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Speech by Hanke Bruins Slot, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at the UN Security Council quarterly open debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, 24 October 2023. The spoken word applies. Thank you, Mr President, I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Mr President, On 7 October, the world witnessed a horrific terrorist attack on Israel. The horrendous violence carried out by Hamas was not aimed at military targets. Rather, it was an attempt to destroy people’s souls. By taking hostages and, murdering civilians, and this threat from Hamas is far from over. In this context we should all stand united: by supporting Israel. And its right to self-defence against the terror threat of Hamas. As we’ve said before: the use of force in self-defence must be necessary and proportionate. And international humanitarian law must be respected. By all parties. This means that every possible measure to protect civilians must be taken. That humanitarian workers must be able to do their job safely and unhindered. And that UN premises and personnel remain safe from harm. All of this requires restraint on the part of Israel in the use of force. Mr President, the Kingdom of the Netherlands shares the concerns voiced by so many today. The situation for civilians in Gaza is catastrophic. They are in dire need of aid. We cannot afford to lose more time. So far, the first convoys have entered Gaza. We need a sustained flow of humanitarian aid of all basis needs. And much more is needed, including fuel. Water supplies need to be restored immediately. Humanitarian pauses are crucial to allow much-needed aid to get through. And a permanent humanitarian corridor is the only way to prevent the situation getting much worse. The Netherlands will step up its humanitarian response. We’ve committed an additional 10 million euros for immediate humanitarian relief; 8 million euros of which is for UNWRA. This funding aims to improve the living conditions for Palestinian citizens, including mental health and psychosocial support. We are also extremely concerned about the conflict spreading beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza. And we call on all concerned to prevent this from happening. We also urge all parties to do their utmost to prevent further escalation in the West Bank. In this context, we will continue with our development aid for stability. The Palestinian Authority fulfils an important role within their power in preventing a further deterioration and deserves our strong support. Settler violence is worsening an already tense situation. This must stop. Let me conclude, Mr President, by saying that our thoughts and prayers are with all the victims and the hostages that need to be released immediately and unconditionally. When the UN was created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the first major crises calling for urgent attention. Today, more than 75 years later, the need to find a solution to this conflict is more pressing and crucial than ever. The Netherlands calls on this Council to provide the leadership required to manage this crisis, contain it and provide perspective on sustainable peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians as the only way forward. In this context I would like to thank the tireless efforts of the UN and express my gratitude to the UN staff acting on the ground. We cannot go back to the status quo; the two-state solution is more urgently needed than ever. Because both sides need it, both sides are entitled to it, and both sides deserve it. Thank you, Mr President.

Whether Hamas’s October 7 assault has ended whatever prospects existed for forging diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains to be seen. The assumption that a second key goal of the attack was to get Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) to back away from a deal to recognize Israel may be true. But it is also possible that a protracted conflict in Gaza that invites a wider regional war—a prospect that now seems likely—could get Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader to revive the “Arab Peace Initiative” (API) that deceased Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz proposed in 2002. After all, there was a time not so long ago when some experts speculated that the initiative might “supplant” the Abraham Accords by providing an umbrella for a consensus of Arab governments, one that would address the key issue that the accords sidestepped: the creation of a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. But such a step faces significant hurdles, not least of which is that no matter the outcome of Israel’s unfolding military campaign in Gaza, Hamas’s success (which surprised even its leaders) in breaching Israel’s defenses and spreading mayhem and death in southern Israeli towns and kibbutzim has made it and Islamic Jihad the paramount symbols in the Arab world of Palestinian resistance to any territorial compromise with Israel. Moreover, as Israel’s incursion creates massive civilian casualties, it is galvanizing the Arab street from Casablanca to Kuwait City, thus making it difficult for any Arab leader to make the case for revising a wider Arab initiative. And yet MBS might try, especially if he concludes that doing so would help consolidate his personal power before his eventual ascension to the throne. Such a move would represent a not insignificant change for the prince. After all, he had already signaled to the Biden administration that securing US support for a nuclear power plant under the umbrella of US security guarantees is far more important to the Saudis than conditioning the normalization of relations with Israel on a demand that Netanyahu’s government would surely reject—namely, to renounce Israel’s intended annexation of the occupied West Bank. Hamas’s assault may leave MBS with a newfound appreciation of the Palestinian issue. But his credibility as an interlocutor for the Palestinians has been tarnished by his lack of enthusiasm for embracing a cause that never topped his list. MBS Wins Either Way Reflecting on the implications of Hamas’s assault for Saudi Arabia, and for MBS in particular, one analyst argues that while the attack may have ended—or at least suspended—efforts to secure Israeli-Saudi normalization, this outcome would not represent a strategic or political loss for MBS. By changing the “discussion to MBS and Israel, away from MBS and Khashoggi,” he suggests, the crown prince got what he wanted: he has rehabilitated his image “just by talking.” Deal or no deal with Israel, MBS wins. However cynical it may be, this assessment is not off-base. In the rarified circles in which MBS thrives, where high-level diplomatic discussions and frequent appearances on global news programs fill his days and weeks, talking is a sign that he is in the game and that he counts. But knowing this, when it comes to the question of normalizing relations with Israel and other hot-button issues, he has been careful with his talk. Thus in a September 20 interview with Fox News, he noted, “For us, the Palestinian issue is very important, we need to solve that part.” Yet he avoided any direct mention of conditions while adding that, “We hope that we will reach a place that eases the life of the Palestinians.” There was no reference to the Arab Peace Initiative or a Palestinian state. Reiterating his hope that the ongoing discussions would give the Palestinians a “good life,” he showed optimism about the course of talks with the Biden administration. From a negotiating standpoint, this caution may have made sense. From his own vantage point, it also makes sense that MBS sees politics through the material lens of securing a “good life.” But from a diplomatic standpoint, his words were potentially problematic, as they suggested that the crown prince might be demanding less of the Israeli government and its leaders than the Biden administration. In late August, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reportedly told Israel officials that they were “misreading the situation” if they thought that Israel would not have to make major concessions to the Palestinians for any deal with Riyadh. On September 13, he asserted that Saudi leaders told him that the “Palestinian piece is going to be very important,” thus seemingly anticipating the language that MBS used a week later in his interview with Fox News. Coordinated or not, these statements set off alarm bells, not in Israel, but in the United States. In a novel situation, several liberal Jewish organizations and a group of 20 Democratic Senators echoed Thomas Friedman’s September 5 opinion piece, in which he urged the administration to “just say no” to a Saudi-Israel deal that didn’t include an Israeli commitment to halting annexation and stopping actions that would preclude a Palestinian state, such as expanding settlements. This campaign was also tied to the stand-off between the Israeli government and the opposition regarding Israel’s “judicial reform” law. The authors of these demands knew that by insisting on linking Saudi-Israeli normalization to the Palestinian issue, the White House would make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu navigate between two choices, one of which would probably lead to the collapse of his government. Thus the specter of US Jewish groups, Democratic senators and a prominent New York Times columnist delivering a message that MBS deliberately fudged, and that the administration seemed hesitant to place at the center of its talks with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Pulling Victory from the Jaws of Defeat? It is not unreasonable to assume that in the wake of the Hamas assault, MBS might talk his way out of an explosive situation that for the moment threatens to undermine Israeli-Saudi normalization, but could upend the entire superstructure of the Abraham Accords. If, in addition to producing a humanitarian crisis and thousands of civilian deaths, a prolonged Israeli incursion into Gaza triggers a wider regional war, the leaders of Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain might freeze their relations with Israel. This would be an enormous setback for the Biden administration, as it has bet nearly its entire Middle East policy on sustaining and expanding the accords. Since such an outcome would also put MBS in a tight spot, it is reasonable to expect that he, his ministers, and the semi-official Saudi press are getting busy revising the crown prince’s talking points in ways that emphasize his commitment to the Palestinians, thus perhaps setting the stage for an effort by him to dust off the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Indeed, it appears that the stage is already being set for such a shift. Careful not to get ahead of MBS, on the first day of Hamas’s attacks, the Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement that the kingdom was “closely following the developments of the unprecedented situation between a number of Palestinian factions and the Israeli occupation forces.” Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud then had a phone call with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, which according to the ministry noted “the kingdom’s rejection of targeting civilians in any way and the need for all parties to respect international humanitarian law.” Taking the message one small step forward, the editor of Saudi-owned newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat said that “Israel’s hubris has pushed it to miss several opportunities.” But as the summary of Saudi responses from which the above statements are all drawn shows, these remarks largely steered clear of Iran, and did not, of course, mention MBS’s recent observation about improving the lives of Palestinians. Echoing this tactical caution while moving the needle forward a little, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Mohammed Alyahya noted in a Washington Post editorial that MBS’s Fox News interview showed “his country’s commitment to easing the life of Palestinians through negotiations for normalization,” but prefaced this observation by stating that Saudi officials remain convinced that the “API is a solid foundation from which good-faith negotiations can proceed.” That position, he added, was also set out on September 23 at the UN General Assembly by the Saudi foreign minister. Thus the crown prince’s allies recast MBS’s tepid words on the Palestinians while placing his outreach to Israel under the umbrella of the API, a plan that is rejected by both Hamas and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Beyond the Dream Wagon These rejections reflect theocratic worldviews about Palestine that have been embraced by both Hamas and at least two ministers in Netanyahu’s government: Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. But this spirit of rejectionism is less the product of ideology or faith than an outcome of a stalemated conflict. That standoff has produced desperation among Palestinians who feel powerless, and a sense of either resignation or arrogant defiance among Israelis, born of the misconception that Israel could protect its security by sustaining the status quo or advancing the annexation of the West Bank. But the current sorry state of affairs was also a product of other factors, including the genocidal language of Iran and its allies in Lebanon, the apathy of Arab leaders, and the decision of the Biden administration to hitch its Middle East policy to a dream wagon of Arab-Israeli harmony that ignored the Palestinian issue. This was a fantasy because while the leaders of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia do not worry about democratic accountability, the sentiments of their people do matter. However charming and even welcomed, all the interfaith dialogue and prayer in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh will not produce conditions that will help Palestinians and Israelis toward some kind of imperfect but just peace. This lesson will now get a new hearing from Arab leaders, from the Biden administration, and perhaps eventually, from a new Israeli government. But the White House will have to make it clear to MBS and other Arab leaders that proposals to revive a wider Arab Peace Initiative must be based on much more than talk, or for that matter, on the kinds of diplomatic hedging that MBS has pursued with a hardline Iranian government that rejects Palestinian-Israeli peace of any kind. Enormous financial and institutional resources, as well as a display of political will the likes of which have not been seen in the region for decades, will all be required to create any hope of moving beyond this apparently hopeless moment. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of World and New World Journal, its staff, or its Board of Directors. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.’ 

As the Israel-Hamas war enters its fourth week, the Kingdom of Jordan finds itself on the frontline of the conflict and King Abdullah II a central figure in the regional and global diplomatic efforts to contain it. Facing a complex set of domestic and external challenges even before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel and with a perilous ground war in Gaza now underway, the Hashemite Kingdom is bracing for a broader conflict and multiple spillover effects. A precarious reality at home and abroad Domestic pressures Jordan faces numerous challenges that King Abdullah II is under mounting pressure to address. Popular discontent with the perceived corruption and indifference of government officials and the royal family itself has been growing, though there are few signs that the survival of the monarchy is at risk. Fueling this discontent are the worsening socio-economic conditions after the Jordanian economy failed to absorb successive external shocks, namely the COVID‑19 pandemic and the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to official figures, the unemployment rate stood at 22.3% in Q2 2023 and over 40% for those aged 15‑24. Interest rates, which have continued to climb as the result of a sustained period of high inflation and the Jordanian currency’s peg to the United States dollar, are further squeezing household incomes. The price of essential goods remains elevated, by pre-2022 standards. Meanwhile, wage growth has broadly stagnated. Public debt has swelled to around 110% of GDP, increasing external debt service payments and thus placing a heavy burden on the country’s foreign currency reserves. About 27% of the population is living in poverty. Jordan’s persistent economic malaise has done little to dissipate the public anger and frustration that boiled over last December, when a nationwide strike over fuel price increases stemming from austerity measures mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sparked riots in several large cities, featuring clashes between anti-government protesters and supporters of the king along with skirmishes between protesters and police. These latest disturbances are part of a recurring pattern marked by chronic economic and fiscal crises, outbursts of public anger, and limited reforms. But it is important to note that in the past couple of years, the state has met growing popular dissent and disgruntlement with heightened repression. External challenges Despite having succeeded in repressing jihadist attacks from infiltrating the kingdom and playing a pivotal role in inter-Arab reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Jordan has continued to grapple with the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war. At the same time, Jordan’s relations with Israel have deteriorated. The kingdom is waging a tough battle against increasing drug and weapons trafficking and carrying a heavy refugee burden, further stretching its resources. Across its northern border with Syria, a prevailing state of lawlessness has transformed Jordan into a key transit route for the smuggling of captagon, a highly addictive and lucrative amphetamine, along with other drugs and weapons. In addition, the United Nations World Food Program’s (WFP) recent reduction by one-third of aid for the 119,000 Syrians residing in Jordan’s Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps has increased fiscal pressure on the government. Meanwhile, Jordan’s political relations with Israel have deteriorated. During Benjamin Netanyahu’s lengthy premiership (2009-2021), Jordan’s relations with Israel were frosty. Although bilateral relations somewhat improved during the 18-month tenure of Israel’s “Change Coalition” under Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid, the return of Netanyahu to power at the head of a hard right-nationalist coalition at the end of 2022 rekindled tensions. A rare meeting between King Abdullah and Netanyahu in Amman last January, aimed at easing tensions, was eclipsed three months later by a series of violent confrontations between Israeli police and Palestinians at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem. The 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel remains deeply unpopular in Jordan. According to a March 2022 survey conducted by The Jerusalem Post, 32% of respondents ranked Israel as the country that most threatens Jordan’s security, and 48% identified the Jewish state as the country most responsible for regional instability. The Doha-based Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies’ Arab Opinion Index 2022, issued in January of this year, found that 94% of Jordanian respondents opposed any recognition of or ties with Israel. Raising the specter of an upsurge of violence in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip last December as a new hardline government in Israel was about to take office, King Abdullah warned in a CNN interview, “We have to be concerned about a next intifada. […] And if that happens, that’s a complete breakdown of law and order and one that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will benefit from.” The Jordanian leader could not have anticipated the shocking Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, yet his remarks at a conference in New York just two weeks earlier were prescient: “This belief by some in the region that you can parachute over Palestine — deal with the Arabs and work your way back — that does not work.” Grappling with conflict The war in Gaza has compounded the domestic and external challenges facing the Hashemite Kingdom. More than 2 million or 40% of all registered Palestinian refugees live in Jordan. Since the onset of the war, thousands of Jordanians have taken to the streets daily in Amman and around the country in pro-Palestinian rallies organized by opposition parties and to protest Israel’s bombing campaign and incursions into Gaza. Some young protesters attempted to storm the Israeli embassy while others reportedly demanded Jordanian authorities “open the borders” so they could join the fight to “liberate Palestine.” Hamas leaders have urged Jordanian tribes to enter the conflict against Israel. King Abdullah has faced growing calls to expel Israeli diplomats and abrogate Jordan’s peace deal with Israel. Two weeks into the war, at an emergency Middle Eastern summit in Cairo, the king channeled Jordanians’ growing public anger, harshly criticizing Israel for inflicting “collective punishment” on Gazan Palestinians. Jordanian diplomats have likewise lashed out publicly against Israel. Meanwhile, officials in Amman have directed their outrage and frustration not just at Israel but at Western “silence” in the face of Palestinian suffering and seemingly unconditional U.S. support for Israeli retribution. In an interview with CNN, Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent, decried the “glaring double standard […] in the face of such human suffering,” which “to many in our region it makes the Western world complicit.” On the 21st day of the conflict, a nonbinding resolution introduced by Jordan calling for “an immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, even as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the expansion of ground operations and a near-total communications blackout was imposed on the besieged enclave. As the war continues into its fourth week, Jordan is grappling with the multiple dimensions of a rapidly escalating conflict. On the domestic front, Jordanian authorities have sought to contain the protests. The Ministry of Interior has banned gatherings and demonstrations in the Jordan Valley and border areas. Earlier, Jordanian police fired tear gas to disperse thousands of people protesting in an area around the Israeli embassy. Meanwhile, suspicion lingers that some Israelis may be flirting with the idea of a population transfer. Reflecting these concerns, a joint statement released during the Cairo summit, after King Abdullah’s meeting with Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, rejected “any attempt at the forced displacement of Gazans into Jordan and Egypt.” At an Oct. 17 press conference held following his meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, King Abdullah stated unequivocally, “There will be no refugees in Jordan and no refugees in Egypt,” declaring it a “red line.” Echoing the king, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi stated, alarmingly, that any attempt to displace Palestinians from the West Bank would be “considered a declaration of war.” The current conflict in Gaza has shaken the foundation of Jordan’s relationship with Israel. Reflecting the strain the conflict has placed on the relationship, Jordan has decided to pull its ambassador from Israel. Yet Jordan needs Israel and, thus, finds itself in a steadily worsening predicament. Facing a deepening water crisis and potentially destabilizing shortages, Jordan was inching closer to finalizing a binding agreement on a “climate barter” with Israel ahead of the 2023 U.N. Climate Change Conference (28th Conference of the Parties, COP28), when the Gaza war broke out. The initiative, dubbed Project Prosperity and sponsored by the United Arab Emirates, envisions the sale of desalinated water to Jordan from Israel and the purchase of green electricity by Israel from an Emirati-funded solar farm in Jordan. The Gaza war is likely at least to postpone, if not derail this project as well as delay completion of the previously approved “Jordan Gateway” joint industrial park. The possible adverse economic repercussions of the escalating conflict on Jordan extend beyond its relationship with Israel. Shortly before the Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, an IMF report warned that mounting economic pressures threatened the “sociopolitical stability” of Jordan as well as Egypt and Lebanon. Supporters of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), protesting against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, are blocking oil tanker trucks from crossing into Jordan, saying they will not allow Iraqi oil to be exported to countries that have peace agreements with Israel. Depending on how long the Israel-Hamas war lasts and is fought, Jordan could suffer a sharp decline in tourism and foreign investment as well as a disruption of cross-border trade. The grand U.S.-backed plan to build a multimodal India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which would pass through Jordan, could become a casualty of the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has also complicated Jordan’s relationship with the United States. King Abdullah, Washington’s longstanding, stalwart regional partner, canceled his meeting with President Joe Biden in Amman in the aftermath of the deadly blast at al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City. The U.S. veto of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a “humanitarian pause” in the conflict was surely greeted with displeasure in Amman. And the U.S. pledge of a $100 million package in humanitarian aid for the Palestinians reportedly was viewed by Jordanian (and Egyptian) officials as a token gesture. Because the U.S. is the single largest contributor of bilateral assistance to Jordan — aid that the country has come to greatly depend upon — Amman will likely tread carefully lest its differences with Washington over the conflict risk severely damaging the relationship. However, the longer the war and the greater the loss of civilian life in Gaza, the more difficult it will be for the Jordanian monarchy to balance the tasks of managing its relations with Washington on the one hand and the domestic political fallout from the conflict on the other. Conclusion Speaking at an Oct. 19 press conference, with diplomatic efforts having failed to yield results in ending the Gaza conflict, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Safad expressed his fear that “the worst is coming.” His apprehension appears to have been confirmed, as, a little over a week later, Israeli troops advanced into the northern part of the enclave, accompanied by a massive aerial and artillery bombardment and amid a communication blackout. With a dangerous new phase of the Israel-Hamas war having begun, Jordan awaits the repercussions, having little leverage and few policy options.

Up to this moment, Israel has demonstrated clear confusion and hesitation regarding launching its ground operation against Hamas and Gaza Strip (GS). Indeed, it has postponed the operation more than once for various pretexts, starting with bad weather conditions, the need to complete the mobilization of the forces necessary to launch the operation, responding to the US administration’s request to delay the operation to allow the release of civilian detainees, and then waiting for more US military support, which raises questions about the factors affecting the Israeli decision to launch a ground assault. One of the most important factors is the desire to restore the image of deterrence which collapsed and was greatly damaged in the October 7th attack, as well as, restoring the Israelis’ confidence, especially the settlers of the Gaza envelope, in the ability of their government and army to protect them and provide security for them. The Israeli political and military leadership realizes the difficulty of achieving this through mere air operations since, despite their brutality and size of human losses and destruction, Hamas still maintains its strength and capabilities and continues to engage in battle and fire rockets without interruption. Also, Israel’s declared goals of its current war, which are to end Hamas’ GS rule and knock out its military capacity, are difficult to achieve without a large ground invasion. Netanyahu and his ruling coalition know that Israelis assessment of the war’s outcomes will be based on the achievement of declared ambitious goals. In addition to the above, there is widespread and unprecedented Israeli political and popular support for launching a large-scale ground invasion that would destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and ends its danger and threat. In addition, there is immense Western support for Israel to take the necessary military steps to punish Hamas for its recent attack under the pretext of self-defence, which constitutes an encouraging factor to pursue the ground war option. However, there are other opposing factors, increasing the complexity of Israeli calculations, making the government hesitant and pushing towards delay. Mainly, the facts on the ground and the extent they make the Israeli leadership sure it would achieve military victory rather than getting involved in a new military failure that would be added to the fiasco of October 7th. The Israeli leadership is aware of the Palestinian forces readiness to engage in a ground confrontation and believes that Hamas did not launch a successful and accurate attack without preparing a defense and confrontation plan for a certain Israeli reaction. The strong reactions of the resistance to some Israeli exploratory manoeuvres to approach the GS outskirts in the Khan Yunis area have shown the extent of the resistance’s vigilance and readiness for confrontation and ground clashes. The psychological and moral dimension also plays an influential role in Israeli calculations. For Israel is aware of the collapsed morale of its military, and the need for time and effort to boost it before going into an extremely ferocious battle. Perhaps this what made Israel seek US forces assistance that the US administration claims have arrived as advisory missions. It has become clear that proceeding with the systematic destruction of the Strip and its infrastructure, the brutal killing of civilians and the application of the scorched earth policy would be a preferable temporary option before achieving complete readiness of the Israeli army and US logistical presence. This policy could also serve as an attempt to further exhaust the advocates and supporters of the resistance and create situations of restlessness among them, as well as exhaust the resistance, deplete its ammunition, and destroy as much of its infrastructure as possible. However, Israel might not find it suitable to embrace this policy indefinitely in light of the escalation of Arab and international popular momentum against the killing of civilians, the steadfastness of the resistance and the restlessness of the Israeli home front as well as the decline in the international cover for the occupation. The US position stands out as an influential factor in forming the Israeli decision to start the ground operation, which was highlighted by the discrepancy and disagreement between the position of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was influenced by US advice to delay the operation, and the position of his Army Minister Yoav Galant and the rest of the army leaders who are eager to launch it. At the same time, the US military buildup in the region seeks to support the Israeli side and is a warning message to Iran, Hezbollah, and the resistance forces, not to intervene effectively. Hence, it provides better conditions for the Israeli ground military attack that wants to deal a devastating blow to Hamas, the resistance forces and GS. Moreover, the hesitant US position is influenced by the fear that the ground war will cause the conflict in GS to spill into a regional confrontation with Hezbollah and other parties, who are threatening to engage fully in the confrontations in the event of a ground invasion. The strikes on US bases in Syria and Iraq by some Iran-affiliated groups have given additional indications of the potential dangers of starting the ground operation. The US does not hide its concerns about the expansion of the current confrontation in a way that exhausts its efforts and constitutes an important challenge to its strategy of calm and de-escalation in the region. It wants to focus on the challenges of the Ukrainian war and the escalation with China in the Taiwan file. In addition to the above, there is the issue of civilians detained by Hamas, a number of whom hold US citizenship. In this respect, the US administration prefers to provide an opportunity to release them before resorting to the option of ground war that might put their lives in danger. The possibility of mass casualties among Palestinian civilians in GS due to the ground attack is no longer an influential factor and sensitive issue for Israel, however, the matter may seem relatively different to the US side. For the US has confirmed its support and endorsement of Israel’s right to defend itself and target Hamas, but at the same time, it has mentioned the importance of avoiding killing civilians and the necessity of bringing humanitarian aid to the Strip. In conclusion, the possibilities of launching a ground operation against Hamas and GS are still strong and have many strong justifications, which makes it expected at any time. Its calculations are mainly related to field considerations and are influenced by the anxious and hesitant US position.

In the space of just over two weeks, Israel’s war on Gaza has upended Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shai` al-Sudani’s year-long careful balancing of Iraq’s foreign relations and his efforts to maintain stability in Iraq. The images from Gaza have outraged Iraqis, as they did others in the region. Following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the beginning of the Israeli response to it, Sudani expressed in a meeting of his government Iraq’s steadfast support of the Palestinian cause, giving a full-throated endorsement of Palestinian rights and statehood. In the ensuing days, he increased his diplomatic outreach, holding phone calls with the King Abdullah II of Jordan and President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, among other regional leaders. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein attended a meeting in Jeddah for the Organization for Islamic Cooperation to discuss Palestine. The prime minister also issued a call for a meeting of the Arab League to coordinate positions. In addition to the humanitarian needs of Gazans, another principal concerns for Sudani during these diplomatic contacts was to avoid escalation of the war and its expansion to other areas in the region. Unanimous Support for Palestinians Other prominent Iraqi politicians made statements of support, including President Abdul Latif Rashid, leader of the Sadr Movement cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who issued a call for protests, and the Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri. Significantly, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a statement supporting Palestinian rights, decrying the Israeli occupation, and condemning the destruction of Gaza. Interestingly, unlike his statement in 2014 in response to the assault by the so-called Islamic State, Sistani did not call for a general mobilization to confront Israel. Sudani’s support for Palestinians responded to a dark national mood, but his statements and diplomatic moves were not sufficient for the Shia militias allied with Iran, who escalated their rhetoric beyond mere condemnation of Israel. Popular anger also put the spotlight on Muqtada Sadr who, on October 9, called for demonstrations following Friday prayers, and on October 13, his adherents gathered in the thousands in Tahrir Square in Baghdad, chanting slogans against Israel and the United States. Not to be outdone, Shia militia groups were more strident, issuing condemnations and threats to the United States and Israel, and carrying out repeated attacks on US bases in Iraq, such as that in Ain al-Asad, Harir airbase, and Baghdad Airport. Hadi Al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization, threatened the United States and pledged that the liberation of Palestine will be launched from Iraq. Similar warnings came from Kataib Hezbollah, Asa`ib Ahl al-Haq, al-Nujaba, and other powerful Shia militias. The bombing of the Ahli Hospital in Gaza on October 17 further inflamed national sentiment and galvanized Shia militia groups into action. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Tahrir Square the following day and on Friday October 20 denounced the United States and Israel and carried pictures of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei, slain commander of Iran’s Quds Force Qassem Suleimani, and leader of Lebanese Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah. Iran heads what is commonly known as the “axis of resistance,” a group of pro-Iran regimes and militia groups in the Middle East, including Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. Officers from Iran’s Quds force met with militia leaders in Iraq to coordinate actions in the event of escalation. Sunni and Kurdish leaders were more muted in their responses to the Gaza crisis. Sunni clerics, Speaker of the Iraqi House of Representatives Mohammed Al-Halbousi, and other Sunni leaders voiced their support for Palestinians. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was more guarded. Through its spokesperson, the KRG in Erbil called for a unified Iraqi stance and stated that the Kurdish position cannot be different from that of the Iraqi government. This may arise from the greater dependence of the Kurds on American good will, and therefore a reluctance to antagonize the United States. Moreover, Shia leaders, and particularly those associated with militias, have often accused the Kurdish leadership of sympathy and cooperation with Israel which was one of the rare countries that supported the 2017 referendum for Kurdish independence, and that was severely condemned by the Iraqi government. Sudani’s Stressful Position Turmoil in Iraq creates multiple headaches for Prime Minister Sudani, especially that provincial elections are due on December 18, less than two months from now. Iraqi militia groups have been invigorated by the events in Gaza and have found new legitimacy, a new raison d’être. While Sudani did not attempt to disarm the militias during the past twelve months, he has at least been able to curb their activities and claim stability with sufficient peaceful space in Iraq to encourage foreign investment and economic growth. Now it will be much more difficult to put the militia genie back into the bottle. With newly empowered hard line Shia groups holding the high ground, Iraq is likely to return to instability, discouraging investment and jeopardizing the prime minister’s economic plans. Worse, it is likely that Sudani will henceforth be far more at the mercy of armed Shia factions after his success in obtaining their grudging acceptance and support in the past twelve months. Now they are far more likely to question and constrain his decisions and actions. Moreover, the political ascendancy of Shia armed groups will equally intimidate the Sunnis and threaten Kurdish interests, further derailing Sudani’s efforts to build good relations across the country that would be conducive to stable politics. What is certain is that the renewed strength of hardliners in Iraq will translate into increased Iranian interference in the country’s internal affairs and foreign policy choices. Iran’s regional calculations will determine the scope and modality of belligerence by its Iraqi allies, leading to greater pressure on the prime minister. His stated intent to maintain an even-handed foreign policy will be in danger of collapsing. In January 2023, Sudani told the Wall Street Journal that Iraq could have good relations with both the United States and Iran, and that foreign forces (specifically American) were still needed. He has also repeatedly endorsed the Strategic Framework Agreement with the United States. Should Iran and its armed Iraqi partisans exert more influence, such a balancing act will be difficult to uphold, and Sudani will risk the good will he has built with the West. There are rising demands on Sudani to amend the Framework Agreement to allow for the removal of all foreign troops from Iraqi soil. In tandem, the prime minister was in Moscow for a meeting with President Putin. Although the meeting was arranged before the Gaza war, it acquires significance now, and was applauded by the militia groups. Within the immediate neighborhood, the bridges so assiduously built by Sudani and his predecessor, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, with Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, will be threatened, since the relation these countries have with Israel is tantamount to treason according to the Shia groups. Likewise, economic cooperation and investments by these countries, sought by Sudani’s government, are likely to suffer. Prime Minister Sudani faces dangerous times. How the coming weeks unfold depends on Iran’s intentions, over which he has no control. But he is an astute politician. At the Cairo Peace Summit on October 21, the prime minister gave an emotional address in support of Palestinian rights, called for a ceasefire and for the establishment of a fund to aid Gaza. Sudani went into high gear because he has much to lose, being dependent for his job, at least in part, on the approval of the Iran-friendly Shia militias. The Cairo speech likely emanated from conviction, but it also served for internal consumption in Iraq. In a significant response, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki praised the statement and urged all to stand by Sudani and not engage in unilateral actions that could cause internal and external instability. This is a step in the right direction, but it does not mean that Sudani and his policies are out of the danger zone. Indeed, he faces a tough choice: he can either cave in to the militias and allow them to destroy what he has achieved in the last year, or he can take a firm stand against their unfettered rising power, and possibly risk his job and the anger of Iran. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of World and New World Journal, its staff, or its Board of Directors. This paper was originally published by Arab Center Washington DC. Republished with permission. © Arab Center Washington DC, October 2023.

International aid groups are warning that they cannot deliver food and other basic services to people in the Gaza Strip and that a “dire” humanitarian crisis is set to worsen. International aid groups provide food and other means of support to about 63% of people in Gaza. Israel stopped allowing deliveries of food, fuel and other supplies to Gaza’s 2.3 million residents on Oct. 10, 2023, and is reportedly preparing for a ground invasion. On Oct. 12, 2023, Israel warned 1.1 million Gaza residents in the northern section of the enclave to leave for the southern region, in advance of a potential ground invasion. I am a scholar of peace and conflict economics and a former World Bank consultant, including during the 2014 war between Hamas and Israel. International aid groups now face the same problem in Gaza that local businesses and residents have encountered for about 16 years: a blockade that prevents civilians and items, like medicine from easily moving into or out of the enclosed area, roughly 25 miles long. That 16-year blockade did not apply to the food and fuel that groups brought in to Gaza. Now, it does. Gaza’s blockade and economy Gaza is about the size of Philadelphia and requires trade with different businesses and countries in order to maintain and grow its economy. But Gaza is heavily dependent on foreign aid. This is partially the result of Israel setting up permanent air, land and sea blockades around Gaza in 2007, one year after Hamas rose to political power. Egypt, which borders Gaza on its southern end, also oversees one checkpoint that specifically limits people coming and going. While Israel has granted permits to about 17,000 Gaza residents to enter and work in Israel, the food, fuel and medical supplies that people in Gaza use all first pass through Israel. Israel controls two physical checkpoints along Gaza, which monitor both the entry and exit of people and trucks. Israel limits the kind and quantity of materials that pass into Gaza. And the blockades generally prohibit Gazans who do not have work permits or special clearance – for medical purposes, for example – from entering Israel. Israel’s restrictions through the blockade intensified since Hamas’ surprise attack on 20 Israeli towns and several military bases on Oct. 7, with Israel then announcing a broad blockade of imports into Gaza. This stopped all food, fuel and medical supplies from entering the region. Gaza’s isolation The Palestinian enclaves of West Bank and Gaza – which are generally lumped together in economic analyses – both have small economies that run a massive deficit of US$6.6 billion in losses each year, as the value of the imports they receive greatly outweighs the value of the items they produce and sell elsewhere. More than 53% of Gaza residents were considered below the poverty line in 2020, and about 77% of Gazan households receive some form of aid from the United Nations and other groups, mostly in the form of cash or food. Gaza’s weak economy is caused by a number of complex factors, but the largest is the blockade and the economic and trade isolation it creates. For the average Gazan, the blockade has several practical effects, including people’s ability to get food. About 64% of people in Gaza are considered food insecure, meaning they do not have reliable access to sufficient amounts of food. Food as a percentage of Gaza’s total imports has skyrocketed by 50% since 2005, when Israel first imposed a temporary blockade. And the amount of food the West Bank and Gaza actually produce has tumbled by 30% since then. It is hard for Gaza to produce food within its own borders. One factor is that Israeli airstrikes hit Gaza’s only power generation plant and main sewage treatment plant in 2008 and again in 2018. These attacks resulted in the spread of sewage waste on land and in the water, destroying farmlands and food crops and threatening fish stocks in the ocean as well. The UN’s big role in Gaza Gaza’s weak economy and isolation because of the blockade mean that it relies heavily on international aid organizations to provide basic services to residents. The biggest of these aid groups in Gaza is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East – also known as UNRWA. Today, UNRWA is the second-largest employer in Gaza, following Hamas. It provides the bulk of the education, food aid and health care services for people in Gaza, in addition to 3 million other people registered as Palestinian refugees who live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and other places. Over time, UNRWA has evolved into a kind of parallel government, alongside Hamas, which Israel, the United States and other countries designate as a terrorist organization. UNRWA funds and runs a network of 284 schools in Gaza alone, employing over 9,000 local people as staff and educating over 294,000 children each year. UNRWA runs 22 hospitals in Gaza that employ almost 1,000 health staff and has 3.3 million patient visits per year. Its schools are converted into humanitarian shelters in times of crisis, such as the current war. People can go there to get clean water, food, mattresses and blankets, showers and more. The number of people in Gaza who are displaced from their homes has quickly risen over the last few days, totaling over 330,000 on Oct. 12, 2023. Over two-thirds of these people are staying in UNRWA schools. A complicated US relationship The U.S. has historically been the single-largest funder of UNRWA, a U.N. agency that relies on governments to support its work. The U.S. gave more than $500 million to Palestinians from April 2021 through March 2022, including more than $417 million that went to UNRWA. U.S. support to UNRWA has fluctuated throughout different presidential administrations. Total U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza peaked at $1 billion in 2009 – after Israel sealed off the territory. It reached $1 billion in annual contributions again in 2013, when former Secretary of State John Kerry helped restart peace talks between Israel and Hamas. In 2018, the Trump Administration cut almost all of the money the U.S. typically gives to UNRWA, amounting to roughly 30% of the organization’s total budget. Defenders of the policy change cited UNRWA-published textbooks that allegedly glorified jihad. UNRWA, for its part, maintained that, as an outside organization, it can only use the educational materials the country it is working in wants. The Biden administration then restored funding to UNRWA and other organizations helping Palestinians in 2021. Some Republican politicians have said that UNRWA has “cozied up” to Hamas. And an internal UNRWA ethics committee has accused top staff at the agency of “sexual misconduct, nepotism, retaliation … and other abuses of authority” that created a toxic work environment. Meanwhile, since the war between Israel and Hamas began on Oct. 8, more than 1,500 Gazans have been killed and more than 5,300 injured, while Hamas attacks have killed more than 1,300 people in Israel and injured about 3,200 others. International aid groups and European Union officials have called for a humanitarian corridor to be set up in Gaza – meaning a protected path specifically for civilians, aid workers and necessary basic items to pass through safely back and forth from Gaza to Israel and Egypt. So far, there are no clear plans for such a protected pathway.

The parallels were striking – and surely not coincidental. Exactly 50 years and a day after being taken completely off guard by a coordinated military attack by its neighbors – Egypt and Syria – Israel was again caught by surprise. Early on Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas militants invaded southern Israel by land, sea and air, and fired thousands of rockets deep into the country. Within hours, hundreds of Israelis were killed, hostages taken and war declared. Fierce Israeli reprisals have already taken the lives of hundreds of Palestinians in Gaza, and many more will surely be dead by the time this war is over. Because war it is. After the Hamas attacks began and the Israeli death toll grew, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the country is at war, just as it was 50 years ago. And that is not where the parallels end. Both wars began with surprise attacks on Jewish holy days. In 1973, it was Yom Kippur, a day of atonement for Jews. This time it was Simchat Torah, when Jews celebrate reading the Torah. Hamas, the Palestinian militant group in control of the densely populated Gaza Strip that adjoins Israel, seemingly hopes to send the same message that Egypt and Syria delivered in October 1973: They will not accept the status quo, and Israel’s military might will not keep Israelis safe.   The 1973 war proved to be a watershed moment not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but also for the politics of Israel. Will this war be the same? Caught flat-footed both times Certainly, the sudden outbreak of war has again left Israelis deeply shocked, just as it did 50 years ago. This war, like the one in 1973, is already being framed as a colossal intelligence failure. Although Israeli military intelligence had warned the government that the country’s enemies believed Israel vulnerable, the intelligence establishment did not expect Hamas to attack. Rather, the intelligence assessment was that Hamas was most interested in governing the Gaza Strip and didn’t want to have a war with Israel, at least not for a while. The assumption was that Hamas would be deterred from carrying out major attacks in Israel out of fear of Israel’s potential disproportionate retaliation bringing more devastation to Gaza. The enclave, home to 2 million Palestinians, many living in poverty, has still not recovered from the last major round of fighting in May 2021. Instead, the intelligence establishment, and many analysts, believed that Hamas preferred to export Palestinian violence to the Israeli-occupied West Bank, where it could help to undermine the already weak and unpopular Palestinian Authority, led by Hamas’ political rival. Their intelligence assessment has proved to be terribly wrong, just as it was prior to the outbreak of the 1973 war. Then, as now, Israel’s adversaries were not deterred by its military superiority. Israeli intelligence not only misjudged the willingness of adversaries to go to war, but it also failed – both in 1973 and now – to recognize their enemy’s preparations. This time, that failure is even more glaring given Israel’s extensive and sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. Hamas must have been carefully planning this attack for many months, right under Israel’s nose. This is undoubtedly Israel’s worst intelligence failure since the 1973 war. But it is not only an intelligence failure, it is also a military failure. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, was clearly not prepared for an attack of this magnitude – indeed, most IDF units were deployed in the West Bank. It is true that IDF’s top brass had repeatedly warned Netanyahu that its military readiness had been diminished by the wave of Israeli reservists refusing to serve in protest of the government’s attempted judicial overhaul. Nonetheless, the IDF was confident that its defensive fortifications – especially the expensive hi-tech barrier that had been built around the Gaza Strip – would prevent Hamas militants from entering Israel, as they had previously done in a May 2021 raid. But just as the so-called Bar-Lev defensive line along the Suez Canal failed to stop Egyptian soldiers from crossing the canal in 1973, the Gaza barrier did not stop Hamas militants. It was simply circumvented and bulldozed through. The blame game begins There will surely be the same blame game after this war as there was after the 1973 war. A commission of inquiry will probably be established, as happened after the 1973 war – the Agranat Commission – which published a scathing report, pointing the finger of blame firmly in the direction of Israel’s military and intelligence establishment. But it is not Israel’s military and intelligence establishment that deserves most of the blame for this war. It is Israel’s political establishment – above all, Netanyahu, who has led the country since 2009, save for a one-year exception between 2021-2022. The 1973 war was also due to a political failure, not only an intelligence failure. In fact, it was Israel’s political leadership, chiefly Prime Minister Golda Meir and her defense minister Moshe Dayan, that was primarily to blame because in the years before the war they had spurned diplomatic overtures from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The Israeli government was determined to retain parts of the Sinai peninsula – which Israel had captured in the 1967 war – even at the price of peace with Egypt. Similarly, Netanyahu has ignored recent Egyptian efforts to broker a long-term truce between Israel, Hamas and fellow militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad. And Israel’s current far-right government prefers to retain the occupied West Bank rather than pursue the possibility of peace with the Palestinians. Moreover, the Netanyahu government has been preoccupied with its widely unpopular attempt to reduce the power and independence of Israel’s Supreme Court, a move seemingly aimed at removing a potential obstacle to a formal annexation of the West Bank. The domestic turmoil and deep divisions that the proposed judicial overhaul have created in Israel is almost certainly one reason why Hamas decided to attack now. More broadly, with the latest attack it is clear that Netanyahu’s strategy to contain and deter Hamas has failed catastrophically. It has been catastrophic for Israelis, especially those living in the south of the country, and even more so for Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Maintaining a blockade of Gaza for 16 years, crippling its economy and effectively imprisoning its 2 million residents, has not brought Hamas to its knees. Rather, Hamas’ control over Gaza, sustained by repression, has only tightened. Innocent civilians on both sides of the border have paid a high price for this failure. In the wake of the 1973 war, Meir was forced to resign, and a few years later, the ruling Labor Party – which had been in power, in various guises, since the country’s founding in 1948 – was defeated by Menachem Begin’s right-wing Likud Party in the 1977 general election. This was a watershed moment in Israeli domestic politics that was brought about in large part by the public’s loss of confidence in the then-dominant Labor Party as a result of the 1973 war. Will history repeat itself this time around? Will this war finally spell the end for Netanyahu and Likud’s long dominance of Israeli politics? Most Israelis have already turned against Netanyahu, repelled by the mix of corruption scandals that surround him, his attempts to downgrade the power of the judiciary and the lurch to the right that his ruling coalition represents. More Israelis may now do so because this devastating surprise attack surely contradicts any claim by Netanyahu of being Israel’s “Mr. Security.” Whatever the outcome of this new war and its political repercussions in Israel, it is already clear that its outbreak will be long remembered by Israelis with great sadness and anger, just like the 1973 war still is. Indeed, it will probably be even more traumatic for Israelis than that war was because while in 1973 it was members of the military bearing the brunt of the surprise assault, this time it is Israeli civilians who have been captured and killed, and on sovereign Israeli territory. In this crucial respect, then, this war is unlike the one in 1973.

There will be only one winner in the war that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas. And it is neither Israel nor Hamas.  In an operation coined “the Al-Aqsa Storm,” Hamas, whose formal name is the Islamic Resistance Movement, fired thousands of rockets into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters infiltrated Israel by land, sea and air. Hundreds of Israelis have been killed, more than 2,000 injured, and many taken hostage. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared war on Hamas and launched airstrikes in Gaza. In the first day of reprisals, close to 400 Palestinians were killed, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. In the weeks ahead, the Israeli military will surely retaliate and kill hundreds more Palestinian militants and civilians. As an analyst of Middle East politics and security, I believe that thousands on both sides will suffer. But when the smoke settles, only one country’s interests will have been served: Iran’s. Already, some analysts are suggesting that Tehran’s fingerprints can be seen on the surprise attack on Israel. At the very least, Iran’s leaders have reacted to the assault with encouragement and support. The decisive factor shaping Iran’s foreign policy was the 1979 overthrow of the U.S.-friendly, repressive Shah of Iran and the transfer of state power into the hands of a Shiite Muslim revolutionary regime. That regime was defined by stark anti-American imperialism and anti-Israeli Zionism. The revolution, its leaders claimed, was not just against the corrupt Iranian monarchy; it was intended to confront oppression and injustice everywhere, and especially those governments backed by the United States – chief among them, Israel. For Iran’s leaders, Israel and the United States represented immorality, injustice and the greatest threat to Muslim society and Iranian security. The enduring hostility felt toward Israel is in no small part due to its close ties with the shah and Israel’s role in his sustained oppression of the Iranian people. Together with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Israel’s intelligence service, the Mossad, helped organize the shah’s secret police and intelligence service, the SAVAK. This organization relied on increasingly harsh tactics to put down dissenters during the shah’s last two decades in power, including mass imprisonment, torture, disappearances, forced exile and killing thousands of Iranians. Israel under attack in shock Hamas operation Support for Palestinian liberation was a central theme of Iran’s revolutionary message. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon – in retaliation for Lebanon-based Palestinian attacks against Israel – provided Iran an opportunity to live up to its anti-Zionist rhetoric by challenging Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and checking U.S. influence in the region. Subsidizing conflict To that end, Iran sent its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – a branch of Iran’s military, usually known as the “Revolutionary Guard” – to Lebanon to organize and support Lebanese and Palestinian militants. In Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, Revolutionary Guardsmen instructed Shiite resistance fighters in religion, revolutionary ideology and guerrilla tactics, and provided weapons, funds, training and encouragement. Iran’s leadership transformed these early trainees from a ragtag band of fighters into Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force today, and Iran’s greatest foreign policy success, Hezbollah. Since the early 1980s, Iran has maintained support for anti-Israeli militant groups and operations. The Islamic Republic has publicly pledged millions of dollars of annual support to groups and provides advanced military training for thousands of Palestinian fighters at Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah bases in Iran and Lebanon. Iran runs a sophisticated smuggling network to funnel weapons into Gaza, which has long been cut off from the outside world by an Israeli blockade. Via the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, Iran has encouraged and enabled Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas violence, and these Palestinian fighters now represent a crucial element in what foreign affairs analysts call Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and the United States, which constitutes Iran’s chief purpose. But Iran cannot risk confronting either state directly. Iranian weapons, funds and training enable surges in Palestinian militant violence against Israel when frustrations boil over, including during the Palestinian uprisings known as the first and second intifadas. Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and death tolls have escalated steadily since 2020. Palestinians are outraged by increased evictions and destruction of property, and how Israel allows Israeli nationalists and settlers to violate a long-standing agreement preventing Jewish prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque – a site holy to both Muslims and Jews. In fact, a recent incursion by settlers into Al-Aqsa was specifically cited by Hamas as a justification for the Oct. 7 attack. Attacking normalization That is not to say that Iran ordered Hamas’ attack on Israel, nor that Iran controls Palestinian militants – they are not Iranian puppets. Nevertheless, Iran’s leaders welcomed the attacks, the timing of which serendipitously works in Iran’s favor and plays into the Islamic republic’s regional battle for influence. “What took place today is in line with the continuation of victories for the anti-Zionist resistance in different fields, including Syria, Lebanon and occupied lands,” according to Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani. The week before the Hamas attack, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman denied reports that Saudi Arabia had paused its recent efforts to normalize relations with Israel, which includes a formal declaration of Israel’s right to exist and increased diplomatic engagement. “Every day we get closer,” he said, an assessment praised and echoed by Netanyahu. Israeli-Saudi normalization would represent the pinnacle of achievement thus far in U.S. diplomatic efforts, including the Abraham Accords, signed by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco in 2020. The accords aimed to normalize and build peaceful relations between Israel and Arab countries across the Middle East and in Africa. Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei lambasted Arab states for signing the Abraham Accords, accusing them of “treason against the global Islamic community.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah praised Saturday’s violence against Israel and echoed Khamenei’s sentiments, warning that the attacks sent a message, “especially to those seeking normalization with this enemy.” Israel’s expected heavy-handed response is likely to complicate Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel in the near term, furthering Iran’s aims. Netanyahu said that Israel’s retaliatory operation seeks three objectives: to eliminate the threat of infiltrators and restore peace to attacked Israeli communities, to simultaneously “exact an immense price from the enemy” in Gaza, and to reinforce “other fronts so that nobody should mistakenly join this war.” This last objective is a subtle but clear warning to Hezbollah and Iran to stay out of the fight. Israeli troops have already mobilized to secure its borders, and airstrikes have hit Gaza. In all likelihood, Palestinian attackers will be killed or arrested in a matter of days. Israeli troops and air forces will target known or suspected rocket launch, manufacturing, storage and transportation sites, along with the homes of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members. But in the process, hundreds of civilians will likely also lose their lives. I believe that Iran expects and welcomes all of this. How Iran wins There are at least three possible outcomes to the war, and they all play in Iran’s favor. First, Israel’s heavy-handed response may turn off Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to U.S.-backed Israeli normalization efforts. Second, if Israel deems it necessary to push further into Gaza to eradicate the threat, this could provoke another Palestinian uprising in East Jerusalem or the West Bank, leading to a more widespread Israeli response and greater instability. Lastly, Israel could achieve its first two objectives with the minimal amount of force necessary, foregoing usual heavy-handed tactics and reducing chances of escalation. But this is unlikely. And even if this occurred, the underlying causes that led to this latest outbreak of violence, and the enabling role Iran plays in that process, have not been addressed. And when the next round of Israeli-Palestinian violence occurs – and it will – I believe Iran’s leaders will again congratulate themselves for a job well done.

The low-profile and high-impact meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on August 5 and 6 was never intended to produce a road map for ending the war in Ukraine; neither was it a summit, since the invitations sent to some 40 countries specified the level of representation as national security advisers. It can, nevertheless, be called a peace conference, following up on the meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, on June 24, and preparing the ground for a wider peace summit proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. What makes the format of the Ukraine-initiated meeting, for which Saudi Arabia agreed to provide a venue, unique is that it brought together members of the US-led Western coalition and key states of the Global South, which generally prefer to keep a safe distance from the war (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 3). The main purpose was to grant Ukraine an opportunity to impress upon the countries that are worried about the costs and risks of maintaining their traditional ties with Russia—such as India, Brazil or South Africa—that the only road to peace leads through a full withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territories (Kommersant, August 3).  The Kremlin noted sourly that it would monitor the proceedings, and mainstream commentators confidently predicted the meeting would end in failure (Izvestiya, August 3). The main argument was that it made no sense to discuss ways and means of ending the war in Ukraine without Russia, which has allegedly consolidated its influence in the Global South (Rossiiskaya gazeta, August 3). The argument might appear sound, but it omits the increasingly obvious fact that it makes even less sense to discuss peace initiatives with Russia, as Moscow’s formal annexation of five Ukrainian regions (Crimea being the first) leaves no space for even minimal compromises (The Moscow Times, July 31). The Ukrainian leadership can only indicate its readiness to negotiate peace arrangements with a post-Putin regime in Moscow, assuming that the commitment to prolonging the Kremlin’s aggression would expire with the departure of the autocrat obsessed with asserting Russia’s “greatness” through territorial expansion (Republic.ru, July 31). The meeting in Jeddah signified a key success in Ukrainian policy aimed at blocking and rolling back Moscow’s intrigues in the Global South, which reached a new high at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 27 and 28 (Forbes.ru, August 2). President Vladimir Putin made an extraordinary personal effort at courting the 17 leaders who opted to come to St. Petersburg, but the lavish entertainment was a poor compensation for the plain refusal to revive the “grain deal,” canceled a week prior to the pompous event (Meduza, July 28; see EDM, July 31). The African leaders were keen to combine their peace initiative with a compromise that would allow the resumption of wheat and corn exports from Ukraine by sea; however, the extra-short joint statement that the Kremlin finally released a week after the meeting made clear that their efforts were wasted (Kremlin.ru, August 4). Another worrisome development for many African countries is Putin’s warm embrace of the leaders of the military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, which indicates that the Wagner Group could expand its activities in the trouble-rich Sahel region, perhaps even toward Niger (Svoboda, August 1). Moscow pundits were certain that China would abstain from partaking in the Jeddah meeting, much the same way it had skipped the meeting in Copenhagen; thus, Moscow’s disappointment was all the more palpable when Beijing announced on August 4 that Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li Hui would attend the discussions in person (RBC, August 5; RIA Novosti, August 5). It was perhaps a bit of an over-statement calling Li Hui’s participation a “super-breakthrough,” as Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba did, because no deviation from Beijing’s Chinese “peace formula” could be expected (Interfax-Ukraine, August 4). Yet, even this carefully worded position paper contains the point on Ukraine’s territorial integrity. As such, it is possible for Ukrainian diplomats to elaborate on it and build a broad consensus in the Global South for the restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders through the full withdrawal of Russian troops (Meduza.io, August 5). In Chinese foreign policy, a distinct new emphasis is being placed on facilitating stability in global markets driven by the need to overcome the country’s worrisome economic slowdown, and the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea following Moscow’s cancellation of the “grain deal” does not fit this approach (Forbes.ru, August 4; The Bell, August 5). Ukrainian threats to Russian oil exports from Novorossiysk add a new urgency to the question of Moscow’s falling petro-revenues, which pertains to the delicate issue of Moscow’s relations with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel, particularly with Saudi Arabia (Izvestiya, August 4). The unpleasant surprise of Saudi involvement in organizing the Ukraine-friendly meeting in Jeddah has produced a stream of speculations about the true intentions of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (Topwar.ru, August 4). Moscow is perfectly aware that a few countries, Saudi Arabia being one, as well as India and Turkey, are able to benefit from the market distortions caused by the war, which does not make them sympathetic toward Russia’s stance, as Putin’s uneasy dialogue with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemingly confirms (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 2). What gradually transpires is that the extra profits these states extract come at the expense of the Russian economy, which is profoundly affected by Western sanctions and is now experiencing the negative impacts from accumulated stress in the financial system, including the declining value of the ruble and rising inflation (The Moscow Times, August 3). No amount of anti-colonial, Western-bashing rhetoric emanating from Moscow can make Russia an attractive and reliable partner for key states of the Global South; however, Ukraine cannot count on gaining their support by commanding the moral high ground. It is rather too obvious for Brazil, India and South Africa, who will come together in two weeks at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg (where Putin will be present only virtually), that the massive economic support the West provides Ukraine means less funds for humanitarian aid to the poorest counties. Thus, Ukraine needs to convince these countries that it is able to cut the long war short, and its diplomatic “counteroffensive” can succeed only if its brigades achieve greater success on the battlefield. Ukrainian resolve and Western unity make Russia’s defeat nearly inevitable, and the meeting in Jeddah has conveyed to the states of the Global South that every contribution they are able to make in accelerating this outcome answers their collective interests.

Israel’s parliament passed a law on July 24, 2023, that limits the Supreme Court’s ability to rein in government actions, part of a broader proposal by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to strengthen the power of the country’s executive branch. The legislation has divided the country for months, sparking massive demonstrations. Opponents say the law threatens democracy; supporters argue it protects the will of the electoral majority. Netanyahu has been a political force and survivor in Israeli politics since the 1990s. Yet it makes sense to assess his career now in light of his recent hospitalizations, the latest coming in the middle of the court reform crisis. As a scholar of Middle Eastern politics, I think that Netanyahu’s long-term legacy will be based on three major developments. He has shifted Israeli politics rightward. He has stymied the emergence of a Palestinian state. He has increased Israel’s links to nondemocratic foreign governments. From democracy to theocracy Netanyahu served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999. He returned to power from 2009 to 2021, and once again in 2022. A country once known for left-leaning politics now has a right-wing government dominated by Jewish religious nationalists who spearheaded the efforts to curb judicial checks on executive power. Netanyahu began his first term as prime minister in 1996 with two main qualities – experience living and working in the U.S. and a record focused on Israeli’s military security. The first quality meant he understood American politics and interest groups. That helped Israel keep and enhance its historic strong support from the U.S. government. The second set him up for political success in a country in which the army is a key – and revered – institution. Massive U.S. foreign aid and military assistance over many years, along with Netanyahu’s political backing, have ensured that Israel’s army is far more powerful and well equipped than the armed forces of any other nearby country. Netanyahu typically portrayed himself as the only leader who could keep his country and its economy secure. Like other elected strongmen, he and his allies have gained support from, and encouraged, right-wing nationalists and divisive politics. With Netanyahu, that meant allying himself strongly with Jewish settlers – many of them Orthodox – in the West Bank in what international law considers to be occupied Palestinian territory. Because Orthodox Jewish families tend to be larger than more secular ones, Israel’s demography has favored politicians and voters who skew towards Netanyahu’s consistent support for the settler movement and broader focus on security. The longer Netanyahu has held power in Israel, the more allegations of corruption and criminal conduct he has faced. His personal legal vulnerability has likely reinforced his autocratic tendencies. Netanyahu’s 2022 government demonstrated its authoritarian tilt with the push for the judicial reform bill that will hobble the Israeli judiciary’s capacity to review legislation and government action. This reform appeals to important sectors of Netanyahu’s supporters who see the Supreme Court’s power as an inappropriate secular check on Israel’s increasingly pro-settler and pro-Orthodox government. But it has been divisive: The mass protests against the reform have even spread to prominent military personnel. Today’s Israel is marked by growing splits between secular, urbanized citizens near the Mediterranean coast and Orthodox and other settlers in or near the West Bank. The two groups have different visions for Israel’s future, with the latter citizens pushing the country in a more theocratic direction. This divisive battle over Israel’s nature owes a great deal to Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership. Distancing Palestinians Netanyahu has long pledged to avoid compromising with Palestinians over control of territory and security in the West Bank and Gaza, areas under Israeli military control since 1967. And he allowed rapid expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. He has rarely wavered from these two policies. Among his most tangible legacies is the physical barrier now separating West Bank Palestinians from Israelis, which gives Israeli authorities great control over how West Bank Palestinians enter Israel. The barrier has kept Israeli Jews from much contact with Palestinians other than during military service. This physical separation and a strong Israeli military presence have decreased Palestinian attacks within Israel and increased misery in Palestinian-controlled areas, for example, by making travel into Israel and other countries difficult. Netanyahu’s approach has minimized pressure on Jewish Israelis to make a final deal that would trade occupied land for a broader peace based on separate Israeli and Palestinian states. It has also deprived Palestinians of some basic liberties and opportunities, particularly in Gaza, which human rights activists have called an “open-air prison.” In fact, Netanyahu has used his formidable military to strike hard when he deems necessary in Gaza, the area between Israel and Egypt that Israel unilaterally returned to Palestinian control in 2004. Hamas, a Palestinian group that advocates military action against Israel, is in charge of Gaza. Reflecting the sentiments of his right-wing base, Netanyahu has had a generally consistent response to Hamas, and Palestinians more generally. Israel, he says, awaits Palestinian consensus that Israel is a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital, and with no right for Palestinians to return to their pre-1948 homes in Israel. Many Palestinians find these conditions unfair, particularly as a precondition to negotiations. Coupled with the Netanyahu government’s vast expansion of Jewish settlements, many veteran observers doubt that a two-state solution with Israeli and Palestinian states remains possible. Reshaping Israel’s alliances Bolstering the Israeli right and undermining Palestinian statehood have accompanied efforts by Netanyahu to reshape Israel’s foreign relations. Those efforts stem in part from his relentless drive to curb Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Tehran’s leaders are unremittingly hostile toward Israel. Netanyahu has played up this hostility to domestic and international audiences, even urging the U.S. to attack Iran. The prime minister’s anti-Iranian campaign connects to strengthening ties to other countries, whether or not they are democratic, with an interest in combating Tehran and its funding of pro-Iranian militant groups, which encourage anti-Israeli politics and attacks in many Arab countries. Shared security goals, perhaps more than anything else, explain the significant willingness of the United Arab Emirates and several other Arab countries to establish diplomatic ties with Israel through the Abraham Accords of 2020. More generally, Netanyahu’s long time in office and his willingness to fan racist flames have endeared him to other rulers who embrace authoritarian or divisive tactics, such as Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former U.S. President Donald Trump. Yet Netanyahu’s policies are also causing major cracks in support for Israel from its central ally, the U.S. In recent years, Israeli and American Jews have diverged increasingly on the ethics and importance of Palestinian autonomy. In turn, organizations working with the Israeli government have tried to silence pro-Palestinian voices in the U.S., often by calling them anti-Semitic. Moreover, Netanyahu’s authoritarian tendencies and his government’s rightist and theocratic tendencies have amplified American voices of those who have been skeptical that Israel is democratic and who have called for reductions in U.S. support. Netanyahu has helped reshape Israel and the broader world in profound ways. It’s clear that the country’s military security and cooperation with major Arab states in the Middle East have expanded. But I see the darker side of the prime minister’s emphasis on military and security solutions in the erosion of hopes for Palestinians and challenges for Israel to remain democratic.