Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Abstract Canada has long maintained that international law must be central to resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. But has there been appropriate follow-through when international law has been violated? This policy brief examines Canada's positions and, importantly, actions, in the face of violations of international law by the Israeli government during its military offensive on Gaza following the 7 October 2023 attacks in southern Israel by Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups. The analysis makes it clear that Canada has rarely condemned those violations, let alone imposed sanctions or other consequences for them.Keywordshuman rights, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Canada, Canadian foreign policy, international law, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, international humanitarian law Professed respect for international law “Israel has a right under international law to take the necessary measures, in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law, to protect the security of its citizens from attacks by terrorist groups.” In many respects, this statement—taken from the section detailing “Support for Israel and its Security” in Global Affairs Canada's overview of “Canadian policy on key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”1—captures what is right in principle, but so terribly wrong in practice, when it comes to Canada's foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine. As it should be, international law is lifted up and given a spotlight. Canada's position is grounded in an expectation that international human rights and international humanitarian law will be respected. But what the statement does not convey is that there is rarely an appropriate response by the Canadian government when it becomes clear that actions taken by Israel—particularly the Israel Defense Forces—to protect the security of its citizens consistently amount to grave, widespread, and systematic violations of both international human rights and international humanitarian law. International law and human rights also feature prominently in other key elements of Canada's policy regarding the conflict. Canada recognizes the “Palestinian right to self-determination.” The rights of Palestinian refugees are to be respected, “in accordance with international law.” Canada notes that the “Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the occupied territories” and consequently that Israeli settlements are in violation of that convention, as is the Israeli government's construction of the barrier inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Failure to uphold international law This is all good, in principle. But how does Canada react to the fact that the Palestinian right to self-determination and the rights of Palestinian refugees have undeniably been abrogated for decades? And what is Canada's response to the defiant expansion of the Geneva Convention–violating settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem? Rather than mount a robust defence (or any defence, for that matter) of the international legal principles at stake, Canada's policy more or less goes quiet at this point. There is no condemnation of the breaches of international law, and consideration of the possible implications under Canadian law is reluctant at best, with a bare minimum of legal, trade, or other consequences for these blatantly unlawful actions. The disconnect between rhetorical flourishes of support for the professed importance of international law but the failure and unwillingness to champion it when it is breached has, unfortunately but perhaps not surprisingly, dominated the key aspects of Canada's response to Israel's unrelenting assault on Gaza following the brutal attacks launched by Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups in southern Israel on 7 October 2023. It was evident from the outset. October 7th, Gaza, and Canada's empty resort to international law Reacting to the horror of the October 7th attack, Canada, like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and many of its allies in Western Europe, almost immediately referenced the fact that Israel had a right to defend itself. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's first statement, on October 8th, noted that Canada “reaffirm[ed] its support for Israel's right to defend itself.”2 But what, as a matter of international law, did that actually mean? The question as to whether Israel as a nation has the right to defend itself from attack is dictated by Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence, and other public international law sources. As Marko Milanovic, professor of public international law at the University of Reading School of Law notes, “[M]any who think there is a single, clearly correct answer to the question whether Israel has a right to self-defence do so simply because the answer fits their prior narratives and worldviews.” Milanovic lays out the complexity and uncertainty in considerable detail and concludes that “the jus ad bellum is indeterminate on the question of whether non-state actors, whose conduct is not attributable to a state, can commit armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 of the Charter.”3 With the threshold question of whether an attack carried out by an armed group such as Hamas constitutes an armed attack of the nature that would trigger application of Article 51 being at best indeterminate, so too is the question as to whether a right of self-defence arises. As such, the Canadian government's simple assertion, without any further expansion or discussion, is clearly not without debate. Offering no qualification or explanation alongside that assertion, on a matter that is unsettled and complex within international law, is problematic. Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations[.]”4 What emerges from a review of applicable international law, however, are differing views as to whether, and to what extent, a nation's right under Article 51 to resort to armed force in response to an attack—in other words, to go to war as a means of self-defence—arises when the attack is carried out by another state, not when the perpetrator is a non-state actor or armed group such as Hamas or the other Palestinian armed groups responsible for the October 7th attacks, operating within territory that is controlled by the state concerned. That is reflected in the conclusion of the ICJ in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (200 l), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.5 Having determined that Article 51 was not relevant, the Court also went on to consider whether Israel could more broadly rely on the customary international legal principle of a “state of necessity” to justify construction of the wall. The Court agreed that Israel had “the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens” but noted that “measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law.”6 This is essentially where Canada's stated policy lands as well. For example, the now former prime minister's October 8th statement, referenced above, goes on to qualify that Israel's right to defend itself must be exercised “in accordance with international law.” This, in turn, echoes the numerous references to the need to respect international law noted above, which are scattered throughout Canada's overall Israel/Palestine policy—established long before October 7th. The phrase “in accordance with international law” has been repeated consistently in written statements, social media posts, and press comments by the prime minister,7 the minister of foreign affairs,8 and other ministers9 at various stages of the current conflict. But we do not find any further explanation as to what that entails-for instance, that regardless of whether or not a right of self-defence to an armed attack exists in these circumstances and legally justifies Israel launching a war against Hamas, fundamental principles from international humanitarian law, such as the requirements of necessity and proportionality, nevertheless always apply. That failure to have clearly acknowledged the applicable international humanitarian law framework is particularly problematic, because the evidence that those legal obligations have been systematically and gravely violated, to the extent of undeniably constituting war crimes, has become incontrovertible. Yet as Israel's full-scale assault on Gaza was launched and expanded—and as reports from the UN,10 humanitarian agencies,11 international12 and national13 human rights organizations, local human rights monitors,14and journalists15 made it clear that massive human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law were occurring—nothing more was said. Canada did not move from stating that international law must be respected to stating the obvious—that it was well-established that this was not happening. The Canadian government refused to criticize Israel for breaches of international law, let alone press for accountability and consequences for the violations. Canada and the ICJ's Genocide Convention case Nowhere has this been more apparent, or more consequential, than in Canada's response to announcements and rulings from the two international courts that have a key role in upholding international law in situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Canada is often regarded as one of the world's most reliable champions of international courts. As such, its failure to show the expected support at this time has been widely noted with concern. The ICJ is actively engaged with the conflict through two separate cases. On 29 December 2023 South Africa launched proceedings16 against Israel, alleging violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) with respect to Israel's actions in Gaza. Given the gravity and urgency of the situation on the ground in Gaza, South Africa has applied to the Court on four separate occasions,17 seeking orders for interim provisional measures while the case proceeds. The Court consequently indicated a range of provisional measures in various orders18 issued between January and May 2024. The Court's provisional measures have been grounded in a finding that “at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa under the Genocide Convention and for which it was seeking protection were plausible, namely the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts mentioned in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel's compliance with the latter's obligations under that Convention.”19 The legal semantics of that ruling are nuanced, but nonetheless significant and with very real consequences. The Court has not reached any conclusion as to whether genocide has occurred in Gaza—or even whether it has possibly or potentially occurred—nor would it be expected to at this early stage of the case. But it is a clear statement that the Court considers the rights protected under the Genocide Convention to be plausibly pertinent to Israel's military operations in Gaza. Drawing on the Court's conclusion, many commentators,20 including legal experts and human rights organizations, now regularly reference plausible, potential, or prima facie genocide in Gaza. The Court's final ruling on whether Israel has in fact breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention is still some way off—likely late 2025, at the earliest. Among the provisional measures indicated by the Court to date are orders that Israel prevent the commission of all acts of genocide, prevent and punish incitement to genocide, enact immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza, and immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in Rafah that may inflict on Palestinians in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about their physical destruction as a group, in whole or in part. Canada's response to the ICJ rulings has been, at worst, tepid and incoherent, and at best, only supportive when consistent with Canada's already established positions. Following the first provisional measures indicated by the Court in January, Canada's foreign affairs minister, Mélanie Joly, issued a statement expressing support for the ICJ's “critical role … in upholding the international rules-based order,” but stressed that this support did “not mean that [Canada accepted] the premise of the case brought by South Africa.”21 There was not a word from the Canadian government calling on Israel to comply with the Court's order, which is what would have been expected from a self-declared champion of the Court. The response four months later to the Court's provisional measures concerning Rafah was stronger. Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated what was by then Canada's established position, calling for “no more military operations in Rafah by Israel, and certainly no escalation of military operations in Rafah.” The prime minister also underscored that the “ICJ's proposals are binding and we expect everyone to follow them as a matter of international law.”22 However, as is well established, Israel did not comply with the Court's ruling with respect to Rafah, and Canada has issued no express condemnation, let alone imposed any consequences, for that disregard of international law. Canada and the ICJ's advisory opinion The second ICJ case dealing with Israel-Palestine is an advisory opinion requested in January 2023,23 following a December 2022 UN General Assembly resolution seeking the Court's views on the legal consequences of Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), including East Jerusalem. The Court's Advisory Opinion24 was issued on 19 July 2024. The Court was unequivocal in concluding that “the sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.”25 Notably, the ICJ specifically addresses the question of the legal consequences of Israel's unlawful presence in the OPT for third states, which would obviously include Canada, and concludes that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”26 This leads to a consideration of Canada's stance before and after the ICJ Advisory Opinion. Canada filed a written submission27 seven months in advance of the hearing, arguing that the Court should use its discretion and decline the General Assembly's request to issue an advisory opinion. Canada also initially requested an opportunity to make oral submissions during the hearing, and was one of fifty-four states and multilateral organizations slated to do so.28 However, as the hearing got underway on 19 February 2024, Canada withdrew its request to make an oral presentation29 and chose to rely solely on the earlier written submission—namely, that the Court should decline to issue an advisory opinion. The explanation offered for withdrawing from the oral hearing was that the government's position had not changed from the time of making its written submission. Apparently, that position was unchanged even though external circumstances had changed dramatically. After all, Canada's position had been formulated seven months earlier—before the October 7th attack in Israel, the subsequent Israeli offensive in Gaza, and the 26 January 2024 ICJ ruling on provisional measures in the case brought by South Africa under the Genocide Convention. Canada's response after the Advisory Opinion was issued was certainly lacking. The immediate reaction was limited to a statement that the government had “taken note” of the Advisory Opinion, stressing that it was “nonbinding.”30 Two weeks later, a passing reference to the Advisory Opinion appeared in a joint statement from Prime Minister Trudeau and the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand reiterating their call for a ceasefire and expressing concern about the mounting hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The statement generically called on Israel “to respond substantively to the ICJ's advisory opinion,”31 but offered no examples as to what that substantive response should entail. Canada's response to the advisory opinion A resolution came before the UN General Assembly on 18 September 2024, following up on the ICJ Advisory Opinion, which had, after all. initially been sought by the General Assembly. Among other provisions, the resolution “[w]elcomes the Advisory opinion … [and] [d]emands that Israel comply without delay with all its legal obligations under international law, including as stipulated by the International Court of Justice.”32 The resolution passed with 124 votes in favour, 14 against, and 43 abstentions.33 Canada was one of the countries to abstain. Many of Canada's close allies, such as France, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand, supported the resolution, while many others, including Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, joined Canada in abstaining. Israel and the United States were among the fourteen states that opposed the resolution. In a statement, the government explained its decision to abstain rather than support the resolution, citing that it did not reference the “need to end terrorism, for which Israel has serious and legitimate security concerns” and that it contained “language that aligns with Boycott Divestment Sanctions, which Canada firmly opposes.”34 To a certain extent, the decision to abstain rather than oppose (which has tended to be Canada's voting record with UN General Assembly resolutions related to Israel/Palestine)35 the resolution may be seen as a small step forward. It was, however, sharply criticized by Canadian groups supportive of Israel.36 There has yet to be any acknowledgement of the steps that Canada is obliged to take—and therefore that it intends to take—in response to the ICJ's identification of a responsibility incumbent on third states not to “render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” What implications might there be, for instance, for Canadian trade policy, the charitable status of Canadian organizations, the involvement of Canadians in real estate deals in the OPT, or the possibility that the actions of some Canadians with respect to settlements in the OPT might even be tantamount to criminal liability for war crimes? Canada designated Hamas a “terrorist entity” under Canadian law in 2002.37 Numerous other Palestinian armed groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, have similarly been designated. Since the October 7th attack, there have been four rounds of sanctions, targeting thirty-nine individuals, including Hamas leadership.38 Canada has been slower to take action against individuals and groups responsible for violence and human rights abuses against Palestinians. After considerable pressure, in May, June, and September of 2024, the government imposed three rounds of sanctions against a total of fifteen individuals and seven groups deemed responsible for “extremist settler violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.”39 These are the first ever sanctions of that nature. However, no sanctions have been imposed against Israeli political leaders who have been widely condemned for supporting, facilitating, and inciting that extremist settler violence—notably Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.40 There have been repeated calls for Canada to impose a comprehensive arms embargo on any weapons, including parts and components, transferred either directly to Israel or indirectly through third countries, most notably the United States. While the government announced in January that no new export permits would be authorized, and later cancelled thirty existing permits, the ban is still far from comprehensive.41 For instance, Canadian-made parts are sold to companies in the United States, where they are used in the assembly of F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. The Canadian Commercial Corporation, a Canadian Crown Corporation acting on behalf of General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems—Canada, also remains under contract to provide the US Department of Defense with artillery propellants that will be supplied to Israel.42 Reports indicate that C$95 million worth of military goods could be exported from Canada to Israel through to the end of 2025.43 It is also worth noting that the Canada–Israel Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in 1997 and was updated in 2019, extends its coverage to the “territory where [Israel's] customs laws are applied.”44 This means the trade deal includes Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which Canada considers to be unlawful. There was a concerted push by legal experts and human rights groups to exclude those unlawful settlements45—which, after all, constitute war crimes under international law—from the gamut of the trade deal when it was updated, but the government refused to make that change. Canada and the International Criminal Court Meanwhile, an announcement from Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, on 29 May 2024, raised further concerns about Canadian double standards regarding international law and institutions when it comes to Israel. Khan indicated that, as part of an ongoing investigation launched over three years ago, he was seeking arrest warrants for five key Israeli and Hamas leaders, including Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and its then minister of defence, Yoav Gallant, on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges in connection with the October 7th attacks in southern Israel and the aftermath in Gaza.46 Canada, famously, was an ardent champion of the establishment of the ICC in 1998.47 Canada's foreign affairs minister at the time, Lloyd Axworthy, played a key leadership role, and a Canadian, Philippe Kirsch, served as the first ICC president. However, rather than express support and offer a commitment to cooperate with Khan and the Court as the case proceeds, Prime Minister Trudeau, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, and Foreign Affairs Minister Joly all pilloried the prosecutor for having sought the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, decrying what they called an unhelpful “equivalence” between Hamas and the Israeli government.48 The government's position was criticized in an open letter to the prime minister from over 375 Canadian law professors, lawyers, legal scholars, academics, civil society, faith and labour movement leaders, and former diplomats and parliamentarians, including Axworthy and two former ambassadors to the United Nations, Allan Rock and Rosemary McCarney. The letter notes: The principles of equal treatment and access to justice in the field of international criminal justice do not, by any measure, amount to an equivalence of the nature you have decried. No country, no armed group, no corporation and no individual can be allowed to stand above or apart from the law. Nothing undermines justice more—at a national or international level—than double standards and exceptionalism. This commitment must be at the core of Canada's ICC position and foreign policy.49 Canada was among ninety-three states to subsequently endorse a joint statement on 14 June 2024 reaffirming that ICC officials and staff must be able to carry out their work “without intimidation.”50 While the statement does not explicitly mention the Israel/Palestine case, it is widely understood to be a response to threats that had been levelled at the Court by supporters of Israel, including the US House of Representatives.51 Beyond that, Canada's position regarding the application for the arrest warrants remained the same. On 21 November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, more commonly known as Deif, commander-in-chief of the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas (known as the Al-Qassam Brigades). Warrants had initially been sought as well for Yahya Sinwar, then head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Ismail Haniyeh, former head of the Hamas political bureau, but those applications were later withdrawn following evidence confirming their deaths.52 The arrest warrant issued for Deif was cancelled on 26 February 2025 after his death was also confirmed.53 In reaction to the news of the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant being issued, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that Canada “will abide by all the regulations and rulings of the international courts.”54 Minister Joly, while declining to answer the “speculative” question about executing the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants if circumstances arose, confirmed that Canada must “abide by its treaty obligations.”55 While there is no explicit commitment to execute the warrants, the generic affirmations that Canada will abide by all rulings of the international courts, and by its treaty obligations, point in that direction. It is not as clear a statement of support as was made by many other governments, but at least it moves away from criticizing the prosecutor. Disregarding international law in Israel/Palestine weakens it everywhere And in the current volatile global context, with the United States, Russia, and China now regularly and flagrantly violating international law and disregarding—often contemptuously—international courts and human rights bodies, the need to vigorously and scrupulously reinforce international law has become imperative. The bottom line is that it is not enough, and is, in fact, dangerous hypocrisy, for the Canadian government to laud the important role of international law and international legal institutions in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if those legal standards and bodies are ignored, abandoned, or, at best, given lukewarm support by Canada when breached or disrespected. It is appropriate and necessary for international law to be at the heart of Canada's foreign policy with respect to the conflict. But that requires demonstrating, with decisive words and concrete measures, both internationally and nationally, that Canada means what it says in standing up for the rules-based international order that it has helped to shape since the 1940s. To do otherwise weakens the international legal framework at a time when it needs to be stronger than ever. Those consequences reverberate far beyond Israel and Palestine alone. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.Notes1. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), “Canadian policy on key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/mena-moan/israeli-palestinian_policy-politique_israelo-palestinien.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).2. Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister on attacks against Israel,” 8 October 2023, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2023/10/08/statement-prime-minister-trudeau-attacks-against-israel (accessed 10 April 2025).3. Marko Milanovic, “Does Israel have the right to defend itself?,” EJIL: Talk!, 14 November 2023, https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-israel-have-the-right-to-defend-itself/ (accessed 22 April 2025).4. United Nations (UN), Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Article 51, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (accessed 10 April 2025).5. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, paragraph 139, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 20 April 2025).6. Ibid., paragraph 141.7. Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau speaks with Israel War Cabinet member Minister Benny Gantz, 16 November 2023,” https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2023/11/16/prime-minister-justin-trudeau-speaks-israel-war-cabinet-member-minister (accessed 10 April 2025).8. GAC, “Statement by Minister Joly on the International Court of Justice's decision on South Africa's request for provisional measures in its case against Israel,” 26 January 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/01/statement-by-minister-joly-on-the-international-court-of-justices-decision-on-south-africas-request-for-provisional-measures-in-its-case-against-is.html (accessed 10 April 2025).9. Bill Blair (@BillBlair), “Canada continues to support Israel's right to defend itself in accordance with international law, following the brutal terror attack by Hamas on October 7. Hamas must immediately release those being held hostage,” X, 4 November 2023, https://x.com/BillBlair/status/1720983221398069565 (accessed 10 April 2025).10. UN Human Rights Council, The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/index (accessed 10 April 2025).11. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “ICRC president tells Gaza forum: civilians must be protected, hostages must be released unharmed,” 9 November 2023, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-president-tells-paris-conference-gaza-immediate-imperative-is-to-save-lives (accessed 10 April 2025).12. Amnesty International, “Damning evidence of war crimes as Israeli attacks wipe out entire families in Gaza,” 20 October 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-as-israeli-attacks-wipe-out-entire-families-in-gaza/ (accessed 10 April 2025).13. B’Tselem—The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Manufacturing famine: Israel is committing the war crime of starvation in the Gaza Strip,” April 2024, https://www.btselem.org/publications/202404_manufacturing_famine (accessed 10 April 2025).14. Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, “About 10 percent of the Gaza Strip's population killed, injured, or missing due to the Israeli genocide,” 25 July 2024, https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/6420/About-10-percent-of-the-Gaza-Strip%E2%80%99s-population-killed,-injured,-or-missing-due-to-the-Israeli-genocide (accessed 10 April 2025).15. Bethan McKernan et al., “Palestinian prisoners describe systemic abuse in Israel's jails,” The Guardian, 5 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/05/palestinian-prisoners-describe-widespread-abuse-in-israels-jails (accessed 10 April 2025).16. ICJ, Application Instituting Proceedings Containing a Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), 29 December 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).17. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Provisional Measures, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/provisional-measures (accessed 10 April 2025).18. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Orders, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/orders (accessed 10 April 2025).19. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Order, 24 May 2024, paragraph 32, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).20. Alexandre Skander Galand and Wim Muller, “The ICJ's findings on plausible genocide in Gaza and its implications for the International Criminal Court, Opinio Juris,” 5 April 2024, https://opiniojuris.org/2024/04/05/the-icjs-findings-on-plausible-genocide-in-gaza-and-its-implications-for-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 10 April 2025).21. GAC, “Statement by Minister Joly,” 26 January 2024.22. Darren Major, “Trudeau says Israel needs to follow ICJ ruling and halt operations in Rafah,” CBC News, 24 May 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-icj-decision-rafah-1.7214231 (accessed 10 April 2025).23. ICJ, Request for Advisory Opinion pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 77/247 of 30 December 2022: Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 17 January 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20230117-REQ-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).24. ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 19 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).25. Ibid., paragraph 261.26. Ibid., paragraph 279.27. ICJ, Request by the United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the “Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,” Written Statement of the Government of Canada, 14 July 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20230724-wri-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).28. ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (Request for Advisory Opinion), Public hearings to be held from Monday 19 to Monday 26 February 2024, Press Release, 9 February 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240209-pre-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).29. Justice for All Canada, “Canada's absence from ICJ hearings is a blow to Palestinian justice,” 20 February 2024, https://www.justiceforallcanada.org/icj-canada-withdrawal-feb20-2024.html (accessed 10 April 2025).30. The Canadian Press, “Ottawa says it has ‘taken note’ of UN court call for end to Israeli settlements,” The Globe and Mail, 19 July 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ottawa-says-it-has-taken-note-of-un-court-call-for-end-to-israeli/ (accessed 10 April 2025).31. Prime Minister of Canada, “Joint statement by the prime ministers of Australia, Canada and New Zealand,” 26 July 2024, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2024/07/26/joint-statement-prime-ministers-australia-canada-and-new (accessed 10 April 2025).32. UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/24: Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel's policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN Document A/RES/ES-10/24, 9 September 2024, paragraphs 1 and 3, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/272/75/pdf/n2427275.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).33. UN, “UN General Assembly demands Israel end ‘unlawful presence’ in Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 18 September 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154496 (accessed 10 April 2025).34. GAC, “Canada abstains from United Nations General Assembly resolution on the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel's policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 18 September 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/09/canada-abstains-from-united-nations-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-advisory-opinion-of-the-international-court-of-justice-on-the-legal-conseque.html (accessed 10 April 2025).35. Jeremy Wildeman, “Assessing Canada's foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, 1979–2019,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 27 no. 1 (2021): 62–80.36. Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, “Canadian government breaks UN promise,” 18 September 2024, https://www.cija.ca/canadian_government_breaks_un_promise (accessed 10 April 2025).37. Public Safety Canada, “Currently listed entities,” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#25 (accessed 10 April 2025).38. GAC, “Canadian sanctions related to terrorist entities,” https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/terrorists-terroristes.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).39. GAC, “Canada imposes third round of sanctions on perpetrators of extremist settler violence against Palestinian civilians in West Bank,” 18 September 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/09/canada-imposes-third-round-of-sanctions-on-perpetrators-of-extremist-settler-violence-against-palestinian-civilians-in-west-bank.html (accessed 10 April 2025).40. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, “Canada's sanctions on illegal settlers in the OPT,” August 2024, https://www.cjpme.org/fs_248 (accessed 10 April 2025).41. Steven Chase, “Mélanie Joly says Canada will block U.S.-bound ammunition sale destined for Israel,” The Globe and Mail, 10 September 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-suspends-arm-sales-israel-through-united-states/ (accessed 10 April 2025).42. Kelsey Gallagher, “Canada under contract to supply the IDF with artillery propellant,” Project Ploughshares, 26 March 2025, https://www.ploughshares.ca/publications/canada-under-contract-to-supply-the-idf-with-artillery-propellant (accessed 22 April 2025).43. Emma Paling, “$95 million in new Canadian military goods could flow To Israel By 2025,” The Maple, 1 August 2024, https://www.readthemaple.com/95-million-in-new-canadian-military-goods-could-flow-to-israel-by-2025/ (accessed 10 April 2025).44. GAC, Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement, 13 September 2019, article 1.7, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/israel/fta-ale/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).45. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, “Annexing Palestine through trade: The Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” September 2023, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/cjpme/pages/7341/attachments/original/1695662785/EN_-_Annexing_Palestine_Through_Trade_-_2023-010_-_FINAL.pdf?1695662785 (accessed 10 April 2025).46. International Criminal Court (ICC), “Statement of ICC prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine,” 20 May 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state (accessed 10 April 2025).47. Valerie Oosterveld, Canada and the Development of International Criminal Law: What Role for the Future?, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Paper no. 16, March 2018, https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/documents/Reflections%20Series%20Paper%20no.16web.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).48. Marie Woolf, “Ottawa weighs in on ICC's warrant requests for Israeli, Hamas leaders,” The Globe and Mail, 21 May 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-says-canada-respects-independence-of-icc-but-rejects-comparing/ (accessed 10 April 2025).49. Open Letter, “A call for Canadian support for the ICC's work with respect to Palestine/Israel,” 29 May 2024, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc01c8f405d5340f3254abf/t/6657cdbfeebac657b722e956/1717030335790/Open+Letter+to+PM+Trudeau%2C+29.05.24+EN.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).50. GAC, “Joint Statement in support of the International Criminal Court,” 14 June 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/06/joint-statement-in-support-of-the-international-criminal-court.html (accessed 10 April 2025).51. Harry Davies, “ICC must be allowed to carry out work ‘without intimidation,’ say 93 member states,” The Guardian, 15 June 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/law/article/2024/jun/15/icc-must-be-allowed-to-carry-out-work-without-intimidation-say-93-member-states (accessed 10 April 2025); Caitlin Yilek, “House votes to sanction International Criminal Court over potential warrants for Israeli officials,” CBS News, 4 June 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/house-vote-international-criminal-court-sanctions-netanyahu/?intcid=CNM-00-10abd1h (accessed 10 April 2025).52. ICC, “Statement of ICC prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine,” 21 November 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-situation-state-palestine (accessed 10 April 2025).53. ICC, Decision terminating proceedings against Mr Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al Masri (Deif), 25 February 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/18-417 (accessed 10 April 2025).54. Robert Fife, “Trudeau says Canada would abide by ICC arrest warrants for Netanyahu, former defence minister,” The Globe and Mail, 21 November 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-says-canada-would-abide-by-icc-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu/ (accessed 10 April 2025).55. CBC News, “Canada needs to follow ICC obligations, Joly says,” 21 November 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.6571268 (accessed 10 April 2025).

For several years, Egypt – which recently announced that Hamas had accepted a ceasefire proposal negotiated in Cairo – has been playing a mediating role in the conflict in Gaza. As the only Arab country sharing a border with the Palestinian enclave, Egypt pursues strategic objectives that combine security concerns and domestic constraints – goals that are under pressure from Israel's expansionist policy. In the absence of a diplomatic solution, the situation in Gaza could have unpredictable consequences for the regime of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, whose options, in the face of public opinion, remain limited to avoid the accusation of indifference and to mask its impotence against Tel Aviv. On August 18th, the announcement of a ceasefire accepted by Hamas, negotiated in Cairo based on a U.S. plan, highlighted the mediating role played by the Egyptian authorities in the war waged by Israel in Gaza. This role remains essential, even though Qatar's actions have often received more media attention due to the emirate's proximity to Hamas. A key and historical role as a mediator  Without going back to the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreements of 1979, Cairo has long been an essential player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to its negotiation capacity between Israel and the Palestinians. Hosni Mubarak's Egypt (1981-2011) played a major role in most agreements concluded between the PLO and Israel after Oslo (1993) and was active in maintaining a channel of discussion with Israel during the Second Intifada (2000-2005). After Hamas's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 and its takeover of Gaza in 2007, Egypt intervened in bilateral negotiations both between Hamas and Fatah and between Hamas and Israel during the conflicts of 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, in which the victims were mostly civilians. The rise to power of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in 2014, following the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi (2013), who was from the Muslim Brotherhood, created tensions with Hamas, which is close to the Islamist movement. Adjustments were necessary, but Egyptian intelligence maintained a discreet connection with Hamas and continued to carry out mediation missions with Israel or with Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority. Since October 7, 2023, alongside Qatar and the United States (the only actor able to pressure Israel), Egypt is once again at the heart of negotiations, whether they take place in Doha or Cairo. A first agreement under the sponsorship of the three states was reached in January 2025. Previously, in December 2024, Egypt had negotiated an agreement between Fatah and Hamas to establish an autonomous administration at the end of the war. A red line against Israeli expansionism?  In recent days, in light of Israel's expansionist policy, Egypt has made numerous statements regarding the situation in Gaza. The authorities in Cairo have expressed support for the establishment of an international peacekeeping force mandated by the UN, while denying rumors that they had proposed a transfer of Hamas's weapons to Egypt. In Rafah (Egypt), in an interview with CNN, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reaffirmed the rejection of a massive relocation of Palestinians, which he described as a 'red line.'  Earlier, President Al-Sisi had crossed a rhetorical threshold by denouncing a 'war of famine and genocide' and reiterated his refusal of any relocation plan. Egypt is also supporting the South African complaint to the International Court of Justice for violation of the Genocide Convention, without joining the stakeholders. These statements come in a dual context of a blockage of negotiations and an acceleration of Israeli operations, with Israeli territorial ambitions that could signify the end of any possibility for a two-state solution and a massive displacement of people outside of Palestine, particularly towards Egypt. The ceasefire negotiated in Cairo by Egyptian and Qatari mediators largely echoed the plan of Donald Trump's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and thus represents a real advancement compared to the situation in early June, when the United States, along with Israel, had rejected the proposal made by Hamas to implement a truce. An advancement that, however, has not resulted in a breakthrough: a week later, Israel has still not responded to the negotiators' proposal. The announcement of the ceasefire accepted by Hamas comes as the Israeli security cabinet approved, on August 8, a plan to take control of Gaza and as the UN, after several warnings, declared a state of famine in the Gaza Strip. Various Egyptian statements also resonate with the vision of a 'Greater Israel' recently put forward by Benjamin Netanyahu, referring to the biblical borders of Israel that include territories currently belonging to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as part of the Sinai Peninsula. The idea of relocating the Palestinian population outside of Gaza is not new, although it has been rather marginal until now. Recently, Netanyahu has publicly considered relocating Gazans to Arab countries or Africa (negotiations in this regard have been mentioned several times). The Sinai, a key security issue for Egypt  Egypt, which shares a 14-kilometer border with the Palestinian enclave, the "Philadelphian corridor," is also a security player because it plays a key role, almost literally, in the blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip (both in terms of its maintenance and/or its easing).  In this regard, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi's Egypt is not spared from criticism that denounces its inaction while, on the other side of the border, the war waged by Israel increasingly resembles ethnic cleansing, if not genocide.  The grievances are numerous and particularly concern the blocking of supplies at the Rafah crossing into Palestinian territory, the security treatment reserved for Gaza refugees – about 100,000 Palestinians have sought refuge in Egypt since the beginning of the war, paying high fees to the Hala company, which specializes in the 'coordination' of the Rafah crossing – as well as the security management of pro-Gaza protests, both in Cairo and in Sinai. It should be noted that Egypt administered Gaza from 1948 to 1967, before the strip came under Israeli control. Since then, Cairo's stance towards Gaza has always been deeply influenced by the situation in Sinai, a large desert area where the border between Egypt and Gaza is located. Occupied by Israel in 1967 following the Six-Day War (at the same time as the Gaza Strip), Sinai was recovered by Egypt in 1982. Underdeveloped territory with inadequate infrastructure, Sinai has been, for decades, a trafficking zone between Egypt, Israel, and Gaza.   As can be seen on this map, it is in the extreme northeast of the Sinai Peninsula that the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is located. Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock After 2011, a local jihadist movement, which joined the Islamic State in 2014, thrived there before being gradually contained by the Egyptian army after a "dirty war" that resulted in several thousand casualties (more than 3,200 deaths among security forces, while the number of civilian casualties is unknown). Sisi proclaimed victory in 2023, with operations ending between 2019 and 2020. For Cairo, the management of Gaza is primarily a security issue. It involves containing trafficking, preventing the infiltration of armed groups more radical than Hamas, the most active of which is the Islamic Jihad, and avoiding an influx of Palestinian refugees, due to its logistical inability to organize such reception. Beyond the logistical question, Egyptian leaders fear a situation that could turn into a de facto state. They have in mind the Lebanese and Jordanian precedents, where the settlement of Palestinian refugees led to the events of Black September in the Hashemite Kingdom and to the civil war in the Land of the Cedar. This position is longstanding. As early as 2008, the forced entry of thousands of Palestinians into Sinai was perceived as a transgression of national sovereignty, a repetition of which must be avoided "at all costs."  Nevertheless, Egypt denies participating in the blockade or being inactive in the face of the tragedy experienced by the Palestinians. President Sisi himself responded to these accusations, reminding that it is Israel that has bombed the Rafah crossing multiple times and controls the Palestinian side of Rafah. Israel, which withdrew from Gaza in 2005, regained control of the Philadelphia corridor in May 2024. Egyptian media, echoing the government's talking points, emphasize the humanitarian convoys sent from Egypt: over 45,000 trucks, accounting for 70% of humanitarian aid, have reportedly supplied Gaza since October 2023 (noting that the crossings can only occur with Israel's agreement and under its security conditions). Between external constraints and internal pressures On the Palestinian issue, Egypt advocates for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the framework of a two-state solution. This is a historical positioning, defined by Anwar El-Sadat in his speech to the Knesset in November 1978. It translates into diplomatic actions, but since 2008, each Israeli war in Gaza highlights the limited scope of Egyptian engagement. However, for Sisi, this engagement comes with domestic constraints. The desperate situation of Gazans resonates widely in Egypt as well as throughout the region and provokes a strong sense of solidarity. Here too, the Egyptian government is caught in its contradictions. For many Egyptians, Hamas is not so much a terrorist movement as a resistance movement against Israel: indeed, even Cairo has not classified it as a terrorist organization, unlike the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. On one hand, the Egyptian authorities repress any demonstration that they do not organize themselves and that could challenge the regime. There is a mistrust of the street that refers to the importance of mobilizations supporting Palestinians in the militant trajectory that led to the 2011 revolution. On the other hand, the president and the government must take into account public opinion’s sensitivity and show that they are not powerless. In this regard, accepting the relocation of Palestinians in Sinai would make them accomplices in the eyes of Egyptians. In any case, Egypt's role seems hardly able to go beyond humanitarian aid and diplomatic negotiations. Peace with Israel remains a pillar of Egyptian foreign policy. Cairo will not jeopardize its bilateral relationship with Israel to the point of threatening to enter into armed conflict with it. Not only for economic reasons, or because part of Egypt's gas supplies depend on Israel – even if these can represent a leverage. In many aspects, the alliance with Israel is crucial for Sisi: beyond the support that Netanyahu was able to provide him by pleading his case in Washington after the coup against Morsi (2013), the Hebrew state is an economic partner, but also a security partner in the fight against jihadist groups still present in the Sinai. While red lines are stated, no real threat has been made.  However, rumors from government sources had circulated in February 2024: they spoke of the threat of a suspension of the peace treaty in the event of an Israeli invasion of Rafah. Alas, Israeli troops have occupied the border area since May 2024 without Egypt reacting in any way other than verbally. It seems particularly unlikely that the Egyptian army could be mobilized to intervene outside of a UN framework and without Israel’s consent. Diplomacy so as not to appear either indifferent or powerless?  It will be understood, therefore, that Egypt's recent statements are part of a long-term policy and do not indicate a change in direction. Israel's expansionist policy puts Egypt's strategic objectives under tension: the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution, the preservation of Egypt's sovereignty in Sinai and its security, and finally, the support of Egyptian public opinion.  While Israel responded to Cairo's announcement by mobilizing 60,000 reservists to carry out its plan to occupy Gaza, the question of the sustainability of this balancing act arises and exposes Cairo to reality. Alone, Sisi's regime can do nothing against Israel. While it is unlikely that the Egyptian president will take the risk of opposing militarily, he seems destined to appear indifferent or powerless. A humiliation on the Gaza issue could be costly for the autocrat internally and have dramatic consequences for the region. Therefore, Egypt is left with only the diplomatic path to get out of the rut. First, negotiate a ceasefire and then find an alternative solution to the Israeli occupation of Gaza. The latter could require Egypt's return to the Gaza Strip. But is Egypt really ready to play its part in a solution for Gaza beyond diplomatic negotiations?

As the two-year mark of Israel’s invasion of Gaza approaches, many wonder why Arab countries are not pressuring Israel. The answer is often simple: they are prioritizing their strategic and economic interests. Since the beginning of Israel’s ruthless offensive in Gaza on October 7, 2023, images have repeatedly shown Palestinian civilians crying out desperately to the cameras for help: “Where are the Arabs? Why isn’t anyone stopping this?” Almost two years later, despite the fact that fewer voices doubt that what began as a war has turned into a genocide that has taken the lives of more than 60,000 Palestinians, Arab states have not shifted even an inch from their initial stance: harmless statements of condemnation, without any action to pressure Israel. “Where are the Arabs? Taking a nap… By Arabs, I mean their rulers, with their heads buried in the sand,” declared Fawaz Gerges, professor at the London School of Economics, in a recent interview with the U.S. network NBC. In fact, it has often been non-Arab countries, thousands of kilometers away from Gaza, that have tried to stand up. Such is the case of South Africa, the country that denounced the existence of genocide in the enclave before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. “In general, Arab regimes have not taken concrete measures in response to the ongoing genocide in Gaza. The main reason is the prioritization of their strategic and economic interests over popular sentiments of support for Palestinians in the face of the horror they are experiencing. This is not surprising given that most [of the regimes] rule based on growing authoritarianism,” asserts Yara Hawari, co-director of the Palestinian think tank Al Shabaka. The gap between the street and the palace This gap between the opinion of the so-called “Arab street” and its rulers is evident in every new survey. In one of the most comprehensive, conducted by the Doha Institute with the participation of around 8,000 people from 16 different Arab countries, 92% of respondents believe that the Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs and not only Palestinians. A similar percentage, 89%, opposes normalizing relations with Israel. For an overwhelming majority, 84%, the genocide in Gaza represents a source of “great psychological stress,” and for another 13% it also constitutes a source of stress, though to a lesser degree. “Although they are not democratic, Arab regimes cannot entirely ignore their respective public opinions, which are horrified by what is happening in Gaza. That is why they must strike a delicate balance. They fear that discontent over their positions on Gaza could converge with other grievances — of which there are many — and potentially trigger social unrest,” explains Haizam Amirah Fernández, executive director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CEARC). So far, this has translated into statements condemning the massacres of civilians perpetrated by Israel, others in support of creating a Palestinian state, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gazans when approved by Tel Aviv. Of the 22 states that make up the Arab League, a total of six have signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. The first to do so was Egypt (1979), followed by Jordan (1994), and then Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan joined under the so-called Abraham Accords sponsored by Trump in 2020 — although Sudan, currently in civil war, has not implemented it. In addition, other states maintain varying degrees of economic relations or security cooperation with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia. Among all these countries, none has broken diplomatic relations with the Israeli state over Gaza, and only Jordan has withdrawn its ambassador. On the other side, among Arab countries with a more hostile stance toward Israel, are Algeria, Tunisia, and Houthi-controlled Yemen, the only one that has applied military pressure on Israel by launching missiles and harassing maritime traffic in the Suez Canal. Lebanon and Iraq represent particular cases, as both are highly fragmented politically and home to pro-Iranian militias that consider Israel an enemy, such as Hezbollah — an opinion not shared by the entire political class. The reasons behind the indifference of so many Arab states toward Gaza are varied. First, some leaders — especially those of the Gulf petro-monarchies — perceive Iran or the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization linked to Hamas, as a greater threat than Israel. Faced with this sense of insecurity, also shared by President el-Sisi in Cairo, many look toward the West. “The permanence in power of these leaders does not depend on the choice of their citizens or subjects, but on external support from the United States, and this shapes their position on Palestine,” asserts Amirah Fernández, who lists several actions these countries could have taken to pressure Israel: from breaking or suspending bilateral agreements, such as the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, to applying serious pressure to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza and thus allow humanitarian aid to reach the enclave, whether by land or by sea. Egypt, for example, has dedicated itself to repressing activists who attempted to carry out such actions near the Gaza border. The “realpolitik” of the new generation of leaders Beyond their deference to the West, the positions of Arab states in some cases respond to a stark calculation of “realpolitik”: the benefits they can gain from their relationship with Israel — a technological and military power — outweigh what an occupied people like the Palestinians can offer. [...]  In an interview with El Salto, journalist Antony Loewenstein, author of the book “The Palestine Laboratory”, explained how the sale of weapons and cyber-espionage tools has become a kind of insurance policy for Israel against possible retaliatory actions. “Almost a quarter of Israel’s [arms] exports went to Arab dictatorships, such as the United Arab Emirates […]. No Arab state has cut ties with Israel, and they won’t,” Loewenstein said. Against this backdrop, for decades the only common denominator among Arab states regarding the Palestinian issue has been the mere signing of joint declarations in support of the “two-state solution” to resolve the conflict with Israel. At the end of July, within the framework of a United Nations-sponsored summit to promote that solution, the “Arab consensus” unexpectedly expanded with all Arab League countries signing a declaration urging Hamas to disarm and hand over control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. Thus, the only bold — and unprecedented — action taken during nearly two years of genocide in Gaza has been to pressure Hamas and not Israel. A very bleak record for pan-Arab solidarity. 

A new vision for Middle East peace emerged this week which proposes the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and the West Bank, the disarming and disbanding of Hamas and the creation of a unified Palestinian state. The plan emerged from a “high-level conference” in New York on July 29, which assembled representatives of 17 states, the European Union and the Arab League. The resulting proposal is “a comprehensive and actionable framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and the achievement of peace and security for all”. Signatories include Turkey and the Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan. Europe was represented by France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK. Indonesia was there for Asia, Senegal for Africa, and Brazil, Canada and Mexico for the Americas. Neither the US nor Israel were present. Significantly, it is the first time the Arab states have called for Hamas to disarm and disband. But, while condemning Hamas’s attack on Israel of October 7 2023 and recalling that the taking of hostages is a violation of international law, the document is unsparing in its connection between a state of Palestine and an end to Israel’s assault on Gaza’s civilians. It says: “Absent decisive measures toward the two-state solution and robust international guarantees, the conflict will deepen and regional peace will remain elusive.” A plan for the reconstruction of Gaza will be developed by the Arab states and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – a Jeddah-based group which aims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world – supported by an international fund. The details will be hammered out at a Gaza Reconstruction and Recovery Conference, to be held in Cairo. It is a bold initiative. In theory, it could end the Israeli mass killing in Gaza, remove Hamas from power and begin the implementation of a process for a state of Palestine. The question is whether it has any chance of success. First, there appears to be growing momentum to press ahead with recognition of the state of Palestine as part of a comprehensive peace plan leading to a two-state solution. France, the UK and, most recently, Canada have announced they would take that step at the UN general assembly in September. The UK stated that it would do so unless Israel agreed to a ceasefire and the commencement of a substantive peace process. These announcements follow those made in May 2024 by Spain, Ireland and Norway, three of the other European signatories. By the end of September at least 150 of the UN’s 193 members will recognise Palestinian statehood. Recognition is largely symbolic without a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from both Gaza and the West Bank. But it is essential symbolism. For years, many European countries, Canada, Australia and the US have said that recognition could not be declared if there was the prospect of Israel-Palestine negotiations. Now the sequence is reversed: recognition is necessary as pressure for a ceasefire and the necessary talks to ensure the security of both Israelis and Palestinians. Israel accelerated that reversal at the start of March, when it rejected the scheduled move to phase two of the six-week ceasefire negotiated with the help of the US, and imposed a blockade on aid coming into the Strip. The Netanyahu government continues to hold out against the ceasefire. But its loud blame of Hamas is becoming harder to accept. The images of the starvation in Gaza and warnings by doctors, humanitarian organisations and the UN of an effective famine with the deaths of thousands can no longer be denied. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, behind the scenes and through their embassies, have been encouraging European countries to make the jump to recognition. Their efforts at the UN conference in New York this week are another front of that campaign. Israel and the Trump administration But in the short term, there is little prospect of the Netanyahu government giving way with its mass killing, let alone entering talks for two states. Notably neither Israel nor the US took part in the conference. Trump has criticised the scenes of starvation in Gaza. But his administration has joined Netanyahu in vitriolic denunciation of France and the UK over their intentions to recognise Palestine. And the US president has warned the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, that recognition of Palestinian statehood would threaten Canada’s trade deal with the US. In response to Trump’s concern over the images of starving children and his exhortation “We’ve got to get the kids fed,” Israel has airdropped a few pallets of aid – less than a truck’s worth. Yet this appears more of a public relations exercise directed at Washington than a genuine attempt to ease the terrible condition on the Strip. A small number of lorries with supplies from UN and humanitarian organisations have also crossed the border, but only after lengthy delays and with half still held up. There is no security for transport and delivery of the aid inside Gaza. A sacrifice for a state? So the conference declaration is not relief for Gaza. Instead, it is yet another marker of Israel’s increasing isolation. After France’s announcement, the Netanyahu government thundered: “Such a move rewards terror and risks creating another Iranian proxy … A Palestinian state in these conditions would be a launch pad to annihilate Israel.” But while recognising Hamas’s mass killing of October 7 2023, most governments and their populations do not perceive Israel as attacking Hamas and its fighters. They see the Netanyahu government and Israeli military slaying and starving civilians. Even in the US, where the Trump administration is trying to crush sympathy for Palestine and Gazans in universities, non-governmental organisations and the public sphere, opinion is shifting. In a Gallup poll taken in the US and released on July 29, only 32% of respondents supported Israel’s actions in Gaza – an all-time low – and 60% opposed them. Netanyahu was viewed unfavourably by 52% and favourably by only 29%. Israel has lost its moment of “normalisation” with Arab states. Its economic links are strained and its oft-repeated claim to being the “Middle East’s only democracy” is bloodstained beyond recognition. This will be of no comfort to the people of Gaza facing death. But in the longer term, there is the prospect that this sacrifice will be the catalyst to recognise Palestine that disappeared in 1948.

In the Middle East, China seeks to appear neutral by engaging in dialogue with all actors, from Tehran to Tel Aviv, including Riyadh. Beijing's objective is clear: to establish itself as a guarantor of stability to secure its energy and commercial interests. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) commitment to the Middle East reflects a carefully calibrated geostrategic approach, aiming to preserve regional stability, ensure uninterrupted access to energy resources, and promote its famous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the 'New Silk Roads.' In this region, the Sino-Iranian relationship is most often highlighted due to its political weight and military dimension; however, whether in economic, diplomatic, or strategic terms, Beijing's presence in this area certainly extends beyond its ties with Tehran. As elsewhere in the world, in the Middle East, China divides its diplomatic partnerships into several types, listed here in descending order of intensity: "global strategic partnerships" (in the Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain); "strategic partnerships" (Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority); "friendly cooperation partnerships" (Lebanon and Yemen); and finally, "innovative global partnerships" (Israel). China is redefining its priorities in the Middle East  Energy dependence is one of the essential drivers of China's policy in the region. Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, are among the main suppliers of crude oil to the PRC—well ahead of Iran in terms of volume, as well as reliability and investment opportunities. This economic reality compels China to invest much more heavily in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, where financial stability, political predictability, and institutional openness promote sustainable strategic partnerships and infrastructure development, unlike in Iran. For these reasons, the Gulf countries have indirectly become essential nodes in the architecture of the BRI through trade, receiving nearly six times more Chinese investments than Iran. Although Iran has geographical interest as a potential corridor between China and Europe, the persistent effect of international sanctions, poor economic management, and regional adventurism severely limit its ability to attract sustainable Chinese investments. In contrast, Israel offers a functioning and favorable environment for investors, making it a preferred destination for Chinese capital and infrastructure projects. Its economy is based on solid infrastructure and a dynamic technology sector. Despite geopolitical shocks, including the recent clashes with Iran – which will undoubtedly impact the country's business environment – Israel, as a member of the OECD, remains attractive in terms of business environment and investment, mainly because the foundations of its economic environment are stronger than those of Iran or Saudi Arabia. The Hebrew state occupies an increasing place within the BRI – not due to the volume of Chinese direct investments, but because of its strategic position and ambitious infrastructure agenda. Its geographical location – straddling Europe, Asia, and Africa via the Mediterranean – makes it a key land and maritime connectivity point that provides an alternative option to Iran for linking China to Europe. In this context, China and Israel have made progress in their negotiations for a free trade agreement that has been discussed since 2016. Although discussions have been suspended since 2023, there remains hope that an agreement could be signed once stability returns to the region. China's trade with Israel and Iran: divergent trajectories China's commercial relations with Israel and Iran reveal two distinct economic approaches.  With Israel, trade is increasingly marked by imports of high technologies - particularly in the semiconductor field - reflecting a growing technological interdependence.  In contrast, trade with Iran remains focused on industrial goods and natural resources, illustrating a more traditional partnership based on access to raw materials. These contrasting dynamics reflect China's strategic flexibility, which relies on Israeli innovation while securing its supplies from Iran.  Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are testing China's strategy in Iran  For nearly fifty years, Iran has turned to China for economic support. However, despite 21 Chinese greenfield investment projects between 2003 and 2020 – mainly in the energy sector – Beijing has gradually begun to disengage due to international sanctions and ongoing regional instability. Large companies such as CNPC and Sinopec have reduced their stake, or even abandoned some projects, while tech companies like Huawei and Lenovo have also scaled back their presence in the Iranian market. Between 2017 and 2019, Iran reportedly saw an outflow of Chinese capital estimated at $990 million. China views instability in the Middle East, particularly the confrontation between Israel and Iran, as a direct threat to its economic and commercial interests. As the world's largest buyer of Iranian oil, China is especially concerned about potential disruptions in strategic maritime routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. In June 2025, Chinese oil imports from Iran significantly increased, reaching up to 1.8 million barrels per day – a surge that occurred just before the military escalation between Israel and Iran, which raised concerns about the security of the Strait of Hormuz. A sign of the weight of the PRC in this region: after the reciprocal airstrikes between Israel and Iran, and Tehran's threat to close this crucial passage, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Beijing to intervene, emphasizing China's heavy dependence on this oil route. China–United States: strategic tensions in a transitioning Middle East China and the United States recently signed a trade agreement and established a 90-day tariff truce, aiming to resolve some key disputes and stabilize economic relations. Furthermore, on the military front, Iran and China signed a military cooperation agreement as early as 2016, reflecting their mutual desire to counter American influence in the region and secure trade routes. Historically, China has supported Iran through arms sales, technology transfers, and training programs. Moreover, despite the official rhetoric, some reports suggest that Chinese technologies have contributed to the development of Iran's ballistic program. The Sino-Iranian relationship in defense illustrates a two-level diplomacy: China discreetly supports Iran's military autonomy while ensuring it does not compromise its strategic relationships with other important regional partners, including Israel, with whom it also maintains top-level security dialogues. This highlights Beijing's broader ambition: to avoid regional polarizations and maintain a balance of power favorable to its interests. China's strategy in the Middle East towards the United States is based on a principle of equidistance: to increase its influence without direct confrontation, while drawing strategic benefits from Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and Egypt. In this perspective, the People's Republic of China does not seek to replace the United States as the dominant power in the region, but rather to offer a multipolar presence focused on preserving stability. Maintaining the status quo, avoiding direct conflicts, and building a parallel system of influence through infrastructure, trade, and diplomacy are the pillars of China's position in the Middle East. This approach ensures Beijing secure access to energy, trade corridors, and sustainable geopolitical influence from Tel Aviv to Tehran.

The recent conflict between Iran and Israel, irrespective of its military and security ramifications, marks the genesis of a new phase in Iran’s engagement with the world. This has the potential not only to alter the regional balance but also to redefine the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program, its sanctions regime, and its diplomatic capacities. While many anticipated that this confrontation would escalate political and economic pressures on Iran, certain strategic realities and diplomatic indicators suggest that, conversely, this crisis might initiate a recalibration in international policy concerning Iran. Ostensibly, the Western alliance continues to voice concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. However, at deeper levels, the question arises: if Iran’s key nuclear facilities have been targeted and completely obliterated, what justification remains for continuing “maximum pressure“? Does this situation, despite its inherent difficulties, not present an opportunity for Iran to enter a new phase of diplomatic play without explicitly signaling retreat? A phase where novel tools, such as collaboration with third countries, the strategic use of silence, and intelligent avoidance of direct negotiation, could supersede the exhaustive path of the past. This analysis endeavors to present a clear and comprehensive picture of the sanctions landscape, the outlook for a potential agreement, and innovative diplomatic avenues for Iran post-conflict. The central question is whether Iran can leverage this crisis into an opportunity to restore its economic and strategic standing, or if the post-conflict environment will merely exacerbate the challenges in its engagement with the world. To begin with, the logic of sanctions has always rested on a simple principle: to generate pressure for behavioral change. However, this logic is deemed effective only when the sanctioned entity retains maneuverability or the motivation to resist. Now, following an attack that the U.S. claims to have inflicted on sensitive parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a clear contradiction has emerged in Western sanctions policy: if Iran is no longer capable of quickly returning to a high level of nuclear activity, what is the meaning and justification for continuing a policy of maximum pressure? From the perspective of independent observers, this juncture could represent a strategic rupture. Maximum pressure is justifiable when Iran is on an escalating trajectory with its nuclear program and the technical balance of power is shifting in Tehran’s favor. However, if, as claimed by the opposing side, Iran’s nuclear capability has been set back, then maintaining the sanctions structure would be less an instrument of foreign policy and more an indication of the aimlessness and inertia within the U.S. policymaking apparatus. Under such circumstances, some circles in Tehran speak of the necessity of adopting “intelligent silence.” This approach, instead of sharp reactions or widespread propaganda, relies on leveraging strategic ambiguity and granting itself time. This is particularly relevant if conditions arise where the West, to maintain the appearance of their operation’s success, is compelled to temporarily halt or alleviate pressures. In this scenario, Iran, without abandoning its principled positions, could create space for a recalibration of international actors’ behavior. The critical point is that sanctions are effective only when dynamically linked to a specific objective. If the goal was to alter nuclear behavior, and that behavior is now contained, then the continuation of sanctions is not a tool of statecraft but a sign of the absence of an alternative strategy. Iran can exploit this contradiction, provided it accurately comprehends the changing strategic landscape and avoids falling into the trap of hasty reactions. Building on this evolving dynamic, the recent conflict not only disrupted strategic calculations in Tehran and Tel Aviv but also palpably darkened the political and diplomatic atmosphere between Iran and the West. Prior to this conflict, although indirect nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. were proceeding in a fragile silence, avenues for reviving the 2015 agreement (JCPOA) were still conceivable. Now, however, following explicit military threats from the U.S. and its overt role alongside Israel, even this fragile path has been severely questioned. In Tehran, many analysts believe that the strategy of appeasement and cautious engagement with the West regarding the nuclear dossier requires reconsideration. The recent military threats posed by Washington and its allies, more than being psychological pressure, carried an operational message—a message that effectively put those political elites in Iran who had always dismissed Western threats as mere rhetoric into a position of weakness. It is now acknowledged that complete disregard for threats can be costly for the country. Consequently, the decision-making discourse in Tehran has undergone a new realism: neither complete appeasement nor hasty confrontation; rather, the management of the balance between threat and opportunity. Nevertheless, direct negotiation with the U.S. remains a red line that is rooted not only in domestic politics but also intrinsically linked to Iran’s strategic prestige. On the other hand, the Trump administration faces domestic challenges and electoral constraints and does not wish to enter a process, on the eve of elections, that could be interpreted by its domestic opponents as “conceding to Tehran.” This is particularly true given that the recent conflict has created a more aggressive image of Iran in Western public opinion, an image that significantly complicates the space for flexible diplomacy. Given this diplomatic deadlock, traditional options are practically defunct. Neither the Vienna path is effective, nor do the Omani or Qatari channels operate with the same ease as before. Therefore, either innovative models must be considered—or it must be accepted that the agreement, in its previous form, has reached a historical dead end, and the time has come for a new architectural approach to engagement. One such idea is the adoption of a “third-party commitment” model, which could resolve part of the nuclear and sanctions crisis without requiring a direct agreement with the U.S. In this model, Iran could entrust a portion of its nuclear technical and supervisory commitments, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, to regional third countries such as Qatar, Oman, or Saudi Arabia. These countries, which maintain more balanced relations with Washington, could act as guarantors of these commitments and, simultaneously, negotiate with the U.S. government for specific sanctions waivers to facilitate economic and banking cooperation with Iran. For instance, Tehran could agree with Saudi Arabia or Qatar that part of the oversight process for enrichment or peaceful nuclear activities would be pursued through structures supervised by these countries or joint regional bodies. In return, these countries could receive licenses from the U.S. Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to participate in energy, banking, or transportation projects with Iran. This model, while circumventing the political sensitivities of direct negotiation, could provide a limited breathing space for Iran’s economy at the technical and executive levels. Another advantage of this approach is the strengthening of Iran’s regional position through the institutionalization of cooperation with its neighbors. Such a model transforms Iran’s image from a threatening actor to a cooperative partner, and effectively, contrary to Israel’s narrative, leaves the path open for regional dialogue. Evidently, this model is not without challenges, including Iran’s need to gain the trust of these countries, provide sufficient technical and legal guarantees, and prevent Israeli maneuvering aimed at disrupting this process. However, in the current circumstances, “third-party commitment” is one of the few options that can overcome the current impasse without imposing the heavy costs of a direct agreement. To fully grasp the broader diplomatic calculus, one must look beyond regional conflicts and into the structural shifts within global geopolitics. For a precise analysis of U.S. sanctions and diplomatic behavior towards Iran, it is insufficient to focus solely on military skirmishes or rhetorical threats. Official and semi-official U.S. foreign policy documents in recent years clearly indicate that Washington’s strategic priority is not Iran, nor even the Middle East, but rather containing China in global competition. This prioritization has created a divergence between verbal threats and the actual U.S. willingness for military engagement or even sustained maximum pressure. Although Washington symbolically and periodically sided with Tel Aviv in the recent Iran-Israel conflict, it was never eager for direct military involvement. In fact, many American analysts warned that drawing the U.S. into a new war in the Middle East would divert the country’s strategic focus from containing China, controlling Taiwan, and technological-economic competition with East Asia. In this vein, the Trump administration—contrary to the traditional perception of its aggressive policy—is disinclined towards costly and protracted wars in the Middle East. Even during his first term as president, he emphasized the withdrawal of troops from the region, reducing foreign expenditures, and focusing on the domestic economy. Therefore, although his policy towards Iran appears more hostile on the surface, in practice, he might prefer an option for managing tension without war; a model that could include maximum economic pressure, occasional threats, and perhaps even a show negotiation, but not direct engagement. Taken together, these factors—shifting U.S. priorities, regional recalibrations, and tactical innovation—suggest that the recent Iran-Israel conflict was a turning point that not only impacted the regional security balance but also provided an opportunity to revisit the path of sanctions, diplomacy, and nuclear policies. Contrary to popular belief, this war may have transformed into a saturation point in the West’s sanctions logic, rather than merely an excuse to intensify pressure—a point where continued pressure, without a clear objective, amounts to strategic self-sabotage. On the other hand, Trump’s return to power, with all its sharp and symbolic implications, conceals a contradictory reality: this president might be less inclined than any of his predecessors to engage in a costly war in the Middle East. The prioritization of China, domestic economy, and Trump’s transactional approach all indicate that Iran can utilize the existing environment to design a new path, one that does not necessarily lead to a classic agreement, but rather to smart tension management through informal and regionally focused tools. In this context, initiatives such as third-party commitments, leveraging neighbors’ capacities to reduce pressure, and pursuing a policy of strategic silence and ambiguity can enable Iran to redefine its economic and diplomatic trajectory – and to do so without retreat, without costly negotiations, and without falling into the trap of zero-sum games. However, success on this path requires several fundamental preconditions: (1) a precise understanding of strategic changes in the US; (2) realism in confronting new threats without succumbing to emotional reactions; (3) intelligent coordination among domestic decision-making bodies; and finally (4) revival of Iran’s economic and regional diplomatic capacity with the aim of exploiting limited but important opportunities. Ultimately, the fundamental question is not whether a grand agreement is imminent or if sanctions will be lifted overnight. The question is whether Iran, at this historical juncture, can calmly, precisely, and with an integrated view of security, economy, and diplomacy, transform the crisis into a platform for recalibrating its role in the regional and global order. The answer to this question depends not merely on external developments, but on the will and initiative within Iran. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

Abstract The right to freedom of expression is currently facing a global crisis unleashed by the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has led to a high polarisation of public opinion, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is facing systematic suppression worldwide. In this column, I shed light on how state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause and I consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context. The column concludes that the failure to protect the right of Palestinians to have their voices heard contributes to the erosion of our collective right to freedom of expression and has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. KeywordsFreedom of expression, Gaza, peaceful protests, media freedom, academic freedom‌, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland 1. INTRODUCTION Since 7 October 2023, the right to freedom of expression has been severely restricted worldwide. Irene Khan, current UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, has depicted the current situation as ‘a global crisis of freedom of expression’ unleashed by the conflict in Gaza.1 The threats to the exercise of this fundamental human right have been so extensive and granular that, for instance, in early October 2024, a beekeeper was fined in Italy for merely having exposed a banner at his market stall reading ‘Stop bombing Gaza – stop genocide’.2 Despite the fact that the International Court of Justice has confirmed that what we see on our screens and read about in the newspapers (which cannot even fully reflect the reality that Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank face every day) may amount to a real and imminent risk of genocide already in January 2024,3 the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is severely restricted, especially in North America and Europe. It has been commented that ‘rarely has a conflict challenged freedom of opinion and expression so broadly and so far beyond its borders’.4 As a result, in this column I shed light on how both state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression in the context of the conflict in Gaza by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause in different ways. I then consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context and I draw some conclusions on the wider implications that restrictions imposed on freedom of expression bear for the protection and promotion of human rights more generally. 2. SILENCING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE: THE ROLE OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS Since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, public opinion has become highly polarised, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, Palestinian voices and their supporters have faced systematic suppression, with both states and non-state actors actively taking measures to silence their positions. Protests in support of the Palestinian cause have been severely restricted in many countries across the world, often on the grounds that these measures are necessary to protect public order and security, to counter “support of terrorism”, and/or to “prevent antisemitism”. Governments, and Western ones in particular, have imposed specific restrictions, blanket bans or pre-emptive bans on demonstrations in support of Palestine.5 Additionally, law enforcement officials have often resorted to excessive use of force and arbitrary detention to disrupt the protests.6 Although in some instances these protests have seen incidents of violence or vandalism, oftentimes the imposed restrictions have been disproportionate. In Germany, for instance, public authorities have imposed pre-emptive bans on several solidarity gatherings in support of Palestinians, based on concerns for ‘public security’, a need to prevent the ‘public celebration of the Hamas terrorist attacks’ of 7 October 2023, and ‘the increase in antisemitic attacks’ in the country.7 These decisions, however, were often grounded on ‘unspecified risks of “inciting, antisemitic exclamations, glorification of and incitement to violence, and acts of violence”’.8 In Italy, protests have been met with excessive use of force by police. For instance, during a protest organised in Pisa in February 2024, riot police and police vehicles were deployed against protesters to block the route to the university square, where participants were directed. In an effort to prevent the participants to reach the square, police charged forward and hit students with batons.9 The disproportionate response by law enforcement led to an unprecedented statement by Italian President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella, who criticised the policing of the protest.10 These restrictions have not been limited to public demonstrations. Academic freedom, in fact, has also faced severe challenges. In many university campuses across the world, students have set up encampments, in solidarity with the Palestinian people, to call for a ceasefire as well as to demand that their universities divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation of the Palestinian territories.11 However, these initiatives have also been met with restrictions: university administrations and local authorities have forcibly removed the encampments, often employing excessive use of force and arbitrarily arresting protestors.12 Students who have participated in the protests have even faced disciplinary measures: as underscored by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, these have included ‘suspension, possible expulsion, eviction from campus housing and the threat of deportation of some foreign students, which could jeopardize their scholarships and future careers’.13 Universities have also increasingly cancelled and even prohibited the holding of events on Israel and Palestine. The recent suspension of a planned event with Francesca Albanese, current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 by the University of Munich14 and by the Free University of Berlin15 are only the latest example in a long list of events on Palestine canceled by universities across the globe.16 Journalists, and the media more generally, have been subjected to an unprecedented level of attacks. Israel has not only denied access to Gaza to foreign press,17 thereby preventing proper reporting from the ground, but those journalists with access to Gaza have been deliberately killed or arbitrarily detained: according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, as of 3 February 2025, 167 journalists and media workers were confirmed killed (159 Palestinian, 2 Israeli, and 6 Lebanese), 49 journalists were reported injured, 2 journalists were reported missing, and 75 journalists were reported arrested.18 Under international humanitarian law, the deliberate killing of journalists is prohibited and the killing of civilians is a war crime.19 Israel has also banned Al-Jazeera20 and raided its offices.21 Recently, the Israeli government has additionally sanctioned the newspaper Haaretz and banned government funding bodies from communicating or placing advertisements with the newspaper on the grounds that Hareetz published ‘many articles that have hurt the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its right to self-defence, and particularly the remarks made in London by Haaretz publisher Amos Schocken that support terrorism and call for imposing sanctions on the government.’22 Additionally, the Israeli government relies on a military censor, which is empowered to fully or partially redact any article dealing with “security issues”: in 2023, 613 articles were barred from publication, and 2,703 articles were redacted.23 Traditional and social media have also played a huge role in censoring pro-Palestinian content. While journalists reporting from Gaza and the West Bank have been silenced by Israel, a worrying majority of media outlets from North America and Europe have consistently failed to perform their watchdog role and speak truth to power: newspaper headlines and TV shows have regularly dehumanised Palestinians,24 and their coverage of the situation in Gaza has consistently employed wording that contributes to the creation a “normality” where, as also underscored by Fuad Zarbiyev, Palestinian lives are not as grievable as Israeli ones.25 Social media platforms have played a crucial role in providing real-time information about the situation in Gaza. This is especially so given that, as mentioned, Israel has severely restricted foreign media access. Nonetheless, despite their crucial role for providing access to information on the situation in Gaza, social media platforms have also significantly contributed to censoring Palestinian content, either because of their inadequate and biased content moderation systems, or following governmental requests for content removal. A human rights due diligence exercise reviewing the impact of Meta's policies and activities during the May 2021 crisis in Israel and Palestine confirms that Meta's policies and practices have resulted in biased outcomes which have specifically impacted Palestinian and Arabic speaking users.26 For instance, the report revealed that Arabic content had greater over-enforcement, meaning that platforms were erroneously removing Palestinian voices.27 While platforms’ content moderation systems already disproportionately restrict Palestinian voices, governmental requests for content removal further exacerbate the issue. As reported by Human Rights Watch, between 7 October and 14 November 2023 alone, Israel's Cyber Unit sent social media platforms 9,500 content takedown requests, 60% of which went to Meta, and platforms overwhelmingly complied with these requests in 94% of cases.28 Content that was shared in support of the Palestinian cause was frequently removed by social media platforms, including the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free”. Although this slogan has been meant and interpreted by many as a peaceful call for the right to self-determination of Palestinians,29 it has been removed by the platforms.30 The slogan has even been criminalised or sanctioned in some countries.31 Taken together, this range of measures represent a substantial and highly problematic attack on the right to freedom of expression and access to information and, in turn, to the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. I will now set out the application and relevance of the contours of this right in this context. 3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The right to freedom of opinion and expression is protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),32 as well as under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).33 Additionally, article 20 of the ICCPR prohibits ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.34 The right to freedom of expression also includes the ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’.35 Freedom of expression is integral to the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly and association,36 protected under article 20 of the UDHR, article 21 of the ICCPR37 and article 11 of the ECHR.38 Crucially, for the right to freedom of expression to be restricted, such restriction must meet three cumulative criteria: (1) it must be provided by law; (2) it must pursue a legitimate aim (the respect of the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals); and (3) the restriction must be necessary and proportionate for pursuing such aim.39 Because the right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler for the exercise of other fundamental rights,40 any restriction must be construed narrowly so as not to impair its exercise. Restrictions to freedom of expression, even when pursuing the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others (for example, the right to non-discrimination of Jewish people and the fight against antisemitism) or public order, need to be proportionate. The rise of antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism requires all states to take the necessary measures to protect Jews, Muslims, Palestinians and Arabs from discrimination and hate speech. However, oftentimes restrictions to freedom of expression have relied upon a definition of “antisemitism” which is, in itself, contrary to international human rights law. Many governments rely, in fact, on the working definition of antisemitism provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.41 This definition is overly broad, does not contain the element of “incitement”, and conflates criticism of the state of Israel with antisemitism, therefore contravening the right to freedom of expression since international human rights law allows for criticism of all states.42 The reliance by many governments on this working definition has been considered as a ‘politically motivated instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism’,43 primarily harming Palestinians and human rights defenders advocating on their behalf.44 As also underscored by Irene Khan, ‘[t]he central conceptual flaw of the “working definition” is the inherent conflation of Zionism, a political ideology, with antisemitism’, which results in “the suppression of legitimate criticism of Israel, not the enhancement of protection of Jews from racial and religious hatred and intolerance”.45 The disruption or prohibition of peaceful protests through the means of excessive use of force, the forcible removal of peaceful student encampments, or even the prohibition of events addressing the topic of Palestine or criticising the state of Israel's actions without it being necessary and proportionate for pursuing a legitimate aim cannot be considered measures in compliance with international human rights law. As also underscored by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association, isolated instances of violent conduct are not sufficient to taint an entire assembly as non-peaceful46 and ‘[w]here isolated instances of violence take place in the context of a protest, law enforcement personnel must make all efforts to locate and remove the violent individuals, to allow other protesters to exercise their rights to assemble peacefully and express themselves’.47 Likewise, the attacks on journalists and on media freedom violate everyone's right to freedom of expression and to access to information and, in some instances, they also contravene international humanitarian law. These violations become even more troublesome given the ‘allegations of targeted attacks on media as part of a strategy to cover up evidence of war crimes’.48 At the same time as governments are violating their own obligations under international human rights law, corporate entities such as traditional media and social media are acting in contravention of their own responsibility to respect human rights. By virtue of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ‘[b]usiness enterprises should respect human rights’, meaning that “they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.49 As such, both traditional media and social media platforms should ensure that their business activities do not infringe on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information. This would include ensuring that reporting does not perpetuate double standards and that content moderation systems do not disproportionately censor Palestinian content. Precisely because the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and access to information acts as a catalyst for the exercise of other fundamental rights, its restriction has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. Not only the right to freedom to peaceful assembly is also heavily impacted, but, more crucially, the right to self-determination of Palestinian people is also affected. The blanket ban on the use of Palestinian symbols is but one example of the impact that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression have on the Palestinian right to self-determination. The lack of proper protection of the right to freedom of expression also results in the failure to shed light on a variety of human rights violations that Palestinians are subjected to everyday in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the right to life and the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.50 4. CONCLUSION That a beekeeper is fined for exposing a banner calling for the end of a genocide, that students lose their scholarship or visas for calling on their government to demand a ceasefire and on their university to divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation, that a professor is prevented from giving a lecture about Gaza in a university premise, that our governments respond to student peaceful protests with violence – these are issues that should concern each of us. Each of these restrictions, when failing to comply with the standards of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality (as set out in international human rights law), violates our fundamental right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler to the exercise of other fundamental rights. As reiterated by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, ‘the genocide in Gaza, the violation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian Territory and the failure of Israel to respect its international legal obligations, including the occupation of Palestinian territory, are matters of global public interest’.51 By failing to stand up for the exercise of our right to freedom of expression in support of the Palestinian cause, and by failing to demand accountability from those actors who consistently violate it, we contribute to its erosion. And by failing to stand up for the rights of Palestinians, including their right to have their voices heard, we fail to stand up for human rights. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Notes1. Irene Khan, Global threats to freedom of expression arising from the conflict in Gaza - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2024 [A/79/319] para 1.2. Federico Berni, ‘Striscione pro Palestina al mercato di Desio, arrivano i carabinieri: multa di 430 euro all’apicoltore’ Corriere della Sera (16 October 2024) <https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/lombardia/24_ottobre_16/striscione-pro-palestina-al-mercato-di-desio-arrivano-i-carabinieri-multa-di-430-euro-all-apicoltore-7c08956e-a16b-4070-a1e7-93b3c5b31xlk.shtml> accessed 3 February 2025.3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (International Court of Justice). See also, Francesca Albanese, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 - Anatomy of a genocide 2024 [A/HRC/55/73].4. Khan (n 1) para 1.5. ibid 34.6. ‘Europe: Under Protected and Over Restricted: The State of the Right to Protest in 21 European Countries’ (Amnesty International, 2024) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/8199/2024/en/> accessed 3 February 2025.7. ibid 97.8. ibid, emphasis added.9. ibid 98.10. ibid.11. Khan (n 1) para 40; Michael Williams, ‘Pro-Palestinian Student Protests around the World – in Pictures’ the Guardian (7 May 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2024/may/07/pro-palestinian-student-protests-around-the-world-in-pictures> accessed 3 February 2025.12. Khan (n 1) para 41.13. ibid 42.14. Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur oPt [@FranceskAlbs], ‘The University of Munich Has Canceled My Talk, a Decision I Hope They Will Reconsider. If Not, I Look Forward to Seeing You Elsewhere, German Friends. May Freedom of Expression and Your Right to Be Informed Prevail. @LMU_Muenchen’ <https://x.com/FranceskAlbs/status/1885703501516267743> accessed 4 February 2025. On how anti-Palestinian racializing processes and repression operate within a framework of liberal freedom in German education, see Anna Younes and Hanna Al-Taher, ‘Erasing Palestine in Germany's Educational System: The Racial Frontiers of Liberal Freedom’ (2024) 33 Middle East Critique 397.15. ‘Statement Regarding the Planned Public Lecture and Discussion with Francesca Albanese and Eyal Weizman on February 19, 2025’, Freie Universität Berlin (12 February 2025) <https://www.fu-berlin.de/en/presse/informationen/fup/faq/nahost/wissenschaftliche-veranstaltung/index.html> accessed 24 February 2025. On the gravity of these actions for academic freedom, see Isabel Feichtner, ‘Where Is Our Outcry?' (Verfassungsblog, 19 February 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/where-is-our-outcry/> accessed 24 February 2025; Khaled El Mahmoud, ‘Special Editorial: A Nation in Crisis: The Suppression of Academic Freedom and the Rise of Ideological Conformity’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 21 February 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/special-editorial-a-nation-in-crisis/> accessed 24 February 2025.16. See, for example, Vimal Patel and Anna Betts, ‘Campus Crackdowns Have Chilling Effect on Pro-Palestinian Speech’ The New York Times (17 December 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/17/us/campus-crackdowns-have-chilling-effect-on-pro-palestinian-speech.html> accessed 4 February 2025; ‘Harvard Medical School Cancels Class Session With Gazan Patients, Calling It One-Sided’ The Harvard Crimson (22 January 2025) <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2025/1/23/hms-cancels-gaza-patient-panel/> accessed 4 February 2025.17. ‘Open up Access to Gaza and Protect Journalists’ Le Monde (29 October 2023) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/29/open-up-access-to-gaza-and-protect-journalists_6212695_23.html> accessed 4 February 2025.18. ‘Journalist Casualties in the Israel-Gaza War’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 3 February 2025) <https://cpj.org/2025/02/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/> accessed 4 February 2025.19. Under art. 79 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (signed on 12 December 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3. “Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1”; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 8(2).20. Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Israel Bans Al Jazeera: What Does It Mean and What Happens Next?’ Al Jazeera (6 May 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/6/israel-bans-al-jazeera-what-does-it-mean-and-what-happens-next> accessed 4 February 2025.21. ‘Israel Raids and Shuts down Al Jazeera's Bureau in Ramallah in the West Bank’ AP News (22 September 2024) <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-al-jazeera-gaza-war-hamas-4abdb2969e39e7ad99dfbf9caa7bb32c> accessed 4 February 2025.22. ‘Israel Sanctions Haaretz Due to Articles That “Hurt” Israeli State’ Al Jazeera (24 November 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/24/israel-sanctions-haaretz-due-to-articles-that-hurt-israeli-state> accessed 4 February 2025.23. Amjad Iraqi, ‘Israeli Military Censor Bans Highest Number of Articles in over a Decade’ +972 Magazine (20 May 2024) <https://www.972mag.com/israeli-military-censor-media-2023/> accessed 4 February 2025.24. The dehumanisation of Palestinians in traditional media is a longstanding phenomenon. See, for example, Laura Albast and Cat Knarr, ‘Opinion | How Media Coverage Whitewashes Israeli State Violence against Palestinians’ Washington Post (28 April 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/28/jerusalem-al-aqsa-media-coverage-israeli-violence-palestinians/> accessed 4 February 2025.25. Fuad Zarbiyev, ‘“What about October 8? What about October 9? What about October 10? What about October 11?” On the Grievability of Palestinian Lives’, Geneva Graduate Institute (14 October 2024) <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/the-grievability-of-palestinian-lives> accessed 4 February 2025.26. ‘Human Rights Due Diligence of Meta's Impacts in Israel and Palestine | Reports | Sustainable Business Network and Consultancy’, BSR (22 September 2022) <https://www.bsr.org/en/reports/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine> accessed 4 February 2025.27. ibid 5.28. Rasha Younes, ‘Meta's Broken Promises’, Human Rights Watch (21 December 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and> accessed 4 February 2025.29. Ellen Ioanes, ‘“From the River to Sea,” the Phrase Used amid the Israel-Hamas War, Explained’ Vox (24 November 2023) <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23972967/river-to-sea-palestine-israel-hamas> accessed 17 February 2025.30. Human Rights Watch has found that “[i]In hundreds of cases, th[e] slogan [“From the River to the Sea”], as well as comments such as “Free Palestine,” “Ceasefire Now,” and “Stop the Genocide,” were repeatedly removed by Instagram and Facebook under “spam” Community Guidelines or Standards without appearing to take into account the context of these comments.”, ibid 27.31. See, for example, Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Announcement of a ban on associations in accordance with Section 3 of the Association Act Ban on the association ‘HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya)” in German), 2 November 2023, available at <https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/pub/publication/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/content/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/BAnz%20AT%2002.11.2023%20B10.pdf?inline>32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 19.33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 10.34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 20.35. ibid 19(2).36. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34 para 4.37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 21.38. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n 33), art 11.39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 19(3).40. Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2011 [A/HRC/17/27] para 22.41. Khan (n 1) para 79.42. ibid, para 80.43. Tendayi Achiume, Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance - Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume 2022 [A/77/512] para 71.44. ibid 76.45. Khan (n 1) para 81.46. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 37, (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21)’ (2020) CCPR/C/GC/37 para 19; Clément Voule, Protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests during crisis situations - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule 2022 [A/HRC/50/42] para 40.47. Voule, (n 46), para 40.48. Khan (n 1) paras 17 & 89.49. OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04 Principle 11.50. OHCHR, ‘Israel's Escalating Use of Torture against Palestinians in Custody a Preventable Crime against Humanity: UN Experts’ (5 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/israels-escalating-use-torture-against-palestinians-custody-preventable> accessed 18 February 2025; Amnesty International, ‘Israel/OPT: Horrifying Cases of Torture and Degrading Treatment of Palestinian Detainees amid Spike in Arbitrary Arrests’ (8 November 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/israel-opt-horrifying-cases-of-torture-and-degrading-treatment-of-palestinian-detainees-amid-spike-in-arbitrary-arrests/> accessed 18 February 2025.51. Khan (n 1) para 88.*This column is based and expands upon a short article previously published on the Geneva Graduate Institute website, available here https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/silenced-voices-freedom-expression-gazaCorresponding author(s):Stefania Di Stefano, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland. Email: stefania.distefano@graduateinstitute.ch

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “dead”. Now, it is showing signs of life again. French President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly pressing other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “political necessity”. Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has reaffirmed its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”. During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a surprising pledge to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state. Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.   The UN conference on June 17–20, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution. Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle for decades. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years. So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success? What is the two-state solution? Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day. The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the the Abraham Accords, without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution. The Hamas attacks on Israel – and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza – have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate. On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially set back the legitimacy of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage. On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo – the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war – is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights. And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May and reports of mass Palestinian starvation have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers. Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition. For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will – both globally and in the Middle East – towards a two-state solution. Huge obstacles remain But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks. First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire. Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue. The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role in governing a future Palestinian state. Though anti-Hamas sentiment is becoming more vocal among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been violently cracking down on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power. However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah – the party leading the Palestinian National Authority – is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21%. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership. There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page. This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan for Israel to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza. The government also just approved its largest expansion of settlements in the West Bank in decades. These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than 700,000 in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been increasing at a faster rate since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022. Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state defining it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”. The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become. Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just 40% of Palestinians support it, while only 26% of Israelis believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel. However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations. A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but peace was achieved through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union. In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made. It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.