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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Let's imagine for a moment that any given day, in the evening hours, an upset (even unbalanced) person were to stop his car in front of the least protected and safest U.S. Embassy in the world, the one on Havana's Malecon, and open fire on the venue until his automatic rifle ran out of bullets. Let's continue imagining that the Cuban authorities, parsimonious and self-important, caught the offender and four years passed without a word on what had happened. Then one fine day, the Granma newspaper announces that the terrorist had been acquitted for alleged insanity at the time of the act and that it had taken them four long years to figure it out. Could anyone foresee what the reaction of the United States would be? Obviously, this story is fictional; it does not coincide with reality. What is contradictory - and even laughable- is that the United States lists Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism”, for a second time, as of January 2020. At this very minute that is the first and highest barrier that prevents our countries from considering a return to the path of a respectful relationship. Organizations and politicians linked to the most conservative sector in the United States have played an important role in the most persevering approaches to Cuba and have promoted for years a new relationship between the two countries, which contrasts with the usual aggressiveness and intransigent public stance of the Republican Party since 1959. The closest thing to lifting a ban on the sale of food and medicines to Cuba occurred back in the year 2000, implemented by the Republican George W. Bush, when at the same time, his administration was bringing back the Plattist ideology of intervention, at which time they even chose a pro-consul who would supervise “the Cuban transition”, once the revolutionary government had collapsed: Caleb McCarry A few years later we would get to see McCarry himself, a member of the staff of then US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Corker, promote dialogue with the Cuban government during a visit to the supposed main enemies of the United States in the region, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, meet with the Cuban foreign minister and president, and thus join those from the conservative sector who are betting on a more constructive relationship with Cuba. In a speech in 2011, the Cuban American senator for Florida, Marco Rubio emotionally pointed out Carlos Gutiérrez, at that time Secretary of Commerce of the United States, also of the Bush administration, as one of the references to which the so-called Cuban exile should look to in order to corroborate his undeniable success. A few months after the opening launched by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro in December 2014, it would be Carlos Gutiérrez himself who would walk freely along the halls of Cuba's emblematic Hotel Nacional and join the conservatives who are betting on a transformation of ties with the island. In what he himself describes as a radical change of posture, this new attitude of Gutiérrez would take him to Cuba on numerous occasions until he headed the US-Cuba Business Council, an organization that, as part of the US Chamber of Commerce, promotes economic relations between the two countries. “I have lost many of my friends in Miami”, he would declare years later to the alternative media Belly of the Beast. Equally noteworthy was the activism of Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia (2003-2011), who in June 2010 would lead a delegation of 43 businessmen to Cuba, and who six years later would become Secretary of Agriculture in the Trump administration. “We would love to have Cuba as a customer” Perdue would declare at his confirmation, ratifying his support for allowing U.S. exports to Cuba. The absence of “merits” for the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, cynically coordinated with the then right-wing government in Colombia and energetically rejected by the current one, confirms its political and sanctioning content as the measure serves as an effective component of the package of sanctions that the United States calls “policy of maximum pressure towards Cuba”. The damage that such a designation does to the credibility and national interest of the United States and to the population of the island, which it claims to support, is profound and sustained. Its effects start in Washington but do not stop there; they are evident in the refusal of different entities to enter into economic and financial relations of any kind with Cuba, some of them even located in the territories of Havana's allies. The treacherous nickname of “terrorist”, as an integral part of the intensified sanctions policy, is partly responsible for the current wave of migration that is being carried out by a share of despairing Cubans. Together with the other nationalities present there, this complicates the operation of the southern border of the United States, an issue that has become a matter of life and death for the Republican leadership and, according to recent surveys, the main interest of the American electorate for the presidential elections of 2024. One of the Republican champions against disorderly migration has been the current governor of Texas Gregg Abbott, who with his policies has even challenged the founding principles of the U.S. federal union and has generated problems with neighboring Mexico. However, Abbott was another of those who showed up in Havana in 2016 to demonstrate his interest in a better relationship. Devoid of all political preconceptions, Abbott spoke in Havana of the inevitability of the end of the “embargo”, of the importance that a change of policy would have for Texas in general and for the southern port of Houston in particular. He did not mention migration because the Cuban migration was not a problem for Texas then. Other conservative politicians would stroll through Havana exhibiting a discourse of coexistence: Richard Lugar, Jeff Flake, Tom Emmer, John Boehner, and even the economic advisors of the Trump Organization, which, by the way, seems to keep alive one of its commercial firms in the Cuban property registry. The visits of the U.S. agribusiness lobby have also been constant over the years headed by numerous executives and businessmen of absolutely republican affinity. Right now it could be said that even defenders of the MAGA tendency are to be found among the latter, all interested in an improvement of the economic ties with Cuba. Few media outlets have objectively reported the impact of Cuba's inclusion on the criticized list and the human toll taken by the policy of maximum pressure on the Cuban population. One of them has been the popular conservative show “Full Measure” hosted by U.S. anchor Sharyll Atkisson. At a time when the United States is competing aggressively with other leading global powers, the anti-Cuban stance substantially affects the national interest of the United States, taking into account that the more belligerent the United States is, the greater the Cuban need to open itself financially and economically to other partners, not always to Washington's liking. The evidence of the damage caused to the Cuban economy by the disastrous combination of Trump's measures with the Covid-19 pandemic, has made President Joe Biden prefer, at least in his first four years in office, to maintain the Republican agenda of maximum pressure towards Cuba and wait to see if, by an act of providence, he could be the first American president of the modern era to set foot in Havana, without the presence of a revolutionary government in place. The expert on Cuban issues William LeoGrande does not give him much hope. In a recent article he describes the Cuban economy as famished, but the Cuban government as solid and far from an unexpected breakup or collapse, which contradicts the optimistic speech of Undersecretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, in Madrid. LeoGrande clarifies that Cuba was not a failed state when Biden assured it was in 2021 and neither is it now, that despite all the economic difficulties and the unprecedented intensification of the “embargo,” the government remains united and unwavering. “With a cohesive ruling elite, a loyal military, and no organized and effective opposition, there is no plausible shift toward a sudden regime transition in Cuba in the foreseeable future,” he asserts. The eventual arrival in 2024 of a more conservative administration to the White House, headed by Trump himself, and the possible incorporation of Senator Marco Rubio to that administration, will surely make them bet on prolonging the economic losses that the U.S. tolerates as a result of its deep limits to the relationship with Cuba. It will continue to curtail the travel rights of Americans and interfere like a Big Brother with the business interests of its citizens, all to comply - once and for all- with the Mallory Memorandum of April 1960. The greatest pressure for regime change in Cuba comes precisely from the closest state, Florida, which, contradictorily, would benefit the most from a more functional treatment of Havana. With a roster of politicians led by Governor Ron DeSantis, Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, who have acted out of electoral interests, without realizing that a pragmatic relationship with the island is in the best interest of the Union and also of its voters . As much as some blame the Cuban government for the current wave of migration to the United States, there is one real fact that cannot be ignored. In 2014, as President Barack Obama deployed his new policy of rapprochement with Cuba, the island was flourishing, Cubans were hopeful about the changes there, and migration levels to the United States could be considered optimal. Controlling illegal migration across the southern border of the U.S. and Mexico will continue to be a priority of the Republican Party. How much better would this situation be if conservatives were to promote a normalization of relations with Cuba, give back to its citizens the constitutional right to travel wherever they want and allow their businessmen to make money on the island, which it so badly needs? It has been concluded that in the case of the Central American countries, the solution to migration lies in greater U.S. investment there, which will open up greater employment opportunities and give people the hope of being able to progress without having to migrate. So, is it really expected that continuing to squeeze Cuba will control the exodus across the southern border? It would be smarter to give the green light to U.S. companies to take advantage of the opportunities in the investment portfolio and compete with European hotel chains in Cuba, to facilitate the new Cuban businessmen's financial procedures so that they can make their way in the face of the new opening of the Cuban government and, even, from the closed concept of U.S. national security, to prevent others from doing so. Undoubtedly, Cuba will have to be respected as an independent and sovereign country. Knowing fully that we are not talking about an associated free state, way beyond the historical strategic and hegemonic pretensions of the U.S. Empire over the years in relation to the island. Establishing a constructive relationship of coexistence with the island of Cuba, even with a government that does not please Washington, would be of great importance for the stability of the southern part of the United States. Law and Order, a precept equally upheld by U.S. conservatives over the years, would win hands down, as evidenced by the effective anti-drug collaboration between the two countries that the United States acknowledges in its latest annual report on the subject, despite a scenario that muddles all contact. I am inclined to believe that relationships are possible if the necessary quota of seriousness and pragmatism is applied to the process. A little known example is that of the frequent coordination between authorities on both sides of the territory occupied by the Guantanamo Naval Base, the military enclave resulting from the archaic Platt Amendment, which the Cuban government has for years denounced as illegal and inadmissible. The politicized and unwarranted inclusion of Cuba in the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, issued unilaterally by the State Department, is there to prevent anything from blossoming. Correcting that mistake would be the first of all steps.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After more than 50 days of deadlock in forming a government (an unprecedented political situation under the Fifth Republic), the choice of Michel Barnier to become Prime Minister may appear as a "solution" to end the crisis, but it above all reveals the current political weakness of President Macron, oscillating between the hope of maintaining control and forced failure. But this nomination puts him at odds with the messages sent by voters during the electoral sequence that he himself chose to trigger. Three key lessons Three lessons from the July legislative election are unambiguously necessary to understand the paradoxes of the current sequence. 1. The rejection of “Macronism” In the previous European election, the Macron camp had been soundly defeated. In confirmation, the message from voters in the legislative elections is one of rejection of the power in place since the presidential parliamentary group went from 245 elected representatives to 163 and the two most pronounced opposition blocs went from 89 to 143 (the RN and its allies) and from 153 to 193 for the left bloc. The aggregation of the various votes therefore expresses a desire to see notable political changes come out of the ballot boxes to break with all or part of Macron's policies. But the differences in direction to translate these inflections maintain the confusion. The left wants to repeal the immigration law, while the RN wants to toughen it up, for example. 2. The refusal of the National Rally in power While it was fashionable to declare it moribund, the "republican front" has regained strength in this summer of 2024. Through a political surge, which is as much an ideological rejection as the expression of sincere fears about the damage of the RN at Matignon, the forces hostile to the RN have accepted mutual withdrawals to "block". This electoral gamble paid off, and if the RN has progressed, it has remained far from the expected absolute majority. Nevertheless, this "republican front" has not led to a political alternative: it was only a front of refusal and not the premises of a probable future governmental cooperation. Hence the current impasse and the threats hanging over the survival of the future Barnier government. 3. The marginalization of the Republican right The emergence of Emmanuel Macron in the political game, eager to overcome the divide and the alternations of government between the PS and the Republicans, has put the right in a vice. Stuck between the center right embodied by Macron and the hard right embodied by Le Pen, the Republican Party has seen its voters melt away on both sides. We must add the electoral rise of the RN to the ordeal of the right. On these early legislative elections, the dilemma remained the same. The president of LR, Éric Ciotti, crossed the Rubicon and made an alliance with the RN, while the rest of the party opposed him without however winning back its voters who had gone to the Marconian camp. In the end, LR, proclaimed heir to Gaullism, which gave four presidents to the Fifth Republic, is no more than a parliamentary force, even if the senatorial voting system still ensures it a counter-power in the Senate. Let us note, however, that if we add a large part of Macron's voters with those of LR and RN, we are entitled to affirm that the parliamentary barycenter is clearly positioned to the right of the hemicycle. However – ultimate confusion – it is the left-wing coalition that comes out on top in the hemicycle.span> The Barnier choice against these messages from voters These three lessons are followed by a governmental choice that has all the makings of a paradox, not to say a contradiction. Indeed, if we sum things up brutally, appointing Michel Barnier amounts to choosing a representative of the minority party (LR), whose profile and political positions poorly embody a break with "Macronism", and who owes his appointment to the benevolent neutrality (to date) of the National Rally. Indeed, President Macron made it clear that "non-censurability" was the decisive criterion for his choice. However, he declared that he had made this choice (after the tests of many other names failed) because he had ensured "the conditions of stability and the broadest rallying". Knowing the disappointment of the New Popular Front, this explicitly indicates that President Macron obtained the commitment of the RN not to censor Michel Barnier a priori. Which was confirmed a few minutes after his nomination by Marine Le Pen. Without of course entering the government, the RN therefore becomes the arbiter of its choice, the arbiter of a censure. The parties of the presidential camp have therefore agreed to make an electoral pact with the left front (yet widely hated in their ranks) in the name of the government barrier to the RN, so that the president ends up appointing a prime minister thanks to the RN's promise not to censure him. A choice of both hope and failure President Macron is primarily responsible for the current political chaos , through a dissolution that was as perilous as it was failed, the success of which rested on the bet that the left would be incapable of uniting and would once again have to resolve to a republican front in the face of the "RN threat". However, he is trying to take advantage of the complexity of the moment to keep control. He wants to be the expert in time, extending for several weeks a government clearly disavowed at the ballot box. He wants to be the expert in the partisan game, imposing the trans partisan coalition including the central bloc as the only horizon for access to Matignon. All this, while claiming to do so in respect of the will of the French people… The Macronists who have been calling for more than 50 days for an “overcoming” of divisions, for “inventiveness” in the creation of an unprecedented coalition, are here benefiting from their central position on the left-right axis to refuse a cohabitation-alternation, in favor of a coalition-continuation (which will nevertheless involve some political inflections). But the choice of Michel Barnier, by default certainly, has the virtue of guaranteeing that Emmanuel Macron's political achievements will not be brutally unraveled, as happens in the case of cohabitation, and as the New Popular Front loudly wanted. President Macron can therefore probably feel a little relief today. He can even hope to convince the French, by invoking that France is on the right and that the left-wing coalition has been intransigent. One Man's Political Failure Yet this nomination is weighted with many signals that speak of the political failure of a man. Emmanuel Macron wanted to dynamite the partisan game: he found himself prisoner of a Republic of ukases, each party announcing who they were going to censor on the sole basis of their name. He wanted to embody a policy breaking with the "old world": here he is giving the Fifth Republic one of the oldest prime ministers (after having sacrificed the youngest by dissolving it). The political party he created around his person, Renaissance, published a press release in reaction to the nomination, specifying that it was not signing a "blank check" to Michel Barnier. This situation thus indicates that, even within the Macronist camp, preparations are already being made for the post-Macron period. This is true of Edouard Philippe, already a candidate for his succession, and of Gabriel Attal who secured his influence by being elected leader of his parliamentary group. Emmanuel Macron has consistently been elected (in 2017, 2022, and in the 2024 legislative elections) in the name of a Republican barrier to the National Rally, benefiting from the votes of the left. And now he owes his (provisional) exit from the crisis to the neutrality negotiated with Marine Le Pen. This unbalanced position can only reinforce frustration, even anger against him, in the left-wing electorate, and can sow confusion among some centrists. Not to mention that being at the parliamentary mercy of the National Rally will very quickly place the head of government in a dilemma: whether to make concessions to the RN in exchange for its survival. The immigration law has left scars within the so-called "left wing" of Macronism. Even greater and more symbolic concessions made to the RN could fracture its own party and further confirm the end of "Macronism" - the left/right divide regaining strength and vigor.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском I would like to extend a warm greeting to the ministers and other senior representatives who are present in the Security Council Chamber. Their participation in today’s meeting confirms the persisting relevance of the topic under discussion. In accordance with Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, I would like to invite the representative of Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Türkiye, UAE, Uganda, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Vietnam, to participate in this meeting. It is so decided. In accordance with the Provisional Rules of Procedure and established practice, I propose that the Council invite the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, which has observer state status at the United Nations, to participate in the meeting. There are no objections, it is so decided. In accordance with Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, I would like to invite E.Rattray, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, to take part in this meeting. I would also like to invite the following persons to take part in this meeting: – His Excellency Mr Maged Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, – His Excellency Mr Sven Koopmans, Special Representative of the European Union for the Middle East Peace Process, – His Excellency Mr Sheikh Niang, Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. It is so decided. The Security Council begins considering Point 2 on the agenda. The floor goes to Mr Courtenay Rattray. *** Ladies and gentlemen, Your excellencies, The Middle East is facing unprecedented risks for the security, well-being and peaceful life of its peoples. The waves of violence surge far beyond the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict destabilising the situation in the Persian Gulf, Red and Mediterranean Seas, and in North Africa. We need a frank and honest conversation about how to stop the bloodshed and sufferings of the civilians without delay and move towards a long-term solution to both long-standing and relatively new conflicts. Our country has been historically maintaining good relations with all the countries in the region. The USSR was the first state to recognise Israel de facto and de jure, having established diplomatic relations shortly after it declared independence in May 1948. Meanwhile, Moscow invariably advocated the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state and the realisation of the Palestinians’ legitimate and fundamental right to self-determination. In 1949, we supported Israel's application for UN membership, subject (I emphasise this) to the implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194 on the Palestine Partition Plan and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. This was clearly stated when we voted in favour of Israel's admission to the United Nations. Likewise, today we support Palestine's admission to our Organisation. Its sovereignty as a state has already been recognised by nearly 150 countries that are UN members. We stand for the position based on the rules of international law within the framework of various international formats for the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, more broadly, the Middle East conflict. We proceed from the imperative of implementing the UN decisions, including the first General Assembly resolutions mentioned above and key Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, adopted after the end of the Six Day War and the Doomsday War, as well as Resolutions 478 and 497 on the status of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. We attach special importance to the dialogue with Arab countries and their neighbours Iran and Türkiye. From the very beginning we appreciated the constructive potential of the Saudi Arabian peace initiative announced in 2002. At the same time, we respected the decision of a number of Arab countries to bring their relations with Israel back to normal even before settling the Palestinian question. We advocated the inclusion of pan-Arab and Islamic organisations – the LAS and the OIC – in the collective efforts under the Quartet of international mediators, which, unfortunately, was "buried" under the ruins of the US "Deal of the Century." The history of the colonial and mandated territories of the Middle East and North Africa has been and remains a heavy burden for the regional countries. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper have planted the time bombs that have been exploding since then. The situation has been further complicated by new Western geopolitical experiments. We firmly believe that the regional countries should themselves choose their paths towards stronger sovereignty and independence, as well as socioeconomic development for the benefit of their nations without foreign interference. This would open up the global historical, civilisational, religious and cultural significance of the Middle East and North Africa in the interests of peace and stability. The Palestinian problem is the most pressing issue today. It is the fourth time in the past 10 months that the UN Security Council is holding a ministerial meeting. It has adopted four resolutions, but the continuing bloodshed in the occupied Palestinian territories shows that all these decisions remained on paper. Russia has consistently denounced all manifestations of terrorism. We implicitly condemned the terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. However, we regard the current developments in Gaza as unacceptable collective punishment of the civilian population. A military mopping up operation has been underway for nearly 300 days in the Gaza Strip, the most densely populated area in the world that has been known for years as an open-air prison. The statistics of death and destruction of the large-scale military operation, which Israel is waging jointly with its American allies, is shocking. Over the past 10 months or 300 days, nearly 40,000 Palestinian civilians have been killed and 90,000 wounded. The majority of them are children and women. This is twice as many as the number of civilian victims on both sides of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine over the past 10 years. The number of civilian victims [in Gaza] over the past 10 months is twice as large as the number of civilian victims in Ukraine over the past 10 years since the state coup in February 2014. According to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry that examines violations of international human rights law, Palestinians aged below 18 make up approximately half of Gaza’s population. It means that they were born and grew up in conditions of a total blockade. Apart from the current escalation of violence, they have seen other Israeli military operations, namely Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds in 2006, Hot Winter and Cast Lead in 2008-2009, Pillar of Defence in 2012, Protective Edge in 2014, and Guardian of the Walls in 2021. Gaza is in ruins today. Residential buildings, schools and hospitals have been turned into rubble, and the critical civilian infrastructure facilities have been knocked out of service. There is an epidemic of infectious diseases and mass hunger there. It is a real humanitarian disaster. There is no safe and reliable access to the victims and those in need amid the ongoing hostilities. The number of casualties among the humanitarian staff of the United Nations and NGOs is approaching 300. This is the largest one-time loss for the UN in modern history. Many of these people have been killed together with their families. We express our condolences to their families and loved ones, as well as to their colleagues. On May 7, Israel began the operation in the city of Rafah, the last shelter for the 1.5 million Palestinians who have fled there from all over Gaza. The Rafah crossing was closed, again turning the Gaza Strip into “the only conflict in the world in which people are not even allowed to flee.” UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said this in 2009, when he was the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The situation has not improved since then. It is only deteriorating. The use of crossings in the Israeli territory has been hindered by major restrictions. The volume of cargo allowed to use them has plummeted compared to the pre-confrontation period, even though the requirements have seriously decreased. The situation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is also dramatic, with military raids by the Israeli military and the settlers’ aggression, which leads to casualties on both sides. Contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 2334, Israel has not slowed but is accelerating the construction of illegal settlements. In addition to seizing Palestinian land and destroying their houses, Israel is retroactively legalising settlements there, even though their establishment has been declared illegal by Israel’s legislation. Such unilateral actions to create irrevocable “facts on the ground,” as Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General Courtenay Rattray said, amount to a gross violation of Israel’s responsibilities as an occupying power. I would like to point out that, ironically, these responsibilities are rooted in the Geneva Conventions adopted 75 years ago to protect Jews, who had been subjected to inhuman suffering during the Second World War, and to prevent future persecution of people on grounds of ethnicity. Colleagues, The current unprecedented outbreak of violence in the Middle East has largely been caused by the well-known US policy in the region. This is the result of US diplomacy about the “effectiveness” of which US representatives have been telling us for the past ten months demanding that work at the UN Security Council be curtailed. My colleague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, also made this call. They are using their veto right time and again to block calls for an immediate and all-encompassing ceasefire. When UN Security Council Resolution 2728 on a ceasefire during the Ramadan holiday was adopted, the United States promptly stated that this was not a legally binding document. In exchange, we received the so-called “Biden plan” that the Americans wanted to approve even before the Israeli response. Everyone knew that the response was negative because Israel did not need any plan with a hint of peace. Today, we became convinced of this once again. I would like to ask the US representative whether they had the impression (while listening to the Israeli representative’s remarks) that they had entered a wrong room and were attending a wrong discussion, rather than the one that was announced. I hope you understand what I am talking about. For precisely this reason, we abstained while voting for UN Security Council Resolution 2735 because we knew that Israel had a priori silently rejected it. While providing diplomatic support for Israeli actions and supplying weapons and ammunition, Washington (everyone realises this) has become a direct party to the conflict, just like with the situation in Ukraine. The bloodshed would stop if this support ends. However, the United States either does not want or is unable to do this. It appears that various manoeuvres making it possible to score additional points during the election campaign, rather than efforts to save human lives, are the most important thing. I would like to outline Russia’s principled approaches once again. We condemn the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack that, nevertheless, cannot justify current Israeli actions and undermine the very idea of establishing a Palestinian state. We advocate a permanent and all-encompassing ceasefire. This will make it possible to release 120 Israeli hostages and about 9,500 Palestinians who were arbitrarily arrested since October 7, 2023. We call for providing safe and adequate humanitarian access to all affected and needy people. We reaffirm the key mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as a unique organisation for aiding the Palestinians on occupied territories and in neighbouring Arab countries. We insist on the immediate cessation of unlawful settlement activities. The accomplishing of these urgent objectives would create favourable conditions for resuming peace talks on a generally recognised international legal foundation in the interests of establishing an independent and sovereign Palestinian state coexisting in peace and security with Israel. Only in that case, the historical injustice with regard to the Palestinian nation and its fundamental right to self-determination would be corrected. The reinstatement of intra-Palestinian unity also has major significance. We have always tried to facilitate this process by allowing representatives of various Palestinian movements to conduct this essential dialogue at the Moscow platform. We are convinced that the Palestinians can independently determine their future without foreign interference, no matter how much someone may want to do this for them and against their will. This also concerns the future of Gaza as an inalienable part of the Palestinian state. All of us know about behind-the-scenes contacts and plans that are being hatched. They predetermine the future organisation of Gaza and the entire Palestinian state. However, they virtually make no mention of the state. I believe that everyone should respect a principle implying that nothing should be said about Palestine without Palestine itself. Our proposal regarding a meeting of all external players who have influence on various groups in Gaza and the West Bank, and who can help overcome the split in the Palestinian ranks provided they speak with one voice, remains on the table. An important step in this direction was taken last February, when representatives of all Palestinian political parties met in Moscow and reaffirmed their support for restoring unity on the basis of the PLO platform. Today, we all have a responsibility to stop the unfolding human tragedy. In addition to the military operation in the occupied Palestinian territories, Israel’s other neighbours are in danger of being drawn into an all-out confrontation with Israel. Tensions on the Blue Line dividing Lebanon from Israel are mounting day by day. Top Israeli officials publicly announce plans to open the northern front. Hezbollah never misses a chance to reply in kind either, promising it is ready to repel the invasion. The Israeli Air Force has significantly intensified attacks on Syria, now also targeting the areas of Damascus, Aleppo, Lattakia and the Golan Heights, and striking at key airports and seaports, which played an important role in the urgent delivery of humanitarian aid, including in response to last year’s deadly earthquake. Colleagues, A ceasefire and cessation of violence in Gaza and the West Bank can do more than enable the negotiation of a lasting settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It can help in alleviating other hotbeds in the wider Middle East in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions, not with some rules the West is trying to replace the UN Charter with, and not feeding someone’s geopolitical ambitions. An important role in upholding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people belongs to pan-Arab and pan-Islamic organisations, whose activities we support, as well as to all truly responsible members of the international community. In particular, I would like to note the high potential of the Gulf States. Now, after the early elections in Iran and the first statements by president-elect Masoud Pezeshkian, it is hoped that all the countries that share the coasts of the Gulf will come closer together to overcome their long-standing disagreements and mistrust, and will unite efforts on a generally acceptable foundation to be able to determine the parameters of mutual security without external interference and speak with one voice to fulfil the aspirations of the Palestinian people and build an architecture of stability and neighbourly relations in the region. Progress on the Palestinian track in full compliance with the UN resolutions, in the normalisation of relations between the Gulf countries, could be an important contribution to the ongoing process of forming a common Eurasian architecture based on the principles of indivisible security, equal collective responsibility, mutual respect and a balance of interests.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском *This is an abbreviated version of the same paper published by the author at: Śliwiński K. (2023). Is Geopolitics Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine. Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 4/2023, 7-25. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33067/SE.4.2023.1 Abstract This paper starts with an assumption that Geopolitics, understood as one of the great schools of International Relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who peruses the challenging and ever eluding realm of international security. It draws chiefly on the Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder to explain the dynamics of contemporary European Security in general and the ongoing war in Ukraine in particular. The analysis leads the author to a pair of conclusions: firstly, that the conflict in Ukraine is unlikely to end anytime soon and, perhaps more importantly, that the outcome of the war will only be one of many steps leading to the emergence of the new, possibly a multipolar, international system and consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before. Keywords: Geopolitics, Heartland, Europe, Security, Ukraine Introduction In the wake of the outburst of the war in Ukraine, the members of the European Union agreed on an extensive package of sanctions against various Russian entities and individuals connected to Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia. Until the attack against Ukraine, the EU had been "muddling through" with numerous countries pursuing their national interests, shaping their individual foreign and security policies, notably vis-à-vis Russia. The attack reinvigorated calls from E.U. bureaucrats for more unity and an actual common defense. EU's chief diplomat Joseph Borrel, during an extraordinary plenary session of the European Parliament on March 1, 2022, urged the European Parliament’s MPs to "think about the instruments of coercion, retaliation, and counterattack in the face of reckless adversaries. […] This is a moment in which geopolitical Europe is being born", he stressed (Brzozowski, 2022). Heartland theory – Geopolitics 101 As an analytical tool, geopolitics has been used since the 19th century. Its reputation was tarnished as a consequence of the policies of the Third Reich before and during WWII. Yet, it is considered a worthy approach that allows explanations that specifically look at the nexus between states' foreign and security policies and their geographical location in a historical context. Geopolitics is one of the grand theories of international relations (Sloan, 2017). Fundamentally, rather than treating states as separate, alienated geographical organisms, geopolitics allows us to look at a broader picture, including regions or even the whole globe, thus making it possible to account for interactions between many states functioning in particular systems defined by geographical criteria. Today's war in Ukraine occurs in a vital region for the European continent – Central and Eastern Europe. One of the founders of Geopolitics, a scientific discipline – Halford Mackinder (British geographer, Oxford professor, founder and director of the London School of Economics) proposed an enduring model in his seminal publication at the beginning of the 20th century - The Geographical Pivot of History. Drawing on the general term used by geographers – 'continental' Mackinder posits that the regions of Arctic and Continental drainage measure nearly half of Asia and a quarter of Europe and, therefore, form a grand 'continuous patch in the north and the center of the continent' (Mackinder, 1919). It is the famous 'Heartland', which, according to his inventor, is the key geographical area for anyone pursuing their dominant position in Euroasia. "[…] whoever rules the Heartland will rule the World Island, and whoever rules the World Island will rule the world" (Kapo, 2021). Notably, the key to controlling the Heartland area lies in Central and Eastern Europe, as it is an area that borders the Heartland to the West. Twenty-First century geopolitics (Dugin vs Mearsheimer) The most influential thinker and writer in Kremlin recently has arguably been Aleksandr Gel'evich Dugin. Accordingly, his 600-hundred pages book, Foundations of Geopolitics 2, published in 1997, has allegedly had an enormous influence on the Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites (Dunlop, 1997). In his book, Dugin, drawing on the founder of geopolitics, Karl Haushofer, posits that Russia is uniquely positioned to dominate the Eurasian landmass and that, more importantly, 'Erasianism' will ultimately hold an upper hand in an ongoing conflict with the representatives of 'Atlantism' (the U.S. and the U.K.). Crucially, Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; instead, he advocates a relatively sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will (Dunlop, 1997). The Moscow-Berlin Axis According to Dugin, the postulated New Empire (Eurasian) has a robust geopolitical foothold: Central Europe. "Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control" (Dugin, 1997). Consequently, while the impulse of the creation of the New Empire needs to come from Moscow, Germany needs to be the centre of its western part. Furthermore "only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow." (Dugin, 1997, 127). Regarding the role of Anglo-Saxons in Central and Eastern Europe, Dugin offers a very straightforward analysis: "The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instil in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences". It follows logically that "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions, represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is, in general, senseless to speak about continental politics" (Dugin, 1997). "[T]he independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present borders) can make sense only as a 'sanitary cordon'. Importantly, as this can inform us to an extent about the future settlement of the conflict: "The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories". The Tragedy of Great Power Politics In the preface to the update of his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (2013 edition), John Mearsheimer acknowledges that his analysis had to be updated with regards to the so-called "peaceful rise" of the People's Republic of China as a significant challenger to the role and position of United States in the international system. Consequently, he envisaged that the process would produce a highly sensitive, if not prone to local conflicts environment (Mearsheimer, 2013, 10). Following the logic of power balancing, he claimed that firstly, China had to build formidable military forces and, secondly, dominate Asia similarly to how the United States dominated Western Hemisphere. Correspondingly, China would strive to become a regional hegemon to maximise its survival prospect. This would make China's neighbours feel insecure and prompt counterbalancing by, as one might surmise, strengthening the existing bilateral and multilateral alliances and building new ones (AUKUS being a perfect example). Logically speaking, therefore, if you follow Mearsheimer's argumentation, Russia and India, Japan and Australia, and the Philippines and Indonesia should build a solid coalition to counter the ascent of China. Such developments would be in the interests of the United States, and Washington would naturally play a crucial role under such circumstances. Notably, the rise of China was not likely to be peaceful and produce "big trouble" for international trade as well as peace and security. This was approximately what the Trump administration had in mind when preparing the national security strategy in 2017. The Strategy mentions Russia 25 times, frequently in connection with China, as major challengers to the U.S.: "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and fair, grow their militaries, and control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence" (National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Yet, after even a short analysis of the document, one identifies the difference between the two in terms of how the U.S. perceives the challenge that each represents. Regarding Russia, Washington concludes that Kremilin's main aim is to: "seek to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders". China seems to be more ambitious in the eyes of the Capitol. As evidenced by such statements as: "Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars", "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free trade flow, threaten other nations' sovereignty, and undermine regional stability."(National Security of the United States of America, 2017). Given this perception, it is no wonder that under Trump, Washington embarked on a new mission that questioned the processes of globalization for the first time in many decades. Under Trump, the U.S.A. introduced numerous economic sanctions against China, which sparked a revolution called 'decoupling'. Johnson and Gramer, writing for foreignpolicy.com in 2020, questioned this policy: "The threat of a great decoupling is a potentially historical break, an interruption perhaps only comparable to the sudden sundering of the first massive wave of globalization in 1914, when deeply intertwined economies such as the Great Britain and Germany, and later the United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic nationalism that didn't stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not by war but peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global coronavirus pandemic that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains and the virtues of a global economy." (Johnson, Gramer, 2020). With the comfort of looking at hindsight, we should conclude that perhaps luckily for the Far East and international political economy, Mearsheimer was wrong, at least for the time being. Firstly, no military conflicts exist in the Far East or the Pacific. The most potentially dangerous issue remains one of the cross-straight relations, i.e. P.R.C. vs Taiwan (Chinese Taipei). Whether Xi Jinping will risk another diplomatic backlash by an open invasion remains to be seen. The jury is out, and one might claim that with the world being focused on the war in Ukraine, China could get away with an invasion of Taiwan. Then, on the other hand, perhaps there is no need for the P.R.C. to unite all territories of China in the imminent future forcefully. At the same time, as it appears at least mid-2023, contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, Russia and China seem to be getting closer regarding geopolitics and geoeconomics. On February 4th, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese President Xi face-to-face. The leaders convened in Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics — and issued a lengthy statement detailing the two nations' shared positions on a range of global issues. The meeting happened shortly before the Russian invasion, and one could surmise that it was supposed to soften the possible adverse reaction from Beijing to the already prepared military operation by the Kremlin since Putin told Xi that Russia had designed a new deal to supply China with an additional 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Consequently, China abstained from a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the Russian invasion (Gerson, 2022). Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770#sel=1:21:S5F,1:37:3jE (Access 18.10.2023) Andrew Krepinevich's Protracted Great-Power War Andrew Krepinevich's “Protracted Great-Power War - A Preliminary Assessment work” published by the Centre for a New American Security, informs us about the American posture. Accordingly, "Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best." (Krepinevich, 2020) Among many valuable lessons that history can offer, one should remember that no country can wage a systemic war on its own on two fronts, hoping to be successful. Suppose both China and Russia are seen as strategic challengers to the American position in the international system. In that case, it follows logically that the U.S. needs to make one of them at least neutral (appease them) when in conflict with another. Given China's technological, economic, military, or population challenges, the most optimal choice would be to make Russia indifferent to American 'elbowing' in Central Asia or the Middle East vis-à-vis China. The price for such indifference also seems logical, and it is the dominance of the Russo-German tandem in Central and Eastern Europe and German dominance in the E.U. This would explain at least some developments in Europe regarding energy security, particularly President Biden's administration position on Nord Stream 2 and the not-so-much enthusiastic help to Ukraine from Germany. However, recent developments seem to contrast such logical argumentation. President Biden's administration, as well as the leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces, seem to be committed to continuing the financial, technical and logistical support to Ukrainian President Zelensky's government for "as long as it takes" (the term frequently used in official speeches by Antony Blinken – The Secretary of State). According to the U.S. Department of Defence information (as of Feb 21, 2023), the U.S. committed security assistance to Ukraine in the form of 160 Howitzers, 31 Abrams tanks, 111 million rounds of small arms ammunition and four satellite communication antennas, among others. On top of that, Washington committed more than 30.4 billion U.S. dollars (only since the beginning of the Biden Administration) (U. S. Department of Defence, 2023). The U.S. is the leader of the coalition of many nations (54 to be exact) in efforts to counter the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This situation puts Washington in a predicament as, at least in the mediasphere, experts and former policymakers such as the former C.I.A. Director and U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta does not shy away from identifying the existing state of affairs as a "proxy war" between the United States and the Russian Federation (Macmillan, 2022). 2 Importantly, Kremlin has been playing the “proxy war” card for some time in building its narrative regarding the ongoing “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine. But is "Uncle Sam" still in a position to effectively challenge either Russia or China on their own? In 2001, French historian, sociologist, and political scientist Emmanuel Todd claimed that as of the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was no longer a solution to global problems; instead, it became one of the problems (Todd, 2003). The U.S. guaranteed political and economic freedoms for half a century. In contrast, today, they seem to be more and more an agent of international disorder, causing uncertainty and conflicts wherever they can. Given the geopolitical changes after 1989, the U.S. took for granted its position in the international system and decided to extend its interests across the globe. Surprisingly, perhaps for Washington, even traditional U.S. lies started to demand more independence (see the case of Germany and its role in southern Europe.) (Macron's idea of 'strategic autonomy') . 3 “Emmanuel Macron's comments about Taiwan and his call for European "strategic autonomy" sparked controversy as he advocated for the EU not to become followers of the US and China”. This parallels with President de Gaulle earlier calls for European strategic independence from American influence over European security (Lory, 2023). According to Todd, given the actual balance of power globally, the U.S. would have to fulfill two conditions to maintain its hegemonic position. Firstly, it had to continue controlling its protectorates in Europe and Japan. Secondly, it had to finally eliminate Russia from the elite group of 'big powers', which would mean the disintegration of the post-Soviet sphere and the elimination of the nuclear balance of terror. None of these conditions have been met. Not being able to challenge Europe or Japan economically, the U.S. has also been unable to challenge the Russian nuclear position. Consequently, it switched to attacking medium powers such as Iran or Iraq economically, politically, and militarily engaging in 'theatrical militarism'. (Todd, 2003). In contrast to the French historian, American political scientist Joseph Nye claims, "The United States will remain the world's leading military power in the decades to come, and military force will remain an important component of power in global politics." (Ney, 2019, p.70). He goes on to question whether the rise of China is going to spell the end of the American era: "[…] but, contrary to current conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as the world's largest economy. Measured in 'purchasing power parity' (P.P.P.), the Chinese economy became larger than the U.S. economy in 2014, but P.P.P. is an economists' measure for comparing welfare estimates, not calculating relative power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, and by that measure, China has a US$12 trillion economy compared to a US$20 trillion U.S. economy." […] “Power—the ability to affect others to get what you want—has three aspects: coercion, payment, and attraction. Economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation, and even in economic power, while China may surpass America in total size, it will still lag behind in per capita income (a measure of the sophistication of an economy).” (Ney, 2019, p.70). And yet, as of 2023, America's economic components of her might seem to be very quickly eroding. After the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis and the consequent Covid-19 induced economic crisis, there are several woes on the horizon: Inflation has been rampant (that is one of the effects of federal stimulus after Covid-19), which makes the Federal Reserve continue to increase interest rates, making loans more and more expensive (Goldman, 2022). The stock market has been in the "sell-everything mode", which means the investors are losing a lot of money, so their trust in the economy is decreasing. Thirdly, this time around, the investors are not switching to bonds, which seems to confirm the previous point. Fourthly and finally, "none of this is happening in a vacuum. Russia continues its deadly invasion of Ukraine, which has choked off supply chains and sent energy prices through the roof. On top of that, a labour shortage has sent salaries surging and hindered the normal flow of goods worldwide (Goldman, 2022). Worse still, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, some of the key performance indicators regarding international trade are primarily negative (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2023). As of July 2022, experts debated whether the country was in a technical recession, whereas by now (mid-2023), the actual national debt had surpassed 31.46 trillion U.S. dollars (FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 2023). The German-French engine of the European federalization? The economic and political decrease of the U.S. and the parallel increase of China with Russia holding its position or even reclaiming its influence vis-à-vis NATO countries causes significant challenges to European powers and offers some ground-breaking opportunities. In terms of challenges, especially economically, Germany and France, as mentioned before, find themselves in a predicament. The war in Ukraine has changed the European dynamics due to the pressure of the U. S. to support Ukraine and, consequently, the economic sanctions against The Russian Federation. Similarly, France and Germany have not been very happy with the economic sanctions against Russia and have continually tried to play down the possibility of an all-out EU vs Russia conflict. Listening to the speeches of Macron and Scholz, one cannot but hypothesize that Paris and Berlin would be content with the end of the war as soon as possible at any cost, to be born by Ukraine, to be able to come back to “business as usual.” Apparently, in an attempt to "escape forward", both European powers are proposing further steps to generate even more federal dynamics. Conversely, they suggest that concerning Foreign and Security Policy, the still observed voting pattern based on unanimity - one of the last strongholds of sovereignty, should be abolished, and the decisions should follow a qualified majority voting procedure. Notably, such arguments are made, invoking the potential gains for the EU as a geopolitical actor. In other words, countries such as Poland and Hungary would no longer be able to block Paris and Berlin from imposing their interests on the rest of the EU by presenting them as European. According to this vision, Hungary would no longer be able to ‘sympathize’ with Russia, and Poland would no longer be the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the U.S. interests in Europe in their game with Russia. And so, the war in Ukraine presents a perfect circumstance to call for a European federation. Germany has recently publicized such a vision. On August 24, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz presented a speech at Charles University in Prague regarding his vision of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Experts, policymakers, and media pundits widely commented on the speech. It starts with an assertion that Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. That fact produces two breakthrough consequences: firstly, Berlin has to pivot from Russia to its European Partners both economically and politically. Secondly, the European Confederation of equal States should morph into a European Federation (The Federal Government, 2022). Scholz’s vision includes four major ‘thoughts’. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition should be made to majority voting in common foreign or tax policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, “we grow more autonomous in all fields; that we assume greater responsibility for our own security; that we work more closely together and stand yet more united in defence of our values and interests around the world.”. In practical terms, Scholz singles out the need for one command and control structure of European defence efforts (European army equipped chiefly by French and German Companies?). Thirdly, the EU should take more responsibility (at the expense of national governments) regarding migration and fiscal policy against the backdrop of the economic crisis induced by Covid-19 pandemic. This, in practical terms, means, according to Scholz, one set of European debt rules to attain a higher level of economic integration. Finally, some disciplining. “We, therefore, cannot stand by when the principles of the rule of law is violated, and democratic oversight is dismantled. Just to make this absolutely clear, there must be no tolerance in Europe for racism and antisemitism. That’s why we are supporting the Commission in its work for the rule of law. Conclusion The war in Ukraine is arguably proof of the region's role in the security and stability of Europe and its economy. Food supplies, mostly various harvests and energy, are a case in point. On top of that, the region has a lot of raw materials. Ukraine has large deposits of 21 of 30 such materials critical in European green transformation (Ukrinform, 2023). Before the war in Ukraine began, in July 2021, the EU and Ukraine signed non less than a strategic partnership on raw materials. The partnership includes three areas from the approximation of policy and regulatory mining frameworks, through a partnership that will engage the European Raw Materials Alliance and the European Battery Alliance to closer collaboration in research and innovation along both raw materials and battery value chains using Horizon Europe (European Commission, Press Release 2021). As for security, in a traditional sense, the U.S. is involved with Ukraine regarding nuclear weapons. In the letter from March 17, 2023, the director of the Energy Department’s Office of Nonproliferation Policy, Andrea Ferkile, tells Rosatom’s director general that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar “contains US-origin nuclear technical data that is export-controlled by the United States Government” (Bertrand, Lister, 2023). Worse still, The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria J. Nuland, admitted in her testimony on Ukraine in the US Congress that, indeed, “Ukraine has biological research facilities, which we are now quite concerned Russian troops, Russian Forces, may be seeking to gain control of, so we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces should they approach” (C-Span, 2022). 4 See more at: https://www.state.gov/energy-security-support-to-ukraine/ (Access 18.10.2023) As Scott and Alcenat claim, the analysis of the competitive policies of each great power confirms the Heartland concept's importance. They project the utility of Mackinder’s analysis to Central Asia, asserting that: “it is valid in today’s foreign policy and policy analyses. Each power strives for control of or access to the region’s resources. For China, the primary goal is to maintain regional stability as a means for border security and assurance of stable economic relations. For the European Union, the main goal is to gain economic access while simultaneously promoting the democratization of those countries that are politically unstable.” (Scott, Alcenat, 2008). 5 Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) - a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, a former director of the Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence of China offered a similar evaluation: “the competition between the two giants (U.S.A. and China) will not occur in the Global South, where the US has already lost out to China. At the same time, in the Indo-Pacific, few nations want to take sides. Instead, it will be in Europe, where the U.S. has most of its allies, and China is the largest trading partner” (Bo, 2023). References Bertrand, N. and Lister, T. 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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections, in simplified terms, usually involve deciding between continuity or change. That decision was clearly expressed by Mexican voters. The results of the electoral day on June 2nd in Mexico reflect that approximately two-thirds of the votes cast favor continuity and, to some extent, a deepening of the outgoing administration's policies. Starting from the theory, this deepening will apply to foreign policy. Following the electoral day, expectations, proposals, questions, and prospects arise. These lines aim to address those that fall within the international sphere. It is advisable to begin with a brief diagnosis of the context and Mexico's recent international actions. It can be confidently stated that the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy, particularly non-intervention, were invoked with a particular emphasis. This emphasis was maintained throughout López Obrador's six-year term, in line with a nationalist-oriented foreign policy. The reference to these principles was made in regional matters as well as in the global thematic agenda. Regionally, in North America, the path was guided by the principle of respect for sovereignty and recognition of shared responsibility in matters that foster understanding, a spirit of cooperation, and a strategic partnership. However, it became evident that in some sensitive issues, antagonistic views do exist. To the south of our border, the overall assessment indicates a strengthening of ties, with a greater emphasis on Central American countries, through the strengthening of political dialogue and Mexico's cooperation agenda with specific social development programs. However, with some South American countries, Mexico experienced and continues to experience disagreements, which have led to a pause and even a setback in Latin American and Caribbean integration. Across the Atlantic, Mexico's relationship with its European counterparts continued on its path toward intensifying friendship and deepening political dialogue as strategic allies, despite brief disagreements. However, on balance, there is also a pause in the formalization of our modernized Global Agreement with the European Union. With the rest of the world's regions, Mexico sought greater diversification. However, it is still an unfinished endeavor. Despite efforts to promote dialogue and greater cooperation on regional and global agendas, bilateral relations with many countries remained on the sidelines of the priorities. In international forums, Mexico has stood out by advocating for the revitalization of multilateralism to create a more favorable global environment capable of addressing and resolving the multitude of global crises that concern the entire international community. For Mexico, the multilateral arena served as a mechanism to balance and counteract asymmetries with other countries and to enhance Mexico's prestige in favor of a world grounded in International Law, a system of clear rules. There have been achievements in Mexico's multilateral policy during this government. It is important to highlight the greater prominence gained in United Nations (UN) bodies, including the decision to occupy a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 2021-2022 biennium, those years were extremely challenging for international stability, peace, and security. This is a characteristic element of a State's foreign policy. Thus, Mexico consolidated a continuous, relevant, and stable relationship with the UN's principal body. Despite the complex scenario in which international security was constantly challenged, our diplomacy in the Council adopted a constructive attitude. Mexico played a successful role in bridging distant positions. Mexico's stances and decisions were supported, as has historically been the case, by legal rigor and in favor of peace and human rights, which has earned it recognition. Thus, our multilateral policy succeeded in capitalizing on credibility and trust among the international community. Another achievement of Mexico in the multilateral sphere has been the call to the international community and the effort to persuade major powers and emerging countries of the urgent need to reform the UN considering global reconfigurations. For Mexico, it is clear that the measures required for a comprehensive reform must be guided by the principles of representativeness, democratization, transparency, and effectiveness. With this foundational assessment, what can be anticipated in terms of foreign policy for the upcoming administration led by Claudia Sheinbaum? What recommendations could be made for Mexico's international efforts in the coming years? The answers to these questions revolve around finding consensus on the need to build a State foreign policy, rather than a government policy. A foreign policy with long-term objectives and vision that allows for the accommodation of the nuances and emphases each head of the Executive may bring. To outline some recommendations, we must emphasize that Mexico is a globally strategic country. The voice of our country and the diplomatic prestige accumulated over the years exert tangible influence on the international stage. Our country plays a key role in the trends and dynamics of international trade and global production chains, being among the top ten exporting countries in the world. In addition to this, Mexico will continue to benefit from the relocation of companies and investments. Thanks to this global phenomenon, known as “nearshoring,” our country could solidify its position as an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment, including the one from Asia, and will have the potential to develop clusters of technological innovations, among other sectors. Therefore, broad opportunities for global engagement are emerging for Mexico. However, the conflict dynamics that prevail on the international scene present complex challenges for Claudia Sheinbaum's management of foreign policy. Commercial, military, or geopolitical tensions, such as the situation in the South China Sea, the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, pose challenges that require reaching agreements on a wide range of issues, particularly in security, migration, climate change, and sustainable development. Identifying and deepening convergences with key countries will be essential to easing the many international tensions that Mexico will face at the beginning of Sheinbaum's term. Our bilateral relationship with the United States is, without a doubt, the clear priority in Mexico's foreign agenda. Mexico's outlook toward the world begins there, at our northern border. The ties of interdependence are broad and deep. Our country and the United States need each other. Therefore, among the issues that could constitute the first successes of Sheinbaum's international agenda could be taking important steps in advancing and deepening a strategic partnership from which cooperative benefits can be derived, setting aside rhetoric. In our relationship with the United States, the main thematic axes from which opportunities arise are bilateral trade, investments, production chains and competitiveness through innovation; migration; security; and border management. Challenges are also apparent in these areas. The vitality of the bilateral relationship demands, first and foremost, building an effective, institutionalized, and frequent dialogue through periodic summits and high-level meetings, in addition to achieving mutual recognition of shared responsibilities in the most significant issues. This is a critical condition, regardless of who occupies the White House in the coming years. Deepening and further institutionalizing this bilateral dialogue is urgent given the likelihood of a remastered “Trumpism” version reaching the Oval Office. These variables will be conclusive and decisive in paving the way toward 2026, the year of the first USMCA review. The goal is to ensure that the review focuses on the formalities of the process, meaning it should be free from deep renegotiations or political setbacks. We now know that Marcelo Ebrard will have the important mission of leading this difficult task for Mexico. One of Ebrard's assets, in addition to his experience during the negotiation of the USMCA, is that he is a familiar figure to our North American counterparts. Our relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is also of utmost importance. It has become clear that this bilateral relationship is essential for Mexico's present and future. The Asian country plays a crucial role in the network of political relations that the Mexican government must continue to weave and deepen, especially considering and recognizing the predominant, superpower role that China exerts in global politics, technological development, investments, and trade. The geopolitical tensions and trends in which the PRC government has played a leading role grant and validate a stronger position for China in the region and, by extension, on the global chessboard. While few doubted years ago, and no one doubts today, that the dynamism of the Chinese economy is of growing importance in terms of the behavior and current state of the world economy. Furthermore, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Given the positioning that the Asian country has achieved, strengthening the bilateral relationship is vital to achieving the global and regional power balances that are in Mexico's best interest. Therefore, Mexico must approach China both politically and economically. It is essential that the government and the business sector jointly adopt medium and long-term measures to achieve a strategic rapprochement, with an updated agenda and innovative dialogue mechanisms that bring both countries closer together. Achieving this also involves the need to foster mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. Consequently, it will be imperative for the new Mexican President to work towards continuing to intensify and expand our relationship with China, primarily in economic and technological matters, as well as in identifying common ground and affinities on global issues. With Europe as a whole, it will be a priority to achieve the signing of the new Global Agreement with the European Union to deepen our alliance. This includes countries with which our bilateral relations are historic, such as Spain; leading EU countries, such as Germany — our main trading partner in Europe — and France; and the group of Eastern European countries where threats to the established international order are clearly perceived at their borders. Additionally, it will be essential to reaffirm Mexico's interest in working alongside all European countries to formulate joint strategies to restore peace and ensure international security. Our ties with Latin America and the Caribbean deserve special mention. The equation of Mexico's foreign policy toward this region, which is undoubtedly a priority, must reaffirm its commitment to strengthening mechanisms for political coordination, advancing regional integration, and agreeing on common policies and principles to achieve shared economic and social development, well-being for the population, and a migration management approach based on human rights, with an emphasis on the comprehensive protection of migrants. Considering that globally there are now 281 million migrants, Mexico will need to assert its regional convening power by stressing the urgency of addressing the structural causes of this phenomenon, condemning hate speech against migrants, and advocating for the need to develop political and legal frameworks that contribute to the sustainable development and the well-being of populations. In this region, the relationship with Brazil will become increasingly strategic, based on the leadership roles that each country plays and the shared values. In the current context, there is an evident political and ideological affinity between both governments, which translates into an additional advantage that will allow us to further strengthen our bilateral ties. This conclusion also considers Brazil's importance within the BRICS framework. Therefore, Tlatelolco should capitalize on the opportunities for alignment with Itamaraty on regional political issues and contributions to resolving crises in certain countries, such as Haiti. Of course, the comprehensive regional partnership that Mexico promotes and seeks within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the fertile ground that political and diplomatic coordination initiatives could experience within its framework, may spark interest for Brazil and clearly outline synergies leading to closer relations. Perhaps the upcoming visit to Mexico by Brazilian President Lula da Silva will provide the ideal opportunity to illustrate the potential harmony between the two countries in advancing the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean and in articulating global initiatives. Undoubtedly, the bilateral issues with some governments in the region, the aired tensions, and the challenges to Latin American integration are imperative topics for the next president and her cabinet to address. Solutions to these pending matters will not be simple or quick. Common ground is limited, and the ideological distances between different leaderships in the region are evident. The relevance of the region to Mexico cannot be denied, given the shared cultural and historical heritage with these countries. However, the divergence of political directions taken by governing groups and the alternations in power across the region have led to a series of ideological and political transitions toward radical centralization of power, evident in regimes characterized by strong presidential figures. Pragmatic approaches in their most extreme forms loom, and given the structural fragility and vulnerability of their economies, they provoke sociopolitical unrest, instability, and emigration, among other outcomes. Therefore, the challenges are complex, and the priorities emerging from the region are clear. Other areas of opportunity for Claudia Sheinbaum's foreign policy will include diversifying our political and commercial relations with emerging and influential countries in regions of growing global importance, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Opening new diplomatic and consular missions in these areas will be ideal and will yield benefits in the medium term. Reactivating political dialogue and cooperation with all international and regional actors is also imperative. The drive to expand our diplomatic footprint in traditionally neglected regions will increasingly take on a sense of urgency. In addition to this diversification, it will be necessary to strengthen the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID, in spanish). Its institutional strengthening should begin with building an international cooperation agenda based on both the results and needs of supply and demand. It seems necessary to increase the capacity of resources allocated to the international cooperation that Mexico offers. It also seems viable to adopt a more proactive and forward-looking approach to cooperation, with a high value on innovation, where Mexico can position itself as a recipient of cooperation in areas such as technological innovation and energy transition. Equally important is to continue betting on trilateral or triangular cooperation schemes, as this decision is based on recognizing shared visions and priorities with other countries, which contributes to strengthening collaborative ties with countries in the region and in various parts of the world. In addition to all of this, there are several other issues that will need to be addressed. To briefly mention a few, it will be crucial to emphasize the urgency of developing international actions aimed at expanding spaces for multilateral engagement and building common positions on issues such as food security, climate change, and the transition to clean and green energy — topics of personal interest to Claudia Sheinbaum given her background, knowledge, and experience. Other topics, also of a global nature and requiring priority attention, include those related to health; contributions to the refinement and progress of International Law codification; the promotion of innovative instruments such as our Feminist Foreign Policy; and, of course, the formulation of initiatives and leadership in multilateral efforts to restore peace. It is important to pause and emphasize that the issue of international peace is one in which Mexico enjoys a reputation as a builder of bridges for understanding. Our advantages lie not only in our traditional pacifist and conciliatory policy but also in the credibility provided by our multiple memberships, which facilitate Mexico's voice and vote in many international organizations. This will undoubtedly contribute to identifying potential consensus and common positions in favor of sustainable peace. These same multiple memberships and Mexico's prestige can be translated into contributions to the urgent need to reform the UN to ensure an updated international system. Individually or collectively, the issues described constitute crucial topics for defining the international profile and image that will be built around the elected president and what her foreign policy will be during her 6-year term. However, it is worth pausing for a reflection that is undoubtedly relevant. The personal decisions that Claudia Sheinbaum makes regarding her trips abroad will carry significant weight. The future international trips of the Head of the Executive, in case they occur frequently, will be an important element to consider in terms of the international presence that Mexico wishes to adopt. In this regard, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro next November presents itself as a valuable first opportunity for Sheinbaum to appear alongside the leaders of the world's most important economies. The advantages of this trip are obvious, as it goes without saying that Mexico's foreign policy fully aligns with the three general priorities of Brazil's G20 presidency. As in this group, global forums are also expecting Mexico's voice to be represented at the highest level. Likewise, the profile of the future Mexican president necessitates highlighting the enormous environmental challenges and adaptability issues imposed by the evidence of climate change. In this context, it is worth noting that Sheinbaum inspires hope. The odds suggest that she could capitalize on international leadership grounded in her political commitment and academic background in this particular area. She seems to understand clearly that it is essential to advance in energy transition and will need to work towards and persuade others to increase public and private sector investments in the proportion of renewable energy within the country's energy matrix. The environmental policies and the focus on energy efficiency, due to their characteristics and implications of global shared responsibility, will occupy a significant portion of the time and space on both the domestic and international agendas during the next Mexican administration. Sheinbaum has the credentials and interest to make progress in the direction demanded by the global climate emergency and to take on a leading role. The work of Alicia Bárcena, the current Foreign Minister and future Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources, will be crucial in supporting and advancing global agreements on this issue. Bárcena's technical and practical knowledge of this agenda is a guarantee, and her appointment underscores the importance of the environmental agenda. As with the start of any new administration, it may be worthwhile to revisit the interpretation of the constitutional principles of Mexican foreign policy. This exercise will need to be carried out considering the limited flexibility that the tumultuous global landscape allows. Despite these contextual limitations, adherence to the principled foundation of our international actions should first and foremost offer a range of resources that can be translated into practical solutions for the successful conduct of Mexico's affairs beyond its borders. The principles are, in essence, fundamental elements for the conduct of foreign policy, and at the same time, they are subsidiary to the definition of strategies for Mexico's international actions. They are not, by definition, meant to be declarative priorities. Instead, they constitute the legal framework for acceptable, possible, and desirable actions and decisions, including their role in safeguarding and upholding the national interest. But they will be useful to the extent that they provide predictability, guide our international actions, signal the positions and definitions that should be valid in line with Mexico's international stature, contribute to our diplomatic tradition, and enhance Mexico's prestige and image. In other words, as our history has shown, their value does not lie in declarations but in their contribution to building global agreements with our international partners and allies, both bilaterally and within the framework of multilateral and regional organizations. For these principles to translate into practical advantages, it is desirable to accompany them with the exercise of soft power and the promotion of Mexico through our valuable cultural, natural, artistic, and historical heritage. To achieve all of the above and meet these objectives, it will be necessary to overcome the obstacle of resource scarcity. To be consistent with the goal of exercising a global presence that corresponds to Mexico's position on the international stage, it is imperative to strengthen action capacities and allocate resources. Additionally, organizational schemes must be developed to skillfully direct actions in both bilateral and multilateral arenas to fully achieve the aforementioned foreign policy objectives. The answer will largely lie in relying on and supporting the professionals of Mexican diplomacy and diplomatically skilled personnel who can act within the framework of our constitutional foreign policy principles and prioritize cooperation over conflict. Therefore, it is essential to recognize the need to affirm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strengthened by the capabilities of the Mexican Foreign Service (SEM, in spanish). It is the oldest service in the country, which has gradually taken on more responsibilities. A service characterized by its committed and professional work in pursuit of Mexican interests and the best causes of humanity. The implementation of this foreign policy, based on the diplomatic tradition embodied by the SEM, should also promote the creation of cooperative synergies through the virtuous tripod of collaboration among universities and research centers, businesses and organized civil society, and the government. Despite its apparent abstraction, foreign policy is as important as domestic policy; this underscores the importance of investing effort and political will in consolidating Mexico's international actions as a State policy. It is clear that global challenges require cooperative actions and common solutions characterized by shared responsibility. Mexican diplomacy possesses sufficient experience, political sensitivity, skill, historical awareness, global perspective, a commitment to serving national interests, and intellectual capital to take the initiative in addressing the solutions that both the world and Mexico demand. The world is increasingly interdependent, interconnected, and globalized. It is also alarmingly radicalized, navigating through axiological debates, as demonstrated by election results in various parts of the world. Mexico needs to contribute to a more stable, orderly, and peaceful world. Finally, these reflections on the international agenda of Mexico's future president would be incomplete without mentioning the person who will lead the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been confirmed by Claudia Sheinbaum herself that Juan Ramón de la Fuente will take on this responsibility. In addition to his personality, which will open doors and contribute to a positive atmosphere for negotiations with his counterparts, his professional experience and shared scientific profile, together with Sheinbaum and Bárcena, combined with a global outlook, are among his strengths. His tenure in the SEM as Mexico's permanent representative to the UN in New York, along with his accumulated international experience working closely with this universal organization's family, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bolster his credentials in guiding and advancing Mexico's interests in global forums. His appointment is seen as a positive development, and it raises expectations.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Good afternoon, everyone. It is an honor for me and for Argentina to participate in this Peace Summit organized by President Zelenski, with whom we have established a close relationship. We Argentinians are fully aware of the value of peace and democratic coexistence as guiding principles of life in society, and that is why I want to especially thank you for the invitation to this event. I want to express, on behalf of the Argentinian people, our utmost support for the people of Ukraine and our friend, President Zelenski, as defenders of the idea of freedom, we condemn any form of violence, whether between individuals, but particularly, we repudiate war as an illegitimate mean of resolving conflicts between nations. War, tragic by nature, can never be the answer to problems that should be resolved in the political sphere. War is not a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts; it is the last resort of a people who must defend themselves, nothing more, nothing less. We are defenders of the idea of freedom. Liberalism, as we understand it, is the respect and protection of the life projects of others, based on the principle of non-aggression, in defense of the right to life, freedom, and private property. As defenders of freedom, we can advocate for nothing other than peace among free peoples and nations. When we say that the guiding principle of our doctrine is the defense of individuals' lives, liberty, and property, we are expressing that there is a direct relationship between peace, commerce, and prosperity. There is no economic prosperity without free trade, and there is no free trade without peace. Free trade naturally promotes peace, because as Bastiat said, "where trade enters, bullets do not," or as Milton Friedman said, "I may hate my neighbor, but if he doesn't buy my product, I go bankrupt." As a fervent believer in the philosophical consciousness found in liberalism and peace, I make this brief defense of these principles today, as they seem to have gone out of fashion. I believe it is an important step for Argentina to be present first at the G7 Summit and now here at this Peace Summit. It is part of the great shift we are undertaking as a country after decades of turning our back on the world. There is a new Argentina that is once again embracing the ideas that, 150 years ago, made it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. There is a new Argentina that also seeks to reclaim the prominent role in the concert of nations that it once held and never should have abandoned. Know that Argentina will always be committed to defending the ideas that made great the West, and that for us, peace among free nations is not only a moral duty but also a necessary condition for prosperity. Thank you all very much.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Donald Trump is now having his lead whither before him as the fresh and young face of Kamala Harris steps forward for the Democrats. It is Trump’s to lose, and any continuation of current tactics are unlikely to be unhelpful. Only a few days ago most of us expected that Donald J Trump would win the battle to become the next president of the United States, beating an aging and befuddled Joe Biden by a substantial majority, according to the polls. Today, we ponder the implications of the first black and South Asian woman running for president and of America electing its first woman president in history. Kamala Harris has long been written off as a contender for the highest office by members of the commentariat, but many are now changing their tune. Within days of Biden renouncing the nomination, leading Democrats and commentators were lining up to give her their strong support and admitting that their earlier judgments could have been wrong. Late but unequivocal support came from Barack and Michelle Obama, who had allegedly been doubtful about her prospects or suitability for the office. In a call to Harris, captured on video, the former president said he “couldn’t be prouder to endorse [Harris] and to do everything he could to get her through the election and into the Oval Office.” Michelle Obama told Harris: “I am proud of you. This is going to be historic.” In a subsequent statement the Obamas said that “There is no doubt in our mind that Kamala Harris has exactly what it takes to win this election and deliver for the American people.” Within a week, everything had changed. Such is the nature of this year’s American presidential election. It is going to be a contentious, close and, almost certainly, dirty fight. But Kamala Harris, a former state prosecutor, has already shown she has more than enough steel in her to withstand whatever blows Trump and his acolytes choose to throw, and can give as good as she gets. The assaults will come but it is unlikely they will inflict any serious wounds, and the return to the White House that Trump longs for and had assumed was his for the taking is, in fact, his to lose. Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator at the Financial Times, sat down with political analyst Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of the National Interest magazine, after learning of the belated withdrawal of Joe Biden from the presidential race, to discuss how strong a candidate Kamala Harris would be. Heilbrunn told Rachman, “I think Harris will be an extremely formidable candidate who is well positioned to slice and dice Donald Trump on a variety of issues, ranging from abortion to gun control to women’s rights. And I don’t think he has any idea of what awaits him. …. The climate is perfect for Harris because she does represent the generational change that the country has been thirsting for. If the Republicans stick with Trump, who is almost 80 years old, they now have the candidate who is elderly and clearly the loopy, if not mentally challenged.” It is not hard to imagine what Mr Trump’s response might be, but were I asked, I would respectfully suggest that he avoids the use of personal invective against Kamala Harris – it will almost certainly backfire on him. Harris, for her part, would be well advised to do the same, avoiding bashing Trump as a convicted felon in favour of convincing the people that she can be trusted to defend American values at home and abroad, acknowledging voters’ struggle with inflation, continuing to speak out strong for women’s reproductive rights, and endorsing America’s global role and the rule of law. Of course, the decision is a matter for the people of the United States, not those of us who live in Europe or elsewhere. But suddenly we feel an uplift of spirit: there is a real contest to play out in the next 100 or so days. Having survived an assassination attempt, Mr Trump enjoys an unshakable hold on his party. But he can be beaten. His rambling and mean-spirited acceptance speech for the party’s nomination at the Republican convention showed the man for what he is. Kamala Harris has made a compelling start in raising funds for her campaign and attracting strong support. She was the beneficiary of Joe Biden’s obstinacy in relinquishing the fight for a second term; his delay in doing so averted an open primary, which she may have lost. Simply by being 59, she is now the face of a new generation of leadership, making Donald Trump, the oldest nominee in history. Despite all this, she remains the underdog in this race, and time is not on her side. Her status as the uncontested nominee for the Democratic party in the presidential election could lead quickly to recriminations if her campaign starts to go wrong. We must hope that Ms Harris can show the American people that she is up to the job of president, and offer them—and the world—hope.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском “This article was originally published here by the International Crisis Group” The ceasefire deal the U.S. has tabled represents the best – and perhaps last – hope for both ending the Gaza war and getting the hostages held in the strip back any time soon. Israeli and Hamas leaders should accept it. Efforts by Egyptian, Qatari and U.S. mediators to reach a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have reached a decisive juncture. The proposal on the table comes closer than its predecessors to getting past the main sticking point regarding a permanent ceasefire, which Hamas demands and to which Israel refuses to commit. It envisages an immediate truce and partial hostage/prisoner exchange, with talks to follow on Gaza’s governance and security. Though the deal on offer fully satisfies neither side, no better one is likely to emerge any time soon that can both end the fighting that has devastated Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages held in the strip. Moreover, the longer the war continues, the graver the risk that tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border, or between the U.S. and Iran-backed groups elsewhere, set off a regional escalation that could further draw in Washington and Tehran. Israel and Hamas should embrace the deal on the table as a humanitarian imperative and because neither side can achieve strategic victory and each has long passed the point of diminishing returns. Continued war will neither destroy Hamas as Israel seeks nor strengthen Hamas’s hand, let alone improve prospects for Palestinians. It guarantees only greater suffering to a people who desperately need relief. Three Phases, Many Questions Full details of the deal on offer have yet to become public, but the rough outlines have been widely reported. They follow the model in the mediators’ previous proposal in early May, a draft of which Hamas accepted, albeit with caveats, and which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government then rejected. The new version, which U.S. President Joe Biden announced in a White House speech on 31 May, appears to leave key elements in place: a ceasefire in three phases, with each consisting of steps that together would end the war. In the first phase, of six weeks’ duration, Israel would withdraw its forces from all “populated areas” of Gaza. Hamas would release Israeli civilian, elderly and wounded hostages, as well as the remains of some deceased hostages, in exchange for Israel freeing an agreed-upon list of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Israel would also allow displaced Palestinian civilians to return to their homes including in Gaza’s north and allow the entry and distribution of more goods and fuel into the strip. The transition from phase one to two would follow talks between Israel and Hamas. Critically, the proposal states that the ceasefire is to hold as long as the parties continue their negotiations even if these extend beyond the allotted six weeks. The deal’s second phase would see the release of all remaining hostages, including soldiers, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. At that point, the phase one ceasefire would turn into a permanent cessation of hostilities. In the third phase, Hamas would hand over the remains of the last of the deceased hostages. The import regime also would be relaxed, with Israel lifting its blockade to enable the movement of people and entry of goods as full reconstruction gets under way. The provision on a “permanent cessation of hostilities” in phase two is the most significant modification to the earlier proposal, which had referred merely to a “sustainable period of calm”. It seeks to bridge the gap that caused previous negotiations to break down, namely between Hamas’s demand that a ceasefire be permanent and Israel’s that it not. Since Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that they are still committed to destroying Hamas (or at least its military and governance capability) in the long term. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and Minister Benny Gantz within the war cabinet and the military establishment have been more willing to halt fighting, at least temporarily, to get the hostages back, though that position is hindered by the fact that Netanyahu has a personal interest in refusing to enter any ceasefire deal, as it would almost certainly mean he would lose power. Hamas, for its part, has been unwilling to hand over hostages, especially the military officers which it considers to be key bargaining chips, in exchange for anything less than explicit guarantees that a ceasefire be permanent. The Biden administration, with the new proposal, has attempted to mollify both sides. It posits an immediate cessation of hostilities; a mechanism to maintain that ceasefire in place if good-faith negotiations on implementation continue; and a permanent cessation of hostilities as the end point of the second phase. That sequence can be read from the Hamas side as achieving a permanent end to fighting. It can be read by Israel as preserving some room for manoeuvre to return to hostilities. By encouraging each side to tolerate the ambiguities that make the deal feasible for the other, Washington is signalling to Hamas that it will make sure the ceasefire holds if the movement embraces the deal while reassuring Israel that even should the deal hold and a permanent ceasefire take root, its military campaign has rendered Hamas incapable of reprising the kind of attack it staged on 7 October. Implicit in the U.S. approach is a belief that a functioning ceasefire will create incentives for both sides, generating momentum and raising the costs of breaking the agreement. Still, even if the two sides sign up, their mutually exclusive positions will make the agreement fragile and contingent. Achieving its primary purpose – stopping the bloodletting and getting the hostages home – will be subject to the completion of phase one and negotiations toward phase two. The absence of detail in the proposal regarding terms and mechanics, presumably even in the full unpublished text, is both its strength and its weakness. Mediators see the ambiguity as necessary for getting both sides to sign up and end a war that is devastating Gaza and its population, tanking Israel’s global standing and risking a wider regional escalation. But the lack of clarity on the most divisive disputes, in effect, punts those issues to talks in the first phase. Fraught negotiations loom. For example, what would constitute Israel’s “full withdrawal” from all “populated areas” of Gaza is open to interpretation, meaning details of even the deal’s initial phase are ambiguous. How will the areas from which Israel withdraws be delineated? Will Israel launch incursions into those areas, as military officials have said it would continue to do after the war? Who would they target in such operations? It is widely assumed that Israel will continue to go after Hamas’s senior leadership, but how widely that is interpreted will bear on the sustainability of a ceasefire. Getting to the second phase and beyond will require addressing the still more challenging questions of post-war governance and security in Gaza. Once even a temporary ceasefire is in place, humanitarian aid is supposed to ramp up and some reconstruction begin, though precisely what material Israel will allow in is unclear. The proposal does not address the political status of Gaza after hostilities end or whether Israel will maintain its systems of physical and administrative control of the strip. It does not address how Gaza would be governed after the war, much less who would govern it, nor the core question of Hamas’s future role. Nor does it lay out a process that could decide these questions. Trying to resolve those questions ahead of time, however, would rule out an immediate stop to the fighting. The focus now is on whether Washington’s assurances will convince the two adversaries to proceed. On Israel’s side, the U.S. president’s decision to make a public statement outlining the proposal, asserting that Israel had already accepted it, caught Netanyahu off guard and put him on the spot. U.S. officials reportedly notified Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Michael Herzog, Gallant and Gantz of the main points in Biden’s speech just an hour and a half before the president delivered it. Netanyahu’s initial comments seemed to hedge, not rejecting the proposal or denying that Israel had agreed to the wording, but offering his broad interpretation that it would allow Israel to keep pursuing its cardinal war objective of destroying Hamas and its governing capability in Gaza. Whether his statements aimed to manage domestic politics or undercut ongoing diplomacy, they have reinforced Hamas’s suspicions about Israeli intentions. The war cabinet has closely guarded the proposal’s full text – which reportedly runs four and a half pages – lest spoilers, especially to Netanyahu’s right, try to torpedo it. While Netanyahu appears to have the votes in the coalition to see the ceasefire deal approved, and polls suggest that a plurality of Israelis favour a hostage deal, two of his far-right ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have threatened to leave the coalition government should he proceed, which could precipitate the government’s collapse, forcing Netanyahu to either form a temporary alternative coalition or leave office and hold elections. As for Hamas, for now it insists on an explicit, up-front guarantee of an end to hostilities and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as the final outcome of the staged process. It welcomed Biden’s statements, and has continued to do so, but said it would not agree to a text that diverges from them; asserting that the proposal, which Hamas called “the Israeli paper … does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, but rather a temporary ceasefire, and it does not closely link the three stages stipulated”. Hamas also called on Biden to “ensure that the occupation government agrees to [his statements] and that they are reflected in the text of the agreement”. Hamas argues, based on past experience, that once it appears that the war is over, even if only provisionally, pressure on Israel and the Biden administration will abate, the process will bog down, and Gaza – already destroyed – again will be forgotten and Israeli military operations will resume. In addition, while recent Hamas statements have prioritised a complete Israeli withdrawal and permanent ceasefire, a senior movement official claimed that the latest proposal imposes unacceptable restrictions on the release of politically prominent prisoners and insists on sending many of them into exile. Time for a Deal By making the proposal’s outlines public, Biden has vested significant personal credibility in his administration’s ability to produce a ceasefire ahead of the November U.S. elections. He is unlikely to be able to use his own authority in another big push for an end to the war before the November vote. His objective appears to be to deny Israel and Hamas negotiating space, making it difficult for either to say no. To put muscle behind his move, the U.S. circulated a draft resolution on a ceasefire in the UN Security Council to mobilise international support for the initiative. Prime Minister Netanyahu should accept the Biden proposal – which the U.S. has gone to lengths to make ambiguous enough for him to work with and that the Israeli defence establishment supports – and avoid public statements to the contrary. For Israel, its eight-month assault has underlined the sobering reality that it has been unable to deal a decisive, strategic blow to Hamas. Nor is Israel’s war effort diminishing Hamas’s power as a political movement; to the contrary, its popularity has surged in the West Bank and beyond. Some vestige of Hamas’s power in Gaza will remain for the foreseeable future, to be diluted, if at all, primarily through politics. Continuing the war will bring further destruction of civilian infrastructure and further damage to Israel’s international standing, not the body blow it hopes to deliver Hamas. It would also mean the continuation and possible escalation of the intensive war of attrition with Hizbollah on the Israel-Lebanon border, which could quickly spiral out of control and has already left tens of thousands of Israelis (and even more Lebanese) displaced. An end to the fighting in Gaza is necessary to halt these exchanges: Hizbollah will only stop rocket fire with such a ceasefire in place. The potential ensuing calm could allow residents on both sides of the border to return. As for Hamas, while the group may not set great store by the U.S.’s signalling that it supports a permanent ceasefire, it has shown that it can survive Israel’s onslaught but is unlikely to achieve anything more than small-scale tactical victories in territory it can neither protect nor fully control. Maintaining the current trajectory in the hope of extracting a higher price from Israel by killing and wounding its troops, draining its resources, undermining perceptions of its military prowess, sullying its international reputation and straining its relationship with the U.S. is unlikely to yield a better deal, while inflicting more suffering and destruction on Gaza. The deal on offer includes an important concession from Israel, based on the communicated proposal – that the phase one ceasefire will be extended as long as negotiations continue in good faith. It is an opportunity for a prolonged cessation of hostilities that many Palestinians would blame Hamas for wasting. Further, if Hamas rejects the current proposal, the Biden administration will almost certainly also blame the group for the collapse of talks and, as November approaches, would be more likely to throw up its hands and let Israel follow its own war logic. The two sides’ acceptance of the ceasefire deal would be just the start of difficult talks, requiring concerted diplomacy from the U.S., Egypt, Qatar and pressure and support from others, to bridge what for now seem almost unsurmountable differences and sustain negotiations. But a rejection of the proposed plan will make arrangements for the day after more complex than they already are. Far better to stop fighting now and seriously discuss what should happen next than to put off what is an inevitable reckoning yet again while, in the meantime, thousands more Palestinian civilians are killed, starved, displaced and further immiserated, and hope of getting the hostages out alive fades.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском After his visit to France, which is taking place these days, a crucial NATO summit, scheduled in Washington from July 9 to 11, awaits the American president, who, soon to end his term, must face the sad record of his foreign policy. Obviously, if we compare him to Trump, who was nothing but chaos and incompetence, there is no comparison. Nevertheless, if we are somewhat honest, we must recognize that the Biden years, as far as international affairs are concerned, will have been cruel. Cruel for America, which will have seen its influence diminish even more, and for the Western bloc in general, dragged along by it, to which the global South has ceased to give credit, in particular because of the double standards practiced in Gaza and Ukraine. The first major error was to condition the return of the United States to the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's strict compliance with the terms of 2015 and on new negotiations on ballistic missiles. While it was the United States that unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Vienna nuclear deal with Iran, under the Trump administration in 2018, leading Iran to increase its uranium enrichment and reduce its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it would have been more adroit for the Biden administration to make a gesture of goodwill towards Tehran by first returning to the agreement before making its legitimate demands. This would have changed nothing in substance, but everything in form, and we might not be here today. As imperfect as the agreement wanted by Obama was, and as unpleasant as the Mullahs' regime is, the JCPOA at least had the merit of having stabilized the region somewhat. Joe Biden's second mistake in international policy, this one of historic magnitude, of course concerns Ukraine. Readers of these correspondences know that, as the son of a Ukrainian woman and with family not far from the front line of the Minsk agreements, I condemned the illegal invasion led by Putin, a mafia president if ever there was one, on February 24, 2022. They may also remember that I pleaded, at the beginning of the war, for a “muscular” response from NATO, namely the creation of a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as Zelensky had requested. This was, in my opinion, the only way to calm things down and bring the Russian president, whose army had proven incapable of reaching kyiv, to the negotiating table. This is not the option that Washington has chosen. Instead, it has decided to arm the Ukrainian forces and push them to continue and continue a war that they will probably, and unfortunately, not be able to win, neither in the short term nor in the medium term – the long term does not exist since they will probably be abandoned by America by then –, due to a lack of sufficient men and equipment. Since we knew that without the risky deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian soil, which would probably have led to a new world war, the battle was lost in advance, it was irresponsible not to invite Volodymyr Zelensky to negotiate when, in the fall of 2022, Ukraine found itself, if not in a position of strength, at least in a favorable position in the Donbass. A missed opportunity that may not come again. The Ukrainian defeat that seems to be looming would therefore not only be that of Kiev, but also that of the policy of an American president trapped in the prism of the Cold War. This policy, devoid of strategy, will have consisted largely of waging a proxy war with Russia, without any precise objective, other than that of pushing Ukraine to fight until an improbable “final victory”. Finally, third and fourth significant errors: the visionless approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopted by the 46th President of the United States throughout his term, who has never really tried to relaunch the peace process and the two-state solution, as well as his lack of consistency in his relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he nevertheless detests. A lack of consistency that led Joe Biden and his entourage to condemn the massacres committed by the IDF in the Gaza Strip while providing it with the weapons necessary to perpetrate them and which forced the United States to build an artificial port at more than 320 million dollars in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Gazans, because Israel subjects land access points to drastic controls. Other inconsistencies in current American diplomacy could be noted, such as the sanctions against Cuba, decided by Trump and maintained by his successor, who, however, when he was vice-president, had been at the origin of the resumption of relations with Havana. But the image that will remain indelibly attached to Biden's international policy, and which will have set the tone for the majority of Americans, is the debacle in Kabul in August 2021. Biden is obviously not responsible for the Afghan disaster as a whole, but this unprecedented rout of American power is his work and bears his signature. While nothing was forcing the United States into haste, it was he who stubbornly clung to the August 31 date to conclude the American withdrawal negotiated by his predecessor. This chaotic end was then perceived as a humiliating defeat, revealing the failure of American foreign policy and the mismanagement of conflicts. Paralyzed in front of their screens, the American people saw their military power, a power that they were told was unparalleled in human history, thwarted by "peasants armed with Kalashnikovs and riding mopeds," to quote a television commentator. Joe Biden is a sincere man, full of good intentions, but a man who is definitely a prisoner of the past and therefore overwhelmed by the geopolitical challenges of today's world. In the Ukrainian crisis, he has led America and its allies into a deadlock, while his adversaries have consolidated a Sino-Russian bloc, allied with North Korea and Iran, and supported by South Africa, as well as many other states around the world, perhaps even India. The November election will obviously not be played out on the international stage, but this theme will nevertheless be present in the debates. Joe Biden will then find himself confronted with a record that few of his predecessors suffered while campaigning for re-election. To find a similar situation, we have to go back to the time of Jimmy Carter.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.