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Defense & Security
The flags of the allied resistance groups with Iran, the flags of Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen, Iraq, Fatimids, the popular uprising and the Islamic Republic of Iran together. Iran Tehran, Jan 7, 2020.

The Limits of Deterrence: Iran's Proxy Power Wanes as Geopolitical Stakes Rise

by Pierre Pahlavi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Geopolitical tensions have intensified across the Middle East, amplifying the Iran-Israel standoff and reshaping regional power dynamics. Israel, deeply impacted by recent events, has adopted a more aggressive security stance, intensifying efforts to neutralise perceived threats from Iran’s regional network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias. Far from being minor, these dramatic developments reshape the strategic balance between Iran and Israel while considerably limiting Tehran’s options moving forward.  Strengths and Constraints of Iran’s Asymmetric Strategy  Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, meticulously armed and funded for nearly 40 years to indirectly challenge Israel and the US. With around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, this Lebanese Shiite militia serves as one of Iran’s main spearheads against Israel, providing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon, and exerting pressure on Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of nearly half of Hezbollah’s military capabilities over the past year, as reported by Israeli sources, along with the loss of key military and political leaders, is severely altering the balance between Israel and Iran. While Hezbollah has historically been a strategic shield for Iran, it is now fully reliant on the actions—or inactions—of the Iranian leadership.  The dismantling of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and the disruption of its decision-making apparatus come alongside the crippling of Hamas—another long-time ally of Tehran in its struggle against Israel. After nearly a year of conflict with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas is facing existential challenges, and its leaders, including figures like Yahya Sinwar, have had their ability to act severely weakened.   It would be premature to consider an end to Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups remain key players in the conflict with Israel despite heavy airstrikes on their command-and-control centers. Despite recent setbacks, they continue receiving support from Iran and other allies, while their actions in Gaza and the Galilee persist. But, although these two organisations remain active, and their ability to recover shouldn’t be underestimated, their operational strength and impact on the balance of power with Israel have been significantly weakened. This, in turn, reduces the short-term influence of their Iranian sponsor in the Levant.   The limits of ballistic deterrence and the nuclear temptation  The neutralisation of Hezbollah and Hamas has significantly reduced the Islamic Republic of Iran’s room for maneuver, and its leaders are faced with choices that, as many analysts observe, all carry major disadvantages.  The ballistic confrontation between Iran and Israel has clearly highlighted the limitations of conventional military capabilities for Tehran. On 13-14 April, Iran launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. On 1 October, Tehran launched a new salvo of missiles in what it called Operation True Promise Two, in response to the elimination of key Iranian-backed leaders like Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.   In both cases, the Iranian attacks were aimed at conveying resolve to Israel, reestablishing deterrence, and reassuring the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” increasingly concerned about Iran’s relative idleness. Each time, however, Israel’s air defence system, supported by its American ally, intercepted the vast majority of Iranian projectiles. During the April exchange of fire, the IDF responded by targeting an airbase in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, highlighting Iran’s vulnerabilities and limitations in its ballistic missile defences.  Given the limitations of its ballistic shield and the diminished potential of its proxy network, Iranian political and military leaders are increasingly aware that these resources are not enough for protecting the Islamic regime. Confronted with Israel’s strategy to contain Iran by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, they recognise a significant decline in terms of strategic depth. Acknowledging this mounting pressure, they are prompted to seek alternative solutions to compensate for these losses. Consequently, they are rationally driven to fortify the security of their Iranian stronghold by enhancing their nuclear deterrent capabilities.  Since 7 October 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly accelerated its nuclear activities, enriching uranium to near weapons-grade levels. By the end of 2023, Iran was producing about nine kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent monthly, raising concerns due to its rapid potential for further enrichment. Despite earlier pauses in production, the rate has surged in response to heightened geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the US, and allies have criticised this acceleration. This summer, Kamal Kharrazi, a close aide to Iran’s Supreme Leader, raised international concerns by mentioning a potential “change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.”  The Eastern Pivot and Its Drawbacks  However, with no indication that Iran will be able to acquire an effective nuclear umbrella in the short term, the mullahs and the Guardians are compelled to consider alternative solutions. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders are faced with two equally unsatisfactory options due to their negative implications for Iranian sovereignty. The first possibility would be to seek a reconciliation with the West. Tasked with embodying this scenario, President Massoud Pezechkian recently expressed Tehran’s desire to renew ties with liberal democracies and reopen negotiations over their nuclear dispute. However, significant mistrust and numerous obstacles still hinder the warming of relations, especially if a new Republican administration takes office in Washington.  The alternative path, already widely explored by Tehran, is to move forward with the so-called “Look East” doctrine. In fact, Tehran has continuously sought to strengthen its ties with Beijing and Moscow in recent years. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step towards deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began its accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Iran has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has even provided logistical and military support to Moscow.   At the September 2022 SCO summit, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping welcomed the Islamic Republic, highlighting the regime’s growing ties within a bloc opposing Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full BRICS member, and, recently, Tehran and Moscow have enhanced their military collaboration, raising concerns about potential nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, this pivot toward the Eastern bloc could threaten Iranian sovereignty by tying the regime’s future more closely to that of Russia and China, undermining Iranian nationalism and the aspiration to preserve independence.  The Islamic regime teetering on the brink of profound transformation  Faced with a drastic reduction in its international geopolitical room for maneuver, the Islamic Republic is also going through a serious economic crisis while facing a growing questioning of its internal political legitimacy. In all respects, the regime is at a crossroads; a decisive turning point that could go so far as to destabilise its political foundations.   In the past, showing extraordinary resilience, Tehran has always managed to get out of trouble by maintaining the course of its multifaceted policy conducted on all fronts and by all available means. Placed in a position of military and economic inferiority, the Iranian outsider has adopted an asymmetrical approach with considerable success by striving to avoid frontal combat and by striking blows where it was not expected. In this, the Iran of the mullahs and the guardians has managed, to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words, to “win by not losing.”  The capacity of Islamist leaders to navigate significant challenges and uphold their once unchallenged grip on the country now seems to be wavering. Increasing threats, coupled with a narrowing of strategic options, have placed the regime in a precarious position. The tactics and remedies that previously aided in maintaining the system’s stability no longer appear adequate to ensure the longevity of the political and ideological regime established in 1979.

Defense & Security
TEL AVIV, IL - May 05, 2022: Three fighter jets flying in formation in front of a stunning beach in Tel Aviv, Israel

Israel’s latest strike against Iran may actually de-escalate regional tensions – for now, at least

by Javed Ali

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s airstrikes of Oct. 26, 2024 – which hit around 20 military targets in Iran, Iraq and Syria – had been anticipated for weeks. Indeed, the operation followed a promise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to retaliate for an earlier ballistic missile attack by Tehran in early October. The move also follows a pattern that has seen Iran and Israel take turns to up the ante in what was for a long time a “shadow war,” but which has has now developed into direct confrontation. These tit-for-tat attacks prompted widespread fears that the whole region was poised to enter a more escalatory phase. But, counterintuitive though it may seem, I believe that the latest Israeli strikes may actually have defused tensions. To understand why, it is worth analyzing the nature and scale of the Israeli operation, as well as the likely stance of decision-makers in Israel, Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the attack. A calibrated attack by Israel The October air assault by Iran was itself retaliation for a series of Israeli operations against Iran’s proxy group Hezbollah. These included the assassination of a high-ranking Hamas official in Tehran on the eve of the inauguration of Iran’s new president in July and the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in late September. Similarly, an earlier air assault on Israeli targets in April by Tehran was in response to Israeli provocations this spring – including a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, on April 1 that killed two senior military officers. Many observers anticipated, or feared, an Israeli response to Iran’s October missile and drone attack to be heavy, and punishing – Israel certainly has the military capability to do so. But rather than target vital infrastructure in Iran or the country’s nuclear facilities, Israel instead opted for “precise and targeted” strikes on the Islamic Republic’s air defense and missile capabilities. The somewhat limited scope of the Israeli operations suggests that the strike was designed to send a strong message to Iran’s supreme leader and Iranian military commanders. In essence, Israel was signaling that it has the capability to strike at the heart of Iran, while holding back from a full-throttled attack that would have had further damaged Iran’s fragile economy. While it will take time for a full assessment of the effectiveness of Israel’s strikes to emerge, early indications suggest that they succeeded in revealing weaknesses in Iran’s overall security. These weaknesses that could be further exploited against other more important targets, such as oil and gas production facilities or even nuclear power sites, should Iran or its partners in the so-called “axis of resistance” choose to retaliate. A cautious response in Iran Despite the apparent success of Israel’s attacks against a wide range of targets, statements from Iranian leaders suggest the operational impact was limited. An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemned the attack, noting that Iran “had a right to self defense.” But at the same it added that Iran would “uphold its commitments for regional peace and stability.” Reading into those words, it suggests to me that Iran is not immediately seeking to retaliate and escalate tensions further. Of course, that could change. Further messages by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini or Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani may give a clearer indication whether Iran will seek to retaliate, and how. But with Iran well-aware of the impact that escalation – and the potential for more U.S.-led sanctions and heightened support for Israel – would have on its ailing economy, it may well calculate that a return to the pre-escalation status quo with Israel is in its interests. In Washington, a wary White House A return to the shadow war between Israel and Iran – as opposed to open warfare – would no doubt be welcomed in Washington. Since the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the Biden administration has been caught between competing obligations and concerns. This has included supporting longstanding ally Israel, while not alienating friendly Arab governments and trying to avoid conflict creep into all out war in the region. Meanwhile, in an election year, the Democratic ticket in particular is trying to balance its support for a largely pro-Israel Jewish voting block with a need not to offend potentially important Muslim votes in key states, nor a more pro-Palestinian youth vote. Escalation of conflict in the region does nothing to help the White House in these respects. Yet President Joe Biden’s decades-long relationship with Netanyahu has not led to outcomes that the administration has sought. Washington has not succeeded in pushing its ally toward a ceasefire in Gaza, nor a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon. And with the U.S. election looming on Nov. 5, elevated tensions in the Middle East on various fronts could impact how voters perceive Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump — especially in the battleground state of Michigan, where the Democratic ticket may lose votes among Arab and Muslim Americans angered over the Biden administration’s perceived pro-Israel stance. Threading the needle? Predicting what will happen next in the Middle East has escaped the most seasoned analysts. It may take days, weeks or even months to assess whether this latest airstrike by Israel will lead to a further escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel – or whether a more de-escalatory dynamic settles over the region. But there are good reasons to believe that decision-makers in Iran, Israel and the U.S. know that more escalation is in no one’s interests. And the latest salvo may have just done enough to satisfy Israel, while providing cover for Tehran to say that there is no need to return fire in kind.

Defense & Security
Palestinian supporters of Hamas stand in front of the house of their leader, Yahya Sinwar, in solidarity with him after Israeli threats to kill him, in Khan Yunis in southern Gaza Strip on May 6, 2022

Hamas at a crossroads: Sinwar’s death leaves a vacuum; Israeli actions make it harder to fill with a moderate

by Mkhaimar Abusada

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Hamas will soon begin the process of deciding who will next head the militant Palestinian organization following the Oct. 16, 2024, killing of former leader Yahya Sinwar – but the task won’t be easy, or quick. What makes his replacement as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau a hard one is that since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack – for which, Sinwar was seen as the main architect – Israel has killed many of the senior political and military commanders that would be in line to replace him, or at least be tasked with determining the future direction of Hamas. Just two months before Sinwar’s death, his predecessor in the role, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran, purportedly in an Israeli operation. Meanwhile, Hamas’ military chief, Mohammed Deif, was killed in July and Saleh Arouri, a senior Hamas official and deputy of Haniyeh, was earlier killed in a Beirut drone strike. As an expert on Palestinian politics, I believe the death of Sinwar will leave a vacuum in Hamas that will likely last for many months, if not years. The question is whether the group eventually opts for a leader who continues Sinwar’s hard-line legacy or tries to moderate Hamas’ approach. Sinwar’s legacy Sinwar’s uncompromising stance has shaped not only Hamas but also the Palestinian cause. Born and raised in the Gazan refugee camp Khan Younis, Sinwar joined Hamas in the early days of the organization, which was established in 1987. He quickly rose through the ranks and was responsible for establishing Majd, a security agency within the military wing of Hamas responsible for apprehending and executing Palestinian collaborators with Israel. Sinwar confessed to Israeli interrogators to have killed and buried 12 suspected collaborators – earning him a life sentence in Israeli jail. He served 22 years before being released in a prisoner-swap deal in 2011, which also saw the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. A few years later, he made it to the top of Hamas, serving as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau in Gaza since 2017. After Haniyeh’s assassination in late July, 2024, Sinwar assumed overall leadership. Throughout, Sinwar has been a proponent of Hamas’ hard-line stance on Israel – an approach that won him respect within the organization. Less than a year after assuming power in Gaza, Sinwar endorsed the “Great March of Return and Breaking the Siege” protests of March 2018 along Israel-Gaza borders. The demonstrations – during which Israeli troops shot dead scores of Palestinian protesters – succeeded in galvanizing international support for the Palestinian cause. The protests may have also contributed to Israel’s decision in August of that year to allow Qatar to begin making monthly payments of millions of dollars to Hamas and Gaza in an attempt to defuse and de-escalate tensions. More concessions came as Israel tried to satisfy Sinwar and avoid the further escalation of unrest in Gaza, including allowing Gazan laborers to work in Israel for the first time since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. But Sinwar had less success in getting Israel to agree to releasing the fellow Hamas members he had left behind in Israeli jails and had vowed to get out. He tried many times to strike a deal for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and two civilians, but Israel was not interested. That failure probably contributed to Hamas’ decision to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. How Hamas reacts to blows The killing of Sinwar has weakened Hamas, but Hamas as an idea and an ideology is harder to kill. Israel knows this. In March 2004, an Israeli missile struck and killed Hamas’ founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; a month later, his successor Abdel Aziz Rantisi was also killed. But those deaths did not weaken Hamas. On the contrary, the organization grew more radical. A younger and more defiant leadership took over the organization, which fought Israel repeatedly from 2008 onward, culminating int the Oct. 7 attacks. Hamas’ reaction to that double blow may give an insight into the current decision-making process now. The killing of Yassin was an opportunity for Hamas to revise its military tactics against Israel – which then mainly consisted of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. But in the end, Hamas vowed to continue the violent struggle against Israel. Moderation or radicalization? Hamas is again at a crossroad. It is weakened, alienated from Arab moderate governments and increasingly unpopular among Gazans. But throughout the last year of conflict it has remained defiant. Footage of an injured Sinwar, fighting to the last and trying to down an Israeli drone with a stick, has only added to his legacy, making him a legend to many supporters. The new leadership will have to chose between continuing down the road of radicalization that Sinwar represented or opting for moderation. But Israel is not making that second option any easier. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s only offer to Hamas is total surrender – he has not left the group any face-saving exit. So it seems likely that Hamas will choose to continue the fight. As such, one of the most likely candidates for post-Sinwar leadership of Hamas is Khalil al-Hayya, a Palestinian politician who has served as the deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau since August 2024. Al-Hayya is known for his hawkish attitude toward the idea of Hamas’ reconciliation with rival Palestinian group Fatah, and his hawkish statements on Israel. After Sinwar’s death, he vowed to continue the fight against Israel, an indication that the spirit of Sinwar will continue to guide Palestinian resistance in the coming years. His main challenger for the role of leader is Khaled Mashaal, who served as chairman of Hamas’ political bureau from 1996 to 2017 and currently serves as its chairman in exile. Mashaal, who has a large network of regional and international allies, is considered a more moderate option. He was responsible for drafting Hamas’ 2017 manifesto – seen as a departure from the earlier, more radical and blatantly antisemitic 1988 charter. Collective leadership: Room for maneuver? But a decision on who will assume the role of leader is not expected immediately. Hamas appears more inclined toward collective leadership until scheduled elections in March 2025, if conditions permit. In the meantime, a five-member committee that was formed in August following the assassination of Haniyeh will take over decision-making. The committee is tasked with “governing the movement during the war and exceptional circumstances, as well as its future plans,” and the new committee is authorized to “make strategic decisions,” according to Hamas sources who spoke to Agence France-Presse reporters. Collective leadership of this sort would seemingly indicate that at present Hamas sees no single person as being able to fill the vacuum left by Sinwar. It would also give Hamas potentially more room to maneuver regarding negotiations with Israel and regional players, as some members of the committee are seen as acceptable faces to moderate Arab governments. Collective leadership also provides Hamas with a survival mechanism, making it harder for Israel to claim the type of success it has so far achieved in assassinating named Hamas “leaders.” No doubt, Israel has weakened Hamas with this strategy – notably with the killing of Sinwar. And while the assassination of leading Hamas figures does not constitute “total victory” over the group, as Israel wants, it does make the choice in choosing the next leader that much harder for Hamas.

Defense & Security
Iron Dome Rocket Interceptions of Hamas Rockets- Southern Israel- Night Attack On Ashdod City

Iran’s leaders have everything to lose in a direct war with Israel. Why take such a massive risk?

by Shahram Akbarzadeh, Middle East Studies Forum

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for”. The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon. Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate. When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that. And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen. In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight. Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity. A delicate balancing act Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran. Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab. There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries. So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles. In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans. But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago. Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself. So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing. Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice. So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors:preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival. In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies, it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action. As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasise its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent. Where things go from here With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out. The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict. Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region. This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

Defense & Security
The Red Sea Region with cargo and pirate ships. Suitable for concepts as red sea conflict, rise of tension between the USA and Iran,Houthi Attacks and Military Escalation

From Iraq to Africa: How the Gaza War Expanded the Houthis' Ambitions

by Igor Subbotin, Nezavisimaya Gazeta

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском A year into the Gaza conflict, the Houthi movement calls itself «Ansar Allah», once focused on defending Yemen’s sovereignty, has emerged as one of the most active members of the «Axis of Resistance» — a club of state and non-state actors loyal to Iran. The military-political platform has not only expanded the geography of its attacks to relatively remote arenas, but has also stepped up its global outreach, reaching out to audiences in South Asia, Europe, and the United States. The most significant development has been the Houthis' ability to enhance their diplomatic activity beyond their traditional sphere of interest. «Ansar Allah» increased coordination with members of the «Axis of Resistance» in Iraq to carry out strikes against Israel. Another notable direction was Africa, where, according to U.S. reports, Yemeni rebels initiated negotiations with the Somali group «Al-Shabaab» (recognized as a terrorist organization, banned in Russia) about the transfer of arms. A major diplomatic loss for the Yemeni movement was the weakening of trust with Syria. Thus, in the fall of 2023, the government of President Bashar al-Assad revoked the Houthis’ rights to diplomatic representation in Damascus and promised to hand it over to a rival faction, the central government of Yemen. However, from October 2023, the «Ansar Allah» movement, which actively demonstrated solidarity with Hamas, began to steadily evolve into a fully-fledged transnational entity capable of influencing security dynamics far beyond the Arabian Peninsula. A Breach in the «Axis of Resistance» In October 2023, just days after Hamas’s armed wing launched an attack on southern Israel, the Syrian government ordered the Houthis to be stripped of their diplomatic representation in Damascus. The Yemeni movement, which is informally affiliated with the Syrian government through its «Axis of Resistance» had its own embassy in the capital since 2015, when the Saudi-led Arab states began their official intervention in Yemen. It appears that this move was influenced by the Gulf countries, which are eager to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold at any cost. Just three days before the expulsion of the «Ansar Allah» diplomats, the leaders of Syria and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had a phone conversation, with the situation in Gaza being the primary focus. According to some reports, Abu Dhabi sent a cautious warning to Damascus, advising it to refrain from direct involvement in the conflict between Israel and Hamas and to prevent loosely controlled paramilitary groups from turning its jurisdiction into a launching pad for attacks on Israel. An indirect indication that the changes surrounding the embassy occurred under the influence of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is that the building, which had been taken away, was promised to representatives of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, which traditionally relies on the support of Saudi Arabia. However, some Arab experts have expressed doubt that the transfer of the diplomatic mission to another Yemeni faction necessarily carries a clearly articulated political message. According to Israeli think tanks, the Houthis still maintain a military presence in Syria, led by their military attaché, Sharaf al-Mawri. Reports indicate that the Syrian authorities continue to invite the military attaché to official events and allow him freedom of communication with local security apparatuses. Furthermore, Israeli analysts suggest that the «Ansar Allah» movement has a group of operatives in Syria, potentially numbering in the hundreds. Some of these fighters are believed to have expertise in operating combat drones and launching ballistic missiles. So the situation around the Damascus embassy did not lead to a complete collapse of ties between Syria and «Ansar Allah» although it was perceived by the Yemeni movement’s functionaries as an absolute tragedy. Iraqi Office In June 2024, the leadership of «Ansar Allah» announced plans to coordinate its attacks on Israel with the «Islamic Resistance in Iraq» — a coalition of several Shiite groups. The collaboration between these two forces was highlighted by coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure in Israeli port cities. Following the decision by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to target Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, the Houthis and the «Islamic Resistance in Iraq» escalated military pressure on Israel.  Amid the escalation around Lebanon in the summer of 2024, the Houthis opened their own office in Baghdad, following the example of the Hamas group. The leadership of «Ansar Allah» has been trying to strengthen ties with Iraq for the past decade. In 2015 the Yemeni movement sent a representative to Baghdad to expand bilateral political and defense relations. Moreover, there is a point of view that the «Ansar Allah» movement actively collaborated with the Shiite factions of Iraq when it launched a powerful combined attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil industry facilities in 2019: the launch of combat drones could have been carried out from the territory of the Republic.  Experts believe that now the nature of these contacts has changed qualitatively. According to their estimates, one of the key tasks of the Houthi representative office opened in Baghdad in the summer should be to obtain financial support from loyal circles in Iraq. Moreover, inside Yemen, Ansar Allah has been facing difficulties in managing financial flows since the beginning of this year. At the same time, Iraq appears to be a relatively comfortable place from the point of view of coordinating actions along the «Axis of Resistance»: representatives of the Iranian military and political leadership often visit the Republic. Cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi groups has every chance of developing, especially against the backdrop of the irreconcilable desire of the Netanyahu government to suppress the military and command potential of its opponents «on seven fronts» at any cost. Apparently, the new Baghdad office of «Ansar Allah» plays the role of not only a financial center, but also a joint operations room for organizing strikes on Israel. A Window into Africa Western countries are increasingly concerned about «Ansar Allah’s» willingness to expand its influence into Africa. The U.S. intelligence community reports that the Yemeni movement is determined to establish effective ties with «Al-Shabaab» a militant group operating in the Horn of Africa, potentially to create a strategic threat to Western interests on the continent. Intelligence agencies suspect that, for now, the two groups are focusing primarily on arms deals. U.S. think tanks have noted that «Ansar Allah» (the Houthis) and «Al-Shabaab» already had indirect connections through local arms trading networks. However, Washington now believes that these two groups, despite being ideological antagonists, are currently engaged in direct dialogue. This dialogue is reportedly focused on the transfer of advanced warfare technologies to the Somali jihadists, including anti-aircraft missile systems and combat drones. US Africa Command has no doubt that «Al-Shabaab» will likely use Houthi-provided equipment to target US facilities and regular personnel. Washington has a direct hand in the Horn of Africa: US drones are constantly hunting for senior «Al-Shabaab» commanders and collecting intelligence in Somalia. But the situation may not be limited to Somalia. The Israeli intelligence community claims that the Houthis are planning to expand their presence in other parts of Africa, in order to project military power unhindered in the Eastern Mediterranean. For example, according to these reports, the Yemeni movement is looking for a tangible foothold in Sudan, Egypt and Morocco, allegedly hoping to transfer groups of its operatives there. This year, the Houthis have promised to harm Israeli interests in the Mediterranean, and the Jewish state believes that this threat is not illusory.  Farewell to the «Proxy» Image During the 12 months of destructive military actions in the Gaza Strip, the «Ansar Allah» movement has established itself as one of the strongest links in the «Axis of Resistance». This has given it the opportunity to become an attractive partner for players who build their policies in the Middle East on the antithesis of the influence of the United States and its allies. It is quite clear that the Houthis' foreign policy capital has only grown in the wake of the U.S.-British operation launched against them on the night of January 12, 2024: the massive strikes from the sea not only failed to weaken the military potential of the Yemeni organization, but within the first few months also demonstrated the international community’s inability to provide military protection for critical maritime routes. If the reports about Ansar Allah deploying its fighters to Syria and North African Arab countries are close to the truth, this currently seems more like a political move than a tactical one, given how sensitive Israel is to the activities of Iran-aligned forces around its sphere of interests. Another question is that the transfer of even a symbolic number of fighters could give the government of Benjamin Netanyahu a formal pretext to resort to escalation scenarios. However, the Yemeni movement’s contacts with Somali jihadists have all the characteristics of a major strategic shift. If the practical level of their cooperation grants them the ability to exert pressure on the Gulf of Aden from different directions, this could strike a blow to the interests of global actors and exacerbate the negative impact of events surrounding Yemen on the global economy. The Houthis' attempt to transform into a transnational movement, which emerged as a response to Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip, has led to the expansion of their operational capabilities. On the one hand, this allows the Iranian-led «Axis of Resistance» to maintain the appearance of unity against the backdrop of the apathy of its Syrian partners and the paralysis that has gripped Hezbollah. But on the other hand, by diversifying their ties, the Houthis are neutralizing the image of a military-political entity that is totally dependent on Iran, a label they have been given since the intensification of hostilities in Yemen.

Defense & Security
RE'IM, ISRAEL - April 17, 2024: Memorial composed of photos of young Israelis killed during the terrorist attack on the NOVA Festival which took place on October 7, 2023 a few kilometers from Gaza

Gaza. Year 1 of the barbarism.

by Ignacio Gutiérrez de Terán Gómez-Benita, Auto

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It has been a year since the massacre began: such a degree of destruction had not been seen in decades anywhere else on the planet. Around 50,000 dead and 200,000 wounded, some two million displaced souls, wandering in the desolation of Gaza, with infrastructure practically destroyed, hunger, disease, and misery. That is the brief and summarized balance of this year of brutal military campaign, by air, sea, and land, decreed by the Tel Aviv regime a year ago. Such a degree of destruction had not been seen in decades anywhere else on the planet; the power of the bombs dropped by Israel on a piece of land barely 360 square kilometers exceeds the great records of destruction seen in major European cities during World War II. The damage suffered by the city of Gaza in its schools, hospitals, sports centers, power plants, roads (those that are not used for the movement of occupation forces and their incursions), water tanks, etc., has no parallel in the records of modern wars. Almost everything, destroyed. The barbarism that the Israeli army and government continue to commit, with the approval of most of its public opinion, now tilted towards the extremism of radical settler movements, finds no one to stop it. These days, as the anniversary of this genocidal campaign is being marked, civilian casualties among the Palestinian population are around one hundred per day. Victims of bombings on what remains of a medical dispensary, a refugee center, or the line to buy bread, rationed and always scarce. The human rights violations committed by this pack — the "most ethical and moral army in the Middle East!" — include all kinds of excesses: Palestinian civilians used as human shields, sometimes tied to the front of military vehicles, arbitrary killings of people suspected of just “passing by,” looting of homes, abuse and torture of women, men, and children, theft of personal belongings that some soldiers later shamelessly display in triumphant videos... And all for what? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies have repeatedly claimed that their goal, after the "affront" perpetrated by Hamas and other Palestinian militias on October 7th, 2023, was to eliminate all of them and free the prisoners, both civilian and military, some 250, who had been taken to Gaza by the “terrorists.” They have achieved neither. The Islamist militants continue to destroy tanks, armored vehicles, and bulldozers daily, causing deaths and injuries among the occupying forces, although military censorship hides or reports the casualties much later. So much so that even the top commanders have acknowledged that they are beginning to run out of armored vehicles and transport trucks for their troops. The famous videos of the inverted red triangle, spread by the few Arab televisions and non-Israeli-American aligned media, show increasingly bold actions, with “multiple” operations in which Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other factions manage to attack three, four, or five targets in a single sequence. It's no coincidence that the Palestinian journalists covering the news from inside Gaza, and sometimes acting as intermediaries to receive videos recorded by the militias — not everything can be images of Israeli soldiers peacefully patrolling the ruins — have become a preferred target for the occupying soldiers. About 150 journalists have been killed, another infamous record in the annals of recent wars, just like the 200 UN workers who have fallen victim to bombings and snipers — without the leaders of the international organization taking decisive action against the State of Israel. No matter how you look at the data from this aberrant rampage of Huns and Vandals, traces of horror and multiple bloody records emerge. But there they remain, uncontrolled, increasing the brutality of their actions with every step. They haven’t succeeded in freeing the hostages in military rescue operations either, except for a mere dozen. The rest were released through peace negotiations and exchanges last November, during a period of ceasefire which, despite the hopes of many, did not lead to a definitive cessation of hostilities. After recovering a large number of civilians, Tel Aviv resumed the confrontation. Today, the "hostage" issue is rarely mentioned by the regime's leaders. Netanyahu, in addition to systematically undermining talks for their release with Arab mediators, had another of his "brilliant ideas" in early August: to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas' Political Bureau, while he was in Tehran attending the inauguration of the new Iranian president, Masud Pezeshkian. Haniyeh was one of Hamas' key figures, but within the political structure, he could be considered one of the most inclined to pursue negotiations and make proposals that, through reasonable concessions from both sides, might lead to a solution. But Netanyahu and his cronies do not understand reason, and the attack on Haniyeh led to Yahya Sinwar, the bogeyman of Zionism and leader of Hamas' military wing, also taking over political leadership, unifying both. Conclusion: The first thing Sinwar did was order the cells holding the prisoners in ultra-secret hideouts to execute them at the slightest sign of danger. Very few now hope to recover them, unless an improbable, at present, new round of negotiations takes place. It has already been said — not by most Western media, who are there to repeat the pro-Zionist propaganda of Israel and the United States — that the Gaza campaign goes beyond delivering a final blow to the Palestinians in general and Hamas in particular. It fits, on the one hand, within a new stage of economic and commercial expansion that aims to transform the Middle East into a space led by Tel Aviv, supported by pro-Israel Arab monarchies and republics (United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and in North Africa, Morocco, with the likely inclusion — once this all passes — of Saudi Arabia). Thus, Israel would become the overseer of major oil and gas supply routes. The neo-Zionist plan includes the creation of railway and maritime trade routes between Europe and the Indian subcontinent. A new order of peace and concord based on flourishing trade, though only for a few. Then there is the push for expansion through settlements and the necessary confiscation of land, before or after, the expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank. The hardline government representatives announce this openly, and the actions — the laws, the army’s incursions, and the settlers’ harassment of Palestinian properties — bear witness to this. But, as there are other matters to discuss, Netanyahu has once again embarked on another major military adventure: the invasion of Lebanon. In there, the number of displaced people has already reached one million, with more than 3,000 homes destroyed and entire villages deserted. So far, neither has he achieved one of the stated objectives, namely, to stop Hezbollah's missiles from targeting northern Israel and to return over 100,000 settlers to the Galilee region and surrounding areas. Worse still, rockets from the Lebanese Islamic resistance are now reaching Tel Aviv itself. Then there are the disputes with Iran, which has become the source of all evils, and the very real possibility of a large-scale regional conflict. In Gaza, where Israeli gangs have targeted journalists and humanitarian workers, all of whom are “saboteurs,” in Lebanon, they have focused on healthcare personnel and ambulance drivers. In the first three days of “limited” ground operations in the south, about 50 were killed. No one asks for explanations, no one is outraged, nor even asks pertinent questions in our Western political and diplomatic circles about all this madness. It is enough for a military spokesman from the regime to say that the paramedics were not transporting the wounded but explosives, or that the ambulances were being used to store Hezbollah weapons, for everyone to feel satisfied. The pro-Zionist narrative, and the fear of being reprimanded by the Tel Aviv regime, the fear of being branded "anti-Semitic," or the punishments that its great patron, the United States, might dole out, act as deterrents. If the Palestinians and the Lebanese, or at least a large segment of them, continue to resist the Israeli benevolence and its sacred right to defend itself — that is, to keep doing whatever they want — we will be heading into a second year of barbarism. They, the "others," those resistant to the modernity and democracy that the misunderstood regime in Tel Aviv so well represents, are to blame.  Article under license CC BY-SA 3.0 ES (Atribución-CompartirIgual 3.0 España)

Defense & Security
iran missle atacks israel, middle east conflict blocks

Iran’s strike on Israel was retaliatory – but it was also about saving face and restoring deterrence

by Aaron Pilkington, University of Denver

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once “shadow war” have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon. On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, direct attack against Israel notionally in retribution for Israel’s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. It was the second such barrage in six months. By many accounts, the previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13 – which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones – caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to U.S. encouragement of restraint, Israel’s immediate military response then – an airstrike against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province – was somewhat measured. Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would prefer to de-escalate rather than engage in ongoing open warfare. But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows. With Hamas’ capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah – the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused tens of thousands to evacuate the area. Israel pivots north Israel’s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas’ political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran’s internal security apparatus. Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei vowed a “harsh response” against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action. Tehran’s inaction caused many Middle East analysts to question if the Iranian response would ever materialize – and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxy forces. If indeed Iran’s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas’ top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel’s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September. Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s command and control through the means of sabotaged explosive communications devices. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating Hezbollah’s top leaders including Nasrallah. The Israeli military then launched what the country’s leaders describe as a “limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border. Tehran’s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence. Challenging Israel’s advance Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world’s most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Nevertheless, Israel’s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah’s top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel’s leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah. And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic’s crown jewel within its “Axis of Resistance.” In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion. The brutal art of save face? It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it’s seen by other parts of its external proxy network. Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault. Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel’s military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated. Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic. Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found. Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran’s borders. And second, Iran’s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas. Reclaiming deterrence Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence. The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones. These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran’s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies. Israel’s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk. Who plays the next move? These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran’s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s aims is unknown. The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been “defeated and ineffective,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel. What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack. IRGC leaders met this warning with a counterthreat of their own that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified “crushing and destructive attacks.” Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

Defense & Security
Israel against Hezbollah, two tank silhouettes facing each other with their respective flags on top

Israel Gambles on All-Out Confrontation with Hezbollah

by Urban Coningham, RUSI Leadership Centre

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah, which have been followed by an ongoing air campaign, signal a new phase in the conflict amid heightened regional tensions. The sophisticated remote pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah on 17–18 September were followed by an intensive Israeli air campaign against the militant group, which is ongoing. These events were hailed by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant as a new phase in the country’s conflict with Hezbollah and a shift of gravity in Israel’s conflict from south to north. These actions, driven by intelligence breakthroughs and rapid decision-making, mark a critical moment in the ongoing conflict in the region and could have far-reaching implications for regional stability and Israel's political landscape. Israel’s ‘Use it or Lose it’ Moment The sensational events of last week were, arguably, a suboptimal military outcome for Israel. Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility for either attack, though the capability and intelligence from allies point to its involvement. The pager and then the walkie-talkie attacks were originally designed to be the opening salvo in a coordinated and total attack against Hezbollah. This would undoubtedly have been devastating, rendering communications obsolete for Hezbollah while being prepared to simultaneously hit hard with drone and missile strikes, maybe even alongside a ground incursion. Despite this careful planning, US sources have reported that Israel’s leaders were forced to either act instantly or risk losing this asset. This was a ‘use it or lose it’ moment, and has ultimately led Israel to ramp up its pressure on the north to follow what Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah fairly identified as a ‘declaration of war’.  After the activation of the pager attack was forced upon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel followed up with the movement of the 98th Division, a paratrooper division, from Gaza to the northern border on 18 September. In addition to this, Gallant visited aircraft bases on the northern border in the immediate aftermath of the pager attack. Israel then activated another of its assets in the walkie-talkie attack, another ‘use it or lose it moment’ as reeling Hezbollah security officials (as well as embedded Iranian officers) began to look for other infiltrations. Israel has since begun a brutal missile campaign against Hezbollah with strikes in Southern Lebanon as well as in Beirut, where Israel reported the successful assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, a senior Hezbollah commander. According to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, these attacks killed almost 500 and wounded many more on 23 September alone. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to Israel’s demand to withdrawing its troops and missile silos to beyond the Litani River. After activating their pager asset, Israeli commanders were forced to activate their walkie-talkie asset before it was detected. The forced use of these two key assets led Netanyahu to believe that this was his best chance to push for a victory against Hezbollah with further missile strikes and assassinations. Israel’s ‘shock and awe’ strategy in Lebanon is clear, proving capability and intent to strike and eliminate targets at will until Hezbollah agrees to its demands What is clear is that throughout this last week Netanyahu has been led by events, and not the other way around. Despite this, he will be delighted that he is one step closer to reclaiming the ‘Mr Defence’ reputation that has seen him serve a record eight terms as prime minister. After the shock of 7 October and the hostages that Israel has not been able to bring home, this is a moment of victory for the Israel Defense Forces, Israeli intelligence services and Netanyahu himself in re-asserting the competence and superiority of Israeli capabilities.  Israel will ultimately hope that ramping up pressure on Hezbollah through its continuing assassination and missile campaign will force its troops back behind the Litani River (some 18 miles from the current border, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701). This would allow Israel to return 200,000 displaced refugees to cities and villages in the north and score a major political and legitimacy goal.  A Crushing Blow for Hezbollah For Hezbollah, the pager and walkie-talkie attacks represented the most significant failure for the organisation since the 2006 war. In three days, Israel’s intelligence services blatantly proved their ability to infiltrate and destroy Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures. This began with the remote detonation of several thousand pagers on Tuesday and was followed up by the remote detonation of thousands of walkie-talkies used by the terrorist group on Wednesday. For Hezbollah this is a serious blow that carries a number of serious implications for the group. Firstly, the successful outcome of the Israeli operation exposed  fundamental weaknesses in the group’s command-and-control mechanisms. Hezbollah already operates in an extremely difficult command-and-control environment due to extensive human intelligence and Pegasus spyware, where Israeli intelligence can compromise mobile phones simply by sending them a signal. This environment has forced Hezbollah to operate on a network of cells which rely on almost constant top-down delegation. The inevitable restructuring as well as the human capacity that Hezbollah has lost will hamper the group’s ability to effectively resist Israel’s attacks. Secondly, there has been an impact on Hezbollah’s legitimacy.  Israel’s attacks are a humiliation for the group, representing as they do a colossal security failure. Hezbollah’s inability to prevent the attacks and protect Lebanon (as it claims to do) makes its position extremely difficult. The severity of this legitimacy hit is demonstrated by Nasrallah being forced to admit that Hezbollah has suffered a major and unprecedented blow. Finally, Hezbollah’s position is made more difficult by its lack of credible options to respond. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion.  At the same time, however, Nasrallah has furious internal stakeholders demanding revenge. The only real pressure valve available to him in this extremely difficult position is being able to claim attacks by the Axis of Resistance as consequences for Israel’s actions. This axis is comprised of an aligned group in the region, led by Iran and including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various militia groups, who claim to resist Israel and its allies. Wider Questions for the Axis of Resistance This is a major test for the Axis of Resistance. Iran has watched seemingly powerlessly as Hezbollah, its ally, has been pummelled again and again by Israel. The refugees streaming out of Southern Lebanon towards Beirut are another example of the pressure Israel is applying on Hezbollah. Iran is also yet to respond to Israel’s assassination of Ismayel Haniyeh in Tehran in July. Iranian leaders and key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps figures will be increasingly frustrated that they have been unable to re-establish credible deterrence against Israel. This is a particularly sore point as it is fairly clear by now that their April missile and drone strikes against Israel were ineffective in achieving this. We can expect to see an evolving Iranian strategy that aims to place maximum diplomatic pressure on Israel through moves such as encouraging proxies to strike at Israel, as well as threatening regional stability and shipping lanes. We may also see Iran to make diplomatic overtures to the West to exert more diplomatic pressure. Hezbollah cannot afford a full-scale conflict with Israel and will be wary of giving Netanyahu the slightest justification for further attacks or a ground incursion Something to be aware of is that there are multiple smaller militia groups and individual cells within Hezbollah that have the potential for escalation. Many of these smaller or splinter groups may feel that they must respond to Israel with an independent attack that pre-empts or goes beyond Hezbollah’s so far very measured response. This danger is illustrated by previous attacks on UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, such as the attack that resulted in the death of Private Sean Rooney in December 2022. If one of these smaller groups was to hit an Israeli population centre, either on purpose or by mistake, the tension could easily spill over into a larger-scale conflict. The US–Israel Relationship An interesting dynamic to note is that the pager attacks and subsequent missile campaign represent another case of Israel making aggressive decisions without first consulting the US. Prior examples of this include the decision to invade Rafah, rejecting any possibility of a future Palestinian state as part of negotiations, and missile campaigns on non-combat areas in Gaza. As the US is Israel’s main ally and security guarantor, this trend embodies the increasing risk appetite of the current Israeli government. This is likely due to an assessment of the strategic environment, particularly Iran’s reluctance to enter a full-scale conflict, but also represents a political calculation by Netanyahu. Once again, the only way for Netanyahu to safeguard his short-term survival is by taking decisions that ensure Israel remains in a state of conflict. Followers of Israeli politics will not need reminding that Netanyahu faces three criminal cases that will progress as soon as he loses the premiership. The escalation perhaps also reflects a weakness in the US’s security arrangements, as it has been unable to effectively dissuade and disincentivise its own allies from escalation. The US has made it very clear that its priority, especially approaching the presidential election, is for regional de-escalation. This is illustrated by the exhaustive diplomatic efforts made since 7 October to reach a settlement between Iran, Hezbollah and Israel in order to keep the border cool. When the new US administration takes office later this year, its first priority in terms of Middle East policy must be addressing the balance of power between Washington and the Israeli prime minister.

Defense & Security
Concept of military aggression in Middle East.

The Developments in the Middle East: a Reflection of the World’s Bigger Picture

by Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affair

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском When the Israeli–Palestinian conflict escalated dramatically in early October 2023, many observers jumped to a grim conclusion that, from then onward, the Middle East was hurtling at an ever-increasing speed toward another major regional conflict. The military operation of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip was to be followed by fierce hostilities in the West Bank, then by a large-scale border clash between Israel and Lebanon, and, finally, by an Israeli–Iranian war, which had been looming on the political horizon for years and was literally just a step away, with the likely involvement of several key regional and global actors, including the United States. Limits to escalation  But in the 11 months that have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel, no major war has broken out in the Middle East. Israel, as predicted, is stuck in Gaza for long. The death toll among Palestinian civilians has passed 40,000, with the number of wounded approaching 100,000, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons now in the seven figures. For the people of Gaza, everything happening there is not a targeted anti-terrorist operation, but an all-out war in every sense. While the neighboring West Bank also saw an escalation, it was much more limited—around 600 Palestinians and several dozen Israelis have died there over the past 11 months. This is still many times more than in previous years (28 people were killed there in 2020, 86 in 2021, and 146 in 2022), but it is clear now that the West Bank has not become a second Gaza today, nor is it likely to become one overnight. Along the line of confrontation between the IDF and Hezbollah forces on the Israeli–Lebanese border, nothing extraordinary has occurred so far either, except for a rocket strike at a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on July 27, which killed 12 Druze teenagers. True, Hezbollah has fired an unprecedented number of missiles at Israel over the past 11 months, up to 6,000 according to some reports. Israel, in response, has launched massive retaliatory and even preemptive strikes on southern Lebanon. But the preliminary results of this duel were relatively minor: 21 civilian and 20 military deaths on the Israeli side, and around 375 fighters and civilians killed on Hezbollah’s side. Even the latest attack on Sunday, August 25, which was announced in advance and involved 340 rockets along with dozens of Hezbollah drones, seems to have caused no significant damage to Israel. In any case, nothing comparable to the IDF’s deep incursion into southern Lebanon in July 2006 (known as the Second Lebanon War) is happening now or is likely to happen soon. In recent months, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to escalate by conducting precision strikes on prominent figures of its adversaries. On April 1, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an Iranian embassy annex building in Damascus, killing 16 people, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran (Israel never claimed responsibility for his death). After each of these incidents, experts predicted a sharp increase in the risks of escalation. But the Iranian leadership’s response to these developments was surprisingly restrained (as was Tehran’s earlier response to the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani in early 2020 by the U.S. military in a Baghdad suburb). The leaders of most Arab states also showed restraint in their response to the events in Gaza. The highly emotional reaction of the Arab street did not translate into decisive actions comparable to the oil embargo imposed on Israel and its allies following the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Efforts to further promote the Abraham Accords between Israel and the conservative Arab monarchies continued, albeit fading from the public eye. The only consistent supporters of Palestine were the stubborn Yemeni Houthis, who have attacked foreign ships in the Red Sea. However, it was Egypt—not Israel—that suffered the most from these attacks, losing nearly half of its revenues from the Suez Canal. Reasons for restraint  Although the trigger of a major regional war was pulled almost a year ago, the bomb itself never exploded. This situation calls for an explanation, particularly to assess the risk that the bomb might eventually detonate in the foreseeable future, among other things. One explanation for the current situation around Palestine lies in the distinct nature of Hamas, which has an ambiguous reputation in the Arab world. Cairo does not hold it in high regard, and Egypt’s current military leadership, not without reason, draws parallels between Palestinian radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood movement (banned in Russia) at home, which has been driven deep underground, but was, alongside Israel, among the founding fathers of Hamas. Damascus has not forgotten that at the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the political opposition rather than President Bashar Assad. Opinions of Hamas are divided in the Gulf states—while the group can count on some patronage and even political support in Doha, Abu Dhabi is much more skeptical and doubtful of the former rulers of the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, all regional actors are under pressure from the international community, which for various reasons does not want further escalation. The U.S. has no interest in a major regional war in the Middle East with an uncertain outcome, especially in the run-up to the presidential election in November. Thus, Washington is focused on maintaining the regional status quo. China has even less reason to welcome such a conflict, in the first place because it would immediately drive global hydrocarbon prices up and create many transportation and logistics issues for Beijing. Moscow could possibly count on some short-term gains from a major Middle East conflagration. The West would have to shift attention away from Ukraine for a while, while prices for Russian oil and gas would skyrocket. But the negative consequences of long-term destabilization in such an important region for Russia are so great that they undoubtedly outweigh any short-term gains. It is no coincidence that at his meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on August 13, President Vladimir Putin emphasized Moscow’s commitment to preventing further escalation and promoting a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It is also plausible that during the visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu to Iran on August 5, Moscow urged Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to refrain from radical responses to Israel—not only to minimize possible civilian casualties but also to avoid provoking a direct conflict with the U.S. Postmodernity as inoculation against war  However, the core reasons lie not outside, but inside the region. It appears that key actors—from Egypt to Syria, and from Turkey to Iran—are unwilling to engage in a full-blown war. Middle Eastern leaders are reluctant to shoulder the numerous risks and costs associated with a major armed conflict in one way or another. True, the arms race in the Middle East region received a powerful new boost in October 2023 and is likely to accelerate later. Belligerent anti-Israeli rhetoric—not only in the Arab world but also in Iran and Turkey—will also persist. Isolated tragic incidents—both planned and accidental—will continue. Yet a major war is a different matter. This is not because all Middle Eastern leaders are exceptionally compassionate and peace-loving, but because almost none of them today can be fully confident in their own power and resilience. It is still possible to maintain a limited military presence near and far, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and the region has advanced too far down the path of postmodernity. It is hardly a coincidence that the strongest proponents of escalation are the Houthis, who are the least affected by the postmodern values and lifestyle in the Middle East. Perhaps even Tehran can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the new generation of Iranian citizens, who would have to pay with their own blood for the decisions of the political and military elite leading to a major regional war. In any case, the victory of the only “reformist” candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, in the recent presidential election is a clear signal from society to the leadership of the Islamic Republic that people want peace, stability and economic development, rather than new military exploits or social and political upheavals that invariably accompany them. Even Israel—for all the outward determination of the current cabinet to see things through to the end—is no exception to this rule. The costs of the Gaza operation have already topped $60 billion, a staggering sum for a relatively small country, meaning inevitable budget deficits, tax hikes and cuts to social programs. Israel’s call-up of reservists has already drained the national economy, and its effects will be felt for a long time. Most importantly, as the Gaza offensive has once again shown, starting a war is easy, but ending it is very difficult. The prospect of a second Gaza in the West Bank or southern Lebanon is far from appealing, even for a politician as determined as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Armageddon is off the table? It is fair to assume that the current situation in the Middle East reflects the broader state of global politics. After February 24, 2022, many experts expressed a gloomy belief that “the world is entering a new era of big wars” and that the confrontation between Russia and the West would inevitably lead to a chain reaction of major armed conflicts all over the planet. They predicted an imminent U.S.–China military clash over Taiwan, an armed standoff between China and India in the Himalayas or between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, a rapid escalation on the Korean Peninsula and numerous new conflicts across Africa, among others. Fortunately, none of the above scenarios have so far come to pass. Many other ominous predictions have not come true either. ECOWAS member states opted out of a military intervention in Niger. The Libyan National Army’s threat of a border conflict with Algeria never materialized. Even Venezuela’s eccentric leader Nicolas Maduro seems to have changed his mind about going to war with neighboring Guyana over disputed territories. The number of conflicts in the world has not decreased, but the ongoing ones are predominantly low-intensity conflicts rather than conventional wars, after all. The international system, though shaken, has overall remained standing—for now. Of course, it is too early to sit back. The situation can explode at any moment and almost anywhere: there are more than enough flashpoints around the world, while the level of trust or even basic communication between the great powers has dropped to near zero. In today’s international environment, any negative scenarios are possible, down to the most apocalyptic ones. And this unsettling uncertainty is now very much felt in the Middle East as well. But for now, there is still hope that the unfolding transition to a new world order will be less destructive and less costly for humanity than many professional pessimists have imagined in recent years.

Defense & Security
São Paulo SP Brazil October 22 2023 People take part in a demonstration against Israel's military offensive in the Gaza Strip in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on October 22, 2023.

Political Insights (13): Brazil’s Stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood

by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, Yarmouk Universi

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction  When the UN General Assembly passed the 1947 partition resolution on Palestine, Brazil was presiding over the meetings, and its delegate delayed the vote multiple times to secure the maximum number of votes in favor of the partition. From that point until 2002, Brazilian policy closely aligned with the US position on Israel. However, with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election in 2002, Brazil’s stance became less aligned with Israel and shifted toward a more balanced and neutral approach between conflicting international poles. This shift, however, was not consistent and fluctuated, particularly during the 2019–2022 period under President Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government. After Lula da Silva’s return to the presidency in early 2023, Brazilian policy once again moved towards a less pro-Israel stance, particularly in response to the aftermath of the Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Brazil holds substantial qualitative significance in Latin America, encompassing around 47.8% of the continent’s area and accounting for nearly half of its population (214 million out of approximately 434 million). First: Determinants of Brazilian Foreign Policy on the Palestine Issue  Three key factors largely shape Brazil’s policy toward Palestine: 1. The Influence of the Brazilian Agricultural Lobby The trade relationship, particularly in the agri-food sector and related investments, is a key factor in Brazil’s policy towards the Middle East. Agri-food products account for 27% of Brazil’s agricultural trade, amounting to $18 billion with Arab countries, $2 billion with Iran, and $2 billion with Israel. In comparison, trade with the Palestinian Authority (PA) stands at approximately $30 million, making Israeli trade with Brazil 60 times larger than that with the PA. Furthermore, Israel was the first country outside South America to sign a trade agreement with Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, in 2007, where Brazil is the leading member. The agricultural sector wields significant influence within the government, with 300 members of the Brazilian legislature—two-thirds of the body—affiliated with its interests. This powerful lobbying presence allows them to block any policies that might negatively impact the agricultural sector. A notable example of their influence is the successful obstruction of Bolsonaro’s plan to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem. After receiving a warning from the LAS that such a move could harm trade relations between Brazil and Arab countries, the agricultural lobby’s pressure led Bolsonaro to instead open a commercial representation office in Jerusalem, rather than relocating the embassy. 2. The Growing Movement of Christian Zionism Studies in political sociology from Latin America indicate a growing shift from Catholicism to Evangelicalism, which may increase the potential for conversion to “Christian Zionism” within the Evangelical movement. Christian Zionism advocates for the establishment of a “Jewish state” in the Promised Land as a precursor to Christ’s return. Some estimates suggest that the proportion of Christian Zionists in Brazil could reach 40% within the next decade. The Pentecostal movement, which supports both Bolsonaro and Israel, plays a significant role in this trend. A concerning aspect of this movement is its deepening influence within political power structures, as it currently holds 25% of the seats in the parliament and 17% in the Senate. 3. Brazil-Israel Security Relations The 1970s marked the beginning of security relations between Brazil and Israel. Faced with intense leftist pressures, right-wing administrations in Latin America sought support from the US and other powers, including Israel. These security ties were formalized in 2008, and even during his second presidency (2007–2010), leftist leader Lula da Silva continued this policy by signing a security cooperation agreement with Israel to leverage its technological advancements. In 2014, Brazil engaged an Israeli security and defense systems company to manage and coordinate security for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, and the relationship has continued since. Second: The Impact of Brazilian-Israeli Relationship Determinants on Operation al-Aqsa Flood’s Ramifications  It is challenging to grasp Brazil’s stance on the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood without considering the three preceding variables, which have led Brazilian scholars to describe the country’s approach as equidistant diplomacy. This approach avoids taking a clear side in the conflict, irrespective of the ruling political movement. This diplomatic stance is evident in the pro-Israeli right wing (the Liberal Party) retracting some of its previous positions of support for Israel, while the left wing (the current ruling Workers’ Party) has not supported the Palestinian side as strongly as expected. The following practices illustrate this relative equidistance: 1. The ruling left-wing government in Brazil has adopted the accusation that Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip (GS), describing it as a “Holocaust.” Brazil has backed South Africa’s initiative to bring the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), reflecting its alignment with the BRICS group, which includes both countries. Additionally, in May 2024, the Brazilian government blocked a deal to purchase Israeli weapons. It has continued to criticize the expansion of Israeli settlements, advocating for a two-state solution and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Brazil has also played a role in drafting and supporting resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Security Council calling for a ceasefire in GS. However, da Silva condemned the resistance attack on 7/10/2023 as an “act of terrorism,” while asserting that the Israeli response was “disproportionate to the Palestinian action.” Although da Silva recalled his ambassador from Israel, he did not sever diplomatic relations. The commercial office in Jerusalem continued its operations as usual. Security ties were not fully severed but were instead “suspended.” While trade in food between the two sides continued, Israel blocked the departure of some Brazilians from GS following the outbreak of hostilities, permitting their exit only after more than a month, whereas individuals of other nationalities were allowed to leave sooner. 2. The right-wing opposition, known for its strong alignment with Israel, has organized a series of meetings with the Israeli ambassador and has provided venues for him to screen films that claim to depict “terrorist activities” by resistance groups. A Brazilian state also awarded Benjamin Netanyahu the title of “honorary citizen,” and Bolsonaro’s wife cast her vote in recent elections while wearing a T-shirt depicting an the Israeli flag. This aligns with right-wing policies that mirrored those of US President Donald Trump, including recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, supporting the Abraham Accords between Arab countries and Israel, and denying the existence of Palestine. Additionally, Netanyahu was hosted as the first Israeli prime minister to visit Brazil. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro decided against moving the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem after receiving warnings from the agricultural lobby, as previously mentioned. Conclusion  The information above highlights Brazil’s significant qualitative influence, particularly in Latin America, and the presence of overlapping factors in decision-making. It also underscores the current favorable environment under President da Silva’s leadership to support the Palestine issue, driven by the severe Israeli actions and the war on GS. Thus, it is essential to intensify efforts to develop the relationship with Brazil both officially and publicly. This includes increasing activities and events in Portuguese, facilitating visits and engaging directly with Brazilian agricultural lobbies and through Arab diplomats. Additionally, Arab Christians, especially Palestinians living in Brazil, should actively engage with Brazilian Christian communities, particularly the Catholic sectors.