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Defense & Security
20241214_ROK_NA_Speaker_Woo_Won_Shik_signing_the_resolution_to_impeach_President_Yoon_Suk_Yeol_01

South Korea: President Impeached for Abuse of Power

by Human Rights Watch

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Failed Martial Law Bid Shows Need to Protect Human Rights, Rule of Law (Seoul) – The South Korean National Assembly’s 204 to 85 vote to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 14, 2024 after his rejected imposition of martial law has reinforced democratic rule and checks and balances in South Korea, Human Rights Watch said today.  All 300 National Assembly lawmakers participated in the vote, with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, three abstentions, and eight invalid votes. The National Assembly charged the president with directing the military and police to obstruct the assembly from voting to overturn his decree; attempting to take over the National Election Committee; and arresting political leaders, current and former judges, journalists, and members of civil society. “Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment reflects the broad support among South Koreans for the rule of law and democracy,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Yoon’s impeachment should encourage South Korea’s political leaders to recommit to democratic institutions and upholding human rights and civil liberties.” The National Assembly impeached Yoon in response to his short-lived declaration of martial law on the evening of December 3, during which he attempted to ban all political activities and suspend due process rights and freedoms of speech and assembly. Yoon sent soldiers into the National Assembly to arrest political leaders and to stop lawmakers from voting to lift the decree.  In announcing martial law, Yoon contended that it was justified because of opposition efforts to impeach members of his cabinet and obstruct the budget, and due to unspecified threats from North Korean communist forces. Yoon repeated these claims in a televised speech on December 11, saying that his decree was a legitimate exercise of his constitutional powers, akin to conducting foreign policy, and so did not amount to insurrection.  The South Korean constitution allows a president to declare martial law only during “war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency.”  In his December 11 speech, Yoon stated that he had not intended to stop the National Assembly from lifting martial law under article 77 of the constitution – a critical check on potential abuses of power that it exercised on the night of December 3. But testimony by military officers ordered to carry out his decree contradicted his claim. In a news conference on December 12, an army special forces commander, Col. Kim Hyun-tae, who led the special forces team that stormed the National Assembly on December 3, said he had received orders from senior military commanders to prevent more than 150 National Assembly members – the number required to repeal martial law – from gathering. The head of South Korea’s police agency, Cho Ji-ho, testified in the National Assembly on December 9 that on the evening of December 3 the armed forces asked the police to help them locate and detain 15 people, including the leaders of the biggest political parties. He also said that several hours before declaring martial law, Yoon ordered him to occupy the newsrooms of several media organizations, including MBC, one of South Korea’s largest broadcasters and a repeated target of criminal defamation charges by Yoon and his allies.  The former deputy director of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service testified that he was ordered to arrest a broadcaster and a union official, as well as several political leaders, including a sitting judge who had ruled in favor of Yoon’s political opponent, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, and other political leaders. Martial law troops also occupied the National Election Commission’s offices and confiscated the phones of five election officials. On December 8, a special police investigation team arrested Yoon’s former defense minister, Kim Yong-hyun, on charges of insurrection. On December 11, the team arrested Cho on the same charge, along with another senior police official.  South Korean law defines insurrection as any attempt to “overthrow government organs established by the Constitution or to make the exercise of their functions impossible by using force.”  As investigations into the events of December 3 continue, the Constitutional Court will now decide whether to uphold the impeachment vote. A police raid on the president’s office on December 11 suggests he may also be charged with insurrection. The proceedings should be fair and impartial and ensure due process, Human Rights Watch said.  Yoon’s actions reflect a culmination of his administration’s assault on the country’s democratic institutions and human rights, Human Rights Watch said. In 2022, Yoon campaigned for president on an anti-feminist platform, rejected the existence of systematic gender discrimination, and pledged to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Once in office, his administration eroded human rights protections for women and girls; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people; racial minorities; migrants; older people; and people with disabilities.  While in office, Yoon also directed police and prosecutors to attack political opponents, unions, and journalists, eroding the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly that his martial law decree nearly suspended. “Events in South Korea since December 3 have highlighted the crucial role democratic institutions play in preventing abuses of power and protecting the rule of law,” Pearson said.

Diplomacy
PARIS, FRANCE - JUNE 13, 2018: Woman reading The Daily Telegrpah newspaper in the office showing on cover U.S. President Donald Trump meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore

Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or Change with the DPRK?

by Jesús Aise Sotolongo

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

Defense & Security
Calls for President Yoon Suk Yeol to resign at Nat'l Assembly on December 4, 2024 01

What South Korea’s short-lived martial law says about nation’s democracy and the autocratic tendencies of President Yoon

by Myunghee Lee, Michigan State University

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском During a whirlwind few hours in South Korean politics, President Yoon Suk Yeol placed the country under martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, only to lift it just a short while later. It marked the first time that a South Korean leader has imposed the emergency power since 1979. And although short-lived, the measure provoked concerns of the country backsliding into authoritarian rule. To explain what happened and what it means for South Korean democracy, The Conversation U.S. turned to Myunghee Lee, an expert on authoritarianism, democracy and South Korean politics at Michigan State University. How did all this unfold? It was a crazy few hours, and I’m still trying to get my head around it – and a lot is still unknown as to why President Yoon did this. But at around 9:30 p.m. Korean time on Dec. 3, rumors started circulating among journalists that Yoon was planning an emergency press conference. And then at 10:20-ish, Yoon gave a short speech in which he blamed certain pro-North Korean and anti-state forces in South Korea of trying to destabilize the country. In effect, he was pointing the finger at opposition parties who have been blocking his policies and trying to impeach some of his appointees. He declared the situation unacceptable and said there was no way for him to continue to smoothly run the county, and as such he was declaring emergency martial law to save the nation from pro-North Korean and anti-state forces. The minister of defense then held a meeting with major military personnel, set up a martial law headquarters, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su was appointed as martial law commander. A martial law proclamation was then issued stating that all political activities were now banned – including the work of the South Korean parliament. This all took place within around one hour of Yoon’s declaration. Despite the proclamation, legislators headed to the National Assembly, where some were blocked from entering. But many did get in, and, at around 1 a.m. local time, legislators voted against the martial law – in effect forcing Yoon to repeal his declaration. He did this but not for another three and a half hours, during which the situation was very tense. He relented at around 4.30 a.m., held another press conference and announced that he was lifting the emergency measure. Why did he declare martial law now? That’s what many people – myself included – are trying to work out. This shocked a lot of people, and it appears many were taken unawares. Obviously some people were in the know, such as the defense minister and army general appointed martial law commander. But it appears even some in his own party were unaware that Yoon was planning to do this. For sure, some opposition politicians have been warning about something like this happening since September. And Yoon has become increasingly frustrated by both divisions in his own party and moves by the opposition in the National Assembly to block key parts of his agenda. Also Yoon is facing numerous influence-peddling scandals involving both himself and his wife. This wasn’t a declaration made from a position of strength then? Hardly. Yoon is in an incredibly weak position: His approval rating has been hovering around the 20% mark. He presides over a divided party, a gridlocked parliament and a population in which he has become very unpopular. So was this an act of desperation? I don’t think so, no. The suggestion that Yoon took this step before the opposition could impeach him? That doesn’t make sense to me. He was already facing calls for impeachment – but I’m not sure that before this episode there was appetite in the country for a second impeachment, following the 2016 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye over a corruption scandal. So on that front, despite the scandals and the political issues he faced, I don’t think this can be characterized as an act of desperation. Especially as those calls for impeachment and removal from power have only been intensified by his actions. I think Yoon declared martial law out of anger – he was angry, and resentful at the opposition blocking him repeatedly. But then again, I can’t read his mind. For many, it is regarded as a foolish move – he was in such a weak position politically, it would have seemed unlikely that this tactic would succeed. But he and some of the plotters must have calculated politically that this tactic would give them a chance to gain support from his core base. The real puzzle is what drove him to make that political calculation. Is Yoon known to be an authoritarian figure? People certainly have aired concern over his autocratic tendencies. Even before this martial law incident, some of his decisions have prompted concerns. He has ignored legal procedures and tried to circumvent the National Assembly. He has certainly shown an illiberal streak at home, attacking the media as “fake news” while smearing opponents as communists and North Korean sympathizers. But that’s not always the way he is perceived in the West. Since the Russian invasion, there have been attempts by foreign policy types to divide the world into two blocs – a liberal one and an illiberal one. Yoon, as a key ally to the U.S., is framed in Washington as a defender of democracy. At home, however, it’s a different story. With the declaration of martial law, his authoritarian tendencies have been amped up for the world to see, and it’s difficult to imagine that won’t be part of his legacy. But even before this decision, he was known for being authoritarian. How does that legacy fit into the political history of South Korea? South Korea has a long history with martial law and autocratic, even military, rule. This latest declaration of martial law is by some counts the 17th instance in Korean history. The last time it was declared was in 1979 following the assassination of Park Chung-hee, a dictator who ruled South Korea during the 1960s and 1970s. That period of martial law lasted until 1981, during which Chun Doo-hwan, another dictator, came to power through a coup and perpetrated a massacre in Gwangju. Martial law hasn’t been declared since the 1980s, but certainly many older Korean people can still remember that occasion, when troops brutally cracked down on protesters. But since becoming a democracy in 1987, there hadn’t been a declaration of martial law until now. Interestingly, in a straw poll of my family, age factored into the response to Yoon’s move. Older family members very much feared the declaration of martial law. For younger family members and friends, it was met not as a joke, but certainly as a foolish move that wouldn’t actually result in a prolonged period of martial law. What happens next? My guess would be President Yoon’s days are numbered – and that this episode will hasten his political demise. Before the events of Dec. 3, there were still many people in the parliament and the public at large resistant to the idea of another impeachment following the last one in 2016. But there appears to be a groundswell of opinion in the parliament that the president should be removed, and it is echoed by the public.

Diplomacy
NATIONAL HARBOR, MD, USA- February 24, 2024: Donald Trump speaks at an event about his plan for defeating current President Joe Biden in November.

Second Trump Administration’s appointees in charge of U.S. foreign & security policy and North Korean policy

by Kim Tae-Woo

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org

Diplomacy
ASEAN Flags Ribbon , AEC (Asean Economics Community) Flags10 Countries , ASEAN Flags Waving Vector Illustration .

New U.S. strategy towards ASEAN: caution, info-colonialism!

by Ksenia Muratshina

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

Defense & Security
Panoramic view of Tokyo and Japanese flag, Japan

Japan on the path to strategic autonomy

by Javier Fernández Aparicio

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract: Japan is going through a difficult domestic political period that coincides with the demands of the enormous geopolitical challenges posed by the threat posed by the increased assertiveness of China and Russia in the region, coupled with the risk of North Korea's nuclear programme. Uncertainty over the immediate future of the security relationship with the United States, which was tightened under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, also leads Japan to a dilemma regarding its own deterrence capabilities, as reliance on such an alliance may become another risk factor in the event that the United States reformulates it. Therefore, the search for Japan's own strategic autonomy is becoming increasingly important, firstly by accelerating remilitarisation that includes possibilities beyond strict self-defence and, as a second pillar, by seeking to create a mutual security organisation with other countries in the region to act as a deterrent to China, Russia and North Korea, bringing together the various bilateral and multinational treaties to which Japan is a party. Introduction The 27 October elections have left Japan in a complicated political situation. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won and remains the most represented party in the Diet, with 191 seats, but together with its current partner, the Komeito, the governing coalition fell far short of the 233 needed for a majority. Nevertheless, the current prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, can continue to hold office and the punishment of the LDP seems to be read in a domestic context and not because of dissent over security and the country's external projection. Japan's stability is key to the region, so it seems unlikely that any government that is formed will affect the main lines of defence policy, as the concern remains an increasingly assertive China and the attitude of other actors such as Russia and North Korea. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party won 148 seats, 52 more than in the last election, but if we look at its election manifesto, on foreign policy it opts to align itself with the strategic concept of a secure and open Indo-Pacific, while on defence the question is whether to continue to rely on the alliance with the US, which has approximately 50,000 troops in the country, or whether Japan should be able to have sufficient deterrent capabilities of its own .1 On 1 October, Shigeru Ishiba took over as prime minister from his party colleague and prime minister from 2021, Fumio Kishida, worn down by several corruption cases. On October 4, Ishiba announced some of his foreign policy priorities: the design of a mutual security organisation, an "Asian NATO" with several Indo-Pacific countries and greater reciprocity in the alliance with the United States, although this does not mean a questioning of this. 2 All this in a regional context where Japan's perception of its security being threatened was growing, given that a few days earlier a Chinese aircraft carrier had passed through the waters between the Japanese islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, coming within 24 miles of Japanese territory. For decades, Japan has been perhaps the main Pacific ally of its former World War II enemy, the United States, and this, coupled with its own geopolitical position, translates into remilitarisation, a dynamic of confrontation with China and the search for allies beyond the US, both in the region itself and further afield, in Europe, for example. With Ishida it seems that there will be some continuity with Kishida's policy, although both belong to the same party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been governing Japan for a decade, although their sensibilities and political paths are different, while some unknowns remain in the immediate future, such as China's own position with the increasingly belligerent discourse from Japan or the future of the close alliance with the United States depending on the tenant in the White House from next year, after the elections on 1 November: continuity or rupture if the United States demands a change in Japan's defence policy, pushing it towards greater spending and thus increasing strategic autonomy? Japan's socio-economic and political turbulence Sigheru Ishiba was appointed prime minister due to corruption cases in the Fushida government, including some dealings in various contracts within the defence industry. Since 2017, laws have been tightened to prosecute bribery of officials, which has an impact on the awarding of contracts and tenders for public works. Since 2021, the year of his appointment as prime minister, Fumio Kishida's career has been punctuated by various scandals, starting with the scenario surrounding the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the summer of 2022, which brought to light the party's links to the controversial religious organisation of the Unification Church, also known as the Moon Sect, to which his assassin belonged. As early as 2023, the case of the blackmailing of senior party officials, including Kishida himself, caused his popular approval rating to fall to less than 15 percent, and after sacking senior officials and ministers, he decided last August to step down and make way for another candidate, who would end up being Ishiba .3 Sigheru Ishiba is a veteran politician known for his loquacity who has been ostracised within the LDP for his criticism of its leaders, for example in 2014 against Shinzo Abe for his reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that prohibited the country from rearming. After several unsuccessful attempts to lead the LDP, Ishiba was a minor parliamentarian, but what was crucial in his rise to prime minister was that he embodied the image of a fighter against corruption, which is also considered a burden in Japan's current complex economic situation. Although it is the fourth largest economic power, in 2023 Germany overtook Japan as the world's third largest economy and also has a trade deficit of around 2 billion euros, as the country is totally dependent on resources such as oil and gas, suffering from rising prices and obstacles in supply chains in the Indo-Pacific, for example, with the Houthi threat in the Red Sea 4.  Another sensitive issue is demographics. Japan has an ageing society, where 30% of its 125 million inhabitants are over 65, the highest rate in the world, while the birth rate is very low, with an average of 1.3 children per woman, according to World Bank figures 5 . This has consequences such as a shrinking domestic market, as older people are reluctant to put their savings at stake, plus the danger of not being able to meet labour needs in some sectors, including defence needs, precisely at a time when there is a desire to increase manpower. Technology and robotisation have been alleviating this situation of the need for demographic renewal, but doubts lurk in the very near future, especially in one of the countries with the most restrictive immigration legislation in the world. Redoubling security threats: China, Russia and North Korea  Japan's historic territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea and with Russia over the Kuril/Chishima Islands have been compounded by a heightened threat perception of these two formidable giants, while North Korean ballistic missile tests have added to the escalating tension. As the 2024 Defence White Paper has made clear, Japan's approximately 16,000 kilometres of coastline along its four main islands, which means that no point in the country is more than 150 kilometres from the sea, means that Japanese military doctrine regards its defences as definitive battle sites. Moreover, the straits separating these islands greatly restrict a rapid transfer of forces, and this is compounded by the mountainous barriers that similarly prevent rapid deployment of troops. 6  The paper notes that China is modernising and expanding its military by leaps and bounds, while Russian manoeuvres in the Kuriles have involved not only naval exercises but also the deployment of coastal missile and air defence systems. On 18 September, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning passed through the waters between the islands of Yonaguni and Iriomote, the first ship of its kind, while it is common for fighter jets and other vessels to invade Japanese airspace or territorial waters 7. Similarly, an anti-Japanese sentiment is beginning to emerge in China that is rooted in cultural and historical elements and embedded in the diplomatic sphere. In addition to Beijing's reminders that both exports and imports between the two countries are key to their respective economies, and that any ban or stricter regulation could alter them, there are also Chinese diplomatic protests over issues such as the sending of a Japanese warship to the Taiwan Strait on 25 September, an unprecedented action, albeit in the framework of collaboration with other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, which took part in joint manoeuvres in the area, dubbed "freedom of navigation exercises"8.  Finally, several Japanese companies based in China are willing to relocate their staff after xenophobic attacks, including the fatal stabbing of a child in Shenzhen on 18 September 9. On social media, many posts from China claim that Japanese schools create spies and label them as "new colonies" in reference to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1932-1945. In these China-Japan frictions, destabilising actions are also observed within the so-called grey zone. A report has identified a disinformation network in China that promotes a supposed independence movement in Okinawa, where there are also calls for an end to the US presence on the island, which is home to more than 25,000 troops in the largest base on Japanese territory.  Violations of Japanese air or maritime sovereignty have also recently come from Russia. On 23 September, a serious incident occurred when a Russian military aircraft violated Japanese airspace north of Rebun Island in Hokkaido Prefecture and was intercepted by a Japanese aircraft, which threw flares that hit its fuselage 10. It is also noteworthy that since the summer of 2019 and on an annual basis, a joint fleet of Chinese and Russian warships have been carrying out joint manoeuvres in the space between the seas of Japan and Okhotsk, while Russia has also announced the installation of new missile platforms in the Kuriles, which is seen as an increased threat to Japan.11  For its part, North Korea and its ballistic missile tests continue to be a risk for Japan, as it seems to have become one of the main targets of such tests, given that these projectiles tend to land in Japanese sovereign waters. Recently, Prime Minister Ishiba has pushed the diplomatic option by proposing to the regime in Pyongyang to set up liaison offices in both countries to settle any disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. This proposal includes an end to missile testing in exchange for Japanese investment in North Korean projects, another sign that Tokyo is beginning to seek its own solutions to problems previously settled within the broad framework of the alliance with the United States.12  Rethinking the alliance with the United States?  It should be remembered that all of Japan's military activity and capabilities are strictly limited to a defensive character, restricting the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' overseas deployments and mission to humanitarian cover. However, the dependence on the United States in this foreign projection is quite evident and goes beyond legal limitations. Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution regulates the use of force in Japan to self-defence. Prior to the reforms during Shinzo Abe's term in office (2012-2020), the 1951 Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is still in force, even with revisions, allows in Articles V and VI for a US presence on Japanese territory, which covers the 50,000 US military personnel stationed at bases throughout the country, especially on the island of Okinawa, up to a maximum of 100,000. 13 But guidelines signed in 1978, also in force, stipulated the possibility of Japanese participation in foreign military operations if vital sea lanes for the country were under attack, such as protection for ships under the US flag of war or carrying Japanese nationals, as well as direct assistance to the US in the event of an attack on its mainland, for example by intercepting missiles overflying Japan. 14 When Abe was prime minister in 2015, the Diet passed two bills, the first allowing Japanese forces to operate abroad for humanitarian reasons or in the case of situations that "threaten Japan's existence", and the second removing restrictions that prevented action in collective self-defence, i.e. it can use its armed forces to defend an ally under attack and no longer just the United States. This opened the door for Japan to join military alliances. Two years later, in 2017, it became a founding member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), although this alliance between the United States, India, Australia and Japan is not, stricto sensu, a coalition with military powers, this same year they agreed to greater involvement in this regard with joint maritime patrols in the waters of the Indo-Pacific from 2025. 15 Some media refer to QUAD as a germ of "NATO in the Indo-Pacific".  With regard to NATO itself, Kishida participated as an observer in the meeting of the heads of state of the member states in Madrid in June 2022, the first Japanese leader to do so in history. Recall that, in the strategic concept agreed during that meeting, China already appeared as a systemic threat in the concept, an issue of vital strategic importance to Japan. Kishida also attended the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, and was the first Japanese leader in history to deliver a speech from a non-coalition partner country: "We welcome the increased interest and engagement in the IndoPacific by our Euro-Atlantic partners"16. Japan is part of the AP4, the NATO AsiaPacific Partners, i.e. NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners along with South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.  In December 2022, the Kishida government updated three important defence documents, the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Strengthening Programme, which ultimately authorised the government, for example, to acquire long-range missile platforms in a controversial decision, as it contradicts the premise of not acquiring offensive weapons. It was justified by Japan's new strategic concept of deterrence and anticipatory defence in the earlier "Three Pillars of Defence" documents, which include improving its security architecture with new equipment such as these missiles, strengthening the alliance with the United States and increasing cooperation with international partners. 17 The so-called 'Spirit of Camp David' 18 , the meeting at President Biden's summer residence in August 2023 between President Biden, Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, further integrated Japan into the US defence architecture in the Pacific, adding a key player to the alliance in South Korea, with whom Japan had hitherto had a complicated relationship stemming from a traumatic common history, and the germ of a trilateral military alliance was even raised, effectively including the possible transfer of certain deterrent technology vis-à-vis China, Russia and North Korea, such as nuclear weapons, something that had already come up at the G7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, no less, although Kishida flatly denied this possibility. However, in 2017 it was the then Diet deputy and now prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, who raised this possibility as a real option for Japan, although the then defence minister immediately rejected it 19. Now Ishiba and part of the Japanese political spectrum seem to advocate a certain distancing from dependence on the US, without disavowing bilateral agreements, but advocating initiatives such as having Japanese forces on US soil, the joint use of military bases in Okinawa, and making Japan's defence less dependent on US policy for the region.  When in doubt, open the fan and increase the force.  Last January, Kishida and his foreign and defence ministers travelled to Washington to meet with their US counterparts. There, a new step in Japan's strategic thinking was revealed when it was announced that Japan intends to increase defence spending by almost 60 per cent over five years, abandoning the 1 per cent of GDP budget cap. Beyond a reading in terms of sustaining the alliance with the United States, the fact is that we are witnessing a revision of the country's defence strategy unprecedented since World War II: doubling defence spending means giving Japan its own autonomy in this area, without depending on third parties and with the agreement of the United States 20.  Japan perceives that the US will remain the global power for the foreseeable future, but may become less so in the medium to distant future, posing a threat to Japan's defence credibility, especially in the face of Chinese assertiveness in the adjacent seas. To counter this risk, one avenue could be a security alliance with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, India or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. In fact, there are already some bilateral agreements that allow Japanese warships to call at various ports, carry out joint manoeuvres or increase the capacity of maritime agencies to improve patrolling, with Japan supplying patrol boats, coastguard vessels and aircraft 21. However, these security agreements are not only encouraged with Indo-Pacific states, but also with more distant actors with many interests in the region, such as the Europeans, where defence exchanges, joint exercises and contracts in the Japanese defence industry are also increasingly common, either bilaterally with countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Spain, or through recent agreements with the European Union 22.  On security issues, Ishiba has also raised the need to create a mutual defence organisation for the Pacific area that would be similar to NATO for the Atlantic, with both sharing a reference to China as a systemic rival. Thus, there is speculation about a new Basic Law on Japan's Security Policy that would authorise participation in a multinational military alliance. The way forward could be to bring together existing alliances such as the bilateral Japan-US alliance, others such as those already mentioned with South Korea and the US, as well as multinational alliances such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty), AUKUS (a partnership between Australia, the UK and the US) and above all QUAD, which would have a principle of "collective self-defence" and expand the number of its partners.23  The narrative gaining traction in Japan is that only such a defensive alliance can deter China, Russia or North Korea from future war moves in the region. Clearly, such a proposal would involve an in-depth debate ranging from the position of a crucial power that would be the key to the success or failure of such an alliance, such as India, to the status and position of Taiwan, to the sharing of units, equipment and technology, such as nuclear, as well as the projection of the US partnership itself, On the contrary, it would be an essential part of this new organisation, from the Japanese point of view, a definitive element of deterrence, but in balance and on an equal footing with the rest of the partners, such as Japan itself. 24 Further evidence of this new Japanese perception is the acquisition of deterrence capabilities of its own, within a range of sophisticated military equipment such as longrange counter-attack missiles, designed in principle to repel a perceived adversary's attack from a distance. The country appears to be preparing not only to defend itself at home, but to anticipate its defence abroad. Other key changes in this regard include the creation of a permanent joint operational headquarters for the Self-Defence Forces, the transfer of authority over Japan's Coast Guard to the Ministry of Defence in the event of conflict, the strengthening of cyber defence and a new commitment to increase intelligence capabilities, vital for a hypothetical confrontation with China or Russia in the grey zone. 25  Conclusions: another uncertain future comes from the United States.  The key to Japan's 'Pacific NATO' project also reflects another uncertainty, that of the immediate future of US foreign policy towards the region. After the good feeling with the Biden Administration, there is some uncertainty and unease in Japan if Donald Trump returns to the White House in 2025, and a term has become popular, "MoshiTora", something akin to "What if Donald Trump wins?" ("Tora" is the beginning of Trump's name translated in Japanese as "Torampu") 26 . This could mean changes in relations between the two countries on the economy - what about tariffs - and security, as well as bilateral defence treaties. During 2017-2021, the Trump administration questioned the value of some of these treaties, especially the costs to the US treasury, insisting that NATO countries and others, such as South Korea and Japan, should pay for them and threatening to withdraw US forces. In Japan in particular, then Prime Minister Abe tried to maintain the status quo despite some of Trump's rudeness and arrogant treatment of the country. Indeed, Trump's time in office can be seen as Japan's discovery of the risks of gambling everything on the US alliance and the beginning of a discourse, like Ishida's, advocating greater autonomy in security and defence 27. However, on the campaign trail, Trump himself has hinted that he will pursue a policy of close alliance with Japan and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific, with China in his sights. 28 Also at stake in the US presidential election is the future of US financial and military assistance to Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia. In line with the previous point and reducing spending in scenarios considered onerous and not vital to US security, a withdrawal of such assistance to Ukraine could be interpreted globally as an indication of what might happen in other areas such as the Indo-Pacific, where Japan could be in a dangerous situation if there were a partial or total US withdrawal, as it would coincide with the process of remilitarisation, without clear regional security alliances and with the certain possibility that both China and Russia would redouble their threats to the country. There are two issues close to Japan that may discern which path the new US administration will take in the region. The first is North Korea, since it should be remembered that in 2019 Trump pushed for talks with Kim Jong-Un to reach an agreement on controlling and curbing the Asian country's nuclear capabilities, although in the end no agreement was reached. The truth is that he did so without including Japan in the negotiations, when it is the main country in the region affected by this threat and North Korean ballistic tests. Secondly, the situation in neighbouring Taiwan. If the United States were to relax its hitherto resolute support for the island in the face of alleged Chinese aggression, how could this be interpreted by Japan, especially when it is committed to this vision? A certain consensus seems to be flourishing in the country at the strategic level: to achieve full security autonomy that demonstrates its own deterrence capabilities. This seems to be the way forward in the short and medium term.  [1] "Contribution to global peace and prosperity", The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. Basic Policies. Available at: Basic Policies - The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (cdp-japan.jp) (accessed 29/10/2024). [2] WARD, Robert. 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Available at: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2024/DIEEEO92_2024_AUGCON_Japon.pdf and/or bie3 link (accessed 30/10/2024). [7] "China's Liaoning aircraft carrier sails for the first time in waters adjacent to Japan", International Press. 21 September 2024. Available in: Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sails for first time in waters adjacent to Japan - International Press - Noticias de Japón en español (accessed 30/10/2024). [8] KOSUKE, Takahashi. "In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait", The Diplomat. 26 September 2024. Available at: In Historic First, Japan Sends Naval Ship Through the Taiwan Strait - The Diplomat (accessed 30/10/2024). [9] "Japanese child stabbed in Shenzhen: new attack with a nationalist matrix", Asianews. 18 August 2024. Available at: CHINA - JAPAN Japanese boy stabbed in Shenzen: new attack of nationalist matrix (asianews.it) (accessed 30/10/2024). [10] JHONSON, Jesse. "Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace", The Japan Times. 23 September 2024. Available at: Japan fighters fire flares after Russian military plane enters airspace - The Japan Times (accessed 30/10/2024). [11] "Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports", Reuters. 16 September 2024. Available at: Russian and Chinese warships practice missile firing at Ocean-2024, RIA reports | Reuters (accessed 30/10/2024). [12] CLARK, Gregory. "Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations", Pearls and Irritations. 28 October 2024. Available at: Breaking the deadlock in Japan-North Korean relations - Pearls and Irritations (johnmenadue.com) (accessed 30/10/2024). [13] LLANDRÉS, Borja. "Japan and the US: 60 years of alliance", Article30. Available at: Japón y EE. UU., 60 años de alianza - Artículo30 (articulo30.org) (accessed 1/11/2024). [14] "The guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation", Ministry of Defence of Japan. 27 November 1978. Available at: 19781127.pdf (accessed 1/11/2024). [15] "Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit", The White House. 21 September 2024. Available at: Fact Sheet: 2024 Quad Leaders' Summit | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [16] "Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace", Government of Japan, 25 August 2023. Available at: Taking the Japan-NATO Partnership to New Heights for World Peace | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [17] TSUNEO, Watanabe. "What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents", Center for Strategic & International Studies CSIS. 13 February 2023. Available at: What's New in Japan's Three Strategic Documents (accessed 1/11/2024). [18] "The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States", The White House. 18 August 2023. Available at: The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States | The White House (accessed 1/11/2024). [19] DEACON, John T. & SOLINGEN, Etel. "Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute", The Asia Times. 1 June 2023. Available at: Japan's nuclear weapon dilemma growing more acute - Asia Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [20] SHALAL, Andrea & BRUNNSTROM, David. "EU.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost", Reuters. 14 January 2023. Available at: U.S. strongly committed to Japan defense, Biden tells Kishida, hails military boost | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). [21] "Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy", Government of Japan. 20 February 2023. Available at: Japan's Two Big Decisions in Foreign and Security Policy | The Government of Japan - JapanGov - (accessed 1/11/2024). [22] DOMÍNGUEZ, Gabriel & TANG, Francis. "Japan, EU launch defence and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns", The Japan Times. 1 November 2024. Available at: Japan, EU launch defense and security tie-up amid mutual China concerns - The Japan Times (accessed 1/11/2024). [23] "Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy", Hudson Institute. 25 September 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba on Japan's New Security Era: The Future of Japan's Foreign Policy | Hudson Institute (accessed 1/11/2024). [24] ESTEBAN, Mario. "Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática", Real Instituto Elcano. 2 October 2024. Available at: Shigeru Ishiba y la nueva política de defensa japonesa: más allá de una OTAN asiática - Real Instituto Elcano (accessed 1/11/2024). [25] Data taken from "Japan country overview", Janes. 29 October 2024. Available at: Janes: Japan (accessed 1/11/2024). [26] "'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy", Japan Today. 7 March 2024. Available at: 'Moshi-Tora' speculates on how Trump's election might impact Japan's economy - Japan Today (accessed 1/11/2024). [27] O'SHEA, Paul & MASLOW, Sebastian. "Making the alliance even greater: (Mis-)managing U.S.-Japan relations in the age of Trump", Asian Security, 17(2). Pp. 195-215. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486 (accessed 1/11/2024). [28] HUNNICUTT, Trevor et ali. "Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials", Reuters. 29 June 2024. Available at: Exclusive: Trump will encourage Japan, South Korea ties, allies tell foreign officials | Reuters (accessed 1/11/2024). .

Defense & Security
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,Taipei City,Taiwan,October 10, 2021:Military parade on Taiwan National Day

Boys Do Not Dream of War: The Impacts of Extending Compulsory Military Service on Levels of Patriotism in Taiwan

by Shelby Tang

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском No mother wants to say goodbye to their child. However, with the looming threat of an attack from China, this fear threatens to become a reality for many Taiwanese mothers. There has been widespread speculation that People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping (習近平) has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027. Amid such predictions, Taiwan has completed numerous actions to increase its capabilities to resist a Chinese attack. Arguably, the island’s most notable single measure—and the most politically controversial—has been the extension of conscripted service for young men from four months to one year of training and military duty. [1]   Current Party Stances  When then-President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) announced the extension of conscripted service in December 2022, public opinion was divided regarding the presidential decision. In the January 2024 presidential election, the three contenders differed on their proposed policies for housing and economic issues, as well as relations with China, but all three—Lai Ching-te (賴清德) of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜) of the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP, (台民黨)—supported expanding conscripted military service. According to Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), acting deputy chief executive of the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR, 國防安全研究院), a government funded think-tank in Taipei, the rare agreement reached by the three men reflects how the issue involves national security interests that transcend party politics.  In Taiwan, the conscription age is 18; however, deferments for higher education are very common. All males must serve in the military by age 36, when they can retire from the reserves. Conscription length has varied throughout administrations. It used to last between two and three years, until being shortened to one year in 2008. This was further cut to four months in 2012 under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who came to power in 2008 and followed a policy of pursuing warmer ties with China. In the years that followed, Taiwan’s conscripted service system has been widely criticized by commentators both inside Taiwan and abroad as ineffective in providing for Taiwan’s defense, leading the Tsai Administration to implement the one-year program.  Public Opinion and the Impacts of Conscription  Former conscripts have frequently expressed disappointment with their training and equipment. In a study conducted in September 2023, participants regarded military service as “useless” and a “waste of time.” Citing as evidence the lack of equipment and the long permitted periods of leisure time, past participants have complained about the military training camps. One participant who trained in the Taiwanese military between 2023 and 2024 stated that “I just sat under the AC with my phone, they [military personnel] didn’t train us with any specific weapons because they said to not waste bullets, so my friends and I just sat on a field most of the time.” The researchers similarly conducted an interview with Jack Huang, a 30 year old male who completed his four months of service over two semester breaks in university. According to this news report, Huang “felt [that] his shooting practice was outdated, like a holdover from the 1950s, and did not see how it would help him in modern warfare.”   These examples support what Dr. Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a research fellow and director of INDSR has found: namely, that psychological defense and troop morale are the top concerns regarding Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. If troop morale and confidence are down, how is a sovereign island supposed to maintain its basic defense capacity against China?   Polling data and public sentiment reflect a mix of opinions regarding the conscription extension. According to a survey by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學), 58 percent of Taiwanese citizens support the extension of conscription to one year, viewing it as a necessary measure for national defense. However, 35 percent oppose the extension, citing particular concerns about its impact on young mens’ educational and career prospects. This division in opinion is evident across different demographics, with younger generations expressing more resistance to the policy compared to older generations.  There is indeed research that points to a one year conscription policy as being an impediment to educational and job prospects. In 2015, The IZA Journal of Labor Economics published a study on the long-term effects of peace-time military conscription on educational attainment and earnings in the Netherlands. Researchers found that compulsory military service decreased the proportion of Dutch university graduates by 1.5 percentage points (from a baseline of 12.3 per cent). Furthermore, the study found that being a conscript diminished the likelihood of earning a university degree by about four percentage points. The impact of military service on wages is also detrimental and long-term. The research concluded that “approximately 18 years after military service, we still find a negative effect of 3 to 4 per cent.” This quantifies some of the negative economic impacts of prolonged military conscription.   Flexibility in Service and Better Compensation for Conscripted Soldiers  Amid public reservations about the new policy, Taiwan’s government has implemented measures aimed to provide benefits after conscription. These include considering service time when calculating future benefits, and providing “flexible” educational options to facilitate the move into the economy for all conscripts. The Taipei Times reported in June 2023 that the Ministry of Education (教育部) has implemented a “3+1” program in which conscripts can complete college in three years and military duty in one year, allowing them to graduate alongside those who do not have to serve. To do this, institutions must raise the limit on the amount of credits that draftee students may obtain each semester. They should also provide summer courses and allow drafted individuals to attend classes at other universities. However, some have criticized the program: for example, KMT members of the legislature have stated that it would jeopardize students’ educational rights, and that conscripts would be “burning the candle at both ends” by balancing studies and conscription.  Conscription programs have also traditionally been known for the very low levels of pay given to junior conscripts—another point that has made the service period unpopular. The return to one-year service is part of a package of conscription reforms that includes increased pay for conscripted soldiers, in which the monthly compensation for a private will increase from NTD $6,510 to NTD $26,307 (USD $203 to USD $850)—still not a huge sum, but a four-fold increase over the standard pay level of the past.  Personal Interviews with Taiwanese Americans Affected by the Conscription Policy   Another issue of concern regarding conscription may be identified in the current attitudes of future Taiwanese-Americans conscripts residing in Taiwan. To investigate the trend, the author conducted a limited study in Taiwan in May 2024, in which interviews were conducted with five teen participants who have to serve upon turning 18. [2] In the interviews, the participants were asked about their views towards the policy. For the first subject pool, four of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, 4, and 5) stated that period of the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future career plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 3 stated in his interview, “Especially because the job market is so tight right now… Having to serve would make getting a job harder. I know I’m supposed to be mad at China, but I’m mad at Taiwan.”   This correlates to the fluctuation of public confidence in Taiwan’s military, according to data found by NCCU’s Election Study Center. In September of 2021, about 58 percent of respondents were confident or very confident in the military’s ability to defend Taiwan. However, confidence dropped to 54 percent in March 2022 and to 43 percent in March 2023—possibly due in part to negative news and cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare and negative news covers many areas: ranging from naval exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan and military aviation flights that steadily advance closer to Taiwan’s airspace, to bans of Taiwanese agricultural products, and the use of fringe political parties employed to spread pro-CCP (and anti-American) narratives.  Another theme commonly cited as a reason for their decreased level of patriotism was the effect of military service on plans for higher education. Three out of the five teen participants (Teens 1, 3, and 4) stated that the prolonged military service caused concerns regarding future education plans. This concern contributed to a decrease in national pride and connection to their Taiwanese identity. For example, when asked about his opinion regarding the conscription policy, Teen 1 stated in his interview, “I’m just trying to live my life and go off to college abroad and never have to think about this problem or Taiwan ever again.” The frustration expressed corresponds to a decrease in patriotic connection: as Teen 4 stated in his interview, “I don’t like it. It inconveniences me and my plans for college. Plus, Taiwan doesn’t have anything to offer to my education.”   In a second subject pool, four parent participants (Parents 2, 3, 4, and 5) stated that the prolonged military service for boys born after 2005 caused concerns regarding future career plans. Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s employment opportunities, and cause them to lose valuable work experience. For example, Parent 2 stated in their interview, “We have to think about what the youth needs. A one-year training with weapons they will never be able to use or use well in their entire life is useless and bad for job prospects. I am disappointed in Taiwan and perhaps even a bit ashamed of my country.”    Many parent participants believed that prolonged service duration would harm a child’s educational development and cause them to lose valuable academic learning. This connects to March 2023 research in the publication Voice Tank, which found that “respondents’ confidence had dropped, for the first time below 50 percent (to 43 percent), and the proportion of those not confident exceeded that of those confident. While such a drop could be attributed to various factors and may only be temporary, we think it may be a result of cognitive warfare and negative news coverage of the ROC armed forces.” [3] This links to Parent 4’s questioning of Taiwan, asking, “What is wrong with Taiwan? Don’t they understand our future generation needs to study abroad for a better chance?” Parent 4 believes that the government is directly hindering her son’s academic development and future by implementing the policy, a reason for her declining level of patriotism.  Conclusion  The prolonged military conscription for males born after 2005 has caused clashing public opinions—and a decline in patriotic sentiment for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling DPP must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat. It becomes imperative for the ruling party to acknowledge that while conscription may appear on the surface to be cost-effective, simple budgetary accounting does not consider the potentially high opportunity cost that young people face when forced to serve, leading to long-term earnings losses and educational disruptions. These factors combine to reduce national income and economic growth. Additionally, for Taiwanese Americans and expatriates, conscription does little to foster unity; instead, it risks further weakening the relationship between overseas citizens and the state, whose voices still influence Taiwan’s future.  The main point: The prolonged military conscription for boys born after 2005 has caused public controversy and a decline in patriotism for Taiwanese Americans currently residing in Taiwan, including future conscripts and their parents. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party must consider the unforeseen impacts of its policy amid the looming Chinese threat.  References  [1] For previous discussions of the issues surrounding the extension of service to one year, see: John Dotson, “Taiwan’s ‘Military Force Restructuring Plan’ and the Extension of Conscripted Military Service,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 8, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/02/taiwan-military-force-restructuring-plan-and-the-extension-of-conscripted-military-service/; and John Dotson, “Taiwan Initiates Its New One-Year Military Conscription Program,” Global Taiwan Brief, February 7, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/02/taiwan-initiates-its-new-one-year-military-conscription-program/.  [2] The research was conducted for a duration of one year, under the supervision of Dr. Irish Farley. The study utilized a two-part, mixed methods approach that surveyed boys between of 14 and 17 living in Taiwan who are eligible for military conscription upon turning of age; followed by small group interviews with the teen participants, and parents of boys aged 14 through 17 living in Taiwan.  [3] For example, a report in Nihon Keizai Shimbun in February 2023 claimed that 90 percent of retired Taiwanese spies have worked with China. In early March, soldiers stationed in Kinmen defected to Xiamen, which led to the circulation of negative news about Taiwan’s military. See: Lee, Kuan-chen, Christina Chen, and Ying-Hsuan Chen. 2024. “Core Public Attitudes toward Defense and Security in Taiwan.” Taiwan Politics, January 2024, https://doi.org/10.58570/WRON8266. 

Diplomacy
Donald Trump win in US president elections 2024. Washington DC, United Sates Of America - 2024 November 6

What Trump’s victory means for Ukraine, the Middle East, China and the rest of the world

by Stefan Wolff

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

Diplomacy
Russia, China and USA political confrontation concept.

USA, China, Russia: Multiplying Deterrence

by Ivan Timofeev

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Minimising the number of one’s enemies while multiplying one’s number of friends is a basic principle of diplomacy that has existed for centuries. The simplicity of the principle itself is more than compensated by the complexity of its practical implementation. In international relations, the price of friendship may be too high, limiting freedom of manoeuvre, while open hostility brings existing contradictions to the limit, radically resolving them in favour of one side or another. Advising a diplomat to expand alliances and limit confrontations is like advising a stock market player to buy shares when they are cheap and sell when they are expensive. It is obvious that minimising the number of rivals allows you to save resources, concentrate them on the tasks of internal development, and not be torn on several fronts. However, it is also obvious that competition may be preferable to concessions to the demands of the opposite side, especially when it comes to issues of principle. The situation is further complicated by the fact that countries can compete in some areas while remaining partners in others. Then adjusting the balance of cooperation and competition becomes even more difficult. The transition of international relations to extreme forms of rivalry is quite possible; history is full of such episodes. In such situations, the key task becomes not so much preserving the remnants of friendship as a preparation for the upcoming war, which the parties may consider inevitable, waging war by proxies, and entering into confrontation at a convenient moment. The bottom line is that the one who finds the optimal balance of allies and rivals will be able to conserve resources, and if confrontation is inevitable, will be able to withstand it, emerge victorious, and make use of the results of victory. The current state of international relations demonstrates a steady tendency towards the multiplication of deterrence tasks among the three key global centres of military power—the United States, China and Russia. Each of them has an increasing number of opponents. Moreover, the increase in their number, as well as the degree of confrontation, has its roots in the relatively favourable situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Washington, Beijing, and Moscow enjoyed much more favourable external conditions: the number of rivals was negligible, while the density of partnerships was unprecedented. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the United States had virtually no rivals among the major powers. Relations with Russia were defined by a network of arms control treaties. It was difficult to call them cloudless, but even a semblance of confrontation from the Cold War era was very difficult to imagine. The key security problem for the United States was radical Islamism in its terrorist guise; Russia actively helped the United States in its fight against international terrorism, and China simply did not interfere. North Korea and Iran formed an “axis of evil” whose nuclear ambitions Washington tried to restrain with sanctions. Moscow and Beijing, if they did not help the Americans, then at least tried to find the optimal formula for solving nuclear problems via the UN Security Council. Some twenty years later, the situation for the United States has changed quite radically. China is perceived as a powerful and long-term rival in all senses. We are talking about a military-political, economic, and even ideological rivalry. It is difficult to compare China with the USSR during the Cold War. But in all three of these dimensions, it represents an alternative to American politics. Although the United States would like to keep the rivalry with China under control, especially given the close ties between the two economies, the task of containing China will become a priority for decades to come. Russia has turned from a weakened and extremely cautious partner into a tough and uncompromising adversary, as its interests in the post-Soviet space are being infringed upon, and its economy and military-industrial complex are being restored. Enmity with it requires a manifold increase in investments in support of Ukraine, an increased presence in Europe, and the modernisation of nuclear potential, taking into account the advance appearance of new missile systems in Moscow. The arms control regime has been torn to shreds. Washington is trying to control the escalation but could find itself at war with Russia, with the unlikely but growing risk of a nuclear exchange. The DPRK has both nuclear weapons and missiles capable of launching them. It would now be more difficult to crush North Korea.  US enmity towards Russia and its rivalry with China has provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to emerge from isolation. The same goes for Iran. The aggravation of US relations with Russia and China plays into Tehran’s hands in overcoming isolation and the blockade. The “axis of evil” that the United States so actively fought against has only strengthened, and in interaction with Russia and partly China, it will continue to strengthen. Russia and China themselves are also getting closer. A military alliance is a long way off. Moscow and Beijing are not striving for it. But their interaction is now closer, and the United States will no longer be able to use Russia to balance China. Chinese diplomacy has been building an extremely cautious foreign policy since the late 1970s. Beijing has most consistently adhered to the principle of minimizing adversaries and maximizing friends. In many ways, China has achieved its goal, having managed to create favourable foreign policy conditions for enormous economic growth, increasing the well-being of citizens and modernising the army. The problem is that such PRC growth, even taking into account the lack of expressed ambitions, has caused growing concern in the United States. As a result, Beijing was faced with the fact that Washington decided to act proactively, containing China while the possibilities for such containment remained in the arsenal of American foreign policy. Perhaps the PRC leadership would prefer to continue to enjoy the benefits of global peace and live amid conditions of minimal competition. But the results of successful modernisation are now becoming an issue that the United States considers a security challenge. This means China will have to live in response to the American policy of containment, which includes the building of anti-Chinese alliances. Here, American diplomacy will try to place its bets, including in India. However, India is too large and powerful a country to play a passive role. China, in turn, is building a special relationship with the United States' European NATO allies. Here Beijing could take into account the Russian experience of “special” relations with the European Union. Finally, Russia at the turn of the century had practically no serious rivals. The country was seriously weakened by the fall of the Soviet Union and controversial reforms. Political relations with the West have gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, but still haven’t reached a critical level, having been compensated with a high level of economic cooperation. In Asia, relations with US allies Japan and South Korea were also especially cordial without the burdens that remained in matters of European security. Today, almost the entire collective West is fighting against a strengthened Russia in Ukraine, supplying Kiev with weapons and ammunition, and providing Ukraine with finances, intelligence, military specialists, etc. Economic relations have been undermined for a long time by sanctions. Tokyo and especially Seoul have taken a more cautious position, but are still forced to follow the American line. The bottom line is that all three powers, for various reasons, have found themselves in a situation where the tasks of containment, expanding confrontation, and the need to resolve security issues involve using force or the threat of its use. Past economic ties have not held back political contradictions. Apparently, we are only at the beginning of an exacerbation. After all, the real fight between the two key rivals—the USA and China—is yet to come. One can argue for a long time about what is the root cause of the increase in deterrence—mistakes of diplomats or objective factors giving rise to rivalry. The result is what’s important. The three largest military-political centres simultaneously faced deteriorating foreign policy conditions, whereas twenty years ago all three were in a much more peaceful environment. The fate of the future world order still depends on the ability of the ‘troika’ to control rivalry and on the results of such rivalry. First published in the Valdai Discussion Club. Original published in Russian. https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/ssha-kitay-rossiya-umnozhenie-sderzhivaniya/

Diplomacy
The tenth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting

Who speaks for the Pacific?

by Kerryn Baker , Theresa Meki

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Pacific Islands Forum came to an end, the underlying questions remain: who has a voice and legitimacy to influence the region, and who doesn’t  The Pacific Islands – a grouping largely made up of small island developing states – is in the middle of an increasingly contested strategic space, making regional politics an important, and closely observed, site. At the end of August, Pacific Islands Forum heads of government met in Tonga for the organisation’s annual leaders’ meeting. Along with the Pacific heads of government, other dignitaries were also present, including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. This is the apex event on the regional calendar, and it came with a crowded agenda, including issues like climate change, transnational crime and health security. But one of the pressing issues facing the Forum is an existential one, as membership debates and geopolitical tussles highlight: the question of who and what the Forum represents. In recent years, divisions within the region have become apparent, including the perceived marginalisation of North Pacific countries in what was initially called the South Pacific Forum. These tensions culminated in the decision by five Micronesian states to leave the Forum in 2021, although this was later reversed. Yet, the final Forum communiqué demonstrates that Pacific leaders are on the same page on many issues, covering agreed outcomes relating to health, education, fisheries and other key issues. Climate change was highlighted as ‘a matter of priority to the Pacific region’ and as an intersecting and broad-ranging issue affecting Pacific states. A new Pacific Policing Initiative – a proposal to create a multinational Pacific police force and invest in subregional policing hubs – was endorsed, although in a nod to some debate surrounding its implementation, leaders emphasised the need for further consultation. Emerging geopolitical frictions  A controversy over the final version of the communiqué, however, highlights enduring divisions in the Forum. In the communiqué initially published online on Friday afternoon, paragraph 66 read that ‘Leaders reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China.’ This refers to Taiwan’s established status as a ‘development partner’ of the Forum. After public statements from China’s special envoy for the Pacific Qian Bo criticising this language, the communiqué was taken offline and revised, with the paragraph referencing Taiwan removed. Forum officials blamed the confusion on an administrative error. Three of the 18 full members of the Forum recognise Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu. While the Pacific was once a key focus of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, its influence has waned in the region in recent years with moves from Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru to shift recognition to Beijing, prompted by a diplomatic offensive by the People’s Republic of China. In an increasingly contested geopolitical context, Taiwan’s status in regards to the Forum is likely to remain a difficult topic for member countries. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not UN member states. In light of rising strategic competition, issues of membership of the Forum also raise existential questions for its future. In 2016, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full Forum members. But their political status does pose interesting questions for the Forum, especially considering the recent riots and ongoing tensions in New Caledonia. In the Forum communiqué, leaders reaffirmed a decision to send a mission to New Caledonia, a move that has been fraught; prior to the meeting, the French Ambassador to the Pacific had asserted that ‘New Caledonia is French territory and it is the [French] State which decides on who enters’. The communiqué also endorsed the applications for associate member status for Guam and American Samoa, two US territories with clear ambitions to accede to full membership status in the future as New Caledonia and French Polynesia have. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not United Nations member states and also do not issue their own passports. Yet, the 2016 decision represented a substantive shift in the principles of Forum membership, one likely to bolster the claims to full membership of other territories. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Forum is becoming more representative in encompassing more Pacific polities and acknowledging the remarkable diversity in political status that exists in the region. On the other, an expanding membership raises questions of the influence of metropolitan powers like France and the US in the Forum. This is an already fraught conversation given the perceived outsized influence of founding member states Australia and New Zealand. Pacific leaders have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. France and the US, along with Australia and New Zealand, all have colonial histories – and, for many, an enduring colonial presence – in the region. Given this context, their present and prospective roles in the Forum have been critiqued as preventing the institution from being a truly Pacific space. Pacific leaders like former Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. Behind all of these decisions and controversies are fundamental questions: who has a voice in the Forum and who does not; who has the legitimacy to exert influence in the region and who does not. Resolving these issues in a way that strengthens the Forum’s own legitimacy as the primary regional institution is a pressing and existential matter. In the midst of this, what was not on the Forum agenda is also worth considering. Even in the presence of two elected women heads of government – President Hilda Heine of Marshall Islands and Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa of Samoa – and even following last year’s endorsement of a Revitalised Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration, gender equality is absent from the 2024 communiqué.