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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском April 2025 marks the second anniversary of Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the prospect of joining the alliance began to be seriously considered after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, a final decision was repeatedly postponed due to the unclear advantages of this move and insufficient public support. Despite close economic ties with Russia and a tradition of cautious diplomacy known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen line” (often criticized as “Finlandization”), the 2022 international crisis pushed Finland to join NATO. Since then, the once-neutral country has shifted its foreign policy, increased defense spending, and expanded its arms exports. Government and Military Perspectives In December 2024, the Finnish government presented a new Defense Report in Helsinki, replacing the previous strategy issued in September 2021. Back in 2021, Finland had highlighted the growing military activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, along with the increased interest of major powers in the natural resources of the North and the Northern Sea Route. Notably, the country didn’t name any specific enemy, choosing to keep its message broad and carefulThe 2024 document takes a much more serious tone. It clearly names Russia as the main source of global instability and describes China as a growing power that challenges the U.S. and its allies. Terrorism is mentioned too, but much less often. Some of the main points about global security include the following - The return of a "large-scale, protracted war" to the European continent;- The Special Military Operation (SMO) is interpreted as a continuation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008;- An increase in hybrid attacks and incidents involving critical infrastructure;- Growing Chinese influence on Finland and its neighboring countries;- An unpredictable and unstable defense and international security environment, with a clear tendency toward further deterioration;- The largest NATO military buildup on the eastern flank since the end of the Cold War;- Accession to NATO is described as “the most significant transformation in Finland’s defense policy since World War II”;- Ongoing integration of Finland’s armed forces into NATO’s structures and joint defense planning;- Finland is now planning its defense together with NATO, focusing not just on its own territory but also on the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In the section on shifts in global power, Russia is named as the main cause of instability. It is described as “the most significant and immediate threat to the Allies, to security, and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.” Other claims include: a long-standing effort to weaken the European Union, a push to restore its great power status, and an attempt to divide Europe into spheres of influence using military force. Russia is also accused of using hybrid tactics—such as spreading fear, influencing public opinion, stirring political divisions, and blocking decisions—to target European countries and their people. Its Special Military Operation is seen as the beginning of a broader, more direct, and unpredictable conflict with the West. China is characterized as a less aggressive player. It is noted that Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, has intensified intelligence activities in the United States and Europe, and has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia, the development of which will determine Moscow’s ability to exert influence over Europe. At the same time, Finnish strategists place greater emphasis on the ongoing competition between China and the United States for global political, military, economic, and technological dominance. In matters concerning NATO’s role in defense, it is noted that the Alliance has intensified its cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, increased its military presence on the eastern flank and the number of military exercises, and is continually updating both general and regional defense plans in the event of a large-scale conflict. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO has become geographically closer to strategically important areas for Russia, including Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Belarus, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic region. Within the Alliance, ensuring the security of maritime transport routes and the modernization of military infrastructure in Northern European countries is viewed as a key condition for the potential reinforcement of troops from North America. The role of the European Union is described as complementary to NATO, while it is also noted that the EU is increasing defense spending and expanding technological cooperation. The report was published after the election victory of Republican U.S. President Donald Trump, known for his isolationist views, which is partially reflected in the document through emphasis on European independence in security matters and the need for further military expenditures. On intra-European regional issues, the report focuses on cooperation with the member states of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic States, and the United Kingdom, as well as on Germany’s shift in security policy, France’s increased defense spending, and Poland’s growing purchases of military equipment. In military and technology matters, the document highlights the growing role of unmanned systems (both remote-controlled and autonomous), artificial intelligence, and advanced human capabilities like improved thinking and synthetic biology. It stresses the need to use the latest scientific and tech innovations in developing weapons — a step that could help make up for fewer soldiers on the battlefield. Cyberspace and outer space are seen as new areas of military and technological competition. This view is based on several factors: the rapid growth of space technologies (driven by private companies), easier access to space, and heavy reliance on cyber tools and satellites for both military and civilian use. Information warfare is also becoming more influential alongside traditional combat. The document notes that small countries can benefit in such conflicts by using innovations smartly and managing resources well. Still, Helsinki does not rely only on high-tech solutions. A key part of Finland’s military strategy is preparing both its army and population for long-term, grinding conflicts. This includes signing long-term arms supply contracts, building strategic reserves, keeping supply chains strong, and staying ready to protect their way of life. Among the main conclusions, the authors of the report present the following: - Finland and Europe are facing a significant decline in security, with no short-term improvement expected.- Russia poses and will continue to pose a constant security threat to Europe and Finland;- Finland will provide military assistance to Ukraine for as long as necessary;- Following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Nordic countries, the Baltic Sea region, and the High North have formed a unified geostrategic space; the Baltic Sea region holds strategic importance for Finland;- Finland’s defense will rely on maintaining conscription, strengthening the training of its military reserve, a strong public will to defend the country, and support from NATO membership.- Commitment to total defense — a combination of all national and international military and civilian measures that ensure the protection of the country under any circumstances (seven components are listed: government administration, international relations, defense capability, internal security, economy, functional capabilities of the population, and psychological resilience of people); There is a need to improve working conditions in the defense industry, increase production, and secure steady, reliable supply chains. A gradual increase in Finland’s military spending. - The development of the EU’s defense potential, and movement toward greater independence of the European Union both in policy and in the development of military technologies and defense supplies;- NATO’s readiness to provide the full spectrum of forces necessary for large-scale, high-intensity combat operations; Finland, in turn, must also create all the necessary conditions for the presence of allied troops on its territory. Similar assessments are presented in the Military Intelligence Review of Finland — 2025 (previous publications date back to 2021 and 2023), prepared by the General Staff of the Finnish Defence Forces. Russia is also named as the main threat there, which “seeks to reduce Western influence, secure its sphere of influence,” “views security policy as a zero-sum great power game in which NATO expansion strengthens the position of the United States and thereby weakens Russia’s security,” and “the interests or security of neighboring countries are not an important factor in Moscow’s calculations.” In addition, Russia is accused of seeking to turn the Global South against Western countries, in particular, there is a reference to “an attempt to present the BRICS group as part of an anti-Western ‘global majority’” . As for the Northern European direction, the Finnish General Staff notes the buildup of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Arctic region, attributes to Moscow attempts to gain unrestricted access to the Northern Sea Route and to weaken the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO structures. Helsinki predicts that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s priority will be the accelerated buildup and modernization of forces in the reestablished Leningrad Military District, bordering Scandinavia. Finnish military officials do not believe in a quick settlement of the situation in Ukraine and forecast a deterioration of Russia’s relations with the West in the coming years, a struggle by Russia for shipping in the Baltic Sea “by any means,” continued attacks on underwater infrastructure in the Baltic (a reference to damage to undersea cables, although no exact culprit is named), escalation of the race between the West, Russia and China for the resources of the High North, and increased intelligence and sabotage activities by Russian special services in Finland. China is not viewed in an entirely negative light; instead, there is recognition of Beijing's ambition to become a political, economic, military, and technological leader by 2049, marking the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. China's growing influence over countries of the Global South is also noted. Russia–China relations are seen as a "lifeline" for the Russian economy and a means of circumventing sanctions. However, Beijing is not seen as an equal partner, but as someone benefiting from Russia’s growing isolation. This makes Russia more dependent on China. The war in Ukraine is seen as helping China, since it distracts the West from China's global rise. At the regional level, Helsinki plans to enhance cooperation and update the foundational NORDEFCO agreement during its presidency of the organization in 2025. This push for renewal is driven by the evolving security environment and Finland’s recent accession to NATO alongside Sweden. Back in April 2024, the defense ministers of the member states signed a memorandum outlining a new vision for NORDEFCO. According to the document, by 2030 the countries plan to improve joint military planning and operations, make it easier to move troops across borders, boost cooperation and intelligence sharing, both directly and through NATO and the EU, and keep strengthening the defense industries of the Nordic countries. NORDEFCO is not officially seen as a mutual defense agreement or a command system like NATO; however, in recent years, it has started to show features usually found in a defense alliance, mostly because of the actions of some of its members. In 2021, the defense ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden signed a deal to strengthen cooperation, allowing for "joint action in times of peace, crisis, or conflict." In 2022, they gave each other permission to use their airspace and military bases. That same year, the defense ministers of Finland, Norway, and Sweden updated their three-way agreement, further growing their military cooperation. After Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway made a joint promise to fully support them if either country were attacked. While NORDEFCO has not yet become an organization like NATO, the current level of defense cooperation between the Nordic countries at the regional level — and repeated promises to help each other in case of conflict — suggest that in the coming years, this effort might start to look like a smaller version of NATO in Northern Europe. This kind of setup would likely be less full of red tape, quicker at making decisions, and made up of countries that share similar views and speak with one voice. It would also have a lower risk of going backward — unlike some NATO members who, in recent years, have threatened to block decisions, added extra demands for new members, or even talked about leaving the Alliance. Defense and Military-Industrial Complex Expenditures Threats identified by Finnish politicians and the military automatically require growing expenditures and an acceleration of the defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2014 to 2020, Finland’s military spending remained annually at the level of 1.5% of GDP, while in absolute terms it gradually increased — from $3.57 billion to $3.9 billion. Amid the pandemic in 2021, the figure dropped to $3.65 billion, but by the end of 2022 it amounted to $4.47 billion, and in 2023 — to $6.85 billion, or 2.4% of GDP. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides similar estimates: growth from $3.72 billion in 2014 to $6.89 billion in 2024, with the budget for 2025 estimated at $7.47 billion. Helsinki does not intend to stop there — on April 1, 2025, following recommendations from the Ministry of Defense, the government began preparations for a phased increase of the military budget to at least 3% of GDP by 2029. Over four years, it plans to raise allocations by €3.7 billion, expand the state defense order, and develop new rearmament programs for the 2030s. Helsinki also views the prospects of its domestic defense industry with optimism — according to the Finnish think tank SaferGlobe (which, according to its website, is “engaged in the study and development of tools to promote sustainable peace and security”), in 2023 arms exports reached €333 million (of which €141 million accounted for weapons intended for civilian use in self-defense, sports, and hunting) — a record since record-keeping began in 2002. About 85% of military exports were distributed within Europe. The largest importing countries by value were Sweden (€51 million), Latvia (€34 million), and Lithuania (€19 million) — together, these three countries accounted for more than half of all military product exports. In value terms, the largest share of exported military products (32%) consisted of land vehicles and their components. The next largest export categories were ammunition (17%), as well as explosives and charges (15%). The largest exports of civilian weapons were to the United States (€52 million), Canada (€15 million), and Australia (€9 million). The year 2023 also set a record for issued export licenses for military products — €667 million. The largest recipient countries of export licenses were Slovakia (€201 million), Japan (€154 million), and Ukraine (€88 million). Similar conclusions were reached by the state investment company Finnish Industry Investment (Tesi), which in autumn 2024 surveyed 368 domestic defense companies: 144 of them were identified as “fast-growing startups and growth companies,” while the rest were described as “more established players with a long history, mainly providing consulting services to the Finnish Defence Forces.” The highest growth rates were shown by producers of dual-use goods, whose net profit has increased annually by 30–40% since 2022. At the same time, companies engaged exclusively in the military sector faced difficulties in attracting investment. 50% of defense companies were located in the capital region of Uusimaa, where the leaders were Helsinki (74 companies) and its satellite city Espoo (65); another 16% were based in the Pirkanmaa region centered around Tampere (40). Rounding out the top five were the high-tech “capital” Oulu (21) and another satellite of Helsinki, Vantaa (14). By type of activity, the majority of companies (246) operated in the support and logistics sector; 70 were engaged in the design of combat command and control systems (C4I — Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence); 20 firms cooperated with the land forces, 13 with the navy, 10 with the air force, five worked in joint operations, and the remaining four were involved in space technologies. A New Strategy — A New President Finland’s entry into NATO happened during the second and final term of President Sauli Niinistö. While he followed the West’s general approach on the war in Ukraine and supported anti-Russian sanctions, he still tried to keep some level of political dialogue with Russia. After February 2022, this became almost impossible, and Finland officially ended its nearly 80-year policy of staying neutral. In the two-round election held in January and February 2024, Finnish voters chose Alexander Stubb from the National Coalition Party as their new president. Stubb studied in the United States and France, and previously worked as a Member of the European Parliament, as well as Finland’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Back in 2014, when Finland still followed the "Paasikivi–Kekkonen line" of cautious foreign policy, Stubb was one of the only top officials who openly supported joining NATO. On the topic of relations with Russia, he said that “Russia’s integration with the West was an illusion.” This view may be influenced by his family history. Stubb’s father, Göran Stubb, was born in Käkisalmi — a town that was given to the Soviet Union after the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940, renamed first as Kexholm (in Swedish), and later as Priozersk. On his father's side, Stubb’s grandparents came from Vyborg, which also became part of the Soviet Union after the war. However, the family had already moved to Helsinki before the conflict started. In his inaugural speech on March 1, 2024, Alexander Stubb uncompromisingly stated to the citizens of Finland that “the post–Cold War era is over” (placing the blame on Russia), “the instruments of cooperation have been turned into weapons,” “the world is in a transitional state,” and “the creation of a new world order takes time.” He added that Finns “will have to respond quickly to changing circumstances, as was the case with NATO membership,” and that “when times become difficult, I too will be ready to make tough decisions to ensure the security of our country.” In addition to his campaign promises, the newly elected president confirmed his commitment to the previously introduced “value-based realism” (arvopohjainen realismi), which he pledged to be guided by in the conduct of foreign policy if elected. Later, this was officially included in the government’s report on foreign and security policy in June 2024. Among other ideas, the report especially highlighted the following: commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, international law, and human rights; strengthening the country’s defense; staying out of military conflicts; and being open to dialogue with countries that do not share these values. The election of A. Stubb as president strengthened the pro-Western trends in Finland’s foreign policy. On September 1, 2024, the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States entered into force, under which Finland opens 15 of its military facilities for possible use by U.S. forces, while Helsinki will not charge rent for premises or land made available to the United States. On September 27 of the same year, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced the placement of NATO headquarters on Finnish territory — in Mikkeli in the southwest of the country, 140 km from the border with the Russian Federation, and in the northern region of Lapland. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish authorities announced preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines (a similar step had previously been taken by the defense ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia), stating that this is “a cost-effective way to supplement the capabilities of the armed forces,” but adding that the country would remain “committed to the humanitarian goals of the convention” even after a possible withdrawal. On April 15, 2025, a Finnish servicemember took part for the first time in a flight aboard a NATO E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft during Ramstein Alloy 2025 exercises in the Baltic region. The NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Force (NAEW&CF) includes personnel from 17 countries, in addition to which Canada, France, Finland, and Lithuania also contribute their staff. NATO noted that the E-3A is the first multinational flying unit created by the Alliance. Statements regarding Russia, despite initial uncompromising tone, began to soften after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, who held a different view of the Ukrainian conflict compared to the strongly pro-Ukrainian administration of Joe Biden. As early as April 2024, Alexander Stubb stated that there was no need to conduct political dialogue with Russia, and considered military action the only path to peace in the context of Ukraine. Under the new Washington administration, the Finnish president approved of the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian leaders, but again repeated the Ukrainian position on the need for a “just peace” and Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO. During his March 2025 visit to Florida, Stubb attempted to dissuade Donald Trump from cooperating with Russia and also called for tougher sanctions against Moscow. On April 1, 2025, the Finnish president admitted that European countries had started talking about renewing contact with Russia. He said that Finland must "morally prepare" for rebuilding political ties with Russia, since "nothing changes the fact that Russia exists and will always be a neighbor." However, he did not give any timeline for when relations might be restored. The situation around the war in Ukraine is made more difficult by the Trump administration’s growing isolationism, along with threats to pull out of talks and a trade war that Washington has launched against almost the entire world (though some parts of it have been paused). This raises fears of a new “Great Depression.” The European Union’s success at the negotiating table will depend on how united its member states are, since they have different geopolitical interests. Although Finland supports calls for a ceasefire, it does not plan to stop its military support for Ukraine or oppose Ukraine joining NATO. Alexander Stubb, on at least two occasions (in November 2024 and March 2025), publicly warned Ukraine against following a “Finnish scenario.” This would mean giving up on NATO membership and possibly giving up territory—similar to what Finland did after World War II, when it accepted neutrality and lost 11% of its land. In a comment on efforts to resolve the conflict in 2025, Stubb criticized Finland’s past policy of “good neighborliness” with the Soviet Union. He said that while Finland kept its independence in 1944, it lost land, part of its sovereignty, and the ability to make its own decisions freely.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Friedrich Merz has been confirmed as Germany’s new chancellor after a close shave left his future in doubt. Merz lost a first round of voting among MPs gathered to confirm his role, and may never know who among his own coalition betrayed him. After the shock of the morning vote, a second vote was called and whoever was blocking his path appears to have stood down. Merz’s CDU/CSU had struck a coalition deal with the social democratic SPD. Ministers were nominated and ready to take office and Merz’ election as chancellor was scheduled for the morning of May 6. But for much of the morning, this looked uncertain. Candidates for chancellor regularly fall short of the number of votes they’d expect to receive (from MPs in their own party and from their coalition partner), and there have been some close-run races, such as Helmut Kohl in 1994, who made it through by just one vote. But this was the first time a candidate has lost the vote. Merz fell dramatically short in the first round, receiving only 310 votes. That’s six below the overall majority he needed, and 18 below the number of MPs in his own CDU/CSU/SPD coalition. Germany’s constitution requires this ballot to be secret so we don’t know and may never find out who voted against Merz. In the second round of votes, hastily organised after Merz’s failure in the first, 325 votes, more than 316 required. There were 289 votes against, one abstention and three invalid votes. Merz will now hope the first vote can be dismissed as “false start” and that life will quickly move on. Why did this happen? There are four groups of MPs who might have, in secret, voted against Merz in the first round. It’s possible that all four were represented in the group – and we will never know for sure. The first is those CDU/CSU parliamentarians who were unhappy with Merz. In particular, just days after his election when he argued for balanced budgets, he pushed through a reform of Germany’s constitutional restrictions on government debt to allow extra defence and infrastructure spending. This irked fiscal hawks, some of whom may have decided to send him a message during the vote. The second is those CDU/CSU MPs who had hoped for ministerial office and missed out. The was inevitable, especially since Merz secured fewer cabinet positions than had been expected for his own party. The third group would be made up for SPD MPs who missed out on a ministerial post or were unhappy at choices of ministers. Fourth, suspicion will fall on some of the leftwing MPs who have policy disagreements with Merz. His decision to vote with the far-right AfD on immigration policy before the election caused great anger. There are internal SPD critics who feel the coalition agreement makes too many concessions to Merz, particularly on immigration. One message about the new government is clear: it had hoped to be more united than its predecessor, the three-party coalition which was frequently consumed by public quarrelling and in the end collapsed over budget policy. Those ambitions have fallen at the first hurdle. We should not overstate the risks to government stability. Most votes happen in public, not secret, so MPs are much more likely to tow the government line from here on. And chancellors have often governed with smaller majorities for an extended period. However, this debacle is a bad omen. If Merz turns things around quickly, this episode can be forgotten. But if he doesn’t this early blow to his authority will embolden the AfD, which will point to the apparent dysfunction of mainstream parties and capitalise on public dissatisfaction. Nor will this blow to Merz’s authority help him realise his ambition to show leadership in Europe. Merz’s poll standing was already weak, and these events risk causing further damage. His first days in the job will now be even more difficult than he expected.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/] 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The European Union was taken by surprise by the geopolitical turning point of 24 February 2022. Yet, at a time when the geography of enlargement is changing, the Union is struggling to revive a process in the Western Balkans on which its credibility and, increasingly, its security depend. The European Union’s failure to ensure that its vulnerabilities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia do not worsen calls for a rethink of the European policy of influence in the region. The EU’s policy of influence in the Western Balkans is based primarily on the accession process in which Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are currently participating. This process, initiated in 2000 at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, makes these countries’ progress towards joining the EU conditional on the implementation of key reforms, with the aim of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. By pursuing this political, economic and legal convergence objective, the Union aspires to transform and shape the countries of the region in its own image. This goal reflects the ideals of the European project, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon, affirmation of Europe’s ambition to be a powerful force along its own borders. The EU’s strategy over the last 20 years has enabled the countries of the Western Balkans to be integrated into the European geography and system. And yet it has not brought them significantly closer to the door of membership. Reform proposals and a blind spot The situation is alarming. The fading membership prospects of the countries in the region, combined with political and institutional deadlocks within the EU, have created gaps into which rival powers, starting with Russia, are rushing. To offset this vulnerability, the EU has endeavoured to revive its accession policy with a series of summits and aid plans, to no avail. Under French leadership, it adopted a new approach in 2020, which emphasised the importance of the political logic inherent in the accession process, in addition to the reforms to be carried out. However, progress is slow, especially at a time when the EU faces new challenges in the East. The EU granted Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia the status of candidates for accession in 2022 —three countries whose territorial integrity is in dispute—. The EU has already opened accession negotiations with the first two countries. As the East seems to be overtaking the Balkans in the race for membership, the idea of reforming the accession process is now becoming a necessity in most capitals. The June 2022 European Council called for acceleration of the accession process. Various proposals have been put on the table: progressive accession, accession in stages, accession to the single market, setting an indicative date for accession, etc. Most of these proposals aim to further strengthen the integration of the countries in the region into the European system. They assume, as the Commission has done for the past twenty years, that integration is a guarantee of membership; that the former necessarily leads to the latter. This axiom is misleading, as the case of Northern Macedonia illustrates perfectly. The integration of the countries in the region is necessary, as are the reforms, but it is not sufficient to bring to a successful conclusion a process whose outcome, membership of the EU, is a matter of co-optation. One of the most ambitious proposals is the report released by the Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, also known as the Group of Twelve, which is the fruit of Franco-German reflection. It has the merit of considering the enlargement of the EU in the light of the need for institutional reform, so that Europe’s ability to act and its sovereignty can finally be strengthened in a fragmenting world. The idea is to reform the accession process as part of a political project that the Union must carry forward both among its Member States and in the Western Balkans. Among these proposals, however, there is an unresolved issue: territorial disputes and disputed sovereignty, a key area in which the EU is struggling to take action. Yet what influence can the Union aspire to in the Western Balkans and beyond, if it sidesteps the most sensitive issues in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia? These issues, which involve sovereignty, territorial integrity, irredentism and geopolitics, are of cardinal importance. It is crucial that the EU now gets involved in these areas, so that the accession policy is no longer limited to promoting the rule of law, good governance and economic integration. It is not only necessary to affirm the credibility of the Union today in the Western Balkans, but also tomorrow in the East. Is the EU at an impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina? In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is confronted first and foremost with strong irredentism in Republika Srpska, which is contributing to a poisonous climate in the country. In its report of 23 November 2023, the Council of Europe condemned inter-ethnic violence, ethno-nationalist and hate speech, the denial of genocide and war crimes, the glorification of war criminals and, more generally, the intolerance that is gaining ground. This irredentism, which has been fuelled for several years by the historic leader of the Serbian entity, Milorad Dodik, is expressed at a political level by an assertive secessionism, striving to dismantle the Bosnian state. To achieve this, the Serbian entity is trying to challenge the authority of central institutions, starting with the courts, whose decisions it is hindering. It is also challenging the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, where international judges sit to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and the authority of the High Representative, who is also responsible for the Dayton Accords. The weakening of these institutions, further exacerbated by the spectre of a secessionist referendum, would pave the way for the dismantling of other regal bodies, notably the army, posing an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, Russia is stepping into these cracks, as the instability in the country is hardly attracting the attention of the West. The ties forged between Republika Srpska and Russia have been strengthened against a backdrop of international tensions. While the EU was anticipating a difficult winter, Milorad Dodik travelled to Moscow in September 2022, much to the EU’s displeasure. In January 2023, Milorad Dodik honoured Vladimir Putin with the highest distinction awarded by the Serbian entity, then went to the Kremlin at the beginning of the summer to receive a distinction himself —the Order of Alexander Nievsky—. This collusion between the two men prevents the central state of Bosnia-Herzegovina from aligning itself with the European sanctions against Russia; it facilitates the penetration of Russian propaganda into the country, and gives Serbian secessionism in Bosnia-Herzegovina an international dimension, since Russia is in a position to block or slow down certain decisions relating to the international presence in the country. According to a poll published in June 2022, 89% of Bosnian Serbs have a positive opinion of Russia’s role in the country, and Vladimir Putin’s popularity is undeniable. As well as undermining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik is suspected of embezzlement, corruption and nepotism. But unlike the United States, which adopted sanctions against him in 2022, the EU remains on the sidelines. And there’s a clear explanation for this. Milorad Dodik has an ally among the Member States: Hungary. Political affinities link the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its leader, Viktor Orbán, with political and financial support given specifically to Republika Srpska. Both politicians harbour the same ideological distrust of Brussels and progressive values. On the European stage, Milorad Dodik can count on Viktor Orbán’s protection, particularly when it comes to sanctions, since Orbán opposes any decision in this regard. However, Hungary is not the only country hampering Europe’s policy of influence. Croatia is also playing a shady game. It has lobbied, through the EU, for the adoption in 2022 of an electoral reform that consolidates the power of the Croatian nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even if it means deepening the ethnic divisions in the country. This reform, which was also supported by Hungary, ran counter to the European vision of a system based on civic rather than ethno-national identities. The EU’s response to these challenges remains limited to the (necessary) promotion of the rule of law and fundamental rights, the fight against corruption and public administration reforms. In 2019, the EU identified fourteen priorities prior to opening accession negotiations, and then granted Bosnia-Herzegovina candidate status in 2022, despite the limited progress made in this area. For this reason, France, the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Germany were less than enthusiastic about the decision. But in the current geopolitical context, it was the position of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Italy that prevailed, and in the end this enabled Bosnia-Herzegovina to move forward without penalising the political elites compromising the country’s future, or calling into question their relays among the Member States. Is the EU stuck in a rut in Kosovo? In Kosovo, the EU is facing a particularly serious challenge, and it has been working for over 10 years to tackle it through the dialogue it facilitates between Belgrade and Prishtina. Yet its efforts have not led to the much hoped-for normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. In fact, the security situation on the ground has continued to deteriorate. Serbia, which opposes the country’s independence, supports pockets of instability and parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo, and fuels irredentism among a section of the Serb population that is resolutely hostile to the authority of the central Kosovan state. In March 2023, tensions arose when Kosovo Albanian mayors were forcibly prevented from taking up their duties in the north of the country, following municipal elections that had been the subject of a Serb boycott orchestrated by Belgrade. Scuffles broke out, with the participation of agitators from Serbia; the Serbian army was placed on alert, and for the first time Serbian protesters attacked Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers, an international NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo under the UN mandate. Instead of incriminating Serbia and Serbian irredentism in Kosovo, the EU, at the instigation of France and Germany, adopted sanctions against the authorities and civil society in the weakest party to the dispute, Kosovo. An even more worrying incident occurred shortly afterwards, in September 2023, when a group of Serb nationalists, armed with an impressive arsenal of weapons, attacked police forces, killing a Kosovar policeman. The attack, carried out by a Kosovo Serb political leader with close links to the political party of the president of neighbouring Serbia, gave rise to considerable concern, especially as Belgrade was at the same time reinforcing its armed forces on Kosovo’s borders. Nationalist, militaristic and pro-Russian rhetoric in Serbia fuelled the perception of an imminent threat to Kosovo, along the lines of that posed by Russia in Ukraine. KFOR stepped up its presence accordingly. In Serbia, a day of national mourning was declared in response to the death of three Serb assailants killed in the shoot-out. In European capitals, the incident was condemned, but the responsibility of the authorities in Prishtina, more so than Serbian irredentism in the north of Kosovo and the diplomacy of the srpski svet in Belgrade, was singled out. These serious incidents attest to the hardening of irredentism fuelled by Belgrade. Above all, they illustrate the current impasse in the dialogue facilitated by the EU. Devoid of any strategic objective, the dialogue has been limited to preparing the ground for an illusory agreement to “normalise” relations between Belgrade and Prishtina. To this end, it focused mainly on technical issues of document recognition, border management, freedom of movement and so on. This was the case, for example, with the “historic” agreement reached in Brussels in 2013, and the dozen or so others that followed. However, these agreements have all been poorly implemented. Furthermore, the attention paid to each stumbling block, along with the resulting tensions, has led the EU to lose sight of the political objective of resolving the dispute – that of Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state and of its territorial integrity. This is not one of the objectives of the dialogue. The dialogue is focusing increasingly on issues of internal governance in Kosovo. In particular, the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in the north of Kosovo is giving rise to controversy, as it is reminiscent of the problems encountered by Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But with an added pitfall. The dialogue currently supported by France and Germany is now making the granting of a form of autonomy to these irredentist municipalities a prerequisite for the “normalisation” of relations with Serbia, with no guarantee that Kosovo will eventually gain international recognition. To increase pressure on Prishtina, France, Germany and Italy have now gone as far as withholding support for Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe in an unprecedented move that brought about satisfaction in Belgrade and Moscow. Unable to adopt a common position on the matter due to five Member States (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia), the EU is struggling to project a policy of influence on this issue through dialogue. Instead, it finds itself forced to manage repeated crises as a matter of urgency, to prevent the situation on the ground from flaring up. To no avail, as the incidents worsen and multiply, the EU leaves a gaping hole into which the regimes in Serbia and, unsurprisingly, Russia rush. Both have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo on this issue, which is a vector of instability, and in ensuring that the EU stays in the same rut. The EU’s limited influence in Serbia The European policy of influence is showing its limits in Serbia too. It has failed to effectively support the democratic forces in Serbia that had been protesting for months against the rise of authoritarianism there. It continues placing its faith in a regime that has continuously demonstrated its neglect for democratic processes and political pluralism. The rigged elections of late 2023, which the EU has not sanctioned, illustrates the EU’s geopolitical helplessness and incapacity to itself face a local authoritarian regime at its doorsteps. The EU, likewise, has failed to significantly influence Serbia’s foreign policy towards Russia. In 2009 Serbia entered into a strategic partnership with Russia, which was extended in 2013 to include cooperation on security and defence. This partnership paved the way for the acquisition of various Russian weapons systems (fighter aircraft, guided missiles, etc.), and for joint military exercises to be held between 2014 and 2021 with Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which Serbia joined as an observer. Economically, cooperation has intensified with the conclusion in 2019 of a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, although trade between Serbia and Russia, representing less than 10% of exchanges, remains well below that with the EU. The war in Ukraine and the EU’s policy of isolating Russia has not lead Serbia to reconsider its approach. At the United Nations, Serbia has indeed supported a number of resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, without saying so loud and clear. But this has not meant that the country has aligned itself with the European sanctions against Moscow. It has only adopted measures against Belarus and pro-Russian figures in Ukraine, and dual-use technologies banned from export by the EU are said to be finding their way to Russia via Serbia. Belgrade has also failed to align itself with most of the statements made by the EU High Representative and the decisions taken by the Council in all areas of foreign and security policy. Yet this is a contractual obligation under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Art. 10.) it concluded with the EU in 2013. Its behaviour as a candidate country for EU membership is troubling. In June 2022, Serbia was represented at ministerial level at the official St Petersburg International Economic Forum, alongside Milorad Dodik. In August 2022, as the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, Belgrade sent Aleksandar Vulin, then head of Serbian intelligence, now deputy prime minister and figurehead of irredentism and srpski svet diplomacy in the Balkans, to the Kremlin. He was decorated by the Russian defence minister. In September 2022, Serbia signed an agreement with Russia reinforcing cooperation in foreign policy. After a few months of restraint, Aleksandar Vučić became more vocal in March 2023 when he expressed his disapproval of the International Criminal Court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. In September 2023, he received the Russian ambassador in Belgrade to discuss the situation in northern Kosovo, and finally, in October 2023, he met Vladimir Putin in Beijing, with whom he had a “cordial exchange”. The presence of Russian media in Serbia, and the control of the press by the Serbian authorities, means that public opinion is shaped accordingly. Criticism of the depraved and hegemonic West is commonplace, as is that of the hypocrisy of the EU, the aggressiveness of the United States and NATO, and the injustice allegedly suffered by the patriots of srpski svet. Unable to assert itself on either the issue of recognition of Kosovo or Serbia’s geopolitical orientation, the EU has also had to deal with the close ties between Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orbán, and their affinities with the Enlargement Commissioner, Olivér Várhelyi. These connections facilitate Serbia’s access to European funds. Despite the democratic setback and pro-Russian ambiguities in the country, in February 2023 the Commission awarded Serbia the most generous subsidy (€600 million) ever granted in the region. This is part of a package worth more than €2 billion allocated to Serbia to finance a high-speed railway line extending the section that China is currently building between Belgrade and Budapest —a project plagued by corruption scandals, but which meets the objectives of trans-European connectivity—. Likewise, when it comes to accession policy, Aleksandar Vučić finds in Viktor Orbán an influential ally in the Council, to ensure that authoritarian and pro-Russian abuses in Serbia are not punished. The serious irregularities that marred the Serbian general elections in December 2023 and the poisonous climate that reigned during the campaign bear witness to the abuses taking place in Serbia. Can a policy of alliance make up for the EU’s powerlessness? Unable to exert strategic influence on the most sensitive issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, the EU faces a major challenge. Where could it be better to practice the “language of power” than in this small, landlocked region that has been earmarked for accession? The EU, which is an imperfect power, is struggling to shake off the illusion that the transformative power it is trying to exert through its accession policy will act as a miracle cure in a region plagued by irredentism, Russian disinformation and authoritarian tendencies. This illusion may prove harmful, for the Balkans lie in the shadows of an even more complex problem in the East. Institutional reform of the EU, which in the future may make qualified majority voting the norm, will not enable the Union to project strategic and political influence overnight, at least not in these most sensitive areas. The same is true of enhanced conditionality that emphasises the rule of law. So how will this help to establish the disputed sovereignty of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to anchor Serbia geopolitically in the European camp? Unfortunately, in the absence of a strong and visionary Commission, the Union cannot be expected to do much, as the Member States, and therefore the Council, do not share the same vision of the political union to which the European project should aspire. Some of them, mainly in the East, remain faithful to sovereignty and intend to resist the Union’s logic of interference everywhere. Others, such as Germany, swear by neofunctionalism and struggle to think of the (political and territorial) purpose of the European project beyond economic integration. As for France, it calls for a political deepening of the Union through a revival of intergovernmentalism but it rejects any federalist logic. These differences in vision inhibit the Union’s ability to develop a policy of influence that is not limited to a membership process that ultimately proves inadequate. To compensate for this weakness, what if the EU were to make greater use of alliances? Within the Union, this would mean strengthening coordination between Member States that share the idea that the challenges in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia should be the subject of a strong political and diplomatic commitment that is separate from the EU accession process. The challenge for the Member States in question would be to help the Union learn the “language of power”, with the aim of consolidating the contested sovereignties of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and changing Serbia’s foreign policy. In the Western Balkans, this logic of alliance would find support in civil society, in the opposition in Serbia and among the new generation of political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stronger support for these progressive political forces, including on the streets, and more scathing criticism of those figures, elected or not, who are fuelling irredentism and instability in the region, would send out an important signal and, above all, develop new levers of influence.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine of February 2022 has propelled EU enlargement to the top of Europe’s political agenda and linked it inextricably to the question of European security. The reshaping of the global political landscape, where strategic competition, growing global instability and attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are prominent features, has added further complexity to EU enlargement. The geopolitical imperative has seemingly expedited EU enlargement, while the merit-based transformative objectives of the process sit uncomfortably in the balance. This article provides a critical analysis of the evolution of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, zooming in on the EU perspective and key initiatives of its Member States. It explains how the initial ambition and hope that the enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans embodied drifted towards enlargement fatigue. It also outlines the hurdles confronting the enlargement process and the Western Balkans, the efforts exerted to revive EU enlargement, and finally considers the questions facing the EU during the new legislative term. EU enlargement perspective – strict but fair? EU enlargement is perceived historically as having played a transformative role. It supported the consolidation of democracy in the Southern European countries and later, in the Central and Eastern European countries, the EU accession process is seen as having fostered stability, democratisation and economic prosperity. The arduous transformative process has, however, been longer and bumpier for the Western Balkans. North Macedonia has been stuck in the EU’s lobby for almost 20 years, Montenegro since 2011, Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 2014. This was partly due to the hardening of rule of law conditionality. A key lesson identified from Romania and Bulgaria’s EU accession path was that the transformation of a country, in particular in the rule of law area, was not only a long process but it was also fraught with obstacles, notably resistance from applicant governments. To remedy the shortcomings identified, the 2005 negotiating framework for Croatia strengthened rule of law conditionality by introducing a specific Chapter 23 on ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’ in addition to the existing Chapter 24 on ‘justice, freedom and security’ in the EU acquis communautaire. This approach continued and was hardened during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. The Western Balkans were first promised a “European perspective” at the Zagreb Summit of 2000. At the June 2003 EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed that the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU. To deliver on this, the enlargement process was tied to substantial financial and technical support through which the EU has aimed to push for the democratisation and resilience of Western Balkan institutions, societies and economies. EU support was made conditional upon the Western Balkans meeting ‘European standards’ (conditionality), including (and especially) rule of law prerogatives. This approach was reflected in the negotiating framework adopted in June 2012 for negotiations with Montenegro, in the High-Level Accession Dialogues respectively with North Macedonia (then former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, fYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with Kosovo, [1] all launched in 2012. The European Commission, but most adamantly civil society in the Western Balkans, repeatedly pointed to the failings of the region’s governments to implement reforms, leading to façade compliance. In parallel, the ‘Brussels dialogue’ between Kosovo and Serbia has oscillated between normalisation and a state of strained peace and conflict prevention, with the signature of the April 2013 ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’ (known as the Brussels Agreement) constituting an exception of ephemeral hope. [2] Moreover, slowly but firmly, stabilitocracy grew roots. Autocrats in the Western Balkans, ruling through informal power structures, state capture by ruling parties, patronage and control of the media, managed to combine EU accession with stronger domestic control. [3] Certain Member States turned a blind eye to or downplayed the democratic backsliding, (indirectly) supporting autocratic leaders accused of nurturing stabilitocracy. Notable examples include Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanović and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who Member States initially hoped would be able to settle the Kosovo status question. EU enlargement fatigue: the breaking point The multiple and overlapping crises that Europe has faced since 2008, from the global financial crisis to the perceived 2015 migration crisis, to the 2020 Covid crisis and the energy and inflationary crisis that followed, relegated the EU integration of the Western Balkan countries to second tier. At the beginning of the Juncker Commission, it had become clear that EU enlargement would be for the long haul. The unfortunate European Council decision of October 2019 not to open EU accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania manifested the fatigue felt with the EU enlargement process, not only in the Western Balkans but on the EU side too. The merit-based process no longer rewarded prospective members engaging in reforms. While Skopje turned a page with Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s election in May 2017, ending stabilitocracy, signing the historic June 2018 Prespa Agreement with Greece that solved the name issue, it was NATO that granted North Macedonia membership in March 2020. The EU accession process was (and continues to be) often kept hostage by the vetoes of individual Member States which are utterly unrelated to the economic and democratic conditions that supposedly govern the process. The exasperation felt in the Western Balkan countries because of the empty promises and broken dreams, gave rise to alternative scenarios and Plan Bs if EU enlargement to the Western Balkans were not to materialise. It opened the doors of the region to other donors and contested powers, in particular Russia through disinformation, China on investments in infrastructure, and Turkey and the Gulf countries through investments and cultural programmes. Their influence in the region came to the detriment of EU leverage. [4] With EU enlargement on the backburner, ways to keep the momentum for reform and initiatives from the region were welcomed. The Berlin Process, a diplomatic initiative by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was launched in 2014 with a view to reinvigorating the integration process. A platform focusing on increased high-level regional cooperation and connectivity between the Western Balkan Six —Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia— and the EU Member States, the process also involves the EU institutions, international financial institutions and the region’s civil society. In addition, the 2013 Brdo-Brijuni Process is a regionally owned platform for political dialogue on sensitive bilateral and regional issues, initiated by Slovenia and Croatia. The ‘Western Balkans Six’ format enables the region’s governments to agree on and promote joint initiatives, with the full cooperation of the European Commission. These initiatives were also a way to show other powers —notably Russia, Turkey and China— that the EU is in the region to stay. Revitalising EU enlargement? The 2018 Strategy for the Western Balkans of the Juncker Commission marked a U-turn, putting the enlargement perspective of the region back on the EU agenda. It also set the tone for the 2019-2024 legislative term. Already during her campaigning for votes in the European Parliament for the confirmation of her nomination as Commission President following the 2019 European elections, Ursula von der Leyen had expressed her support for enlargement. This became clear in her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission, in which she committed to supporting the European perspective of the Western Balkans. [5] At the same time, experts argued that a move from Juncker’s political Commission to Von der Leyen’s geopolitical and therefore “politicized” Commission would translate to more pressure from Member States on the Commission. That could compromise the Commission’s role as guardian of the EU Treaties, they explained. [6] In a way, EU Member States’ backroom dealings that led to a deviation from the expected Spitzenkandidat process in 2014, were a precursor to how they would deal with the EU enlargement process. The February 2020 revamped EU enlargement methodology, urged by French President Emmanuel Macron, aimed to make the process more credible, more dynamic and predictable. It also sought to make the enlargement process more robust by putting pressure on those candidate countries (notably Serbia) that have been comfortably hiding behind empty political promises for reform while nurturing stabilitocracy. In terms of EU decision-making, the new methodology decreased the number of Member State’s veto points in the Council by introducing the opening of clusters instead of individual chapters, which was hoped would expedite the enlargement process. In addition, some experts highlighted that “by reinvigorating democratic reform, facilitating foreign and security policy alignment, and making real once more the idea that Western Balkan countries are welcome as new Member States, the EU would suck the oxygen from competing and malign illiberal influences”. [7] Nevertheless, at the outset, the prospective new members perceived the novelties in the enlargement methodology as yet another way to slow down the accession process. The new methodology further reinforced the requirements for rule of law reforms (including the oversight of the relevant institutions) allowing Member States to put negotiations on hold, re-open closed chapters, reconsider funding availability and, in the worst-case scenario, suspend accession negotiations altogether. Moreover, it took the Commission more than three years to implement the methodology, fuelling the uncertainty felt in the Western Balkans. At the same time, North Macedonia, in particular, and Albania as its collateral victim, given that its accession progress was coupled to that of North Macedonia, faced intense resistance to progress on its EU accession path both from France and the Netherlands. The European Council gave its long-awaited green light to start North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations in March 2020 (together with Albania). But even then, the unity in Council was tarnished by Bulgaria, which requested that a statement be attached to the March 2020 Council conclusions, insisting, among other things, on scrapping references to the Macedonian language and to the existence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. [8] These hurdles have effectively meant that accession negotiations have not started with either North Macedonia or Albania. In that light, more initiatives parallel to the EU enlargement process were launched, raising controversy. On the Western Balkans side, Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia agreed on the Open Balkans Initiative (better known as Mini-Schengen), in August 2021, although it had been under discussion since 2019. Its stated aim was to deepen political and economic ties by opening the borders between the three countries and creating a common market that would bring the countries closer to EU integration. Kosovo and Montenegro have expressed support for this idea, while Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to garner the necessary political support. Geopolitical EU enlargement: a turning point The 2022 Russian war in Ukraine has “injected new urgency into the enlargement debate but it has also underscored enlargement as a strategic necessity” for European security. [9] In June 2022, EU leaders expressed their full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans and called for acceleration of the accession process. The latest EU Strategic Agenda “underscores the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity” [10] That geopolitical urgency led at last to the official opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022. The enlargement momentum, which accelerated the opening of accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and an offer for conditional candidacy to Georgia in December 2023, spilled over to Bosnia and Herzegovina despite its constitutional blockage. The EU decided to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024. These political decisions were a clear signal that the EU is still serious about the enlargement process. At the same time, in line with the general framework of the Copenhagen political criteria and the 2006 renewed EU consensus on enlargement, the Council’s latest conclusions on enlargement of 12 December 2023 stressed the need for fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. The June 2024 endorsement of the rule of law benchmarks (Chapters 23 and 24 in the ‘fundamentals cluster’) at Montenegro’s Intergovernmental Conference (ICG) is a key milestone for the country’s EU accession path, but also of the centrality of the merit-based approach. In parallel, the Council led by French President Macron, has also stressed the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development, including its capacity to integrate new members. This new hurdle in the way of EU accession has led experts and policy-makers alike to consider the latest Council decisions on EU accession as “relatively symbolic”. Besides the length and unpredictability of the enlargement process, this is also the case because of the number of obstacles applicants have found on their way to the EU, including vetoes over bilateral disputes that are unrelated to the Copenhagen criteria. [11] In addition to the vetoes North Macedonia has faced consecutively from Greece and Bulgaria, Tirana’s opening of the first cluster of negotiation chapters was obstructed more recently by Athens over the jailing of an ethnic Greek Albanian mayor accused of electoral fraud. The momentum for EU enlargement has revived concerns about the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’, i.e., the EU’s preparedness for accepting new members. These concerns have revived the debate on the need for EU institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of the Union post-enlargement. Yet much of this debate is linked to the decision-making bottlenecks in the Council, when responding to urgent and complicated crises (particularly the war in Ukraine). In terms of the legal feasibility of EU enlargement, the Treaty of Lisbon contains the necessary provisions regarding institutions and decision-making processes for the EU to be able to welcome new members without any Treaty changes. In addition, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU has liberated seats in the European Parliament that would make the absorption of small new members possible. In reaction, some experts and policy-makers have seen the determination with which France and a few other Member States push for EU internal reforms as yet another attempt to either hinder EU enlargement and/or rather move towards a multi-speed EU. [12] Against this backdrop, the rise of the populist right in the European elections and national elections across the EU has amplified the mantra that EU “values and the rule of law are our compass, both internally and externally”, [13] led by a group of Member States with France in the lead. Hence, support for EU enlargement may be more complicated in the Council, where a number of EU governments have shifted to the far right and when, in a super-election year, more such parties are likely to find themselves at the helm of or in governing coalitions in the EU Member States. Nevertheless, the European Commission and Parliament are likely set to continue to support EU enlargement in the 2024-2029 legislative term. In her political priorities, incoming Commission President von der Leyen has framed enlargement as “a moral, political and geostrategic imperative” for the EU and appointed a Commissioner dedicated specifically to enlargement. In support for boosting enlargement, von der Leyen has also committed to presenting in her first 100 days in office, pre-enlargement policy reviews across a wide array of EU policy sectors, implying that there will be post-enlargement phase. [14]  The political priorities also note that the “emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values…will always remain the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement policy”. [15]  This could entail further delays in the accession process, for reasons already explained. The Parliament has applied a ‘cordon sanitaire’ on all leadership positions (Committee chairs and vice-chairs, Quaestors and Vice-Presidents) to block those seen as positioning themselves against the EU project (namely the far right). It is hoped this will ensure that the EP’s mainstream positions hold, including its strong support for EU enlargement. In that regard, David McAllister MEP (EPP, Germany) was re-elected chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), which is the main committee legislating on and scrutinising progress in EU enlargement. Initiatives on EU enlargement for a new legislative term 2024-2029 Several ideas have been discussed in EU circles on how to move forward with enlargement and capitalise on the current enlargement momentum. The EU has also launched new initiatives aiming to incentivise the Western Balkans to make the necessary reforms to meet the enlargement requirements. The discussion on gradual integration or “phasing-in”, in the words of the European Commission, is not a new concept. The idea of fashioning a new kind of conditionality, a way to encourage reform especially in the rule of law, but also in regional integration, good neighbourly relations, reconciliation and the resolution of bilateral disputes, now goes beyond the promises of the revised EU enlargement methodology. It became more concrete with the adoption of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, in May 2024, whose stated aim is to support the Western Balkans partners on their EU path by encouraging faster socio-economic convergence with the EU. Specifically, in return for socio-economic and fundamental reforms, including in the rule of law and fundamental rights, the Western Balkans countries will benefit from EU integration in the areas where they have met the acquis requirements. In addition to those conditions, Serbia and Kosovo are expected to engage constructively on the normalisation of their relations, leading to tangible results. At the centre of this new plan is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, a new financial instrument that will provide €6 billion (€2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans) over the 2024-2027 period. An additional €2 billion was allocated to the Facility as part of the mid-term revision of the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027. For their part, each candidate and prospective candidate has prepared a detailed reform agenda explaining how it will undertake EU-related reforms. But experts have raised questions on whether the financial support is sufficient for such broad-based and demanding reforms, whether the carrots offered are enough to convince Western Balkan governments to implement reforms, whether conditionality is applicable and how it will be monitored and measured. [16] The idea of introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) —55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population— in the Council of the EU for decisions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy has inspired experts and politicians alike to consider QMV for decision in the intermediary steps of EU enlargement. The European Parliament has been a strong proponent of this idea during the last legislative term, but importantly, this idea has gained traction in the Council itself, the ultimate decision-maker on EU enlargement. Specifically, a Slovenian-German non-paper to the General Affairs Council of January 2024 proposed that the opening (and only the opening) of negotiating clusters, including the Opening Benchmark Assessment Reports (OBAR) be decided in Council by QMV. This proposal is supported by some 15 other Member States. Experts have explained that introducing QMV could facilitate bypassing blockages that result from bilateral disputes between Member States and candidate countries. [17] It has also been argued that QMV could be way of providing a realistic accession scenario for the Western Balkan countries thus, on the one hand, helping the EU regain its credibility in the eyes of the Western Balkans while, on the other, rendering the enlargement process fairer and more effective. [18] Combining these two broad themes, some experts have pushed for a ‘staged accession’ to restore positive momentum to EU enlargement and ease the most serious concerns that EU Member States have regarding the prospect of further enlargement. Among other things, this proposal suggests granting QMV powers —rather than veto powers— to new Member States upon accession, in anticipation of and conditioned on streamlining the whole EU decision-making process. In that case, ‘new Member States’ could be regarded as avant-garde, in that their exclusion from veto voting power would align them to the revamped EU, which would itself progressively adapt institutionally by reducing unanimity requirements. In parallel, this provisional period of socialization would allow new Member States to be gradually introduced to the intricacies of EU policy-making. [19] The geopolitical imperative for enlargement is likely to be felt more strongly in the coming years. Russia, China and others remain active in the Western Balkans and continue to “capitalise on every opportunity that the EU fails to use and on any moment of strategic confusion and hesitance”. [20] The return of Donald Trump to the White House will likely mean a call for the EU to tackle its own responsibilities on its continent. It will take resolute EU leadership for progress in EU accession to be concrete. It implies that the enlargement process should be recalibrated so that the Western Balkan candidates are not left lingering behind the Eastern trio. It also requires that the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) starting later next year adequately reflects enlargement as a priority. Geopolitical choices cannot resort to ‘selective democracy’ as each of the Western Balkan countries should be treated on its merits. Ultimately, the EU integration of the Western Balkans needs to be understood as a win-win for all. References and footnotes 1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.2 Ioannides, I. (2018). “Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of the EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans”. EPRS, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_STU(2018)6218163 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (2017). “The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy”. Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/policy-paper-the-crisis-of-democracy-in-the-western-balkans-authoritarianism-and-eu-stabilitocracy/ 4 Bechev, D. (2017). Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe. Yale University Press. See also Shopov, V. (2021). “Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans”. European Council for Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/ 5 Von der Leyen, U. (2019). “A Union that strives for more. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024”. Directorate-General for Communication. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/063d44e9-04ed-4033-acf9-639ecb187e87_en?filename=political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf 6 Blockmans, S.; Gros, D. (2019). “From a political to a politicised Commission?” Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/from-a-political-to-a-politicised-commission/ 7 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 8 Ioannides, I. (2020). “The New EU Budget and Recovery Fund: A Positive Omen for the EU Enlargement Process?” IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-new-eu-budget-and-recovery-fund-a-positive-omen-for-the-eu 9 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 10 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 11 Armakolas, I.; Dimitrov, N.; Ioannides, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2024). “EU Enlargement to the Western Balkans: Where There Is a Will, There Is a Way”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/eu-enlargement-to-the-western-balkans-where-there-is-a-will-there-is-a 12 Buras, P.; Morina, E. (2023). “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU”. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/ 13 European Council (2024). “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029”. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf 14 Von der Leyen (2024). “Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024−2029”. Strasbourg, July 18, 2024, p. 25, p. 30. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 15 Von der Leyen (2024). Mission Letter from Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, to Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for Enlargement. Brussels, September 17, 2024, p.5. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1a2d0ad0-270d-441b-98c8-b6be364d8272_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20KOS.pdf 16 Uvalic, M. (2024). “The Potential of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans”. Civil Society Forum – Tirana 2023. European Policy Institute – Skopje. https://epi.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/The-Potential-of-the-New-Growth-Plan-for-the-Western-Balkans.pdf 17 Zweers, W.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Dimitrov, N. (2024). “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP, and Solutions. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf 18 Dimitrov, N.; Cvijic, S.; Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Armakolas, I.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Zeneli, V. (2022). “What is to be done? The war, the Western Balkans and the EU”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/blog/what-is-to-be-done-the-war-the-western-balkans-and-the-eu 19 Emerson, M.; Lazarević, M.; Blockmans, S.; Subotić, S. (2021). “A Template for Staged Accession to the EU”. Centre for European Policy Studies. https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 20 Ioannides, I.; Nechev, Z.; Popescu-Zamfir, O.; Dimitrov, N. (2023). “It’s a Package Deal! Reforming and Enlarging the European Union in a Contested World”. IWM. https://www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/its-a-package-deal-reforming-and-enlarging-the-european-union-in-a 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Germany’s presumptive new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, faces challenges both at home and overseas following his conservative alliance’s election victory on Feb. 23, 2025. A strong showing from the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) – which Merz, in line with other mainstream German parties, refuses to countenance as a coalition party as part of an unofficial “firewall” against extremism – will make forming a functioning government tricky. But in the moments after the election results, it was the future of the European Union and its relationship with America that was his immediate focus: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” To understand why that is such a concern for Germany now and what “real independence” from Washington means, The Conversation U.S. turned to Garret Martin, an expert on U.S.-Europe relations at American University, for answers. What prompted Merz’s ‘real independence’ line? Presumably it was a response to a series of recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration that have shocked the German political establishment. This includes the sudden revelation that the U.S. would negotiate directly with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, but seemingly without the Europeans or Ukrainians involved. That development went down like a lead balloon in Berlin, especially considering Germany’s significant financial support of Kyiv since 2022. Moreover, the German establishment has also frowned at a series of recent declarations by members of the Trump administration. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, in which he harshly criticized Europe for allegedly undermining freedom of expression, provoked clear pushback from German leaders. Trump, for his part, hardly endeared himself to his German allies when he denounced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator.” And, of course, Elon Musk’s interference in the German elections – as well as his open support for the far-right Alternative for Germany – provoked a fierce response from Merz. The then-candidate promised that Musk would need to be prepared for legal consequences for his meddling. How would this ‘real independence’ be achieved? Defining what “real independence” means and being able to implement such a drastic change in transatlantic relations will be a tall order. If by “real independence” Merz means that Germany would no longer rely on the U.S. for its security, then that would require several major steps. Merz would first need to convince his likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, that this is the right goal. After all, German governments are bound by very detailed coalition agreements. Second, Merz would need to significantly increase German defense spending. As it stands, Germany’s annual defense budget is slightly over US$90 billion, or 2% of its GDP. But a recent study by the economic think tank Bruegel suggests Berlin would need to increase its budget by $145 billion annually to defend Europe without the assistance of the U.S. But to achieve this, Merz will likely need to increase defense spending by such a level that it will contravene the country’s “debt brake.” This 2009 constitutional rule essentially caps the annual deficit that the government can take on. But overturning this mechanism would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers of the German Parliament. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union party won 28.6% of the vote – and even with the support of the country’s main center-left party, the Social Democrats, Merz will fall short of the parliamentary votes needed. Finally, “real independence” would also require convincing other European Union partners to join him down that path. Assuming that the Trump administration continues its current trajectory and further undermines NATO, the EU would have to step in to become a more prominent security actor for the continent. It might also require, as Merz hinted, that the United Kingdom and France be ready to share their nuclear weapons, since the U.S. may not be trusted anymore to defend NATO countries. All of these steps would cover “real independence” only in the security sphere and not touch other crucial policy areas, such as trade and energy. And that would be an equally tall order given the level of economic ties binding Germany to the U.S., as well as the looming threat of tariffs. What does this mean for German-US relations? Merz’s “real independence” statement would have been noteworthy coming from any German chancellor. But it is even more striking when one considers the fact that Merz is a committed transatlanticist who deeply admires the U.S. and counts Ronald Reagan as one of his role models. At 69, Merz came of age during the final years of the Cold War, when the U.S. played a key role in enabling German reunification. He worked for years for Atlantik-Brücke, a lobbying group pushing for closer transatlantic ties. And he has, by his own account, traveled more than 100 times to the U.S. Independence will not likely mean a complete divorce between the U.S. and Germany – the ties binding the two countries, whether economic, cultural or political, run too deep. However, we can expect that Berlin will not hesitate to take a more combative approach toward Washington when necessary, so to protect German and European interests. As Merz pointed out, it is clear that the Trump administration does “not care much about the fate of Europe.” What does this signal for Merz’s view of Germany’s position in the EU? Merz’s win will certainly lead to important shifts in Germany’s position in the EU, and could be a major boost for a union in need of leadership. His predecessor, Olaf Scholz, was hampered by a weak economy, divisions within his coalition and indecisive leadership in Europe. Moreover, poor relations with French President Emmanuel Macron also stalled the Franco-German partnership, normally a key engine of leadership in the EU. Merz certainly plans to take a very distinct approach toward the EU than his predecessor. His calls for “real independence” will certainly be very welcome in France, which has long called for Europe to be more responsible for its own security. As such, it opens up the possibility of far closer ties between Paris and Berlin than we saw in recent years. Moreover, Merz, with his more hawkish position toward Russia, could be counted on to provide greater support for Ukraine.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a week away from the inauguration of Donald J. Trump as the 47th President of the United States of America, not only strategic allies and trading partners but also multilateral organisations and the UN system are bracing themselves for the certainty of unpredictability.  However, taking into consideration President Trump’s first term in office, his announcements on the campaign trail, his own personality, the nomination of personnel for positions of high relevance for the international system as well as the impact of the Republican trifecta and diminished checks and balances, a substantial re-positioning of the US within the international system can be expected.   The impact of the first Trump Administration Since the UN’s founding in 1945, the relationship between the US and the United Nations can at best be described as contradictory, which is largely the result of constant tensions between domestic considerations and foreign policy goals. As the leading advocate for a successor institution to the League of Nations, the US fundamentally shaped the objectives and values of the United Nations. This support, which had been driven by national interests, started to wane in the mid-70s when enlarged membership and the creation of the G77, a group of 77 developing countries, reduced US influence.  Although the US was a leading actor in the UN’s establishment, the UN has become a secondary platform of international cooperation. Various US administrations have engaged substantially with the UN system when it served national interests. However, domestic power constellations have frequently impeded any substantial engagement that has gone beyond financial contributions.1  However, Trump’s “America First” ideology stood out from his predecessors’ policies, and particularly conservative ones, in its obstructive approach to the United Nations and disdain towards institutions such as NATO, thus rebuking the closest allies of the US. Indifference and discord towards the United Nations not only damaged the institution but also the reputation of the US. President Trump’s unilateral “America First” policy and abject disregard for multilateral institutions damaged US legitimacy as a global leader and weakened the UN. Under Trump, the transactional nature of US engagement with the UN became obvious. As long as US interests were served, constructive engagement was applied.  US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley even managed to gain the support of China and Russia on a Security Council Resolution (SC/RES/2397) that would impose harsh sanctions on North Korea (DPRK).2 However, in other areas the dominance of national interests guided US policies at the UN during the Trump administration. In showing its unconditional support for Israel, the Trump administration cut all of the US’s funding from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and further reduced its potential role as mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.3 After accusing the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of supporting coercive abortions and involuntary sterilisations in China without proof, the Trump administration cut all core funding for UNFPA and jeopardised many family planning programmes in developing countries.4 In the Security Council, the US position at times even aligned with Russia’s or China’s policy – particularly when other UNSC members tried to raise the nexus of climate change and security. This, as well as the US positions on the rights of victims of sexual violence in war and their reproductive health, further enhanced tensions with traditional Western allies. In addition, Trump withdrew the US from the Paris Climate Accords, the JCPOA5, the INF treaty6, and boycotted the UN Migration Pact7 negotiations.  However, the most obstructive political manoeuvres under President Trump have certainly been the scapegoating of the WHO and the labelling of the organisation as a Chinese puppet during the COVID-19 crisis, the suspension of funding for WHO, and the subsequent withdrawal from the UN body at the height of the pandemic. By doing so, the US squandered its reputation as a reliable partner and blocked any declaration by the UNSC on the pandemic for months.  Equally harmful was the US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights (HR) Council in 2018. Not only did the US abandon a platform for denouncing human rights violations worldwide, but its departure also allowed China to disseminate its own human rights narrative. Although autocratic regimes are regularly elected to the Council and use the opportunity to ensure their own HR violations are not addressed, the US withdrawal created a vacuum and took away a powerful ally for like-minded states, particularly the European Union (EU). In the HR Council, we see an increasingly assertive China, which previously only tried to shield its domestic situation from scrutiny, but which has now come up with its own interpretation of collective, developmental rights versus individual human rights. Swift action and a prepared agenda During his first term President Trump only slowly appointed key positions in foreign relations. It took him two years to appoint an Ambassador to Geneva, for example. His ambition to fundamentally cut financial support to the UN system found its limits in Congress. The US remained the world’s largest donor of development and humanitarian assistance. Even within in the Republican party and in conservative circles, particularly in the religious and evangelical constituencies the opinion prevailed that official development assistance still served the interests of the American people.  In January 2025, the situation is different. One of the first nominations of Donald Trump after his re-election in November has been Marco Rubio, as Secretary of State, and he appointed Republican Representative Elise Stefanik as his Ambassador to the United Nations in New York.  Senator Rubio has been known so far as a supporter of US global engagement as when it serves American economic interests and national security. He is hard on China and aims for more transparency and accountability in the aid sector. He supported the fight against Malaria and other preventable and treatable diseases in the past. Although a sigh of relief went through the development community when his name was circulated, it cannot be taken for granted that he will defend their interests against the MAGA dynamics in the party and administration. As with all Trump appointments, and considering experiences from the past, the question will always be how much autonomy can they preserve, and for how long will they endure in the system?8  Although Donald Trump distanced himself during the campaign from Project 2025, a blueprint for an incoming conservative administration by the Heritage Foundation, it is to be expected that those he has so far selected not only share the views on the multilateral order but also the criticism and preconceptions brought up against the institutions.  The frontline of Trump’s anticipated crusade against multilateral organizations might this time also include those who have been spared so far: World Bank, IMF, as well as the OECD. 9 In the case of others, he might continue where the end of his first term prevented further action or the Biden administration reversed the steps he had taken. Human Rights Council The latter has been the case of the Human Rights Council. In 2018 the Trump administration had been withdrawing from the Council arguing that it had become an “exercise in shameless hypocrisy – with many of the world’s worst human rights abuses going ignored, and some of the world’s most serious offenders sitting on the council itself.”10  In October 2021, the US got reelected to the Human Rights Council. In the context of its staunch support for Ukraine, the US became the driving force behind a Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine as well as on the creation of the Special Rapporteur on Russia. However, when its reelection came up again in October 2024, the Biden administration deliberately decided not to stand as a candidate. Although some observers argue that this decision has been taken in order to avoid a backlash from a majority of UN Member States who see the unwavering US position on the collateral implications for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights by Israel’s fight against Hamas and Hizbollah as a paramount example of double-standards. One could also argue that not being a sitting Member of the Human Rights Council at a time when the likelihood of another withdrawal is not too far away, reduces the reputational damage for the organization as well as for the standing of the US in the International System.  US Ambassadors to the United Nations in New York are generally Cabinet Members, thus directly involved in shaping policies. With Elise Stefanik, Trump has not only appointed a staunch supporter of Israel who has accused the UN of being “a den of antisemitism”11 but also a reliable anti-abortion proponent. Her positioning in New York will certainly influence dynamics in Geneva as well. And if Project 2025 is becoming the playbook that everybody expects it to be, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the US is a signatory might not remain the uncontested reference point anymore.  The U.S. Commission on Unalienable Human Rights created during the first Trump administration by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, produced a report which is projected by Project 2025 as an important guidepost for bilateral and multilateral engagements on human rights.12 The report sets out to define which rights are ‘unalienable,’ elevating religious liberty and the right to private property, while dismissing rights the report calls “divisive social and political controversies,” including sexual and reproductive rights, LGBTI rights, and the right to non-discrimination.13  The intention of Project 2025 is not only to reevaluate all multilateral engagements by the US in the light of the work of the Commission on Unalienable Human Rights, but also to forge a consensus among like-minded countries in support of human life, women’s health, support of the family as the basic unit of human society, and defense of national sovereignty. In 2020, the Trump administration sponsored in the UN General Assembly the Geneva Consensus Declaration on Women’s Health and the Protection of the Family (A/75/626) for which it gained the support of 34 Member States, including those whose human rights and women rights track records are anything but clean: e.g. Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Pakistan.14  Taking into consideration initiatives like the Geneva Consensus, the in-coming Trump administration could besides of complete withdrawal also undermine Human Rights standards by introducing almost in a similar way as China is doing, new narratives. In this endeavour, the US could even find support amongst states who are normally staunch US critics but who will seize the moment and opportunity to dismantle the liberal rules-based order that they perceive as Western dominated anyway. World Trade Organisation (WTO) To avoid another blockage in the appointment of a WTO Director General in 2025 by the US, WTO members brought forward the re-election process of incumbent Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala by two months. President Trump had already in 2020 blocked her appointment, leaving the organisation without leadership for almost seven months.  From an “America first” perspective, “America gets fleeced every day in the global marketplace both by a predatory Communist China and by an institutionally unfair and nonreciprocal WTO.”15 Thus, Project 2025 recommends to reform the WTO or to build a successor organisation and limiting its membership to liberal democracies. The main red-flag for the US at WTO certainly is the developing-country status of China in the WTO and the alleged infringements on US sovereignty – albeit ignoring the veto right the US has as the WTO is a consensus-based organisation.  However, and although Trump’s announced tariffs applied on friends and foes will be disruptive for the international trade system, one must highlight that also during the Biden administration, the US has not been a WTO member easy to engage. This held particularly true for the reform of the appellate body of the dispute settlement mechanism whose appointment process remains dysfunctional since the Obama administration. For the in-coming administration, trade is considered also as a tool for development. In this regard it does not differ too much from the reforms out-going USAID Administrator, Samantha Power, had tried to initiate.16 And it could be an area where WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who is seen as particularly focused on the development aspects of trade, and the Trump administration could perhaps find a common ground. Humanitarian and development assistance Humanitarian assistance that already faces substantial funding gaps will certainly face new vulnerabilities with the in-coming Trump administration. Despite substantial reductions which already kicked in in 2022, the US remains the largest donor for UN agencies such as the World Food Programme (2023: 36.53% of total WFP came from US); UNHCR (2023: 38.93%); and OCHA (2023: 19.9%). Although humanitarian aid and particularly funding for food security (WFP was run by the Trump ally, David Beasley) was not contentious during Trump’s first administration, this might change. According to Max Primorac who had been Deputy Administrator of USAID during Trump’s first term, and is the author of the Project 2025 chapter on the Agency for International Development, “’emergency’ aid distorts humanitarian responses, worsens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those we intend to help.[...] humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments from reforming, and propping up malign regimes. Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our humanitarian assistance, but so do international organizations.”17 While criticizing the overheads international agencies have to charge in order to deliver aid in emergency situations, Trump affiliated development experts highly advocate for localisation – albeit in a slightly different fashion as progressive voices would do. The quest of the latter for enhanced equity, inclusion, and ownership of local organizations from project design to implementation remains disregarded while a case is built for aid delivery by faith-based organisations. Although enhancing the inclusion of local organizations for the right reasons is laudable, it certainly will not diminish the need for strong oversight and staff capacities on donor level. One reason why multilateral and international organisations are often used as a type of “middlemen” in aid delivery relates to the lean project management structures in Foreign and Development Ministries these days and the need for accountability mechanisms where taxpayers’ money is spent.  Drawing on the visions presented by Project 2025, development assistance under the in-coming Trump administration will have a strong focus on countering Chinese influence and will align foreign and developmental with anti-abortion policies. What is labelled as “Protecting life in Foreign Assistance”18 will inter alia reintroduce the “global gag rule” which prohibits US funding to organisations abroad that provide abortion services or information. Trump had already in his first term expanded the interpretation of it to the “Protecting Life in Global Health Policy”, and it is expected that he will include now humanitarian and development assistance as well – making it extremely difficult to assess what is included under these new rules and what not.19 In this context it is almost a given that Trump will cut again all funding for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) as its reproductive health services worldwide are a red-flag.20 Although UNFPA has gotten used to budget cuts by conservative US governments over the years, loosing 11% of its budget (2023) would not be easy to compensate for. World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNAIDS During the Covid-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) became a prime target for President Trump who inter alia accused the organisation of being too close to China and its handling of the early stages of the outbreak.21 He initiated a process to withdraw the US from it – a move that has been immediately reversed by his successor President Biden. Also for WHO, the US is currently the largest donor of assessed and voluntary contributions totalling 15.59% (2023).22 But with the negotiations of the Pandemic Treaty still underway, and the possibility for states to challenge the finalised amendments of the International Health Regulations until July 2025, it is much more at stake for WHO than just the financial implications of a disruptive relationship with the next Trump administration. With the nomination of Robert Francis Kennedy (RFK) Jr as the new Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the global health community is on high alert. On his campaign trail for president, RFK Jr. had already proclaimed to stop the pandemic treaty, as has done President elect Trump. In addition, RFK Jr has linked vaccines to autism, called the Covid-19 vaccines deadly, supports anti-vaccine organisations, and even questioned the proven fact that HIV causes AIDS.23 When 77 Nobel Laureates urged the US Senate in December 2024 to reject the nomination of RFK Jr.24, WHO Director General Dr Tedros Ghebreyesus called for a “wait and see” attitude. He and his team are looking for areas where it might be possible to engage the Trump administration and its new HHS secretary. One area could be the epidemic of non-communicable diseases faced by Americans and which is often cited by RFK Jr. who advocates for enhanced prevention by healthier diets, environments and an active lifestyle.25  Health security has in the past always been a matter of common concern, and parties were able to work across the aisle. However, polarisation has also become a characteristic feature here. With a trifecta in place, the majority of Republicans in the House as well as in the Senate could become an issue of survival for programs such as PEPFAR. Already this year, PEPFAR, the US global flagship initiative in the fight against HIV/AIDS that had been established under Republican President George W. Bush in 2003, failed to secure bipartisan support for a full, five-year legislative reauthorization. After conservative groups had launched a campaign accusing without evidence the Biden administration to use PEPFAR money for abortions, the program only secured a temporary one-year reauthorization until March 2025.26 PEPFAR funding (6.5 billion USD in 2024) is comprised of U.S. bilateral funding and U.S. contributions to multilateral organizations addressing HIV, primarily the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund: 1.65 billion USD from PEPFAR) and UNAIDS. Particularly the latter would be severely impacted if funding would get further reduced. In 2024 UNAIDS received 50 million USD from PEPFAR27 making the US its largest donor. Personality, Ideology and Money – a toxic cocktail For most UN Agencies, Funds and Programs the US is the largest contributor in assessed and voluntary contributions. 22% of the UN budget are financed by assessed US contributions. With voluntary contributions counted in, this figure amounted in 2023 to 27.9%.28 Thus, the UN leadership is bracing itself for the worst-case scenarios. However, scraping the bottom of the barrel at times when other donors are equally becoming reluctant in financing multilateral and developmental programs, is only sustainable in the short term. In addition, the much-lamented growing influence of autocratic states such as China will only grow further when the US is creating once again a vacuum that will be filled with pleasure by its adversaries. During the first Trump administration’s withdrawal from multilateralism, the EU and EU Member States were stepping up their engagement and managed in many cases to fill the void.  To preserve a rules-based multilateral order, European governments need to be prepared not only to contribute to the empty coffers of UN institutions but also to take on a leadership role and to forge new alliances with states who are still sharing the same values. In the future, Russia will not remain the only disruptor on the multilateral parquet and China will not be the only country trying to create new narratives around human rights. By disengaging from multilateral arrangements and disregarding established collective norms, the next Trump Presidency will certainly have a negative impact on the social fabric of international cooperation.  But this should not come to us as a surprise. Multilateralism needs as a minimum requirement moral commitment to the established principles of collective decision-making, including the precondition of pacta sunt servanda. Multilateralism strives for inclusive decision-making and equality amongst those sitting around the table. Multilateralism lives on tolerance for the point-of-view of others, and the acceptance of compromises for the sake of mutual benefits. In the transactional, zero-sum world of Donald Trump neither compromise, reciprocity nor empathy are part of the vocabulary. “America First” reflects his personality and illustrates a perceived incompatibility between US national interests and multilateral engagement.29  To keep up a rules-based international order in a geo-political era of manifold crisis, like-minded states and above all Europeans have to step up their action to preserve what they treasure. Despite all the headwinds coming out of Washington, DC starting January 20th, multilateralism is not doomed to fail without US engagement. Power relations will certainly change but it must be Europe’s core interest to safeguard its influence in shaping the global order. References 1 Ostheimer, Andrea E.: The United Nations and Global Multilateral Organisations as a Playground for American-Chinese Rivalry, in: New Realities of Multilateralism, Panorama 2022, pp. 7-26.[ Panorama 2022_01_Multilateralism_cover_v3_crop.indd https://www.kas.de/documents/288143/21303801/Panorama+2022+New+Realities+of+Multilateralism.pdf/d2ed886c-83fa-6423-90b8-eeaa48ef8620?version=1.0&t=1668409843028 ].  2 Runde, Daniel F.: Competing and Winning in the Multilateral System. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 2020, p 4. [ https://www.csis.org/analysis/competing-andwinning-multilateral-system-us-leadership-united-nations ]. 3 Amr, Hady. 7 September 2018. Brookings. [ https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from chaos/2018/09/07/in-one-move-trump-eliminated-us-funding-for-unrwa-and-the-us-role-as-mideast-peacemaker/ ].  4 Morello, Carl. 4 April 2017. The Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/trump-administration-to-eliminate-its-funding-for-un-population-fundover-abortion/2017/04/04/d8014bc0-1936-11e7-bcc2-7d1a0973e7b2_story.html]. 5 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) had been an accord that restricted the Iranian nuclear program to mere peaceful usage.  6 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had limited the type of weapons systems the signatories, US and Russia could pursue.  7 The Global Compact for Safe, https://www.iom.int/resources/global-compact-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration/res/73/195 Orderly and Regular Migration is the first intergovernmental agreement covering all dimensions of international migration. It is a non-legally binding, cooperative framework that upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law. 8 Saldinger, Adva; Igoe, Michael: “We can work with him: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick”, 14 November 2024, [‘We can work with him’: Aid advocates react to Trump’s Rubio pick | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/we-can-work-with-him-aid-advocates-react-to-trump-s-rubio-pick-108752 ]  9 Klingebiel, Stephan; Baumann, Max-Otto: Trump 2.0. in time of political upheaval? Implications of a possible second presidency for international politics and Europe, IDOS Policy Brief, No 24/2024, [https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb24.2024]. 10 Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, 19 June 2028 [Remarks on the UN Human Rights Council - U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/06/21/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-council/ ]  11 Elise Stefanik cited in King, Ryan; Spector, David, New York Post, 20 November 2024, [ICYMI: New York Post: Elise Stefanik vows to take on ‘den of antisemitism’ and ‘apologist for Iran’ at the UN | Press Releases | Congresswoman Elise Stefanik https://stefanik.house.gov/2024/11/icymi-new-york-post-elise-stefanik-vows-to-take-on-den-of-antisemitism-and-apologist-for-iran-at-the-un ].  12 2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-06.pdf  13 Commission on Unalienable Rights | https://bidenhumanrightspriorities.amnestyusa.org/commission-on-unalienable-rights/  14 n2034430.pdf https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n20/344/30/pdf/n2034430.pdf  15 Navarro, Peter: The case for fair trade, Project 2025, [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf ] 16 90% of USAID funding from US Congress is earmarked and dedicated to basic sectors such as health care, education and agriculture. At the start of the Biden administration only 5% of USAID’s budget went into economic growth programs. Miolene, Elissa: How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID, 10 December 2024, [How economic growth became a forgotten priority at USAID | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/how-economic-growth-became-a-forgotten-priority-at-usaid-108911#:~:text=At%20the%20start%20of%20the,lack%20of%20focus%20surprised%20her. ]  17 Primorac, Max: The Agency for International Development, Project 2025 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ].  18 [2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-09.pdf ] 19 Igoe, Michael: What we do and don’t know about Trump’s US aid plans, 15 November 2024, [What we do and don't know about Trump's US aid plans | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/what-we-do-and-don-t-know-about-trump-s-us-aid-plans-108719 ]  20 Lynch, Colum: Will Trump gut UN family planning funds….again?, 31 October 2024, [Will Trump gut UN family planning funds ... again? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-trump-gut-un-family-planning-funds-again-108655 ] 21 Coronavirus: what are President Trump’s charges against WHO?, BBC Fact Check, 8 July 2020, Coronavirus: What are President Trump's charges against the WHO? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52294623   22 WHO | Programme Budget Web Portal https://open.who.int/2022-23/contributors/top25  23 Lei Ravelo, Jenny: Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health?, 4 December 2024, [Will RFK Jr. ‘go wild’ on global health? | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/will-rfk-jr-go-wild-on-global-health-108837 ]. 24 Nobel laureates oppose RFK Jr.'s confirmation to HHS https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/5031298-nobel-laureates-oppose-rfk-jr/  25 Fletcher, Elaine Ruth: ‘Give them some space’: WHO Director General on Trump Nomination of RFK Jr as US Health Secretary, 11 December 2024, [‘Give Them Some Space’: WHO Director General On Trump Nomination Of RFK Jr As US Health Secretary - Health Policy Watch https://healthpolicy-watch.news/give-them-some-space-who-director-general-comments-on-trump-nomination-of-rfk-jr-as-us-health-secretary/ ]  26 Igoe, Michael: PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight, 22 July 2024, [PEPFAR chief warns waning political will could hurt AIDS fight | Devex https://www.devex.com/news/pepfar-chief-warns-waning-political-will-could-hurt-aids-fight-107022 ] 27 The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization | KFF https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-and-the-world-health-organization/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20in%20the%20previous%20budget%20period%20(2022%2D2023,totaled%20%2428.1%20million%20(0.4%25).  28 Revenue by Government donor | United Nations – CEB https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor  29 Loewener, Franca/Cook, Justin D.: Trump re-elected. How the Trump Doctrine reshapes US multilateral engagement and global influence. 12.11.2024 [Publication - OI] https://observatoire-multilateralisme.fr/publications/trump-reelected-how-the-trump-doctrine-reshapes-us-multilateral-engagement-and-global-influence/  The text of this work is licensed under the terms of by "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike same conditions 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The history of Russian-American relations has been marked by numerous ups and downs, periods of cooperation and confrontation that have shaped not only bilateral relations but also had a significant impact on the global political stage. In this regard, these relations have always attracted the attention of researchers attempting to predict their development. Moreover, every U.S. presidential election is not just a change of power in the country but also an opportunity to reassess foreign policy, which, in turn, affects the interests of other nations, including Russia. Each new president comes to power with their own views, priorities, and strategies, directly influencing both bilateral and multilateral relations. One only needs to recall examples where shifts in the White House have led to dramatic turns in foreign policy — ranging from escalations in tension to attempts to set a new tone for dialogue. For instance, consider President Obama's “reset” policy towards Russia, followed by the intensification of anti-Russian sanctions when the “reset” did not unfold according to American expectations. What significance do the 2024 U.S. presidential elections hold for Russian-American relations? Will the continuity of U.S. foreign policy towards Russia persist? How might the election results impact the future of these two great powers and their interactions on the global stage? At the Intersection of Hopes and Ambitions Among the factors influencing Russian-American relations are the views, priorities, and strategies of American decision-makers. In this regard, the 2024 U.S. presidential election drew the close attention of the international community. It is expected that a change in president and government could lead to a transformation of foreign policy. The position of the elected president serves as an indicator of the likely foreign policy tactics and strategies Washington may adopt towards other countries and in addressing various international issues during the upcoming four-year term.   So, what do we know about Donald Trump? First and foremost, he brings valuable presidential experience and is well aware of the pitfalls that await him now. He is better prepared for the role than he was eight years ago. Secondly, he might challenge the deep state, which, while unlikely, cannot be entirely ruled out. He has nothing left to lose unless he amends the Constitution to create the possibility of running for a third term. Thirdly, he fiercely defends the national interests of the state in the spirit of realism. This means he can be engaged within this paradigm.   At the same time, he is a businessman, which implies that reaching an agreement with him is possible one way or another. The key is to offer him a “price” that aligns with his interests. If a foreign policy “business proposal” does not appeal to him or offer any tangible benefit, he will not even consider it.   It is also important to note that he is ambitious when it comes to wielding power. He has both the financial resources and influence within certain circles. It seems that what he lacks is global power. To realize his ambitions — such as demonstrating his ability to shape world destinies and influence international events through Russia — he may facilitate a revival of Russian-American relations from their current low point.  Whether Moscow would find this scenario acceptable is another question entirely. Nevertheless, American foreign policy does not depend solely on the desires and intentions of the president. Typically, it retains its key characteristics, even with occasional deviations from continuity in foreign policy tactics and strategies. An example of this can be seen in the shift towards a quasi-isolationist stance during Donald Trump's first term, followed by a reversal under Joe Biden's presidency (such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement, reversing the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO, and lifting the travel ban on citizens from several Muslim and African countries). Now, a return to Trump's approach is anticipated, though the main directions of previous foreign policies across all fronts are expected to remain intact.   It is also crucial to consider the presence of the so-called deep state in the U.S., which may attempt to hinder Trump’s plans and intentions. During his first term, the deep state proved to be a significant force, preventing the president from implementing certain plans and agreements with other world leaders, including Russia — for example, in the realm of cybersecurity.  However, Trump is now more aware of the specific challenges he might face and is better positioned to shape his foreign policy strategy in a way that circumvents potential obstacles posed by the deep state, enabling him to achieve his desired outcomes. This includes negotiating and implementing agreements he reaches.  Who will prevail in this dynamic — Trump or the deep state — remains to be seen in the near future. At the same time, it is essential to consider the impact of previously made decisions on U.S. foreign policy. For example, laws are much more challenging to amend or repeal than executive orders issued by a previous president. This is particularly relevant to one of the major sticking points in Russian-American relations — sanctions. Reaching an agreement to lift sanctions would be extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, under current conditions, as a law can only be repealed with the approval of the U.S. Congress. In other words, the president does not have the authority to unilaterally lift sanctions without Congressional consent.   However, if such a move aligns with strengthening the global influence of the United States — particularly Donald Trump’s role — it is conceivable that he might find a way to achieve the seemingly impossible. At the same time, the U.S. president is not the sole influential figure in shaping the country’s foreign policy — Congress also plays a crucial role. The current situation is unfolding in a manner similar to 2016. The outcome of the 2024 U.S. elections resulted not only in the victory of former president and businessman Donald Trump, but also in Republican candidates securing a majority in Congress. The Republican Party now holds the upper hand, with 53 seats in the Senate compared to the Democrats' 47, and 220 seats in the House of Representatives compared to the Democrats' 215.   There is a likelihood that Republicans will be inclined to support Trump’s initiatives. However, opposition on certain issues is also possible, one of which could be Russia, particularly regarding anti-Russian sanctions, as was the case during his previous term.  In this context, it is important to note that Republican members of Congress have backed the nomination of the current Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, for the same position in the new House. The vote on his candidacy is scheduled for January 3, 2025. While he previously supported funding for Ukraine, his rhetoric has recently shifted, and he has started opposing this initiative.   Meanwhile, John Thune has become the new Republican leader in the Senate. He has already expressed his willingness to approve Trump’s cabinet appointments through a simplified and expedited process. Notably, he also supported aid for Ukraine in the past. However, this fact is now being downplayed in public discourse in the United States. In addition to the role of the president and the composition of Congress, those appointed to key foreign policy positions and the advisors to the head of state can also play a significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Currently, Donald Trump, drawing on his experience from his first term, is selecting candidates for his team who are not only loyal to him but also influential and well-resourced figures, such as Elon Musk. He is choosing individuals who share his ambitions.  In this regard, Trump and Musk are quite similar — both aspire to global influence. This has led to a consolidation of Trump’s inner circle around his expressed ideas, even if some of these individuals previously held different positions on foreign policy issues. This dynamic is evident, for instance, in the case of Mike Johnson.   Undoubtedly, this alignment is primarily motivated by the desire to secure positions in the upcoming administration. However, these individuals are also well aware that if they oppose Trump, they risk being replaced by more loyal candidates. One of the top priorities on the agenda for the newly elected president is filling government positions. The importance of those he selects for his team should not be underestimated. Despite their loyalty, it is important to consider the potential, albeit limited, influence they may have on the stance of the newly elected president. First and foremost, Donald Trump has selected U.S. Senator J.D. Vance from Ohio as his vice president. Vance considers Russia an adversary of the United States but believes treating Moscow as an outright enemy is counterproductive. He has been cautious in supporting anti-Russian sanctions, remarking that the Biden administration's use of this tool against Russia has been as effective as a “damp firecracker”.   J.D. Vance has been a vocal opponent of providing aid to Ukraine and has advocated for negotiations with Russia. According to him, “just because we don’t like someone doesn’t mean we can’t talk to them from time to time”. This suggests a degree of pragmatism in the approach toward Moscow within the future U.S. presidential administration.   Nonetheless, national interests will remain the top priority for Trump’s entire team, as well as for Trump himself. In this context, one potential negotiation strategy could involve emphasizing that agreements on specific issues align with American national interests. Currently, Michael Waltz is being considered for the role of National Security Advisor. This position is one of the most significant in the U.S. administration and does not require Senate confirmation. Waltz would be responsible for briefing Donald Trump on key national security issues and coordinating the work of various agencies.   Regarding his foreign policy views, Waltz believes it is necessary to reassess the U.S. objectives in Ukraine. At the same time, he is among those who support imposing sanctions on Russia and conducting strikes deep within Russian territory. So far, no changes in his stance on these matters have been observed.   However, it is unlikely that he will openly contradict Trump. Instead, a “good cop, bad cop” dynamic may emerge, which could align perfectly with the newly elected president's objectives. After all, Trump is advancing the concept of “peace through strength”. Donald Trump plans to appoint Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. In recent interviews, Rubio stated that Ukraine should seek opportunities for a peaceful resolution with Russia rather than focusing solely on reclaiming its territories. He was also one of 15 Republican senators who voted against the $95 billion military aid package for Ukraine passed in April 2024. This alignment with Trump’s position on Ukraine indicates Rubio’s intention to remain loyal to the U.S. president.   For the role of Secretary of Defense, Trump is considering Pete Hegseth, a Fox News host. Hegseth has expressed skepticism about continuing U.S. support for Ukraine, further reflecting his loyalty to Trump, consistent with other candidates being considered for positions in the new administration. Donald Trump has proposed New York Congresswoman Elise Stefanik as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Stefanik has called for “crushing actions” to defeat Russia and was one of the initiators of anti-Russian sanctions. However, she voted against a multi-billion-dollar aid package for Ukraine in early 2024.   For the position of Director of National Intelligence, Trump has nominated Tulsi Gabbard, known for her criticism of U.S. foreign policy regarding Ukraine and Russia. In early 2022, she attributed the conflict to the Biden administration's failure to acknowledge Russia's “legitimate security concerns” regarding Ukraine's potential NATO membership. Other key positions include Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Commerce, who are responsible, among other things, for implementing anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the Director of the CIA. Additionally, the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) will be led by businessman Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, Trump's former rival in the primaries.  In this context, it is important to note that Donald Trump places a high value on loyalty and support for his ideas. Consequently, members of his team are likely to carefully weigh their words to avoid contradicting him — or at least not contradicting him significantly — while subtly advancing their own views when possible.   In summary, all candidates share a common trait: loyalty to Trump and support for his ideas, particularly regarding Ukraine, even if they previously held differing views on certain issues. However, it would be premature to infer a shift in the U.S. position toward Russia based solely on their expressed desire to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Bridges or Walls: The Shape of Russian-American Relations After 2024  The trends in relations between Moscow and Washington after 2024 will largely depend not only on the outcome of the recent elections but also on the genuine readiness of both nations for dialogue and cooperation. Notably, Russia has already articulated its position, expressing its willingness for constructive dialogue. However, the question remains: Is Washington prepared for this, considering its deeply entrenched anti-Russian background? Can Donald Trump navigate these challenges effectively, and more importantly, does he even want to?   Russian-American relations after the elections stand at a crossroads. The choice between constructive cooperation and deepening confrontation will be critical. What factors will ultimately determine the future trajectory of these relations? It is important to remember that Donald Trump is a businessman who thinks and acts accordingly. He is ambitious and seeks to influence international relations while positioning himself as a leader. Consequently, he will never agree to concessions. At best, the outcome will be compromise solutions on a range of issues that he, as U.S. president, does not consider vital but which allow him to fulfill his ambitions and emerge as the winner in negotiations. On one hand, under current conditions, the shadow of conflict will continue to loom over Russian-American relations regardless of the statements and actions of Donald Trump and his team. Among the contentious issues that will be challenging to resolve are North Korea (a longstanding U.S. adversary), relations with China (Trump would like to reduce the level of Russian-Chinese cooperation), and Iran (its nuclear program remains a major concern for the U.S.).  On the other hand, potential areas for dialogue and cooperation could include counterterrorism efforts and cybersecurity. An attempt was made during Trump’s first term in 2017, when a bilateral working group on cybersecurity was proposed following a meeting between the Russian and U.S. presidents. However, these agreements ultimately fell apart due to pressure on Trump from the U.S. deep state. It is highly unlikely that Russia and the United States will be able to overcome their significant differences, establish a mutually beneficial dialogue, restore strategic stability, or “reset” their relations over the next four years, especially given Donald Trump's stance on achieving “peace through strength”. Interestingly, Trump has expressed a desire to resolve the crisis in Ukraine as quickly as possible. However, during his first presidential term, his administration approved the transfer of weapons to Ukraine. It can be speculated that this decision was influenced by the deep state, which may have pressured him to provide military aid to Kyiv.   That said, it is improbable that Trump's current desire to end the conflict will take Russian national interests into account. Notably, he has been largely silent on the broader development of relations with Russia. One should not expect a dramatic shift in Russian-American relations. The United States will continue to act in its national interests, as it always has. However, there is now an opportunity to reopen negotiations with Donald Trump, approaching him as a businessman open to a potential win-win scenario, provided that the strategy is carefully crafted — much like Henry Kissinger once did.   Russia has made its move; now it is Trump’s turn. Whether he is capable of restoring even a minimal level of trust between the two countries, necessary for de-escalating tensions, will become evident over the next four years.