Diplomacy
Pacific transactionalism: Art of the diplomatic deal
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by Tess Newton Cain
First Published in: Feb.26,2025
Mar.31, 2025
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Cook Islands' recent deals with China sees shift from soft to hard-edged diplomacy embedded in Pacific.
Strategic engagement between the Pacific and its partners has now well and truly switched to overt security transactionalism, from soft to hard diplomacy. The explicit position emanating from the United States under the Trump administration reflects what has already been happening in the Pacific, particularly with the region’s largest aid donor Australia. When the Cook Islands and China signed deals this month, they sidelined New Zealand, leaving it to reassess how to do business with Pacific island nations.
In recent years there’s been a flurry of agreements, MoUs, treaties and more between Pacific island countries and their partners, both established and emerging. The recently confirmed Papua New Guinea rugby league deal with Australia introduced “strategic trust” into the lexicon. Grafted on to the prized spot in the Australian National Rugby League competition is an undertaking by PNG to rebuff any kind of security agreement with China. Similar trade-offs form part of Australia’s deals with Nauru last year and Tuvalu in 2023.
How this transactionalism can or should be accommodated, or even countered, by Pacific island states has the region talking. Professor Transform Aqorau in his keynote speech to last week’s Pacific Islands Political Science Association (PIPSA) conference in New Zealand stated: “The question that we must ask ourselves is, ‘how do we assert agency in this space while we avoid being drawn into the conflicts that are not of our making?’”
Many who spoke at PIPSA agreed that conversations about security and strategy must be led by Pacific voices and underpinned by Pacific norms. There were numerous calls for partner countries (of all stripes) to do better - listen, focus on relationships, work more ‘Pacifically’.
The other side of the asymmetrical power dynamic remained largely unaddressed – what can and should Pacific leaders and officials do to shift partners’ behaviour to what is wanted and needed? And if business-as-usual is already getting these partners what they want, where is the incentive for them to change?
Unlike the successes Pacific nations have had when taking a united regional posture, guided by the Pacific Islands Forum and advancing their Blue Pacific Strategy 2050, the bilateral deals see them operating without the benefit of collective support.
There are some ‘green shoots’ of Pacific assertiveness. In a Facebook post over the weekend, Vanuatu’s newly-elected Prime Minister Jotham Napa said, “climate change is very critical to our survival. Moving away from (the) Paris agreement by (the) Trump administration is like committing suicide. Climate change must be part of any security agreement in the future.” The message to the U.S. is clear. It is also a message to Australia, who have long sought a security agreement with Vanuatu and will no doubt continue to press that with Napat.
That is not to say partners’ approaches are not evolving. When it comes to engaging with China, the overall picture is that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now focused on smaller projects with greater use of grant financing rather than loans. Of course, it is often the case that the exception proves the rule. The recent agreement (and associated MoUs) between Cook Islands and China envisages serious infrastructure investment in the maritime sector, including ports. Cue “dual-use” alarm bells in Canberra, Wellington and beyond.
The New Zealand government is now contemplating a more transactional approach with Pacific partners. Its relationships with Kiribati and Cook Islands have deteriorated markedly in the last few weeks, following what could be termed “assertive” actions by Pacific leaders.
After months of trying, New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Winston Peters was all set to meet President Taneti Maamau in Kiribati in January. The arrangements were upended at the last minute resulting in a public diplomatic tiff. Peters has now initiated a review of New Zealand aid to Kiribati as an expression of his frustration.
Meanwhile, Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown also raised the ire of Wellington. Peters has claimed that there was insufficient consultation by Cook Islands (which is in free association with New Zealand) about entering into a strategic partnership agreement with China and signing of other MOUs. Peters has now called for a “reset” of the relationship.
Whilst much has been made of the geopolitical aspects of these tensions, the most significant implications are in the domestic spheres.
In Kiribati, opposition leader Tessie Lambourne has argued that the falling out with New Zealand is part of a pattern of isolationism on the part of Maamau, which is harming the interests of the i-Kiribati population. His government switched allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019 and has become increasingly withdrawn, including a ban on diplomatic visits last year. A New Zealand aid cut would have a significant impact on health, education, and climate resilience projects in Kiribati.
In Cook Islands, Brown’s bullish approach has come back to bite him. Last week around 400 people marched in protest, and he faced a motion of no confidence in the Parliament, which failed. Whilst the strategic partnership with China was part of what prompted Cook Islanders to take the streets, they were also enraged at the debacle surrounding Brown’s attempt to introduce a Cook Islands passport, in addition to the New Zealand passport they currently hold.
The geostrategic environment in the Pacific is becoming increasingly complex and the tempo of bilateral offers shows no sign of slowing. The calculated nature of relations offered by partners poses a huge challenge to Pacific leaders, negotiating in relative isolation, often in secret, while they try to maintain their “friends to all, enemy to none” positions. Pacific states will have to work harder than ever and expend precious resources to strike the right balance as they assert their agency while managing strategic partnerships.
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Benar News
Tess Newton Cain
Tess Newton Cain is a Principal Consultant at Sustineo and adjunct Associate Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. She is a former lecturer at the University of the South Pacific and has over 25 years of experience working in the Pacific islands region.
