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I. IntroductionAccording to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Middle Eastern countries spent $243.5 billion on defense in 2024 — a 15 percent increase from 2023. Saudi Arabia led the region with $80.3 billion in defense spending, ranking seventh in the world. It was followed by Israel with $46.5 billion, Turkey with $25 billion, the United Arab Emirates(UAE) with $24 billion, Qatar with $14.4 billion, Iran with $7.9 billion, Kuwait with $7.8 billion, Iraq with $6.2 billion and Oman with $6 billion.[1] Pro-US countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar increased their military spending in response to perceived threats from Iran. Experts say that they have focused not just on deterrence but also on enhancing real-world capabilities. “These Middle East countries witnessed the consequences of being unprepared during the Israel–Hamas war and the Israeli–Iranian conflict,” said Kang Eun-ho, head of Jeonbuk National University’s defense industry research center and former chief of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in South Korea. “Given the Middle East’s geopolitical tension, South Korean defense firms face growing opportunities.”[2] A key area of focus for Middle Eastern countries is the modernization of ground-based weapons like missiles, multiple launch rocket systems and self-propelled howitzers. As aging inventories in Middle East countries face obsolescence, the need for replacements is growing. According to a March 2025 report by Kyobo Securities, 2,350 out of 6,088 tanks, howitzers and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) units currently in use across Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq — or 39 percent — require replacement due to age or maintenance issues.[3] This presents a major opportunity for South Korean defense firms. South Korea has already exported K9 self-propelled howitzers to Turkey and Egypt, Chunmoo MLRS to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and the Cheongung-II missile to multiple countries, including Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have recently shown strong interest in Hyundai Rotem’s K2 tanks, while the UAE is eyeing Hanwha Aerospace’s K9s. Air power modernization is also on the agenda of several Middle East countries. Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) is promoting its FA-50 light attack aircraft to Egypt, the KF-21 fighter to Saudi Arabia and the Surion helicopter to Iraq and the UAE.   The appeal of K-defense lies in its cost-effectiveness. A single Cheongung-II interceptor, for example, costs approximately 1.5 billion won ($1.1 million), which is roughly a third of the price of a US Patriot missile, which ranges from 4 billion to 6 billion won. “US ground weapon offerings are limited, and some high-end fighter jets may be overkill for the region,” said Kim Ki-won, a professor of military studies at Daekyeung University. “South Korean weapon systems carry less political baggage and offer options like technology transfers and local production — attractive incentives for buyers.”[4]   Under this circumstance of the Middle East, this paper aims to introduce South Korean major weapons to government officials and businessmen in Middle Eastern countries.   This is the second paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons that were exported to Middle East countries, as well as on the weapons that have the potential to be exported to the Middle East. The first paper dealt with South Korean weapons that were exported to European countries.   This paper first provides an overview of South Korean defense industry and then introduces major Korean weapons exported and to be exported to Middle East countries.   1.South Korean Defense Industry: World’s top 10 arms exporter   It was 72 years ago that the bloody 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice.   Today, South Korea, the once-war-ravaged nation, stands among global leading arms exporters, and its factories turn out advanced tanks, artillery systems and fighter jets destined for battlefields far beyond the Korean Peninsula.   As Figure 1 shows, South Korea’s arms industry has been riding a wave of global demand. South Korea’ arms exports increased from 2.5 billion dollars in 2019 to 23 billion dollars (estimate)in 2025. South Korean weapons are in high demand for their advanced technology and fast delivery.   As a result, in recent years, South Korea has often been listed among the world’s top 10 arms exporters, competing with the US, Russia and China. As Figure 2, South Korea ranked No. 10 in global arms exports, with a 2.2 % share of the world arms market in the 2020-2024 period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The South Korean government is now setting its sights on breaking into the ranks of global top 4 arms exporters.   Figure 1: South Korea arms exports Figure 2: world’s biggest arms exporters   1.South Korean ‘Big 4’ defense companies   According to the Defense News Top 100 list for 2020, four of South Korea’s defense companies were ranked in the top 100 defense companies in the world. These four companies are Hanwha (32nd), Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI 55th), LIG Nex1 (68th), and Hyundai Rotem (95th).   These South Korea’s top four defense companies are expected to surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) in total order backlog in 2025, driven by strong export growth. More European and other countries adopt self-reliant defense strategies as US President Donald Trump warn that the US will no longer protect them for free and as he calls for increasing military spending. Moreover, the Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict continue. Thus, there are higher expectations that South Korea’s leading defense firms will secure more orders.   According to data compiled by the Chosun Ilbo, a top Korean newspaper, on May 6, 2025, the combined backlog of South Korea’s top four defense companies stands at around 94.5 trillion won. The figures for Hanwha Aerospace and KAI are based on the results of the first quarter in 2025, while those for LIG Nex1 and Hyundai Rotem reflect data from the end of 2024.[5]   All four companies secure more export deals, thereby enhancing both the scale and quality of their order books. Hanwha Aerospace, for example, holds 31.4 trillion won in ground defense orders, led by exports of K9 howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket systems. Exports account for 65% of that backlog. KAI’s backlog at the end of the first quarter in 2025 reached 24.3 trillion won, up 32% from 18.4 trillion won in 2020. The KAI aims to exceed 29 trillion won by year-end. Its export share has also risen from 50% in 2020 to 63% by the end of 2024.   LIG Nex1 holds a backlog of around 20 trillion won as of the end of 2024, while Hyundai Rotem’s stands at 18.8 trillion won. More than half of the orders for both companies come from overseas. Hyundai Rotem is also expected to finalize a second contract with Poland to export around 820 K2 tanks, valued at over 8 trillion won. If finalized, the deal would significantly boost its backlog this year.   According to updated data from the Chosun Ilbo, as Figure 3 shows, South Korea’s four major defense companies saw their combined order backlog surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) for the first time, driven by strong overseas demand. Data in second quarter of 2025 show that Hanwha Aerospace, LIG Nex1, Hyundai Rotem, and Korea Aerospace Industries held backlogs totaling 103.48 trillion won, more than double the 42.23 trillion won recorded at the end of 2021. Industry officials say that these companies now have enough work secured for the next four to five years.[6]   Figure 3: South Korea top 4 defense companies’ order backlog (source: the Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2025)   This jump in exports of Korean-made conventional weapons has led to the Korean defense industry boom. Orders for Korean artillery weapons and armored vehicles from Eastern Europe and the Middle East have significantly increased since the outbreak of the Ukraine war.[7]   Sales of Hyundai Rotem Co., the supplier of the K-2 Black Panther tank, and Hanwha Aerospace Co., the supplier of the K-9 Thunder howitzer, have skyrocketed over the same period. Their parts suppliers have also seen their sales double over a year.   The South Korean defense industry’s current heyday is expected to continue for a while as global demand for Korean-made weapons and combat systems has surged amid growing geopolitical conflicts around the world.   According to defense industry sources, Hanwha Aerospace is expected to soon close a deal with Vietnam to export the K9 self-propelled howitzers, a contract expected to be worth 1 trillion won. Indeed, Hanwha Aerospace signed an agreement to export its K9 self-propelled howitzers worth US$250 million to Vietnam.  Hyundai Rotem is also reportedly nearing the final stage of inking a second agreement with Poland for K2 battle tanks that could be worth over 7 trillion won. LIG Nex1 has supposedly been in talks with Malaysia to export its surface-to-air missile system Cheongung. KAI is looking to export its KF-21 fighter jet to the Middle East.[8]   As the Korean defense companies continue to rack up orders and look to expand their list of clients worldwide, JP Morgan released a report on the four major defense firms -- Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI – in March 2025, increasing their stock price targets by an average of 28 percent while pointing out that there is “plenty of room to go” for their values to rise.[9]   The report surprised investors, industry officials and analysts as it set the target prices of the four defense companies higher than the domestic market consensus. J.P. Morgan adjusted the target stock prices of Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI to 950,000 won, 90,000 won, 370,000 won and 120,000 won, respectively.[10]   JP Morgan noted that it estimates an annual new order market of 19 trillion won -- 14 trillion won from Europe and 5 trillion won from the Middle East -- for Korean land weapons systems companies.   “Korean-made weapons remain one of the top choices for Eastern European countries facing national security issues,” said Lee Tae-hwan, an analyst at Daishin Securities. “Discussions about ordering conventional weapons will gain momentum. The K9 self-propelled howitzers and K2 tanks are excellent candidates with strong potential for scoring additional export deals in Eastern Europe.”[11]   Yu Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told The Korea Herald that “South Korea has rapidly matured into one of the world’s leading arms exporters, backed by a highly capable manufacturing base, a track record of delivering on time and at scale, and proven platforms.”[12].   II. Importers of South Korean weapons   Table 1. The 20 largest importers of major arms and their main suppliers, 2020–24   Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, March. 2025   According to the SIPRI, as Table 1 shows, during the period of 2020–24, four of the world’s top 10 arms importers were in the Middle East: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait. More than half of Middle Eastern arms imports came from the US (52 per cent). The next largest arms suppliers to Middle Eastern nations were Italy (13 per cent), France (9.8 per cent) and Germany (7.6 per cent). Israel was the 15th largest arms importer in the world during the period of 2020–24, down from 14th in 2015–19. The US was the biggest supplier of major arms to Israel in 2020–24 (accounting for 66 per cent of Israeli arms imports), followed by Germany (33 per cent). Iran’s arms imports have been at a very low level relative to those of most other arms importers in the Middle East since 1993. Iran’s only supplier of major arms during the period of 2020–24 was Russia. Iran received a total of 6 light combat aircraft from Russia in 2023 and 2024 and has pending deliveries for 42 combat aircraft.[13]   Against the backdrop of tensions with its neighbors, Qatar was the 3rd largest arms importer in the world in 2020–24. Qatari arms imports during the period of 2020–24 were 127 per cent higher than in 2015–19. Qatar’s main arms supplier in 2020–24 was the US (accounting for 48 per cent of Qatari arms imports), followed by Italy (20 per cent), the UK (15 per cent) and France (14 per cent). In 2020–24 Qatar’s imports included 42 combat aircraft from the US, 31 from the UK and 16 from France; Qatar also imported 7 major warships from Italy. Arms imports by Saudi Arabia decreased by 41 per cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24. Saudi Arabia went from the world’s largest arms importer in 2015–19 to fourth largest importer in 2020–24. Saudi Arabia’s main arms supplier during the period of 2020–24 was the US (accounting for 74 per cent of Saudi Arabian arms imports), followed by Spain (10 per cent) and France (6.2 per cent). The decline in Saudi Arabia’s arms imports in 2020–24 can be partly attributed to the cyclical nature of arms procurement. Based on known pending deliveries, Saudi Arabia is expected to remain a major importer of arms in the coming years.[14]   According to data from the Korea International Trade Association and the Korean Herald, Middle Eastern countries occupied most of the top five spots among importers of Korean weapons in 2024 as regional tensions escalated due to the conflicts involving Israel, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen.   Saudi Arabia ranked second in the purchase of South Korean weapons with $530 million in 2024, while the United Arab Emirates and Turkey placed fourth and fifth with $145 million and $113 million, respectively. Last year’s biggest importer of South Korean defense systems was Poland, which purchased Korea-made weapons worth about $2.51 billion, more than four times what it bought in 2023. The US was the third-biggest importer of South Korean weapons at $219 million.[15]   As the Gaza conflict has threatened to spiral into a prolonged war, South Korea’s defense industry  sees a surge in international interest — particularly from the Middle East, where Arab governments have been accelerating large-scale military modernization programs.   Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates open the door to South Korean arms manufacturers, as regional demand has been rising for weapons systems that can be delivered fast and customized to local needs and priced more competitively than their US or European counterparts.   As Table 1 shows, Middle East countries have historically relied on US and Russian weapons. However, they are increasingly diversifying their weapons procurement by turning to suppliers in China, Europe and, more recently, South Korea.   South Korean arms appeal to many countries due to their strong performance, faster delivery timelines, competitive prices compared to products from the US and Europe, and the ability to customize systems to local needs. This South Korean approach has already translated into tangible results in the Middle East.   LIG Nex1’s medium-to-high altitude interceptor system, the Cheongung II, secured export contracts worth 12.1 trillion won ($8.7 billion) from the UAE in 2022, as well as from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2024. Several countries in the Middle East also reportedly consider purchases of the Cheongung II.   Interest in South Korean naval vessels, submarines and fighter jets has also risen in the Middle East.   Saudi Arabian Navy Chief of Staff Faisal al-Gharibi visited the 2025 International Maritime Defense Industry Exhibition in Busan on May 28, showing particular interest in Hanwha Ocean’s 3,600-ton Jangbogo-III Batch-II submarine. The delegation also visited HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ booth, showing a strong interest in a 6,500-ton frigate on display.[16]   The UAE has expressed interest in the KF-21, South Korea’s next-generation fighter jet. The UAE Air Defense Commander Rashid Al Shamsi visited Korea Aerospace Industries’ (KAI) headquarters in April 2025 to inspect production facilities for the KF-21 and other aircraft. Azzan A. Ali Al Nuaimi, commander of the UAE’s Air Warfare and Missile Defense Center, even requested to sit in a KF-21 prototype himself.   The KAI also pushes additional exports of the Surion multipurpose helicopter, having already delivered two units to Iraq.[17]Chae Woo-seok, executive director of the Korea Defense Industry Association, said that demand for South Korean weapons is likely to grow due to the region’s urgent security needs. He told that “We expect higher demand for South Korean defense systems that can be delivered quickly in a region such as the middle East with high geopolitical risk.” Chae said that “demand will grow for weapons systems that strengthen air power and build aerial defense networks, particularly those that enhance war deterrence capabilities.”[18]   III. Major military weapons of South Korean Defense Industry   1.South Korea’s expanding arms export portfolio   In South Korea’s expanding arms export portfolio, the K2 tank, called “Black Panther” and built by Hyundai Rotem, has been a flagship item.   The K2 is South Korea’s most advanced main battle tank, designed for speed, precision and adaptability on the mountainous Korean Peninsula. In recent years, the K2 has drawn major international orders, most notably from Poland, as Polish and other nations’ militaries seek modern armor to replace aging Cold War units.   It is central to South Korea’s largest-ever defense export deals, including the one with Poland, signed in 2022, in which Poland ordered 180 K2 Black Panther tanks from Hyundai Rotem in a $3.37 billion agreement. Deliveries began within months, far faster than European or American suppliers could offer.[19]   In 2025, Poland signed with a $6.5 billion contract for 180 upgraded K2PL tanks, making South Korea one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s most important new arms partners and cemented South Korea’s status as a major player in the global defense market.   Other key weapons in the South Korean export portfolio are the K239 Chunmoo Multiple Rocket Launcher System, K9 self-propelled howitzer, FA-50 fighter jets, KP-SAM chirons, M-Sam 2 (천궁 II), KF-21 fight jets, and KUH-1 (수리온 헬기).[20]   Prominent deals made with global clients include K239 Chunmoo MLRS systems purchased by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in 2017 and 2022, respectively.   South Korea also signed a $250 million agreement to supply Vietnam with 20 K9 self-propelled howitzers on August 14, 2025, marking the weapon’s first deployment to a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc. The K9 howitzers are already in service in countries such as Turkey and Egypt.[21]   In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017.   On March 28, 2014, Department of Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million). Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017.[22]   Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated KP-Sam Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additionally, 2 Chirons were transferred according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report. 54 KP-SAM chirons were delivered to Romania in June 2024.   M-Sam 2 (천궁 II) secured export contracts worth 12.1 trillion won ($8.7 billion) from the UAE in 2022 and Saudi Arabia & Iraq in 2024. Iraq purchased KUH-1 (수리온 헬기) in 2024.   As the Israel-Palestine conflict spirals into a prolonged war, South Korea’s defense industry is seeing a surge in international interest — particularly from the Middle East, where governments have been accelerating large-scale military modernization programs. Several countries in the Middle East also reportedly consider additional purchases of South Korean weapons. Interest in South Korean naval vessels, submarines and fighter jets has been also rising.[23]   Saudi Arabian Navy showed strong interest in Hanwha Ocean’s 3,600-ton Jangbogo-III Batch-II submarine. The UAE has expressed interest in the KF-21, South Korea’s next-generation fighter jet. The KAI has also pushed additional exports of the Surion multipurpose helicopter.   2. Major South Korean weapons that were exported to Middle East countries   This is the second paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons that were exported to Middle East countries.   According to data from the Korea International Trade Association and the Korea Herald, last year’s biggest importer of South Korean defense systems was Poland. The most-exported items were from Hanwha Aerospace, which shipped 212 units of its K9 self-propelled howitzers, and Hyundai Rotem, selling 134 units of the K2 battle tank.[24]   Middle Eastern countries occupied most of the top five spots among importers of South Korean weapons as regional tensions escalated due to the conflicts involving Israel, Iran, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen.   Saudi Arabia ranked second in the purchase of South Korean weapons with $530 million in 2024, while the United Arab Emirates and Turkey placed fourth and fifth with $145 million and $113 million, respectively. The United States was the third-biggest importer of Korean weapons at $219 million. As Table 2 shows, South Korea has exported the following weapons to several Middle East countries during the period of 2001-2024: K2 tanks, K 9 howitzer, Chunmoo multiple rocket systems, M-Sam 2, FA-50, and KUH-1 Surion.   Table 2: Major defense export contracts with Middle East countries, 2001-2024   Year Destination Name of company Name of weapon Contract money  (₩ Korean won or $ US dollars) 2001 Turkey Hanwha Aerospace K 9 howitzer $1 billion 2007 Turkey Hyundai Rotem K2 tanks $ 0.4 billion (Technology export) 2013 Iraq Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50 ₩2.0121 trillion won 2017 UAE Hanwha Aerospace K239 Chunmoo (천무) ₩700 billion won 2022   Saudi Arabia Hanwha Aerospace K239 Chunmoo ₩1 trillion won Egypt Hanwha Aerospace K 9 howitzer ₩2 trillion won UAE LIG Nex1 M-Sam 2 (천궁 II) ₩12.1 trillion won 2024   Saudi Arabia LIG Nex1 M-Sam 2(천궁 II) Iraq LIG Nex1 M-Sam 2 (천궁 II) Iraq KAI KUH-1 Surion (헬기) ₩1.358 billion won (source: Chosun Biz, 12 February, 2025 & several Korean newspapers)   3. Major South Korean weapons that have the potential to be exported to Middle Eastern countries   As the Gaza conflict spirals into a prolonged war, demand for defense products in the Middle East has rapidly increased. Moreover, Middle Eastern countries have been transforming their defense industry and accelerating large-scale military modernization programs. In particular, Saudi Arabia has been actively advancing the transformation of its defense industry under ‘Vision 2030,’ with the goal of localizing 50% of military spending by 2030. To this end, Saudi Arabia has made strategic investments to develop its domestic defense manufacturing capabilities, increase self-sufficiency, and reduce reliance on foreign suppliers. One of the key events showcasing these advancements is the World Defense Show (WDS) 2026, scheduled to take place in Riyadh, where Saudi Arabia will highlight its growing defense capabilities and industry partnerships.[25]   Since the launch of Vision 2030 in 2016, Saudi Arabia has made significant progress in localizing its defense industry. The localization rate of military expenditures increased from 4% in 2018 to 19.35% by the end of 2023. In addition, the number of licensed and authorized facilities in the Saudi military industry sector increased from five in 2019 to 296 by the third quarter of 2024. This growth is the result of policies and regulations designed to oversee and stimulate the sector, enhancing the competitiveness of domestic products. These efforts aim to establish a robust industrial base and foster a national ecosystem capable of attracting investment and strategic collaborations with global entities.[26]   Several initiatives have been introduced to achieve these ambitious goals. The General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) stands at the forefront of this movement, acting as the regulatory and enabling body for the Saudi defense industry. GAMI’s mandate includes overseeing technology transfer, streamlining military procurement, and supporting the growth of local defense production.[27]   The GAMI has signed over 53 industrial cooperation agreements, amounting to approximately 35 billion riyals ($9.32 billion), with local and international companies. Among these agreements, approximately 13 billion riyals ($3.46 billion) pertain to orders for local firms, supporting the development of national capabilities. Saudi Arabia seeks to strengthen ties with major global manufacturers and accelerate technology transfer to its domestic industry through these initiatives.   In parallel, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), established in 2017, plays a central role in this transformation. As a wholly owned subsidiary of the Public Investment Fund (PIF), SAMI aims to rank among top 25 global defense firms by 2030. The SAMI focuses on the development of air, land, naval, and defense systems while forming strategic partnerships to facilitate technology transfer and enhance local capabilities.[28]   During this Saudi Arabia’s modernization of its defense industry, Saudi Arabia and South Korea have strengthen defense cooperation. In particular, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to South Korea in 2019 led to the signing of an MoU aimed at strengthening defense and industrial partnerships, focusing on military acquisitions, research, and technology.   Since then, defense ties between Saudi Arabia and South Korea have grown through several agreements. For example, in February 2024, defense ministers in Saudi Arabia and South Korea discussed closer collaboration, and they signed an MoU to establish a joint committee for weapons research and development.[29]   This MoU signing was followed by a $3.2 billion deal, with South Korea’s LIG Nex1 agreeing to supply Saudi Arabia with mid-range surface-to-air missile systems.   On the other hand, for several decades, the UAE has been the undisputed regional economic leader, attracting foreign investors. Recently, however, Saudi Arabia has doubled down on its efforts to compete with the UAE and present itself as the new regional economic & defense leader. This competition could reshape Saudi-UAE relations and have impacts on the entire region.   As the competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE has intensified, rifts between the two Arab nations have deepened, occasionally leading to strained relations and divergent geoeconomic and geopolitical agendas.   Without a doubt, the UAE is the regional leader not only in the economic sector, but also in the defense sector, offering advanced autonomous solutions, air defense systems including missiles, land systems, electronic warfare, and even space technologies. The UAE has surpassed Egypt, previously the Arab world’s largest industrial power.[30]   The UAE’s decision to develop its domestic capabilities in defense stems from the UAE’s recognition of the risks that rely totally on a partnership with the US, particularly after the Biden administration imposed export restrictions on Saudi Arabia. In addition, UAE leaders see building their own industrial base as a necessary hedge against the oil rentier model, whose longevity cannot be assured. Moreover, as Saudi Arabia made significant transformation in its defense sector under ‘vision 2030,’ the UAE also needed to embark on major restructuring of its defense sector and programs.[31]   The UAE approach has emphasized forming joint ventures with various foreign partners. This strategy has allowed the country to acquire foreign technologies, develop them further, and eventually implement and market them as its own. One notable example is the Falaj 3, a 60-meter offshore patrol vessel. In January 2025, Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), which is owned by EDGE (an Emirati advanced technology and defense conglomerate), launched the first ship of this class, with four planned in total. These vessels are the result of a partnership with Singapore-based ST Engineering that provided technologies from its Fearless-class ships.[32]   Decision-makers in the UAE have not limited their cooperation to the largest defense firms. While major companies were crucial in the initial technology transfer phase, EDGE is now actively seeking industrial agreements with smaller yet ambitious and innovative partners that can significantly expand the offerings of Emirati entities. For instance, in January 2025, EDGE signed a letter of intent with Hungary under which the UAE will supply Caracal sniper rifles to the Hungarian military – marking the first time EDGE has provided such systems to a NATO member state. Not coincidentally, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan welcomed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to Abu Dhabi at the same time.[33]   As the UAE modernizes its defense industry and actively pursues joint ventures with foreign partners, other Middle Eastern countries are likely to adopt similar strategies.[34]   Under these circumstances, several countries in the Middle East, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as Qatar, shift their focus away from the traditional US- and European-centric arms supply chain and toward South Korean defense companies. South Korea has emerged as a new strategic partner, leveraging the technological prowess and independent defense platform it has accumulated over the past several years.   Saudi Arabia and the UAE opened the door to South Korean arms manufacturers, as regional demand has been rising for weapons systems that can be delivered fast and customized to local needs and priced more competitively than their US or European counterparts.[35]   The Middle East countries have historically relied on US and Russian arms. However, they have been increasingly diversifying their weapons procurement by turning to suppliers in Europe, China, and, more recently, South Korea.   South Korean weapons appeal to many Middle Eastern countries due to their strong performance, faster delivery timelines, competitive prices, and the ability to customize systems to local needs. This South Korean approach has already produced positive results in the Middle East.   LIG Nex1’s medium-to-high altitude interceptor system, the Cheongung II, secured export contracts from the UAE in 2022, as well as from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2024. Several countries in the Middle East also consider purchases of the Cheongung II.[36]   Moreover, many Middle Eastern countries have shown interests in South Korean fighter jets, naval vessels, and submarines.   The most noteworthy South Korean weapon is the KF-21 Boramae, a 4.5th-generation fighter jet. The KF-21 is expected to be fully domestically produced in the future, and its component replacement cycle and operational and maintenance costs are lower than those of US or European aircraft. This economic feasibility and maintenance efficiency are highly attractive to Middle Eastern countries seeking to rapidly bolster their military capabilities. The UAE has expressed interest in the KF-21. The UAE Air Defense Commander Rashid Al Shamsi and his delegation visited Korea Aerospace Industries’ (KAI) headquarters in April 2025 to inspect production facilities for the KF-21 and other aircraft.   Moreover, South Korea possesses a diverse portfolio that includes not only fighter jets but also ballistic missile interception systems (e.g., the Cheongung II), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, self-propelled howitzers (K9s), maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, tanks, and armored vehicles, allowing it to flexibly respond to the complex security needs of Middle Eastern countries.[37]   The KAI has pushed additional exports of the Surion multipurpose helicopter, having already delivered two units to Iraq. “We’ve seen a sharp increase in visits and inquiries about our fighter jets and helicopters, especially from Middle Eastern countries,” a KAI representative said. “We will focus on country-specific strategies for countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia to secure final export deals.”[38]   Saudi Arabian Navy has showed strong interest in Hanwha Ocean’s 3,600-ton Jangbogo-III Batch-II submarine. Saudi Arabian Navy Chief of Staff Faisal al-Gharibi visited the 2025 International Maritime Defense Industry Exhibition in Busan on May 28, 2025, showing particular interest in Hanwha Ocean’s  Jangbogo-III Batch-II submarine. The Saudi delegation also visited HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ booth, where they inquired about the export readiness of a 6,500-ton frigate on display. 4. Introduction of major South Korean weapons to become the game changer in the Middle East   This paper first introduces South Korean weapons that have the potential to be exported to the Middle East and then shows weapons that were already exported to the Middle Eastern and other countries.   1.M-Sam Block (천궁)   Type Medium-range, mobile surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile system Place of origin South Korea Service history In service 2015–present Production history Designer Agency for Defense Development  Almaz-Antey (Block 1) Designed Block 1: 2001–2011[2]  Block 2: 2012–2017 Block 3: 2024–In development Manufacturer Hanwha Aerospace (launcher, radar)  LIG Nex1 (missile, system) Produced Block 1: 2015–2020 Block 2: 2021–present Specifications Mass Missile: 400 kilograms (880 lb) Length 4.61 meters (15 ft 1 in) Diameter 275 millimeters (10.8 in) Engine Solid-fuel rocket motor Operational range Block 1: 40 km (25 mi) Block 2: 50 km (31 mi) Flight ceiling Block 1: 15 km (49,000 ft) Block 2: 20 km (66,000 ft) Maximum speed Mach 4.5 – Mach 5 (1,530–1,700 m/s; 5,510–6,100 km/h) Guidance system Inertial guidance with midcourse updates through datalink, terminal active radar homing   Figure 4:  M-Sam (천궁) (source: Wikipedia)   The M-SAM (Medium-range Surface-to-Air Missile, 천궁), or often called KM-SAM, is a South Korean medium range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system that was developed by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) with technical support from Almaz-Antey and Fakel, based on technology from the 9M96 missile used on S-350E and S-400 missile systems. The project was named Cheolmae-2 (Iron Hawk, 철매) during its development phase.[39] M-SAM serves as a key system in South Korea’s Air and Missile Defense (KAMD).   The KM-SAM is the middle-tier of South Korea’s three-tier aerial and missile defense system. Though it was developed in Russia by the Almaz Design Bureau in association with Samsung Thales, LIG Nex1, and Doosan DST, localization and industrialization were done in South Korea enough to consider it an indigenous Korean system. South Korea has independent export rights under international intellectual property law and does not use Russian-made parts. Therefore, export is possible regardless of international sanctions against Russia. The KM-SAM can intercept targets up to an altitude of 15 km (49,000 ft) at a range of 40 km (25 mi). It is to replace upgraded MIM-23 Hawk batteries in South Korea and be made available for export. Almaz-Antey continued with the program after prototypes were transferred and have created a distinctly Russian version called the Vityaz missile system.[40]   The South Korean Air Force revealed in mid-2015 that the KM-SAM would soon enter mass production and begin delivery to the Air Force that September, replacing the Hawk missile that had been in Korean service since 1964, which the US military retired in 2002. The system can intercept up to six targets simultaneously, and the missiles have anti-electronic warfare capabilities to keep functioning despite jamming. The system passed the military’s operational requirement verification test in July 2015, and began deployment in early 2016 near the maritime border with North Korea in the Yellow Sea.   On 28 April 2020, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) in South Korea announced that deliveries of the Cheongung KM-SAM Block-1 system to South Korean Air Force had been completed. In July 2021, South Korea retired its last MIM-23 Hawk system, phasing it out for the Cheongung Block-1.[41]   LIG Nex1 participated in International Defence Exhibition held in the UAE in 2021 and showed off the South Korean weapon system, including KM-SAM and AT-1K Raybolt.[42]   On 16 November 2021, the UAE’s Ministry of Defense tweeted that it plans to acquire the M-SAM as a “qualitative addition” to its existing air defense capabilities and that the deal could reach US$3.5 billion. An official at South Korea’s DAPA said that the announcement was "positive" but "we still need to see how negotiations on the details will proceed." On 16 January 2022, the DAPA announced that the UAE would purchase the system in a deal worth $3.5 billion. At that time, it was the largest arms export deal ever made by South Korea.[43]   In 2022, the US requested South Korea to send this missile system to Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However South Korea declined the request on the basis of its security situation.   In February 2024, the South Korean Defense Ministry announced that Saudi Arabia would purchase 10 KM-SAM Block II batteries, in a deal worth $3.2 billion.[44] In September 2024, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense signed a deal with LIG Nex1 worth $2.8 billion, in order to acquire an unspecified number of KM-SAM Block II batteries.[45]   Currently South Korean Air Force is the only operator of KM-SAM, operating KM-SAM Block I & Block II. Future operators may be Iraqi, Saudi, UAE Armed Forces (unspecified number of batteries). The Iraqi armed forces ordered Block II (unspecified number of batteries) in September 2024 for USD $2.8 billion. Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces also ordered Block II (10 batteries) in February 2024 for USD $3.2 billion. In addition, United Arab Emirates Army ordered Block II (12 batteries) in January 2023, and to be produced partially in the UAE, worth USD $3.5 billion.[46]   Figure 5: on May 13, 2025, the UAE officially unveiled M-SAM II (source: https://en.topwar.ru/264565-oaje-oficialno-predstavili-zakuplennuju-ranee-v-juzhnoj-koree-sistemu-perehvata-ballisticheskih-raket-m-sam-ii.html)   The South Korean government recently took two major steps toward strengthening its air defense shield against attack from North Korea’s ballistic-missile arsenal. First, on 28 July 2025, the South Korean government announced that it had deployed a first Medium Surface-to-Air Missile (M-SAM) Block II system after it had been upgraded from a Block I. Secondly, on 1 August 2025, the government revealed that it had awarded contracts for development of the M-SAM Block III (also known as the Cheongung-III) as its next-generation air defense system.[47]   Original Cheongung-I missiles, in a mobile, medium-range system focused on aircraft threats, were fielded in 2016. Since then, the South Korean government has pursued a phased improvement program rather than developing entirely new systems.   The South Korean Air Force formally deployed its first new-build M-SAM Block II batteries in 2023, with each battery containing 32 missiles that possess an anti-ballistic capability. The latest milestone covered the upgrade of Block I systems into the Block II.[48]   The Cheongung-II is a key element of the multi-layered South Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) network. It addresses both fixed-wing aircraft and high-speed, maneuvering missile threats. The Cheongung-II has a hit-to-kill capability and improved low-altitude target detection, plus it allows multi-target engagements, thus increasing response to saturation or complex attacks.[49]   The Block II system uses a ground-based, multifunction, X-band, 3D, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with a 100km range; it is capable of tracking up to 40 targets simultaneously. Detection or jamming of the radar is minimized by employing electronic beam steering and reducing sidelobe emissions.[50]   The interceptor missiles employ active radar guidance in their terminal phase. Each has a range of 40km at altitudes of up to 15km. An M-SAM Block II battery consists of a truck-mounted AESA radar, a command post vehicle and four eight-cell missile launchers.   The upgrade path to the future Cheongung-III, which should be completed by 2034, will realize similar cost savings as occurred with the Block II.   The primary contract award to LIG Nex1 involves development of the engagement control system, command-and-control unit, interceptor missile and full system integration. Hanwha, although not selected as a prime contractor, will provide missile launchers, propulsion system and multifunction radars.   The Block III program is valued at KRW3 trillion (US$2.2 billion), and it will extend the current system’s capabilities by intercepting envisioned future ballistic-missile threats. It will have five times the operational range and increase the engagement altitude to 30km. The solid-fuel missile will achieve speeds of Mach 4.5, and use inertial guidance and active radar homing to address both short- and medium-range targets.[51]   The density and multi-layered structure of the KAMD network reflect South Korea’s clear appreciation of the threat posed by North Korea and its anticipated attack tactics.   Continued development of indigenous defense systems also demonstrates the country’s commitment to increased self-reliance and to establishing itself as a top-tier exporter of defense equipment.   The new system, upon completion, will upgrade the multi-layered defense network alongside other defense systems, such as the Cheongung-II and L-SAM systems. “We will develop the M-SAM Block-III system that satisfies both performance and price to ensure it contributes to strengthening our competitiveness in exports,” said DAPA Vice Commissioner Kang Hwan-seok.[52]   The M-SAM system (Cheongung)with this high quality is comparable to US Patriot system and Israeli Iron Dome. This paper compares M-Sam 2, Patriot (PAC-3) and Iron Dome. As Table 3 shows, M-Sam 2, Patriot (PAC-3) and Iron Dome have their own strengths and weaknesses. M-Sam 2 is better than Patriot (PAC-3) and Iron Dome in terms of high interception capability, high mobility, and low cost of purchase & maintenance. For more information about the M-SAM system, please watch the following Youtube videos:   الدفاع الجوي M SAM II الذي تعاقد علية العراق   Saudi Arabia Ordered Multi-Function Radar for Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile from South Korean   UAE STRENGTHENS AIR DEFENSE IN 2025 — M-SAM II NOW INTEGRATED WITH PAC-3 & THAAD SYSTEMS   Table 3: Comparison of M-Sam 2 (천궁 II), Patriot (PAC-3), and the Iron Dome   Name of system M-Sam 2 Patriot (PAC-3), The Iron Dome Country of Origin South Korea USA Israel Period of use 2017-current (with ABM capabilities) 2009-current 2011-current Intercept Terminal Terminal Terminal Role against SRBM SRBM, MRBM Short-range rockets, artillery shells, drones Range (Max) Up to 50 km Up to 160 km Up to 70 km Ceiling (Max) 20km 24km + 10km Speed Mach 4.5+ 6,170 km/h (3,830 mph) Mach 2.2 Cost Export cost for Saudi Arabia, 10 batteries for US$ $3.2 billion, 2024 Export cost: US$2.37–2.5 billion for battery; US$6–10 million (FY 2018) for a single missile $50 million per battery; $100,000–150,000 per interception Interception success rate 100% (claim). No real war records 95% (claim). Operational experience in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing problem: on June 28, 2025, seven Russian ballistic missiles were fired, with one intercepted. above 90% (claim) Strength High interception capability, High mobility, low cost of purchase & maintenance Long-range interception, wide defense range, effectiveness against a wide range of targets, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. Extensive real combat experience Extensive real combat experience Weakness Limited range, No real combat experience High cost of purchase & maintenance, lack of full 360-degree radar coverage, difficulty with hypersonic threats and saturation attacks Limited range, difficulty with saturation attacks & long-range ballistic missiles with larger and more powerful warheads, not effective against very short-range rockets that are fired from close proximity. (source: Wikipedia & https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_anti-ballistic_missile_systems, & https://gallery.modernengineeringmarvels.com/2025/10/09/russias-missile-maneuvers-expose-patriot-defense-weakness/, & https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/irondome-flaws-system/)   2. KUH-1 Surion General information Type Medium utility helicopter Role Transport National origin South Korea Manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries Designer Agency for Defense Development (mission equipment package)  Korea Aerospace Industries (with technical assistance from Eurocopter) Status In service Primary users Republic of Korea Army National Police Agency (South Korea) Number built 218+ (including derivatives) History Introduction date 22 May 2013 First flight 10 March 2010 In service 2013–present Developed from Eurocopter AS332 Super Puma Figure 6: KUH-1 Surion (source: Wikipedia)   The KUH-1 Surion is a twin-engine, transport utility helicopter developed primarily by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) jointly with Eurocopter. In 2006, the research and development phase of the Korea Helicopter Project - Korea Utility Helicopter (KHP-KUH), costing around ₩1.3 trillion (equivalent to ₩1.67 trillion or US$1.48 billion in 2017), was launched by the Agency for Defense Development.[53]   In June 2008, KAI announced that the first prototype KUH was to be rolled in the following month and that ground tests would begin later that year. The KAI stated that it aimed to conduct the type’s first flight in early 2010 and that the first production aircraft would be delivered in 2013.[54] In August 2009, the first prototype was introduced by President Lee Myung-bak at an unveiling ceremony in Sacheon, South Korea.   On 10 March 2010, KAI announced that a prototype had performed the maiden flight of the Surion. Two test pilots and an engineer performed a series of taxiing and hovering maneuvers, as well as a stationary hover at 30 ft (9.1m), during this initial flight.[55] In May 2010, following three months of flight testing, the prototype performed its first public flight demonstration.[56] In January 2011, Eurocopter and KAI established a joint venture, KAI-EC, for the purposes of marketing the Surion and handling export sales. At the time, it was envisioned that 250-300 units would be sold worldwide by 2021. In December 2012, deliveries of the first Surion model began. In February 2013, low temperature testing in Alaska, US, was completed, leading to development of the KUH-1 Surion being formally recognized as completed in March.[57] In 2012, full-scale production of the Surion began. KAI became the principal manufacturer of the type.   An initial force of around 245 Surions have been ordered by the South Korean Army to replace their aging fleets of UH-1H utility helicopters and 500MD light utility helicopters, which have been in service for decades. KAI will also construct civilian and law enforcement variants of the helicopter.[58]   KAI has offered the Surion to international markets for military and civilian purposes. In late 2013, it was reported that KAI had received requests for proposals regarding the Surion from two South American nations and another Asian nation; at the time, KAI stated that the company hoped to sell 60–120 Surions over the following 15–20 years.[59] International marketing efforts were expected to escalate in 2017, as prior to this point the overwhelming priority had been to fully develop the Surion to conform with existing domestic requirements and roles. KAI has deliberately focused on marketing the Surion to countries in which previous export success had been found for the KAI T-50 Golden Eagle and KAI KT-1 Woongbi trainer aircraft.[60]   KUH-1 export version prototype helicopter was unveiled at the Seoul ADEX in 2019. The new prototype helicopter was developed over four years to meet requirements of foreign customers. This helicopter for export was equipped with a GARMIN G5000H avionics suite, and this equipment strengthened airframe/structures for the installation of external fuel tanks and a weapons wing pylon. It can accommodate VIPs and passengers with enhanced interior and Bluetooth/wi-fi connectivity.   The Korea Utility Helicopter (KUH-1), the Surion, successfully achieved mass production by applying the concurrent engineering design concept, which involved simultaneous design and prototype development. Designed with the Korean Peninsula’s weather and mountainous terrain in mind, the Surion was developed to hover even at high altitudes, such as Mount Baekdu. This makes it a multi-purpose helicopter capable of conducting air operations throughout the Korean Peninsula and various support missions, including airlifting personnel and cargo to high altitudes.[61]   To counter enemy attacks in battlefield environments, critical flight safety components for the Surion, including the rotor system, cockpit, engine, and fuel tank, were designed with ballistic resistance. The rotor blades maintained their functionality even after a hit, ensuring the helicopter’s safe return. The windshield was designed to contain and prevent fragments from dispersing in the event of an external impact, ensuring pilot safety.   The fuel tank sealed itself in the event of a hit to prevent fuel leakage and explosion, and the engine was equipped with a Full-Factor Engine Control Unit (FADEC). The control system employed a dual-compensation design, allowing a backup system to operate in the event of a failure. The main gearbox can operate without lubrication for 30 minutes in an emergency. Furthermore, the integrated digital instrument panel (Glass Cockpit) enhanced pilot convenience. Equipped with a four-axis autopilot and digital power control, the aircraft can autonomously fly to a tactical target point after takeoff, enabling tactical missions even at night and in adverse weather conditions. It also features automatic hover capability.[62]   Current operators of KUH-1 Surions are South Korean Army, Marine Corps and Korea Coast Guard. South Korean government agencies such as National Police Agency, Korea Forest Service, Jeju Fire Department, and Korea Aerospace Industries also operate KUH-1 Surions. Potential customers of KUH-1 Surions are Vietnam and Iraq:   Vietnam: In mid-2023, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Viettel Aerospace Institute (VTX) to “cooperate in developing and producing helicopters.” By that, KAI and VTX plan to collaborate on the development and production of helicopter’s rotary wings. The agreement is expected to boost KAI’s presence in the Southeast Asian helicopter market while eventually making Vietnam a very potential customer of the Surion.[63]   Iraq: In August 2024, Korean media reported that a high-ranking Iraqi Army official, Lieutenant General Samir Zaki Hussein Al-Maliki, commander of Iraq’s Army Aviation Command, embarked on a four-day visit to South Korea. The official’s visit to South Korea coincides with Iraq’s exploration of potential acquisitions to modernize its military assets. While Iraq previously secured a deal with KAI for the procurement of 24 FA-50 light attack aircraft in 2013, discussions regarding the Surion helicopter mark a new avenue for collaboration between the two nations. In December 2024, the KAI signed a US$93.7 million deal to export the Surion to Iraq. Under the deal, KAI will supply 2 KUH-1 helicopters to the Iraqi government by March 2029.[64] 3. KF-21   General information Type Block 1: Air superiority fighter  Block 2: Multirole combat aircraft, air superiority fighter  Block 3: Stealth strike fighter, multirole combat aircraft, air superiority fighter National origin South Korea Manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries Designer Agency for Defense Development Primary user Republic of Korea Air Force, Republic of Indonesia Air Force Number built 6 prototypes History Introduction date 2026 (planned) First flight 19 July 2022   Figure 7: KF 21 (source: Wikipedia)   The KF-21 Boramae (KF-21 보라매) is a South Korean fighter aircraft development program with the initial goal of producing multirole fighters for South Korean Air Force. The airframe uses stealth technology but carries weapons externally, and features such as internal bays will be introduced later with KF-21EX program.[65] The KAI KF-X is South Korea’s second domestic fighter jet development program, following the FA-50.[66]   In April 2021, the first prototype was completed and unveiled during a rollout ceremony at the headquarters of KAI in Sacheon. It was named the Boramae. The first test flight was on 19 July 2022. The serial production started in July 2024. 40 aircraft were planned to be delivered by 2028, with South Korean Air Force expecting to deploy 120 of the aircraft by 2032.[67] It will also be available for export. South Korea will begin replacing its F-4D/E Phantom II and F-5E/F Tiger II jets with KF-21s. Later, F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15EX Eagle IIs will also be replaced.[68]   The KF-21’s specifications are as impressive as its development speed. This jet can reach a speed of Mach 1.8 (or 1,400 miles per hour), has a ceiling of 50,000 feet, and can carry 17,000 pounds of ordnance.[69]   The KF-21 also has an advanced suite of avionics and other electronics, like an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar; a cutting-edge system that uses thousands of tiny antennas to rapidly scan, track, and target multiple objects simultaneously. The two-seater variant is expected to be capable of teaming with South Korea’s Low Observable Unmanned Wingman System (LOWUS), a collaborative combat aircraft under development.[70]   Despite its impressive capabilities, the KF-21 is not a 5th-gen fighter, because it does not have the same stealth capabilities as its American, Chinese, and Russian counterparts.[71] While the jet does feature an angular design to reduce its radar cross section, it lacks radar-absorbent materials (RAM) across its entire body and does not have internal weapons bays, instead relying on ten external hardpoints. Thus, KAI and analysts often refer to the KF-21 as a “4.5 generation” fighter — in other words, an advanced 4th-gen fighter with some 5th-gen characteristics.   But that may not be the case for long. KAI announced that it intends to upgrade a version of the KF-21 to a full stealth fighter. Dubbed the KF-21EX, these upgrades will include internal weapons bays, more advanced RAM coatings, conformal antennas (flat sensors embedded in the airframe’s skin that replace protruding antennas), and possibly low-observable exhaust nozzles for engine exhaust and infrared signature reduction. Internal weapons bays are important for a 5th-generation fighter because external weapons produce sizable radar returns.   The KF-21EX may be available by the late 2030s or early 2040s. South Korea’s Air Force signed its first contract for 20 KF-21s in 2024, with deliveries expected between the end of 2026 and summer of 2027. A second order of 20 more is expected to come by the end of this year. The country hopes to acquire 120 of the jets by 2032.[72]   Based on the final basic design (C109) released in late 2018, the KF-21 is a medium-sized fighter jet. The KF-21is larger than smaller fighters like the F-16 or JAS 39 Gripen, but is smaller than larger fighters like the F/A-18E/F, F-15, and F-22, and is comparable in weight to the Dassault Rafale, MiG-35, Eurofighter Typhoon, and F/A-18C/D.[73]   The KF-21 is smaller and lighter than the F/A-18E/F, which uses the same F414-GE-400 engine, and has the advantage of lower wing loading than the F-35, which has a similar thrust rating. Thanks to this, the thrust-to-weight ratio is comparable to that of the Eurofighter Typhoon, and with the application of triple digital FBW, LEX (Leading Edge eXtension), and variable camber wings, it is expected to demonstrate high acceleration, turning ability, and high angle of attack maneuverability. The subjective evaluation of current test pilots is that its maneuverability is similar to or better than that of the F-16. The speed is Mach 1.8 or higher. To ensure survivability in future battlefields, the KF-21 has a low-observable shape design, including a reflection angle alignment design, a flush antenna, S-Duct, a flat fuselage, and a semi-recessed weapons bay. RAM is applied to the canopy, wings, and tail, and RAS is applied to the ducts and flaps inside the fuselage. Frequency-selective surface technology is applied to the radome to prevent radar waves from enemy fighters from reflecting back onto the antenna.[74]   As befitting a cutting-edge 4.5-generation fighter, the KF-21 incorporates sensor fusion technology. This technology integrates various sensors, including an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, along with information shared via the AESA radar, IRST, EOTGP, and datalink. This technology determines whether a target is the same target, calculates the target’s flight trajectory, and displays it to the pilot via the radar-activated display (LAD). The IRST and EOTGP are developed based on Leonardo's PIRATE IRST, used on the Eurofighter Typhoon, and Lockheed Martin’s Sniper Targeting Pod, used on fighters such as the F-15K. Contrary to popular belief, the EOTGP is also used in air-to-air missions, enabling more effective detection of enemy aircraft through IRST and sensor fusion, much like the Rafale's Front Sector Optronics (FSO).[75]   The Multi-Function Radar developed by Hanwha Systems is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, and its performance is developed with the goal of being equal to or superior to that of the AN/APG-81. It can detect/track more than 20 targets simultaneously, and supports simultaneous air-to-air/air-to-ground/air-to-ship search modes, air-to-ground SAR mode, air-to-air tracking mode, and LPI mode. The radar signal processing computer was developed by Intellics, a South Korean company, and is equipped with OpenCL for high-speed calculations. It provides a total processing performance of 25 TFLOPS by installing eight of the latest high-performance FPGA Virtex 7, server-grade CPU Intel XEON D, and MXM type AMD Radeon E8950 MXM GPUs in parallel, which is a 47% improvement compared to the 17 TFLOPS of the Mercury product installed on the F-35. By applying this low-observable technology, it achieved a lower RCS than the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and at the time of exploration and development, it was predicted that the combat effectiveness would be 4.1 times that of the F-16, 1.2 times that of the F/A-18E/F, and 1.3 times that of the F-16C.[76]   Currently KF-21 is operated only in South Korea, but potential operators of KF-21 are as follows: Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Poland, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Because this paper focuses on Middle East countries, it explains only Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.   Egypt is regarded as a potential purchaser of the FA-50, as well as the newly-developed KF-21 Boramae fighter jet.[77]   Saudi Arabia is seen as another potential purchaser of KF-21. On 30 January 2024, a South Korean Defense Ministry official stated that senior representatives from the Ministry and the Agency for Defense Development made an unannounced visit to Saudi Arabia from 23 to 26 January, 2024. During the visit, the South Korean delegation met with Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Defense Minister, Dr. Khalid bin Hussein Al-Biyari, and other officials to discuss the potential joint development of a 5th or 6th generation multi-role fighter based on the KAI KF-21 Boramae design.[78]   On July 29, 2025, Royal Saudi Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Turki bin Bandar bin Abdulaziz met with South Korean Air Force General Lee Young-soo. The two Generals discussed military cooperation and topics of mutual interest, including potential Saudi involvement in the KF-21 Boramae fighter jet project.   On August 14, 2025, officials from Saudi military company SAMI Aerospace held a meeting with the Chief of Staff of South Korean Air Force to talk about boosting their partnership in the aviation sector.[79]   To strengthen its position in developing and exporting next-generation combat aircraft, South Korea has proposed joint development of the KF-21 and its successor to several countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, with a particular focus on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.   On 15 May 2024, senior air force officials from South Korea and the UAE signed a letter of intent for comprehensive cooperation on South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae program. The agreement was signed by South Korean Air Force General Lee Young-su and UAE Air Force and Air Defense Commander General Rashed Mohammed A.[80]   In April 2025, the United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defense, and the South Korean Air Force signed a letter of intent to further their cooperation on the program.   On July 7, 2025, a friendship flight took place at Sacheon Air Base in South Korea, involving high-ranking officials from both South Korean Air Force and the United Arab Emirates. South Korean Air Force General Lee Young-su piloted an FA-50 fighter jet, while UAE Assistant Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense, Ibrahim Nasser Mohamed Al Alawi, flew in a prototype of the KF-21 Boramae fighter.[81]   4. KSS-III submarine    Class overview Builders ·Hanwha Ocean ·HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Operators  Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) Preceded by Son Won-il class (Type 214 submarine) Cost USD $900,000,000 per submarine Built 2014–present In service 2021–present Planned 9 Building 3 Completed 3 Active 3 General characteristics Type Attack submarine with ballistic missile launching capabilities Displacement ·Batch-I:- ·3,358 t (3,305 long tons) (Surfaced) ·3,750 t (3,690 long tons) (Submerged) ·Batch-II:- ·3,600 t (3,500 long tons) (Surfaced) ·4,000 t (3,900 long tons) (Submerged) Length ·Batch-I:- ·83.5 m (273 ft 11 in) ·Batch-II:- ·89.3 m (293 ft 0 in) Beam ·Batch-I/II:- ·9.6 m (31 ft 6 in) Draught ·Batch-I:- ·7.62 m (25 ft 0 in) Propulsion ·Batch-I:- ·Diesel-electric propulsion ·Air-independent propulsion (AIP) ·3 × MTU 16V396SE84L marine diesel engines ·4 × Bumhan Industries PH1 PEM fuel cells, each with 150 kW ·Batch-II:- ·Diesel-electric propulsion ·Air-independent propulsion ·Samsung SDI lithium-ion fuel cells Speed ·12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph) (surfaced) ·20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph) (submerged) Range 10,000 nmi (19,000 km; 12,000 mi) Endurance 20+ days (submerged) Complement 50 Sensors & processing systems ·Combat suite: ·Hanwha-developed "Combat Management System" (CMS) ·Sonar: ·LIG Nex1-developed sonar suite ·Thales-developed mine-avoidance sonar ·Electronic warfare: ·Indra-developed radar electronic support measurement (RESM) ·Other processing systems: ·Safran-developed "Series 30" optronic surveillance mast ·Babcock-developed "Weapons Handling and Launch System" (WHLS) ·ECA Group-developed steering consoles Armament ·Batch-I:- ·6 × 533 mm (21 in) torpedo tubes o        LIG Nex1 K761 Tiger Shark heavyweight torpedoes ·6 × K-VLS cells o        6 × Hyunmoo 4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile ·Batch-II:- ·10 × K-VLS cells o        10 × Hyunmoo 4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile o        Chonryong land attack cruise missile Notes First-ever AIP-equipped submarine capable of launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).   Figure 8: KSS-III 잠수함 (source: Wikipedia)   The KSS-III (잠수함) is a series of diesel-electric attack and ballistic missile submarines that are currently being built for South Korean Navy, jointly by Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The KSS-III is the final phase of the South Korean Attack Submarine program, a three-phased program to build 27 attack submarines for the South Korean Navy, between 1994–2029.[82]   The KSS-III initiative consists of the development of nine diesel-electric attack submarines, capable of firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), to be built in three batches, between 2014–2029.[83]   A total of three submarines of the first batch of the series have been launched, with the first submarine, ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, commissioned on 13 August 2019. The second ship, ROKS Ahn Mu, was commissioned on 20 April 2023.   On October 30th, 2024, a steel-cutting ceremony for the third and final vessel of the KSS-III Batch-II submarine took place at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyards. The KSS-III Batch-II submarine, designed and constructed with domestic technology, is the latest and most advanced diesel submarine for the South Korean Navy.[84]   The KSS-III Batch-II, with a displacement of 3,600 tons (surfaced), is 5.5 meters longer than the previous KSS-III Batch-I submarines and is equipped with 10 VLS cells for launching Hyunmoo-IV-4 SLBMs. Additionally, the Batch-II features enhanced combat and sonar systems for improved detection and targeting capabilities, along with a lithium battery system that enables extended underwater operations, making it a core asset in safeguarding national security.[85]   In addition to enhanced sensors and weapon systems, the KSS-III Batch-II is also expected to operate an Anti-Submarine Warfare Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (ASWUUV), currently being co-developed by Hanwha Systems and the Agency for Defense Development. The incorporation of a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) system is anticipated to extend the operational range and enhance the combat capability of its carrier by remaining underwater for extended periods to detect enemy submarines in advance, thereby ensuring the survivability of manned combat vessels. Moreover, with variable operational depth control, the UUV will effectively monitor and gather intelligence on underwater threats. The ASWUUV is planned to be operational with the South Korean Navy by 2030.[86]   The KSS-III Batch-II has also extended its localization rate to over 80% by incorporating more than 70 types of domestically developed and built equipment. With more accessible maintenance, South Korean Navy is expected to achieve more stable submarine operations, while for the shipbuilding industry, this provides a more manageable construction process for future exports, anticipated to boost defense exports.[87]   Current Operators of the KSS-III submarines are South Korean Navy - Three in service, out of a total of nine planned. Potential operators are Royal Canadian Navy - up to twelve conventionally-powered submarines are planned to replace the Victoria class submarines, with long-range patrols being a key factor. The Hanwha has emerged as a frontrunner, formally responding to the request for information by its deadline of 18 November, 2024, offering to have the first in class launched by 2030 and the first four by 2035. Hyundai Heavy Industries made a partner offer to supply artillery, likely the K9 Thunder.[88] On 26 August 2025, the KSS-III was shortlisted as the only qualified options alongside the TKMS Type 212CD developed by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems.[89]   5. K 2 Black Panther (K 2 tanks)   Service history In service 2014–present Production history Designer Agency for Defense Development  Doosan Mottrol  Hyundai Rotem  Poongsan Corporation  Samsung Thales  Samyang Comtech  WIA Designed 1995–2008 Manufacturer Hyundai Rotem Unit cost ₩7.8 billion (production batch  US$8.5 million (constant 2009 USD) Produced 2008–present No. built · Republic of Korea Army: Batch I: 100, Batch II: 106, Batch III: 54, Batch IV: 150 (ordered) · Polish Land Forces: Batch I: 180 (ordered), Batch II: 180 (ordered) · Total: 440 Specifications Mass Curb weight: 55 metric tons (54 long tons; 61 short tons) Combat weight: 56 metric tons (55 long tons; 62 short tons) Length Overall: 10.8 meters (35 ft 5 in)  Chassis: 7.5 meters (24 ft 7 in) Width 3.6 meters (11 ft 10 in) Height Highest: 2.4 meters (7 ft 10 in) Lowest: 2 meters (6 ft 7 in) Crew 3 (commander, gunner and driver) Armor MIL-12560H armor steel and silicon carbide non-oxide ceramic plate along with ERA and NERA modular add-on armor Main armament Hyundai WIA CN08 120 mm 55 caliber smoothbore gun (40 rounds) Secondary armament 1× 12.7×99mm (.50 BMG) K6 heavy machine gun (3,200 rounds) 1× 7.62×51mm NATO coaxial machine gun (12,000 rounds) Engine · Batch I: STX Engine/MTU Friedrichshafen MT883 Ka-501 4-short stroke, 12-cylinder water-cooled diesel, dry weight: 2,064 kg 1,500 hp (1,103 kW)· Batch II-IV: HD Hyundai Infracore DV27K 4-long stroke, 12-cylinder water-cooled diesel, dry weight: 2,550 kg 1,500 hp (1,110 kW)] Power/weight 27.3 hp/t (20.35 kW/t) Transmission · Batch I-II: RENK HSWL 295 TM (5 forward, 5 reverse gears), dry weight: 2,450 kg · Batch III-IV: SNT Dynamics EST15K (6 forward, 3 reverse gears, in development), dry weight: 2,500 kg Suspension Semi-active in-arm suspension unit (ISU) with dynamic track tension system (DTTS) Fuel capacity 1,296 liters (342 U.S. gal) Operational range 450 km (280 mi) Maximum speed Paved road: 70 km/h (43 mph) Cross country: 50 km/h (31 mph) Acceleration from 0–32 km/h (0–20 mph) in 7.47 seconds (MT883 Ka-501) or 8.77 seconds (DV27K)   Figure 9: K2 Black Panther (source: Wikipedia)   K2 Black Panther (K-2 흑표 tank) is a South Korean fourth-generation main tank,  manufactured by Hyundai Rotem.   The K2 Black Panther has an advanced fire-control system, in-arm suspension, laser rangefinder, a radar, and crosswind sensor for lock-on targeting. The K2’s thermographic camera tracks target up to 9.8 km, and its millimeter-band radar acts as a Missile Approach Warning System, enhancing situational awareness. And its soft-kill active protection system deploys smoke grenades to counter incoming projectiles. The K2’s autoloader reduces crew size from 4 to 3, thereby providing a faster rate of fire, better fuel efficiency, and lower maintenance costs compared to other western main tanks requiring human loaders. In addition, the K2 can operate in indirect fire mode, offering key advantages over Western designs.[90]   The K2’s production started in 2008 and its mass production began in 2013. The first K2 tanks were deployed to South Korean army in July 2014.[91]   The K2 Black Panthers were exported to Turkey and Poland. The potential operators of K2 Black Panthers are Armenia, Egypt, Morocco, Peru, Romania, and Slovakia.   a. Turkey   In June 2007, South Korea and Turkey negotiated a deal worth $540 million that included South Korea’s support for the development of Turkey’s Altay battle tank.   On July 29, 2008, Hyundai Rotem and Turkey’s Otokar (Turkish defense firm) signed a contract to provide design assistance and technology transfer for the Altay tank project. This collaboration included systems integration, critical design elements, and manufacturing expertise from South Korea, specifically tailored to develop Turkey’s domestic manufacturing capabilities.   South Korea’s contributions to the Altay’s development included the transfer of manufacturing technologies for critical components. Hyundai Rotem played a central role in the system design and integration process, and Hyundai WIA provided the 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun technology. Poongsan Corporation supported the development of ballistic protection systems, while Samyang Comtech shared expertise in advanced armor materials. These collective efforts laid the foundation for Turkey’s capabilities in producing the Altay tank.[92]   This cooperation extended beyond technical support, encompassing assistance in establishing production lines for key subsystems. Hyundai Rotem guided Otokar in tank systems development, while MKEK (Turkish mechanical and chemical corporation) received tank gun production technologies. Roketsan (Turkish defense firm) was supported in the design and manufacturing of advanced armor packages. These collaborative efforts were instrumental in the development of prototypes PV1 and PV2, finalized in 2015, and the Altay project's official completion in 2016.[93]   On 10 March 2021, BMC, the Turkish contractor responsible for the production of Altay tanks, made a decision to import engines and transmissions from South Korea to address production delays. Seven months later, on 22 October 2021, South Korea’s DAPA approved the export of Hyundai Doosan Infracore (now HD Hyundai Infracore) DV27K engines and SNT Dynamics EST15K transmissions to Turkey. In August 2022, durability testing of the powerpack, combining the DV27K engine and EST15K transmission from South Korea, was successfully completed. Following this success, the first batch of Altay tanks will be produced using this Korean powerpack including engines from HD Hyundai Infracore and transmissions by SNT Dynamics. The tank is in production according to the Turkish media.[94] In 2025, mass production of the Altay tank officially started on 5 September, 2025.   b. Poland   In January 2020, Poland announced negotiations with Hyundai Rotem for license production of the K2 Black Panther for the Polish Army.   On 13 June 2022, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced that it had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to buy at least 180 K2 tanks for the Polish military.   On 27 July 2022, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hyundai Rotem signed a framework agreement to provide 180 K2s and 820 K2PLs. The contract included rapid arms supply and extensive technology transfer from South Korea. According to the contract, 180 K2s will be produced in South Korea and delivered to Poland starting in 2022, and 820 K2PLs will be produced in Poland under license beginning in 2026.[95]   On 26 August 2022, the first executive agreement worth $3.37 billion was signed to procure 180 K2s in Morąg in northern Poland. The contract included logistics packages, training programs, explosive reactive armor packages, 50,000 120 mm, 4.3 million 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition for the K2. Soldiers of the 16th Mechanized Division of the Polish Army were sent to South Korea in October 2022 to participate in the training program. The 180 K2 tanks will be delivered during the period of 2022-2025 and then be deployed to the 20th Mechanized Brigade, 15th Mechanized Brigade, and 9th Armored Cavalry Brigade in Poland.[96]   On 7 September 2022, PGZ and Hyundai Rotem signed a partnership agreement to develop and produce tanks, armored vehicles and ground unmanned systems. The contract included joint cooperation in building manufacturing facilities in Poland for the production and maintenance of 1000 K2 tanks and the production of K3 next-generation battle tanks. The facilities to be built in Poland will be used as a hub in Europe for the sale and maintenance of Hyundai Rotem’s armed vehicles and tanks.   On 5 December 2022, the first 10 K2 tanks arrived in Poland, just “six months” after the signing of the agreement. The tanks were delivered to the 20th Mechanized Brigade of the 16th Mechanized Division on 9 December 2022.   On 31 March 2023, the Polish Ministry of Defense signed a foundational agreement with Hyundai Rotem for a consortium to produce K2PL in Poznań.   6. The K9 Thunder (K 9 howitzer)   Service history In service K9: 1999–present K9A1: 2018–present Wars Bombardment of Yeonpyeong in South Korea Production history Designer ●     Agency for Defense Development (main developer) ●     Samsung Aerospace Industries (integration and production) ●     Kia Heavy Industry (main armament) ●     Dongmyeong Heavy Industries (turret and suspension) ●     Poongsan Corporation (ammunition) Designed 1989–1998 Manufacturer ●     Samsung Aerospace Industries (1998–2000) ●     Samsung Techwin (2000–2015) ●     Hanwha Techwin (2015–2017) ●     Hanwha Land Systems (2017–2019) ●     Hanwha Defense (2019–2022) ●     Hanwha Aerospace (2022–present) Unit cost 4 billion KRW (ROK Armed Forces, 2021) Produced K9: 1998–2018 K9A1: 2018–present No. built 1,900 (2025) Specifications Mass K9 & K9A1: 47 t (46 long tons; 52 short tons), combat K9A2: 48.5 t (47.7 long tons; 53.5 short tons), combat, with metal track Length Overall: 12 m (39 ft 4 in) Hull: 7.44 m (24 ft 5 in) Width 3.4 m (11 ft 2 in) Height 2.73 m (8 ft 11 in) Crew K9 & K9A1: 5 (commander, driver, gunner, assistant gunner, loader) K9A2: 3 (commander, driver, gunner) Maximum firing range 18 km (M107, HE) 30 km (M549A1, RAP/HE) 36 km (K310, BB/DP-ICM) 41 km (K307, BB/HE) 54 km (K315, LAP/HE) Sights Panoramic scope (manual mode) Safran MINEO DFSS (option) Armor POSCO MIL-12560H armor steel (South Korean produced variants only, after 2022) Bisalloy armour steel (foreign licensed variants, after 2022) Spall liner (option)  Plasan add-on armor (option) Main armament Hyundai WIA CN98 155 mm 52 caliber, 48 rounds Secondary armament SNT Dynamics K6 12.7x99 mm NATO HMG Engine STX Engine/MTU Friedrichshafen MT881Ka-500 8-cylinder water-cooled diesel engine 735 kW (1,000 hp) @ 2,700 rpm STX Engine SMV1000 8-cylinder water-cooled diesel engine 735 kW (1,000 hp) @ 2,700 rpm (available since 2024) Power/weight 21.3 hp/t (15.88 kW/t) Transmission SNT Dynamics/Allison Transmission X1100-5A3 4 forward, 2 reverse Suspension Mottrol/Horstman Hydropneumatic Suspension Unit (HSU)  Travel distance: ≤ 275 mm Dead weight: 40–45 kN Ground clearance 410 mm (16 in) longitudinal slope: 60 % lateral slope: 30 % vertical: 0.75 m trench: 2.8 m fording: 1.5 m Fuel capacity 850 L (225 U.S. gal) Operational range 360 km (220 mi) Maximum speed 67 km/h (42 mph) Figure 10: K9 Thunder (source: Wikipedia)   The K9 Thunder is a South Korean 155 mm self-propelled howitzer designed and developed by the Agency for Defense Development and South Korean corporations including Samsung Aerospace Industries, Dongmyeong Heavy Industries, Kia Heavy Industry, and Poongsan Corporation for South Korean Armed Forces. It is now manufactured by Hanwha Aerospace. K9 howitzers operate in groups with the K10 ammunition resupply vehicle variant.[97]   The entire K9 fleet operated by South Korean Armed Forces has undergone upgrades to K9A1, and a further upgrade variant K9A2 is now tested for production. As of 2022, the K9 series  had a 52% share of global self-propelled howitzer market.[98]   The K-9 Thunder is superior to the US self-propelled howitzer M109A6 Paladin or the British self-propelled howitzer AS90. The Chinese PLZ-05 has poor recoil and suspension functions as revealed in the released operating video. And the performance of the Russian 2S35 Kalitsa-SV has not been verified. Compared to the German PzH2000 (currently the world’s best self-propelled howitzer), the K-9 Thunder is a cost-effective alternative, offering a similar balance of performance, range, and mobility but at a lower price, making the K-9 a highly successful export system. The main differences between K-9 and PzH2000 lie in cost and performance. The PzH 2000 has been known for its superior automation and slightly higher firing rate, while the K9 Thunder boasts excellent mobility, a better cost-performance ratio, and seamless integration with its K10 ammunition resupply vehicle.[99]   For these reasons, as Table 4 shows, the K9 Thunders were exported to a number of countries such as Turkey, India, Norway, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Australia, Egypt, and Romania.   Table 4: Countries to which K9 howitzers have been exported and the number of units under contract, 2001-2024   Country Number of contract Year of exports Name of K 9 Turkey 280 2001 T-155 Firtina Poland   120 2014 Krab 212 2022 K9 152 2023 K9 India 100 2017 K9 Vajra-T Finland 96 2017 K9 Moukari Norway 28 2017 K9 VIDAR Estonia 36 2018 K9 Kou Australia 30 2021 AS9 Huntsman Egypt 2 trillion won   2022 K9A1EGY Romania 54 2024 K9 Tunet   (source: Hanwha Aerospace)   a. Turkey   In May 1999, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea ordered its military attaché in Turkey to arrange a presentation for K9 Thunder. Although Turkey showed interest in K9 Thunder, there was no business deals made as Turkey was planning to produce German Panzerhaubitze 2000 at that time. As Turkey’s plan to build PzH2000 eventually became halted by Germany, South Korea and Turkey signed MOU to strengthen their military and defense cooperation on 18 November, 1999.[100]   On 12 December, Turkey sent a team of military general and engineers to Korea to inspect K9 Thunder. Satisfied with the K9’s performance, Turkey cancelled its plan to find replacement from Israel, and decided to manufacture K9 Thunder. On 19 February 2000, a technology evaluation team from members of the Agency of Defense Development and Samsung was sent to Turkey and inspected various Turkish companies and facilities including Turkish 1010th Army Factory, MKEK, and Aselsan to optimize manufacturing process of K9 in Turkey. On 4 May 2000, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea and Turkish Land Forces Command signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to supply 350 K9 systems untill 2011.[101]   The prototype was finally assembled on 30 December 2000, and earned the nickname Firtina (Fırtına; Storm). Winter test was held in January and February 2001 at Sarıkamış, and Firtina was able to operate in snowy mountain terrain without issue.   A formal contract was signed by Samsung Techwin (formerly Samsung Aerospace Industries) and the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Seoul on 20 July 2001. South Korean government promised to transfer the technologies of the Agency for Defense Development to  Turky for free in exchange for Turkey’ purchase of 350 vehicles—280 for Turkish Land Forces and 70 for its future customer—by 2011, which the total is expected to be $1 billion. The first 24 T-155 Firtina consisted of Korean subsystems worth $65 million. The Turkish model was named T-155 Firtina.[102]   Hanwha Defense has generated more than $600 million from Turkey since then, much lower than expected. This is because Turkey produced fewer units than planned and because Turkey  increased its localization efforts gradually by indigenous research and from technology transfer.   b. India   On 25 March 2012, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen their economic and military ties. On 29 March 2012 at DEFEXPO, Samsung Techwin and Larsen & Toubro announced their partnership to produce the K9 Thunder in India. According to the agreement, Samsung Techwin will transfer key technologies, and the vehicle will be manufactured under license in India using 50 per cent of the domestic content such as FCS and communication system.[103]   Two units of K9 were sent to Thar Desert, Rajasthan for firing and mobility test, and competed against Russian 2S19. Operated by Indian military personnel, the K9 fired 587 Indian ammunitions including Nub round and drove a total distance of 1,000 km. Maintenance test was conducted at Pune, EMI (electromagnetic interference) test at Chennai, and technical environment test was held in Bengaluru until March 2014. K9 Thunder achieved all ROC set by Indian military while the Russian counterpart failed to do so. Hanwha Techwin (previously Samsung Techwin) later told in an interview that the Russian engine performance dropped when the air density is low and in high temperature, the placement of the engine also resulted in the center of the mass located at the rear, making the vehicle difficult to climb high angles. On the other hand, K9 benefitted from automatic control system of the engine, providing the optimum performance based on given condition automatically—this was one of the decisive reason why India selected K9 over 2S19.[104]   In September 2015, the Indian Ministry of Defense selected Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro as preferred bidder to supply 100 K9 Vajra-T to the Indian Army after K9 outperformed 2S19 Msta-S and passed two-year trial. On 6 July 2016, India agreed in purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T for $750 million. On 29 March 2017, the Government of India approved budget of $646 million for purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T. A formal contract of $310 million was signed between Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro in New Delhi on 21 April. According to the contract, Hanwha Techwin will supply first 10 K9 Vajra-T, and 90 K9 will be license produced in India by Larsen & Toubro.[105]   In May 2021, it was reported that India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation was working with Larsen & Toubro on a light tank using the K9 chassis with 105 mm or 120 mm gun system to counter China’s Type 15 tank.[106]   The Indian Army planned to order an additional 40 K-9 Vajra-T from Larsen & Toubro as of 2021 after completion of high altitude trials at Ladakh under cold climatic conditions. At that time, India was also looking to export the K9 Vajra-T variant to third countries in collaboration with South Korea and its industry partners.   As per a report in 2022, the Indian MoD could place a repeat order of 200 K9 Vajra-T worth ₹9,600 crore (equivalent to ₹100 billion or US$1.2 billion in 2023) after satisfactory performance of the guns at high altitude terrain.[107]   According to a report in May 2024, the clearance for next 100 units would be approved after the formation of a new government after Indian general election in 2024. The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the purchase of 100 units on 12 December 2024.[108] The contract, worth ₹7,628.70 crore (US$900 million), was signed with Larsen & Toubro on 20 December 2024 in the South Block, New Delhi. The entire order is to be processed and delivered by the end of 2025. On 3 April 2025, Larsen &Toubro signed another contract with Hanwha Aerospace at $253 million to execute the order.[109]   c. Norway   In May 2015, Samsung Techwin joined the Norwegian artillery upgrade program to replace Norway’s M109Gs with 24 new systems, competing against the KMW Panzerhaubitze 2000, the Nexter CAESAR 6x6, and the RUAG M109 KAWEST. A single K9 was sent to Norway to join the competition. Operated by a sales team, the vehicle went through tests between November 2015 and January 2016. During the January winter test, the K9 was the only vehicle that managed to drive through meter-thick snow field and fire its weapon without any issue. Competing vehicles experienced engine troubles or broken parts.[110]   The K9’s engine was able to maintain heat overnight by simply covering the area with tarpaulin, a simple trick learned from operating experience, allowing the engine to ignite without failure the next day at an extremely cold temperature. The hydropneumatic suspension became a huge advantage for mobility, as its mechanism melted snow on mobility parts much quicker. The test result had also significant impact on Finland and Estonia to acquire K9, because the two nations were invited to observe performances for their artillery replacement.   In December 2017, a contract of $230 million was signed between Hanwha Land Systems and the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. According to the contract, Hanwha would supply 24 K9 Thunder and 6 K10 ARV by 2020. The K9 outperformed competitors in various weather and terrain conditions according to Norwegian military officials during trials.[111]   The Norwegian variant was named K9 VIDAR based on the K9A1 configuration. In November 2022, Norway decided to purchase 4 K9s and 8 K10s, increasing its total vehicles to 28 K9s and 14 K10s (2:1 ratio). The delivery was expected to be completed in 2 years.[112] In April 2025, it was announced that Norway plans to almost double its K9s by ordering an additional 24 K9s for about $534 million USD.[113]   d. Poland i) PK9 (AHS Krab with PK9 chassis)   In 1999, Poland joined NATO and launched a military program named Regina Project to replace its 152mm Soviet-era SPGs with the NATO standard 155 mm artillery system.   In December 2014, Samsung Techwin signed a cooperation agreement with Huta Stalowa Wola to supply modified K9 Thunder chassis for AHS Krab self-propelled howitzer. The deal is worth $310 million for 120 chassis, which includes related technology transfer and the power pack. From 2015 to 2022, 24 units were scheduled to be manufactured in South Korea, and 96 would be license produced in Poland. First chassis rolled out on 26 June 2015, and all 24 vehicles produced in South Korea were sent to Poland as of October 2016.[114]   Late in May 2022, the Polish government sent 18 AHS Krab howitzers to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian military to defend against Russia during the Ukraine war. On 29 May, Polish minister of defense visited South Korea for high level talks about the purchase of various Korean weapons to increase AHS Krab production. On June 7, Poland and Ukraine signed a contract for the purchase of an additional 54 units plus support vehicles, in a deal worth US$700 million. The agreement was the largest defense contract that Polish defense industry had made.[115]   On 5 September 2022, Poland ordered 48 Krabs and other support vehicles for a value of PLN 3.8 billion zlotys (USD $797 million).   On 23 December 2024, the contract worth PLN 9 billion for 96 Krabs, command vehicles, command and staff vehicles, ammunition vehicles, and repair workshops was signed. The delivery for this batch was scheduled by the end of 2029.[116]   On 8 April 2025, Huta Stalowa Wola signed a ₩402.6 billion deal with Hanwha Aerospace to supply parts and power packs for 87 AHS Krabs between 2026 and 2028.   ii) K9PL   On 27 July 2022, Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hanwha Defense signed a framework agreement to supply 672 K9PL. Hanwha Defense hoped to expand the deal by adding K10 ARV and K11 FDCV support vehicles. Poland was also expected to produce AHS Krab in parallel; however, due to the low production capability, the deliveries of the existing order will be completed by 2026. On 26 August 2022, an executive contract of $2.4 billion was signed to acquire 212 K9PL manufactured by Hanwha Defense as a Batch I order.  Under the contract, Hanwha is responsible for delivery of all 212 vehicles by 30 September 2026. Poland plans to build K9PL locally afterward via technology transfer for the Batch II. On 7 September, Hanwha Defense and WB Electronics signed a $139.5 million deal for installation of Polish communication systems on the Batch I order.[117]   The first 24 K9PL(GF) was rolled out on 19 October 2022. The delivery ceremony was held in Poland on 6 December. The first new K9PL began its construction in July 2023.[118]   On 1 December 2023, Poland and Hanwha Aerospace signed a $2.6 billion agreement for 6 Batch I K9PLs by 2025, 146 Batch II K9PLs between 2026 and 2027, and integrated logistics support for the howitzers and 155 mm ammunitions.[119]   On 4 April 2024, Hanwha Aerospace opened a European office in Warsaw and announced the integration of the K9 and Krab howitzer systems with cooperation from Huta Stalowa Wola to improve the operational and maintenance efficiency of the Polish military.   e. Finland   On 1 June 2016 at KDEC (Korea Defense Equipment & Component) industry fair, South Korea and Finland signed a MOU for defense cooperation including export of used K9. In July 2016, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that an undisclosed number of used K9s have been acquired from South Korea. In September 2016, K9 was field tested in Finland, and Seppo Toivonen, the commander of the Finnish Army, visited South Korea to inspect operating units during 2016 DX Korea. On 25 November 2016, two countries signed MOU to supply 48 used K9 for $200 million and match equal amount of free technology transfer related to vehicle maintenance.[120]   On 17 February 2017, the South Korean Ministry of Defense announced that Finland will acquire 48 used K9s over a period of seven years starting in 2018, with conscript training on the equipment begining in 2019. On 2 March 2017, final contract of value of €145 million ($160 million) was signed by two governments in Seoul, South Korea.[121]   On 21 October 2021, Finnish Ministry of Defense authorized exercising option to purchase 10 new vehicles including spare parts and supplies—5 in 2021 and another 5 in 2022—for €30 million, increasing the fleet size to 58 vehicles.[122]   On 18 November 2022 Finnish Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen authorized purchase of another 38 used vehicles for €134 million.   The official Finnish designation of the K9 howitzer is 155 PSH K9 FIN, colloquially called Moukari (meaning Sledgehammer).   On 4 March 2024, Millog, a Finnish company, signed a contract with the Finish Defense Force to upgrade 48 vehicles purchased in 2021 and 2022 at €8.1 million. The work is expected to be completed by 2030.[123]   f. Estonia   To reduce the cost for both nations, Finland invited Estonia to jointly procure the K9. In February 2017, Estonian military officials visited South Korea for price negotiations.   In June 2018, Rauno Sirk, the director of the Estonian military procurement agency, announced that Estonia would buy K9 Thunder howitzers. Hanwha Land Systems was to supply 12 used K9s for €46 million, which would cover maintenance, parts and training, as in the contract with Finland. In October 2019, the Estonian Ministry of Defense announced that it would exercise the option to purchase 6 additional K9s under the terms of this contract, at an estimated cost of €20 million.[124]   In August 2021, the Estonian Centre for Defense Investment (RKIK) signed a €4.6 million contract with Hanwha Defense and Go Craft to modernize 24 K9EST Kõu, hinting at purchasing 6 more for its inventory. The upgrade involves communication systems, a FCS, painting, fire suppression system, and electronics.[125]   In September 2022, it was reported that Estonia had purchased 24 vehicles in total. In October, the Estonian defense minister stated that Estonia would procure 12 additional K9s, bringing the total number up to 36 units. In November 2022, Go Craft opened Estonia's first private military workshop, and will start upgrading K9s. In January 2023, Estonia ordered 12 vehicles for €36 million, which will be delivered before 2026. The first Estonian edition by Go Craft was rolled out in February 2023.[126]   g. Australia   In August 2009, it was reported that the consortium of Samsung Techwin and Raytheon Australia had the upper hand for Australia’s Land 17 artillery replacement program by becoming a sole bidder, as KMW, the manufacturer of the competing Panzerhaubitze 2000, had not provided the detailed offering proposal that Australia requested.[127]   The K9 was sent to Australia and was evaluated by the Australian military starting in April 2010. The test included firing M982 Excalibur, a requirement which the K9 satisfied.   In June 2010, the K9 became the preferred bidder for the LAND 17 program, but the program was delayed. In May 2019, in the lead-up to the 2019 Federal Election, the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, announced that 30 K9 howitzers and associated support equipment, including ten K10 ammunition resupply vehicles, would be acquired for the Australian Defense Forces. No time frame was given for the purchase.[128]   In September 2020, the Minister for Defense, Linda Reynolds, announced a request for tender to locally build 30 K9s under the Land 8116 Phase 1 Protected Mobility Fires requirement. The sole-source request for tender was released to the preferred supplier, Hanwha Defense Australia, to build and maintain 30 K9s and 15 K10s, as well as their supporting systems. These would be built at Hanwha Defense Australia's Geelong facility. Australian variant AS9 Huntsman was based on Norwegian K9 VIDAR.[129]   In December 2021, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) of Australia and Hanwha Defense Australia signed a formal contract of producing 30 AS9s and 15 AS10 AARVs under license at Hanwha Defense Australia facility in Geelong. The estimated value of the deal is $788 million, and manufacturing was expected to start in Q4 2024.[130]   Production of AS9 and AS10 began in June 2023. In July, Australian army conducted tests on ammunition compatibility at the Agency for Defense Development test center in South Korea. In August, another Israeli company Epsilor was selected to supply NATO standard 6T Li-ion batteries for the howitzer.[131]   On 28 March 2024, Hanwha Aerospace announced the beginning of assembly of two AS9s and one AS10 in Changwon. The remaining 28 AS9s and 14 AS10s will be built at H-ACE in Australia.   On 23 August 2024, Hanwha Aerospace invited Korean and Australian government officials for an opening ceremony of H-ACE. The factory will start mass production of AS9 and AS10 in 2024 and deliver all vehicles to the Australian Army by 2027.[132]   In December 2024, Hanwha Aerospace delivered two AS9 and one AS10 to Hanwha Defense Australia, and the Australian military received them in January 2025.   h. Egypt   In 2010, the K9 was evaluated by the Egyptian military to replace its aging artillery fleet. The regional instability resulting from the Arab Spring revolution caused the Egyptian government to postpone the replacing project indefinitely.   In April 2017, it was reported that Hanwha Techwin was again in negotiations with Egypt to export the K9 Thunder. Hanwha Techwin sent a K9 howitzer to Egypt in July and K9 test-fired at a range located west of Cairo in August, competing with the French CAESAR, Russian 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, and Chinese PLZ-45. During the test, the K9 hit a target ship approaching to the shore, successfully performing an anti-access/area denial simulation against enemy ships for the Egyptian Navy.[133]   In October 2021, South Korea and Egypt discussed the sale of the K9 Thunder. The estimated value of the deal was $2 billion, including training of technicians.[134] In February 2022, South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced that Hanwha Defense had signed a $1.6 billion K9 Thunder export contract at Egypt's Artillery House, attended by Egypt's Ministry of National Defense and key officials from both countries. According to the DAPA, the deal provided for the production of 200 K9A1EGY and 100 K10EGY in Egypt, including technology transfer. An unknown number of the earliest vehicles in the series were to be produced in South Korea and delivered to the Egyptian Army and the Egyptian Navy.[135]   The production of the first K9A1EGY was expected in Q4 2022. At a military parade on 25 October 2023, the Egyptian Army unveiled the K9A1EGY in service with the 4th Armored Division. On 1 July 2024, Egyptian media reported that the exact number of South Korean exports was 216 K9A1EGY, 39 K10, and 51 K11. Previously, Egypt received K9A1 and K10 vehicles with 1,000 horsepower Korean-made SMV1000 engines for testing purposes.[136]   On 5 October 2024, Arab Defense reported that the Ministry of Military Production in Egypt announced local manufacturing of the SMV1000 engine by the state-owned Helwan Casting Company, also known as Military Factory 9. In addition, Egypt worked with Hanwha Aerospace in transferring manufacturing technology and installing production lines. The Military 200 became the main manufacturer, and the Military 100 would produce the CN98 cannon and armored steel. Moreover, Egypt plans to become the regional center to export the K9 Thunder system to African and Arab countries, and the Minister of Military Production confirmed negotiations with a number of countries.[137]   i. Romania   On 26 September, 2022, Romanian media reported that the Romanian military was interested in purchasing K9 Thunder and K2 Black Panther. Romania also expressed interest in the K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher and the K21 infantry fighting vehicle. In July 2023, it was reported that Romania planned to acquire 54 (3 systems of 18) K9 Thunders.[138]   On 19 June 2024, Romanian Defense Minister Angel Tîlvăr finally decided to buy 54 K9s worth ₩1.3 trillion ($920 million) during an official meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik. The Romanian version is called K9 Tunet. The first 18 vehicles are expected to completely built at the Changwon factory in South Korea, while the rest will be assembled in Romania.   On 9 July 2024, Hanwha Aerospace signed the ₩1.3 trillion contract with the Romanian Ministry to supply 54 K9s and 36 K10s, including ammunition and support equipment packages. Hanwha will deliver the vehicle from 2027 in cooperation with a local defense company in Romania. Meanwhile, Hanwha will deliver 18 K9s and 12 K10s from South Korea.[139]   j. Vietnam   The negotiation for K9 Thunder began when Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the president of Vietnam, visited South Korea for the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2022.   In March 2023, Vietnam’s highest military figure Phan Văn Giang and other officials showed interests in the K9 by visiting South Korean Army’s K9 operator unit and discussion with Hanwha Aerospace on the potential K9 procurement for the Vietnam military.[140]   In April 2024, it was reported that the Vietnam Ministry of National Defense has officially outlined the K9 procurement plan to its South Korean counterpart, with Korean officials  supporting the deal. 108 units was mentioned as the potential purchase number.   Vietnam confirmed the purchase on 11 August 2024 during Vietnam Prime Minister Tô Lâm's visit to South Korea.   7. The K239 Chunmoo (천무)   Service history In service 2015–present Production history Designer Agency for Defense Development (launcher)  Doosan DST (vehicle)  Hanwha (rocket)  Samyang Comtech (armor) Designed 2009–2013 Manufacturer ●     Hanwha Aerospace (2015–present) ●     Korea Defense Industry (2020–present) ●     Huta Stalowa Wola (2023–present) Unit cost ₩3.6 billion (US $2.94 million) per one launcher+K239L vehicle (2020) Produced 2014–present No. built 356/705 Variants Homar-K Specifications Mass 31 metric tons (31 long tons; 34 short tons) Length 9 meters (29 ft 6 in) Width 2.9 meters (9 ft 6 in) Height 3.3 meters (10 ft 10 in) Crew 3 (K239L launcher vehicle) 2 (K239T ammunition support vehicle) Caliber 131 mm (K33) 230 mm (KM26A2) 239 mm (CGR-080) 280 mm (CTM-MR/ASBM) 600 mm (CTM-290) Rate of fire 6 rds/in 30 sec (CGR-080) Effective firing range 36 km (K33) 45 km (KM26A2) 80 km (CGR-080) 160 km (CTM-MR/ASBM) 290 km (CTM-290) Armor Samyang Comtech Steel / Ceramic + Polymer Matrix Composites (STANAG 4569 Level 2) Main armament 20×2 K33 6×2 KM26A2 6×2 CGR-080 4×2 CTM-MR/ASBM 1×2 CTM-290 Engine HD Hyundai Infracore DV11K 6-cylinder water-cooled diesel engine  450 hp (340 kW) Power/weight 14.5 hp/t (10.81 kW/t) Transmission Allison Transmission 4500SP Fuel capacity 250 liters (66 U.S. gal) Operational range 450 km (280 mi) Maximum speed 80 km/h (50 mph) Guidance system GPS-aided INS Accuracy 9 m CEP (CTM-290) 15 m CEP (CGR-080)   Figure 11: K239 Chunmoo (source: Wikipedia)   The K239 Chunmoo(천무) is a rocket artillery system developed in 2013 to replace the aging K136 Kooryong(구룡) of the South Korean military. The K239 Chunmoo is a self-propelled multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) capable of firing several different guided or unguided artillery rockets. The Cheonmu has a maximum range of 80km, capable of striking North Korean coastal artillery positions near the Military Demarcation Line and even the Wonsan area. It can fire 12 rounds continuously per minute, striking 12 different targets.[141]   The Chunmoo is much better than US military’s HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) multiple rocket launcher in the ammunition capacity. The Chunmoo can fire up to 12 230mm guided missiles in single or burst bursts. Moreover, using 130mm pod-type ammunition (POD) of the same caliber as the Kooryong(구룡), the Chunmoo can fire 20 rounds per pod, for a total of 40 rounds simultaneously. It can also fire the US military’s 227mm MLRS ammunition. The wheeled Chunmoo launcher vehicle boasts excellent mobility, reaching a top speed of 80 km/h. It also has rapid response capabilities, capable of firing its first round within seven minutes of arriving at the firing point, and protection to ensure crew survivability. The Chunmoo boasts an excellent capability of carrying a wide variety of rocket types. The US Hymas, whose effectiveness was recently proven in the Ukraine war, can carry six rockets, while the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile can only carry a single rocket. However, the Chunmoo can fire 130mm rockets (36 rockets per pod), 227mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods), and 230mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods). Unguided 227mm rockets can travel up to 80km, while guided rockets can travel up to 160km, allowing them to strike all major North Korean military targets.[142]   The K239 Chunmoo(천무) were exported to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Poland.   a. United Arab Emirates (UAE)   In 2017, Hanwha Defense announced at ADEX (Aerospace & Defense Exhibition) in Seoul that it had signed a nondisclosure contract worth 700 billion won to export K239 Chunmoo to a certain country in the Middle East. Later it was revealed that the United Arab Emirates signed a supply contract with Hanwha Defense, including 12 K239 Chunmoos, 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles, GPS-guided rockets, and munitions. In February 2021, 12 K239 Chunmoo systems and 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles were delivered to the United Arab Emirates.[143]   b. Saudi Arabia   At the World Defense Show in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 9, 2022, Hanwha signed a defense export contract worth 1 trillion won ($800 million) with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense, but details of the contract were not known. It was later confirmed on 31 March 2023 that an unknown number of Chunmoo was in service by the Royal Saudi Land Forces. As in the case of UAE, it is presumed that Saudi Arabia has signed a non-disclosure contract.[144]   c. Poland   On 27 August 2022, Polish defense minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, said that there were ongoing negotiations to acquire South Korea’s rocket artillery system. On 13 October 2022, Polish Armament Agency announced that the negotiations with South Korea to acquire nearly 300 K239 Chunmoo systems had been completed and the framework agreement was signed on October 17. Poland had originally intended to procure 500 American M142 HIMARS launchers, but such an order could not be fulfilled in a satisfactory timeline, so decision was made to split the HIMARS order into two stages, buying less of them and adding Chunmoo procurement. A supply contract for 288 Chunmoo MLRS mounted on Jelcz 8x8 chassis and equipped with Polish TOPAZ Integrated Combat Management System along with 23 thousand missiles with the range of 80 and 290 kilometers was signed in Poland on October 19, 2022.[145] On 20 August 2023, first Homar-K (Polish version of Chunmoo), which completed system integration and testing in South Korea, was deployed to the 18th Mechanized Division of the Polish Land Forces in Poland.[146]   8. FA- 50     General information Type T-50: Advanced trainer jet  TA-50: Lead-in fighter-trainer  FA-50: Light Strike-fighter  FA-50 Block 20: Multirole light fighter National origin South Korea Manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries  Lockheed Martin Status In service Primary users Republic of Korea Air Force Iraqi Air Force  Royal Thai Air Force  Indonesian Air Force Number built 200 (all models) History Manufactured 2001–present Introduction date February 22, 2005 First flight August 20, 2002 Figure 12: FA-50 (source: Wikipedia)   The FA-50 is a light combat aircraft manufactured by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for South Korean Air Force (ROKAF). It is a light combat version of the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft.   FA-50 aircraft can carry a weapons load of up to 4.5t. The aircraft can be armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground tactical missiles (AGM), GBU-38/B Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), CBU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), Mk-82 Low Drag General Purpose (LDGP) bombs and Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs).[147]   The aircraft is also mounted with an internal, three-barrel 20mm Gatling gun and LAU-3/A 19-tube 2.75″ rocket launcher for firing Folding-Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR). The wide range of weapon systems aboard the FA-50 jet allows it to counter multiple threats in today’s complex battlefield scenario.[148]   The FA-50 platform will be integrated with Lockheed Martin’s Sniper advanced targeting pod (ATP), which is an electro-optical targeting system encased in a single, lightweight pod. It will expand the capabilities of FA-50 with two-color laser spot tracking (LST), high-definition, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), and the Global Scope™ sensor software suite for non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR) missions.[149]   The FA-50 can be externally fitted with Rafael’s Sky Shield or LIG Nex1’s ALQ-200K ECM pods, Sniper or LITENING targeting pods, and Condor 2 reconnaissance pods to further improve its electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Other armaments include SPICE multifunctional guidance kits, Textron CBU-97/105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon with WCMD tail kits, JDAM, JDAM-ER for more comprehensive air-to-ground operations, and AIM-120 missiles for BVR air-to-air operations. FA-50 has provisions for, but does not yet integrate, Python and Derby missiles, also produced by Rafael, and other anti-ship missiles, stand-off weapons, and sensors to be domestically developed by Korea. The South Korean military is reviewing whether to arm the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a stand-off engagement capability of 400 km (250 mi). European missile maker MBDA’s Meteor and ASRAAM medium and short-range air-to-air missiles are also reportedly available for integration on the FA-50.[150]     Currently FA-50 is operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, Poland, and Malaysia. a. South Korea In 2011, the first squadron with the TA-50, the T-50’s light attack variant, became operational with the South Korean Air Forces. In 2014, the FA-50 was officially deployed by the South Korean Air Forces with President Park Geun-hye officially leading a ceremony during which a flight demonstration was held showing its capabilities. 20 FA-50s was assigned its own Air Force wing. 60 FA-50s were ordered by South Korean Air Forces. On October 9, 2014, an FA-50 successfully test fired an AGM-65 Maverick at a stationary target, a retired ship.[151] b. Indonesia Indonesia had been considering the T-50, along with four other aircraft, to replace its BAE Systems Hawk Mk 53 trainer and OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft. In August 2010, Indonesia announced that T-50, Yak-130 and L-159 were the remaining candidates for its requirement for 16 advanced jet trainers. In May 2011, Indonesia signed a US$400 million contract for 16 South Korean T-50s, designated T-50i. They feature weapons pylons and gun modules, enabling light attack capabilities. Deliveries began in September 2013 and the last aircraft were delivered in January 2014.[152]   In July 2021, KAI confirmed that it has been awarded a US$240 million contract to supply another batch of six T-50s along with a support and logistics package. c. Iraq   Iraq first publicly expressed interest in the T-50 trainers during the Korea–Iraq summit in Seoul on February 24, 2009. In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017, while the second batch arrived in May 2018. However, none were flown until June 2022, following the negotiation of a maintenance, logistics and training contract with KAI in November 2021.[153]   d. Philippines   The Philippine Air Force (PAF) chose 12 TA-50s to fulfill its requirement for a light attack and lead-in fighter trainer aircraft. In January 2013, state media reported that the FA-50 variant, not the TA-50 as previously reported, was selected for procurement. On March 28, 2014, the  Department of National Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million).[154] Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017. On January 26, 2017, two PAF FA-50PHs conducted a nighttime attack on terrorist hideouts in Butig, Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, the first combat sorties flown by these aircraft.[155]   e. Thailand   In September 2015, the Thai government chose Korean T-50TH for its air force over the Chinese Hongdu L-15 to replace its aging L-39 Albatros trainers. In July 2017, the Thai government approved the procurement of eight more aircrafts. Deliveries began in January 2018. The Royal Thai Air Force’s 2024 White Paper outlined a plan to acquire two more T-50TH aircraft in the fiscal year 2025. This acquisition will bring the total number of aircraft in squadron 401 to 16.[156]   f. Poland   On July 22, 2022, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced in a press interview that Poland would purchase 48 FA-50 fighter jets. KAI officially signed a contract with the Polish government on July 28 for 12 FA-50GF (Gap Filler) Block 10 aircraft and 36 FA-50PL (Polish version) Block 20 aircraft.[157] Blaszczak stated that KAI’s ability to quickly deliver aircraft was a decisive factor in the selection. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 required the Polish Air Force to urgently replace its remaining MiG-29 fighters and Su-22 attack aircraft. However, the United States was unable to supply additional F-16s in such a short timeframe. The FA-50PL contract was awarded for an aircraft version still under development. The FA-50PL is an improved version of the basic FA-50 designed to meet Poland’s specific requirements. Many of these requirements, including the sniper targeting pod, GBU-12 bombs, KGGB guided bombs, and aerial refueling probes, had already been tested and integrated onto the FA-50 platform prior to the Polish order. Other integration plans for the FA-50PL, such as the Phantom Strike AESA radar and Link-16 datalink, were considered challenging, primarily in terms of timing, but not technically impossible.[158] The FA-50PL will be integrated with modern air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM. The FA-50 is a light fighter aircraft similar in size to the F-16. While the FA-50 has limited combat capabilities, it is not without the capabilities and can carry and use certain weapons.[159] The FA-50’s training role has been compared to the Italian M-346 AJT. While the M-346 can simulate a wider range of virtual weapons, it is more expensive to operate than the FA-50. Unlike the M-346, the FA-50 can also be used for training against live targets and has unique combat capabilities. g. Malaysia   On February 24, 2023, KAI announced the signing of a $920 million deal with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense for the purchase of 18 FA-50 Block 20 for the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s light combat aircraft (LCA) and fighter in-lead trainer (FLIT) tender, which is intended to replace the Aermacchi MB-339 and Hawk Mk 108/208 currently in service.[160] The FA-50 was in competition with the Indian HAL Tejas, Italian Alenia Aermacchi M-346 Master, Turkish TAI Hürjet, Chinese Hongdu L-15, Russian Mikoyan MiG-35, and Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder. On May 23, 2023, Malaysia signed a $920 million final contract with KAI to purchase 18 FA-50 Block 20s. KAI officials said Malaysia is willing to order 18 more FA-50s later.[161] 9. The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁)   Service history In service 2005–present Production history Designer Agency for Defense Development  LIG Nex1 Designed 1995–2004 Manufacturer LIG Nex1 Unit cost €2.6 million (2023) Produced 2004–present Specifications Mass Total: 19.5 kg (43 lb) Missile: 15 kg (33 lb) Length 1.68 m (5.5 ft) Diameter 80 mm (3.1 in) Crew 2 (If based from a tripod), 1 (If held) Maximum firing range 7 km (4.3 mi) Warhead 720 Tungsten balls] Warhead weight 2.5 kg (5.5 lb) Engine Solid fuel rocket Flight ceiling 4 km (13,000 ft)] Maximum speed Mach 2.5 (851 m/s; 3,060 km/h) Guidance system Infrared homing Figure 13: KP-SAM Chiron (source: Wikipedia)     The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁) is a South Korean shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile manufactured by LIG Nex1. The KP-SAM Chiron was created to protect South Korean troops in the forward area, which started in 1995 under the direction of LIG Nex1.  The KP-SAM began production in 2004 with extended trials in early 2005.[162]   In late 2005, the KP-SAM entered service with the South Korean Army, after development for nearly 8 years.   The KP-SAM was marketed in 2012 for India’s modernization of their VSHORAD system, competing with the RBS 70, the Starstreak, the Mistral-2 and the SA-24.[163]   In 2014, Indonesia bought the KP-SAM for integration with the Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft system.[164]   While the KP-SAM missile system externally resembles a French Mistral system, the entire missile systems including the seeker, control section, warhead and motor were developed and manufactured in South Korea. The missile features integrated IFF systems, night and adverse weather capabilities, a two-color (IR/UV) infrared seeker to aid in negating infrared countermeasures (IRCM) and a proximity-fuse warhead. During development tests, the missile scored a 90% hit ratio.   According to Agency for Defense Development officials, the KP-SAM is superior to the American FIM-92 Stinger or the French Mistral in hit probability, price and portability. the KP-SAM had been involved in a missile test where its missile made impact on a low-flying target as high as 3.5 kilometers with a speed of 697.5 m/s (more than Mach 2.36) and a distance range of 7 km.[165]   The KP-SAM Chirons are operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Romania. Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additional 2 Chirons were transferred to Indonesia according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report.[166] First systems of 54 KP-SAMs were delivered to Romania in June 2024. The KP-SAM Chirons have been operational in South Korean army since 2005.     IV. Conclusion   This paper provided an overview of South Korean defense industry and its major military weapons that have been exported to Middle Eastern countries. The paper also explained major military weapons that have the potential to be exported to Middle Eastern countries. 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I. Introduction South Korea’s defense industry has rapidly emerged as a significant global arms exporter, driven by technological advancements, strategic government support, and increased geopolitical tensions such as the Ukraine war. South Korean arms exports have surged from $1.2 billion (2011–2015) to $38 billion (2021–2023), positioning South Korea as a key player in global arms market, challenging traditional arms exporters. This paper aims to introduce South Korean weapons to government officials and businessmen in European and Middle Eastern countries. This is the first paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons exported to Europe. The second paper will deal with South Korean weapons exported to Middle Eastern countries. This paper first provides an overview of South Korean defense industry and then introduces major Korean weapons exported to European countries. II. Overview of Korean Defense Industry It was 72 years ago that the bloody 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice. Today, South Korea, the once-war-ravaged nation, stands among global leading arms exporters, and its factories turn out advanced tanks, artillery systems and fighter jets destined for battlefields far beyond the Korean Peninsula. As Figure 1 shows, South Korea’s arms industry has been riding a wave of global demand. South Korea’ arms exports increased from 2.5 billion dollars in 2019 to 23 billion dollars (estimate)in 2025. South Korean weapons are in high demand for their advanced technology and fast delivery. As a result, in recent years, South Korea has often been listed among the world’s top 10 arms exporters, competing with the US, Russia and China. As Figure 2, South Korea ranked No. 10 in global arms exports, with a 2.2 % share of the world arms market in the 2020-2024 period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The South Korean government is now setting its sights on breaking into the ranks of global top 4 arms exporters. Figure 1: South Korea arms export Figure 2: world’s biggest arms exporters 1. Major South Korean defense companies According to the Defense News Top 100 list for 2020, four of South Korea’s defense companies were ranked in the top 100 defense companies in the world. These four companies are Hanwha (32nd), Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI 55th), LIG Nex1 (68th), and Hyundai Rotem (95th). These South Korea’s top four defense companies are expected to surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) in total order backlog in 2025, driven by strong export growth. More European and other countries adopt self-reliant defense strategies as US President Donald Trump warn that the US will no longer protect them for free and as he calls for increasing military spending. Moreover, the Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict continue. Thus, there are higher expectations that South Korea’s leading defense firms will secure more orders. According to data compiled by the Chosun Ilbo, a top Korean newspaper, on May 6, 2025, the combined backlog of South Korea’s top four defense companies stands at around 94.5 trillion won. The figures for Hanwha Aerospace and KAI are based on the results of the first quarter in 2025, while those for LIG Nex1 and Hyundai Rotem reflect data from the end of 2024 (The Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 2025). All four companies secure more export deals, thereby enhancing both the scale and quality of their order books. Hanwha Aerospace, for example, holds 31.4 trillion won in ground defense orders, led by exports of K9 howitzers and Chunmoo multiple rocket systems. Exports account for 65% of that backlog. KAI’s backlog at the end of the first quarter in 2025 reached 24.3 trillion won, up 32% from 18.4 trillion won in 2020. The KAI aims to exceed 29 trillion won by year-end. Its export share has also risen from 50% in 2020 to 63% by the end of 2024. LIG Nex1 holds a backlog of around 20 trillion won as of the end of 2024, while Hyundai Rotem’s stands at 18.8 trillion won. More than half of the orders for both companies come from overseas. Hyundai Rotem is also expected to finalize a second contract with Poland to export around 820 K2 tanks, valued at over 8 trillion won. If finalized, the deal would significantly boost its backlog this year. According to updated data from the Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s four major defense companies saw their combined order backlog surpass 100 trillion won ($72 billion) for the first time, driven by strong overseas demand. Data in second quarter of 2025 show that Hanwha Aerospace, LIG Nex1, Hyundai Rotem, and Korea Aerospace Industries held backlogs totaling 103.48 trillion won, more than double the 42.23 trillion won recorded at the end of 2021. Industry officials say these companies now have enough work secured for the next four to five years. (The Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2025)  Figure 3: South Korea top 4 defense companies’ order backlog (source: the Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2025)  This jump in exports of Korean-made conventional weapons has led to the Korean defense industry boom. Orders for Korean artillery weapons and armored vehicles from Eastern Europe and the Middle East have significantly increased since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Sales of Hyundai Rotem Co., the supplier of the K-2 Black Panther tank, and Hanwha Aerospace Co., the supplier of the K-9 Thunder howitzer, have skyrocketed over the same period. Their parts suppliers have also seen their sales double over a year. The South Korean defense industry’s current heyday is expected to continue for a while as global demand for Korean-made weapons and combat systems has surged amid growing geopolitical conflicts around the world. According to defense industry sources, Hanwha Aerospace is expected to soon close a deal with Vietnam to export the K9 self-propelled howitzers, a contract expected to be worth 1 trillion won. Indeed, Hanwha Aerospace signed an agreement to export its K9 self-propelled howitzers worth US$250 million to Vietnam. Hyundai Rotem is also reportedly nearing the final stage of inking a second agreement with Poland for K2 battle tanks that could be worth over 7 trillion won. LIG Nex1 has supposedly been in talks with Malaysia to export its surface-to-air missile system Cheongung. KAI is looking to export its KF-21 fighter jet to the Middle East. As the Korean defense companies continue to rack up orders and look to expand their list of clients worldwide, JP Morgan released a report on the four major defense firms -- Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI – in March 2025, increasing their stock price targets by an average of 28 percent while pointing out that there is “plenty of room to go” for their values to rise (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). The report surprised investors, industry officials and analysts as it set the target prices of the four defense companies higher than the domestic market consensus. J.P. Morgan adjusted the target stock prices of Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1 and KAI to 950,000 won, 90,000 won, 370,000 won and 120,000 won, respectively. JP Morgan noted that it estimates an annual new order market of 19 trillion won -- 14 trillion won from Europe and 5 trillion won from the Middle East -- for Korean land weapons systems companies. “Korean-made weapons remain one of the top choices for Eastern European countries facing national security issues,” said Lee Tae-hwan, an analyst at Daishin Securities. “Discussions about ordering conventional weapons will gain momentum. The K9 self-propelled howitzers and K2 tanks are excellent candidates with strong potential for scoring additional export deals in Eastern Europe.” (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). Yu Ji-hoon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told The Korea Herald that “South Korea has rapidly matured into one of the world’s leading arms exporters, backed by a highly capable manufacturing base, a track record of delivering on time and at scale, and proven platforms.” (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). 2. Importers of South Korean weapons According to data from the Korea International Trade Association and the Korea Herald, last year’s biggest importer of Korean defense systems was Poland, which purchased Korea-made weapons worth about $2.51 billion, more than four times what it bought in 2023. The most-exported items were from Hanwha Aerospace, which shipped 212 units of its K9 self-propelled howitzers, and Hyundai Rotem, selling 134 units of the K2 battle tank. (The Korea Herald, April 17, 2025). Middle Eastern countries occupied most of the top five spots among importers of Korean weapons as regional tensions escalated due to the conflicts involving Israel, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia ranked second in the purchase of Korean weapons with $530 million in 2024, while the United Arab Emirates and Turkey placed fourth and fifth with $145 million and $113 million, respectively. The United States was the third-biggest importer of Korean weapons at $219 million. III. Major military weapons of South Korean Defense Industry 1. Overview In South Korea’s expanding arms export portfolio, the K2 tank, called “Black Panther” and built by Hyundai Rotem, has been a flagship item. The K2 is South Korea’s most advanced main battle tank, designed for speed, precision and adaptability on the mountainous Korean Peninsula. In recent years, the K2 has drawn major international orders, most notably from Poland, as Polish and other nations’ militaries seek modern armor to replace aging Cold War units. It is central to South Korea’s largest-ever defense export deals, including the one with Poland, signed in 2022, in which Poland ordered 180 K2 Black Panther tanks from Hyundai Rotem in a $3.37 billion agreement. Deliveries began within months, far faster than European or American suppliers could offer. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) In 2025, Poland signed with a $6.5 billion contract for 180 upgraded K2PL tanks, to be produced in part in Poland. The two phases, part of a broader plan involving the manufacturing of up to 1,000 K2s, have made South Korea one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s most important new arms partners and cemented South Korea’s status as a major player in the global defense market. Other key weapons in the South Korean export portfolio are the K239 Chunmoo Multiple Rocket Launcher System, K9 self-propelled howitzer, FA-50 fighter jets and KP-SAM chirons. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) Prominent deals made with global clients include K239 Chunmoo MLRS systems purchased by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in 2017 and 2022, respectively. South Korea also signed a $250 million agreement to supply Vietnam with 20 K9 self-propelled howitzers on August 14, 2025, marking the weapon’s first deployment to a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc. The K9 howitzers are already in service in countries such as Turkey and Egypt. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017. On March 28, 2014, Department of Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million). Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017. (The Korea Herald, August 14, 2025) Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated KP-Sam Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additional 2 Chirons transferred according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report. 54 KP-SAM chirons were delivered to Romania in June 2024. 2. Major South Korean weapons exported to Europe This is the first paper in a series on South Korean defense industry. Focus is on South Korean weapons exported to Europe. As Table 1 shows, South Korea exported the following weapons to European countries such as Poland, Romania, and Turkey in the period of 2022-2024: K 2 tanks, K 9 howitzer, Chunmoo multiple rocket systems, FA-50, and the KP-SAM Chiron. Table 1: Major defense export contracts, 2022-2024 (source: Issues & Insights on Economy, Technology, and Security, no. 011 (25-06) 4 June, 2025, p. 2) 1. K 2 Black Panther (K 2 tanks) Figure 4: K2 Black Panther (source: Wikipedia) K2 Black Panther (K-2 흑표 tank) is a South Korean fourth-generation main tank, manufactured by Hyundai Rotem. The K2 Black Panther has an advanced fire-control system, in-arm suspension, laser rangefinder, a radar, and crosswind sensor for lock-on targeting. The K2’s thermographic camera tracks target up to 9.8 km, and its millimeter-band radar acts as a Missile Approach Warning System, enhancing situational awareness. And its soft-kill active protection system deploys smoke grenades to counter incoming projectiles. The K2’s autoloader reduces crew size from 4 to 3, thereby providing a faster rate of fire, better fuel efficiency, and lower maintenance costs compared to other western main tanks requiring human loaders. In addition, the K2 can operate in indirect fire mode, offering key advantages over Western designs.[1] The K2’s production started in 2008 and its mass production began in 2013. The first K2 tanks were deployed to South Korean army in July 2014.[2] The K2 Black Panthers were exported to Turkey and Poland. The potential operators of K2 Black Panthers are Armenia, Egypt, Morocco, Peru, Romania, and Slovakia. a. Turkey In June 2007, South Korea and Turkey negotiated a deal worth $540 million that included South Korea’s support for the development of Turkey’s Altay battle tank. On July 29, 2008, Hyundai Rotem and Turkey’s Otokar (Turkish defense firm) signed a contract to provide design assistance and technology transfer for the Altay tank project. This collaboration included systems integration, critical design elements, and manufacturing expertise from South Korea, specifically tailored to develop Turkey’s domestic manufacturing capabilities. South Korea’s contributions to the Altay’s development included the transfer of manufacturing technologies for critical components. Hyundai Rotem played a central role in the system design and integration process, and Hyundai WIA provided the 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun technology. Poongsan Corporation supported the development of ballistic protection systems, while Samyang Comtech shared expertise in advanced armor materials. These collective efforts laid the foundation for Turkey’s capabilities in producing the Altay tank.[3] This cooperation extended beyond technical support, encompassing assistance in establishing production lines for key subsystems. Hyundai Rotem guided Otokar in tank systems development, while MKEK (Turkish mechanical and chemical corporation) received tank gun production technologies. Roketsan (Turkish defense firm) was supported in the design and manufacturing of advanced armor packages. These collaborative efforts were instrumental in the development of prototypes PV1 and PV2, finalized in 2015, and the Altay project's official completion in 2016.[4] On 10 March 2021, BMC, the Turkish contractor responsible for the production of Altay tanks, made a decision to import engines and transmissions from South Korea to address production delays. Seven months later, on 22 October 2021, South Korea’s DAPA approved the export of Hyundai Doosan Infracore (now HD Hyundai Infracore) DV27K engines and SNT Dynamics EST15K transmissions to Turkey. In August 2022, durability testing of the powerpack, combining the DV27K engine and EST15K transmission from South Korea, was successfully completed. Following this success, the first batch of Altay tanks will be produced using this Korean powerpack including engines from HD Hyundai Infracore and transmissions by SNT Dynamics. The tank is in production according to the Turkish media.[5] In 2025, mass production of the Altay tank officially started on 5 September, 2025. b. Poland In January 2020, Poland announced negotiations with Hyundai Rotem for license production of the K2 Black Panther for the Polish Army. On 13 June 2022, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced that it had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to buy at least 180 K2 tanks for the Polish military. On 27 July 2022, the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hyundai Rotem signed a framework agreement to provide 180 K2s and 820 K2PLs. The contract included rapid arms supply and extensive technology transfer from South Korea. According to the contract, 180 K2s will be produced in South Korea and delivered to Poland starting in 2022, and 820 K2PLs will be produced in Poland under license beginning in 2026.[6] On 26 August 2022, the first executive agreement worth $3.37 billion was signed to procure 180 K2s in Morąg in northern Poland. The contract included logistics packages, training programs, explosive reactive armor packages, 50,000 120 mm, 4.3 million 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine gun ammunition for the K2. Soldiers of the 16th Mechanized Division of the Polish Army were sent to South Korea in October 2022 to participate in the training program. The 180 K2 tanks will be delivered during the period of 2022-2025 and then be deployed to the 20th Mechanized Brigade, 15th Mechanized Brigade, and 9th Armored Cavalry Brigade in Poland.[7] On 7 September 2022, PGZ and Hyundai Rotem signed a partnership agreement to develop and produce tanks, armored vehicles and ground unmanned systems. The contract included joint cooperation in building manufacturing facilities in Poland for the production and maintenance of 1000 K2 tanks and the production of K3 next-generation battle tanks. The facilities to be built in Poland will be used as a hub in Europe for the sale and maintenance of Hyundai Rotem’s armed vehicles and tanks. On 5 December 2022, the first 10 K2 tanks arrived in Poland, just “six months” after the signing of the agreement. The tanks were delivered to the 20th Mechanized Brigade of the 16th Mechanized Division on 9 December 2022. On 31 March 2023, the Polish Ministry of Defense signed a foundational agreement with Hyundai Rotem for a consortium to produce K2PL in Poznań. 2. The K9 Thunder (K 9 howitzer) Figure 5: K9 Thunder (source: Wikipedia) The K9 Thunder is a South Korean 155 mm self-propelled howitzer designed and developed by the Agency for Defense Development and South Korean corporations including Samsung Aerospace Industries, Dongmyeong Heavy Industries, Kia Heavy Industry, and Poongsan Corporation for South Korean Armed Forces. It is now manufactured by Hanwha Aerospace. K9 howitzers operate in groups with the K10 ammunition resupply vehicle variant.[8] The entire K9 fleet operated by South Korean Armed Forces has undergone upgrades to K9A1, and a further upgrade variant K9A2 is now tested for production. As of 2022, the K9 series had a 52% share of global self-propelled howitzer market.[9] The K-9 Thunder is superior to the US self-propelled howitzer M109A6 Paladin or the British self-propelled howitzer AS90. The Chinese PLZ-05 has poor recoil and suspension functions as revealed in the released operating video. And the performance of the Russian 2S35 Kalitsa-SV has not been verified. Compared to the German PzH2000 (currently the world’s best self-propelled howitzer), the K-9 Thunder is a cost-effective alternative, offering a similar balance of performance, range, and mobility but at a lower price, making the K-9 a highly successful export system. The main differences between K-9 and PzH2000 lie in cost and performance. The PzH 2000 has been known for its superior automation and slightly higher firing rate, while the K9 Thunder boasts excellent mobility, a better cost-performance ratio, and seamless integration with its K10 ammunition resupply vehicle.[10] For these reasons, as Table 2 shows, the K9 Thunders were exported to a number of countries such as Turkey, India, Norway, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Australia, Egypt, and Romania.  Table 2: Countries to which K9 howitzers have been exported and the number of units under contract, 2001-2024 a. Turkey In May 1999, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea ordered its military attaché in Turkey to arrange a presentation for K9 Thunder. Although Turkey showed interest in K9 Thunder, there was no business deals made as Turkey was planning to produce German Panzerhaubitze 2000 at that time. As Turkey’s plan to build PzH2000 eventually became halted by Germany, South Korea and Turkey signed MOU to strengthen their military and defense cooperation on 18 November 1999.[11] On 12 December, Turkey sent a team of military general and engineers to Korea to inspect K9 Thunder. Satisfied with the K9’s performance, Turkey cancelled its plan to find replacement from Israel and decided to manufacture K9 Thunder. On 19 February 2000, a technology evaluation team from members of the Agency of Defense Development and Samsung was sent to Turkey and inspected various Turkish companies and facilities including Turkish 1010th Army Factory, MKEK, and Aselsan to optimize manufacturing process of K9 in Turkey. On 4 May 2000, the Ministry of Defense in South Korea and Turkish Land Forces Command signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to supply 350 K9 systems untill 2011.[12] The prototype was finally assembled on 30 December 2000, and earned the nickname Firtina (Fırtına; Storm). Winter test was held in January and February 2001 at Sarıkamış, and Firtina was able to operate in snowy mountain terrain without issue. A formal contract was signed by Samsung Techwin (formerly Samsung Aerospace Industries) and the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Seoul on 20 July 2001. South Korean government promised to transfer the technologies of the Agency for Defense Development to Turkey for free in exchange for Turkey’ purchase of 350 vehicles—280 for Turkish Land Forces and 70 for its future customer—by 2011, which the total is expected to be $1 billion. The first 24 T-155 Firtina consisted of Korean subsystems worth $65 million. The Turkish model was named T-155 Firtina.[13] Hanwha Defense has generated more than $600 million from Turkey since then, much lower than expected. This is because Turkey produced fewer units than planned and because Turkey increased its localization efforts gradually by indigenous research and from technology transfer. b. India On 25 March 2012, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen their economic and military ties. On 29 March 2012 at DEFEXPO, Samsung Techwin and Larsen & Toubro announced their partnership to produce the K9 Thunder in India. According to the agreement, Samsung Techwin will transfer key technologies, and the vehicle will be manufactured under license in India using 50 per cent of the domestic content such as FCS and communication system.[14] Two units of K9 were sent to Thar Desert, Rajasthan for firing and mobility test, and competed against Russian 2S19. Operated by Indian military personnel, the K9 fired 587 Indian ammunitions including Nub round and drove a total distance of 1,000 km. Maintenance test was conducted at Pune, EMI (electromagnetic interference) test at Chennai, and technical environment test was held in Bengaluru until March 2014. K9 Thunder achieved all ROC set by Indian military while the Russian counterpart failed to do so. Hanwha Techwin (previously Samsung Techwin) later told in an interview that the Russian engine performance dropped when the air density is low and in high temperature, the placement of the engine also resulted in the center of the mass located at the rear, making the vehicle difficult to climb high angles. On the other hand, K9 benefitted from automatic control system of the engine, providing the optimum performance based on given condition automatically—this was one of the decisive reason why India selected K9 over 2S19.[15] In September 2015, the Indian Ministry of Defense selected Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro as preferred bidder to supply 100 K9 Vajra-T to the Indian Army after K9 outperformed 2S19 Msta-S and passed two-year trial. On 6 July 2016, India agreed in purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T for $750 million. On 29 March 2017, the Government of India approved budget of $646 million for purchasing 100 K9 Vajra-T. A formal contract of $310 million was signed between Hanwha Techwin and Larsen & Toubro in New Delhi on 21 April. According to the contract, Hanwha Techwin will supply first 10 K9 Vajra-T, and 90 K9 will be license produced in India by Larsen & Toubro.[16] In May 2021, it was reported that India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation was working with Larsen & Toubro on a light tank using the K9 chassis with 105 mm or 120 mm gun system to counter China’s Type 15 tank.[17] The Indian Army planned to order an additional 40 K-9 Vajra-T from Larsen & Toubro as of 2021 after completion of high altitude trials at Ladakh under cold climatic conditions. At that time, India was also looking to export the K9 Vajra-T variant to third countries in collaboration with South Korea and its industry partners. As per a report in 2022, the Indian MoD could place a repeat order of 200 K9 Vajra-T worth ₹9,600 crore (equivalent to ₹100 billion or US$1.2 billion in 2023) after satisfactory performance of the guns at high altitude terrain.[18] According to a report in May 2024, the clearance for next 100 units would be approved after the formation of a new government after Indian general election in 2024. The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the purchase of 100 units on 12 December 2024.[19] The contract, worth ₹7,628.70 crore (US$900 million), was signed with Larsen & Toubro on 20 December 2024 in the South Block, New Delhi. The entire order is to be processed and delivered by the end of 2025. On 3 April 2025, Larsen &Toubro signed another contract with Hanwha Aerospace at $253 million to execute the order.[20] c. Norway In May 2015, Samsung Techwin joined the Norwegian artillery upgrade program to replace Norway’s M109Gs with 24 new systems, competing against the KMW Panzerhaubitze 2000, the Nexter CAESAR 6x6, and the RUAG M109 KAWEST. A single K9 was sent to Norway to join the competition. Operated by a sales team, the vehicle went through tests between November 2015 and January 2016. During the January winter test, the K9 was the only vehicle that managed to drive through meter-thick snow field and fire its weapon without any issue. Competing vehicles experienced engine troubles or broken parts.[21] The K9’s engine was able to maintain heat overnight by simply covering the area with tarpaulin, a simple trick learned from operating experience, allowing the engine to ignite without failure the next day at an extremely cold temperature. The hydropneumatic suspension became a huge advantage for mobility, as its mechanism melted snow on mobility parts much quicker. The test result had also significant impact on Finland and Estonia to acquire K9, because the two nations were invited to observe performances for their artillery replacement. In December 2017, a contract of $230 million was signed between Hanwha Land Systems and the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. According to the contract, Hanwha would supply 24 K9 Thunder and 6 K10 ARV by 2020. The K9 outperformed competitors in various weather and terrain conditions according to Norwegian military officials during trials.[22] The Norwegian variant was named K9 VIDAR based on the K9A1 configuration. In November 2022, Norway decided to purchase 4 K9s and 8 K10s, increasing its total vehicles to 28 K9s and 14 K10s (2:1 ratio). The delivery was expected to be completed in 2 years.[23] In April 2025, it was announced that Norway plans to almost double its K9s by ordering an additional 24 K9s for about $534 million USD.[24] d. Poland i) PK9 (AHS Krab with PK9 chassis) In 1999, Poland joined NATO and launched a military program named Regina Project to replace its 152mm Soviet-era SPGs with the NATO standard 155 mm artillery system. In December 2014, Samsung Techwin signed a cooperation agreement with Huta Stalowa Wola to supply modified K9 Thunder chassis for AHS Krab self-propelled howitzer. The deal is worth $310 million for 120 chassis, which includes related technology transfer and the power pack. From 2015 to 2022, 24 units were scheduled to be manufactured in South Korea, and 96 would be license produced in Poland. First chassis rolled out on 26 June 2015, and all 24 vehicles produced in South Korea were sent to Poland as of October 2016.[25] Late in May 2022, the Polish government sent 18 AHS Krab howitzers to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian military to defend against Russia during the Ukraine war. On 29 May, Polish minister of defense visited South Korea for high level talks about the purchase of various Korean weapons to increase AHS Krab production. On June 7, Poland and Ukraine signed a contract for the purchase of an additional 54 units plus support vehicles, in a deal worth US$700 million. The agreement was the largest defense contract that Polish defense industry had made.[26] On 5 September 2022, Poland ordered 48 Krabs and other support vehicles for a value of PLN 3.8 billion zlotys (USD $797 million). On 23 December 2024, the contract worth PLN 9 billion for 96 Krabs, command vehicles, command and staff vehicles, ammunition vehicles, and repair workshops was signed. The delivery for this batch was scheduled by the end of 2029.[27] On 8 April 2025, Huta Stalowa Wola signed a ₩402.6 billion deal with Hanwha Aerospace to supply parts and power packs for 87 AHS Krabs between 2026 and 2028. ii) K9PL On 27 July 2022, Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and Hanwha Defense signed a framework agreement to supply 672 K9PL. Hanwha Defense hoped to expand the deal by adding K10 ARV and K11 FDCV support vehicles. Poland was also expected to produce AHS Krab in parallel; however, due to the low production capability, the deliveries of the existing order will be completed by 2026. On 26 August 2022, an executive contract of $2.4 billion was signed to acquire 212 K9PL manufactured by Hanwha Defense as a Batch I order. Under the contract, Hanwha is responsible for delivery of all 212 vehicles by 30 September 2026. Poland plans to build K9PL locally afterward via technology transfer for the Batch II. On 7 September, Hanwha Defense and WB Electronics signed a $139.5 million deal for installation of Polish communication systems on the Batch I order.[28] The first 24 K9PL(GF) was rolled out on 19 October 2022. The delivery ceremony was held in Poland on 6 December. The first new K9PL began its construction in July 2023.[29] On 1 December 2023, Poland and Hanwha Aerospace signed a $2.6 billion agreement for 6 Batch I K9PLs by 2025, 146 Batch II K9PLs between 2026 and 2027, and integrated logistics support for the howitzers and 155 mm ammunitions.[30] On 4 April 2024, Hanwha Aerospace opened a European office in Warsaw and announced the integration of the K9 and Krab howitzer systems with cooperation from Huta Stalowa Wola to improve the operational and maintenance efficiency of the Polish military. e. Finland On 1 June 2016 at KDEC (Korea Defense Equipment & Component) industry fair, South Korea and Finland signed a MOU for defense cooperation including export of used K9. In July 2016, the Finnish Ministry of Defense announced that an undisclosed number of used K9s have been acquired from South Korea. In September 2016, K9 was field tested in Finland, and Seppo Toivonen, the commander of the Finnish Army, visited South Korea to inspect operating units during 2016 DX Korea. On 25 November 2016, two countries signed MOU to supply 48 used K9 for $200 million and match equal amount of free technology transfer related to vehicle maintenance.[31] On 17 February 2017, the South Korean Ministry of Defense announced that Finland will acquire 48 used K9s over a period of seven years starting in 2018, with conscript training on the equipment begining in 2019. On 2 March 2017, final contract of value of €145 million ($160 million) was signed by two governments in Seoul, South Korea.[32] On 21 October 2021, Finnish Ministry of Defense authorized exercising option to purchase 10 new vehicles including spare parts and supplies—5 in 2021 and another 5 in 2022—for €30 million, increasing the fleet size to 58 vehicles.[33] On 18 November 2022 Finnish Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen authorized purchase of another 38 used vehicles for €134 million. The official Finnish designation of the K9 howitzer is 155 PSH K9 FIN, colloquially called Moukari (meaning Sledgehammer). On 4 March 2024, Millog, a Finnish company, signed a contract with the Finish Defense Force to upgrade 48 vehicles purchased in 2021 and 2022 at €8.1 million. The work is expected to be completed by 2030.[34] f. Estonia To reduce the cost for both nations, Finland invited Estonia to jointly procure the K9. In February 2017, Estonian military officials visited South Korea for price negotiations. In June 2018, Rauno Sirk, the director of the Estonian military procurement agency, announced that Estonia would buy K9 Thunder howitzers. Hanwha Land Systems was to supply 12 used K9s for €46 million, which would cover maintenance, parts and training, as in the contract with Finland. In October 2019, the Estonian Ministry of Defense announced that it would exercise the option to purchase 6 additional K9s under the terms of this contract, at an estimated cost of €20 million.[35] In August 2021, the Estonian Centre for Defense Investment (RKIK) signed a €4.6 million contract with Hanwha Defense and Go Craft to modernize 24 K9EST Kõu, hinting at purchasing 6 more for its inventory. The upgrade involves communication systems, a FCS, painting, fire suppression system, and electronics.[36] In September 2022, it was reported that Estonia had purchased 24 vehicles in total. In October, the Estonian defense minister stated that Estonia would procure 12 additional K9s, bringing the total number up to 36 units. In November 2022, Go Craft opened Estonia's first private military workshop, and will start upgrading K9s. In January 2023, Estonia ordered 12 vehicles for €36 million, which will be delivered before 2026. The first Estonian edition by Go Craft was rolled out in February 2023.[37] g. Australia In August 2009, it was reported that the consortium of Samsung Techwin and Raytheon Australia had the upper hand for Australia’s Land 17 artillery replacement program by becoming a sole bidder, as KMW, the manufacturer of the competing Panzerhaubitze 2000, had not provided the detailed offering proposal that Australia requested.[38] The K9 was sent to Australia and was evaluated by the Australian military starting in April 2010. The test included firing M982 Excalibur, a requirement which the K9 satisfied. In June 2010, the K9 became the preferred bidder for the LAND 17 program, but the program was delayed. In May 2019, in the lead-up to the 2019 Federal Election, the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, announced that 30 K9 howitzers and associated support equipment, including ten K10 ammunition resupply vehicles, would be acquired for the Australian Defense Forces. No time frame was given for the purchase.[39] In September 2020, the Minister for Defense, Linda Reynolds, announced a request for tender to locally build 30 K9s under the Land 8116 Phase 1 Protected Mobility Fires requirement. The sole-source request for tender was released to the preferred supplier, Hanwha Defense Australia, to build and maintain 30 K9s and 15 K10s, as well as their supporting systems. These would be built at Hanwha Defense Australia's Geelong facility. Australian variant AS9 Huntsman was based on Norwegian K9 VIDAR.[40] In December 2021, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) of Australia and Hanwha Defense Australia signed a formal contract of producing 30 AS9s and 15 AS10 AARVs under license at Hanwha Defense Australia facility in Geelong. The estimated value of the deal is $788 million, and manufacturing was expected to start in Q4 2024.[41] Production of AS9 and AS10 began in June 2023. In July, Australian army conducted tests on ammunition compatibility at the Agency for Defense Development test center in South Korea. In August, another Israeli company Epsilor was selected to supply NATO standard 6T Li-ion batteries for the howitzer.[42] On 28 March 2024, Hanwha Aerospace announced the beginning of assembly of two AS9s and one AS10 in Changwon. The remaining 28 AS9s and 14 AS10s will be built at H-ACE in Australia. On 23 August 2024, Hanwha Aerospace invited Korean and Australian government officials for an opening ceremony of H-ACE. The factory will start mass production of AS9 and AS10 in 2024 and deliver all vehicles to the Australian Army by 2027.[43] In December 2024, Hanwha Aerospace delivered two AS9 and one AS10 to Hanwha Defense Australia, and the Australian military received them in January 2025. h. Egypt In 2010, the K9 was evaluated by the Egyptian military to replace its aging artillery fleet. The regional instability resulting from the Arab Spring revolution caused the Egyptian government to postpone the replacing project indefinitely. In April 2017, it was reported that Hanwha Techwin was again in negotiations with Egypt to export the K9 Thunder. Hanwha Techwin sent a K9 howitzer to Egypt in July and K9 test-fired at a range located west of Cairo in August, competing with the French CAESAR, Russian 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, and Chinese PLZ-45. During the test, the K9 hit a target ship approaching to the shore, successfully performing an anti-access/area denial simulation against enemy ships for the Egyptian Navy.[44] In October 2021, South Korea and Egypt discussed the sale of the K9 Thunder. The estimated value of the deal was $2 billion, including training of technicians.[45] In February 2022, South Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced that Hanwha Defense had signed a $1.6 billion K9 Thunder export contract at Egypt's Artillery House, attended by Egypt's Ministry of National Defense and key officials from both countries. According to the DAPA, the deal provided for the production of 200 K9A1EGY and 100 K10EGY in Egypt, including technology transfer. An unknown number of the earliest vehicles in the series were to be produced in South Korea and delivered to the Egyptian Army and the Egyptian Navy.[46] The production of the first K9A1EGY was expected in Q4 2022. At a military parade on 25 October 2023, the Egyptian Army unveiled the K9A1EGY in service with the 4th Armored Division. On 1 July 2024, Egyptian media reported that the exact number of South Korean exports was 216 K9A1EGY, 39 K10, and 51 K11. Previously, Egypt received K9A1 and K10 vehicles with 1,000 horsepower Korean-made SMV1000 engines for testing purposes.[47] On 5 October 2024, Arab Defense reported that the Ministry of Military Production in Egypt announced local manufacturing of the SMV1000 engine by the state-owned Helwan Casting Company, also known as Military Factory 9. In addition, Egypt worked with Hanwha Aerospace in transferring manufacturing technology and installing production lines. The Military 200 became the main manufacturer, and the Military 100 would produce the CN98 cannon and armored steel. Moreover, Egypt plans to become the regional center to export the K9 Thunder system to African and Arab countries, and the Minister of Military Production confirmed negotiations with a number of countries.[48] i. Romania On 26 September, 2022, Romanian media reported that the Romanian military was interested in purchasing K9 Thunder and K2 Black Panther. Romania also expressed interest in the K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher and the K21 infantry fighting vehicle. In July 2023, it was reported that Romania planned to acquire 54 (3 systems of 18) K9 Thunders.[49] On 19 June 2024, Romanian Defense Minister Angel Tîlvăr finally decided to buy 54 K9s worth ₩1.3 trillion ($920 million) during an official meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik. The Romanian version is called K9 Tunet. The first 18 vehicles are expected to completely built at the Changwon factory in South Korea, while the rest will be assembled in Romania. On 9 July 2024, Hanwha Aerospace signed the ₩1.3 trillion contract with the Romanian Ministry to supply 54 K9s and 36 K10s, including ammunition and support equipment packages. Hanwha will deliver the vehicle from 2027 in cooperation with a local defense company in Romania. Meanwhile, Hanwha will deliver 18 K9s and 12 K10s from South Korea.[50] j. Vietnam The negotiation for K9 Thunder began when Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, the president of Vietnam, visited South Korea for the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties in 2022. In March 2023, Vietnam’s highest military figure Phan Văn Giang and other officials showed interests in the K9 by visiting South Korean Army’s K9 operator unit and discussion with Hanwha Aerospace on the potential K9 procurement for the Vietnam military.[51] In April 2024, it was reported that the Vietnam Ministry of National Defense has officially outlined the K9 procurement plan to its South Korean counterpart, with Korean officials supporting the deal. 108 units was mentioned as the potential purchase number. Vietnam confirmed the purchase on 11 August 2024 during Vietnam Prime Minister Tô Lâm's visit to South Korea. 3. The K239 Chunmoo (천무) Figure 6: K239 Chunmoo (source: Wikipedia) The K239 Chunmoo(천무) is a rocket artillery system developed in 2013 to replace the aging K136 Kooryong(구룡) of the South Korean military. The K239 Chunmoo is a self-propelled multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) capable of firing several different guided or unguided artillery rockets. The Cheonmu has a maximum range of 80km, capable of striking North Korean coastal artillery positions near the Military Demarcation Line and even the Wonsan area. It can fire 12 rounds continuously per minute, striking 12 different targets.[52] The Chunmoo is much better than US military’s HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) multiple rocket launcher in the ammunition capacity. The Chunmoo can fire up to 12 230mm guided missiles in single or burst bursts. Moreover, using 130mm pod-type ammunition (POD) of the same caliber as the Kooryong(구룡), the Chunmoo can fire 20 rounds per pod, for a total of 40 rounds simultaneously. It can also fire the US military’s 227mm MLRS ammunition. The wheeled Chunmoo launcher vehicle boasts excellent mobility, reaching a top speed of 80 km/h. It also has rapid response capabilities, capable of firing its first round within seven minutes of arriving at the firing point, and protection to ensure crew survivability. The Chunmoo boasts an excellent capability of carrying a wide variety of rocket types. The US Hymas, whose effectiveness was recently proven in the Ukraine war, can carry six rockets, while the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile can only carry a single rocket. However, the Chunmoo can fire 130mm rockets (36 rockets per pod), 227mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods), and 230mm rockets (6 rockets per pod, two pods). Unguided 227mm rockets can travel up to 80km, while guided rockets can travel up to 160km, allowing them to strike all major North Korean military targets.[53] The K239 Chunmoo(천무) were exported to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Poland. a. United Arab Emirates (UAE) In 2017, Hanwha Defense announced at ADEX (Aerospace & Defense Exhibition) in Seoul that it had signed a nondisclosure contract worth 700 billion won to export K239 Chunmoo to a certain country in the Middle East. Later it was revealed that the United Arab Emirates signed a supply contract with Hanwha Defense, including 12 K239 Chunmoos, 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles, GPS-guided rockets, and munitions. In February 2021, 12 K239 Chunmoo systems and 12 K239T Ammunition Support Vehicles were delivered to the United Arab Emirates.[54] b. Saudi Arabia At the World Defense Show in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on March 9, 2022, Hanwha signed a defense export contract worth 1 trillion won ($800 million) with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense, but details of the contract were not known. It was later confirmed on 31 March 2023 that an unknown number of Chunmoo was in service by the Royal Saudi Land Forces. As in the case of UAE, it is presumed that Saudi Arabia has signed a non-disclosure contract.[55] c. Poland On 27 August 2022, Polish defense minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, said that there were ongoing negotiations to acquire South Korea’s rocket artillery system. On 13 October 2022, Polish Armament Agency announced that the negotiations with South Korea to acquire nearly 300 K239 Chunmoo systems had been completed and the framework agreement was signed on October 17. Poland had originally intended to procure 500 American M142 HIMARS launchers, but such an order could not be fulfilled in a satisfactory timeline, so decision was made to split the HIMARS order into two stages, buying less of them and adding Chunmoo procurement. A supply contract for 288 Chunmoo MLRS mounted on Jelcz 8x8 chassis and equipped with Polish TOPAZ Integrated Combat Management System along with 23 thousand missiles with the range of 80 and 290 kilometers was signed in Poland on October 19, 2022.[56] On 20 August 2023, first Homar-K (Polish version of Chunmoo), which completed system integration and testing in South Korea, was deployed to the 18th Mechanized Division of the Polish Land Forces in Poland.[57] 4. FA- 50 Figure 7: FA-50 (source: Wikipedia) The FA-50 is a light combat aircraft manufactured by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for South Korean Air Force (ROKAF). It is a light combat version of the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainer and light attack aircraft. FA-50 aircraft can carry a weapons load of up to 4.5t. The aircraft can be armed with AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground tactical missiles (AGM), GBU-38/B Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), CBU-105 Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW), Mk-82 Low Drag General Purpose (LDGP) bombs and Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs).[58] The aircraft is also mounted with an internal, three-barrel 20mm Gatling gun and LAU-3/A 19-tube 2.75″ rocket launcher for firing Folding-Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR). The wide range of weapon systems aboard the FA-50 jet allows it to counter multiple threats in today’s complex battlefield scenario.[59] The FA-50 platform will be integrated with Lockheed Martin’s Sniper advanced targeting pod (ATP), which is an electro-optical targeting system encased in a single, lightweight pod. It will expand the capabilities of FA-50 with two-color laser spot tracking (LST), high-definition, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), and the Global Scope™ sensor software suite for non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR) missions.[60] The FA-50 can be externally fitted with Rafael’s Sky Shield or LIG Nex1’s ALQ-200K ECM pods, Sniper or LITENING targeting pods, and Condor 2 reconnaissance pods to further improve its electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Other armaments include SPICE multifunctional guidance kits, Textron CBU-97/105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon with WCMD tail kits, JDAM, JDAM-ER for more comprehensive air-to-ground operations, and AIM-120 missiles for BVR air-to-air operations. FA-50 has provisions for, but does not yet integrate, Python and Derby missiles, also produced by Rafael, and other anti-ship missiles, stand-off weapons, and sensors to be domestically developed by Korea. The South Korean military is reviewing whether to arm the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a stand-off engagement capability of 400 km (250 mi). European missile maker MBDA’s Meteor and ASRAAM medium and short-range air-to-air missiles are also reportedly available for integration on the FA-50.[61] Currently FA-50 is operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, Poland, and Malaysia. a. South Korea In 2011, the first squadron with the TA-50, the T-50’s light attack variant, became operational with the South Korean Air Forces. In 2014, the FA-50 was officially deployed by the South Korean Air Forces with President Park Geun-hye officially leading a ceremony during which a flight demonstration was held showing its capabilities. 20 FA-50s was assigned its own Air Force wing. 60 FA-50s were ordered by South Korean Air Forces. On October 9, 2014, an FA-50 successfully test fired an AGM-65 Maverick at a stationary target, a retired ship.[62] b. Indonesia Indonesia had been considering the T-50, along with four other aircraft, to replace its BAE Systems Hawk Mk 53 trainer and OV-10 Bronco attack aircraft. In August 2010, Indonesia announced that T-50, Yak-130 and L-159 were the remaining candidates for its requirement for 16 advanced jet trainers. In May 2011, Indonesia signed a US$400 million contract for 16 South Korean T-50s, designated T-50i. They feature weapons pylons and gun modules, enabling light attack capabilities. Deliveries began in September 2013 and the last aircraft were delivered in January 2014.[63] In July 2021, KAI confirmed that it has been awarded a US$240 million contract to supply another batch of six T-50s along with a support and logistics package. c. Iraq Iraq first publicly expressed interest in the T-50 trainers during the Korea–Iraq summit in Seoul on February 24, 2009. In December 2013, Iraq signed a contract for 24 T-50IQ aircraft, a FA-50 variant, plus additional equipment and pilot training over the next 20 years. The first batch of aircraft was delivered in March 2017, while the second batch arrived in May 2018. However, none were flown until June 2022, following the negotiation of a maintenance, logistics and training contract with KAI in November 2021.[64] d. Philippines The Philippine Air Force (PAF) chose 12 TA-50s to fulfill its requirement for a light attack and lead-in fighter trainer aircraft. In January 2013, state media reported that the FA-50 variant, not the TA-50 as previously reported, was selected for procurement. On March 28, 2014, the Department of National Defense in the Philippines signed a contract for 12 FA-50 fighters worth P18.9 billion (US$421.12 million).[65] Deliveries began in November 2015, all 12 aircraft were delivered by May 31, 2017. On January 26, 2017, two PAF FA-50PHs conducted a nighttime attack on terrorist hideouts in Butig, Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, the first combat sorties flown by these aircraft.[66] e. Thailand In September 2015, the Thai government chose Korean T-50TH for its air force over the Chinese Hongdu L-15 to replace its aging L-39 Albatros trainers. In July 2017, the Thai government approved the procurement of eight more aircrafts. Deliveries began in January 2018. The Royal Thai Air Force’s 2024 White Paper outlined a plan to acquire two more T-50TH aircraft in the fiscal year 2025. This acquisition will bring the total number of aircraft in squadron 401 to 16.[67] f. Poland On July 22, 2022, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced in a press interview that Poland would purchase 48 FA-50 fighter jets. KAI officially signed a contract with the Polish government on July 28 for 12 FA-50GF (Gap Filler) Block 10 aircraft and 36 FA-50PL (Polish version) Block 20 aircraft.[68] Blaszczak stated that KAI’s ability to quickly deliver aircraft was a decisive factor in the selection. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 required the Polish Air Force to urgently replace its remaining MiG-29 fighters and Su-22 attack aircraft. However, the United States was unable to supply additional F-16s in such a short timeframe. The FA-50PL contract was awarded for an aircraft version still under development. The FA-50PL is an improved version of the basic FA-50 designed to meet Poland’s specific requirements. Many of these requirements, including the sniper targeting pod, GBU-12 bombs, KGGB guided bombs, and aerial refueling probes, had already been tested and integrated onto the FA-50 platform prior to the Polish order. Other integration plans for the FA-50PL, such as the Phantom Strike AESA radar and Link-16 datalink, were considered challenging, primarily in terms of timing, but not technically impossible.[69] The FA-50PL will be integrated with modern air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120 AMRAAM. The FA-50 is a light fighter aircraft similar in size to the F-16. While the FA-50 has limited combat capabilities, it is not without the capabilities and can carry and use certain weapons.[70] The FA-50’s training role has been compared to the Italian M-346 AJT. While the M-346 can simulate a wider range of virtual weapons, it is more expensive to operate than the FA-50. Unlike the M-346, the FA-50 can also be used for training against live targets and has unique combat capabilities. g. Malaysia On February 24, 2023, KAI announced the signing of a $920 million deal with the Malaysian Ministry of Defense for the purchase of 18 FA-50 Block 20 for the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s light combat aircraft (LCA) and fighter in-lead trainer (FLIT) tender, which is intended to replace the Aermacchi MB-339 and Hawk Mk 108/208 currently in service.[71] The FA-50 was in competition with the Indian HAL Tejas, Italian Alenia Aermacchi M-346 Master, Turkish TAI Hürjet, Chinese Hongdu L-15, Russian Mikoyan MiG-35, and Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder. On May 23, 2023, Malaysia signed a $920 million final contract with KAI to purchase 18 FA-50 Block 20s. KAI officials said Malaysia is willing to order 18 more FA-50s later.[72] 5. The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁) Figure 8: KP-SAM Chiron (source: Wikipedia) The KP-SAM Chiron (신궁) is a South Korean shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile manufactured by LIG Nex1. The KP-SAM Chiron was created to protect South Korean troops in the forward area, which started in 1995 under the direction of LIG Nex1. The KP-SAM began production in 2004 with extended trials in early 2005.[73] In late 2005, the KP-SAM entered service with the South Korean Army, after development for nearly 8 years. The KP-SAM was marketed in 2012 for India’s modernization of their VSHORAD system, competing with the RBS 70, the Starstreak, the Mistral-2 and the SA-24.[74] In 2014, Indonesia bought the KP-SAM for integration with the Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft system.[75] While the KP-SAM missile system externally resembles a French Mistral system, the entire missile systems including the seeker, control section, warhead and motor were developed and manufactured in South Korea. The missile features integrated IFF systems, night and adverse weather capabilities, a two-color (IR/UV) infrared seeker to aid in negating infrared countermeasures (IRCM) and a proximity-fuse warhead. During development tests, the missile scored a 90% hit ratio. According to Agency for Defense Development officials, the KP-SAM is superior to the American FIM-92 Stinger or the French Mistral in hit probability, price and portability. the KP-SAM had been involved in a missile test where its missile made impact on a low-flying target as high as 3.5 kilometers with a speed of 697.5 m/s (more than Mach 2.36) and a distance range of 7 km.[76] The KP-SAM Chirons are operational in South Korea, Indonesia, Romania. Indonesian Air Force acquired and operated Chirons since 2014 which was integrated with Oerlikon Skyshield 35 mm anti-aircraft gun system. Additional 2 Chirons were transferred to Indonesia according to a 2019 SIPRI small arms report.[77] First systems of 54 KP-SAMs were delivered to Romania in June 2024. The KP-SAM Chirons have been operational in South Korean army since 2005. IV. Conclusion This paper provided an overview of South Korean defense industry and its major military weapons that have been exported to European countries. The future for South Korean defense industry looks bright because of its advanced technology and fast delivery amid ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Middle East. References [1] For more information, see "Abrams i Czarna Pantera kontra rosyjskie T-14 i T-90M". Default (in Polish). 2023-01-23. [2] Kim Moon-kyung (27 September 2014). “K2 전차 실전배치 후 첫 공개 -- 백발백중.” YTN. [3] For more detailed information, see Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K2_Black_Panther [4] “Altay National Main Battle Tank of Turkey”. Globalsecurity.org. 5 February 2022. 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Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

Abstract Never before had a sitting U.S. president managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, nor had any leader from Pyongyang sat face-to-face with a sitting U.S. president during their term as Kim Jong Un did. With Trump’s potential return, could there be another cycle of rapprochement? This paper seeks to address this question. The failure of the previous negotiating cycle, the DPRK’s advances in deterrence, and shifts in peninsular, regional, and global circumstances suggest that both leaders might bring new attributes to their interactions, potentially yielding surprising outcomes Introduction Except for a few moments of rapprochement, since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), U.S. administrations have maneuvered with various forms and methods to destabilize its political and economic system. And since Pyongyang decided to develop nuclear weapons, Washington has labeled them illegal, demanding that they be abandoned, sponsoring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, and implementing strict unilateral penalties. Meanwhile, successive DPRK leaders have persevered in a military doctrine based on the development of nuclear deterrence to guarantee national defense and security. Nevertheless, an unprecedented moment that broke with that persistent circumstance took place during Donald Trump’s previous term, when the relationship shifted from “fire and fury” to successive summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019, in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. The exchange of insults — Trump calling Kim “little rocket man” and Kim referring to Trump as a “dotard” — mutated into their approaching one another as “pen pals.” This surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK temporarily, though without the expected results, loosened the “Korean Gordian knot.” No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, and in history, no North Korean leader had ever stood face-to-face, on equal footing, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did. Former President Barack Obama delivered several appealing speeches, but he seemed weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea, calling it “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its weapons and nuclear programs (Kausikan, 2025). For his part, at the beginning of his term, Joe Biden announced a “new strategy” toward the DPRK that never materialized; he pleaded for dialogue with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously increasing war threats; he grouped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into an ideological category that resurrected the Bush-era notion of the “axis of evil.” Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored the differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of integration into the global economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea (Kausikan, 2025). The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances, obstacles, and expectations for a new cycle of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Development This second term of President Donald Trump, more transactional and less predictable, seems to be raising expectations of reducing confrontational stress on the Korean Peninsula, and everything indicates that it brings with it a modification of Washington’s policy toward the DPRK. This is conditioned by the following radical changes in strategic circumstances compared to his previous term: DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have undergone new and sophisticated advances. The DPRK has broken all ties and symbols of its relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as its “principal and unchanging enemy.” Declaring that it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the Korean People’s Army to accelerate preparations to “occupy, subdue, and completely reclaim” South Korea. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two Kim Jong Un–Vladimir Putin summits, and Kim’s reference to Putin as his “closest comrade,” have shown the very high level of understanding and commitment between the parties. This is reflected in the DPRK’s unrestricted support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures, which includes a “mutual military assistance” clause. Meanwhile, Russia supports the DPRK diplomatically and economically, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports — essentially oil, raw materials, and food — as well as providing assistance in various fields. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis has been taking shape among China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies describe it as a “new axis.” Within this interconnection, the DPRK holds important advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. The removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his irresponsible Martial Law is reinforcing the possibility of a new government led by the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae Myung as the clear favorite and, as of today, more likely to win. [1] This would open the door to a revival of North–South détente reminiscent of the Moon Jae In era. Trump’s foreign policy objectives are based on his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) vision — now reinforced — which prioritizes U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments (e.g., South Korea and Japan). At least these six factors seem to be significantly influencing Donald Trump’s decision to return to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. While the DPRK occupies a relatively lower position on Trump’s list of priorities (with China and the Russia–Ukraine conflict taking precedence), and dialogue does not appear imminent, he has made it clear that he would like to reconnect with Kim Jong Un, seems willing to reopen negotiations, and is evaluating and discussing possible avenues of interaction that could lay the groundwork for a potential summit. It is said that Washington has been holding discreet conversations with Pyongyang, consulting external experts, and considering options to potentially restart dialogue. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un — clearly more assertive and militarily more powerful in Washington’s eyes — has not publicly shown any willingness to renew his earlier offers related to denuclearization. In his own words: “the DPRK’s nuclearization is non-negotiable,” and he continues to exert pressure by showcasing the country’s missile–nuclear power. This has been illustrated unequivocally and consistently when Kim Jong Un visited nuclear material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and January 2025. For the DPRK, survival is an existential matter, and Pyongyang considers its nuclear–missile programs absolutely indispensable to secure it; there is nothing we can see that would persuade or force it to renounce them, as that would imply regime change. Everything indicates that the U.S. president is aware that his counterpart has not yet overcome the discouragement caused by the failure of the previous negotiation process, and for that reason, he is sending increasingly precise messages about the possibility of renewed talks, while boasting of his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. At the same time, however, Pyongyang continues to issue contradictory signals of distrust toward Washington, in response to the confrontational attitude and the increasingly close military and intelligence ties with the DPRK’s immediate neighbors. It is worth noting that, this past February, the U.S. sent a nuclear submarine and several B-1B bombers to South Korea; U.S. military forces carried out multiple war exercises, including live-fire drills along the Demilitarized Zone, as well as heavy bombing maneuvers and even space force operations. In March, a large-scale scheduled exercise took place—70 percent larger than the one held the previous year. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of 2024 the DPRK leadership decided to create a certain margin of diplomatic maneuver in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration. The coverage given to Trump’s inauguration on January 22 marked a shift from Pyongyang’s initial decision to remain silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections in November. Moreover, this information was published in media outlets aimed at both domestic and international audiences, suggesting that North Korea has begun preparing its people for a new approach to Trump, when appropriate. Despite the steady flow of official statements and media commentary criticizing the United States, anti-American rhetoric has become somewhat less intense. Notably, the use of the expression “U.S. imperialists” has significantly decreased since then. This is also true of Kim’s public statements, which are considered the most authoritative in North Korea. For example, Kim’s speech at the Ministry of Defence on February 8 was the harshest and most detailed on the United States since his speech at a national defence exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in many of his previous speeches at defence-related venues or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “U.S. imperialists.” In fact, the last reported use by Kim of the term “U.S. imperialists” was in his defence exhibition speech last November. While there has been a rise in criticism of the United States since early February, as demonstrated by a series of “KCNA commentaries,” the broader trend since December still holds. The media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when criticizing U.S. statements or actions. When issuing criticism, they have only referred to “the new U.S. administration,” “the current administration,” or the “U.S. ruler.” KCNA’s commentary on February 12 regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “current U.S. administration” for the plan to take control of Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. All these articles were published in outlets aimed at domestic audiences, likely because they addressed foreign policy issues not directly relevant to North Korea. In contrast, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of Rubio’s statement about the “rogue state” was only published on external websites and not disseminated to the domestic audience. This allowed Pyongyang to register its rejection of the statement to external audiences while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home. Pyongyang also appears to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking while it awaits the new Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. Its Ministry of Defence stated that the United States was “openly ignoring the DPRK’s security concerns” in reference to a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that entered a South Korean port — an unusually direct accusation that the United States “ignores” its security concerns. If we consider the reverse side of this message (do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns), it is in fact a call from Pyongyang to the new administration to take its “security concerns” into account in its policy toward North Korea (Minyoung Lee, 2025). We can therefore see some Trumpist signals that could prove attractive to Pyongyang’s leadership: Repeated references by the U.S. president, describing the DPRK as a “nuclear power,” a concept recently reinforced when he qualified it as a “great nuclear power.” It is noteworthy that very recently U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the expression “nuclear-armed state” to refer to the DPRK, implicitly admitting Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. This comment suggests that the U.S. is unofficially considering the DPRK as a nuclear-armed nation, just as it does with India, Pakistan, and Israel. There are signs of a strategic shift aimed at overcoming deadlock and building trust by moving from denuclearization as the priority toward nuclear security. In other words, instead of demanding denuclearization, the focus would be on improving the safety of nuclear facilities — such as preventing accidents, leaks, or proliferation risks to third countries — through active bilateral technical cooperation that aligns reciprocal interests. The decisions that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, when the U.S. classified South Korea as a “sensitive country,” as well as the so-called “strategic flexibility” that “modifies the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” It is true that many officials in the Trump administration continue to officially reiterate their commitment to the DPRK’s denuclearization. However, statements by the U.S. president and his Secretary of State suggest that they recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, generating a dual reaction: on one hand, surprise at an abrupt shift in policy toward the DPRK’s nuclearization, and on the other, uncertainty about what would happen to the security concerns of its allies — South Korea and Japan — as well as those of the U.S. itself. It should be noted that Trump stated — no less than in front of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — that he intended to re-establish relations with Kim Jong Un, that “he would do it,” that he has “…an excellent relationship with Kim Jong Un and we’ll see what happens.” And he declared: “But without a doubt, it is a nuclear power.” In that same setting, Trump also mentioned that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, effectively recognizing them as de facto nuclear-armed states, adding that Kim Jong Un “possesses numerous nuclear weapons” and that “others possess them as well.” Therefore, the statements by Trump and Rubio that tacitly recognize the DPRK as a “nuclear power” indicate a shift in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang. It seems that interactions between the DPRK and the U.S. are moving toward a turning point: from denuclearization as the priority to nuclear security — a strategic change in U.S. policy aimed at overcoming deadlock and establishing trust, as a preliminary step toward a possible peace treaty. The repeated reference by U.S. President Donald Trump to the DPRK as a nuclear power could be an effort to draw Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, since North Korea seeks de facto recognition by the U.S. as a nuclear-armed state. Trump seems to be maintaining the perspective that the next negotiation should focus on reducing threats rather than denuclearization, despite his stated pursuit of “complete denuclearization.” Everything suggests that Trump is emphasizing the evident reality of Pyongyang’s progress in its nuclear program. It can also be considered that Trump’s remarks may imply that, as a result of the failure of his summit efforts to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, he may now be encouraging the consideration of an alternative strategy. However, Pyongyang is publicly and incessantly rejecting Trump’s attempts to restart dialogue; this stance has much to do with the recent history of U.S. negotiations and the president’s insufficient reciprocity to the concrete measures proposed by Kim Jong Un. In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting the latest developments that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, which could, to some extent, influence a shift in Pyongyang’s perception and lead it to accept talks with Washington. We refer to the classification of South Korea as a “sensitive country” and the idea of “modifying the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” a classification that significantly restricts collaboration in areas of advanced technology, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, quantum science, and advanced computing. This measure, which took effect on April 15, subjects South Korean researchers to stricter controls for collaborating or participating in research at DOE facilities or research centers and marks the first time South Korea has received such a designation from the U.S. government. In this regard, the “sensitive country” classification is based on unilateral criteria such as national security, nuclear non-proliferation, regional instability, threats to economic security, and alleged support for terrorism. This list, maintained by the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) along with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), already included countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Additionally, North Korea and Iran are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” while China and Russia are considered “countries of concern.” Such a designation suggests that the U.S. has growing concerns about the increasing voices among South Korean academics, politicians, and citizens who support the development of domestic nuclear weapons. Recent surveys reveal that popular support for nuclear armament has reached between 60% and 70%, apparently stemming from the belief that South Korea must take a bold defensive measure against North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Although some who favor this idea believe that President Donald Trump’s skeptical view of alliances — focused on reducing the financial burden of protecting U.S. allies — might allow Seoul to develop nuclear weapons and thus reduce Washington’s responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of this happening remains slim. However, the debate will not disappear in the short term due to growing skepticism about the so-called U.S. “extended deterrence,” which relies only on the deployment of strategic assets in the South of the peninsula. In the meantime, the DPRK is very likely to feel satisfied, as it sees its long-standing desire fulfilled: to witness cracks in the Washington–Seoul alliance. Another decision that would benefit the DPRK under the so-called “strategic flexibility” is the projection that the Trump administration may deploy U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, following the circulation of a purported Pentagon memorandum detailing its objective of deterring China from occupying Taiwan. As is well known, the primary mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter threats from the DPRK. Should this decision materialize, their mission would then shift to countering China, considered a key component of the current administration’s foreign policy. This would create a security vacuum for Seoul and further strain its relations with Beijing. In such a circumstance, the Trump administration could pressure South Korea to handle conventional military actions from the DPRK independently, with the U.S. intervening only in the case of nuclear threats. Therefore, the best option for Seoul is to significantly strengthen its defensive capabilities, preparing for a scenario in which U.S. troops are not involved in a conventional war with the DPRK. The notion of “strategic flexibility” for the USFK reflects a shift in the main mission of U.S. forces abroad, moving from the defense of nations through their permanent presence to rapid deployment in other parts of the world where conflicts arise. As expected, unease is growing in Seoul in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing assertiveness, while the latter shows greater defiance. First, due to the possibility that Trump’s second administration may divert part of the USFK’s resources to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would leave South Korea more vulnerable. Second, because South Korea is currently in open political turmoil over the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, and everything seems to indicate that the so-called South Korean democracy has failed to demonstrate itself as reliable in the eyes of Trump and his team. It is worth mentioning what Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University, stated in his most recent book, titled “Why American Diplomacy Fails”. The expert describes North Korea’s nuclear problem as an illustrative failure of U.S. diplomacy. His remarks are eloquent when he says: “In my conversations with members of the Trump administration during my trip to America, I had the impression that they firmly feel that Korea [South Korea] has been getting a free ride [on U.S. security] for far too long. South Korea’s excessive dependence on the United States could have serious consequences. The Korean government needs to develop autonomous strategic thinking. It needs to explore creative contingency plans for the worst-case scenario of a U.S. absence from the Korean peninsula.” We can see that Trump’s return is testing diplomatic limits and fueling a key question: Will Trump’s return to the White House open another cycle of engagement with Kim Jong Un, but with new attributes? The U.S. president always highlights his good personal relationship with the DPRK leader, something that, undoubtedly, could have a positive effect. But, as of today, Pyongyang seems to lack incentives to negotiate with Washington for four essential reasons: Military, it has achieved significant advances in its conventional weapons programs, strategic missiles, and nuclear arms, which provide it with a high deterrent capability. Economically, even under heavy sanctions, it is experiencing moments of economic expansion, it has made progress in import substitution, its local industry is reviving, and infrastructure construction is in full development. This makes negotiating the lifting of sanctions, in general and with Washington in particular, less urgent for Pyongyang. Its willingness to take political risks in exchange for economic benefits has clearly diminished. Geostrategically, its military alliance with Russia may generate new revenues, transfers of military technology, practical experience in modern warfare, and weaken the international sanctions regime. Geopolitically, the world is entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that could eventually result in a multipolar order. The DPRK seems well positioned due to its ties with two key actors in the multipolarization process: Russia and China. At the same time, it observes the disruption of the traditional alliance structure with the United States and sees Washington distancing itself from its main allies, who are also DPRK’s adversaries in East Asia. Therefore, it appears willing to watch the evolution of events and their outcome. Donald Trump has stated that his administration has opened a line of communication with the DPRK and considered that, at some point, “something will probably happen,” emphasizing: “There is communication. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un… I get along wonderfully with him… I think it is very important. It is a ‘great nuclear nation,’ and he is a ‘very smart guy.’ I got to know him very well… We will probably do something at some point.” It cannot be ruled out in this analysis that the DPRK is doubly leveraged. On one hand, with stable trade with China; on the other, with Russia’s reciprocity for its declared and materially sustained support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Therefore, additional incentives directly linked to DPRK’s comprehensive security must emerge. If the U.S. were to formally recognize the DPRK as a “de facto nuclear power,” which would represent a radical change in U.S. strategy, the prospect of future negotiations focused on threat reduction rather than denuclearization would open up. Despite Trump’s flattering words and the expectations they raise, it is not clear whether the U.S. president would be able to secure internal consensus within his administration to make such a decision without major obstacles, and, at the same time, manage to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership around him. Conclusions The viability of negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK under Trump’s new government remains uncertain, but it is possible that Trump will pursue a new “diplomatic victory” — similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un — through an alternative strategy that bilaterally satisfies Pyongyang’s aspiration to be recognized as a de facto nuclear state. However, it is unlikely that the international community would accept the U.S. unilaterally recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a vote by the UN Security Council would be required, where the United Kingdom and France would surely veto it; and if it were brought to the General Assembly as a resolution, the number of opposing votes would probably be a majority. It is worth noting that the DPRK is doubly leveraged: it has stable trade with China and reciprocity from Russia for its material support, in addition to enjoying the diplomatic backing of both powers. Given its persistent distrust of Washington, it is to be expected that Pyongyang will maintain its close coordination with Beijing and Moscow and use it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, for the time being, it is not clear whether the U.S. president will be able to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership surrounding him. Notes[1] Lee Jae Myung was elected as president of the Republic of Korea after the June 3rd, 2025 elections. References Aise Sotolongo, J. (2025). Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or change with the DPRK? World and New World Journal. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4082Chan-kyong, P. (2025, 12 de marzo). Kim Jong Un seeks negotiating leverage over Trump's new nuclear demands, analysts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3296722/kim-jong-un-seeks-negotiating-leverage-over-trump-new-nuclear-demands-analystsChung-in, M. (2025, 15 de febrero). 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Trump valora su relación con líder norcoreano Kim Jong Un y planea un eventual contacto. El País CR. https://www.elpais.cr/2025/03/31/trump-valora-su-relacion-con-lidernorcoreano-kim-jong-un-y-planea-un-eventual-contacto/YONHAP. (2025, 8 de marzo). Trump appears to use 'nuclear power' label to lure N. Korea to dialogue: US expert. The Korea Times. https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=394200

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic region in international geopolitics and a hotspot of disputes involving sovereignty, economy, and security. This text analyzes the positions of two key actors in the region — China and the Philippines — whose growing tensions have been a defining factor in the evolution of the conflict. Located in Southeast Asia, the SCS borders China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, and connects the Pacific to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest maritime routes. Its wealth in fishery and energy resources has intensified disputes over the Pratas, Macclesfield, Paracel, and Spratly Archipelagos, which are claimed entirely or partially by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this context, the SCS holds significant geopolitical importance. From the classical perspective of Alfred T. Mahan, maritime control is essential for a country to consolidate itself as a power, as it enables access to strategic resources, trade routes, and the projection of military power. Today, this remains a key factor of political, economic, and military influence in the macro-region that authors such as Ulises Granados (2022) refer to as the Indo-Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, the SCS conflict is a dispute rooted in the construction of geographic and political meanings. According to Gerard Toal, space is not fixed but rather a construction shaped by power relations and discourses. One example is its naming: China calls it the South Sea, the Philippines refer to it as the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam calls it the East Sea. Each name not only reflects a territorial claim but also a geopolitical imaginary. Interests in the SCS date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Japan exerted control over some areas through the state and its corporations. However, after World War II, sovereignty over these territories remained undefined, leading to competing claims from neighboring countries. During the Cold War, the United States strengthened its alliance with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to contain communism, while China consolidated its presence in areas like the Paracel Islands. This context has been key in shaping the current competition over the sea. The Chinese government claims sovereignty in the SCS based on historical precedents going back to the Han dynasty. Beijing argues it recovered the Spratly and Paracel Islands after World War II, invoking the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (1945), which called for the return of territories occupied by Japan. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, incorporating the Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), Macclesfield (Zhongsha), and Spratly (Nansha) Islands into its sovereign territory. Later, in 2009, it reaffirmed its claim through the Nine-Dash Line (NDL), a delimitation drawn in 1947 that encompasses nearly 80% of the SCS. Although this line is not clearly defined in international law, Beijing maintains that it holds sovereign rights within it and that disputes should be resolved without intervention from extra-regional actors — a stance that contrasts with the Philippines’ actions, which have sought international support to strengthen their position. From China’s perspective, its claims in the SCS are essential to its sovereignty and national security. For this reason, it has increased its naval, paramilitary, and civilian presence. Maritime projection and control of trade routes are also key aspects of its strategy to advance initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is fundamental to its regional and international economic growth. In contrast, the Philippines has claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the 1970s and has resorted to legal and media avenues to denounce China. In 1995, it protested China’s construction of structures on Mischief Reef, and in 1997, it stationed the Sierra Madre ship in the Spratlys. Today, the Philippine Navy maintains operations in the area. Moreover, in 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. However, tensions escalated in 2009 when China reaffirmed the Nine-Dash Line. In response, in 2013, the Philippines brought the case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), arguing that China was violating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting its rights over exclusive economic zones. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines, concluding that China's claims lacked legal basis under international law. However, China rejected the ruling, stating that it does not reflect its interpretation of territorial sovereignty based on its history and legal frameworks. Moreover, Beijing considered the Philippine complaint a unilateral action. In 2024, the Philippines enacted the “Maritime Zones Law” and the “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act,” which define its maritime rights in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected both laws, arguing they violate its sovereignty. From the Philippine perspective, China’s actions represent a challenge to its security, prompting it to seek support from ASEAN for a joint response in the SCS. However, the bloc’s positions are divided: the Philippines actively denounces China, Vietnam takes a more pragmatic approach, and Malaysia avoids confrontation. These differences have led ASEAN to adopt a moderate stance, prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. In summary, the Philippines is strengthening its alliance with the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which ensures assistance in the event of an attack in the Pacific, including the SCS. This cooperation aligns with the U.S. geopolitical strategy in Asia, which has evolved from Obama’s “Asia Pivot” to the “Indo-Pacific” vision, focused on a “rules-based order” and the security of trade routes. However, the exclusion of China has led to perceptions that this strategy is a containment mechanism against the world’s second-largest economy. For example, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that the U.S. strategy aims to “besiege and contain China” through alliances that promote confrontation. He also claims it undermines regional cooperation, while the Asian giant promotes a “community with a shared future in the Asia-Pacific” based on integration and stability. Thus, China employs the concept of the Asia-Pacific and, although it remains cautious in its rhetoric, insists that its approach prioritizes cooperation and avoids a bloc-based logic in the region. In this context, during Balikatan, a joint military exercise between the U.S. and the Philippines in April 2024, Washington deployed Typhon missile systems in the northern part of the country. By the end of the year, Manila expressed interest in acquiring them, which Beijing perceived as a threat. In 2025, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated he would reconsider the U.S. military presence if China ceased its territorial claims. China has not officially responded, and these remarks could be part of Philippine political rhetoric, reflecting its perception of threat in the region. Additionally, the Philippines has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, which also faces territorial disputes with China. In 2024, they signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement to facilitate military deployments, and Japan supported the modernization of the Philippine Navy. In 2025, both nations reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. While Manila strengthens its position through strategic alliances, Beijing views this as an attempt to internationalize the conflict. Another point is that the Philippines’ approach varies depending on the administration in power. During Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–2022), Manila prioritized closer ties with Beijing, favoring economic cooperation. In contrast, the arrival of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in 2022 strengthened the alliance with the United States, increasing defense and security cooperation, but also escalating tensions with China. On the other hand, while the U.S. has expanded its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) had a more isolationist approach compared to the Obama (2009–2017) and Biden (2021–2025) administrations. The Philippine government hopes to maintain the agreements reached in 2024, although their continuity will depend on how the new Trump administration (2025–) manages its Indo-Pacific strategy. Moreover, the Philippines cannot fully align with just one actor, as both China and the U.S. are essential to its economy. The United States is its main export market, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority, while China is its largest source of imported goods, top investor, infrastructure partner, and shares agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Therefore, while Manila strengthens its defense cooperation with the U.S. and maintains strategic interests in the South China Sea, its relationship with China remains crucial due to its economic importance. Final Considerations From a geopolitical perspective, cooperation between the Philippines and the United States seeks to counterbalance China's presence in the region, while China reinforces its position in the SCS for sovereignty and security reasons. In this context, the relationship between Manila and Washington, along with the stance of ASEAN members, will be decisive in the evolution of the conflict. Thus, the dispute in the South China Sea reflects a geopolitical competition between regional and extra-regional actors for control of strategic areas, where each defends its own interests. Although none of the parties appear to seek open conflict, increasing militarization and patrols have raised the risk of incidents that could escalate tensions. In this context, the future will depend on the willingness of actors to negotiate concessions, although the lack of consensus and divergent interests make a definitive solution unlikely in the short term. In this way, Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on maritime power remain relevant in the SCS, although their application is not absolute. Beyond the control of sea routes, the competition also unfolds through the construction of narratives by regional and external actors. The way these narratives shape alliances and perceptions will be key in defining power dynamics in the region.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском This piece was originally published on March 11, 2025, by the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). View the original publication on the FPRI website.https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/forceful-taiwan-reunification-chinas-targeted-military-and-civilian-military-measures/ Bottom Line China is systematically preparing for a forceful reunification campaign by redesigning and intensifying military and civilian-military measures such as military mobilization, amphibious capabilities, standardization of operations, and resource stockpiling. The People’s Liberation Army’s expanded and improved military exercises around Taiwan since August 2022 have been shifting toward more coercive and multi-domain operations to assert control over the region. These systematic and incremental military and civilian-military measures might provide China with the tools to successfully conduct a potential forceful reunification with Taiwan in the near future. For nearly a century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have largely avoided direct military confrontations across the Taiwan Strait. However, there have been four notable exceptions: the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, and most recently, 2022–23. In the first three instances, the status quo was primarily restored following the crisis. However, recent events suggest worrying trends highlighting that Beijing is preparing for a forceful reunification with Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has already made reunification with Taiwan a part of his signature China Dream, announced during the 19th Party Congress meeting in 2017. However, this was not the first time Taiwan was featured prominently in speeches by top Chinese leaders. As political scientist Ketian Zhang highlights in her book China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion, annexing Taiwan is considered a core interest of China, with official references to its significance appearing regularly since 2003. The most recent instance was Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech on December 31, 2024, where he declared, “No one can stop the historical trend of reunification of the motherland” (誰也不能充實祖國統一的歷史大勢). But beyond rhetoric and political posturing, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has taken concrete measures over the past decade to advance Beijing’s reunification agenda. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, these measures have intensified, reinforcing China’s willingness to use force. This article highlights the PLA’s systematic and incremental military and civilian-military measures—capabilities that might provide China with the tools to successfully conduct a potential forceful reunification with Taiwan in the near future. These measures include changing the institutions and patterns of PLA mobilization, constructing and using civilian infrastructure in military exercises, and establishing a new status quo through increasingly coercive military exercises around Taiwan. They also include standardization of the PLA for greater efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, stockpiling resources, and re-enlisting veterans with specific skills. This article builds upon Oriana Skylar Mastro’s arguments in her piece “The Taiwan Temptation,” which contends that China’s expanding military capabilities and rising nationalism could drive Beijing to contemplate using force for reunification with Taiwan. It identifies granular military details, especially post-2020, but it doesn’t venture into arguments about the timing of the reunification, potential diplomatic backlash, or economic costs of the invasion. Recent Military-Civilian Measures Since 2015, the PRC has undertaken significant organizational, legal, and structural reforms to enhance the National Defense Mobilization System (NDMS) (國防動員系統). As China scholar Devin Thorne highlights in his recent testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, NDMS enables the PRC to harness its political, economic, technological, cultural, social, and other civilian resources from peacetime to wartime. This helps China to address a wide range of threats, such as escalations on its border, domestic instabilities, natural disasters, and other crises. It also bolsters China’s military logistics. As Thorne highlights, the key developments include the enactment of the National Defense Transportation Law in 2017, the introduction of updated auditing and surveying data on natural resources protocols in 2018 and 2021, the establishment of new NDMS offices beginning in December 2022, the creation of a new type of highly trained and professional local militia force since 2021, and the enhancement of cross-militia training initiatives starting in 2024. The PLA can mobilize private and civilian resources through the NDMS during national emergencies. It highlights China’s determination to prepare for potential contingencies, including escalation activities on its borders with India, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. Lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have further shaped these efforts. Once operational, the NDMS would ultimately allow the PRC to mobilize society and harness civilian and military resources more systematically and institutionally in case of a potential forceful reunification attempt with Taiwan. However, mobilizing resources and force is insufficient, as China would need to reach the other side of the Taiwan Strait during a potential escalation. Some scholars dismiss the idea that the PLA remains incapable of conducting amphibious operations at the scale needed to take control of Taiwan. Amphibious operations (landing assault) are one of the five most important campaigns (alongside anti-landing, island blockade, border area counter-attack, and counter–air-raid campaigns) discussed at length in the PLA’s first written doctrine on joint operations, Joint Campaign Outline, as operational requirements to take over Taiwan by force. Taiwan has 169,000 active military personnel, backed by 1.66 million reservists. As career naval officer Harlan Ullman explains, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, the PLA would need to mobilize at least 507,000 soldiers. By extension, to cross the 106-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait to conduct landing operations, China would need thousands of ships—far more than the current PLA Navy capabilities of 234 operating warships. However, China has long been working to mobilize its civilian infrastructure to support its military campaign. For instance, the PRC has emphasized the construction of roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) (滾裝船) ships, which can use their power to set up ramps on docks or beaches to transport vehicles. Each RO–RO ship is estimated to carry at least three hundred vehicles and about fifteen hundred passengers. Since establishing the “strategic projection support ship fleets” in China’s major ship-building companies in 2012, the PLA has actively cooperated with local shipping companies to improve maritime “strategic delivery” capabilities by prioritizing the production of RO-RO ferries. According to naval strategist J. Michael Dahm, in January 2023, China had around thirty-one RO-RO ferries in operation. However, the Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out that the mainland shipyards would deliver up to two hundred RO-RO ships in the four years from 2023 to 2026. Furthermore, the PLA has used these ferries in military exercises in the Taiwan Strait since 2019. For instance, the first fifteen-thousand-ton ferry, Bang Chui Dao RO-RO ship (棒槌島滾裝船), participated in an amphibious assault exercise in 2019. Since then, the PLA has conducted such military exercises regularly. In July 2020, the PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault craft from civilian ferries toward the beach rather than port facilities, and it conducted day and night exercises off the coast of Guangdong Province. August 2021 was the first time the PLA used a ten-thousand-ton–class civilian ferry ship to land military exercises. Furthermore, in August 2022, after then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, six of these RO-RO ships, which are operated by the Bo Hai Ferry Group Company (渤海輪渡集團公司) and are affiliated with the PLA Maritime Militia 8th Transport Brigade (海上民兵第8運輸旅), headed south toward Xiamen—the closest point to Taiwan. The RO-RO ferries were used more frequently in cross-transportation military exercises in July and September 2023. Furthermore, it was also discovered in January 2025 that China is building at least five landing barges at the Guangzhou shipyard with unusually long road bridges that extend from the bow of the ship, which makes them relevant to amphibious landing operations. Although these vessels and barges are extremely susceptible to attacks from Taiwanese F-16s, warships, and submarines, they would be supported by the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force. The Changing Nature of Coercion and Military Exercises around Taiwan On September 17, 2020, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense published its first real-time military update, documenting PLA incursions into Taiwan’s de facto air defense identification zone (ADIZ). As meticulously recorded by Ben Lewis and Gerald C. Brown, by January 2025, there had been approximately eight thousand PLA violations of the ADIZ, including multiple crossings of the median line. Notably, Chinese warplanes crossed the median line in 2019 for the first time since 1999. However, Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan provided the PLA with a pretext to escalate its activities, culminating in multiple advanced military exercises conducted around Taiwan from all sides. Since August 2022, the PLA has conducted five large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. Most of them coincided with significant political events. For instance, the first military exercise in August 2022 followed Pelosi’s visit. This was succeeded by the inaugural PLA Joint Sword exercises in April 2023, coinciding with former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s visit to the United States and her meeting with then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy. Subsequent exercises included Joint Sword A in May 2024 and Joint Sword B in October 2024. These exercises aligned with the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te’s tenure and his National Day speech. The most recent military exercises, conducted in December 2024, were held shortly after President Lai Ching-te’s travels through the United States. Notably, President Lai did not engage with any major US leaders during his transit. However, the recent exercises display the opportunistic Chinese behavior of leveraging situations to establish a new normal through increasingly coercive activities in the Taiwan Strait. The Joint Sword A and B exercises and the December 2024 drills are particularly significant for understanding the evolution of China’s coercion pattern and the difference between China’s military posturing and its intentions in the Taiwan Strait. While the Joint Sword A and B drills were declared in advance and focused on anti-intervention and amphibious assault near Taiwan, recent December 2024 exercises intended to perform blockade, strategic deterrence, and anti-interventionism exercises. The latest exercises occurred across expanded locations like Fujian, Zhejiang, and the Western Pacific. Significantly, the December 2024 exercise, for the first time, witnessed all three of the PLA’s sea-facing theater commands—North, East, and South—jointly participating in an operation in the eastern waters of China, a key demand by the leadership to achieve multi-domain joint operations capabilities. Notably, these instances reveal that the Chinese leadership is keenly aware of the PLA’s pre-existing weaknesses, like amphibious assaults and anti-intervention operations, and has been pushing the PLA to address this gap gradually. They also leveraged elements of strategic deterrence and surprise while adhering to steps toward joint combat operations, a prerequisite for a forceful reunification. Geographically, these exercises extended beyond the Taiwan Strait to cover broader areas, including Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai, and the Western Pacific, indicating a shift toward controlling key maritime zones in the First Island Chain. Thus, with active participation from all major PLA services and the three sea-facing theater commands, and indulgence in numerous aspects of warfare targeted toward the PLA’s primary strategic direction—Taiwan—these exercises signalled a more nuanced and multi-layered operational focus. Multiple Standardizations within the PLA Over the past seven years, particularly in the post-pandemic period, China has prioritized comprehensive standardization of procedures with the PLA and its auxiliary support systems—non-combat systems and components that support and sustain military operations. PLA leadership has issued numerous directives to achieve uniformity across various domains, such as the construction of barracks, military equipment procurement, and the establishment of standardized military training grounds. These efforts are extended to standardizing resource allocation, engineering procurement, equipment support, logistical operations, medical services, communication infrastructure, cybersecurity systems, and intelligence gathering and analysis mechanisms. These initiatives highlight China’s attempt to enable standardization within the PLA’s military operations to enhance its overall efficiency, effectiveness, and combat readiness. Streamlining key processes, including operational logistics, equipment maintenance, and strategic communication networks, would help the PLA to accelerate achieving capabilities to perform multi-domain integrated joint operations. Standardization facilitates interoperability across services, theaters, and arms, resulting in seamless coordination among ground, naval, air, space, and cyber units. Developing these capabilities is a prerequisite for conducting multi-domain integrated joint operations, a requirement for forceful Taiwan reunification. They are also indicative of the PLA’s steps toward achieving operational readiness. It is particularly relevant in regional and near-regional escalations, such as those in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean, which could be possibilities during the Taiwan reunification campaign. Resource Stockpiling Resource stockpiling is an important indicator of a nation’s preparedness for a potential conflict. It involves the systematic accumulation of critical materials, energy reserves, food supplies, and industrial inputs essential during wartime. Such activities are often undertaken to ensure self-sufficiency, mitigate vulnerabilities, and maintain resilience in the face of potential embargoes, trade disruptions, or blockades. Agricultural economist Gustavo F.C. Ferreira highlights in his testimony to the US-China Economy and Security Review Commission that China has been significantly increasing its energy resource reserves, particularly coal, crude oil, and natural gas. The country has built an extensive storage capacity for crude oil, estimated to exceed 1.8 billion barrels, including strategic petroleum reserves and underground storage facilities. Additionally, he points out that China’s coal production has ramped up aggressively, with approval of expansion projects equivalent to the European Union’s annual coal production in just one year. He notes that beyond energy resources, the stockpiling extends to other critical areas such as food (grains and protein sources), strategic metals (rare earth, copper, and lithium), and technological components (semiconductors). These measures are supported by state policies to reduce China’s reliance on global markets and ensure continued operation during a conflict or escalation. Similarly, there are reports about China’s record 105.03-million-metric-ton import of soybeans in 2024. This marks a 6.5 percent increase from 2023. This surge is possibly due to China’s efforts to prepare for a contingency, particularly in anticipation of intensified trade tensions with the United States. Researcher Zongyuan Zoe Liu’s work highlights China’s strategies to shield its economy from potential Western sanctions by drawing lessons from sanctions imposed on Russia. She notes China’s attempt to increase economic and technological self-sufficiencies by immunizing its economy against sanctions and building financial resilience against potential sanctions by the United States. Re-enlistment of Veterans Since 2017, the PLA has notified several enlistment orders for veterans with specific skill sets. A key focus has been the integration of veterans into civil-military roles. This is supported by policies to re-enlist them in specialized units adhering to Xi’s stated and revealed military goals for the PLA. For instance, in the case of Taiwan-focused operations, the PLA’s re-enlistment efforts focus on operational readiness by re-enlisting veterans skilled in amphibious operations, cyber warfare, and missile systems. Since 2022, there has been an emphasis on integrating these veterans into critical roles, such as reserve forces, militia coordination, and rapid mobilization units. Beyond these six measures, several other developments—China’s heavy investment in dual-use infrastructure such as ports and airfields on the east coast, development of amphibious and airborne military capabilities like the large Type 075 landing ships and Y-20 aircraft, investment in offensive intelligence and cyber capabilities, deployment of strategic missile systems like the DF-15 and DF-21, training of the maritime militia with the PLA and their expansion to support the armed forces whenever required, and the integration of real-time battlefield awareness via the BeiDou navigation system—are additional factors to conclusively determine the PLA’s intention and readiness for a potential reunification campaign with Taiwan. Conclusion It is a political decision to pursue the reunification campaign. Western scholars dismiss such arguments on the basis of the PLA’s perceived lack of military preparedness and the significant economic costs China would incur during and after a reunification attempt. However, as this essay highlights, China is keenly aware of these considerations and is taking proactive steps to limit the fallout, if not eliminate it. This essay doesn’t argue whether China would attempt a forceful unification campaign or the cost of its campaign. Instead, it argues that through a combination of military and civilian measures, an effort has been made to address the possible critical vulnerabilities in military and economic sectors. The question remains about the PLA’s ability to execute and sustain complex cross-strait operations, especially after targeted military purges in 2023 and 2024. Every measure mentioned here can be seen in isolation and not as a part of a complex puzzle that indicates that the PLA is preparing to invade Taiwan. However, these measures involve systemic integration with military logistics, enabling rapid deployment and sustainability when required. A steady accumulation of capabilities indicates deliberate preparation for eventualities that may align with China’s political-military objectives across the Taiwan Strait.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Security dialog among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was founded in 2007 by the USA, Japan, Australia, and India to promote a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, secure freedom of navigation and balance the growing influence of China. After a temporary dissolution, QUAD was revived in 2017. Since then, there have been regular meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, which have led to concrete working groups in areas such as maritime security, modern technologies, infrastructure, climate change, health, space, and cyber security. QUAD has made considerable progress, including the provision of COVID-19 vaccines, decarbonization initiatives, the promotion of renewable energy and programs to improve maritime surveillance and digital infrastructure. QUAD is not a formal alliance, but an informal forum without a mutual defense commitment. Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common goals such as maritime security, infrastructure development and climate protection and offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Will QUAD change the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific? Founded in 2007 as an informal alliance by the USA, Japan, Australia and India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) has proven its worth as a platform for regional security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, despite difficulties and interim dissolution. The original motivation for QUAD was the increasing concern about China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and the challenges to the rules-based order in the region. In recent years, cooperation in the QUAD has deepened and includes issues such as maritime security, maintaining free shipping lanes, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Securing a free and open Indo-Pacific - in which all countries can act sovereignly and free from coercion - is a central concern of QUAD. The beginnings of cooperation between the four countries can be traced back to 20041. In response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, which killed over 230,000 people2, the USA, Australia, India, and Japan spontaneously formed an ad hoc grouping to pool and coordinate their resources and capacities for emergency relief in the disaster areas. The grouping disbanded after the end of the reconstruction aid in January 2005, but the positive outcome of the cooperation proved to be viable for the future and opened the way for further initiatives towards closer cooperation between the four Indo-Pacific states.3 First foundation and dissolution of QUAD It was the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who, as part of his new foreign and defense policy, called for a value-based dialogue between Japan, India, Australia, the USA, and other like-minded countries on common interests in the Indo-Pacific at the end of 2006. On May 25, 2007, representatives of the four countries met officially for the first time at an informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila.4 In September 2007, the maritime military exercise "Malabar" in the Indian Ocean, which had previously only been held bilaterally between the USA and India, was expanded to include participants from Japan, Australia and Singapore. This led to strong reactions from China, which sent official protest notes to the governments of the participating countries. Beijing portrayed QUAD as an anti-China initiative, while critics described the grouping as the nucleus of a future "Asian NATO "5. China's harsh criticism of the QUAD initiative and political changes in some of the four participating countries led to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue being dissolved after a brief time. Australia, where there was a change of government in December 2007, wanted to avoid a confrontation with its most important trading partner China and therefore announced its withdrawal from QUAD in February 2008. In Japan, the most important promoter of QUAD, Shinzo Abe, was forced to resign as Prime Minister at the end of 2007 after losing the elections. There was also increasing criticism of the purpose of QUAD in India and the USA, so that in 2008 the four countries ceased their activities in the direction of quadrilateral security cooperation.6 However, taking China into consideration did not lead to the hoped-for easing of tensions. On the contrary: China's massive military build-up, its territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, its threatening gestures towards Taiwan and the use of economic pressure to achieve foreign policy goals7 have further increased geopolitical tensions in the region. In the meantime, contacts and cooperation between the four QUAD states have continued and intensified at bilateral and minilateral level. In 2011, the first meeting at the level of state secretaries took place between the governments of Japan, India, and the USA. A similar trilateral cooperation meeting was established in 2015 between Japan, India, and Australia. India and the United States signed a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.8 These agreements are a prerequisite for the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. Since October 2015, Japan has been a regular participant in the annual naval exercise "Malabar" alongside India and the USA. And in 2017, Indian armed forces took part in the Australian naval exercise AUSINDEX for the first time, and two years later also in the air force exercise Pitch Black. Australia has been involved in the Malabar exercises again since 2020.9 Revival of the QUAD Shinzo Abe, who returned to the office of Japanese Prime Minister in 2012, put the concept of a quadrilateral security alliance (Democratic Security Diamond) in the Indo-Pacific back on the political agenda. He succeeded in convincing the new US President Donald Trump of the idea, leading to the first meeting of high-ranking representatives from the USA, Japan, India, and Australia on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila in the Philippines in November 2017. The QUAD was revived.10 In June 2018, representatives of the four countries met on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Singapore and again in November of the same year at the East Asia Summit, also in Singapore. On May 31, 2018, the first official meeting of the foreign ministers of the four QUAD states finally took place on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. Since then, the four foreign ministers have met once a year to discuss regional strategic challenges and priorities.11 The Biden administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral Dialogue to an important instrument for the implementation of its Indo-Pacific policy. On March 12, 2021, the first summit of QUAD heads of state and government took place, still in virtual form due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the summit, a joint final declaration, The Spirit of the QUAD,12 was published, which lists the key objectives and principles of the quadripartite dialog. On September 24, 2021, the QUAD heads of government met in person for the first time in Washington. Six permanent working groups were formed to deal with the policy areas of health, climate change and clean energy, critical and modern technologies, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity.13 On March 4, 2022, the four heads of government of the QUAD states convened for a virtual summit to discuss the impact of Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and to reaffirm the commitment of the four dialog partners to the Indo-Pacific region. The fourth QUAD Leaders’ Summit took place in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The follow-up meeting planned for May 2023 in Sydney was canceled as US President Biden had to remain in Washington due to the domestic budget crisis. Instead, the heads of state and government met on May 20, 2023, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Prior to this, the foreign ministers of the QUAD met in India in March, where it was decided to establish a working group on combating terrorism.14 In 2024, there was one meeting at foreign minister level (July 29 in Tokyo, Japan) and one summit meeting of QUAD leaders (September 21, 2024, in Wilmington, USA). On September 20, 2024, one day before the summit in Wilmington, a bipartisan group of representatives and senators, the QUAD Caucus, was formed in the US Congress to promote cooperation between the USA and the other QUAD members (Japan, India, and Australia). In doing so, Congress is underlining the bipartisan recognition of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific for the USA and strengthening the institutional anchoring of the QUAD partnership in the US political system.15 What concrete results has QUAD achieved since its revival in 2017? The six QUAD working groups established in 2021 cover the most important policy areas of quadrilateral cooperation: 1. Health Security Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the QUAD Group committed to producing one billion vaccine doses by the end of 2022 and making them available to countries in the Indo-Pacific. The USA, Japan and Australia supported the expansion of production capacities for coronavirus vaccines in India. Together, the four QUAD members donated over 400 million vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries in 2021 and 2022 and almost 800 million worldwide. In addition, the group of four supported the COVAX initiative with 5.6 billion US dollars. In September 2024, the "QUAD Cancer Moonshot" initiative was announced, which aims to reduce the number of cancer deaths in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through measures to prevent and treat uterine cancer16. 2. Climate Change The countries of the Indo-Pacific are particularly affected by climate change. The QUAD agenda aims to accelerate decarbonization, promote renewable energy and protect the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the expansion of clean hydrogen technologies, climate information services and early warning systems as well as the diversification of supply chains. 3 Critical and Emerging Technologies The QUAD countries are committed to the responsible and safe use of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G. Specifically, for example, the establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in Palau, Micronesia, is being promoted, which will later be extended to other Pacific island states. 4. Space All four QUAD nations have their own space programs, which are linked by a large number of bilateral and minilateral cooperation projects. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, launched in 2022, aims to strengthen maritime security and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. It will provide countries in the region with real-time maritime surveillance information, primarily data from satellites, sensors, and other surveillance technologies. This will enable small and medium-sized coastal states in the Indo-Pacific to gain a better overview of maritime activities in their exclusive economic zones, such as illegal fishing, smuggling and piracy. 5. Cyber Security In 2022, the QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership was established to combat threats from cybercrime and state-sponsored attacks. The partnership is divided into four sectors, with each member of QUAD taking the lead in one sector to address cyber vulnerabilities. The sectors include critical infrastructure protection, supply chain resilience, skills training, and software security standards.17 6. Infrastructure QUAD countries are promoting the development of sustainable port infrastructure and announcing major investments in submarine cable projects to improve digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the goal was set to invest up to USD 50 billion in infrastructure projects in the region within five years. Launched in 2023, the QUAD Infrastructure Fellowship will provide over 1,800 fellowships, exchanges and other program opportunities for government officials and infrastructure professionals in the region to share best practices in infrastructure management. Outside of these six main themes, the QUAD group also collaborates in other areas: The QUAD Fellowship Program provides scholarships for master's and doctoral students in the fields of mathematics, computer science, natural sciences and technology (STEM) in the US, and since 2024, applicants from the ten ASEAN countries have also been admitted18. The Counterterrorism Working Group was founded in 2023. Other areas of cooperation mentioned in the QUAD plans are sustainable, transparent, and fair lending and financing practices, nuclear stability, and critical minerals. Conclusion The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD has proven to be a stable and effective security policy dialog platform in recent years. QUAD has the potential to transform the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific by creating a strategic balance in the face of challenges such as China's rising power and territorial expansion. The QUAD promotes cooperation between the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the four most influential democracies in the region. Cooperation is based on shared values such as freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and adherence to international rules. QUAD is not a formal security alliance, there is no mutual defense commitment. It is a flexible, informal coalition forum that focuses on a wide range of issues, including broader security, the economy, infrastructure, technology, and climate change. QUAD has no institutional structures. There are annual summits of heads of state and government and foreign ministers, and the decisions of the summits are implemented by the state apparatuses of the member countries. The naval exercise "Malabar" is not an official part of QUAD but serves as a platform to strengthen military interoperability and is seen as an operational extension of QUAD's security objectives, particularly in the maritime domain. India plays a special role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. It contributes not only its geographical and geopolitical importance in the Indo-Pacific, but also a perspective characterized by strategic autonomy and multipolar diplomacy. India is regarded as an important representative of the so-called Global South and is seen as a counterweight to China in this group of states.19 On the other hand, India avoids presenting QUAD as an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance in order to avoid putting too much strain on its own sensitive relationship with China. The EU and Germany should adopt a strategically balanced position towards QUAD that considers both the geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific and their own economic and security interests. The EU and Germany share with the QUAD states the goal of preserving a rules-based order, particularly regarding international maritime law (UNCLOS). To exert greater influence on the region, Germany and the EU should strengthen bilateral partnerships with the QUAD states to promote common interests such as infrastructure development, new and critical technologies, climate protection and maritime security. Joint infrastructure development projects in the Indo-Pacific could offer a sustainable alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Information This publication of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. is for information purposes only. It may not be used by political parties or by campaigners or campaign helpers for the purpose of election advertising. This applies to federal, state, and local elections as well as elections to the European Parliament. The text of this work is licensed under the terms of "Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 international", CC BY-SA 4.0 (available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.de) References 1 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/2 Earthquake in the Indian Ocean 2004, https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdbeben_im_Indischen_Ozean_2004  3 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ 4 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue5 Madan, Tanvi, „The Rise, the Fall and the Rebirth of QUAD”, War on the Rocks, 16. November 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/  6 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 7 Feigenbaum, Eva A., „Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?”, MarcoPolo, Paulson Institute, 25. Juli 2017, https://macropolo.org/analysis/is-coercion-the-new-normal-in-chinas-economic-statecraft/?rp=m  8 Panda, Jagannath, „India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue”, 12. June 2020, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/india-and-quad-plus-dialogue 9 Parker, Jennifer, „Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging”, 10. August 2023, The Strategist, ASPI, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-another-naval-exercise-malabars-vital-messaging/ 10 Buchan, Patrick Gerard, and Rimland, Benjamin, „Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Dialogue”, CSIS Briefs, 16. March 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-presentand-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue 11 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024,  https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/  12 The White House, 12. March 2021, Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: „The Spirit of the QUAD”, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ 13 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, „The QUAD”, last visit 02.12.2024, in https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/quad 14 Ebd. 15 U.S. Representative Ami Bera, M.D. (D-CA), Press Release, 20. September 2024, https://bera.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400409 16 Samir Saran, Satu Limaye, Vivek Mishra, Lilah Connell, Amy Namur, Robin McCoy, and Aryan D’Rozario, East-West Center, „Two Decades of the QUAD: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indopacific”, 14. June 2024, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/two-decades-quad-diplomacy-cooperation-indo-pacific/ 17 Ebd. 18 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Kooperation international, „QUAD-Fellowship-Programm auf ASEAN-Staaten ausgeweitet“, zuletzt gelesen am 02.12.2024 in https://www.kooperation-international.de/aktuelles/nachrichten/detail/info/quad-fellowship-programm-auf-asean-staaten-ausgeweitet  19 Heiduk, Felix; Wirth, Christian: „The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between Australia, India, Japan and the USA “, SWP-Aktuell, Nr. 35, June 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023A35/ 

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. All in all, Trump’s next presidency will surely bring a lot of interesting developments, which are likely to fuel a new world order.  References - A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017. NSS_BookLayout_FIN_121917.indd - Agenda 47. https://www.donaldjtrump.com/platform - Associated Press, Nov. 8, 2024. “The Kremlin has revised its nuclear policy. Does that make the use of atomic weapons more likely?” https://apnews.com/article/russia-nuclear-doctrine-putin-ukraine-war-b5ee115aa2099fa247f630e16da861d8- Bahari, Diana Mutiara, and Ahmad Sahide. 2022. “The Comparison of The United States Foreign Policy Against The Islamic World Under President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump Administration.” Journal of Islamic World and Politics 6 (2): 270–97. https://doi.org/10.18196/jiwp.v6i2.13060. - Berg, Aslak and Meyers, Zach. Oct. 3, 2024. “Surviving Trump 2.0: What does the US election mean for Europe's economy?” https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2024/surviving-trump-20-what-does-us-election-mean-europes-economy - Bodner, Matthew, Luce, Dan De and Smith, Alexander. Dec. 2, 2024. “Russian troops mass on Ukraine's border. West worries this isn't like the last time.” https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-troops-mass-ukraines-border-west-worries-isnt-last-time-rcna7203 - Carreras, Miguel, Giancarlo Visconti, and Igor Acácio. 2021. “The Trump Election and Attitudes toward the United States in Latin America.” Public Opinion Quarterly 85 (4): 1092–1102. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfab055. - Election Centre 2024, CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/election/2024 - Entous, Adam, Schmitt, Eric and Barnes, Julian E. Nov. 17, 2024. “Biden Allows Ukraine to Strike Russia With Long-Range U.S. Missiles.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html- Fit for 55, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/ - Germany must become 'the best equipped armed force in Europe', Scholz says. Euronews, September 16, 2022. Accessed March 8, 2023. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/09/16/germany-must-become-the-best-equipped-armed-force-in-europe-scholz-says- Hansler, Jennifer. Nov. 6, 2024. “Trump’s victory could mean US withdraws support for Ukraine in war with Russia.” https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/06/politics/trump-election-ukraine-war-russia-intl/index.html- James, Toby S. 2021. “The Effects of Donald Trump.” Policy Studies 42 (5–6): 755–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1980114. - Kawashima, Shin. 2017. "Japan–US-China Relations during the Trump Administration and the Outlook for East Asia." Asia-Pacific Review 24 (1): 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2017.1328800. - Liptak, James. Sept. 23, 2014. “Countries bombed by the U.S. under the Obama administration.” CNN Politics. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/23/politics/countries-obama-bombed/index.html - Macgregor, Douglas & Ramaswamy, Dave, Nov. 19, 2024. “Trump and the Storm of the Century. The U.S. is sleepwalking into disaster in the Middle East.” The American Conservative. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/trump-and-the-storm-of-the-century/ - Mansbach, Richard W. 2021. "America’s Foreign Policy under Donald Trump.” In, 201–34. oxford university. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618721.003.0010. - National Security Strategy. Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany (2023). Federal Foreign Office, Werderscher Markt 1, 10117 Berlin. - Nczas Info. Nov. 12, 2024. “Szokujące słowa wiceszefa MSZ. Oddamy jeszcze więcej Ukrainie? „Jesteśmy gotowi przejąć dużą część kosztów” [VIDEO]”. https://nczas.info/2024/11/12/szokujace-slowa-wiceszefa-msz-oddamy-jeszcze-wiecej-ukrainie-jestesmy-gotowi-przejac-duza-czesc-kosztow-video/ - Newman, Benjamin, Jennifer L. Merolla, Sono Shah, Danielle Casarez Lemi, Loren Collingwood, and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan. “The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication.” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (2021): 1138–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000590. - OCHA, Dec. 5, 2024. “The Whole of Syria Flash Update No. 2 - Recent Developments in Syria (As of 5 December 2024)”. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-flash-update-no-2-recent-developments-syria-5-december-2024 - Ott, H, Dec. 9, 2024. “What to know after Syrian rebels force Bashar al-Assad from power in a rekindled civil war”. CBC News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-war-assad-ousted-what-to-know/ - Pew Research Centre, The biggest problems and greatest strengths of the U.S. political system. Sept. 19, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/09/19/the-biggest-problems-and-greatest-strengths-of-the-u-s-political-system/ - Pew Research Centre, Top Problems Facing the U.S., May 23, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/05/23/top-problems-facing-the-u-s/ - Sahide, Ahmad, Misran Misran, and Ali Maksum. 2024. “Indonesian Media Framing against Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election.” Multidisciplinary Reviews 7 (5): 2024097. https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2024097. - Sky News. April 16, 2024. “Are we heading for World War Three? Experts give their verdicts.” https://news.sky.com/story/are-we-heading-for-world-war-three-experts-give-their-verdicts-13116540 - South China Morning Post, Nov. 21, 2024. “China war scenario calls for US boost in defence spending to more than 3% of GDP. China’s projected military industrial base cannot be matched without increased spending, lawmakers hear”. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3287467/china-war-scenario-calls-us-boost-defence-spending-more-3-gdp?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage- Teller, Neville, June 28, 2024. “'The End of Israel': Building a case against Netanyahu – review. The End of Israel is undeniably thought-provoking and, in a world where exchanges of differing views is being increasingly inhibited, to be welcomed.” The Jerusalem Post. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-808080- The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752 - The First Battle of the Next War, Jan. 2023. A Report of the CSIS International Security Program. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ- Tinline, Phil. July 19, 2023. “Imagining Armageddon: the mad and dangerous ideas of Herman Kahn”. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/policy/defence-news/62117/imagining-armageddon-herman-kahn-nuclear-ladder- USA FACTS, How is the U.S. economy doing? https://usafacts.org/state-of-the-union/economy/ - VoA, Dec. 3, 2024. „West pushes for more Ukraine military aid, not NATO membership”. https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-support-in-focus-as-nato-foreign-ministers-meet/7885166.html - Xinhua, Nov. 18, 2024 b. “Full Text of Chinese President's signed article in Brazilian media”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/597977#Full-Text-of-Chinese-president's-signed-article-in-Brazilian-media--2024-11-18 - Xinhua, Nov. 19, 2024. “G20 Summit: Xi calls for multipolar world, inclusive globalization”. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/newsletter/top_headlines/article/581033

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Subsequent U.S. administrations, except for brief moments of relative calm, have persisted in demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon its nuclear program and, moreover, have made extensive efforts to destabilize its political and economic system. Meanwhile, the successive leaders of the DPRK have persisted in advancing their defensive capabilities until reaching their preferred deterrent: nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, a guarantee of survival. This persistent situation reached an unprecedented moment when, during his previous presidency, Donald Trump made a surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK, temporarily unraveling, although without the expected results, the "Korean Gordian Knot." This led to successive summits in 2018 and 2019 (Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom) with Kim Jong Un, the leader of a state that, throughout its history, has maintained sharply confrontational relations with the United States. The world witnessed the transition from exchanges of insults and threats—Trump calling Kim "Little Rocket Man" and Kim referring to Trump as "old senile man"—and threatening the latter with "fire and fury" if the North Korean leader continued missile tests, to becoming "pen pals" and holding three unprecedented summits. No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK like Donald Trump did, and no North Korean leader in history has sat face-to-face, as equals, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did, which granted him prestige on the global stage. Due to reasons associated with its strategic ambiguity, the Biden Administration made no diplomatic progress with Pyongyang. Even though at the beginning of his term he committed to a "new strategy toward North Korea," over the past four years, his actions have only promoted sanctions in the Security Council, which have clashed dramatically with Russia's veto, struggled with the dissolution of the DPRK Expert Group in the Sanctions Committee, and observed the exponential increase in its arsenal of intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads capable of targeting the continental U.S. and U.S. military bases in the region. Furthermore, the DPRK has resumed uranium enrichment and reopened its nuclear test center. In the end, the outgoing president has been unable to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less contain it. So, one must ask: Will Trump's return to the White House mark continuity or a change from his previous term? An analysis of the future position of the Trump administration toward the DPRK should consider that, compared to his previous term, the circumstances have radically changed. 1. DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have made new and significant advances. At the same time, its foreign policy has undergone a reorientation due to the sustained increase in distrust toward Washington from Pyongyang.2. By order of its leader, the DPRK has severed all its ties and symbols of relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as the "main and unchanging enemy," and as it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the People's Armed Forces to accelerate preparations to "occupy, subjugate, and fully reclaim" South Korea, in response to the confrontational attitude and increasingly close military and intelligence ties between Washington and Seoul.3. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two summits between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, and Kim's description of Putin as the "closest comrade," have shown the high level of understanding and commitment between the two, which has materialized in the DPRK's unwavering support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures. This treaty includes a clause for "mutual military assistance," while Russia provides diplomatic and economic backing to the DPRK, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports, mainly oil, raw materials, and food, as well as assistance in various fields.4. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis is taking shape between China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies are labeling it the "new axis of evil." In this interconnected relationship, the DPRK holds significant advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. At least these four factors will significantly impact Donald Trump's decision to return, or not, to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, raising doubts about whether the former would be willing to revisit it. However, if he tries, it is unclear what Kim Jong Un's response would be, clearly more determined and militarily more powerful in the eyes of Washington, which at first glance seems unwilling to renew its offers related to denuclearization. The ironic jest by Trump at the 2024 Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, when he said that Kim Jong Un "missed him," that they "got along very well," and that "he misses me" and "wants me back in the White House" and "it's good to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons," was met with a response from North Korean media, stating that "they don't care" who assumes office in the U.S. This suggests that Pyongyang's official stance is that, regardless of what happens, it will not abandon its nuclear deterrent. Considering the visible changes in the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape that differ from those in 2018-2019, any type of negotiation aimed at reaching compromises between the parties on the denuclearization of North Korea will be even more challenging. Trump may seek alternative approaches to encourage the DPRK to freeze nuclear and missile tests, but he will need to weigh several options. These include: which side should take the first step toward engagement; whether it is necessary to "rattle sabers" to create influence; the possibility of "unilateral conciliatory gestures"; and whether he should stick to the goal of "complete denuclearization" (Chad O’Carroll and Shreyas Reddy, 2024). Donald Trump exhibits an unpredictable, egocentric personality and is a fan of diplomatic spectacle, with a penchant for reality shows. Given this, he might be tempted to revisit diplomacy, possibly considering the absence of John Bolton, who, alongside Michael Pompeo, led the Hanoi Summit to failure. Many agree with what was stated by Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University and former special advisor for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae In administration, when he admitted: "It is possible that, in his second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policy would be heavily influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he cares about how history will remember him. Achieving a major deal with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve to fulfill that ambition, potentially allowing him to win a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the Ukraine war or the Gaza crisis could also improve his chances of receiving the prize, negotiations with Kim Jong Un are likely to be a key agenda for Trump. In that sense, Trump could actively engage with the North Korean leader, and might even consider a visit to Pyongyang for a summit, where he could make surprising offers. However, the success of such efforts ultimately depends on Kim's response" (Lee Hyo Jin, 2024). It is necessary to build some scenarios: 1. The influence of personal friendship could encourage Kim Jong Un to engage in communication with Trump, turning the page on the Hanoi failure and minimizing distrust toward the U.S.2. Recognition by the Trump Administration of the DPRK as a de facto nuclear power and easing of sanctions to promote progress toward the partial normalization of relations.3. Strong U.S. demands for denuclearization and the promotion of further sanctions, leading to increased tensions. Given Trump’s volatility and the unpredictability of the DPRK leadership, there are currently no conditions to determine the most likely scenario. The campaign team has not commented on whether Trump will seek new meetings with Kim Jong Un, but his statements prior to his victory suggest that he might seek to revive talks, possibly sooner rather than later. Now, it is unpredictable what roadmap Trump will implement, as his opinions during the campaign may differ from the decisions he makes officially when in office. It is not accurate to assume that his demeanor during the first term will be indicative of his future conduct. It is worth dedicating a brief space to the designated Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. As a staunch anti-communist, he is one of the promoters of the term "axis of evil," which includes the DPRK, and considers China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as aligned against the US. He has advocated concrete actions and plans against these states. It is expected that, initially, he will oppose any commitment from the incoming administration with the DPRK. As John Bolton and Michael Pompeo did at the time, Rubio could attempt to limit Donald Trump’s maneuvering room with Kim Jong Un. However, there is also the possibility that the next U.S. president’s assertive and authoritarian character, who, despite previous disagreements, appointed Rubio, will lead him to align with Trump’s decisions or, alternatively, suffer the same fate of being ousted with a “tweet and a punch,” as happened to Rex Tillerson and John Bolton. Regarding the Republic of Korea, it is important to specify that the most critical foreign policy issues for Donald Trump’s new administration will be its relationship with the European Union, the Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, the China-Taiwan dispute, and relations with the DPRK. It is precisely the latter that concerns South Koreans the most, as their security largely depends on the presence of U.S. troops in their country and Washington’s support for South Korea’s defense against the imminent “North Korean threat.” The conservative government of Yoon Suk Yeol has marked a clear distinction from his predecessor Moon Jae In by significantly strengthening his alliance with the U.S., driven by his growing animosity towards the DPRK and his pro-American stance. This situation presents little likelihood of encouraging Trump to engage in talks with Kim Jong Un, especially without a clear indication from Pyongyang toward denuclearization. This is likely, as all signs point to Pyongyang not making significant concessions regarding its nuclear deterrent and showing a strong aversion towards the Republic of Korea. After Donald Trump's victory, the South Korean president had a phone conversation with him to extend his congratulations and quickly express his desire for the alliance to continue under his leadership. Although both agreed to hold a summit as soon as possible, the issue of the DPRK, which was already addressed in this initial dialogue, will certainly be on the agenda. It is said that Trump plans for his government to work with South Korea on several bilateral issues, but one of the key aspects will be South Korea’s contribution to Washington for hosting U.S. bases on its territory. Let's remember that during Trump's first term, this was a hot topic in his military relations. It is worth mentioning that due to Donald Trump's transactional approach to international relations, his perception that many of the U.S. allies are "taking advantage" of its military power, and the pressure he exerted on Seoul when he was in office, with Trump's victory, national security against the DPRK is placed at the forefront. Many are concerned that his return to the White House could mean that Washington will no longer be a reliable partner, making it necessary for South Korea to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Han Dong Hoon, leader of the ruling People Power Party, said at a seminar organized to discuss the future of South Korea's nuclear policy that Trump's victory had positive aspects. "Acquiring nuclear potential — meaning having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium — does not inherently equate to possessing nuclear weapons," he said, according to The Korea Herald. "But we would be able to move to that phase at any time if North Korea intensifies its nuclear threats," he added. "I believe we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the changing dynamics of global power and order." Meanwhile, retired Army General Han Ki Ho went a step further and suggested that South Korea may no longer have a choice. "Nuclear armament may be the only path left for South Korea's survival," he stated (Julian Ryall, 2024). However, whether the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear weapons will depend on how the Trump administration approaches the alliance and relations with North Korea, that is, whether it abandons or restricts the "extended deterrence" and whether it pursues an agreement with Pyongyang that halts its development of long-range missiles that could reach the continental United States in exchange for accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. This type of agreement would affect Seoul, located just 48 kilometers from the border, and therefore within the range of North Korea's short-range missiles. We are facing an uncertain situation, and therefore, expectant, where the expectations regarding Donald Trump's stance on DPRK are uncertain. Whether the denuclearization of DPRK is a priority for the Trump administration depends on the approach and methods with which the president and his team address an increasingly complex scenario. DPRK, in terms of its economic performance and national defense potential, is not the same as before, which gives Kim Jong Un greater effectiveness in his military deterrence and diplomatic maneuverability, especially when his reliable conduct with Moscow and the appropriate handling of relations with Beijing strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. Trump will have to deal with these realities. And while he may intend to continue his legacy, he will necessarily have to reframe his policy towards DPRK, considering that DPRK is no longer the same, that its main contenders (Russia and China) are precisely the closest to DPRK, and that the country itself is no longer the same, either militarily or socioeconomically, as it was when he engaged in talks with Kim Jong Un in 2018-2019. References - Simone McCarthy (2024) Trump claims Kim Jong Un “isses him. But he faces a very different North Korea leader this time around. Disponible en: https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-intl-hnk/index.html- Keith Johnson (2024) Could Trump Rekindle Diplomacy With North Korea? Disponible en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/13/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-putin-russia/- Joel S. Wit (2024) Blame Donald Trump for North Korea´s sable-rattling. Disponible en: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/blame-donald-trump-for-north-koreas-sabre-rattling/- Rubén Criado (2024) Así afecta la victoria de Trump a Corea del Norte. Disponible en: https://as.com/actualidad/politica/asi-afecta-la-victoria-de-trump-a-corea-del-norte-n/- Josh Smith (2024) Donald Trump se enfrenta a un Kim Jong Un envalentonado, cercano a Rusia y con un arsenal de misiles más grande. Disponible en: https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/11/07/donald-trump-se-enfrentara-a-un-kim-jong-un-envalentonado-cercano-a-rusia-y-con-un-arsenal-de-misiles-mas-grande/- Julian Ryall (2024) Regreso de Trump atiza debate nuclear en Corea del Sur. Disponible en: https://amp.dw.com/es/el-regreso-de-trump-atiza-el-debate-nuclear-en-corea-del-sur/a70798786#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317231276140&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com- Chad O´Carrol y Shreyas Reddy (2024) Why North Korean denuclearization will likely take backseat in second Trump term | NK Disponible en: https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/- Miguel Jiménez (2024) Donald Trump planea elegir a marcos Rubio como secretario de Estado. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/internacional/elecciones-usa/2024-11-12/donald-trump-elige-a-marco-rubio-como-secretario-de-estado.html?outputType=amp#amp_tf=De%20%251%24s&aoh=17317890370552&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump, who won the US presidential election on November 5th, is appointing key officials for the new government that will be launched in January next year, and the content is very unconventional. In a word, they are young, reformist, and loyalists who have been breathing together with him. This is especially true for those who will lead foreign policy and security. The nominations include 40-year-old Senator James Vance as Vice President, 53-year-old Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, 44-year-old Fox News anchor Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, 50-year-old Representative Mike Walz as National Security Advisor, 43-year-old Representative Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 59-year-old former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe (59) as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 53-year-old South Dakota Governor Kristi Nome as Secretary of Homeland Security, and 67-year-old Suzy Wiles as Co-Chair of the White House Campaign Committee. Among these, the five key figures are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and Director of National Intelligence, with an average age of 46, and all of them are ‘hawkish conservative patriots.’ Vice President Vance, a Catholic, shares the same ideological stance as President-elect Trump, including his opposition to abortion and his denial of global warming, and served in Iraq as a Marine. Secretary of State nominee Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants, has taken a hard-line stance on Chinese corporate infiltration of the United States and human rights in China while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 2020, he introduced the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. He also opposed the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and called North Korea a “criminal group” for its human rights abuses, nuclear and missile development, and criticized it as a “massive group of lunatics” immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in 2017. He is also a pro-Korea figure who has visited the DMZ in South Korea several times. National Security Advisor nominee Walz, a retired colonel from the U.S. Army Special Forces and a veteran of the Middle East, has advocated for reducing dependence on China for key minerals and boycotting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and in June criticized North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a “dangerous and evil alliance.” He also always visited the DMZ when he came to Korea. Secretary of Defense Haggis is also a veteran of the Middle East and a former US Army major. He later became a host for FOX News and developed a relationship with President-elect Trump. Director of National Intelligence Gabbard, who collects and analyzes information from intelligence agencies, is a reserve lieutenant colonel with experience in the Middle East. She became the youngest member of the House of Representatives in Hawaii at 21 and is the first female veteran of the war. As such, the five key figures in the diplomatic and security line are all young and reformist, and most of them are veterans of the Middle East. If we look at the ideological tendencies, passion, careers, and past words and actions of President-elect Trump and the nominees for the diplomatic and security line, we can predict many things. First, domestically, reforms will be attempted to fit Trump’s slogan of “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” such as reducing and streamlining government organizations, strengthening the US military, promoting growth-oriented economic policies, and protecting domestic companies through fair trade. Under the slogans of “political correctness (PC) and being woke (WOKE),” abortion, homosexuality in the military, and environmental policies that were spread are expected to decline. Externally, there will be a strong confrontation with the “axis of change” powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that are leading international conflicts in the new Cold War structure, and the US nuclear military power and nuclear doctrine are also expected to be strengthened and reinforced. In other words, the trend of nuclear reduction and conventional military reduction that has continued since the end of the Cold War will be reversed, and efforts will be made to develop tactical nuclear weapons, new ships, and aircraft. Regionally, it is expected that efforts will be made to check China’s expansionism and pressure the public economically, strengthen security cooperation with allies on fairer terms, strengthen support for Israel, and bring an early end to the Ukraine War.  Considering all these things, we can predict several things about Trump’s second term US policy toward North Korea. First, regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, unlike the ‘strategic patience’ shown by the Obama and Biden administrations, it is expected that they will actively respond. In line with this, they will likely actively oppose the restoration of the Russia-North Korea alliance, Russia-North Korea military cooperation, and the dispatch of North Korean troops to Ukraine, and they will likely be just as nervous as South Korea about Russia helping North Korea advance its nuclear program. They will also actively establish military operation plans against North Korea in case of an emergency, and South Korea-US joint training and South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation will also be strengthened. Criticism of North Korea’s human rights issues through the UN is also likely to intensify. Nevertheless, considering that all the key officials who will move the diplomatic and security line are patriots who value national interests, they may also show a pragmatic tendency. In other words, if North Korea comes to the nuclear negotiations with a genuine will to compromise, the US will also engage in sincere dialogue, and if North Korea makes a sincere proposal rather than stalling or tricking, it is possible that the US will make efforts for an unprecedented agreement. Therefore, as Trump’s second term approaches, North Korea will have to consider whether to stick to its reckless nuclear policies to date or adopt a more pragmatic stance in the face of an increasingly powerful United States. Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org