Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Researchers in the INSS Russia program argue: Now is the time for Israel to change it approach toward Moscow Since October 7, Russia has sided with Hamas, refuses to condemn the murderous terror attack that the organization perpetrated in the western Negev, and has questioned Israel’s right to defend itself. Russia’s behavior should underscore to Israel the need to change its policy toward the Kremlin and to stand firmly with Western nations, under the leadership of the United States. Moscow’s firm support for Hamas in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 massacre represents a turning point in relations between Israel and Russia. While many world leaders have condemned the murderous attack on October 7, Russia has adopted an anti-Israel line and refrained from condemning Hamas. Only a week later after the attack, in a speech to leaders of former Soviet states in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the Hamas massacre was unprecedented, but in the same breath he accused Israel of a cruel response. He went on to compare the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip to the Nazi siege of Leningrad, which led to a high number of civilian causalities, estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Although Putin said that Israel has the right to self-defense, he added that the attack on innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip was unacceptable. It was only on October 16 that Putin, in a phone conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed condolences to the families of the murdered Israelis, but without condemning Hamas. Russia’s strategy of maintaining good relations with both sides in any given conflict is reflected in its policy of nurturing ties with Hamas. For Hamas too, ties with Russia are highly important, since it positions it as an organization that is welcome in one of the most important countries in the world. In principle, Moscow has clung to its position that Hamas – defined as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other members of the European Union – is a legitimate political organization. The relationship between Russia and Hamas has not always been as close as it is today. Throughout the 1990s and until Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Russia condemned the organization’s terrorist activities and referred to its members as Islamic militants, fanatics, and extremists. The relationship changed dramatically after the election, when Putin declared that the organization was elected through a democratic and legitimate process. Russian Foreign Ministry officials began meeting regularly with Hamas representatives in 2006. In 2011, there was a temporary decline in relations after Hamas backed the opposition forces in the Syrian civil war. Hamas figures who were in Syria when the war broke out played an active role fighting alongside the opposition, while Russia supported President Bashar Assad. Nonetheless, ties were not severed, and over the years began to warm. Delegations of Hamas leaders visited Moscow, where they met with the Russian Foreign Minister and other senior officials, and meetings took place between Hamas officials and Russian diplomats in other countries. Russia did not adopt a consistent position during previous rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas and was influenced by its particular interests at the time. In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, there was a change in Russian policy as it sought to maintain an image of objectivity and deliberately scaled back its criticism of Israel – in contrast to previous conflicts, such as Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. This was probably in response to Israel refraining from criticizing Russia over its invasion of Crimea. Russia’s current interests are not to Israel’s benefit. Moscow’s main goal at this time is to divert the attention of the West, under the leadership of the United States, away from Ukraine. An increase in US involvement in events in the Middle East serves this goal. At the same time, Russia blames the United States for the outbreak of the current conflict. Second, Russia aspires to restore its standing as an influential actor on the international stage, and thus is attempting to promote a ceasefire in Gaza. In addition, Russia’s relations with Iran have become a strategic alliance as a result of the war in Ukraine, and in order to safeguard it, Moscow has adopted a policy that is sympathetic to Iran’s allies, including Hamas. Moreover, it is very convenient for Moscow that the US is the focus of attention in the Middle East. Russia’s support for Hamas can be seen in the measures it has taken in the international arena. On October 16, Russia submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council on a ceasefire, but it failed to include any condemnation of Hamas and its attack on Israel. Rather, it condemned violence and terrorist acts against civilians, which could be interpreted as a condemnation of Hamas’s actions or of Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the Russian resolution suggested that Israel was responsible for the explosion at the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, despite clear evidence that the rocket that hit the hospital was fired from within Gaza. On October 25, Russia used its veto power in the Security Council to block a US resolution calling for the condemnation of Hamas and supporting Israel’s right to defend itself. Later, Russian anti-Israel rhetoric became even harsher, returning to the terminology used by the Soviets, when on November 2, the Russian ambassador to the UN rejected Israel’s right to self-defense since it is an “occupying power.” Comments from senior Hamas officials also shed much light on how close the organization is to Russia. For example, in an October 8 interview with Russia Today, a state-run media outlet, senior Hamas official Ali Baraka said that Hamas had updated Moscow about the attack shortly after it began. During the war itself, when a delegation of senior Hamas officials visited Moscow, Mousa Abu Marzook said that “we look at Russia as our closest friend.” After the visit, Hamas thanked Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry for their efforts to halt “the Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.” Hamas leader Khaled Mashal also said in an interview with an Egyptian television station that the Russians were impressed with the Hamas attack and that they would teach it in their military academies. Russia’s support for Hamas is not limited to the international diplomatic sphere. There is evidence that Russian weapons have been found in Hamas’s possession, including anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles that apparently were transported via Iran – while Russia turned a blind eye. In addition, in the same interview with Russia Today, Baraka claimed that Russia had given Hamas a license to manufacture its own modified version of the AK-47 (Kalashnikov) assault rifle and ammunition. Hamas’s armed wing uses Russian servers. On the economic front too, it is evident that Hamas relies heavily on the Russian crypto market, sending tens of millions of dollars into digital wallets controlled by Hamas (and Islamic Jihad), while bypassing US sanctions. According to Ukrainian reports, the Wagner Group helped to train Hamas terrorists. State-run Russian media has also adopted a clearly pro-Palestinian line. Russian propaganda seeks to justify the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine by highlighting the IDF’s killing of civilians and exaggerating the number of Palestinian causalities. After the blast at the al-Ahli hospital, the Russian media claimed that thousands of people had been killed – a figure higher even than the death toll reported by Gazans. Israeli soldiers are depicted as “immoral” because of the massive causalities they inflict on a civilian population, unlike the Russian soldiers who, according to state-run media, “would never be able to attack civilians, women, and children.” Russian social media channels, such as Telegram, are also awash with anti-Israel rhetoric and blatantly antisemitic comments. In the aftermath of the attempted pogrom against Israeli and Jewish passengers in Dagestan on October 29, Putin convened a meeting with the government and heads of the security establishment and drew a direct line between the war in Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas, accusing the United States and the West of undermining stability in Russia, the Middle East, and the entire world. He declared that “the fate of Russia and, indeed, of the whole world, including the future of the Palestinian people, is being decided” on the Ukrainian front. By connecting the two conflicts, Putin is clearly putting Russia on the side of Hamas and Israel on the opposing side, alongside the United States and the West. In effect, Putin has validated US President Joe Biden’s statement that Russia and Hamas are waging a war against democracy. Putin’s comments and Russia’s behavior in the aftermath of October 7 highlight the misconception that Russia would not oppose Israel at critical moments. The change that Israel must make in its policy vis-à-vis Russia is to stand unequivocally beside the United States – which includes supporting Ukraine. The quicker Israel adapts its policy to meet the challenge, the better its strategic balance in the Middle East and beyond will be.

Speech by Hanke Bruins Slot, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at the UN Security Council quarterly open debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, 24 October 2023. The spoken word applies. Thank you, Mr President, I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Mr President, On 7 October, the world witnessed a horrific terrorist attack on Israel. The horrendous violence carried out by Hamas was not aimed at military targets. Rather, it was an attempt to destroy people’s souls. By taking hostages and, murdering civilians, and this threat from Hamas is far from over. In this context we should all stand united: by supporting Israel. And its right to self-defence against the terror threat of Hamas. As we’ve said before: the use of force in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate. And international humanitarian law must be respected. By all parties. This means that every possible measure to protect civilians must be taken. That humanitarian workers must be able to do their job safely and unhindered. And that UN premises and personnel remain safe from harm. All of this requires restraint on the part of Israel in the use of force. Mr President, the Kingdom of the Netherlands shares the concerns voiced by so many today. The situation for civilians in Gaza is catastrophic. They are in dire need of aid. We cannot afford to lose more time. So far, the first convoys have entered Gaza. We need a sustained flow of humanitarian aid of all basis needs. And much more is needed, including fuel. Water supplies need to be restored immediately. Humanitarian pauses are crucial to allow much-needed aid to get through. And a permanent humanitarian corridor is the only way to prevent the situation getting much worse. The Netherlands will step up its humanitarian response. We’ve committed an additional 10 million euros for immediate humanitarian relief; 8 million euros of which is for UNWRA. This funding aims to improve the living conditions for Palestinian citizens, including mental health and psychosocial support. We are also extremely concerned about the conflict spreading beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza. And we call on all concerned to prevent this from happening. We also urge all parties to do their utmost to prevent further escalation in the West Bank. In this context, we will continue with our development aid for stability. The Palestinian Authority fulfils an important role within their power in preventing a further deterioration and deserves our strong support. Settler violence is worsening an already tense situation. This must stop. Let me conclude, Mr President, by saying that our thoughts and prayers are with all the victims and the hostages that need to be released immediately and unconditionally. When the UN was created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the first major crises calling for urgent attention. Today, more than 75 years later, the need to find a solution to this conflict is more pressing and crucial than ever. The Netherlands calls on this Council to provide the leadership required to manage this crisis, contain it and provide perspective on sustainable peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians as the only way forward. In this context I would like to thank the tireless efforts of the UN and express my gratitude to the UN staff acting on the ground. We cannot go back to the status quo; the two-state solution is more urgently needed than ever. Because both sides need it, both sides are entitled to it, and both sides deserve it. Thank you, Mr President.

As the Israel-Hamas war enters its fourth week, the Kingdom of Jordan finds itself on the frontline of the conflict and King Abdullah II a central figure in the regional and global diplomatic efforts to contain it. Facing a complex set of domestic and external challenges even before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel and with a perilous ground war in Gaza now underway, the Hashemite Kingdom is bracing for a broader conflict and multiple spillover effects. A precarious reality at home and abroad Domestic pressures Jordan faces numerous challenges that King Abdullah II is under mounting pressure to address. Popular discontent with the perceived corruption and indifference of government officials and the royal family itself has been growing, though there are few signs that the survival of the monarchy is at risk. Fueling this discontent are the worsening socio-economic conditions after the Jordanian economy failed to absorb successive external shocks, namely the COVID‑19 pandemic and the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to official figures, the unemployment rate stood at 22.3% in Q2 2023 and over 40% for those aged 15‑24. Interest rates, which have continued to climb as the result of a sustained period of high inflation and the Jordanian currency’s peg to the United States dollar, are further squeezing household incomes. The price of essential goods remains elevated, by pre-2022 standards. Meanwhile, wage growth has broadly stagnated. Public debt has swelled to around 110% of GDP, increasing external debt service payments and thus placing a heavy burden on the country’s foreign currency reserves. About 27% of the population is living in poverty. Jordan’s persistent economic malaise has done little to dissipate the public anger and frustration that boiled over last December, when a nationwide strike over fuel price increases stemming from austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sparked riots in several large cities, featuring clashes between anti-government protesters and supporters of the king along with skirmishes between protesters and police. These latest disturbances are part of a recurring pattern marked by chronic economic and fiscal crises, outbursts of public anger, and limited reforms. But it is important to note that in the past couple of years, the state has met growing popular dissent and disgruntlement with heightened repression. External challenges Despite having succeeded in repressing jihadist attacks from infiltrating the kingdom and playing a pivotal role in inter-Arab reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Jordan has continued to grapple with the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war. At the same time, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. The kingdom is waging a tough battle against increasing drug and weapons trafficking and carrying a heavy refugee burden, further stretching its resources. Across its northern border with Syria, a prevailing state of lawlessness has transformed Jordan into a key transit route for the smuggling of captagon, a highly addictive and lucrative amphetamine, along with other drugs and weapons. In addition, the United Nations World Food Program’s (WFP) recent reduction by one-third of aid for the 119,000 Syrians residing in Jordan’s Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps has increased fiscal pressure on the government. Meanwhile, Jordan’s political relations with Israel have deteriorated. During Benjamin Netanyahu’s lengthy premiership (2009-2021), Jordan’s relations with Israel were frosty. Although bilateral relations somewhat improved during the 18-month tenure of Israel’s “Change Coalition” under Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid, the return of Netanyahu to power at the head of a hard right-nationalist coalition at the end of 2022 rekindled tensions. A rare meeting between King Abdullah and Netanyahu in Amman last January, aimed at easing tensions, was eclipsed three months later by a series of violent confrontations between Israeli police and Palestinians at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem. The 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel remains deeply unpopular in Jordan. According to a March 2022 survey conducted by The Jerusalem Post, 32% of respondents ranked Israel as the country that most threatens Jordan’s security, and 48% identified the Jewish state as the country most responsible for regional instability. The Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies’ Arab Opinion Index 2022, issued in January of this year, found that 94% of Jordanian respondents opposed any recognition of or ties with Israel. Raising the specter of an upsurge of violence in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip last December as a new hardline government in Israel was about to take office, King Abdullah warned in a CNN interview, “We have to be concerned about a next intifada. […] And if that happens, that’s a complete breakdown of law and order and one that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will benefit from.” The Jordanian leader could not have anticipated the shocking Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, yet his remarks at a conference in New York just two weeks earlier were prescient: “This belief by some in the region that you can parachute over Palestine — deal with the Arabs and work your way back — that does not work.” Grappling with conflict The war in Gaza has compounded the domestic and external challenges facing the Hashemite Kingdom. More than 2 million or 40% of all registered Palestinian refugees live in Jordan. Since the onset of the war, thousands of Jordanians have taken to the streets daily in Amman and around the country in pro-Palestinian rallies organized by opposition parties and to protest Israel’s bombing campaign and incursions into Gaza. Some young protesters attempted to storm the Israeli embassy while others reportedly demanded Jordanian authorities “open the borders” so they could join the fight to “liberate Palestine.” Hamas leaders have urged Jordanian tribes to enter the conflict against Israel. King Abdullah has faced growing calls to expel Israeli diplomats and abrogate Jordan’s peace deal with Israel. Two weeks into the war, at an emergency Middle Eastern summit in Cairo, the king channeled Jordanians’ growing public anger, harshly criticizing Israel for inflicting “collective punishment” on Gazan Palestinians. Jordanian diplomats have likewise lashed out publicly against Israel. Meanwhile, officials in Amman have directed their outrage and frustration not just at Israel but at Western “silence” in the face of Palestinian suffering and seemingly unconditional U.S. support for Israeli retribution. In an interview with CNN, Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent, decried the “glaring double standard […] in the face of such human suffering,” which “to many in our region it makes the Western world complicit.” On the 21st day of the conflict, a nonbinding resolution introduced by Jordan calling for “an immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, even as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the expansion of ground operations and a near-total communications blackout was imposed on the besieged enclave. As the war continues into its fourth week, Jordan is grappling with the multiple dimensions of a rapidly escalating conflict. On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have sought to contain the protests. The Ministry of Interior has banned gatherings and demonstrations in the Jordan Valley and border areas. Earlier, Jordanian police fired tear gas to disperse thousands of people protesting in an area around the Israeli embassy. Meanwhile, suspicion lingers that some Israelis may be flirting with the idea of a population transfer. Reflecting these concerns, a joint statement released during the Cairo summit, after King Abdullah’s meeting with Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, rejected “any attempt at the forced displacement of Gazans into Jordan and Egypt.” At an Oct. 17 press conference held following his meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, King Abdullah stated unequivocally, “There will be no refugees in Jordan and no refugees in Egypt,” declaring it a “red line.” Echoing the king, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi stated, alarmingly, that any attempt to displace Palestinians from the West Bank would be “considered a declaration of war.” The current conflict in Gaza has shaken the foundation of Jordan’s relationship with Israel. Reflecting the strain the conflict has placed on the relationship, Jordan has decided to pull its ambassador from Israel. Yet Jordan needs Israel and, thus, finds itself in a steadily worsening predicament. Facing a deepening water crisis and potentially destabilizing shortages, Jordan was inching closer to finalizing a binding agreement on a “climate barter” with Israel ahead of the 2023 U.N. Climate Change Conference (28th Conference of the Parties, COP28), when the Gaza war broke out. The initiative, dubbed Project Prosperity and sponsored by the United Arab Emirates, envisions the sale of desalinated water to Jordan from Israel and the purchase of green electricity by Israel from an Emirati-funded solar farm in Jordan. The Gaza war is likely at least to postpone, if not derail this project as well as delay completion of the previously approved “Jordan Gateway” joint industrial park. The possible adverse economic repercussions of the escalating conflict on Jordan extend beyond its relationship with Israel. Shortly before the Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, an IMF report warned that mounting economic pressures threatened the “sociopolitical stability” of Jordan as well as Egypt and Lebanon. Supporters of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), protesting against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, are blocking oil tanker trucks from crossing into Jordan, saying they will not allow Iraqi oil to be exported to countries that have peace agreements with Israel. Depending on how long the Israel-Hamas war lasts and is fought, Jordan could suffer a sharp decline in tourism and foreign investment as well as a disruption of cross-border trade. The grand U.S.-backed plan to build a multimodal India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which would pass through Jordan, could become a casualty of the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has also complicated Jordan’s relationship with the United States. King Abdullah, Washington’s longstanding, stalwart regional partner, canceled his meeting with President Joe Biden in Amman in the aftermath of the deadly blast at al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City. The U.S. veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a “humanitarian pause” in the conflict was surely greeted with displeasure in Amman. And the U.S. pledge of a $100 million package in humanitarian aid for the Palestinians reportedly was viewed by Jordanian (and Egyptian) officials as a token gesture. Because the U.S. is the single largest contributor of bilateral assistance to Jordan — aid that the country has come to greatly depend upon — Amman will likely tread carefully lest its differences with Washington over the conflict risk severely damaging the relationship. However, the longer the war and the greater the loss of civilian life in Gaza, the more difficult it will be for the Jordanian monarchy to balance the tasks of managing its relations with Washington on the one hand and the domestic political fallout from the conflict on the other. Conclusion Speaking at an Oct. 19 press conference, with diplomatic efforts having failed to yield results in ending the Gaza conflict, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Safad expressed his fear that “the worst is coming.” His apprehension appears to have been confirmed, as, a little over a week later, Israeli troops advanced into the northern part of the enclave, accompanied by a massive aerial and artillery bombardment and amid a communication blackout. With a dangerous new phase of the Israel-Hamas war having begun, Jordan awaits the repercussions, having little leverage and few policy options.

Up to this moment, Israel has demonstrated clear confusion and hesitation regarding launching its ground operation against Hamas and Gaza Strip (GS). Indeed, it has postponed the operation more than once for various pretexts, starting with bad weather conditions, the need to complete the mobilization of the forces necessary to launch the operation, responding to the US administration’s request to delay the operation to allow the release of civilian detainees, and then waiting for more US military support, which raises questions about the factors affecting the Israeli decision to launch a ground assault. One of the most important factors is the desire to restore the image of deterrence which collapsed and was greatly damaged in the October 7th attack, as well as, restoring the Israelis’ confidence, especially the settlers of the Gaza envelope, in the ability of their government and army to protect them and provide security for them. The Israeli political and military leadership realizes the difficulty of achieving this through mere air operations since, despite their brutality and size of human losses and destruction, Hamas still maintains its strength and capabilities and continues to engage in battle and fire rockets without interruption. Also, Israel’s declared goals of its current war, which are to end Hamas’ GS rule and knock out its military capacity, are difficult to achieve without a large ground invasion. Netanyahu and his ruling coalition know that Israelis assessment of the war’s outcomes will be based on the achievement of declared ambitious goals. In addition to the above, there is widespread and unprecedented Israeli political and popular support for launching a large-scale ground invasion that would destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and ends its danger and threat. In addition, there is immense Western support for Israel to take the necessary military steps to punish Hamas for its recent attack under the pretext of self-defence, which constitutes an encouraging factor to pursue the ground war option. However, there are other opposing factors, increasing the complexity of Israeli calculations, making the government hesitant and pushing towards delay. Mainly, the facts on the ground and the extent they make the Israeli leadership sure it would achieve military victory rather than getting involved in a new military failure that would be added to the fiasco of October 7th. The Israeli leadership is aware of the Palestinian forces readiness to engage in a ground confrontation and believes that Hamas did not launch a successful and accurate attack without preparing a defense and confrontation plan for a certain Israeli reaction. The strong reactions of the resistance to some Israeli exploratory manoeuvres to approach the GS outskirts in the Khan Yunis area have shown the extent of the resistance’s vigilance and readiness for confrontation and ground clashes. The psychological and moral dimension also plays an influential role in Israeli calculations. For Israel is aware of the collapsed morale of its military, and the need for time and effort to boost it before going into an extremely ferocious battle. Perhaps this what made Israel seek US forces assistance that the US administration claims have arrived as advisory missions. It has become clear that proceeding with the systematic destruction of the Strip and its infrastructure, the brutal killing of civilians and the application of the scorched earth policy would be a preferable temporary option before achieving complete readiness of the Israeli army and US logistical presence. This policy could also serve as an attempt to further exhaust the advocates and supporters of the resistance and create situations of restlessness among them, as well as exhaust the resistance, deplete its ammunition, and destroy as much of its infrastructure as possible. However, Israel might not find it suitable to embrace this policy indefinitely in light of the escalation of Arab and international popular momentum against the killing of civilians, the steadfastness of the resistance and the restlessness of the Israeli home front as well as the decline in the international cover for the occupation. The US position stands out as an influential factor in forming the Israeli decision to start the ground operation, which was highlighted by the discrepancy and disagreement between the position of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was influenced by US advice to delay the operation, and the position of his Army Minister Yoav Galant and the rest of the army leaders who are eager to launch it. At the same time, the US military buildup in the region seeks to support the Israeli side and is a warning message to Iran, Hezbollah, and the resistance forces, not to intervene effectively. Hence, it provides better conditions for the Israeli ground military attack that wants to deal a devastating blow to Hamas, the resistance forces and GS. Moreover, the hesitant US position is influenced by the fear that the ground war will cause the conflict in GS to spill into a regional confrontation with Hezbollah and other parties, who are threatening to engage fully in the confrontations in the event of a ground invasion. The strikes on US bases in Syria and Iraq by some Iran-affiliated groups have given additional indications of the potential dangers of starting the ground operation. The US does not hide its concerns about the expansion of the current confrontation in a way that exhausts its efforts and constitutes an important challenge to its strategy of calm and de-escalation in the region. It wants to focus on the challenges of the Ukrainian war and the escalation with China in the Taiwan file. In addition to the above, there is the issue of civilians detained by Hamas, a number of whom hold US citizenship. In this respect, the US administration prefers to provide an opportunity to release them before resorting to the option of ground war that might put their lives in danger. The possibility of mass casualties among Palestinian civilians in GS due to the ground attack is no longer an influential factor and sensitive issue for Israel, however, the matter may seem relatively different to the US side. For the US has confirmed its support and endorsement of Israel’s right to defend itself and target Hamas, but at the same time, it has mentioned the importance of avoiding killing civilians and the necessity of bringing humanitarian aid to the Strip. In conclusion, the possibilities of launching a ground operation against Hamas and GS are still strong and have many strong justifications, which makes it expected at any time. Its calculations are mainly related to field considerations and are influenced by the anxious and hesitant US position.

International aid groups are warning that they cannot deliver food and other basic services to people in the Gaza Strip and that a “dire” humanitarian crisis is set to worsen. International aid groups provide food and other means of support to about 63% of people in Gaza. Israel stopped allowing deliveries of food, fuel and other supplies to Gaza’s 2.3 million residents on Oct. 10, 2023, and is reportedly preparing for a ground invasion. On Oct. 12, 2023, Israel warned 1.1 million Gaza residents in the northern section of the enclave to leave for the southern region, in advance of a potential ground invasion. I am a scholar of peace and conflict economics and a former World Bank consultant, including during the 2014 war between Hamas and Israel. International aid groups now face the same problem in Gaza that local businesses and residents have encountered for about 16 years: a blockade that prevents civilians and items, like medicine from easily moving into or out of the enclosed area, roughly 25 miles long. That 16-year blockade did not apply to the food and fuel that groups brought in to Gaza. Now, it does. Gaza’s blockade and economy Gaza is about the size of Philadelphia and requires trade with different businesses and countries in order to maintain and grow its economy. But Gaza is heavily dependent on foreign aid. This is partially the result of Israel setting up permanent air, land and sea blockades around Gaza in 2007, one year after Hamas rose to political power. Egypt, which borders Gaza on its southern end, also oversees one checkpoint that specifically limits people coming and going. While Israel has granted permits to about 17,000 Gaza residents to enter and work in Israel, the food, fuel and medical supplies that people in Gaza use all first pass through Israel. Israel controls two physical checkpoints along Gaza, which monitor both the entry and exit of people and trucks. Israel limits the kind and quantity of materials that pass into Gaza. And the blockades generally prohibit Gazans who do not have work permits or special clearance – for medical purposes, for example – from entering Israel. Israel’s restrictions through the blockade intensified since Hamas’ surprise attack on 20 Israeli towns and several military bases on Oct. 7, with Israel then announcing a broad blockade of imports into Gaza. This stopped all food, fuel and medical supplies from entering the region. Gaza’s isolation The Palestinian enclaves of West Bank and Gaza – which are generally lumped together in economic analyses – both have small economies that run a massive deficit of US$6.6 billion in losses each year, as the value of the imports they receive greatly outweighs the value of the items they produce and sell elsewhere. More than 53% of Gaza residents were considered below the poverty line in 2020, and about 77% of Gazan households receive some form of aid from the United Nations and other groups, mostly in the form of cash or food. Gaza’s weak economy is caused by a number of complex factors, but the largest is the blockade and the economic and trade isolation it creates. For the average Gazan, the blockade has several practical effects, including people’s ability to get food. About 64% of people in Gaza are considered food insecure, meaning they do not have reliable access to sufficient amounts of food. Food as a percentage of Gaza’s total imports has skyrocketed by 50% since 2005, when Israel first imposed a temporary blockade. And the amount of food the West Bank and Gaza actually produce has tumbled by 30% since then. It is hard for Gaza to produce food within its own borders. One factor is that Israeli airstrikes hit Gaza’s only power generation plant and main sewage treatment plant in 2008 and again in 2018. These attacks resulted in the spread of sewage waste on land and in the water, destroying farmlands and food crops and threatening fish stocks in the ocean as well. The UN’s big role in Gaza Gaza’s weak economy and isolation because of the blockade mean that it relies heavily on international aid organizations to provide basic services to residents. The biggest of these aid groups in Gaza is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – also known as UNRWA. Today, UNRWA is the second-largest employer in Gaza, following Hamas. It provides the bulk of the education, food aid and health care services for people in Gaza, in addition to 3 million other people registered as Palestinian refugees who live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and other places. Over time, UNRWA has evolved into a kind of parallel government, alongside Hamas, which Israel, the United States and other countries designate as a terrorist organization. UNRWA funds and runs a network of 284 schools in Gaza alone, employing over 9,000 local people as staff and educating over 294,000 children each year. UNRWA runs 22 hospitals in Gaza that employ almost 1,000 health staff and has 3.3 million patient visits per year. Its schools are converted into humanitarian shelters in times of crisis, such as the current war. People can go there to get clean water, food, mattresses and blankets, showers and more. The number of people in Gaza who are displaced from their homes has quickly risen over the last few days, totaling over 330,000 on Oct. 12, 2023. Over two-thirds of these people are staying in UNRWA schools. A complicated US relationship The U.S. has historically been the single-largest funder of UNRWA, a U.N. agency that relies on governments to support its work. The U.S. gave more than $500 million to Palestinians from April 2021 through March 2022, including more than $417 million that went to UNRWA. U.S. support to UNRWA has fluctuated throughout different presidential administrations. Total U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza peaked at $1 billion in 2009 – after Israel sealed off the territory. It reached $1 billion in annual contributions again in 2013, when former Secretary of State John Kerry helped restart peace talks between Israel and Hamas. In 2018, the Trump Administration cut almost all of the money the U.S. typically gives to UNRWA, amounting to roughly 30% of the organization’s total budget. Defenders of the policy change cited UNRWA-published textbooks that allegedly glorified jihad. UNRWA, for its part, maintained that, as an outside organization, it can only use the educational materials the country it is working in wants. The Biden administration then restored funding to UNRWA and other organizations helping Palestinians in 2021. Some Republican politicians have said that UNRWA has “cozied up” to Hamas. And an internal UNRWA ethics committee has accused top staff at the agency of “sexual misconduct, nepotism, retaliation … and other abuses of authority” that created a toxic work environment. Meanwhile, since the war between Israel and Hamas began on Oct. 8, more than 1,500 Gazans have been killed and more than 5,300 injured, while Hamas attacks have killed more than 1,300 people in Israel and injured about 3,200 others. International aid groups and European Union officials have called for a humanitarian corridor to be set up in Gaza – meaning a protected path specifically for civilians, aid workers and necessary basic items to pass through safely back and forth from Gaza to Israel and Egypt. So far, there are no clear plans for such a protected pathway.

The parallels were striking – and surely not coincidental. Exactly 50 years and a day after being taken completely off guard by a coordinated military attack by its neighbors – Egypt and Syria – Israel was again caught by surprise. Early on Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas militants invaded southern Israel by land, sea and air, and fired thousands of rockets deep into the country. Within hours, hundreds of Israelis were killed, hostages taken and war declared. Fierce Israeli reprisals have already taken the lives of hundreds of Palestinians in Gaza, and many more will surely be dead by the time this war is over. Because war it is. After the Hamas attacks began and the Israeli death toll grew, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the country is at war, just as it was 50 years ago. And that is not where the parallels end. Both wars began with surprise attacks on Jewish holy days. In 1973, it was Yom Kippur, a day of atonement for Jews. This time it was Simchat Torah, when Jews celebrate reading the Torah. Hamas, the Palestinian militant group in control of the densely populated Gaza Strip that adjoins Israel, seemingly hopes to send the same message that Egypt and Syria delivered in October 1973: They will not accept the status quo, and Israel’s military might will not keep Israelis safe.   The 1973 war proved to be a watershed moment not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but also for the politics of Israel. Will this war be the same? Caught flat-footed both times Certainly, the sudden outbreak of war has again left Israelis deeply shocked, just as it did 50 years ago. This war, like the one in 1973, is already being framed as a colossal intelligence failure. Although Israeli military intelligence had warned the government that the country’s enemies believed Israel vulnerable, the intelligence establishment did not expect Hamas to attack. Rather, the intelligence assessment was that Hamas was most interested in governing the Gaza Strip and didn’t want to have a war with Israel, at least not for a while. The assumption was that Hamas would be deterred from carrying out major attacks in Israel out of fear of Israel’s potential disproportionate retaliation bringing more devastation to Gaza. The enclave, home to 2 million Palestinians, many living in poverty, has still not recovered from the last major round of fighting in May 2021. Instead, the intelligence establishment, and many analysts, believed that Hamas preferred to export Palestinian violence to the Israeli-occupied West Bank, where it could help to undermine the already weak and unpopular Palestinian Authority, led by Hamas’ political rival. Their intelligence assessment has proved to be terribly wrong, just as it was prior to the outbreak of the 1973 war. Then, as now, Israel’s adversaries were not deterred by its military superiority. Israeli intelligence not only misjudged the willingness of adversaries to go to war, but it also failed – both in 1973 and now – to recognize their enemy’s preparations. This time, that failure is even more glaring given Israel’s extensive and sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. Hamas must have been carefully planning this attack for many months, right under Israel’s nose. This is undoubtedly Israel’s worst intelligence failure since the 1973 war. But it is not only an intelligence failure, it is also a military failure. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, was clearly not prepared for an attack of this magnitude – indeed, most IDF units were deployed in the West Bank. It is true that IDF’s top brass had repeatedly warned Netanyahu that its military readiness had been diminished by the wave of Israeli reservists refusing to serve in protest of the government’s attempted judicial overhaul. Nonetheless, the IDF was confident that its defensive fortifications – especially the expensive hi-tech barrier that had been built around the Gaza Strip – would prevent Hamas militants from entering Israel, as they had previously done in a May 2021 raid. But just as the so-called Bar-Lev defensive line along the Suez Canal failed to stop Egyptian soldiers from crossing the canal in 1973, the Gaza barrier did not stop Hamas militants. It was simply circumvented and bulldozed through. The blame game begins There will surely be the same blame game after this war as there was after the 1973 war. A commission of inquiry will probably be established, as happened after the 1973 war – the Agranat Commission – which published a scathing report, pointing the finger of blame firmly in the direction of Israel’s military and intelligence establishment. But it is not Israel’s military and intelligence establishment that deserves most of the blame for this war. It is Israel’s political establishment – above all, Netanyahu, who has led the country since 2009, save for a one-year exception between 2021-2022. The 1973 war was also due to a political failure, not only an intelligence failure. In fact, it was Israel’s political leadership, chiefly Prime Minister Golda Meir and her defense minister Moshe Dayan, that was primarily to blame because in the years before the war they had spurned diplomatic overtures from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Israeli government was determined to retain parts of the Sinai peninsula – which Israel had captured in the 1967 war – even at the price of peace with Egypt. Similarly, Netanyahu has ignored recent Egyptian efforts to broker a long-term truce between Israel, Hamas and fellow militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad. And Israel’s current far-right government prefers to retain the occupied West Bank rather than pursue the possibility of peace with the Palestinians. Moreover, the Netanyahu government has been preoccupied with its widely unpopular attempt to reduce the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court, a move seemingly aimed at removing a potential obstacle to a formal annexation of the West Bank. The domestic turmoil and deep divisions that the proposed judicial overhaul have created in Israel is almost certainly one reason why Hamas decided to attack now. More broadly, with the latest attack it is clear that Netanyahu’s strategy to contain and deter Hamas has failed catastrophically. It has been catastrophic for Israelis, especially those living in the south of the country, and even more so for Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Maintaining a blockade of Gaza for 16 years, crippling its economy and effectively imprisoning its 2 million residents, has not brought Hamas to its knees. Rather, Hamas’ control over Gaza, sustained by repression, has only tightened. Innocent civilians on both sides of the border have paid a high price for this failure. In the wake of the 1973 war, Meir was forced to resign, and a few years later, the ruling Labor Party – which had been in power, in various guises, since the country’s founding in 1948 – was defeated by Menachem Begin’s right-wing Likud Party in the 1977 general election. This was a watershed moment in Israeli domestic politics that was brought about in large part by the public’s loss of confidence in the then-dominant Labor Party as a result of the 1973 war. Will history repeat itself this time around? Will this war finally spell the end for Netanyahu and Likud’s long dominance of Israeli politics? Most Israelis have already turned against Netanyahu, repelled by the mix of corruption scandals that surround him, his attempts to downgrade the power of the judiciary and the lurch to the right that his ruling coalition represents. More Israelis may now do so because this devastating surprise attack surely contradicts any claim by Netanyahu of being Israel’s “Mr. Security.” Whatever the outcome of this new war and its political repercussions in Israel, it is already clear that its outbreak will be long remembered by Israelis with great sadness and anger, just like the 1973 war still is. Indeed, it will probably be even more traumatic for Israelis than that war was because while in 1973 it was members of the military bearing the brunt of the surprise assault, this time it is Israeli civilians who have been captured and killed, and on sovereign Israeli territory. In this crucial respect, then, this war is unlike the one in 1973.

There will be only one winner in the war that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas. And it is neither Israel nor Hamas.  In an operation coined “the Al-Aqsa Storm,” Hamas, whose formal name is the Islamic Resistance Movement, fired thousands of rockets into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters infiltrated Israel by land, sea and air. Hundreds of Israelis have been killed, more than 2,000 injured, and many taken hostage. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared war on Hamas and launched airstrikes in Gaza. In the first day of reprisals, close to 400 Palestinians were killed, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. In the weeks ahead, the Israeli military will surely retaliate and kill hundreds more Palestinian militants and civilians. As an analyst of Middle East politics and security, I believe that thousands on both sides will suffer. But when the smoke settles, only one country’s interests will have been served: Iran’s. Already, some analysts are suggesting that Tehran’s fingerprints can be seen on the surprise attack on Israel. At the very least, Iran’s leaders have reacted to the assault with encouragement and support. The decisive factor shaping Iran’s foreign policy was the 1979 overthrow of the U.S.-friendly, repressive Shah of Iran and the transfer of state power into the hands of a Shiite Muslim revolutionary regime. That regime was defined by stark anti-American imperialism and anti-Israeli Zionism. The revolution, its leaders claimed, was not just against the corrupt Iranian monarchy; it was intended to confront oppression and injustice everywhere, and especially those governments backed by the United States – chief among them, Israel. For Iran’s leaders, Israel and the United States represented immorality, injustice and the greatest threat to Muslim society and Iranian security. The enduring hostility felt toward Israel is in no small part due to its close ties with the shah and Israel’s role in his sustained oppression of the Iranian people. Together with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Israel’s intelligence service, the Mossad, helped organize the shah’s secret police and intelligence service, the SAVAK. This organization relied on increasingly harsh tactics to put down dissenters during the shah’s last two decades in power, including mass imprisonment, torture, disappearances, forced exile and killing thousands of Iranians.  Israel under attack in shock Hamas operation  Support for Palestinian liberation was a central theme of Iran’s revolutionary message. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon – in retaliation for Lebanon-based Palestinian attacks against Israel – provided Iran an opportunity to live up to its anti-Zionist rhetoric by challenging Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and checking U.S. influence in the region.  Subsidizing conflict  To that end, Iran sent its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a branch of Iran’s military, usually known as the “Revolutionary Guard” – to Lebanon to organize and support Lebanese and Palestinian militants. In Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, Revolutionary Guardsmen instructed Shiite resistance fighters in religion, revolutionary ideology and guerrilla tactics, and provided weapons, funds, training and encouragement. Iran’s leadership transformed these early trainees from a ragtag band of fighters into Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force today, and Iran’s greatest foreign policy success, Hezbollah. Since the early 1980s, Iran has maintained support for anti-Israeli militant groups and operations. The Islamic Republic has publicly pledged millions of dollars of annual support to groups and provides advanced military training for thousands of Palestinian fighters at Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah bases in Iran and Lebanon. Iran runs a sophisticated smuggling network to funnel weapons into Gaza, which has long been cut off from the outside world by an Israeli blockade. Via the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, Iran has encouraged and enabled Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas violence, and these Palestinian fighters now represent a crucial element in what foreign affairs analysts call Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the United States, which constitutes Iran’s chief purpose.  But Iran cannot risk confronting either state directly.  Iranian weapons, funds and training enable surges in Palestinian militant violence against Israel when frustrations boil over, including during the Palestinian uprisings known as the first and second intifadas. Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and death tolls have escalated steadily since 2020. Palestinians are outraged by increased evictions and destruction of property, and how Israel allows Israeli nationalists and settlers to violate a long-standing agreement preventing Jewish prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque – a site holy to both Muslims and Jews. In fact, a recent incursion by settlers into Al-Aqsa was specifically cited by Hamas as a justification for the Oct. 7 attack.  Attacking normalization  That is not to say that Iran ordered Hamas’ attack on Israel, nor that Iran controls Palestinian militants – they are not Iranian puppets. Nevertheless, Iran’s leaders welcomed the attacks, the timing of which serendipitously works in Iran’s favor and plays into the Islamic republic’s regional battle for influence. “What took place today is in line with the continuation of victories for the anti-Zionist resistance in different fields, including Syria, Lebanon and occupied lands,” according to Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani. The week before the Hamas attack, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman denied reports that Saudi Arabia had paused its recent efforts to normalize relations with Israel, which includes a formal declaration of Israel’s right to exist and increased diplomatic engagement. “Every day we get closer,” he said, an assessment praised and echoed by Netanyahu. Israeli-Saudi normalization would represent the pinnacle of achievement thus far in U.S. diplomatic efforts, including the Abraham Accords, signed by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco in 2020. The accords aimed to normalize and build peaceful relations between Israel and Arab countries across the Middle East and in Africa. Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei lambasted Arab states for signing the Abraham Accords, accusing them of “treason against the global Islamic community.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah praised Saturday’s violence against Israel and echoed Khamenei’s sentiments, warning that the attacks sent a message, “especially to those seeking normalization with this enemy.” Israel’s expected heavy-handed response is likely to complicate Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel in the near term, furthering Iran’s aims. Netanyahu said that Israel’s retaliatory operation seeks three objectives: to eliminate the threat of infiltrators and restore peace to attacked Israeli communities, to simultaneously “exact an immense price from the enemy” in Gaza, and to reinforce “other fronts so that nobody should mistakenly join this war.” This last objective is a subtle but clear warning to Hezbollah and Iran to stay out of the fight. Israeli troops have already mobilized to secure its borders, and airstrikes have hit Gaza. In all likelihood, Palestinian attackers will be killed or arrested in a matter of days. Israeli troops and air forces will target known or suspected rocket launch, manufacturing, storage and transportation sites, along with the homes of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members. But in the process, hundreds of civilians will likely also lose their lives. I believe that Iran expects and welcomes all of this.  How Iran wins  There are at least three possible outcomes to the war, and they all play in Iran’s favor. First, Israel’s heavy-handed response may turn off Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to U.S.-backed Israeli normalization efforts. Second, if Israel deems it necessary to push further into Gaza to eradicate the threat, this could provoke another Palestinian uprising in East Jerusalem or the West Bank, leading to a more widespread Israeli response and greater instability. Lastly, Israel could achieve its first two objectives with the minimal amount of force necessary, foregoing usual heavy-handed tactics and reducing chances of escalation. But this is unlikely. And even if this occurred, the underlying causes that led to this latest outbreak of violence, and the enabling role Iran plays in that process, have not been addressed. And when the next round of Israeli-Palestinian violence occurs – and it will – I believe Iran’s leaders will again congratulate themselves for a job well done.

Israel’s parliament passed a law on July 24, 2023, that limits the Supreme Court’s ability to rein in government actions, part of a broader proposal by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to strengthen the power of the country’s executive branch. The legislation has divided the country for months, sparking massive demonstrations. Opponents say the law threatens democracy; supporters argue it protects the will of the electoral majority. Netanyahu has been a political force and survivor in Israeli politics since the 1990s. Yet it makes sense to assess his career now in light of his recent hospitalizations, the latest coming in the middle of the court reform crisis. As a scholar of Middle Eastern politics, I think that Netanyahu’s long-term legacy will be based on three major developments. He has shifted Israeli politics rightward. He has stymied the emergence of a Palestinian state. He has increased Israel’s links to nondemocratic foreign governments. From democracy to theocracy Netanyahu served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999. He returned to power from 2009 to 2021, and once again in 2022. A country once known for left-leaning politics now has a right-wing government dominated by Jewish religious nationalists who spearheaded the efforts to curb judicial checks on executive power. Netanyahu began his first term as prime minister in 1996 with two main qualities – experience living and working in the U.S. and a record focused on Israeli’s military security. The first quality meant he understood American politics and interest groups. That helped Israel keep and enhance its historic strong support from the U.S. government. The second set him up for political success in a country in which the army is a key – and revered – institution. Massive U.S. foreign aid and military assistance over many years, along with Netanyahu’s political backing, have ensured that Israel’s army is far more powerful and well equipped than the armed forces of any other nearby country. Netanyahu typically portrayed himself as the only leader who could keep his country and its economy secure. Like other elected strongmen, he and his allies have gained support from, and encouraged, right-wing nationalists and divisive politics. With Netanyahu, that meant allying himself strongly with Jewish settlers – many of them Orthodox – in the West Bank in what international law considers to be occupied Palestinian territory. Because Orthodox Jewish families tend to be larger than more secular ones, Israel’s demography has favored politicians and voters who skew towards Netanyahu’s consistent support for the settler movement and broader focus on security. The longer Netanyahu has held power in Israel, the more allegations of corruption and criminal conduct he has faced. His personal legal vulnerability has likely reinforced his autocratic tendencies. Netanyahu’s 2022 government demonstrated its authoritarian tilt with the push for the judicial reform bill that will hobble the Israeli judiciary’s capacity to review legislation and government action. This reform appeals to important sectors of Netanyahu’s supporters who see the Supreme Court’s power as an inappropriate secular check on Israel’s increasingly pro-settler and pro-Orthodox government. But it has been divisive: The mass protests against the reform have even spread to prominent military personnel. Today’s Israel is marked by growing splits between secular, urbanized citizens near the Mediterranean coast and Orthodox and other settlers in or near the West Bank. The two groups have different visions for Israel’s future, with the latter citizens pushing the country in a more theocratic direction. This divisive battle over Israel’s nature owes a great deal to Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership. Distancing Palestinians Netanyahu has long pledged to avoid compromising with Palestinians over control of territory and security in the West Bank and Gaza, areas under Israeli military control since 1967. And he allowed rapid expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. He has rarely wavered from these two policies. Among his most tangible legacies is the physical barrier now separating West Bank Palestinians from Israelis, which gives Israeli authorities great control over how West Bank Palestinians enter Israel. The barrier has kept Israeli Jews from much contact with Palestinians other than during military service. This physical separation and a strong Israeli military presence have decreased Palestinian attacks within Israel and increased misery in Palestinian-controlled areas, for example, by making travel into Israel and other countries difficult. Netanyahu’s approach has minimized pressure on Jewish Israelis to make a final deal that would trade occupied land for a broader peace based on separate Israeli and Palestinian states. It has also deprived Palestinians of some basic liberties and opportunities, particularly in Gaza, which human rights activists have called an “open-air prison.” In fact, Netanyahu has used his formidable military to strike hard when he deems necessary in Gaza, the area between Israel and Egypt that Israel unilaterally returned to Palestinian control in 2004. Hamas, a Palestinian group that advocates military action against Israel, is in charge of Gaza. Reflecting the sentiments of his right-wing base, Netanyahu has had a generally consistent response to Hamas, and Palestinians more generally. Israel, he says, awaits Palestinian consensus that Israel is a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital, and with no right for Palestinians to return to their pre-1948 homes in Israel. Many Palestinians find these conditions unfair, particularly as a precondition to negotiations. Coupled with the Netanyahu government’s vast expansion of Jewish settlements, many veteran observers doubt that a two-state solution with Israeli and Palestinian states remains possible. Reshaping Israel’s alliances Bolstering the Israeli right and undermining Palestinian statehood have accompanied efforts by Netanyahu to reshape Israel’s foreign relations. Those efforts stem in part from his relentless drive to curb Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Tehran’s leaders are unremittingly hostile toward Israel. Netanyahu has played up this hostility to domestic and international audiences, even urging the U.S. to attack Iran. The prime minister’s anti-Iranian campaign connects to strengthening ties to other countries, whether or not they are democratic, with an interest in combating Tehran and its funding of pro-Iranian militant groups, which encourage anti-Israeli politics and attacks in many Arab countries. Shared security goals, perhaps more than anything else, explain the significant willingness of the United Arab Emirates and several other Arab countries to establish diplomatic ties with Israel through the Abraham Accords of 2020. More generally, Netanyahu’s long time in office and his willingness to fan racist flames have endeared him to other rulers who embrace authoritarian or divisive tactics, such as Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former U.S. President Donald Trump. Yet Netanyahu’s policies are also causing major cracks in support for Israel from its central ally, the U.S. In recent years, Israeli and American Jews have diverged increasingly on the ethics and importance of Palestinian autonomy. In turn, organizations working with the Israeli government have tried to silence pro-Palestinian voices in the U.S., often by calling them anti-Semitic. Moreover, Netanyahu’s authoritarian tendencies and his government’s rightist and theocratic tendencies have amplified American voices of those who have been skeptical that Israel is democratic and who have called for reductions in U.S. support. Netanyahu has helped reshape Israel and the broader world in profound ways. It’s clear that the country’s military security and cooperation with major Arab states in the Middle East have expanded. But I see the darker side of the prime minister’s emphasis on military and security solutions in the erosion of hopes for Palestinians and challenges for Israel to remain democratic.

The Arab-Israeli settlement remains one of the important challenges in the foreign policy activities of the Joe Biden administration, whose strategy, following the logic of the continuity of the traditional course of supporting Israel, is aimed at overcoming the inconsistency in American policy in this direction and at finding approaches to neutralize threats from other actors, seeking to expand their influence in the region. In maintaining American leadership in the Middle East, the United States faces both internal and external challenges. Iran remains one of the main external challenges, which is perceived by Washington as the main threat in the Middle East and beyond, also occupying a central place in Israel's foreign policy strategy. Given the general priority importance of the Iranian topic for both countries, the positions of the current US administration and the Israeli government differ regarding the degree of trust in the statements of the Iranian leadership and readiness to return to the previous level of negotiations, violated by D. Trump's sharp demarche. At the same time, being a pivot point of mutual understanding, the Iranian agenda can “muffle” the differences between the parties on the Palestinian issue and move the direction of the Arab-Israeli settlement – Israel manages to use the topic of Iranian influence in the region, which is sensitive for the United States, to advance its interests, emphasizing the security issue in the Middle East region. The second external challenge for maintaining US leadership in the peace process is the growing role of China, the main strategic competitor of the US, as a peaceful mediator in international affairs (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, in Iranian-Saudi relations) and in the context of increasing Sino-Israeli economic cooperation. China has a dominant position in Israel's imports in 2021-2022 and is Israel's third largest investor. Israel's diversification of partnerships will ultimately make it possible, if not to reduce the role of the United States in the Middle East as a whole, then to realize its foreign policy interests without the need to take undesirable compromise steps on the Palestinian issue. The main internal challenge for the United States remains the party split, which gives other participants in the Arab-Israeli resolution process a reason to question the exclusive role of Washington in it. The inconsistency of American policy in this area largely stems from the difference in the approaches of Democrats and Republicans to achieving the same goal - maintaining and strengthening security in the region. If the commitment to US-Israeli security cooperation remains the same regardless of which party is in power, then unconditional support for Israel remains a point of contention between the two parties. Traditionally, Democrats are more critical in assessing Israel's domestic policy, in particular in the issue of building new settlements in disputed territories. One of the most striking cases of manifestation of such inter-party contradictions occurred during B. Obama's trip to the Middle East in the spring of 2013. Then B. Obama proposed a formula for in-depth regional cooperation with equal consideration for the interests of both sides of the conflict, recognizing the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the creation of their own national state while condemning the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Meanwhile, despite inter-party disagreements, Israel retains its place as a unique and priority ally and partner of the United States, and the essence of their "special" relationship is not subject to systemic changes. Thus, at the end of B. Obama's presidency, the third Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the United States and Israel. The ten-year military-economic plan, first adopted by the B. Clinton administration and supported by B. Obama, provides allocation of $3.3 billion for military financing and $500 million for joint missile defense programs for the period of 2018–2028. During the presidency of D. Trump, the delicate balance of American policy in the region swung again towards exclusive support for Israel. The progressive political rhetoric of the Democratic President in support of the Palestinians was followed by an equally unexpected symbolic gesture of the Republican President towards Israel: in 2017, D. Trump did something that no other American president dared to do - announced the transfer of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The decision to move the embassy was criticized by the world community, and Hamas again declared an intifada against Israel. And although Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hastened to smooth over the effect of his president’s grand gesture, saying that the decision to move the embassy does not change the status of Jerusalem in any way, the new embassy was nevertheless opened in May 2018. Subsequently, this step was also supported by the Democratic Party. At the same time, the Trump administration continued the regional format for resolving Middle East conflicts by signing the Abraham Accords. At the same time, M. Pompeo announced that the approach, fixed by the United States in 1978, that the construction of Israeli settlements on the West Bank was inconsistent with international law, did not contribute to the development of negotiations. By doing this, he signaled Washington's support for Israel's new plans for the construction of settlements, which, in turn, did not hesitate to start implementing them. And the ultimatum plan “Peace to prosperity” presented by D. Trump completely ridiculed the Palestinians’ claims to build a state within the borders before 1967 and was regarded by the UN Human Rights Council as a violation of international law and the rights of Palestinians under occupation. This position of the Republican administration provoked criticism from the Democrats. As expected, after the change of party control over the federal government in 2021 in the House of Representatives, the progressive Democratic wing proposed a bill to resolve the conflict based on the principle of Two-State Solution Act, which reflected concerns about Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The bill includes monitoring the funds allocated under the ten-year plan (MoU) and other financial assistance, so that they are not used by the Israeli authorities for further annexation of disputed territories. The document also pays special attention to the term "occupied territories", it is proposed to mention such a wording in all official communications and documents regarding the territory of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. At the same time, changes in the US-Israeli security policy are not supported by the legislation. Unlike his predecessors, J. Biden, from the very beginning of his presidency, tried to avoid such steps that could further destabilize the situation between the conflicting parties. The administration returned to the traditional principles of the Democratic Party in the Middle East - the principle of the unacceptability of the expansion of settlements, the continuation of the policy of ensuring the security of Israel and involving this country in regional cooperation with Arab countries in the spirit of the "Abraham Accords", protecting the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians equally and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This position was repeatedly emphasized by the US President in September-October 2022, as well as by Secretary of State A. Blinken during meetings in 2023. As part of the efforts made, contacts between the US and UNRWA were restored, and funding for programs was resumed. The elections of the Prime Minister of Israel, held in the fall of 2022, led to ambiguous results, from the point of view of some American experts, and became a new problematic factor in the settlement issue. The victory of the Likud party under the leadership of B. Netanyahu and the coalition government formed by him with the right wing represented by Religious Zionism, Shas and Yahadut Ha Torah caused fears among representatives of both US parties and lobbyist organizations. First of all, the American leadership was alarmed by the connection of the current members of the coalition with an organization recognized as terrorist in the USA. Kahane Hai was officially designated a terrorist organization in Washington from October 1997 to May 2022, and has been a “specially designated global terrorist organization” since last year. It is also critically perceived that part of the new government called for a reduction in the powers of the Israeli Supreme Court, the return of the death penalty for those accused of terrorism, some supported the Russian policy towards Ukraine. Despite the fact that the results of the 2022 elections are perceived in Washington as a serious blow to Israeli democracy, they fully reflect public sentiment. Based on the polls, the vast majority of Israeli voters (62%) identify themselves as right-wing. This means that the Americans, one way or another, will have to reckon with this factor and start a sustainable dialogue with this political force. In general, the United States welcomed Netanyahu's victory in the elections, but emphasizing the special status of relations with Israel, common interests and values and the intention to cooperate with the new government, focusing on its policies, and not on individuals, clearly declares its readiness to prevent any attempts to undermine the efforts to stabilize the situation in vulnerable areas. In fact, despite the existing concerns and even rejection of certain positions of the new Israeli government, the US is ready to accept their right-wing conservative rhetoric as part of the Israeli democratic choice. The current formula of American policy in this area is that the United States will continue to promote its vision of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on protecting the interests of both sides of the conflict, but Israel's security will remain an American priority and will determine a restrained reaction to Tel Aviv's policy regarding disputed territories. The reason for this duality, in addition to traditional inter-party disagreements, may also be a shift in the focus of the security dialogue from the Palestinian issue to the Iranian threat. The contours of the problems outlined signal that the very inconsistency of the American policy regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iranian problem is becoming a factor that delays the prospect of Washington playing the role of the main regional mediator and peacemaker. In this regard, the emergence of new approaches on the part of other powers and a change in the alignment of forces in the region should be considered natural, which is the basis of the challenge for the Joe Biden administration. Nevertheless, the consistency of the White House in relation to ensuring Israeli security is the main stable link, which, firstly, guarantees the American presence in the Middle East, and, secondly, smooths out the corners of emerging contradictions in US-Israeli relations. Thus, the main task for Washington remains to restore the traditional Democratic balanced approach to Middle East politics and overcome the threats and problems posed by Iran, the new Israeli coalition government, and China as a new significant actor in the Middle East.

Egypt is advancing an initiative with Hamas and Islamic Jihad for a long-term ceasefire for Gaza; Israel is not directly involved in these talks. Although the chances of a hudna are slim, Israel would do well not to reject the Egyptian initiative and should, rather, enable the economic projects it includes At a meeting in Cairo in early June 2023, Egypt presented leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad the framework for a hudna in the Gaza Strip, i.e., a long-term ceasefire. Israel is not officially involved in the initiative, which would bring it some clear benefits, including prolonged security calm and Cairo’s willingness for deeper involvement in Gaza. These benefits are not obviated by the fact that Hamas would also benefit from the initiative, which includes plans for broader infrastructure and economic projects, providing the organization with an opportunity to continue its political and military intensification. Nonetheless, Hamas is not enthusiastic about the Egyptian initiative. In any case, Israel would be well advised not to oppose the initiative, even though it involves giving up on three principles: (1) Israel would presumably give a “green light” to Hamas and Islamic Jihad to continue to execute terror attacks in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Israel itself, as well as from southern Lebanon. (2) Israel would concede its demand that any arrangement include the return of soldiers’ bodies and civilians held hostage in Gaza. (3) The lack of an effective response to Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s growing strength would continue. On June 4-6, 2023, senior Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders visited Cairo at the invitation of Major General Abbas Kamel, the director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate. The Palestinian delegation was headed by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh (accompanied by his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, and the head of the organization’s “external” bureau, Khaled Mashal), and the leader of Islamic Jihad, Ziyad al-Nakhaleh. At the meeting, the Egyptians presented an initiative for a long-term ceasefire – a hudna – in the Gaza Strip. Discussions were influenced by the results of Operation Shield and Arrow, which highlighted Israel’s capability to carry out targeted killing operations, as well as by the atmosphere of recent agreements across the Middle East, leading to reduced tensions and violence. The basis for the discussions was a proposal for a long-term ceasefire coupled with Cairo’s willingness to help calm the security situation on the Gaza front and participate in reconstructing the area, with the political support of the United States and financial assistance from Qatar. Cairo’s motivation for becoming more involved in Gaza lies in the economic and political rewards it would enjoy in this context, as well as its success in launching local infrastructure projects. For example, three Egyptian construction projects of high-rise housing in Jabaliya and Bet Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip have already reached an advanced stage and are nearly ready for occupancy. Similarly, there are plans to develop the a-Rashid coastal road, which runs parallel to the sea in northern Gaza. The Egyptian Initiative includes the following projects: ● Expansion of the el-Arish port in the northern Sinai Peninsula, allowing it to become a cargo port for all of the Gaza Strip; a paved highway for trucks to enter Gaza; and expanded trade between Egypt and Gaza via the Salah al-Din crossing. ● Connected electricity systems that would distribute power from Egypt to the Strip. ● Development of the Gaza Marine natural gas field that lies off the coast of the Strip. This would require the involvement of the Palestinian Authority, since the PA is recognized as the Palestinian government, which has the rights to the gas reserves. It is possible that this is reason that Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh visited Cairo a week before the Hamas and Islamic Jihad delegations. ● Establishment of a free-trade zone between the northern Sinai and the Gaza Strip. ● Egyptian insistence that the Palestinian Authority remain in the picture by reestablishing its control over the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing between Hamas-run Gaza and Egypt – just as it was until four years ago. It was also reported that to enable the conditions for long term ceasefire in Gaza, Egypt, in its talks with Iran, demanded that Tehran refrain from using its proxies – primarily Palestinian Islamic Jihad – and that it do nothing to undermine the nascent agreement between Cairo and the Palestinian factions that are under the influence of the Islamic Republic. At this stage, Israel is not directly involved in the talks, but it has apparently been briefed about them. As part of the Egyptian proposal, Israel will be required to make certain commitments, including adhering to a long-term ceasefire, refraining from carrying out targeted killing operations against senior Palestinian commanders, further easing of the restrictions on movement of people and goods from Gaza into Israel, and agreement on gas production from Gaza’s exclusive economic zone.                                                Perspectives The absence of two important Palestinian leaders from the meeting in Cairo – Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas – suggests that Egypt exerted no pressure on the Palestinians regarding internal reconciliation or elections. It is much more convenient for Sinwar to allow Hamas’s external leadership to be in the front of the negotiations so that he will not have to explain the missing elements in the hudna settlement, including the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the total lifting of what they see as the Israeli siege of Gaza. In his current situation, Abbas is not a relevant actor on the Gaza front, with the exception of the agreements over gas production, and it even seems that Cairo has given up on its efforts to persuade him to promote intra-Palestinian reconciliation. The Egyptian incentive includes the promotion of Egyptian economic projects in the Gaza Strip, which will be highly beneficial to Cairo (expansion of the el-Arish airport and electricity infrastructure in Rafah and el-Arish, construction of a highway to allow quick access for goods, and development of the Gaza Marine gas field). In addition, the most recent round of fighting between Israel and Islamic Jihad in May – which coincided with Ramadan – made it clear to Egypt the challenge in mediating in an event with multiple actors and addresses, some of whom are located outside the Gaza Strip and are under the influence of Iran and Hezbollah. Therefore, Egypt wants to make the rules of the game clear yet again: as far as it is concerned, there is only one Palestinian actor that is responsible for what happens in the Gaza Strip, namely Hamas. Moreover, it wants to safeguard its exclusive role as mediator with Israel. The Israeli game: It is convenient for Israel to remain outside of the negotiations – certainly the open talks – whether or not by choice. This frees Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from having to explain to his radical right partners in the coalition why Israel is making deals with Hamas and why the agreement does not include the return of captive Israelis and the bodies of Israeli soldiers held by Hamas. In addition, Egypt is responsible for all the initial elements of the agreement, so Israel can downplay the significance of what it is being asked to concede (beyond the understandings that currently exist, especially its policy vis-à-vis the border crossings and permits for some 18,500 Gazan laborers to enter Israel). Israel is not being asked to change its policy on the Temple Mount or in Jerusalem, or to limit its own freedom of operation to conduct counterterror missions. Consequences if Egypt Succeeds in Achieving a Hudna 1. Strengthening Hamas’s role in the Gaza Strip: Hamas is the force factor with which Israel must advance a long-term ceasefire in Gaza, while neutralizing Islamic Jihad. Hamas would benefit from the arrangement, with the continued easing of the closure of Gaza and the implementation of infrastructure and economic projects in the region – without any commitment to Israel that it would refrain from supporting terrorism in Jerusalem, the West Bank, inside Israel, and from southern Lebanon. Saleh al-Arouri will be free to continue initiating terror attacks and preparing for further violence during Ramadan next year. At the same time, Hamas will retain its bargaining chips – the missing Israelis and the bodies of fallen soldiers. Similarly, an agreement of this kind – especially if the United States is involved, even with a low profile – will increase the legitimacy and international recognition of Hamas. 2. Deeper Egyptian involvement in Gaza and Cairo’s willingness to engage in the Gaza quagmire: The greater Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, the less it will rely on Israel. At the same time, Egypt has not shown particular effectiveness when it comes to prevention of arms smuggling via Sinai into Gaza. The concern is that the expansion of trade and movement of goods from Sinai will provide increased opportunities for smugglers, while Israel’s ability to respond to such incidents would be limited because of its reliance on Egypt and the desire to maintain the special relationship with Cairo. 3. Israeli tension between the expected benefits and the price it will be asked to pay: On the one hand, Israel would consider it an achievement if there were a long-term ceasefire in Gaza and if its own responsibility for the Strip were reduced. On the other hand, this would reduce Gaza’s dependence on Israel, which would lose whatever influence it has over events in Gaza. In addition, the prevalent Israeli belief is that improving the economic conditions in Gaza is the way to rein in Hamas, which is why it supports easing the closure for civilian matters and the ongoing reconstruction of Gaza. However, if the proposed Egyptian ceasefire is accepted, the extreme right wing elements in Netanyahu’s government are likely to oppose any Israeli concessions, such as a sweeping easing of the closure or Israeli approval for a Palestinian gas field – without a deal that includes the missing and fallen Israelis. 4. Can the rogue elements be contained? One precondition for implementation of a long-term ceasefire is that Islamic Jihad accepts the authority of Hamas and Tehran agrees to this, at least tacitly. However, it is not clear to what extent Iranian influence over Islamic Jihad would be curbed, also in light of the improved bilateral relations between Cairo and Tehran. 5. Another stage in the increasing irrelevance of the Palestinian Authority: A negotiated ceasefire on the Gaza front would be another nail in the coffin on the Palestinian Authority, which fails to reap any significant economic or political benefits – comparable to those that Hamas will enjoy if the proposed ceasefire comes into effect – in the territories under its control. Against this backdrop, Hamas is likely to intensify its efforts to take control of the Palestinian Authority the day after Abbas is no longer in power. Conclusion and Recommendations The Egyptian initiative on a hudna in Gaza does not include any measures to curb Hamas’s consolidation or to limit its freedom of operation on other fronts, and it does not advance a deal for the return of missing Israelis and the bodies of fallen soldiers. Moreover, the hudna would ensure the survival of Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip. One of the main demands that Islamic Jihad made before agreeing to the May 13 ceasefire that ended Operation Shield and Arrow was an end to the Israeli policy of targeted killings against its senior militant commanders – to which Israel responded, “Quiet will be met with quiet.” If a hudna is achieved, Islamic Jihad – like Hamas – will have the freedom to rebuild its ranks and its military capabilities It seems doubtful that Egypt will manage to broker a long-term ceasefire, especially given Hamas’s likely rejection. Notwithstanding the benefits that a hudna would give Hamas, the organization might find it acceptable if it felt it was in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis Israel – but that is not the case today. The Hamas leadership believes that the organization’s strength on the Palestinian and regional fronts is growing, while it believes that Israel’s strength is waning and that its international and regional influence is on the decline. Therefore, Hamas will likely prefer to maintain the status quo of “quiet,” with certain embellishments that would allow it to continue reconstructing the Gaza Strip, increase its own military strength, and solidify its political position – but without being asked to make any ideological compromises or grant any rewards – even indirectly – to Israel or the Palestinian Authority (e.g., the gas field). Although the chances of the Egyptian hudna initiative bearing fruit are slim, Israel should refrain from opposing it, and it should likewise support the expansion of Egyptian infrastructure and economic projects in Gaza. Improved living conditions in the Strip and increased Egyptian involvement will advance Israel’s strategic goals – ensuring long-term quiet and deepening the rift between Gaza and the West Bank. The continued promotion of the Egyptian initiative would allow Israel to examine whether Hamas is motivated enough to exercise control over the “rogue” terror organizations in Gaza – mainly Islamic Jihad – and to what extent Sinwar is committed to security quiet in the long term. At the same time, in order not to invalidate the hudna, Israel will have to come to terms with the following: continued freedom of operation for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to commit terror attacks on other fronts; improvements for Hamas in Gaza without a solution to the issue of the missing and fallen Israelis; and the absence of an effective solution to the growing military power of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.