground in the region through alliances with those governments where the influence of the United States is not desired, is closely watching the stance taken by Latin American countries.

Defense & Security
Tehran Enghelab Iran - April 29, 2022: Al Quds day march against Israel in Iran

Iran Has Retaliated Against Israel for Its Killing of Several Quds Force Generals

by Michael Young

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Spot analysis from Carnegie scholars on events relating to the Middle East and North Africa. What Happened? On the night of April 13–14, Iran retaliated for the killing by Israel of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, including Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi, the commander for Syria and Lebanon, Gen. Hossein Aminullah, the chief of staff for Syria and Lebanon, and Maj. Gen. Mohammed Hadi Haj Rahimi, the commander for Palestine. The Iranians fired around 200 missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel, but Israeli military officials said most were shot down and the destruction was minor. The Iranian retaliation had been expected, with U.S. officials even predicting the exact time of the anticipated attack to news outlets. The considerable publicity before the event, Iranian assurances that the response would seek to avert a regional conflict, and the fact that Iran knew that Israel and the United States would be able to monitor the launches of the missiles and drones early on and shoot down a large number of them, suggest the Iranians may have been looking to achieve more of a psychological impact than cause major death and destruction. In this regard, few images were more powerful from the Iranian perspective than that of missiles flying over Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This symbolized best Iranian ambitions to liberate one of Islam’s holiest sites from Israeli control, while personifying Israel’s vulnerabilities against the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. Why Is It Important? Israel has long assumed that it’s security can only be guaranteed by ensuring that the balance of military power with its enemies leans heavily in its favor. This harks back to the notion of the “iron wall,” first enunciated by the Revisionist Zionist thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who argued in an essay in 1923 that Jewish colonization of Palestine had to proceed behind an “iron wall” of Zionist military superiority. The only way that Arabs would agree to the Jewish presence in Palestine, he wrote, “is the iron wall, which is to say a strong power in Palestine that is not amenable to any Arab pressure. In other words, the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present.” Today, that principle has been expanded by Israel to encompass the entire region. Though Jabotinsky was an enemy of the Labor Zionists who ultimately dominated Israeli political life for decades, his idea of an “iron wall” has been embraced by Israel’s leadership and military for some time. That is why the response to the October 7 Hamas attacks in Gaza has been so ferocious. It is also the reasoning behind the so-called “Dahiya Doctrine,” which was notably articulated by an Israeli general, Gazi Eisenkot, currently a government minister. The doctrine, which first emerged during Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, holds that Israel will engage in a disproportionate destruction of its foes’ civilian and military infrastructure in order to dissuade them from ever attacking Israel. However, when Israel bombed the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus on April 1, it crossed an Iranian red line. While the Iranians had more or less accepted the systematic Israeli killing of IRGC figures over the years in Syria, along with members of Hezbollah, this could be justified by the fact that Iran was successfully setting up a military infrastructure in southern Syria with which to bomb Israel and the occupied Golan. It made no sense to jeopardize that effort by entering into a major conflagration with the Israelis, and perhaps even the United States. The embassy compound attack was a different matter. Not only did it affirm Israel’s willingness to ignore diplomatic protection (even though Israel’s supporters argued that the building where the IRGC figures were killed was not, technically, a diplomatic facility), it took place in a broader context since October 7 in which Israel has sought to alter the rules of engagement in Syria and Lebanon to their advantage, narrowing Iran’s and Hezbollah’s margin of maneuver. In other words, it went to the heart of the rivalry between Israel and Iran over regional hegemony, and it was obvious that Iran would not allow this to happen. More worryingly, the embassy compound bombing could also have been an effort by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to drag the United States into a conflict with Iran. To decisively weaken the Iranians and their nuclear program are Israeli priorities, but Israel needs U.S. participation in any bombing campaign against the Islamic Republic for this to succeed, with the added hope that Iran’s leadership can be overthrown. Washington has repeatedly avoided this. According to NBC News, President Joe Biden expressed concern about Netanyahu’s intention to provoke a wider war, and he quickly moved to limit Israel’s options. What Are the Implications for the Future? For the immediate future, the main news item on the morning of April 14 was Biden’s conversation with Netanyahu in which he made two things clear: First, that Iran had failed to do much damage, so that Israel should consider this a success. “You got a win. Take the win,” Biden reportedly said. And second, in light of the Iranian failure, the United States saw no need to escalate the situation further and provoke a region-wide conflict. Therefore, if Israel decided to hit back against Iran, the Biden administration would not participate in any such operation. How Israel will react to this remains unclear. Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said that the tensions with Iran “were not over,” after Netanyahu had stated, on the evening of April 13, that “Whoever harms us, we will harm them. We will defend ourselves against any threat and will do so level-headedly and with determination.” It’s conceivable that Netanyahu will chose to respond on his own, but if the aim is to reestablish an equitable deterrent, the prime minister cannot afford to allow such a response to come up short. All the signs are that Iran retains a wide array of means to harm Israel and wear it down through a thousand small cuts. Moreover, Netanyahu’s forces are still fighting in Gaza, so that escalating the conflict regionally would only further complicate the grinding battle against Hamas. More generally, for the first time in its history, Israel looks dangerously exposed. The country may not be facing an existential threat, but it is reaping the fruits of a cynical policy largely built on ignoring Palestinian and Arab rights, while blocking all avenues that might force Israel to surrender occupied land. The Iranians have exploited this well, and even if their latest attacks did not cause major devastation, subsequent strikes, particularly ones with less prior signaling, may be much bloodier. On its own, this is enough for Iran to say that it has reimposed a balance of deterrence, even if it remains to be seen whether further attacks against Iranian officials in Syria will invite similar retaliation from Iranian territory. It is this perception of helplessness that is stuck in the craw of Israeli leaders. Israel has long projected an image of strength. The Iranians have succeeded in scratching that image. It’s difficult to see how Netanyahu can go along with Biden’s suggestion that he “take a win,” when everything about Iran’s assault suggested less than that.

Defense & Security
Washington DC, USA - October 21, 2023: Pro-Palestine, anti-Israel protesters.

Gaza: a litmus test for the humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation?

by Zainab Moallin , Nosheen Malik , Leen Fouad

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Despite shifts in governance, vast sums of international aid and various peace talks, the Occupied Palestinian Territories cannot escape perpetual crisis due to Israel’s decades-long occupation. Amidst the latest surge of violence in Gaza since 7 October, the world contends not only with a devastating civilian death toll but also a battle of narratives – with questions of how this violence is being framed, depicted and portrayed publicly, or the ‘stories’ that are shaping the public’s perception of the conflict. The limits of neutrality While much of the world has, quite rightly, focused on unpicking the narratives shaped by political figures and the media, as well as their consequences, much less attention has turned to narratives emanating from the humanitarian sector. Profound disagreements are rife between humanitarian leadership and staff, revealing concerns about the presence of ‘neutrality’ as staff highlight insufficient acknowledgement of longstanding Palestinian oppression and question the proximity of some United Nations agencies’ leadership to the United States government. The repeated refusal of the United Kingdom and the US governments to call for a ceasefire has been mirrored by some international organisations, and many of those who did used underwhelming language when talking about Palestinian rights and Israeli accountability. The New Humanitarian reports on a disconnect between aid workers from the Global South, where most humanitarian activity is situated, and the sector’s disproportionately Western decision-makers, raising the question: is the humanitarian principle of neutrality increasingly at odds with decolonisation? By promoting an objective, non-partisan approach, neutrality inadvertently aligns with ‘saviourism’, implying that international aid actors are the only ones capable of fair and neutral arbitration. This notion reflects disturbing racist underpinnings, as it appears to privilege international actors above community members. Ending the occupation For many international organisations, neutrality is seen to improve access to affected populations in conflict. However, if aid agencies are willing to trade access for truth and justice, what is the genuine purpose of humanitarianism? Many aid professionals are urging humanitarian organisations to step out from behind the long-held tones of measured neutrality to instead be ‘more representative of the Global South’. According to one aid worker, ‘It did not start with the war on Gaza. Our organisations know better. It is a bit shocking to see that some organisations are even reluctant to say, “end of occupation.”’ Prior to the Oslo Accords, most aid to Palestinians was ‘emergency’ in nature. However, following the agreement, the focus shifted towards supporting the establishment of a two-state solution – a goal that remains unachieved 30 years later. This shift has overlooked a critical issue: humanitarian efforts have not effectively confronted the root cause of the need for aid, which is effectively Israel's occupation. Across the Occupied Palestinian Territories, UNRWA’s presence has enabled Israel to maintain its system of control, without having to assume full responsibility for the livelihoods, essential services and basic rights of the occupied population. In other words, by not directly challenging the root causes of Palestinian suffering, humanitarian aid has placed Palestinians on life support for the last 75 years. The interplay between humanitarianism and decolonisation The enduring challenges faced by the humanitarian sector are not without precedent. The ‘first wave’ of global NGO expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, a period marked by widespread decolonisation, saw humanitarian efforts aiming to fundamentally alter the course of the newly independent nations. This reciprocal influence between a decolonising world and the evolving field of humanitarianism set the stage for both its achievements and its limitations. But nowhere were the moral hazards of humanitarianism during twentieth-century decolonisation more apparent than in relation to the forced resettlement of civilians. Forced resettlement, often undertaken in the guise of humanitarian intervention, laid bare the complex ethical dilemmas and unintended consequences that can arise when aid intersects with political agendas and colonial legacies. Today, over 80% of Gaza’s population has been internally displaced since October, and Israel’s military offensive has turned much of Gaza’s landscape into uninhabitable land as whole neighbourhoods and agricultural land have been erased. The Israeli government has not publicly confirmed any plan for Gaza’s population, but Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel suggested in December that an ‘option’ would be ‘to promote the voluntary resettlement of Palestinians in Gaza, for humanitarian reasons, outside of the Strip’. An active commitment to decolonisation In confronting Israel’s settler-colonial military tactics, the humanitarian sector must stay true to its decolonisation commitments. The sector can learn from the ways in which humanitarian need was framed during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. As the anti-apartheid movement developed into a global political discourse, it revealed how Black South Africans were not only victims of racial injustice, but of a system designed specifically for collective punishment. A humanitarian discourse against apartheid developed, highlighting it as a driver of crisis that must be dismantled. Global solidarity was paramount. Decolonisation is not an academic pursuit. It is not a metaphor, nor is it a box-checking exercise. The humanitarian sector’s commitment to decolonisation is more critical now than ever – it is essential when entire families are wiped out, countless Palestinian children are orphaned and hundreds of thousands of people are on the precipice of famine. It is vital when Western media continues to peddle age-old racist and Orientalist tropes of ‘violent’ and ‘savage’ Arab men to justify Palestinian suffering. Decolonisation means the humanitarian sector must amplify Palestinian narratives, highlighting the ways in which Palestinians have endured decades-long occupation and oppression. Humanitarians’ influence must be leveraged for long-term justice for Palestinians. Anything less will perpetuate the sector’s role as an ineffectual bandage to a 75-year-old wound.

Defense & Security
Jerusalem, Israel-November 2023

The Return of the Political to the National Discourse: Implications for National Resilience During War

by Meir Elran , Anat Shapira

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Five months into the war, and it seems that the political and social divisions of October 6 have returned to the center stage, reshaped by issues relating to what is happening on the battlefield, the future of the war, and the fate of the hostages. This may have serious consequences for Israel’s social resilience and national security Political disputes and polarization have, of late, returned to the forefront of the public and media discourse in Israel. While one could view this trend as seemingly signaling a return to some kind of normalcy, which is a positive aspect during wartime, it also poses significant challenges to the resilience of Israeli society. A polarizing discourse harms social solidarity, undermines trust in state bodies and the decision-making process, and casts doubts regarding the motives of civil-society organizations. Considering this, policymakers and politicians in Israel should pay very close attention to the situation and try to avoid adding to the toxic and hurtful political discourse. Primarily, they should refrain from portraying sensitive issues related to the war—disagreements over which are perfectly legitimate—as polarizing political issues, such as the issue of the hostages. Over the past few weeks, the political and social disputes within Israeli society have returned to the forefront of the social and media discourse in Israel. Until then, the nation had been preoccupied with the war, creating an image of unity around the goals of the war. Recently, however, the social-political crisis within Israeli society—which was created due to the government’s attempts to advance its judicial/regime reform/revolution—has again reemerged in the public discourse over various issues, including those related directly to managing the war in Gaza. In general, these rifts manifest themselves in part in the context of the incumbent government, its priorities, and its conduct, as well as regarding civilian aspects of the war. These include, for example, the state budget that was recently approved in its first reading by the Knesset, or the amendments to the Military Service Law. This is in addition to politicians trading personal insults with each other and allegations that the prime minister wants to continue the war out of personal considerations and is not giving top priority to releasing the hostages held in Gaza, as most do not come from his traditional base of supporters. At the same time, the political disagreements have grown more extreme in terms of balancing between the goal of toppling Hamas by means of “an absolute military victory” and the efforts to free the hostages. Even the public campaign waged by the hostages’ families vis-à-vis the government has become more acute and could assume a political tone, partly because of disputes among the families that are being portrayed as political. The escalation in the political discourse on social media includes accusations of a campaign aimed to discredit the hostages’ families, as revealed in a report by the Fake Reporter organization, which alleged that social media influencers supporting the prime minister have attempted to portray the campaign of the hostage families as illegitimate and inauthentic. Similarly, the issue of humanitarian aid to residents of the Gaza Strip also has led to demonstrations at the border crossings, some of which have been violent, requiring police intervention. There has also been significant political debate regarding “the day after” the war. This includes the far-right’s proposal to resettle Gaza and debates on the feasibility of incorporating Palestinian factions into any future agreements concerning the governance and civilian management of Gaza. Research and polls have suggested that these disagreements often align with the political positions that these people had before the war. During the first weeks of the war, any extremist political discourse was widely deemed as inappropriate, with emphasis placed on fostering national unity (“Together we will win”). Even those conducting political polls were criticized, although polls have since become routine again. The resurgence of the political rifts is reflected in the resumption and spread of public protests—on both sides of the political divide and on a variety of issues. Demonstrations calling for the prime minister to resign have resumed, and many organizations—such as the Kaplan Force and Brothers in Arms—have announced their intention to intensify their protests. In this context, 56 percent of the respondents in the latest poll conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies on February 4 said that they were concerned or very concerned about the state of Israeli society on the day after the war.[1] The resurgence of the political discourse and protests in Israeli society could be seen as a positive sign of recovery from the paralysis caused by the collective trauma of the events of October 7. Research literature recognizes the phenomenon of “rallying round the flag”; when a crisis threatens the fundamental values of a given society, the public will join forces and unconditionally support the decisions of the political leadership regarding how to resolve that crisis. Immediately after October 7, Israeli society became unified in support of the war’s objectives and the IDF, setting aside pre-existing divisions and rifts from before Hamas’s attack. This unity, still largely maintained today, is reflected in the mainstream media. Additionally, early in the war, civil-society organizations—including those previously identified as political—joined together in volunteer efforts and, most importantly, agreed to set aside divisive political discourses. As the war shifts into a low-intensity conflict, which could last many months, Israeli society seems to be adapting to a “war routine.” This shift has resulted in a diminished need for unity, bringing the socio-political divisions back to the forefront of the discourse with renewed vigor. The reappearance of political disputes poses a challenge to the resilience of Israeli society and its capacity to endure a prolonged and strenuous war. Polarization could hinder Israel’s recovery from the crisis on several levels. The polarizing discourse erodes social solidarity, a crucial component of social resilience; solidarity enables a society to unite and work together, including through extensive civic involvement, to rebuild the ruins— both metaphorical and literal. Polarization also affects a society’s self-perception and the levels of hope and optimism, which are vital to social resilience. The return of the polarizing discourse—especially if it becomes violent—undermines the social solidarity as it places an emphasis on what divides and distinguishes different sectors in society, undermines trust in the state’s institutions, and threatens the necessary civic cooperation. An illustration of the negative impact of renewed polarization is evident in the INSS poll from February 4 (see figure 1), which showed a decline in Israel’s sense of solidarity, and therefore its social resilience for the first time since the war began. It is still true that, in most of the resilience indices, the positive trends remain and are relatively stable. Nonetheless, the data signals a concerning shift in the public sentiment, with the resumption of a toxic public discourse already causing damage.   For a society to successfully recover from a profound and severe crisis, trust in the decision-making process and the country’s leaders is essential, partly to ensure that the public will cooperate with the implementation of decisions and to bolster the general sense of security. The resumption of the divisive political discourse stains many of the decisions that are currently being made—on civic and military matters—with a political hue. For example, in the poll conducted on February 4, 56 percent of respondents claimed that they disagreed with the statement that the decisions of the political leadership regarding the hostage issue were based on relevant considerations rather than political considerations. In the same survey, 64 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that the decisions taken by the political leadership regarding the war were based solely on military considerations and not political ones (see figure 2). This is a significant increase compared to the findings of the previous poll, conducted on December 31, which asked the same questions. These percentages, reflecting a lack of public trust in the government’s decisions, should be considered along with the low level of trust that the public expressed, in the February 4 survey, in the government itself (24 percent) and the prime minister (30 percent). Further evidence of the negative impact of the politicization of the discourse can be found in surveys conducted by Kimchi and others, showing that respondents who support the government perceive resilience to be higher across all parameters: national, communal, and personal. One explanation for this phenomenon is that supporters of the government have more trust in its decisions.[2]   It should be noted that while at the beginning of the war, civil society organizations, including groups that were active in the social protests, played a central role in ensuring that the Israeli economy and society continued to function, resuming their political involvement will make it difficult for them to serve as connecting social capital, which is essential for overcoming the internal crisis, especially in the face of the government’s weakness. The more their activities become tainted with toxic political overtones, the more the genuine disputes among the public will undermine the ability of these organizations to aid any aspect of the Israeli war effort; this, in turn, will weaken social resilience. In conclusion, the resumption of the political discourse and the polarization could significantly harm the ability of Israeli society to build its social resilience needed to recover from this major crisis. To limit these negative effects, Israeli policymakers should shun toxic political discourse as much as possible and avoid deepening the rifts and the polarization that exists in Israeli society as a whole—and especially as it relates to the war. [1] The surveys were based on a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel and included 500 respondents. The surveys were conducted between October 12 to February 4, led by the Data Analytics Desk of INSS. The field work was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute and was based on internet questionnaires. The maximum sampling error for each sample is ±4 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. [2] Shaul Kimchi and others, “Research Report: The Connections Between Public Resilience, Coping Indices, and Support for the Government, Three Months After the Outbreak of the War,” [Unpublished].

Defense & Security
Raid at the Mexican Embassy in Quito, Police capture Jorge Glas

Are embassies off-limits? Ecuadorian and Israeli actions suggest otherwise − and that sets a dangerous diplomatic precedent

by Jorge Heine

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français It has long been held that embassies should be treated as “off-limits” to other nations. Yet in a single week, two governments – both long-established democracies – stand accused of violating, in different ways, the laws surrounding foreign diplomatic missions. First, on April 1, 2024, Iran’s embassy in Damascus was bombed, presumably by Israel, killing several high-ranking commanders of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Then, on April 5, Ecuadorian police forced their way into the Mexican Embassy in Quito to arrest a former vice president of Ecuador who was seeking political asylum. Both actions have led to claims of international law violations and accusations that the Vienna Convention, which establishes the immunity of diplomatic missions, was contravened. As someone with a fair amount of knowledge of embassy life – I have served as Chile’s head of mission in China, India and South Africa and coedited The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy – I believe the two incidents are of greater concern than much of the international community appears to be viewing them. Contrary to the famous quip from late businessman and presidential candidate Ross Perot, embassies are not just “relics of the days of sailing ships.” Rather, in an increasingly complex world where geopolitical conflict, mass migrations, pandemics and climate change require careful and stable diplomatic management, any incidents that erode the sanctity of embassy rules could have serious negative consequences. In short, they make for a more dangerous world. Curious indifference to embassy attack Of the two recent incidents, the Iranian embassy bombing is the more serious, as it involved the loss of life and resulted in warnings of retaliatory attacks. Yet, Western countries, leaders of which often voice concern over upholding the so-called “rules-based order,” have been reluctant to condemn the act. It was notable that the three liberal democracies on the U.N. Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – all refused to condemn the strike on Iran’s embassy when the issue came up before them. Israel, while not officially acknowledging responsibility, argued that the Iranian ambassador’s residence was not really a diplomatic venue but “a military building … disguised as a civilian building.” As such, to Israel it was a perfectly legitimate target. But by this logic, nearly all embassies would be seen as fair game. Almost by definition, the vast majority of embassies – particularly of the larger countries – are populated with significant numbers of military and intelligence personnel. To suggest that for that reason embassies should lose their diplomatic immunity and become legitimate targets for armed attacks would bring the whole edifice of the Vienna Convention crashing down. And with it would come the structure on which worldwide formal diplomatic interactions are based. Bedrock diplomatic principles The case of Ecuador, though less serious because it did not involve loss of life, is a bit more complex and demands some unpacking. At the center of the diplomatic spat between Ecuador and Mexico is former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who served four years behind bars following a 2017 conviction on corruption charges. Glas is now facing trial on different charges, prompting his December 2023 application for asylum at the Mexican Embassy. Mexico accepted the request and conveyed this to the Ecuadorian government. The latter justified its decision to send police into the Mexican embassy on the grounds that it believes Glas cannot be granted political asylum as he is a convicted felon. There is some basis to this claim: Under the Organization of American States’ Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, political asylum cannot be given to convicted felons unless the charges behind such conviction are of a political nature. But at the same time, Article 21 of the Vienna Convention states that diplomatic missions enjoy full immunity and extraterritoriality, meaning the host government does not have the right to enter an embassy without the authorization of the head of mission. Ecuador argues that Mexico abused its diplomatic immunity, leaving it no option other than to send police in. Yet, here a crucial distinction needs to be made. Diplomatic immunity and the extraterritoriality of foreign missions are bedrock principles of the Vienna Convention. Political asylum is a separate matter that should be handled on its own. As such, if the Ecuadorian government considered Glas not to qualify for political asylum, it could have attempted to legally block the move or refuse safe passage for the asylum-seeker to exit the embassy and leave the country. Mexico would have strong grounds to counter such measures, however, as according to the Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, it is up to the asylum-granting state to decide whether the case is politically motivated. Implications for the future Regardless of the merits of the asylum case, sending in the equivalent of a SWAT team to storm the embassy represents a deliberate violation of diplomatic norms. There is a long history of Latin America politicians seeking asylum who spent many years holed up in embassy buildings because governments would not grant them safe passage – the most notable being Peruvian leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who spent five years at the Colombian Embassy in Lima. Yet, with a few exceptions, not even in the darkest hour of Latin America’s military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s were police permitted to storm into embassy buildings to arrest asylum-seekers. And this highlights what makes Ecuador’s actions especially worrisome. Precisely because of Latin America’s problems with political instability and a tradition of military coup, the laws surrounding political asylum and diplomatic immunity are necessary. Undermining the Vienna Convention in the way Ecuador has risks setting a precedent that other governments might be tempted to follow. Political asylum in Latin America has traditionally worked as a safety valve, allowing deposed leaders to get themselves out of harm’s way. Weakening the diplomatic structures in place supporting asylum will make the handling of democratic breakdowns more difficult. It also risks exacerbating regional disagreements. We are already seeing this with Mexico breaking relations with Ecuador as a result of the embassy raid. Making diplomacy more difficult Of course, embassy violations are not unprecedented. Guatemala’s dictatorship attacked the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 1980, killing several asylum-seekers, including a former vice president. And Uruguay’s military government sent security forces into the Venezuelan Embassy in Montevideo in 1976 to arrest a left-wing militant who had sought asylum, leading to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But those events in the relatively distant past were widely and rightly condemned at the time as the product of authoritarian regimes with little regard for international conventions. The comparatively relaxed international attitude to the embassy violations by Israel and Ecuador reflects, I believe, a failure to grasp the significance of eroding diplomatic immunity and norms. As global challenges increase, embassies and their representatives become more important, not less so. If the takeaway from the two latest embassy incidents is that the protection of diplomatic premises can be secondary to whatever is politically expedient on any given day, then it will be of great detriment to the management of international relations. Diplomacy will become much more difficult. And given the enormity of the challenges the world faces today, that is the last thing any country needs.

Defense & Security
Confrontation between Israel and Iran.

Shadow war no more: Hostilities between Israel and Iran have strayed into direct warfare – is there any going back?

by Javed Ali

For decades, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a “shadow war.” Falling short of direct military confrontation, this conflict has been characterized by war through other means – through proxies, cyber attacks, economic sanctions and fiery rhetoric. Events over the last few weeks in the Middle East have, however, changed the nature of this conflict. First, Israel – it is widely presumed – broke diplomatic norms by bombing an Iranian mission in Syria. The operation, in which 12 individuals were killed – including seven officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Quds Force – ratcheted up the stakes. It also crossed a new threshold. Never before had that many Quds Force or other Iranian military officials been killed in a single attack by Iran’s adversaries. Almost immediately, rhetoric from leaders in Tehran indicated Iran would respond swiftly and dramatically. Then, on April 13, 2024, Iran responded by crossing a line it had, to date, not crossed: launching a direct attack on Israeli soil. Iran’s attack against Israel was also qualitatively and quantitatively different than anything Tehran had directly attempted before. Israel Defense Forces spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that it consisted of at least 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. The attack was launched from positions in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In physical terms, the barrage caused little damage. Hagari said that 99% of the projectiles sent by Iran were intercepted by air and missile defenses, and that only one person was injured. For now, it appears that Tehran is content with its own response; the Iranian Mission to the United Nations posted a message on social media following the attack indicating that the operation had concluded. But as an expert on national security and the Middle East, I believe the Iranian attack was not about inflicting physical damage on Israel. It was more about Iran attempting to restore deterrence with Israel following the Damascus incident and showing strength to its domestic audience. In so doing, Tehran’s leaders are also conveying the message that should Israel conduct more aggressive actions against Iranian interests, they are willing to escalate. Friends, then longtime foes Iran and Israel have been adversaries virtually since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah of Iran fled the country to be replaced by a theocracy. New leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini broke the former regime’s ties with Israel and quickly adopted a strident anti-Israel agenda both in words and policy. In the decades since, Israel and Iran have inflicted harm on the other’s interests in both the physical and virtual worlds. This has included major terrorist attacks backed by Iran against Israeli interests in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, Tehran’s backing of Hezbollah’s grinding insurgency against Israel in southern Lebanon, and the major operational support provided to Hamas that in part enabled the attacks on Oct. 7, 2023. Meanwhile, Iranian officials have blamed Israel for the killing of senior military officials and scientists related to Iran’s nuclear program in Iran or elsewhere in the region. The lack of open acknowledgment by Israel of the killings was to create the illusion of plausible deniability and implant doubt about who was actually responsible. In recent years, Iran has relied heavily on its “axis of resistance” – militant groups in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Gaza that share some of Tehran’s goals, notably in regard to countering Israel and weakening U.S. influence in the region. In the monthslong conflict sparked by the Oct. 7 attack, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq network have repeatedly attacked Israeli and U.S. interests. ‘A clear message’ So what comes next? A lot will depend on how Israel and the U.S. respond. Officially, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated that in repelling the Iran missiles and drones, Israel had sent “a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten [its] security.” But there are reports that Biden has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Israel should “take the win” and could not rely on the U.S. supporting any offensive operations against Iran. A number of factors will determine whether Iran and Israel continue to launch more attacks against each other out in the open, or revert to shadow warfare. These include how each side reads domestic sentiment. Netanyahu is already facing pressure based on his handling of the war in Gaza and previous domestic concerns regarding attempts to influence the Israeli Supreme Court, among other matters. Likewise, inside Iran, the United Nations reports that two years after major public protests inside the country based on socio-economic conditions, the regime in Iran continues to ruthlessly suppress dissent. Apart from domestic considerations, both Iran and Israel will also weigh the risks of more open confrontation against their current operational capabilities. Here, it seems clear that neither Iran nor Israel can decisively win a prolonged military campaign against each other. Israel’s powerful military certainly has the ability to launch air and missile strikes against Iranian interests in the region, as they have already demonstrated in Syria and Lebanon for many years. And Israel probably could do the same for a short period of time directly into Iran. But Israel would face major challenges in sustaining a prolonged combined arms campaign in Iran, including the relatively small size of the Israel Defense Forces compared with Iran’s military, and the physical distance between both countries. Israel has openly conducted military exercises for years that seem more focused on simulating air strikes and perhaps special operations raids against a smaller number of targets inside Iran, like nuclear facilities. Moreover, launching a new front by directly attacking Iran risks diverting Israeli resources away from more immediate threats in Gaza, the West Bank and its northern border with Lebanon. Of course, Israel has fought and won wars with its regional adversaries in the past. But the conflicts Israel fought against its Arab neighbors in 1967 and 1973 took place in a different military age and prior to the development of drone warfare, cyber operations and support to Iranian-backed proxies and partners in Israel’s immediate neighborhood. Wary of further escalation A similar type of campaign against Iran would be unlike anything Israel has faced. Israel would no doubt find it difficult to achieve its objectives without a high-level of support from the United States, and probably Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt. And there is no indication that such backing would be forthcoming. Iran, too, will be wary of further escalation. Tehran demonstrated on April 13 that it possesses a large – and perhaps growing – inventory of ballistic missiles, drones and cruise missiles. However, the accuracy and effectiveness of many of these platforms remains in question – as evidenced by the seeming ease in which most were shot down. The Israeli and U.S. air and missile defense network in the region continues to prove reliable in that regard. Given the realities and risks, I believe it seems more likely that Iran will seek to revert back to its unconventional warfare strategy of supporting its proxy axis of resistance. Overt attacks, such as the one carried out on April 13, may be reserved for signaling resolve and demonstrating strength to its domestic audience. The danger is now that war has come out of the shadows, it may be hard to put it back there.

Diplomacy
Amman, Jordan - October 18, 2023 : Arab unity in the Al-Aqsa flood war (flag of Jordan and Palestine) Demonstrations of the Jordanian people in solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinian people

Political Insights (5): Determinants of the Jordanian Stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Atef al-Joulani

Jordan’s official stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood faced challenges in maintaining a balanced position, despite strong and unprecedented engagement from the Jordanian public. The initial official stance, which seemed relatively strong and clear, diminished later, revealing contradictions between political declarations and practical measures on the ground. This has raised questions about the factors influencing Jordan’s position on the confrontation. First: Determinants of the Official Stance The official Jordanian stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood was shaped by various factors: 1. Concerns regarding national security intensified due to the hostile attitudes of extreme right-wing Zionist groups towards Jordan, along with fears of forced displacement in the West Bank (WB) amidst the arming of tens of thousands of settlers and their persistent efforts to compel Palestinians to relocate to Jordan. Furthermore, concerns emerged regarding security threats to the kingdom’s northern and eastern borders amidst increased attempts to breach them due to escalation in Gaza Strip (GS). On 28/1/2024, a drone attack targeted US forces stationed near the Syrian border in Jordan, killing three soldiers and wounding about 35 others. 2. Geographic and demographic factors, coupled with strong public engagement with Operation al-Aqsa Flood, persistently fueled Jordanian protests against Israeli aggression and in support of resistance since October 7th. The protests have spanned the entire geographical and societal spectrum in Jordan. 3. The provisions of the Wadi Araba Treaty between Jordan and Israel, including political, economic restrictions, and normalization commitments between the parties. 4. The strategic relationship between Jordan and the US, which fully sided with Israel and provided it with political, military and financial cover to continue its aggression on GS. 5. Jordan’s tepid ties with Hamas suffered a setback after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which coincided with a noticeable decline in relations, prompted by the arrest of several Hamas members for attempting to smuggle weapons into WB. 6. Jordan’s political stance within the Arab and international sphere, which opposes Hamas and “political Islam” movements. 7. Jordan’s political choices in the Palestinian arena, which support the political settlement, negotiations and the two-state solution, the efforts to de-escalate and impose calm in WB, enhancing the PA status within the Palestinian society, and preventing its collapse or decline in favor of other parties. 8. The official side voiced concerns about the impact of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on Jordanian public sentiment and electoral trends, fearing its exploitation by the Islamic movement during the critical upcoming parliamentary elections later this year (2024). Second: The Various Facets of the Jordanian Position On the political front, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi was the first to indicate in the early days of the confrontation that “Hamas is an idea, and the idea does not end.” He emphasized that discussing a post-Gaza phase is a leap in the air, clarifying that Hamas did not create the conflict but rather the conflict created Hamas. Jordan was quick to describe Israeli military operations in GS as aggression and heinous war crimes, with positions issued by the King, Queen, Crown Prince and Jordanian Prime Minister condemning the aggression, calling for its cessation, and declaring solidarity with the Palestinian people. On the practical front, Jordan canceled the Quad Summit scheduled in Amman with the US President on 18/10/2023, in protest against the Israeli massacre at the Baptist Hospital in GS. Jordan also froze the energy-for-water agreement with Israel. On 1/11/2023, Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and conducted multiple air drops to support its field hospital in GS, while establishing a second field hospital in Khan Younis. Yet, the Jordanian public deemed these official actions insufficient, demanding the cancellation of the Wadi Araba treaty and the gas agreement with Israel, along with halting the water-for-electricity deal, closing foreign military bases in Jordan, supporting Palestinian resistance and engaging with its factions. The Jordanian official stance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be summarized as follows: 1. Condemnation of Israeli aggression on GS and urging an end to war crimes. 2. Implementation of measures falling short of public demands, amidst strong interaction by the Jordanian public during the confrontation. 3. Permitting limited popular activities, restricting access to borders with the occupied Palestinian territories, opposing open sit-ins and arresting activists participating in some events. 4. Allowing Jordanian territory for Gulf-to-Israel truck transit, within the context of a land bridge inaugurated to bypass Houthi restrictions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait for ships bound to Israel. Conclusion Jordan’s official response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood reveals significant confusion in aligning its regional and international stance, political choices and commitments with addressing the demands of the Jordanian public. Jordan’s participation in the land bridge for goods transit to Israel has damaged its credibility and provoked public outrage. This revelation coincided with Israel’s intensified blockade on GS, coupled with increased measures to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid, as part of the Israeli policy to starve the population and incite popular resentment against the resistance. Given recent practical behavior and relative retreat in stance and rhetoric, ongoing confusion in Jordan’s official position is expected in the coming period, with increased engagement in Arab and international arrangements regarding Gaza’s post-war future. Regarding relations with Palestinian factions, Jordan’s official side is expected to maintain its preference for engaging solely with the Palestinian Authority, aiming to bolster its position in the Palestinian arena, without showing openness to resistance movements in the foreseeable future.

Defense & Security
The Israeli-Lebanese border along the coastal road, south of Enn Naqoura

Between War and Agreement with Lebanon: The Conflict Over the Land Border

by Orna Mizrahi , Stephane Cohen

Demarcating the land border between Israel and Lebanon is an important and necessary step—but is it right to do under fire? In this document, INSS researchers provide an answer to this question and detail the background and points of disagreement between the two countries on this issue As part of the American-led efforts to use diplomatic means to end the fighting that has been ongoing for nearly five months between Israel and Hezbollah, the need to demarcate an agreed-upon border between Israel and Lebanon was also on the agenda. The Lebanese government is eager to include border demarcation in any ceasefire agreement and has adopted the same policy on this matter as Hezbollah, linking an end to the fighting to the cessation of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and presenting a hardline maximalist approach to border demarcation. Negotiations over the land border between the two countries are likely to be exhaustive due to the complexity of the issue and the wide gaps between the sides. It would be wrong, therefore, to conduct them under fire. At the same time, as part of an agreement to end the conflict, it is feasible to include an agreement over the establishment of a mechanism to discuss the issue at the next stage—once the fighting on the Israel–Lebanon border has died down. Increasingly concerned that the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah could escalate further and turn into an all-out war, the United States is working to advance a diplomatic move that would lead to a ceasefire. France, and more recently the United Kingdom and Germany have joined the Americans in this effort. The Americans have entrusted the task to US President Joe Biden’s close adviser, Amos Hochstein, who successfully brokered the maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon, which was signed in October 2022. At the behest of the Lebanese, Hochstein has been trying over the course of the past year to recreate this success and to get the parties to agree to a permanent land border. Thus far, he has not been successful. Beirut recently raised again the issue of demarcating the land border between Israel and Lebanon in the framework of efforts to secure a ceasefire between the IDF and Hezbollah, which have been engaged in limited combat along Israel’s northern border since Hezbollah initiated the conflict on October 8. The fighting has been ongoing since then, in parallel to the war in Gaza. In their discussions with American officials, acting Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and his foreign minister, Abdallah Bou Habib, have been pleased by the Biden administration’s willingness to help broker a ceasefire and to restore quiet to southern Lebanon. They say that they are committed to a diplomatic solution and to international decisions, with an emphasis on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. At the same time, they have taken a hardline position and have been forced to toe the Hezbollah line. They have done so not only in terms of linking an end to the fighting on the Lebanon border with a cessation of IDF operations in the Gaza Strip but also in terms of their demands when it comes to demarcating the land border. Their opening position is intransigent. In their diplomatic meetings and in interviews they have given to the media, both Mikati and Habib have raised the demand that Israel withdraws from every inch of Lebanese territory and, at the same time, they speak about the Mandate-era border, which was adopted as part of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, as the reference point rather than the Blue Line, the line of withdrawal identified in 2000 by the United Nations, without prejudice to any future border agreement. Reports in the Israeli and Lebanese media suggest that the issue was also raised during Hochstein’s recent visits to Israel (on January 4 and again on February 4) and Beirut (on January 11), but for the time being, Hezbollah and, in its wake, the Lebanese government are adamant that they will not pursue a diplomatic channel as long as the war in Gaza is ongoing. Milestones in the Demarcation of the Border between Israel and Lebanon The border between Israel and Lebanon, which is around 120 kilometers in length,[1] was demarcated more than a century ago as part of the Franco–British Agreement on Mandatory Borders that was signed in Paris in December 1920. That agreement saw the two European superpowers divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire between them and agree on the borders between both Lebanon and Syria (readers must understand that it was not between Lebanon and Syria specifically, but between the territory of both and Palestine), which were under the French Mandate, and Palestine, which was under the British, from the Mediterranean Sea to Hama (which now makes up the border triangle between Israel, Syria, and Jordan). The agreement drew out the general path of the border, and the sides agreed to set up a joint commission to demarcate the exact path of the border. The commission was headed by two officers—French Lieutenant Colonel Paulet and British Lieutenant Colonel Newcombe. The commission demarcated the border, and in March 1923, the final agreement was approved by both countries. It was ratified in 1935 by the League of Nations. The system used by the commission to demarcate the border—a process that took an entire year and which left behind meticulous documentation of its work—was old-fashioned and problematic; it led to huge inconsistencies in the border. The border they drew up did not fully correspond to the border that was agreed on in Paris in 1920, but it was marked on the ground using piles of rocks. These piles were eventually replaced by 71 posts known as boundary pillars (BPs), of which 38 were placed along the Israel–Lebanon border. It should be noted that most of these BPs disappeared or were destroyed, making later demarcation difficult. Throughout the Mandatory period, right up until Israel and Lebanon gained their independence, the boundary drawn up by the commission was recognized as the international border. It was also the boundary that was used for the March 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon. That agreement, which the Lebanese are citing as their reference point for demarcation today, was not a detailed demarcation of the boundary. Rather, the agreement merely stated that the “armistice line will run along the international border.” In other words, along the border that was drawn up by the two Mandatory powers and approved in 1923.[2] Following the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon in May 2000 and as part of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), the United Nations tried to demarcate the IDF’s withdrawal line using a team of its own cartographers. They drew what became known as the Blue Line, which deviates in several points from the Mandate-era boundary, and they based it on cartographic data and the interpretation thereof by members of the team. Israel and Lebanon both accepted the Blue Line as the line to which IDF forces would withdraw from southern Lebanon, but Lebanon submitted reservations that turned into points of contention between the sides. The UN approach is to recognize a border line upon which both parties will agree, although it is doubtful that Lebanon will agree to the Blue Line as the basis and likely will insist on the 1949 line. After the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Israel and Lebanon agreed to physically demarcate the Blue Line on the ground, and to this end, a professional committee was formed. This committee determined the exact location of 470 reference points along the Blue Line—around four such points for every kilometer. The goal of marking the border using blue barrels was to make the border clear to the local population, to military personnel, and to the United Nations—and to prevent any inadvertent Blue Line crossings or violation. Thus far, however, barrels have only been placed on around half of the reference points (more than 270). Each of them was only placed after Lebanon and Israel had examined its exact position and given their approval. Points of Contention between Israel and Lebanon Along the Border Region After the delineation and demarcation of the Blue Line, Lebanon presented reservations regarding 13 points along the Blue Line, covering an area of 485,000 square meters (not including the territory in the triangle of borders with Syria beyond the 1949 Armistice Line). To this day, this remains the main point of contention between the two countries. According to the Lebanese, these points deviate from the boundary that was determined in the 1949 Armistice Agreement (see the map in Appendix A). These points have been discussed at length over the years in contacts between the sides as part of the tripartite meetings and coordination mechanism established by UNIFIL. On a number of occasions, there were even reports that they have reached understandings about a solution for seven of them (although there has been no official announcement that they have been resolved). In July 2023, before the outbreak of the current conflict, the Lebanese foreign minister claimed that of the 13 contested points, agreement had been reached over seven, and that there were only six left to be resolved. Two months later, however, the Lebanese army issued an official statement in which it said that it still sees the 13 as being violations by Israel (the Lebanese see the territory on their side of the 1949 Armistice Line and the Blue Line as having been occupied by Israel) and that nothing had been finalized on the matter. Moreover, the army said representatives in the tripartite coordination mechanism did not have the authority to approve this. Recently, against the backdrop of negotiations, the issue was again raised in an interview given by Mikati. On February 1, he claimed that seven of the 13 points had already been settled, but that there were still major gaps in the positions of both sides with regard to the remaining six. Five days later, the foreign minister made a similar argument. The table below shows the 13 contested points, most of which could be resolved with some good will from both sides. At the same time, a number of points of strategic importance will be hard to resolve—primarily the first point close to the coast at Rosh Hanikra (B1), given its strategic location and its importance to both sides. This was one of the reasons that Israel demanded within the maritime agreement to preserve the status quo at this particular point, which was initially intended to be the starting point for the maritime demarcation, and to postpone the discussion on it until negotiations took place over the land border. >> Table: Lebanese reservations over the demarcation of the Blue Line    According to some recent reports, in addition to the 13 familiar points, Lebanon has already presented more Israeli violations and has demanded that Israel withdraw from 17 other areas beyond the Blue Line, some of which correspond with the 13 previous areas of contention. This is in contrast to the recently stated position of the Lebanese prime minister and foreign minister, both of whom referred only to the 13 contested areas. Details of these points, as published by the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Akhbar newspaper, appear in Appendix B. In addition to the points of contention along the Israel–Lebanon border, there are also a number of substantial contested points on the Golan Heights. The Lebanese have laid claim to areas that were captured by Israel from Syria in 1967 during the Six-Day War in the border triangle between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. According to Beirut, Israel must return these territories, which it claims as its own, before any resolution of the conflict with Syria, which has opted not to deal with the issue at the current time. Further complicating the situation in these areas is the Golan Heights Law that Israel passed in 1981, which formalized the change in the legal status of the Golan and determined that the area fell under Israeli law, jurisdiction, and authority. These disputes form a major part of Hezbollah’s narrative. The organization argues that it is fighting for the liberation of more Lebanese territory from Israeli occupation, while exacerbating the already intense disputes between Beirut and Jerusalem and using them as part of its struggle against Israel. Therefore, it is no coincidence that many of Hezbollah’s military attacks during the past nearly five months of fighting have also been directed at the areas of Mount Dov and Shebaa Farms. There are two main areas in question: The northern part of the village of Ghajar: Lebanon claims sovereignty over the northern part of the village, which is located on the original border between Syria and Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanon’s claim is not entirely groundless, since the Blue Line dissects the village, in accordance with the findings from 2000 by UN cartographers, who worked according to maps in their possession. The northern part of the village, therefore, is in Lebanese territory, even though it was captured by Israeli forces from Syria in 1967 and its residents are Alawites. Lebanese complaints intensified after September 2022, when Israel erected a fence to the north of the village to prevent infiltrations from Lebanon. The erection of this fence was done in coordination with the IDF, which took into account the residents’ suffering from having their village split in two and the fact that entry was only possible via a border police and military checkpoint. Closing off the village from the north allowed it to open to visitors. In addition to the northern section of the village, Lebanon is also demanding territory to the east of the village. The Shebaa Farms: This is an unpopulated agricultural area on Mount Dov (the foothills of Mount Hermon), between the village of Ghajar and the Lebanese village of Shebaa (in the border triangle), which Beirut claims belongs to the village. From an Israeli perspective, this strategic area is vitally important in order to monitor a hostile region. Evidence of this was provided in October 2000, when three Israeli soldiers were abducted in a cross-border raid. It is no coincidence that Hezbollah’s first attack during the current conflict, on October 8, was against Mount Dov, which has become a key target over the past months. In contrast to the official Lebanese position, Hezbollah also has claims to more Israeli territory, which it wants to “liberate from occupation.” There are seven Shiite villages in the Upper Galilee which were abandoned or evacuated, and then captured by Israel during the War of Independence in 1948. It should be stressed that in official statements from Beirut about the border dispute with Israel, these villages are not mentioned. However, it is likely that, even after the resolution of the dispute over border demarcation between the two countries, Hezbollah will continue to refer to these villages as occupied Lebanese territory. This is an integral part of its efforts to maintain its status as “defender of Lebanon” and it will be used to incite hostility toward Israel. From an Israeli perspective, it would be wrong to negotiate the border demarcation under fire. The issue of border demarcation has, as mentioned, come up as part of the diplomatic efforts to end the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel; the Lebanese side (and, it seems, the mediators) raised it as one of the things that Israel could offer in order to promote a ceasefire. However, given the ongoing escalation and the possibility of all-out war, it appears that it would not be the right course of action for Israel to include negotiations over the future land border in talks aimed at securing a ceasefire—notwithstanding the importance of an agreed-upon resolution of the issue. There are several reasons for this: The time element: Negotiations are likely to be long and complex, given the profound disagreements that exist, especially over three points: Rosh Hanikra (B1); the village of Ghajar; and the Mt. Dov/Shebaa Farms. Such talks will not be completed quickly and will not lead to a ceasefire any time soon, especially given that the Lebanese side is currently presenting a particularly hard line. Israel, on the other hand, is interested in an immediate end to the fighting, so that the evacuated residents of the North can return to their homes as soon as possible. This argument is also supposed to convince the Americans, who are also keen to secure a ceasefire sooner rather than later and to avoid regional conflagration. An achievement for Hezbollah and the loss of a bargaining chip: If Israel were to hand over territory to Lebanon—no matter how little—as a result of the current conflict, it would inflate Hezbollah’s sense of accomplishment, as well as its claimed status as the ‘protector of Lebanon.’ It would also strengthen its argument to remain an armed organization, against the wishes of those citizens in Lebanon who want it to turn over its weapons to the Lebanese army. Moreover, Israel would lose a bargaining chip in the anticipated negotiations over the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, especially in terms of its desire for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River. The same is true of a partial solution, regarding, for example, the seven border points over which there is agreement in principle. While Hezbollah would portray this as a “victory,” the disagreements and the reasons for continued conflict would remain unaddressed. There is no official address on the Lebanese side with which Israel can sign any agreement, given the political vacuum that exists there. Since the last election in Lebanon, in May 2022, a transitional government has been in power and, since the end of President Michel Aoun’s term of office in October 2022, Lebanon has yet to elect a replacement. As per the constitution, it is the Lebanese president who has the authority to sign such agreements; indeed, it was Aoun who signed the maritime border agreement with Israel on his last day in office. Similarly, opponents of any agreement with Israel could challenge the authority of the current interim government to engage in negotiations on any issue with Israel. In conclusion, reaching an agreement on the route of the land border between Israel and Lebanon would be an important element in forging a new reality in the region. However, it would not be right to hold a complex discussion on the issue, and certainly not to accept a partial agreement that would include Israel’s surrendering of territory, as long as Hezbollah has not agreed to cease the current fighting, which it initiated. Therefore, Israel must reject the inclusion of the issue in the preliminary understandings over a ceasefire and must insist that negotiations over the demarcation of the land border only take place at a later stage. Appendix A Map of the Disputed Areas According to the Lebanese Side  Appendix B Lebanese Claims of Israeli Violations Along the Blue Line    Note: These are areas that Israel currently occupies and which the Lebanese claim violate the Blue Line. This list was published on September 7, 2023, by the Al-Akhbar newspaper, which is affiliated with Hezbollah. [1] “It’s time to talk about the Blue Line: Constructive re-engagement is key to stability,” March 5, 2021, https://unifil.unmissions.org/it%E2%80%99s-time-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-key-stability [2] Haim Srebro, True and Steady: Mistakes in the Delimitation of the Boundaries of Israel and Their Correction (Tzivonim Publishing, 2022), p. 143.

Defense & Security
Border between Gaza and Egypt in Rafah

Why Egypt refuses to open its border to Palestinians forcibly displaced from Gaza

by Liyana Kayali

Around 1.5 million Palestinian civilians are currently squeezed into the southern Gaza city of Rafah after repeatedly being forced by Israeli bombardment and ground assaults to evacuate further and further south. The town, which originally had a population of 250,000, is now host to more than half of Gaza’s entire population. They are sheltering in conditions the UN’s top aid official has called “abysmal”, with disease spreading and famine looming. In a military onslaught the International Court of Justice has ruled a plausible case of genocide, Israel has so far killed over 29,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Now there are increasing fears Israel’s expected ground assault on Rafah could push civilians across the border into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Originally designated as a “safe zone”, Rafah is now being targeted by Israeli airstrikes, as well. Those fleeing the violence have nowhere safe to go. However, Egypt, the only country aside from Israel that has a border with Gaza, has rebuffed pressure to accept Palestinian refugees displaced by Israel. Reports have indicated that Israeli officials have tried to lobby international support to compel Egypt to accept refugees from Gaza. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, however, has been adamant in refusing to allow humanitarian corridors or the entry of large numbers of Palestinians into Sinai. He has called it a “red line” that, if crossed, would “liquidate the Palestinian cause”. In recent days, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, has validated Egypt’s position. Grandi said displacing Gazans to Egypt would be “catastrophic” for both Egypt and the Palestinians, who, he indicated, would likely not be allowed to return. Why Egypt is opposed to the idea There are a few reasons for Egypt’s opposition. The first is that Egypt does not want to be seen to be facilitating ethnic cleansing through the permanent resettlement of Palestinians outside of Gaza. In October, a leaked document from Israel’s Intelligence Ministry included recommendations to forcibly transfer of Gaza’s population of 2.3 million out of the territory and into tent cities in Egypt’s Sinai Desert. Government ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir have also both openly advocated the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza to make way for their replacement by Israeli settlers. Further, in January, a conference in Israel calling for this very plan was attended by 11 members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet and 15 additional members of parliament. While Netanyahu last month said Israel has “no intention of permanently occupying Gaza”, he hasn’t shut down talk from his ministers about it. When asked about the conference in January, for example, he said everyone was “entitled to their opinions”. Sisi is also conscious of the strong surge of sympathy the Egyptian public has demonstrated for the Palestinians and the support they have shown for his opposition to any displacement of people across the border. This is due to feelings of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, as well as an awareness of the lessons of history. Recalling 1947-49, when an estimated 750,000 were either expelled or forced to flee their homes by Zionist forces during the war surrounding the creation of the state of Israel, Egypt doesn’t want to be seen to be enabling another Nakba, or “catastrophe”. The total number of refugees created by the Nakba now stands at around 6 million. According to the UN, about a third live in refugee camps, Israel having denied their right to return to their homeland. Significantly, in November, Israel’s minister for agriculture, Avi Dichter, declared: “We are now rolling out the Gaza Nakba,” adding, “Gaza Nakba 2023. That’s how it’ll end.” Egypt’s complicated relationship with Hamas Another key concern for Egypt is its security. If Palestinians were resettled in Sinai, it could make the Egyptian territory a new base from which to launch resistance operations. This could drag Egypt into a military conflict with Israel. In addition, Sisi has only just managed to clamp down on Islamist insurgents in North Sinai in recent years and is presumably concerned that an influx of refugees could be destabilising. Finally, Sisi likely believes Hamas could mount opposition to his regime. After overthrowing President Mohamed Morsi in a military coup in 2013, the Sisi regime cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and repressed all dissent. This extended to a demonisation of Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch. Between 2014 and 2016, the Egyptian military bombed and flooded tunnels linking Gaza with Egypt, at the same time as accusing Hamas of colluding with the Muslim Brotherhood against the state. It has also enforced Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. Having said that, the relationship is not straightforwardly antagonistic. Hamas and Egypt have co-operated on counterinsurgency operations against the Islamic State in Sinai. Egypt has also played a role in mediating current and past ceasefire negotiations between Hamas and Israel. However, the latest rounds of negotiations have gone nowhere, leaving Egypt to nervously ramp up its warnings around any Israeli moves on the border. Egypt and Israel have had a peace treaty since 1979, and their relationship has become stronger with Sisi in power. However, Egypt has threatened to suspend the peace treaty if Rafah is invaded. Where does this leave the people of Gaza? Netanyahu has vowed to push ahead with a ground incursion of Rafah in the coming weeks. Concurrently, Egypt has moved to fortify its border and, according to reports and satellite images, begun building a walled buffer zone of about 21 square kilometres in the Sinai. This suggests Egypt is preparing for a potential removal or exodus of Palestinians. While it isn’t entirely clear whether this is being done in co-ordination with Israel or as a “contingency” measure, the zone would condemn Gazans to yet another densely packed open-air prison with dire human rights implications. As much as states like Egypt and Jordan have strengthened their rhetorical opposition to Israel in the past few months, neighbouring Arab countries have done little to seriously pressure Israel to halt its military operations or significantly improve aid access to the Gaza Strip. In fact, Egypt’s intermittent closures of the Rafah crossing have delayed the entry of desperately needed aid into Gaza. There are also reports Egyptian authorities are demanding thousands of dollars in bribes from those desperate to leave via Rafah, deepening a sense of cynicism, despair and, ultimately, abandonment.