Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Another drug war has begun in Latin America. The newly elected president of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, has declared a state of emergency and the military is being used to tackle violence and drug trafficking in a country that is part of the transnational cocaine smuggling trade. Ecuador will probably realise what other countries in Latin America have done: military solutions to the illicit drug problem do not work. For decades, the Colombian government has confronted powerful drug cartels and drug-related violence with a policy guided by a series of UN treaties that prohibit drugs and oblige governments to prosecute recreational drug use and production. These treaties are known as the “drug prohibition regime”. Under the mantle of these treaties, the US has pushed Latin American governments to implement tough laws on drug use, and crackdown on drug cartels in an attempt to tackle drug trafficking and drug addiction. Governments, such as Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador and Honduras, have used their armies against drug cartels since the 1980s. However, the use of the military in the region, with operations supported by the US Drug and Enforcement Agency, has not prevented an increase in violence in the region. In the case of Mexico, researchers have found a relationship between the deployment of the military in anti-drug operations and the rise of homicides since 2007. Moreover, drug addiction has not reduced in the US (one expected outcome of the “war on drugs”). Nowadays, Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world. According to the 2023 report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 34% of the homicides on the planet during 2021 happened in the Americas. Many of these homicides relate to the global war on drugs. Some Latin American administrations have started to push back against policies that make drugs illegal. For example, Bolivia legalised indigenous production of coca crops in 2011. Uruguay and Jamaica legalised some purchases of cannabis in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Mexico and Colombia are discussing cannabis regulation. Some of these governments, including Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia, tried to put forward a plan for a new global approach to drug use in 2016 at a UN general assembly special meeting but proponents of this failed to convince other countries to allow all types of drug decriminalisation. However, the assembly did reach an agreement to allow countries to regulate the medical uses of some previously illegal drugs such as cannabis. Now, these countries led by Colombian president Gustavo Petro will call for a new UN meeting to try to get more support for a new approach to the “war on drugs”. Colombia’s role Since the early 1960s, Colombia has been the epicentre of the global war on drugs. Infamously known as the centre of production of cocaine trafficked by regional criminal organisations, this country is experimenting with a peace process on two fronts: first, with the guerrillas, and second, with the drug cartels. Petro was elected with the promise to reduce the endless problem of violence. In September 2023, Petro asked his Mexican counterpart, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to help convene a new UN meeting to overhaul the international approach to illegal drugs. Petro was also responding to pressure from global research showing the existing policy was not working. For example, public health experts in The Lancet have argued that making drugs illegal has failed to stem drug use. There is a longstanding debate about whether proposing the end of drug prohibition – and the war on drugs as a consequence – will stop violence and reduce harmful addiction. From 2011, a group of former world leaders and intellectuals (such as former presidents of Mexico and Colombia, César Gaviria, Juan Manuel Santos and Ernesto Zedillo) have pushed for the end of drug prohibition. The data seems to back up their claims that prosecuting drug consumption and production is not reducing addiction. According to the Global Burden of Disease Data, from the Institute For Health Metrics and Evaluation, since the late 1990s, the number of drug users with drug dependence has increased from 40 to 50 million users yearly around the world, despite the “war on drugs”. But Petro faces an uphill battle to gather support to challenge the drug prohibition regime. In September 2023 Latin American governments signed the Cali declaration, calling for a UN assembly on the global drug problem to be held in 2025, one year before Petro’s presidency ends. But the US, which is experiencing a fentanyl opioid epidemic, is not likely to be positive about making more drugs legal. US president Joe Biden is less prone to tackle drug policy with police prosecution and his approach includes alternatives such as treating addicts in health clinics instead of incarceration. If in November Donald Trump wins the presidential election, drug policy is likely to be more militarised than ever. The former president explored using US military force in Mexico to tackle fentanyl smuggling through Mexico. López Obrador helped to organise the September 2023 Cali conference, but domestically he is not pursuing drug legalisation policies. He has deployed the Mexican military to reinforce drug confiscation of fentanyl after pressure from the US government. Petro might find an ally in Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei. The new Argentinian president has declared he favours drug legalisation, inspired by his libertarian position. However, Argentina is facing increasing crime rates in some regions and this security challenge might dissuade him from pursing drug legalisation. Beyond the Americas, some European countries might back the initiative, such as Portugal which decriminalised personal possession of all drugs in 2001. There, possession results in confiscation or a fine, but not imprisonment. If political factors align, Petro might edge forward with his plans to tackle the global war on drugs differently. However, international tensions and the recent war in Ecuador have complicated the scenario. Hopefully, scientific evidence may force countries to consider new options.

Haiti is experiencing a widespread crisis of its institutions, political turmoil, high levels of poverty, disorder and increasing violence in the streets. Last nearly 5,000 people were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnapped, according to the United Nations, more than double the number in 2022. [1] In this context, on March 11th, Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who is out of the country, announced his resignation once the necessary mechanisms for the transition of the government are in place. This publication describes the events that led to Henry’s resignation, the international community’s reaction, the outbreak of violence, as well as some points for reflection on what lies ahead for the Caribbean country. The resignation of Ariel Henry The current Prime Minister of Haiti, came to power following the assassination of the country’s former president, Jovenel Moise, in 2021. He had previously stated that he would resign in February, but later indicated that he would do so only once national security was restored. On February 29, following pressure from members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Henry pledged to hold general elections before August 31st next year. In the meantime, the regional mechanism would send an assessment team to help plan the elections. [2] Although CARICOM does not have a unified foreign policy, they “generally promote democratic governance” in their public discourse, said Rasheed Griffith, executive director of the ‘Instituto de Estudios del Progreso del Caribe’. [3] Henry’s reluctance to resign soon caused the violent protest to escalate, especially in Port-au-Prince, where most of the city is controlled by gangs. Among the gangs, one leader, Jimmy Chérizier, has stood out, calling for Henry’s government to be overthrown and warning of a “civil war that will lead to genocide” if the prime minister does not resign. [4] In addition, last January, the mandates of the last ten elected senators in Haiti officially expired, leaving the country without any officials elected by the people. Moreover, Henry’s government is linked to that of the also controversial Moise, who in any case, would have ended his term in February 2022. Henry has remained in office without constitutional legitimacy. [5] Last week, after traveling abroad, Henry tried to return to Haiti, but had to change his itinerary because gangs blocked access to the Port-au-Prince airport. The Prime Minister sought to land in the Dominican Republic and cross the border but was prevented from doing so by the neighboring nation’s authorities, so he was deviated to Puerto Rico. The United States then urged the Caribbean leader to “accelerate the transition to an empowered and inclusive governance structure.” [6] Originally, Henry had gone to Kenya to sign an agreement to pave the way for a multinational force to operate in Haiti. Amidst the growing violence and insecurity on the streets, the European Union evacuated its personnel on March 14th. The spokesman for the diplomatic division of the European Commission, Peter Stano, said that the bloc is “extremely concerned” about the situation, given the attacks on hospitals and prisons, food shortages and blocked infrastructures. [7] The US Armed Forces also withdrew non-essential personnel from its embassy, as reported by the Southern Command in a statement. [8] The UN has stated that it will remain in Haiti. On March 11th, senior officials from different countries met in Kingston, Jamaica, for a meeting convened by CARICOM to analyze the crisis. The US State Department reiterated Washington’s support for the creation of an “independent” body to assume presidential powers in Haiti, as well as the deployment of a security mission to help contain the violence. It also announced that it will provide 300 million pesos to alleviate the situation in the Caribbean country. [9] The initiative, which contemplates these resources, is under review by the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee [10]. From Puerto Rico, Henry participated in the CARICOM meeting virtually. At the end of the meeting, during a press conference, the temporary president of the Caribbean Community and leader of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, announced that Henry had agreed to resign from his position. He said the prime minister would step down after “the establishment of a transitional presidential council and the appointment of an interim authority”. Later, in a video, Henry stated that he would continue to “handle current affairs until the appointment of a prime minister and a government”. The council will include the participation of the main political parties, the private sector and the Montana Agreement, a coalition that proposed the formation of an interim government and a roadmap following Moise’s assassination [11]. Among the members of the mechanism is the political force Pitit Desalin, led by former senator and presidential aspirant Moise Jean-Charles. The EDE party of former Prime Minister Charles Joseph, the Fanmi Lavalas formation, and the December 21st coalition led by Henry, will also have a vote [12]. In addition, there will be two non-voting observers, one from civil society and another from the religious community. None of the members of the collegiate body may have been accused or convicted in any jurisdiction, be sanctioned by the UN, or seek a position in the upcoming elections in the country [13]. In theory, this council should be defined tomorrow, Thursday, March 14th, in the meantime, negotiations are underway to define who will form this structure [14]. The United States indicated that Henry could stay in Puerto Rico or go anywhere in its territory in case it is unsafe to return to Haiti [15]. Actions to set up a multinational support mission Since 2022, Prime Minister Henry called on the international community to integrate a support mission to strengthen the Haitian National Police (HNP) [16]. Kenya responded to this call in July 2023, when it announced its intention to “lead” the initiative and send “1,000 police officers to the Caribbean nation” [17]. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2699, authorizing the deployment of a multinational ad hoc security support mission to Haiti, under the leadership of Kenya [18]. The start of this operation has been delayed due to challenges in African country’s courts, which a few days ago the leaders of Haiti and Kenya tried to resolve by signing a bilateral security agreement. The international community has responded very timidly to the initiative. The Bahamas pledged 150 people. Jamaica and Antigua & Barbuda expressed their willingness to help. Benin offered to send 2,000 soldiers [19]. Spain also showed interest in contributing to the cause. However, on March 10th, the UN stated that despite the promises, a trust fund to pay for this force only amounts to 10 million dollars [20]. The new mission will not be a blue helmet operation. Its objectives will be to protect the state institutions, as well as critical infrastructure and transportation hubs. They will also seek to pacify gangs. It has been reported that an advanced contingent of several hundred officers will be deployed to survey the terrain [21]. To avoid repeating the problems the UN mission has had in the country, such as the spread of cholera and cases of exploitation and sexual abuse, there will be very rigorous scrutiny to oversee the multinational mission. This time the Security Council resolution demands appropriate wastewater management measures to prevent the introduction and spread of disease, as well as robust, secure, and accessible mechanisms for lodging complaints and conducting investigations into any allegations of misconduct, including sexual assault [22]. However, for the time being, Kenya has communicated that the deployment of its agents is on hold until a new government is formed in the Caribbean nation, as officials said on March 12th. Spike in violence and importance of gangs Port-au-Prince has been the epicenter of gang violence, especially the National Police stations, its cadet academy, the prisons, from which more than 3,500 prisoners have fled, the Sylvio Cator national stadium and the international airport [23]. On March 3rd, the Government declared a state of emergency and a curfew in most of the country, [24] which will be extended until March 22nd. The gang members’ main demand was the resignation of the prime minister, although they also seek to prevent the deployment of international forces. According to international analyst Robert Muggah, the gangs hope to be part of a governing council to lead the country [25]. According to a report done by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, there are up to 200 gangs operating in Haiti, and almost half of them have a presence in Port-au-Prince. They range from small groups of youths sharing guns to gangs of more than a thousand people with permanent salaries and automatic weapons that belong to hierarchical organizations. There are two more visible groups: the G-Pèp and the G-9 Family, which control the poorest neighborhoods of the capital. They have been linked to political parties: the G-9 is close to the ruling Haitian Tèt Kale, while the G-Pèp tends to support opposition forces. In this crisis, the G-9 and its allies have taken over the ports and roads surrounding the country’s main airport [26]. Delinquency controls 80% of the capital [27]. Gang members are often aligned with elite businessmen and politicians who finance them [28]. The leaders of some gangs announced an informal alliance called “Vivre Ensemble” (Living Together). As noted above, the most notable leader is Jimmy Chérizier, who is known as “Barbeque”. He was an elite policeman and has shown himself to be bloodthirsty in his operations [29]. Reports say his gang was receiving support from the government of Jovenel Moise [30]. While CARICOM leaders met to discuss the situation in Haiti, Chérizier told reporters that if the international community continued on the same path, it would only “generate more chaos”. “We Haitians have to decide who is going to be the leader of the country and what model of government we want” [31]. Clashes in Port-au-Prince have caused hundreds of inhabitants of the northern part of the capital to flee their homes. The UN reported that more than 800 people died in January. The violence is also driving tens of thousands of Haitians out of the country. The Dominican Republic is the main destination of that diaspora. For this reason, President Luis Abinader issued a cry for help to “save” Haiti [32]. For now, the Dominican government maintains the cancellation of flights to and from Haiti and on March 6th, Carlos Luciano Díaz Morfa, Minister of Defense, announced that they have incorporated strict security measures in the border zone, including more equipment and more personnel [33]. In the United States, the Defense Department and military officials told the Congress that they must be prepared for a possible mass migration from Haiti [34]. Dozens of people have died in the violent attacks and over 15,000 Haitians have been left homeless after fleeing their communities during these clashes. Food, water, fuel, and medical care are scarce. The humanitarian situation is dire. As a result, many people feel that the best thing to do is to leave the country [35]. According to the United Nations, approximately one million people are on the brink of famine, with 350,000 displaced [36]. What’s next after the Prime Minister’s resignation Some experts wonder what role the gangs will play. Robert Fatton, an expert on Haitian politics at the University of Virginia, says they will necessarily have to participate in the national discussion. Officials will have to deal with the groups and try to convince them to disarm [37]. According to an analysis by Crisis Group, the gangs will have two options in the face of deployment of the multinational forces: if they perceive weakness, they will not submit, but if they see that the intervention is strong, they will consider under what conditions they could disarm [38]. In these circumstances, gangs have emerged as power brokers in Haiti for the first time, posing a challenge for any transitional government [39]. However, for many civic and religious groups involved in the talks, this is a red line. Chérizier’s next steps are unknown. Days ago, he said that if Henry resigned, “all areas around Port-au-Prince that are blocked or inaccessible will be reopened” and “attacks on police stations will stop” [40]. He also vowed to begin “the real fight against the system of oligarchs and corrupt people” and proposed his own “peace plan”. He demands total amnesty for gang members and that the country be governed by a “council of wise men” in which he would have a place [41]. On March 11th, Chérizier announced that the “Viv Ansanm” gang alliance will not recognize any government resulting from the agreement with CARICOM and that “it is up to the Haitian people to designate their rulers”. On the other hand, an advisor to Guy Philippe, the former rebel leader who recently returned to Haiti and called for “revolution” against Henry, warned that any new government must include him [42]. There is uncertainty about the timing of the transition. For now, security conditions in Port-au-Prince are precarious, while doubts persist about the timetable for deploying an international mission to reinforce the local police and restore order [43]. These days, Henry’s resignation seems to have eased the situation in the capital, as no attacks on government offices or police stations have been reported. The main CPS cargo port opened, and some fuel was allowed to leave the Varreux facilities near the port. However, protests continue in opposition to the CARICOM plan [44]. The economist and political scientist Joseph Harold writes about three aspects of the crisis. First, Haitians are in a humanitarian emergency and aid is not enough. The distribution of supplies should be done by national institutions, not international agencies. This practice weakens the institutional framework. Resources to alleviate the emergency amount to 720 million dollars and only 16% have been collected [45]. In terms of security, it will be difficult for the multinational solution to be successful. Experts are skeptical that a relatively small force led by Kenya, whose officers speak English, not Creole or Frech, will help control the situation [46]. Wooldy Edson Louidor, a Colombian-Haitian professor at the Javeriana University of Colombia, affirms that the support of the international community is important, “but to achieve a Haitian solution. And this involves returning to constitutional order” [47]. Haitians have traditionally opposed any foreign intervention in their internal affairs and pride themselves on being the first black republic to emerge after a slave revolt during European colonialism [48]. The third point is the elections that must be organized [49]. This is not a recipe for conflict resolution, but it is a necessary step. It gives the international community and local actors a goal to work towards [50]. In this sense, analyst Philippe de Bard points out the importance of designing an electoral system that contemplates the constitution of a reliable electoral roll, the integration of a permanent electoral council and the creation of an independent dispute mechanism. He believes that it will be necessary to evaluate the necessary constitutional reforms. A new electoral law requires the approval of the Haitian Parliament, which does not exist today [51]. The immediate term, the challenge is to control the gangs and create a capable police force. After that, the effort should focus on developing a political strategy to establish conditions for free elections [52]. According to proposals by leading figures, this could happen in about two years [53]. In 2009, writer and journalist Sergio Ramirez did a report on Haiti, following two devastating hurricanes and before the 2010 earthquake. He interviewed the head of the UN Stabilization Mission, Hédi Hannabi, who said, “this is not the classic peacekeeping mission, because there are no two parties in conflict, what we have is anarchy, the presence of gangs, and the absence of institutions. If we were to leave today, chaos would ensue. The problem is that more than ten years later, the disorder situation continues [54]. References [1] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas que han invadido la capital de Haití y qué quieren?”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/03/09/espanol/haiti-pandillas-que-pasa.html [2] CARICOM, “Communiqué – 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM”, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://caricom.org/communique-46th-regular-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-caricom/ [3] Catherine Osborn, “How Haiti’s Unelected Leader Lost America’s Blessing”, Foreign Policy, 7 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/07/haiti-crisis-gangs-ariel-henry-united-states-caricom-elections/ [4] Sarah Morland, “Haiti PM commits to elections by 2025, CARICOM to send team”, Reuters, 29 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-pm-commits-elections-by-2025-caricom-send-team-2024-02-29/ [5] Monique Clesca, “Haiti’s Rule of Lawlessness”, Foreign Affairs, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-america-caribbean/haitis-rule-lawlessness [6] Catherine Osborn, op. cit. [7] Deutsche Welle, “UE evacúa a todo su personal de Haití”, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/ueevac%C3%BAa-a-todo-su-personal-de-hait%C3%AD-y-caricom-convoca-cumbre-de-urgencia/a-68493344 [8] Colin McCullough, “Estados Unidos evacuó al personal no esencial de su embajada en Haití por el aumento de la violencia de pandillas”, CNN, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/10/ejercito-ee-uu-evacuo-personal-no-esencialembajada-haiti-trax/ [9] Jennifer Hansler and Tara John, “US will contribute $300 million to Haiti’s multinational security mission”, CNN, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/11/americas/haiti-us-blinken-security-mission-intl-latam/index.html [10] Matt Berg y Eric Bazail-Eimil, “State just sent Republicans their Haiti plan”, Politico, 12 de marzo de 4024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/03/12/state-just-sent-republicans-their-haiti-plan-00146474 [11] Monique Clesca, “Haitians Have a Solution to Haiti’s Crisis”, World Politics Review, 8 de septiembre de 2022. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-gangs-protests-crisis-corruption-crime/ [12] Dánica Coto y Evens Sanon (AP), “El premier de Haití dice que renunciará tras pico de violencia. No está claro quién tomará el relevo”, Los Angeles Times, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2024-03-12/elpremier-de-haiti-dice-que-renunciara-tras-pico-de-violencia-no-esta-claro-quien-tomara-el-relevo [13] DW, “Dimisión de Ariel Henry, una esperanza para Haití”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/dimisi%C3%B3n-de-ariel-henry-una-esperanza-para-hait%C3%AD/a-68503873 [14] Widlore Mérancourt, Samantha Schmidt, Michael Birnbaum y Amanda Coletta, “As leader resigns, Haitian politicians rush to form new government”, The Washington Post, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/12/haitiprime-minister-ariel-henry-resigns/ [15] El País, “El caos y una ola de violencia sin precedentes fuerzan la renuncia del primer ministro de Haití, Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-12/el-caos-y-una-ola-de-violencia-sin-precedentes-fuerzan-la-renuncia-del-primerministro-de-haiti-ariel-henry.html [16] DW, “Haití reitera la necesidad de una fuerza multinacional”, 10 de junio de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-reitera-la-necesidad-de-una-fuerza-multinacional/a-65877041 [17] Frances Robles, “An International Force May Be Headed to Troubled Haiti, again”, The New York Times, 1 de agosto de 2023. Consultado el 11 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/01/world/americas/haiti-international-intervention.html [18] Emily Mae Czachor, “U.S. military airlifts embassy staff from Port-au-Prince amid Haiti's escalating gang violence”, CBS News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-military-airlifts-evacuation-staff-embassy-port-au-prince-haiti-gangviolence/ [19] Samuel Salgado, “Haití firma acuerdo con Kenia para que policías de Nairobi lideren misión de seguridad”, France24, 1 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240301-hait%C3%AD-y-kenia-firman-acuerdo-paraque-polic%C3%ADas-de-nairobi-lideren-misi%C3%B3n-de-seguridad [20] Jacqueline Charles, “U.S., Caribbean leaders propose plan to lead Haiti out of crisis and toward elections”, The Miami Herald, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article286558805.html#storylink=cpy [21] Crisis Group, “Haiti’s Gangs: Can a Foreign Mission Break Their Stranglehold?”, 5 de enero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b49-haitis-gangs-can-foreign-mission-break-their-stranglehold [22] Ídem [23] Pablo Ferri, “Haití camina hacia el desastre a la espera de ayuda internacional”, El País, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-10/haiti-camina-hacia-el-desastre-a-la-espera-de-ayuda-internacional.html [24] Carlos S. Maldonado, “Haití, en estado de urgencia y toque de queda tras la huida de miles de presos de una cárcel de Puerto Príncipe”, El País, 3 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/america/2024-03-03/miles-de-presos-huyen-de-la-principal-carcel-dehaiti-tras-un-asalto-de-las-bandas-criminales.html [25] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [26] Ídem [27] Nacho Carretero, “Haití, cuando colapsa un Estado”, El País, 2 de julio de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/eps/2023-07-02/haiti-cuando-colapsa-un-estado.html [28] Frances Robles, “¿Cuáles son las pandillas…”, op. cit. [29] Tom Phillips y Luke Taylor, “Is the feared gang boss ‘Barbecue’ now the most powerful man in Haiti?”, The Guardian, 10 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/10/haiti-gang-boss-kingpin-barbecue-jimmy-cherizier [30] InSight Crime, “Jimmy Chérizier, alias ‘Barbecue’”, 10 de noviembre de 2023. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/haitiorganized-crime-news/jimmy-cherizier-alias-barbecue/ [31] Coto y Sanon (AP), op. cit. [32] Carlos S. Maldonado, op. cit. [33] Jessica Hasbun, “Después no se quejen de las acciones que vamos a tener que hacer”: la advertencia del presidente Luis Abinader por crisis en Haití”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/advertencia-republicadominicana-haiti-luis-abinader-orix/ [34] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití, las pandillas y la dimisión del primer ministro en vivo: noticias y más”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/12/ultimas-noticias-sobre-la-escalada-de-la-violencia-en-haiti-y-dimision-delprimer-ministro-en-vivo [35] Frances Robles, David C. Adams y Andre Paultre, “With Haiti in Chaos, a Humanitarian Crisis Is Rapidly Unfolding”, The New York Times, 9 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/world/americas/haiti-gangs-political-uprising-ariel-henryhumanitarian-crisis.html [36] Philippe de Bard, “In Haiti, as Elsewhere, Elections Alone Are Not the Answer”, Foreign Policy, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/12/haiti-gang-violence-elections-ariel-henry-resignation/ [37] Coto y Sanon, op. cit. [38] Crisis Group, op. cit. [39] Sam Woolston, “Prime Minister’s Resignation Tips Haiti Into Uncharted Territory”, Insight Crime, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://insightcrime.org/news/prime-minister-resigns-haiti-unchartered-territory [40] Matt Rivers, “Haiti's most notorious gang leader plots its future amid rebellion”, ABC News, 11 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://abcnews.go.com/International/haitis-notorious-gang-leader-plots-future-amid-rebellion/story?id=107994731 [41] Amalendu Misra, “Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own”, The Conversation, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangsterbehind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 [42] CNN, “Última hora de la violencia en Haití”, op. cit. [43] Infobae, “Crece la incertidumbre en Haití tras el anuncio de renuncia del primer ministro Ariel Henry”, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2024/03/12/crece-la-incertidumbre-en-haiti-tras-el-anuncio-de-renuncia-delprimer-ministro-ariel-henry/ [44] Al Jazeera, “Uneasy quiet in Haiti capital after prime minister pledges to step down”, 13 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/3/13/uneasy-quiet-in-haiti-capital-after-prime-minister-pledges-to-step-down [45] Fernando del Rincón, “Hay incoherencia en la respuesta internacional para la situación en Haití, dice analista”, CNN, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/haiti-violencia-bandas-inseguridad-ariel-gobierno-conclusiones-tv/ [46] Tom Phillips, Archie Bland y Oliver Holmes Haiti, “What caused the gang violence and will it end now the PM has quit?”, The Guardian, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/haiti-crisis-gang-jailbreak-explained [47] Isabella Escobedo, “Haití: radiografía de un Estado fallido”, DW, 5 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.dw.com/es/hait%C3%AD-radiograf%C3%ADa-de-un-estado-fallido/a-68448368 [48] BBC News, “La multimillonaria multa que Haití le pagó a Francia por convertirse en el primer país de América Latina en independizarse”, 30 de diciembre de 2018. Consultado el 13 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-46680927 [49] Fernando del Rincón, op. cit. [50] James Bosworth, “To Address Its Crisis, Haiti Needs an Elected Government, World Politics Review, 26 de febrero de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/haiti-elections-gangs-crisis/ [51] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [52] The Washington Post (editorial), “Haiti needs security now. For the future, it needs democracy”, 8 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/08/haiti-violence-gangs-chaos-anarchy-kenya-peacekeepers/ [53] Philippe de Bard, op. cit. [54] Sergio Ramírez, “Haití, un país en extinción”, El País, 12 de marzo de 2024. Consultado el 12 de marzo de 2024 en: https://elpais.com/opinion/2024-03-12/haiti-un-pais-en-extincion.htm

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français The US Should Bring This Demand to the UN Security Council Washington, DC — The Biden administration should immediately demand that Ecuador release former vice president Jorge Glas from custody, and allow him to return to the political asylum that the Mexican government had granted him, said Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Glas had sought political asylum in the Mexican embassy, claiming that he is a victim of persecution and lawfare by Attorney General Diana Salazar and the Daniel Noboa government. The Mexican government granted his request for political asylum on Friday; Ecuadorian authorities raided the embassy on Friday night, reportedly injuring several Mexican nationals and knocking the Mexican mission’s second-in-command — a career diplomat — to the ground in a dramatic incident caught on video. “Ecuador’s government has committed a very serious crime, one that threatens the security of embassies and diplomats throughout the world — not least those of the United States, which has threats to its embassies in much of the world,” Weisbrot said. “The international community cannot allow this to happen. The United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, should propose a resolution there as well, to force the release of the kidnapped prisoner.” The Ecuadorian government’s actions violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and pose a direct threat to the principles of asylum, of national sovereignty, and of diplomatic immunity. This clear violation of international law is the latest in a series of troubling actions by the Noboa government, which include his declaration of an “internal armed conflict,” the deployment of military forces for domestic law enforcement, mass arrests, and rampant human rights violations. The Noboa administration’s raid on the embassy has been met with condemnation from many governments in the region, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras (the current head of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC), Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Antigua and Barbuda. Colombian president Gustavo Petro says his government is seeking human rights protections for Glas. Canada criticized the Ecuadorian government’s actions. Both the Organization of American States and CELAC have issued statements rejecting the Noboa government’s actions, and have said they will each hold special meetings to address the matter. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, condemned the embassy raid, and the UN secretary-general issued a statement “stress[ing] that violations of this principle jeopardize the pursuit of normal international relations.” Weisbrot noted that such crimes as Ecuador committed on Friday are quite rare, and are taken very seriously, because of the threat that they pose to the system of international diplomacy. This is the system that nations rely upon to try and resolve conflicts without violence and war. The International Court of Justice has held that “there was no more fundamental prerequisite for relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies …” Several members of the US Congress have also condemned the Noboa government’s actions. The Biden administration’s statement, made yesterday evening, “condemns any violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” The administration has recently deepened military and security relations with the Noboa government in the midst of Noboa’s broad crackdown and rights violations. The Ecuadorian government’s actions are a grave violation of international law and norms, and pose a dangerous precedent. Embassies are considered foreign territory, and Ecuador’s raid is a violation of Mexico’s territorial sovereignty under the law. Host governments historically have avoided violating embassies even when desiring to apprehend individuals seeking refuge or asylum. The British government did not raid Ecuador’s embassy in London in the years that Julian Assange was staying there; it was only after the Ecuadorian government of Lenín Moreno revoked Assange’s Ecuadorian citizenship and evicted him from the embassy that British authorities took him into custody. Likewise, the Pinochet dictatorship and other Latin American dictatorships never violated the integrity of foreign embassies, even to apprehend wanted dissidents or political opponents. The coup government of Jeanine Áñez in Bolivia never raided the Mexican embassy where several officials from the illegally ousted Evo Morales government had sought refuge following the 2019 coup d’etat. Salazar has long engaged in a campaign of lawfare and political persecution against former president Rafael Correa and other figures from the former Correa government. The charges against Correa have been shown to have so little credibility, and the evidence is so lacking, that Interpol for years has refused to act on Ecuador’s red notice against him. Belgium has granted him political asylum, and he can travel freely to almost anywhere in the world without fear of extradition. And last year, a Brazilian supreme court judge annulled evidence against Glas after authorities admitted it may have been tampered with. “The United States is providing crucial diplomatic, military, and material support to Ecuador; and Canada is currently seeking a ‘free trade’ agreement with Ecuador,” said Weisbrot. “All of this should be suspended until Ecuador releases its former vice president, who it has kidnapped from Mexico’s embassy.”

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français It has long been held that embassies should be treated as “off-limits” to other nations. Yet in a single week, two governments – both long-established democracies – stand accused of violating, in different ways, the laws surrounding foreign diplomatic missions. First, on April 1, 2024, Iran’s embassy in Damascus was bombed, presumably by Israel, killing several high-ranking commanders of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Then, on April 5, Ecuadorian police forced their way into the Mexican Embassy in Quito to arrest a former vice president of Ecuador who was seeking political asylum. Both actions have led to claims of international law violations and accusations that the Vienna Convention, which establishes the immunity of diplomatic missions, was contravened. As someone with a fair amount of knowledge of embassy life – I have served as Chile’s head of mission in China, India and South Africa and coedited The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy – I believe the two incidents are of greater concern than much of the international community appears to be viewing them. Contrary to the famous quip from late businessman and presidential candidate Ross Perot, embassies are not just “relics of the days of sailing ships.” Rather, in an increasingly complex world where geopolitical conflict, mass migrations, pandemics and climate change require careful and stable diplomatic management, any incidents that erode the sanctity of embassy rules could have serious negative consequences. In short, they make for a more dangerous world. Curious indifference to embassy attack Of the two recent incidents, the Iranian embassy bombing is the more serious, as it involved the loss of life and resulted in warnings of retaliatory attacks. Yet, Western countries, leaders of which often voice concern over upholding the so-called “rules-based order,” have been reluctant to condemn the act. It was notable that the three liberal democracies on the U.N. Security Council – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – all refused to condemn the strike on Iran’s embassy when the issue came up before them. Israel, while not officially acknowledging responsibility, argued that the Iranian ambassador’s residence was not really a diplomatic venue but “a military building … disguised as a civilian building.” As such, to Israel it was a perfectly legitimate target. But by this logic, nearly all embassies would be seen as fair game. Almost by definition, the vast majority of embassies – particularly of the larger countries – are populated with significant numbers of military and intelligence personnel. To suggest that for that reason embassies should lose their diplomatic immunity and become legitimate targets for armed attacks would bring the whole edifice of the Vienna Convention crashing down. And with it would come the structure on which worldwide formal diplomatic interactions are based. Bedrock diplomatic principles The case of Ecuador, though less serious because it did not involve loss of life, is a bit more complex and demands some unpacking. At the center of the diplomatic spat between Ecuador and Mexico is former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who served four years behind bars following a 2017 conviction on corruption charges. Glas is now facing trial on different charges, prompting his December 2023 application for asylum at the Mexican Embassy. Mexico accepted the request and conveyed this to the Ecuadorian government. The latter justified its decision to send police into the Mexican embassy on the grounds that it believes Glas cannot be granted political asylum as he is a convicted felon. There is some basis to this claim: Under the Organization of American States’ Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, political asylum cannot be given to convicted felons unless the charges behind such conviction are of a political nature. But at the same time, Article 21 of the Vienna Convention states that diplomatic missions enjoy full immunity and extraterritoriality, meaning the host government does not have the right to enter an embassy without the authorization of the head of mission. Ecuador argues that Mexico abused its diplomatic immunity, leaving it no option other than to send police in. Yet, here a crucial distinction needs to be made. Diplomatic immunity and the extraterritoriality of foreign missions are bedrock principles of the Vienna Convention. Political asylum is a separate matter that should be handled on its own. As such, if the Ecuadorian government considered Glas not to qualify for political asylum, it could have attempted to legally block the move or refuse safe passage for the asylum-seeker to exit the embassy and leave the country. Mexico would have strong grounds to counter such measures, however, as according to the Convention on the Right to Asylum of 1954, it is up to the asylum-granting state to decide whether the case is politically motivated. Implications for the future Regardless of the merits of the asylum case, sending in the equivalent of a SWAT team to storm the embassy represents a deliberate violation of diplomatic norms. There is a long history of Latin America politicians seeking asylum who spent many years holed up in embassy buildings because governments would not grant them safe passage – the most notable being Peruvian leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who spent five years at the Colombian Embassy in Lima. Yet, with a few exceptions, not even in the darkest hour of Latin America’s military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s were police permitted to storm into embassy buildings to arrest asylum-seekers. And this highlights what makes Ecuador’s actions especially worrisome. Precisely because of Latin America’s problems with political instability and a tradition of military coup, the laws surrounding political asylum and diplomatic immunity are necessary. Undermining the Vienna Convention in the way Ecuador has risks setting a precedent that other governments might be tempted to follow. Political asylum in Latin America has traditionally worked as a safety valve, allowing deposed leaders to get themselves out of harm’s way. Weakening the diplomatic structures in place supporting asylum will make the handling of democratic breakdowns more difficult. It also risks exacerbating regional disagreements. We are already seeing this with Mexico breaking relations with Ecuador as a result of the embassy raid. Making diplomacy more difficult Of course, embassy violations are not unprecedented. Guatemala’s dictatorship attacked the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 1980, killing several asylum-seekers, including a former vice president. And Uruguay’s military government sent security forces into the Venezuelan Embassy in Montevideo in 1976 to arrest a left-wing militant who had sought asylum, leading to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But those events in the relatively distant past were widely and rightly condemned at the time as the product of authoritarian regimes with little regard for international conventions. The comparatively relaxed international attitude to the embassy violations by Israel and Ecuador reflects, I believe, a failure to grasp the significance of eroding diplomatic immunity and norms. As global challenges increase, embassies and their representatives become more important, not less so. If the takeaway from the two latest embassy incidents is that the protection of diplomatic premises can be secondary to whatever is politically expedient on any given day, then it will be of great detriment to the management of international relations. Diplomacy will become much more difficult. And given the enormity of the challenges the world faces today, that is the last thing any country needs.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Oscar Alejandro Pérez, a popular Venezuelan YouTuber who uploads travel videos, was arrested on terrorism charges on Sunday, March 31. Pérez was detained, and subsequently held for 32 hours, over a video he uploaded in 2023. In the video, he points to the Credicard Tower, a building in Caracas that hosts the servers that facilitate the country’s financial transactions, and jokingly adds: “If a bomb were to be thrown at that building, the whole national banking system would collapse.” He was accused of urging people to blow up the building, something Pérez denies. His arrest is the latest evidence of President Nicolás Maduro’s growing crackdown on human rights and civil liberties as the country prepares for presidential elections in July. Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, was a hugely popular president. While in office, he led a social and political movement called the “Bolivarian Revolution”, which aimed to address social, economic and political inequalities through a series of progressive reforms funded by Venezuela’s vast oil wealth. Then, in 2013, Chávez died and Maduro (who was then vice president) came to power after narrowly winning a special election. Initially, Maduro enjoyed the sympathy and support of many Venezuelans loyal to Chávez and his socialist ideals. But since taking office Maduro has presided over a series of economic crises. Hyperinflation, shortages of basic goods, and a deep recession have all made him increasingly unpopular. And Venezuela’s economy has contracted by about 70% under Maduro’s leadership. Consolidating power The last time Venezuelans went to the polls was in 2018. The contest was so rigged that many neighbouring countries branded the election illegitimate. Two of the most popular opposition candidates were disqualified or barred from running, and Maduro won the contest amid claims of vote rigging and other irregularities. Many Venezuelans have grown disillusioned with Maduro and have taken to the streets to vent their anger. But widespread discontent and protests have only fed more insecurity, criminality, poverty and social unrest. Now lacking support from within the Chavista political movement and the Venezuelan military, Maduro has turned to criminal groups to promote a state where illegal armed groups act at the service of the government. Maduro has consolidated power by using state institutions to silence critics, while at the same time engaging in human rights abuses and profiting from corruption. He has been accused of committing crimes against humanity, including torture, kidnapping and extrajudicial killings. And according to Amnesty International, between 240 and 310 people remain arbitrarily detained on political grounds. Unsurprisingly, around 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled repression and economic hardship at home. Roughly 3 million of those displaced have started a new life in Colombia, 1.5 million of them have migrated to Peru, while others have made their way north to the US. The Venezuelan migrant crisis has become the largest in the world, with the number of displaced people exceeding that seen in Ukraine and Syria. Silencing dissent Venezuelans will head to the polls on July 28. The arrest of Pérez is part of a wider strategy aimed at silencing dissent and strengthening the regime’s hold over its people as Maduro seeks re-election. On February 9, a prominent lawyer and military expert Rocío San Miguel was arrested in Caracas before several members of her family disappeared. San Miguel is known for her work exposing corruption in the Venezuelan army. She appeared at a hearing four days later accused of “treason, conspiracy and terrorism” for her purported role in an alleged plot to assassinate Maduro. Her arrest set off a wave of criticism both inside and outside Venezuela, including from the UN Human Rights Council. Its office in Caracas was subsequently ordered to stop operations on the grounds that it promoted opposition to the country and staff were told to leave the country within 72 hours. It is unclear whether San Miguel remains in jail. In March, Ronald Ojeda, a 32-year-old former lieutenant in Venezuela’s military, was found dead in Chile ten days after he had gone missing. He had protested against the Maduro government on social media wearing a T-shirt with “freedom” written on the collar and prison bars drawn on the map of Venezuela. His body was found in a suitcase beneath a metre of concrete. Chilean prosecutors later announced that his abduction and killing was the work of El Tren de Aragua, one of Venezuela’s most powerful criminal organisations. Don’t bank on free and fair elections The crackdown on civic society poses a dilemma for the Biden administration. In October 2023, Maduro secured a partial lifting of US economic sanctions (which have been in place since 2019) in return for a commitment to holding “free and fair” presidential elections, in addition to political reforms and the release of political prisoners. But that deal is quickly unwinding. In January, the leader of the opposition and a clear favourite in the polls, María Corina Machada was banned from holding office for 15 years. The Biden administration has since reimposed some sanctions and has threatened new ones on Venezuela’s vital oil sector if political reforms are not made. Venezuela has become a deeply corrupt, authoritarian and criminal state that shuts down dissent, forces millions of its own people to flee, and kills or abducts whoever threatens the regime. Its occasional displays of reason are motivated purely by economic gain. In many ways, Maduro’s political repression reflects his growing fear that his regime’s days are numbered, driving him to desperate measures to force a different fate. Once a dictator takes hold, it becomes very difficult to dislodge them.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском One of the most important and ambitious banners of Gustavo Petro’s government for Colombia is the Total Peace. His bet seeks a negotiated path with the illegal armed groups in the country, this includes guerrillas and criminal groups, aiming to end or significantly reduce the violence in the territories, without a doubt, it sounds dreamy, ambitious, and challenging. Unfortunately, throughout Colombia’s history, armed conflict has been a daily feature that “pari passu” has led different governments to propose strategies aimed at overcoming it, but when it comes to implementing them, it is more complicated than one might think. It would sound illogical for someone not to want peace, but the interests, the vulnerability of the population and the dynamics of the conflict in Colombia are so complex and diverse that they hinder the implementation of peace in all its spheres. The strategies to achieve peace have traditionally been at the center of the national debate by those who want to lead the country. Petro’s government has not been an exception in this purpose and has prioritized it in a particular way: with openness to human rights and human security, expressing a special commitment to the guarantee of rights and the protection of human life and the environment, trying to build a new relationship between citizenship and institutionality. In November 2022, President Petro sanctioned Law 2272 defining the Total Peace policy, which prioritizes the initiation of dialogues and negotiations with the ELN, FARC-EMC, Segunda Marquetalia and criminal gangs. This shows the government’s importance and willingness to achieve various dialogues that help strengthen the pacification and transformation of the territories. However, it has been observed that, from the speech to practice, the execution of the policy is much more complicated than it seems. While it is true that President Petro received a country with great challenges in terms of security and peace, the panorama has not changed. Petro’s government proposes through the Total Peace policy to reduce or end violence, but ultimately, this has not been a reality. Violence in the territories continues to be a constant for the population, with extortion, murders, kidnappings, recruitment, among others, still happening. According to INDEPAZ, in 2023 there were 94 massacres, 189 leaders and 42 assassinated peace signatories; then in 2023 there were 94 massacres, 188 leaders and 44 peace signatories murdered. So far in 2024 there have been 14 massacres, 36 leaders and 9 peace signatories murdered. This shows that we are still in a dynamic of rhetoric rather than the implementation of policies for the protection of life. We hear frequent speeches about the protection of life or Colombia as a world power for life, but in reality, violence and serious human rights violations do not diminish, let alone stop. At this point, the orientation and implementation of the government’s peace policy is of concern, as it transcends only the lack of rigor, planning and implementation. One of the positive factors of the policy is the chance to have 9 dialogue tables with armed groups of totally different origin and thinking. The government has been able to engage in talks or rapprochements with i) ELN, ii) FARC-EMC, iii) Segunda Marquetalia, iv) AGC, v) ACSN, vi) Shottas y Espartanos, vii) Oficinas en Medellín, viii) Las Fuerzas Armadas RPS, Los Locos Yam y Los Mexicanos and ix) Ex AUC, although some of these spaces for dialogue are weakened with the change of the new Peace Commissioner. This plurality of spaces is the novelty that changes the historical phenomenon in Colombia, since traditionally governments have focused on dialoguing with only one armed group, while militarily fighting the others. Enabling 9 simultaneous dialogue spaces is a highly challenging task that requires a programmatic structure, experts, and direction. With these spaces, the government aims for the armed groups to demonstrate their willingness for peace and achieve a negotiated solution to the dynamics of violence in the territories. Another positive measure of the peace policy is that bilateral and temporary ceasefires have been signed with some of the armed groups, with the objective of advancing in the dialogues. In fact, some of these have been extended. This measure also seeks to reduce the impact of the conflict on the civilian population, thus seeking the pacification of the territories. Agreements have also been reached, including the establishment of humanitarian corridors to deliver food or medicine to specific villages or truces between groups to halt killings. The idea of dialogue with various armed groups is that they demonstrate their willingness for peace by reducing their violent strategies of social control against the civilian population. However, the armed groups continue to operate violently against the population, they are growing in number and are expanding rapidly in the territory. Paradoxically, it is said that, thanks to the temporary ceasefires signed with the national government, these groups have been facilitated in their strengthening. Unfortunately, this is not the first time that something similar has happened; one cannot forget when, during the Pastrana administration, in the “distension zone”, the FARC expanded their armed power. According to the Early Warnings of the Ombudsman’s Office, it is confirmed that FARC-EMC and Segunda Marquetalia have increased their presence, going from controlling 230 municipalities to 299 by 2023. The most affected departments are Antioquia, Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Cauca and Nariño. Even the lack of state presence has been evidenced in some parts of the country, where armed groups are inaugurating roads and handing out school supplies to children, this ultimately only demonstrates the strengthening of the groups in the territories and the absence of the social rule of law. On the other hand, the numbers of ELN members are alarming, the military forces indicate that this group had 4,000 members and now they are around 5,000. Another group that is highly alarming is the AGC, its expansion has not stopped, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace said in early 2023 that this group had about 10,000 members and currently, the group claims to have up to 13,000 members, that means a worrying growth of about 30%. The strengthening of armed groups is a reality. This only means that something within the peace policy and the spaces for dialogue with the groups is failing. Some groups and their dissidents have repeatedly mocked the Colombian population and the agreements reached in the spaces. Illegal groups have engaged in armed strikes in vulnerable communities, forced displacement and recruitment. By 2022, 41% of the inhabitants of the most affected areas felt safe; by 2023, only 37% feel safe, this shows that the sense of insecurity is growing and, ultimately, institutional trust is not improving; on the contrary, it is generating a lack of credibility in the institutions. According to the 2023 report of the Ombudsman’s Office, forced displacement is one of the fastest growing phenomena. Nariño was affected by 58 events that impacted almost 24 thousand people, there were also 215 instances of confinement last year, affecting more than 18 thousand families; it is said that there was an increase of 63% compared to 2022, when there were 132 instances of confinement. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Peace has also reviewed 11 codes of conduct developed by non-state armed group imposed on communities in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Guaviare, Huila, Meta, Valle del Cauca, Tolima, and Nariño. These codes of conduct contain social control guidelines that restrict rights and aim to subject the civilian population to the control of the armed group. Actions to reduce violence and its impact on communities must be concrete and immediate. While it is true that confrontations between armed groups and the security forces have decreased, it is a fact that confrontations between armed groups, with the undesired impact on the population, have increased significantly, and even today they are the main source of violence, thus generating a disarticulation between the security policy and the Total Peace policy. The Ministry of Defense spent almost the entire first year defining and planning the security policy, despite the efforts, today only a passive public force is evident in its actions, absent in regions, without articulation with local entities and without guidelines or specific strategies to combat violence and seek the protection of life. The Total Peace policy for now is not giving the expected response to the territories, many times even the population itself perceives that it does not have a clear north. The armed groups must demonstrate their real will for peace, as an agreement to reduce violence against the civilian population. It is necessary to reinforce and improve the articulation between the Total Peace policy, the dismantling policy, and the human security policy in the territories. Based on the figures mentioned, the Total Peace policy should undergo a radical shift, becoming much more grounded and aware of the real dynamics of the conflict in Colombia and understanding very well the extent it can have, given that there are only two and a half years left in the government’s term. Colombia cannot continue to normalize violence; it needs a peace policy that generates concrete results and truly protects life. Weapons are not the solution, and we must continue to strengthen the dialogue for the pacification of the territories, as long as this path has a structure, a north and a clear agenda, otherwise, it will continue to be just an encouraging and even hopeful discourse, while in reality there are still deaths, massacres and human rights violations.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The events in the Middle East have the international community on alert. Iran understood the April 1st attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus as a blow to its own territory and a violation of its sovereignty. After several days of threats, on April 13th and for five hours, Iran used 300 projectiles (170 drones, more than 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles) to attack Israeli territory, 99% of which were intercepted. These movements in the geopolitical scenario can be felt in geographically distant regions such as Latin America. To interpret this new scenario, it is necessary to understand how Iran is currently positioned in this region. Its approach to the region is focused on creating ties with states that may be ideologically sympathetic. This is demonstrated by the relationship with Cuba since the end of the first Gulf War, the close relationship with Venezuela, the closeness with Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship in Nicaragua and with Bolivia since the mandate of Evo Morales. Iran has seen the leftward shifts in Latin America as an opportunity to acquire new trading partners, increase its influence in the region and carve out an increasingly important space in the US backyard. Current Iranian Minister of Defense, Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, stressed that “South American countries have a special place in Iran’s foreign and defense policy because they are located in a very sensitive area”. In this sense, we can highlight two key countries: Bolivia and Venezuela. Bolivia, Argentina, and the Triple Frontier Bolivia represents the greatest Iranian foreign policy success in Latin America. Diplomatic relations between these two states date back to 2007. With less than twenty years of friendship, the two signed in July 2023 a memorandum of bilateral cooperation in terms of security and defense that may pose a threat to the stability in the region. The agreement is aimed at assisting Bolivia in its fight against drug trafficking and supporting the state in monitoring its borders. The agreement includes the sale of material and training of military personnel. However, the details of the agreement were not disclosed because they are protected by a confidentiality clause. The Bolivian Minister of Defense, Edmundo Novillo, described Iran as a scientific, technological, security and defense example “for nations that want to be free”, despite the current international sanctions. The agreement entails benefits for both parties. Bolivia will receive weapons, will improve its cyber-operations capabilities and training of military forces’ personnel. On the other hand, Iran will have access to Bolivia’s natural resources, including lithium and gas. It would also be strategically positioned in the heart of South America, where its proxy, Hezbollah, has activities in the Triple Frontier (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and a relationship with the various cartels operating in the region, according to a report by the Wilson Center. This same report notes that the area of the Triple Frontier has for decades been the center of Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Latin America, taking advantage of the large Lebanese and Shiite diaspora communities. According to the late Argentinian special prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah established its presence in Latin America in the mid-1980s, starting in the Triple Frontier area, a relatively lawless region. Argentina and the AMIA case Two days before the Iranian attack on Israel, the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation of Argentina, the highest criminal court in the country, condemned Iran for the 1992 attacks in Argentina against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and in 1994 against the Israelite Mutual Association of Argentina (AMIA, in Spanish). This ruling proves that the attacks, carried out by the terrorist group Hezbollah, were committed at the behest of the government of that theocracy. After the trial in absentia, it was ratified that those attacks constitute a crime against humanity. This implies that the crimes committed are considered imprescriptible, and the verdict describes Iran as a terrorist state. A series of events has resulted in three decades of impunity. The scandals that led to the imprisonment of the judge and prosecutors in the case, the issuance of Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) red notices against five former Iranian officials and the investigation against two former presidents, Carlos Menem (1989-99) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-15), torpedoed the process. These events, along with the death under strange circumstances of the special prosecutor for the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, hours before presenting key evidence to the Congress in 2015, explained the delay in the sentencing against Iran. Brazil and the Operation Trapiche In November 2023, the Brazilian Federal Police in collaboration with the Mossad and the FBI carried out Operation Trapiche, which led to the apprehension of three Brazilian nationals. An international arrest warrant was also issued for Mohamad Khir Abdulmajid (Syrian) and Haissam Houssim Diab (Lebanese), accused of recruiting for Hezbollah in Brazil for terrorist purposes. Operation Trapiche was carried out as part of the fight against electronic cigarette smuggling in the Triple Frontier area. The profits from this fraudulent trade were destined to finance illicit activities of the Commercial Affairs Component of Hezbollah’s External Security Organization. Following the events in the Middle East over the last two weeks and Argentina’s full support for Israel, Argentinian Security Minister, Patricia Bullrich, has expressed her concern about the security on the border with Bolivia and has denounced the presence of 700 Iranian members of the Quds forces, a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard., in this country. Bullrich believes that Argentina could be subject to retaliation by Iran. The causes of this fear include the recent ruling condemning Iran as a terrorist state for the AMIA case and the announcement by the president, Javier Milei, of the decision to move the Argentinian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Not to mention the purchase of 26 supersonic F16 aircraft from Denmark, as well as the request to NATO to add Argentina as a “global partner of the organization”. Venezuela Bilateral relations between Venezuela and Iran have been fortified through a series of agreements implemented in recent years in response to the economic sanctions faced by both states. During the visit of Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, to Caracas in June 2023, 25 economic agreements worth approximately US $3,000 million were signed. Details were not disclosed. A year earlier, in June 2022, a cooperation agreement was established for the next 20 years covering science, technology, agriculture, oil and gas, petrochemicals, tourism and culture. In the same year, Iran signed a contract for 110 million euros to repair and reactivate the El Palito refinery, located in the state of Carabobo, which has a production capacity of 146,000 barrels per day. Thus, despite the tough economic sanctions, the operation of “extraterritorial refineries” increases Venezuela’s dependence (also under economic sanctions) on Iranian crude and oil expertise. Regarding the arms sector, while the cooperation memorandum with Bolivia was being signed, an Iranian cargo ship allegedly arrived at Venezuelan shores to deliver vehicles to the Maduro regime. A few days later, Iranian fast attack vessels and anti-ship missiles were exhibited during the bicentennial celebrations of the Venezuelan Navy. Thus, Iran has made possible that Venezuela becomes the first Latin American country to have access to this technology. On the eve of the Venezuelan presidential elections scheduled for July, the Iranian regime has supported the persecution and disqualification of opponents of the Maduro regime to the detriment of the Barbados Agreement. Indeed, it is in Iran’s interest to maintain the status quo in Venezuela, whose regime publicly supports terrorist groups linked to the Ayatollah’s regime. In short, Iran’s interest in maintaining and establishing close cooperative relations in Latin America seek to create ties of dependence with nations sympathetic to the regime. While the international community is on alert for the situation in the Middle East, Iran, which has been gaining ground in the region through alliances with those governments where the influence of the United States is not desired, is closely watching the stance taken by Latin American countries.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President López Obrador's announcement of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Ecuador marks a turning point in Mexico's foreign policy. Since 1979, the country had not interrupted such a relationship with another nation. In recent years, breaking relations had not been a common practice by Mexico. In the 19th century, Benito Juárez suspended ties with countries that recognized Maximilian's Empire. In the 20th century, the government severed links with the Soviet Union in 1930 for promoting communist ideology; with Spain in 1936 during its Civil War; with the United Kingdom in 1938 after the oil expropriation; with Germany, Japan, and Italy in 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor; with Guatemala in 1958 after Guatemalan planes fired on Mexican vessels in the Pacific; in 1974 with Chile after the coup against Salvador Allende, and in 1979 with Nicaragua due to the Somoza dictatorship. But in the last 45 years, the country had not resorted to this practice. The recent announcement was somewhat surprising because Mexico is known for projecting friendly relations with Latin America and is recognized for its defense of peace. Additionally, President López Obrador had proposed to have friendly relations with Latin American countries and adhere to the principle of Non-Intervention. Prior to the rupture with Ecuador, Mexico had been involved in some diplomatic crises with certain Latin American countries. During Vicente Fox's presidency, Mexico expelled the Cuban ambassador in 2004, and later a similar incident occurred with Venezuela, but ties were not broken. In both cases, the level of interaction shifted from Ambassador to Chargé d'affaires. In the current administration, Bolivia and Peru had declared Mexican ambassadors ‘personas non gratas’ and they were recalled. Moreover, Peru announced the same status against President López Obrador. However, in both cases, there was no outright rupture of relations. On the other hand, Mexico has been a generous actor in granting diplomatic asylum to political refugees. For example, the country hosted Leon Trotsky in the 1930s and a significant number of Spaniards fleeing the civil war in that nation. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico received hundreds of asylum seekers from South America after military coups in those countries. Even López Obrador granted this status to Evo Morales and offered it to Pedro Castillo, former presidents of Bolivia and Peru respectively. Partly, the origin of the diplomatic crisis between Ecuador and Mexico stemmed from Mexico hosting Jorge Glas, former vice president of Ecuador, accused of corruption, since December 2023. Since the beginning of 2024, the Ecuadorian government requested Mexico to extradite Glas to serve his sentence as he had already been convicted. When the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused and López Obrador criticized Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa's government, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Mexican Ambassador Raquel Serur ‘persona non grata’. In response, the Mexican government granted political asylum to Jorge Glas. Fearing a possible escape, the Ecuadorian government decided to forcibly enter the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest Glas. The incident constituted a flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states in Article 22 that "the premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them without the consent of the head of the mission." The incident set a negative precedent in inter-American interactions. In response to this action, President López Obrador decided to sever diplomatic relations with Ecuador. The measure represented a milestone in Mexico's foreign policy, but it was consistent with Ecuador's actions. Although Mexico had other options, severing diplomatic relations was the appropriate decision given the gravity of the situation. The possible alternatives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) had—without the need to completely sever ties—were: 1) sending a protest note to the Ecuadorian government; 2) recalling the Ecuadorian ambassador to Mexico; 3) presenting the case to the Organization of American States (OAS); 4) suing Ecuador to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the UN; 5) breaking diplomatic relations but maintaining consular relations. The first option was too soft from a foreign policy standpoint and might have been ineffective. The second was feasible but not highly impactful. The third is appropriate because the OAS serves to resolve differences among its members. The fourth is the best alternative without the need to sever diplomatic relations. The fifth option could be feasible to avoid leaving the Mexican community in Ecuador unprotected and to not affect the economic and tourism relationship between the two countries. Specifically, a suitable decision was to combine some of the mentioned alternatives; for example: presenting the case to the OAS, suing Ecuador in the ICJ, and maintaining consular relations. However, severance was the decision made due to the gravity of the situation. But it's also important to consider the domestic context. In part, AMLO made that decision for domestic political reasons. Defending sovereignty strengthens his popular support base. His followers see him as the president who defends the nation's sovereignty. Additionally, the measure aids MORENA and Claudia Sheinbaum's electoral campaign by bolstering Mexico's position abroad and domestically. For example, there was broad consensus among the Mexican public. Even the opposition candidate, Xóchitl Gálvez, supported the decision. Moreover, the majority of Latin American nations condemned the act and showed solidarity with Mexico. The UN, OAS, and European Union also condemned the violation of international law. Additionally, the United States and Canada expressed displeasure with Ecuador's action. Not all public opinion supported López Obrador's decision. Some criticized Mexico for granting political asylum to a criminal. Similarly, there was an opinion that AMLO's statements – criticizing the Ecuadorian government – constituted a violation of the principle of Non-Intervention and were the cause of the diplomatic crisis between the two countries. In other words, from this perspective, Mexico also bore responsibility for the conflict escalating to the severance of diplomatic relations. Indeed, the Caracas Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1954 establishes that a government cannot grant political asylum to a person with a criminal conviction. However, the same instrument states that "it is up to the granting State to qualify the nature of the offense or the reasons for persecution." In other words, Mexico was applying this criterion and decided to grant asylum to Glas. Therefore, there is a divergence on this point. For Ecuador, Mexico could not grant asylum because Glas was a convicted criminal. However, for Mexico, Glas is a politically persecuted individual and, therefore, has the right to asylum. The most appropriate course would have been for Ecuador not to invade the embassy, not to grant Glas safe passage, and to present the case to the ICJ for this body to decide whether he was a criminal or a politically persecuted individual. What factors explain the escalation of the crisis between these two countries—the embassy assault and the rupture of relations? Understanding these decisions requires first knowing the context in Ecuador. Firstly, Daniel Noboa is a young president with little political experience. He is a right-wing businessman who came to power when the previous president established the "cross death," a mechanism that allows for the removal of the Ecuadorian president and the dissolution of the National Assembly. In this context, Noboa is filling the remainder of the former president's term and must leave office in 2025 to call for new elections. Additionally, in recent months, Ecuador experienced a period of intense insecurity when some inmates took over prisons and held the guards as hostages. Drug trafficking, linked to Mexican cartels, has increased in the country. Last year, a presidential candidate was even assassinated. Faced with this situation, President Noboa needed strong actions to consolidate his power and gain legitimacy. However, some groups within Ecuador have criticized the invasion of the Mexican embassy and are calling for his resignation due to his inability to govern. The opposition party criticizes the foreign minister for her lack of diplomatic experience and the minister in charge of the operation, who is of Mexican origin. Both the president and the foreign minister have justified the action based on the possibility of Glas's escape; the consideration that he was a convicted criminal and that the asylum request was illegal; and the defense of Ecuador's dignity. On the other hand, in Mexico, President López Obrador has developed an inconsistent foreign policy towards Latin America. If governments are aligned with his ideology, then there is an amicable treatment. But if they are opposed to his way of thinking, then he criticizes those governments, which constitutes a violation of the principle of Non-Intervention in the internal affairs of another country. In other words, the president applies principles in a discretionary manner. Furthermore, the president has appointed ambassadors in Latin America without diplomatic experience, which contributes to generating conflict in some cases. AMLO's often improvised statements do not contribute to maintaining stable relations with right-wing governments in Latin America. In this administration, three ambassadors were declared ‘personas non gratas’, which represents a failure in the foreign policy strategy. The consequences of the diplomatic relations rupture are broad and negative. For instance, nationals of each country will lack diplomatic protection. In the near future, obtaining visas for travel and trade between both countries may become difficult. Ecuador was exploring the possibility of joining the Pacific Alliance. With what happened, that option is now canceled. Therefore, strengthening Latin American integration may encounter obstacles. The embassy invasion and the diplomatic relations rupture can affect inter-American relations and generate polarization in the region. Cooperation for combating drug trafficking between Mexico and Ecuador may likely halt. Potential joint solutions to Latin American migration to the United States may face obstacles if the incident creates divisions. Ecuador's prestige in the region may be affected by the clear violation of international law. Perhaps not all countries will support Mexico, but they will defend the principle of embassy inviolability. In summary, both parties contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Both Ecuador and Mexico made wrong decisions. However, nothing justifies a country storming an embassy and violating one of the most respected principles of international law. Therefore, Mexico's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Ecuador is justified by the gravity of what happened.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Press statement on the occasion of the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron Full statement to the press by the President of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, following the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron in Brasília (DF), on March 28, 2024 It is a great joy to reciprocate the hospitality with which my delegation and I were received in Paris when I participated in the Summit for a 'New Global Financial Pact' last June. Over the past three days, we have carried out an extensive agenda that included stops in Belém, home to COP30; Itaguaí, where we have Prosub; and now Brasília, for a State visit. This true marathon gives a sense of the breadth of the cooperation and friendship ties between France and Brazil. Among traditional powers, none are closer to Brazil than France. And among emerging powers, you tell me if any are closer to France than Brazil. In today's highly complex international landscape, the dialogue between our nations serves as a vital bridge connecting the Global South to the developed world, fostering efforts to overcome structural inequalities and achieve a more sustainable planet. Brazil and France are committed to collaborating in advancing a shared global vision through democratic dialogue. A vision grounded in the priority of production over unproductive finance, solidarity over selfishness, democracy over totalitarianism, and sustainability over predatory exploitation. President Macron was able to personally witness that our commitment to the environment is not merely rhetorical. In the past year, we have reduced illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 50%, and we aim to eliminate it entirely by 2030. As a symbol of the revitalization of our partnership, today we embraced a New Action Plan, broadening our collaboration into new arenas. These include financing the ecological and energy transition, advancing in bioeconomy, agriculture, public administration, digital issues, artificial intelligence, and reinforcing human rights and gender equality on our bilateral agenda. This range of topics is reflected in the more than 20 agreements we celebrate today. We discussed the success of the Brazil-France Economic Forum, held yesterday in São Paulo, which had not convened presentially since 2019. We explored ways to expand and diversify trade, which reached 8.4 billion dollars last year and has the potential to grow even further. France is the third-largest investor in Brazil, with a strong presence in sectors such as hospitality, energy, defense, and high technology, which generate employment and income in our country. I presented to President Macron the new investment opportunities in infrastructure and sustainability facilitated by the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC) and the Neoindustrialization Program. I presented our commitment to combating inequalities as the cornerstone of Brazil's G20 Presidency. Within this context, we are launching a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. As we mark the 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions this year, President Macron and I concur on the imperative for the G20 to send a clear message advocating for global governance reform and the reinforcement of multilateralism. We also agree that it is time for the super-rich to pay their fair share of taxes, in line with the proposal for fair and progressive international taxation that Brazil advocates within the G20. As strategic partners, we exchanged views on the major dilemmas facing humanity. Across the globe, democracy is under the shadow of extremism. The denial of politics and the dissemination of "hate speech" are growing and concerning. For this reason, Brazil joined, in 2023, the French initiative Partnership for Information and Democracy and will continue to work to promote and protect the circulation of reliable information. It is time to promote a truly multilateral debate on the governance of artificial intelligence. It is unacceptable for a new divide to emerge, segregating wealthy nations, possessors of this technology, from developing countries where basic internet access remains precarious. I reiterated to President Macron Brazil's unwavering belief in dialogue and the defense of peace. My administration will continue working diligently to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remain a conflict-free zone, where dialogue and international law prevail. The Security Council's paralysis in response to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza is both alarming and inexplicable. The arguments questioning the obligation to comply with the recent ceasefire directive in Gaza during the month of Ramadan once again undermine the authority of the Council. Discussing a world governed by rules that are not collectively agreed upon signifies a regression of centuries, reverting back to the law of the jungle. Brazil categorically condemns all forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. We cannot permit religious intolerance to gain ground among us. Jews, Muslims, and Christians have always lived in perfect harmony in Brazil, contributing to the construction of the modern nation we see today. Dear friend Macron, the Strategic Partnership with France embodies our joint endeavor to modernize and invigorate our economies, prioritizing sustainability and upholding human rights. I am convinced that, even after three intense days, there is still much work ahead of us. The future holds countless possibilities for our countries to cooperate, develop, and create together I look forward to seeing you again soon at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Thank you very much.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Beijing’s investment approach to Latin America focuses on industries of strategic importance, the EU and US will need to contend with growing Chinese competition China is pouring less foreign direct investment (FDI) into Latin America. But while this may seem like a sign of Beijing’s disinterest in the region, data suggests that Chinese companies are simply recalibrating, not retreating. In doing so, they are becoming important players in sectors key to Western interests: critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy. While the European Union and the United States have long been top investors in Latin America, increased competition with Chinese investment now jeopardises their interests in the Latin American industries that will become most crucial to the digital and green transitions. The number of Chinese projects in Latin America grew by 33 per cent from 2018-2023, compared with the previous five-year period of 2013-2017, even as the total value declined. In other words, Chinese companies are making more investments in the region but are pursuing smaller-scale projects on average. These investments are also more focused on what China calls “new infrastructure“ (新基建), a term which encompasses telecommunications, fintech, renewable energy, and other innovation-related industries. In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s investments were in these frontier sectors, a key economic priority for the country. Beijing also views smaller projects in these industries as incurring less operational and reputational risk, especially compared to some of the large-scale infrastructure investment projects often associated with the Belt and Road initiative. Like China, the investment priorities of the G7 grouping – particularly the US and the EU – are centring on critical minerals, fintech, electric vehicles, and green energy as they aim to grow and reinforce existing economic and political partnerships in Latin America. However, both the US and the EU risk falling short of China’s investment strategy in the region. The US has signalled want for greater economic engagement with the region, especially in sectors of strategic interest. However, to date, US efforts to compete with China remain largely focused on building US domestic capacity in these strategic sectors, even as some US companies, such as Intel, are increasingly focused on including regional partners in their supply chains. Some see opportunity for Latin America in Joe Biden’s landmark legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which is aimed at incentivising the energy transition while also de-risking critical supply chains. For example, certain countries in the region may benefit from preferential market access for their lithium or other key inputs to new energy and technology supply chains. However, the reach of the IRA – which remains a largely domestic policy – does not stretch as far as China’s current investment reshuffle. The Americas Act, announced by members of Congress in March could generate promising new investment opportunities for the region, as it encourages US companies and others to move their operations out of China, to which Latin America stands as a promising replacement. But Americas Act reshoring would primarily incentivise textiles and potentially medical equipment manufacturing, with less overall focus on the range of “new infrastructure” industries that China is prioritising. Chinese interests in information and communication technologies reveal a similar story. While the US has focused its policy on 5G equipment sales, China is undertaking a process of vertical integration in Latin American tech sectors that will dramatically boost its competitiveness. For instance, Chinese company Huawei is rapidly expanding its focus to include data centres, cloud computing, cybersecurity, and other services, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. (Computing accounted for a sizable 41 per cent of total Chinese information technology investment in the region between 2018 and the first half of 2023.) At the same time, Global Gateway, the EU’s proposal for a global investment initiative is yet to reach its potential in the region. Brussels is looking to be Latin America’s partner of choice by building local capacity for making batteries and final products like electric vehicles, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen noted last year. Yet even as the EU signals renewed commitment, China is becoming increasingly dominant in the electric vehicle market in Latin America and other regions. China surpassed the US in electric vehicle sales in 2023, with Chinese companies accounting for 45 per cent of total global sales and three times that of Germany’s. What is more, China has invested $11 billion in lithium extraction in the region since 2018, as part of a bid to control a third of global lithium-mine production capacity. Meanwhile the EU has secured some access to lithium as part of trade deals with Chile, alongside other nations, but this pales in comparison to what will be required to fuel the future of EU battery production. Latin America as a whole accounts for an estimated 60 per cent of the world’s lithium reserves. Based on its current levels of engagement in the region, the EU risks falling short of lithium, stalling its battery production and subsequently, its electric vehicle sales, just as China advances in this field. The window is closing for the EU, the US, and other partners looking to both maintain market share and compete with China in these Latin American industries, despite still-high rates of US and EU investment in and trade with the region. Indeed, US automakers increasingly see Chinese competition across the globe as an “extinction-level event.” Ensuring competitiveness in “new infrastructure” and related sectors will require a continuous commitment by partners to building and supporting project pipelines, and to delivering products and services at price points that can compete with China’s subsidised offerings. Both the EU and the US remain critical economic partners for Latin America and are contributing in ways that China is not. Still, complacency risks allowing China to take the lead in emerging industries in the region, some of which weigh heavily in the EU’s green and digital transformation. To protect their own future industries, the EU and the US need to first take a longer look at Latin America’s – especially as China vies for a dominant position.