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Diplomacy
Digital chatbot interface translating several global languages, representing multilingual AI technology in customer service. business communication systems

Digital Soft Power: Reinvention of the Spanish-Speaking World

by World & New World Journal

Introduction Soft-power dynamics have gained importance in the global arena. Moving from the classical cultural approach to the digital realm, soft power has now the ability to shift and transform geopolitics through technological influence. In the age of AI – where digital competitiveness across language blocs determines access to innovation, data, and influence – the emergence of a robust, multilingual digital ecosystem has become essential. Within this landscape, Spanish has become a key player. Spanish is a Romance language from the Indo-European language family that is spoken by around 636 million people worldwide. This number represents 7.6% of the global population and makes it the third most widely spoken mother tongue, after Mandarin and Hindi. Therefore, holding that position, Spanish has rapidly become one of the most influential languages in the digital sphere, this can be seen in the fact that Spanish ranks as the second most used language on the web, surpassed only by English. In fact, this digital presence is not a coincidence, it is part of a rapid digital reinvention driven by demographic strength, expanding connectivity, regional and local policies modernization, and a growing tech-savvy diaspora. Therefore, this transformation can be said to be reshaping Spanish-speaking economies, is enabling new digital ecosystems, and is positioning several Spanish-speaking countries as emerging innovation and digital hubs. As the transformations unfold, the digital reinvention of the Spanish-speaking world presents a powerful case of how linguistic, demographic, and technological forces converges to reshape geopolitical and economical power through digital soft-power. Figure 1: Spanish speaking countries. Source: Speak easy. The Acceleration Drivers For a better understanding, there are multiple forces that can explain why this shift is happening now. In economic terms, the demand for fintech, e-commerce, and mobile-based services has grown as Latin America’s expanding middle class accelerates the shift toward digital consumer habits. In demographic terms, with over 60% of the region’s population under 35 years old, it has one of the world’s youngest digital workforces. In addition, the large Spanish-speaking diaspora in the U.S. and Europe further amplifies cross-border entrepreneurship, remittances, and cultural-technological exchange. Moreover, global connectivity — expanded through fiber, 4G/5G networks, the widespread smartphone adoption and including digital transformation projects and financing — has enabled digital inclusion and remote-work globalization. While governments have also introduced strategic initiatives, such as digital identity programs, fintech sandboxes, and AI policies, helping structure the ecosystem. Key Regions Leading the Transformation Spain has become a European gateway for Spanish-speaking startups by providing access to EU-wide digital infrastructure, funding programs, and regulatory harmonization. For instance, Barcelona and Madrid – usually ranked among Europe’s top tech hubs –, and initiatives like ‘España Digital 2026’ or the AI Strategy 2020 have played an important role in supporting Spain in this regard. In addition, Spain is also home of one of the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure (EBSI) nodes and has hosted major innovation events like 4YFN or the Mobile World Congress, which help Latin American founders integrate into the EU market In the Americas, Argentina stands out for its strong AI talent pipeline and world-class developer community. The country produces one of the highest numbers of software engineers per capita in Latin America – just behind Brazil and Mexico –, and some Argentinian Universities – like the UBA and UTN – are constantly top-ranked in math and computer sciences in the region. In addition, Argentina is home to pioneering companies such as Auth0 or Mural, while its AI scene has also contributed to multilingual datasets and early experimentation with Large Language Models (LLM) fine-tuning tailored to Spanish and regional dialects. Argentina’s neighbor, Chile, has taken a leadership role in digital governance, cybersecurity, and regulatory modernization. In 2021, Chile became the first Latin American country to pass a National AI Policy, and it is among the first to establish a Fintech Law and regulatory sandbox, enabling companies like NotCo, Fintual, and Betterfly to scale with legal clarity. In terms of digital governance, Chile’s Digital Government Division is internationally recognized for its interoperability standards and cybersecurity strategy aligned with OECD recommendations. Colombia is another key player in the region as it is rapidly scaling its digital workforce and fintech ecosystem, becoming one of the fastest-growing digital economies in Latin America. For instance, companies such as Rappi, Addi, and Mercado Pago Colombia have turned the country into a logistics and payments innovation center. In addition, the Colombian government has boosted initiatives like Misión TIC 2022 – which objective was to train over 100,000 citizens in software development – or GovTech Colombia – aiming to accelerate digital procurement – to strength its young-tech talent base. Finally, Uruguay is known for having built one of the strongest digital infrastructures in the hemisphere. In this context, Uruguay – ranked among the top in digital connectivity worldwide – has a universal fiber-optic coverage and nearly 100% of households connected to high-speed internet through the public telecom company ANTEL. In addition, its digital ID system, Ceibal, and its national e-government platform, AGESIC, are considered global benchmarks for digital public infrastructure in the region. Figure 2: LATAM Fintech ecosystem growth. Source: Finn Summit. Data collected by Finnovista and the IDB within the framework of this report (2023) and historical data. The 2023 report considers 26 LAC countries, including The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. https://www.finnosummit.com/en/fintech-ecosystem-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-exceeds-3000-startups/ Where does innovation happen? As read in the previous section, innovation is happening already across different key sectors. For instance, AI and LLMs are rapidly being adapted to Spanish, Indigenous languages, and regional contexts. At the same time, the region’s fintech and digital banking sectors are expanding at remarkable speed, positioning Latin America as one of the world’s most dynamic fintech environments. On the other hand, smart cities and digital public infrastructure — such as digital IDs, online government portals, and interoperable public services — are being deployed across major urban areas. In parallel, the EdTech sector is training millions of new professionals and turning the region into an exporter of digital-skilled talent. Finally, e-commerce and logistics innovations are also undergoing transformation, they are evolving introducing blockchain and Web3 frameworks, enabling new forms of decentralized marketplaces and governance. Together, these developments reveal how the Spanish-speaking world is building a connected and technologically adaptive innovation landscape. Figure 3: Innovation competitiveness scores of certain Spanish-speaking countries. Source: ITIF. Latin American Subnational Innovation Competitiveness Index 2.0 https://itif.org/publications/2025/09/22/latin-american-subnational-innovation-competitiveness-index-2/ Challenges However, despite the rapid progress shown, several issues continue to limit the digital transformation of the Spanish-speaking world. First, the digital divide remains a major challenge, particularly between urban centers with high-speed connectivity and rural or low-income areas where access to broadband, devices, and digital skills is still limited. Therefore, the resulting gap is visible in education, financial inclusion, and the ability of smaller communities to participate in the digital economy. The second challenge is the regulatory lag, which is also slowing the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI, cryptocurrency, and automation. This can be visible in the fact that many countries are still developing comprehensive frameworks for data protection, AI ethics, and digital asset oversight, usually leaving innovators operating in uncertain legal environments in the meantime. The third challenge is talent mobility. The region continues to experience significant brain drain as skilled workers tend to migrate to the U.S. and Europe. Even though there is an emerging countertrend of “brain return” thanks to remote-work global hiring, competitive salaries in tech, and new government incentives aimed at retaining or repatriating talent, still is not enough and is a challenge to be addressed. Finally, the fourth challenge is the cybersecurity risks, which have also become a big problem. Latin America has become one of the regions most targeted by ransomware and phishing attacks, vulnerabilities in public infrastructure, small businesses, and critical sectors have been highlighted in most of these attacks. In addition, the spread of misinformation and weak data-governance systems further threaten trust in digital services and democratic institutions. What Comes Next? Although significant challenges remain, addressing them requires aligning technological growth with stronger governance, skilled talent, sustained investment in human capital, and resilient digital infrastructure. Therefore, the next phase of digital reinvention will likely focus on region-wide AI standards, cross-border digital markets, and stronger public-private collaboration to scale infrastructure, talent pipelines, and cybersecurity. Thus, countries that successfully integrate education reforms, innovation incentives, and robust digital institutions will position themselves as global players in emerging technologies. Conclusion Spanish, as the third most spoken language in the world, provides a unique base for building a shared digital ecosystem that could connect people across continents – or the world. This linguistic advantage – combined with a young population, a growing connectivity, and a wave of technological innovation – has positioned the Spanish-speaking world at a pivotal moment of digital reinvention. Countries within the Spanish-speaking sphere are not only adapting new tools or technologies; they are building digital public infrastructure, developing and exporting tech talent, and contributing and participating in the global development of AI, fintech, and smart-city solutions. Still, innovation on its own is not enough. Consequently, closing the gap in the digital divide, strengthening cybersecurity, modernizing regulations, and finding ways to retain and reverse brain drain remain the main challenges. If governments and private actors succeed in building resilient digital institutions and harmonizing regional standards, the Spanish-speaking world could emerge as a major center of global technological influence. Ultimately, this transformation has the potential not just to modernize economies, but to redefine how more than 600 million Spanish speakers participate – and shape – in the digital age. Referencias AGESIC (Agencia de Gobierno Digital) (2023). Digital Government Strategy of Uruguay 2020–2025. https://www.gub.uy/agesic/ BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2022). Fintech Regulation and Payment Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap124.pdf CAF (2022). GovTech Index for Latin America — Colombia Chapter. https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1916 CAF (2022). Urban Mobility Observatory: Digital Public Infrastructure in Latin American Cities. https://www.caf.com/en/knowledge/ CB Insights (2023). Global Fintech Report: Q4 2023 — Latin America Section. https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/fintech-trends-q4-2023/ CMF Chile (2022). Ley Fintech y Marco Regulatorio para Innovación Financiera. https://www.cmfchile.cl ECLAC (2022). State of Digital Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.cepal.org/en/publications ECLAC (2023). Status of Digital Infrastructure in Uruguay. https://www.cepal.org/en European Commission (2023). Spain Digital 2026: Spain’s Digital Transformation Strategy. https://espanadigital.gob.es/ Fira Barcelona (2023). Smart City Expo LATAM Congress Report. https://www.smartcityexpolatam.com GSMA (2023). Mobile World Capital Barcelona: Digital Talent Overview. https://www.mobileworldcapital.com GSMA (2023). The Mobile Economy: Latin America 2023. https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/latin-america/ Government of Chile (2021). National Artificial Intelligence Policy. https://www.ciencia.gob.cl/ia/ IDB (2021) Accelerating the Digitization of SMEs in Latin America and the Caribbean. https://www.iadb.org/en/project/RG-T3902#:~:text=and%20the%20Caribbean-,Accelerating%20the%20Digitization%20of%20SMEs%20in%20Latin%20America%20and%20the,the%20digital%20transformation%20of%20MSMEs. IDB (2022). The Digital Transformation of Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities, Challenges and Policy Priorities. https://flagships.iadb.org/en/MicroReport/digitalizing-public-services-opportunities-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean IDB (2023). Argentina’s Digital Talent and Innovation Ecosystem. https://www.iadb.org/en IDB (2025) IDB Approves Financing to Support Digital Transformation and Use of Artificial Intelligence in Piauí, Brazil. https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-approves-financing-support-digital-transformation-and-use-artificial-intelligence-piaui-brazil#:~:text=The%20expansion%20of%20connectivity%20is,co%2Dfinancing%20is%20$12.5%20million.&text=The%20Inter%2DAmerican%20Development%20Bank%20(IDB)%20is%20devoted%20to,well%2Dbeing%20in%2026%20countries. Instituto Cervantes (2025). Anuario del Instituto Cervantes 2025: El Español en el Mundo. https://www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informes_actividad/anuario.htm MIT Technology Review (2023). AI Innovation in Latin America: Spanish-Speaking Ecosystems. https://www.technologyreview.com/ Ministerio TIC (2022). Misión TIC — Informe de Resultados. https://mintic.gov.co OECD (2020). Digital Government Review of Chile: En Chile, hacia un Estado Digital. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/digital-government-in-chile_9789264258013-en.html OECD (2020). Latin American Economic Outlook 2020: Digital Transformation for Building Back Better. https://doi.org/10.1787/20725140 OECD (2022). OECD Digital Government Review of Spain: Enhancing the Digital Transformation of the Public Sector. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/07/enhancing-digital-diffusion-for-higher-productivity-in-spain_8b97078e/ce12270a-en.pdf Poorte, Marielle (2025) How many people speak Spanish in the world? 42 Statistics. Speak easy. https://www.speakeasybcn.com/en/blog/how-many-people-in-the-world-speak-spanish#:~:text=42%20statistics%20about%20Spanish%20speakers,most%20widely%20spoken%20Romance%20language. Stanford HAI (2024). AI Index Report 2024 — Regional Spotlight: Latin America. https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/ Statista (2023). Fintech in Latin America – Market Insights and Outlook. https://www.statista.com/topics/5123/fintech-in-latin-america/?srsltid=AfmBOorQcdxpAWPuf6g7Ojqbg8Yb_bQtZZmsl--OxOL29w4nQxKsI8lp#topicOverview UNESCO (2021). Latin America and the Caribbean: Artificial Intelligence Needs, Challenges and Opportunities. https://unesdoc.unesco.org United Nations (2022). World Population Prospects 2022 — Latin America & Caribbean Profile. https://population.un.org/wpp/ World Bank (2020). Argentina: Fostering Technology and Innovation for Productivity. https://documents.worldbank.org World Bank (2021). Digital Economy for Latin America and the Caribbean (DE4LAC) Report. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/digitaldevelopment World Bank (2022). GovTech Maturity Index 2022 — Uruguay Profile. https://www.unesco.org/ethics-ai/en/uruguay World Bank (2023). Colombia Digital Economy Country Assessment (DECA). https://www.worldbank.org

Defense & Security
Conflict between USA and Venezuela, conceptuall image witth a sea thunderstorm and the flag of venezuela and usa, ongoing conflic betwenne the two country

The Increasing Tensions in the Caribbean. The US and Venezuela amid a Regional Security Complex

by Krzysztof Sliwinski

Abstract This paper analyses the escalating tensions between the United States and Venezuela as of 2025, focusing on the Caribbean regional security complex. Under President Donald Trump, U.S. - Venezuela relations have sharply deteriorated, marked by increased military deployments, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, and over 4,000 troops near Venezuela. Operation Southern Spear targets alleged narco-terrorist groups linked to Venezuela, with numerous airstrikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels resulting in significant casualties. Despite official claims of counternarcotics objectives, critics question the legality and evidence supporting these actions. Venezuela, backed by Russian arms and military support, has mobilised substantial forces and prepared for guerrilla resistance. The potential for full-scale conflict remains elevated but uncertain, complicated by domestic U.S. opposition, legal constraints, and regional diplomatic backlash. Additionally, Venezuela's rare earth mineral deposits add a strategic dimension to the conflict amid global supply chain concerns. The study highlights the multifaceted geopolitical, military, and economic factors shaping this volatile confrontation. Key Words: the U.S., Venezuela, Regional Security Complex Introduction Recently, the U.S.-Venezuela relations have deteriorated significantly under President Donald Trump, marking a continuation of longstanding tensions rooted in U.S. opposition to the socialist government led by President Nicolás Maduro, including past sanctions and diplomatic isolation. [1] The year 2025 has seen a sharp escalation in U.S. military posturing framed as a counternarcotics campaign, with Trump signing a secret directive in August authorising Pentagon forces against select Latin American drug cartels, including those allegedly tied to Venezuelan entities.[2] This has involved designating groups like Tren de Aragua (TdA) as a foreign terrorist organisation in February and the Cartel de los Soles as a transnational terrorist group in July, with unsubstantiated claims linking them to Maduro's regime in drug trafficking operations targeting the U.S.[3] Recent developments alarmingly include a U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean since August 2025, featuring assets such as Aegis-class destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, over 4,000 troops deployed off Venezuela's coast, an additional 5,000 on standby in Puerto Rico, F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and B-52 bomber demonstration flights over Caracas. Starting in September, the U.S. has conducted at least 16 airstrikes on suspected drug-running boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific waters, resulting in at least 67 deaths. However, critics argue that these lack sufficient evidence of drug ties and raise concerns over extrajudicial killings.[4] Administration officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, have emphasised that these operations are limited to maritime counternarcotics and intelligence gathering, with no current plans for strikes inside Venezuela itself, citing a lack of legal justification for land-based actions under existing Justice Department opinions. However, the administration is seeking a new legal opinion to potentially authorise future land strikes without congressional approval, aligning with Trump's hints that Maduro's leadership is nearing its end.[5] On November 6, 2025, the U.S. Senate rejected a bipartisan resolution under the 1973 War Powers Act that would have required congressional authorisation for any military attack on Venezuela, failing by a 51-49 vote, with only two Republicans — Sens. Rand Paul and Lisa Murkowski — joining Democrats in support.[6] Some have interpreted this vote as giving tacit approval to Trump's "America First" doctrine, which critics compare to past interventions in Panama (1989) or Iraq (2003), warning of risks like regional instability or failed regime change efforts. Economically, the intensified U.S. pressure has led to a surge in Venezuelan bond prices, reflecting investor speculation on the potential for regime change amid the country's $150 billion in defaulted debt and interest payments.[7] Broader implications include debates over Trump's endgame, with experts suggesting limited strikes to pressure elites around Maduro rather than a full invasion. However, this could echo U.S. misadventures in Afghanistan or Libya.[8] From Venezuela's perspective and allied views, these actions represent an imperialistic push to undermine the Bolivarian Revolution, potentially through fabricated pretexts or assassinations, with international actors like China and Russia conducting joint exercises in the region to counter U.S. moves.[9] Congressional Democrats have voiced scepticism over the campaign's legality and transparency, while Republicans largely support executive authority in combating drug threats.[10] Source: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela The U.S. military build-up towards Venezuela Diplomatic relations were terminated in 2019 following the United States' recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's interim president. Consequently, as reported by the media, several South American nations, including Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, have also acknowledged Mr. Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela.[11] In response to President Trump's recognition of the opposition leader, President Maduro severed diplomatic relations with the United States and mandated that its diplomatic personnel vacate Venezuela within 72 hours. He accused Washington of attempting to govern Venezuela remotely and alleged that the opposition was endeavouring to orchestrate a coup. Consequently, the U.S. embassy in Caracas remains closed. The United States continues to recognise the National Assembly elected in 2015, but ceased to acknowledge Guaidó's presidential claim in 2023. The U.S. government maintains that neither Maduro nor his affiliates represent the legitimate Venezuelan government. [12] Furthermore, the United States has markedly augmented its military presence in the Caribbean Sea as part of "Operation Southern Spear," purportedly to address drug trafficking. This initiative includes the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and thousands of military personnel, constituting the largest military deployment to the region in several decades.[13] As reported by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, recent operations have primarily targeted vessels suspected of drug smuggling. The initial attack was recorded on September 2 in the Caribbean, and since then, the frequency of these attacks has increased, extending into the Eastern Pacific.[14]    Reports suggest the strikes in the Caribbean have occurred near the Venezuelan coast. Previous analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described a potential U.S. surveillance operation off the coast, which the United States has purportedly established to detect and target potential drug traffickers before they integrate with the dense maritime traffic of the Caribbean.[15] Until late summer, the deployment of U.S. Navy ships to the Caribbean was relatively limited compared to previous years. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, this situation changed in August when the administration initiated a significant increase in forces to combat drug smuggling. Deployment levels further escalated with the arrival of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group (CSG).[16]    Recent deployments have also involved larger vessels, which bring substantial firepower and additional combat capabilities. A rudimentary method to quantify the enhancement in capability is to examine the displacement of the deployed ships. Figure 3 illustrates the significant increase in the displacement of deployed ships since the commencement of the second Trump administration. The initial major increase occurred with the deployment of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group; the arrival of the Ford CSG nearly doubled the number.[17]   Since September 2025, the U.S. has conducted a series of airstrikes on boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, which it claims are drug-trafficking vessels operated by "narco-terrorist" organisations like the Tren de Aragua gang.[18] On Monday, September 15, President Trump announced that, under his directive, United States military forces executed a second kinetic strike against drug trafficking cartels and narco-terrorists identified as extraordinarily violent within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. This strike was conducted while these confirmed narco-terrorists from Venezuela were in international waters, transporting illegal narcotics intended for the United States, which he described as a deadly weapon poisoning Americans. In the same announcement, President Trump asserted that these extremely violent drug trafficking cartels pose a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, and vital U.S. interests.[19] The strike on September 15 resulted in the deaths of three individuals aboard the vessel. Subsequently, on Friday, September 19, U.S. military forces executed an additional strike. President Trump asserted that, under his directive, forces conducted a strike against a designated terrorist organisation involved in narco-trafficking. Intelligence confirmed that the vessel was transporting illicit narcotics and was en route to harm Americans. The strike resulted in the deaths of three male narco-terrorists. It remains unclear which group within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility was targeted in the third airstrike.[20] On September 2, 2025, the United States military conducted its initial strike, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals suspected of narco-terrorism. Following the third strike, the cumulative number of suspected drug traffickers killed reached 17. By mid-November 2025, at least 20 strikes had been announced, resulting in over 80 deaths, with most occurring in the Caribbean and several expanding to the Pacific off South America's coast.[21] U.S. officials, including President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, have justified the actions as part of a counternarcotics campaign against groups like TdA and the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), framing them as an "armed attack" on the U.S. and releasing videos of some strikes.[22] Maduro's government has denounced the U.S. actions as acts of aggression and "regime change through military threat," launching its own "massive mobilisation" of troops and military exercises in response.[23] Additionally, the Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, who is in the midst of a spat with Donald Trump over the boat strikes and tariffs, said: "The attack on another boat in the Pacific … killed people. It is murder. Whether in the Caribbean or Pacific, the U.S. government strategy breaks the norms of international law." Interestingly, María Corina Machado, a prominent Venezuelan politician and opposition leader, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2025 for her "unwavering commitment to promoting democracy and human rights in Venezuela", according to The Nobel Prize.[24] Following her award on October 10, 2025, Machado has called for increased international support, urging U.S. leaders like Donald Trump to intensify pressure on Maduro to facilitate a democratic transition, including by calling for military intervention.[25] The military build-up has fueled speculation of a potential U.S. invasion, though President Trump downplayed the possibility, saying he "doubts it". Experts disagree on the likelihood of a full-scale invasion, noting the U.S. has previously opted for sanctions and diplomatic pressure over direct military action. War Speculation As of mid-November 2025 (when this analysis is written), the likelihood of a full-scale war between the United States and Venezuela remains elevated but not imminent or inevitable.[I] While tensions have escalated dramatically through U.S. military build-up and operations in the Caribbean, several restraining factors—including domestic U.S. opposition, legal hurdles, and high risks of failure would suggest a medium probability of limited escalation to airstrikes or missile attacks on Venezuelan targets, but a lower chance of a ground invasion or prolonged conflict. As mentioned above, the U.S. did launch "Operation Southern Spear" on November 13, a joint task force under U.S. Southern Command aimed at defending against "narco-terrorists" allegedly tied to Venezuela.[26] The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group on November 11 has shifted the focus toward potential anti-Maduro operations, supported by a build-up of over a dozen warships, an attack submarine, amphibious vessels, roughly 15,000 troops (including Marines in joint exercises with Trinidad and Tobago), 10 F-35 fighter jets, drones, and special operations forces in the region and Puerto Rico. [27] President Trump has authorised CIA covert operations in Venezuela and, on November 14, stated he has "sort of made up my mind" on military options after briefings from top officials like Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. [28] He has suggested "the land is going to be next" after maritime strikes, hinting at ground operations or strikes on Venezuelan soil, such as military facilities, drug routes, or even targeting Maduro directly.[29] However, Trump has also mentioned possible discussions with Maduro and expressed caution about actions that could fail or entangle U.S. troops. In response, Venezuela has mobilised around 200,000 military personnel, civilians, and militias in large-scale exercises, deploying aging Russian-made equipment like 5,000 Igla missiles and preparing for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "anarchization" strategies to make the country ungovernable for invaders[30] Maduro has warned that U.S. intervention would turn Venezuela into "another Gaza, Afghanistan, or Vietnam," emphasising national resistance.[31] What could enhance the likelihood of a war between the U.S. and Venezuela? The U.S. holds overwhelming advantages in air, sea, and missile capabilities (e.g., up to 170 Tomahawk missiles in the region, stealth bombers for long-range strikes), making initial air or missile campaigns feasible without ground forces.[32] Venezuela's forces are numerically larger on land but poorly trained, under-equipped, and focused on internal control, with limited operational aircraft and inoperable submarines.[33] Experts note that this imbalance could encourage U.S. escalation, similar to the 1989 invasion of Panama.[34] Trump's administration views the situation as an "armed attack" on the U.S. via drugs and migration, with regime change as a potential endgame to disrupt flows and secure oil deals.[35] The Senate's rejection of a War Powers Act resolution earlier in November gives tacit executive leeway. Analysts describe the region as "on the brink," with the carrier deployment starting a "shot clock" for action before unsustainable costs mount.[36] There are several arguments against a potential war. According to YouGov.US, polls show that 55% of Americans oppose a U.S. invasion, with only 15% in support, including majorities among Democrats, Independents, and even some Republicans.[37] Apparently, Trump's anti-war coalition, including figures like Vice President JD Vance and Hegseth, is sceptical of foreign entanglements.[38] According to experts, there is no current legal justification for land strikes, as the War Powers Act's 60-day limit has expired and Congress is pressing for transparency.[39] Regional leaders (e.g., Brazil's Lula, Colombia's Petro, Mexico's Sheinbaum) condemn the build-up as aggression, suspending intelligence sharing and evoking "gunboat diplomacy." What is more, the UN and human rights criticisms label U.S. actions as potential extrajudicial killings, risking broader isolation.[40] A full invasion could require 50,000 - 150,000 troops, facing guerrilla resistance in challenging terrain and leading to a failed state or protracted insurgency (comparisons to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). Experts warn it won't solve drug or dictator issues, damaging U.S. credibility in Latin America (e.g., falling favourability ratings) and diverting from diplomatic alternatives. What about Russia? – Is there the potential for another Cuban Missile Crisis? Russia has been Venezuela's primary arms supplier since the early 2000s under former President Hugo Chávez, providing a wide array of military equipment that forms the backbone of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and plays a central role in its defence strategy amid escalating U.S. - Venezuela tensions in 2025.[41] This arsenal, largely Soviet-era designs manufactured or upgraded by Russia, distinguishes Venezuela's military from others in Latin America, which typically rely on U.S. or European weaponry, and is intended to deter external aggression, particularly from the U.S., through asymmetric warfare capabilities.[42] Among the most critical for countering U.S. air and naval superiority are Russian-derived air defence and missile systems. In this category, according to media, the key assets include: 12 batteries of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), nine Buk-M2E medium-range SAMs, 44 S-125 Pechora-2M short-range SAMs, and thousands of portable Igla-S shoulder-fired SAMs (with up to 5,000 units reported in some estimates).[43] The S-300 and Buk systems are positioned to protect key sites like oil facilities and radar installations, potentially threatening U.S. aircraft, helicopters, and drones at various altitudes. Igla-S launchers are distributed to regular troops and the Bolivarian Militia for low-altitude defence.[44] As for the aircraft and anti-ship capabilities, experts estimate around 20-30 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole fighter jets, armed with Kh-31 "Krypton" anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, serve as the core of Venezuela's air force. [45] These jets, equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles, could challenge U.S. naval vessels in the Caribbean by launching sea-skimming attacks, forcing U.S. forces to operate under heightened risk. Russia has also provided Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters for transport and attack roles.[46] As for ground and artillery systems, Venezuela fields 92 T-72B1 main battle tanks, 123 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, and Smerch multiple rocket launchers.[47] Infantry weapons include Kalashnikov rifles (e.g., AK-103) and Dragunov sniper rifles, with a new factory opened in July 2025 for producing Kalashnikov munitions to sustain supply.[48] Finally, as for other support systems, Russian radar arrays and electronic warfare tools, integrated with Chinese communications, enable jamming of U.S. signals, creating a contested electromagnetic environment.[49] These systems contribute to Venezuela's overall force of about 150,000 active personnel, plus a Bolivarian Militia estimated at 220,000 - 1 million (with government claims up to 8 million), which could use Russian arms for guerrilla-style resistance.[50] Amid heightened U.S. pressure, President Nicolás Maduro drafted a letter in October 2025 requesting additional Russian missiles, radars, drones, upgraded aircraft, and other support directly from Vladimir Putin.[51] According to the media, a Russian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane, linked to military or Wagner Group operations, landed in Caracas in late October to deliver cargo, potentially including arms or parts.[52] Russia has also allegedly assisted in maintenance and opened a Kalashnikov munitions factory in Venezuela in July 2025. However, experts caution that Russia's commitments may be limited due to its focus on Ukraine, economic strains, and reliance on allies like China and Iran for broader support, suggesting more symbolic gestures (e.g., past bomber deployments in 2018-2019) than substantial reinforcements.[53] This aid seems to be part of a multipolar strategy involving China and Iran, but Russia's role remains pivotal in sustaining Venezuela's deterrent posture. Conclusion What about Venezuela's rare earths? Venezuela does have deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), though they are not among the world's largest or most developed reserves. Known occurrences include the Navay phosphate deposit in southwestern Venezuela, where phosphorites contain REE concentrations averaging around 208 parts per million, with potential for extraction as a byproduct of phosphoric acid production.[54] Additional deposits occur in the Amazon Basin and the Guiana Shield, particularly in the Bolívar and Amazonas states, where REEs are found alongside other critical minerals, such as coltan (a source of tantalum), tin, and tungsten.[55] These areas feature preliminary survey results indicating reserves of around 43 million tons of ore with REE oxide concentrations averaging 1.5%, though much of the extraction is informal and unregulated.[56] Historically, Venezuela has exported small amounts of REE compounds, such as $27,600 worth in 2003, but current production is limited and often tied to illicit mining.[57] REEs play a minor but notable role in the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Venezuela, primarily as part of broader competition over critical minerals rather than as a central driver of the conflict. The main issues in US-Venezuela relations remain oil sanctions, political disputes over the Maduro regime, and human rights concerns, but Venezuela's mineral resources—including REEs and coltan—have drawn international attention amid global supply chain vulnerabilities.[58] The U.S. defence and technology sectors rely on these materials for applications such as fighter jets, missiles, and electronics, and Venezuela's deposits are seen as potential alternatives to China's dominant supply, especially after China's recent export restrictions heightened Western diversification efforts.[59] Mining in these areas is often controlled by armed groups like the ELN and FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) dissidents—designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S.—leading to smuggling, environmental damage, and human rights abuses that complicate international involvement.[60] Some analysts suggest that U.S. policies, including sanctions and border measures, may indirectly aim to secure access to these resources to counter China's influence, viewing Venezuela's alliances with Beijing as a strategic threat in the context of rare-earth dependencies.[61] However, REEs are not the primary motivator compared to oil, and their extraction remains largely illicit rather than a formalised point of diplomatic contention.[62] Notes [I] Importantly, on November 29, 2025, President Donald Trump declared that the airspace "above and surrounding" Venezuela should be considered "closed in its entirety. See more at: https://www.politico.com/news/2025/11/29/trump-venezuelan-airspace-military-00670743 References [1] U.S. Relations With Venezuela. (2024, July 18). U.S. Department of State. https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/ [2] U.S. Confrontation With Venezuela. (2025, July 11). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela [3] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [4] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [5] War looms in Venezuela as Trump tests an “Americas First” doctrine. (2025, November 6). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2025/11/06/war-looms-in-venezuela-as-trump-tests-an-americas-first-doctrine [6] O’Brien, C., & Gould, J. (2025, November 6). Senate sinks measure to block military action against Venezuela. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/11/06/congress/senate-venezuela-vote-00640088 [7] Campos, R. (2025, November 7). Venezuela bonds surge as US pressure intensifies on Maduro. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-bonds-surge-us-pressure-intensifies-maduro-2025-11-06/ [8] Kroenig, M., & Marczak, J. (2025, November 6). The expert conversation: What’s Trump’s endgame in Venezuela? Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-expert-conversation-whats-trumps-endgame-in-venezuela/ [9] The United States Continues Its Attempt to Overthrow Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: The Forty-Fifth Newsletter (2025). (2025, November 6). Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. https://thetricontinental.org/newsletterissue/us-threats-venezuela/ [10] Bertrand, N., Hansler, J., Lillis, K. B., Cohen, Z., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 7). Trump admin tells Congress it currently lacks legal justification to strike Venezuela. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/06/politics/trump-venezuela-legal-congress-land [11] Juan Guaidó: US backs opposition leader as Venezuela president. (2019, January 24). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46980913 [12] Lee, D. D., & News Agencies. (2025, October 7). Venezuela’s Maduro says US embassy ‘false flag’ bombing foiled in Caracas. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/7/venezuelas-maduro-says-us-embassy-false-flag-bombing-foiled-in-caracas#:~:text=Following%20the%20rupture%20of%20diplomatic,and%20upkeep%20of%20the%20premises. [13] Operation Southern Spear: Latest Development in Operationalizing Robotic and Autonomous Systems. (2025, January 28). America’s Navy. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4044322/operation-southern-spear-latest-development-in-operationalizing-robotic-and-aut/ [14] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [15] Ibidem. [16] Ibidem. [17] Ibidem. [18] Ducharme, J. (2025, September 22). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. Orion Policy Institute. https://orionpolicy.org/airstrikes-on-drug-traffickers-in-the-caribbean/ [19] Ibidem. [20] Madhani, A. (2025, September 19). Trump says U.S. has carried out another fatal strike targeting alleged drug-smuggling boat. CNBC. https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/trump-us-strike-drug-smuggling-boat/3694397/ [21] Flaherty, A., & Pereira, I. (2025, November 17). Timeline: US strikes on alleged drug boats. CBCNews. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-us-strikes-alleged-drug-boats/story?id=126940218 [22] Jaffe, A. (2025, October 30). Assessing the Facts and Legal Questions About the U.S. Strikes on Alleged Drug Boats. FactCheck.Org. https://www.factcheck.org/2025/10/assessing-the-facts-and-legal-questions-about-the-u-s-strikes-on-alleged-drug-boats/ [23] Lowell, H., & staff, G. (2025, October 23). US military kills five people in strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats in Pacific. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/22/military-boat-strike-pacific-pete-hegseth [24] Maria Corina Machado Facts. (2025, November 20). The Nobel Prize. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2025/machado/facts/ [25] Nobel Peace Prize Winner: US Escalation Is “Only Way” to Free Venezuela. (2025, October 31). Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2025-maria-corina-machado-weekend-interview/?embedded-checkout=true [26] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [27] Ibidem. [28] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [29] Reuters. (2025, November 12). Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [30] Venezuela announces ‘massive mobilization’ of military forces as America’s largest warship sails into region. (2025, November 12). CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/11/americas/venezuela-military-mobilization-us-buildup-intl-latam [31] Venezuelan military preparing guerrilla response in case of US attack. (2025, November 12). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelan-military-preparing-guerrilla-response-case-us-attack-2025-11-11/ [32] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [33] Ibidem. [34] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [35] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [36] Cancian, M. F., & Park, C. H. (2025, November 10). Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data Behind Operation Southern Spear. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict [37] Rossell Hayes, A., & Orth, T. (2025, October 31). The U.S. Navy deployment near Venezuela has become even less popular in the past month. YouGov.US. https://today.yougov.com/international/articles/53298-the-us-navy-deployment-near-venezuela-has-become-even-less-popular [38i] Klein, B., Liptak, K., Britzky, H., & Atwood, K. (2025, November 17). Trump has suggested he’s made a decision on Venezuela military operations. Here’s what we know. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know [39] Vidaurri, M., Marckwardt, J., & Gedan, B. N. (2025, November 14). A War in Venezuela Would Not Solve Latin America’s Drug and Dictator Problems. STIMSON. https://www.stimson.org/2025/a-war-in-venezuela-would-not-solve-latin-americas-drug-and-dictator-problems/ [40] Tisdall, S. (2025, November 16). The US is now a rogue state - look at its extrajudicial killings off Venezuela’s coast. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/nov/16/us-rogue-state-extrajudicial-killings-venezuela [41] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [42] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [43] Ibidem. [44] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [45] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [46] Ibidem. [47] Padinger, G. (2025, November 14). How Venezuela’s aging Soviet-era military stacks up against US forces in the Caribbean. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/11/13/americas/venezuela-military-us-tensions-explainer-intl-latam [48] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [49] Frazier, A. (2025, October 20). What U.S. Forces Face as Venezuela Puts Russian-Armed Military on Wartime Alert. MIlitary.Com. https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/10/20/what-us-forces-face-venezuela-puts-russian-armed-military-wartime-alert.html [50] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [51] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [52] Romero, S. (2025, November 5). How Venezuela’s Military Might Respond to U.S. Attacks. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/05/us/venezuela-military-maduro-coup.html [53] Bayoumi, I., & Magid, S. (2025, November 4). Facing the threat of US strikes, Maduro has requested Russia’s help. He shouldn’t expect much. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/facing-the-threat-of-us-strikes-maduro-has-requested-russias-help-he-shouldnt-expect-much/ [54] Linares, E., Velasquez, G., Manrique, J., Monsalve, J., Lo Mónaco, S., & Shumlyanskyy, L. (2026). REE + Y signatures of the Navay phosphate deposit, SW Venezuela: Seawater paleoredox conditions and diagenetic implications. Journal of South American Earth Sciences, 129. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsames.2023.104532 [55] Venezuela’s rare earth rush. A growing supply chain risk. (2025, November 12). Southern Pulse. https://southernpulse.substack.com/p/venezuelas-rare-earth-rush [56 Killeen, T. J. (2024, July 12). Industrial minerals in the Pan Amazon. MONGABAY. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/07/more-industrial-minerals-on-brazils-borders-with-ecuador-venezuela-and-colombia/ [57] Rare-Earth Metal Compounds in Venezuela. (2025, November 25). OEC. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/rare-earth-metal-compounds/reporter/ven [58] Garcia, J. (2025, October 26). Trading Oil for Influence. The Heights. https://bcheights.com/224288/opinions/column/trading-oil-for-influence/ [59] Russell, M., & Ellner, M. (2025, November 15). The US War on China, Venezuela, and the Global Left. Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-war-china-venezuela [60] bus, B. (2025, November 7). ‘Drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping’: the lawless rush for rare earth minerals in Venezuela. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/07/drug-trafficking-extortion-kidnapping-the-lawless-rush-for-rare-earth-minerals-in-venezuela [61] Giunta, C. (2015, May 6). Follow the Minerals: Why the US is Threatened by Venezuela’s ‘Blue Gold.’ Venezuelanalysis. https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11372/ [62] Blakemore, R., Harmon, A., & Engelke, P. (2025, November 19). Critical minerals in crisis: Stress testing US supply chains against shocks. Venezuelanalysis. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/critical-minerals-in-crisis-stress-testing-us-supply-chains-against-shocks/

Defense & Security
Caracas (Venezuela) Feb. 18, 2009. The President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, arrival to Caracas, Venezuela, on official visit in febraury 18, 2009.

Why China is watching Trump’s Venezuela campaign closely

by Tom Harper

Donald Trump’s campaign against Venezuela escalated recently with the US president announcing that the country’s airspace should be considered “closed”. This is a move that has preceded US military interventions in the past, perhaps most notably in Iraq in 2003. It remains to be seen whether Trump’s declaration will be followed by military action or is just a means of raising the pressure on the Venezuelan leader, Nicolás Maduro, in an attempt to force him from office. But regardless of what happens next, what has been notable is the reaction of China. In a December 3 briefing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that closing Venezuelan airspace would violate international norms and infringe on national sovereignty. Jian added that China rejects interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs “under any pretext” and called on all parties to keep Latin America a “zone of peace”. This stance is no great surprise. China has developed strong relationships with several Latin American countries, including Venezuela, as part of a broader strategy to expand its presence in regions long dominated by the US. Trump’s threats of military action could jeopardise the influence China has built there. China has been involved in Latin America for centuries. But its ties to the region have grown rapidly over the past 25 years or so, with China becoming an indispensable partner to many Latin American countries. Brazil is a clear example of this indispensability. The election of Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in 2018 led to expectations that Brazil would tilt towards Washington. However, such expectations were soon dampened due to China’s role as a major consumer of Brazilian goods. By 2020, China was Brazil’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 30% of total exports from the country. Ties between Brazil and China have only deepened under Bolsonaro’s successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This has been helped by the intensification of the US-China trade war, which has seen Brazil become a crucial alternative source of agricultural products such as soybeans that China has historically imported from the US. This relationship has enabled China to exert economic pressure on the US. Brazil’s large soybean exports to China have increased the global supply, which has suppressed prices for all suppliers – including those in US. China has been a similarly indispensable partner to Venezuela since the days of Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who took power in the Latin American state in 1999. Chávez was a keen advocate of a multipolar international order, a concept that has gained traction as Beijing’s political and economic power has grown. Over the years, China has become the main destination for Venezuelan oil. In 2024, China bought around 268,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela on average every day – a figure that, in reality, is likely to be higher as Venezuelan oil is routinely mislabelled to bypass US sanctions. Venezuelan oil is key for China. Beijing has been attempting to diversify its sources of natural resources in recent years as part of efforts to retain its global advantage in cheap manufacturing and wean itself off a dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Trump’s threats to intervene militarily in Venezuela may, at least in part, be aimed at challenging Chinese interests. Indeed, the White House issued an official statement on December 2 affirming the Trump administration’s commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Signed in 1823, the doctrine said the US would reject other countries’ influence in Latin America. A new “Trump Corollary” to the doctrine states that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. Challenging Chinese influence Any US military action in Venezuela will probably increase paranoia across the region. Trump warned recently that any country he believes is making illegal drugs destined for the US is vulnerable to a military attack, and singled out Colombia. On December 2, Trump told reporters at the White House that he “heard” Colombia was “making cocaine”. “They have cocaine plants”, he added. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, hit back immediately on social media, saying: “To threaten our sovereignty is to declare war”. But China is unlikely to step in militarily to defend countries in Latin America from US aggression. While China has used its developmental influence there to pursue some political objectives – most notably persuading El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to renounce diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years – its engagement with Latin America has largely been transactional. China’s strategy in Latin America is driven primarily by economic considerations, and Beijing has generally been reluctant to enter into formal alliances with states there. This hesitance to commit to defending its partners could strain relations with countries in the region that may expect Beijing to support them in the event of a crisis. However, Trump’s Latin America campaign does provide China with some opportunities. Just as European countries concerned about Russia’s expansionist intentions have become a key market for American arms, it’s possible that Latin America becomes a lucrative destination for Chinese weaponry. Venezuela is already buying Chinese arms, varying from riot control equipment to missiles and – possibly in the future – fighter jets. China has also sold military equipment to Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. The US appears to be taking an increasingly active interest in Latin America. As outlined in its recently published National Security Strategy, the Trump administration is looking to readjust the US’s “global military presence to address urgent threats” in the western hemisphere. Having carefully built up its influence in Latin America over many years, China’s leadership will be keeping a keen eye on how events unfold there in the months ahead.

Diplomacy
Russia US Peace Plan as Russian American and Ukrainian deal to end the war as an agreement of Moscow and Washington Kyiv on the outside in negotiations.

Peace in Ukraine? Believe it when you see it, especially if demands are prioritized

by Oleksa Drachewych

The United States recently — and suddenly — announced a 28-point peace plan to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, seemingly jointly written with Russian delegates, and presented it to Ukraine. The leaked contents of the peace plan caused concerns for Ukrainian representatives, European leaders and some American politicians. Yet it has nonetheless led to “meaningful progress”, according to the White House, on a revised peace proposal drafted by Ukrainian and American delegates in Geneva. Ukraine has reportedly agreed to the deal, with minor tweaks, while Russia says it’s premature to say a resolution is close, even as Russian representatives met with U.S. delegates in Abu Dhabi to discuss the revised plan. What was in the first plan? The leaked initial 28-point plan was criticized for asserting many Russian demands that date back to the initial peace negotiations of March and April 2022: • It placed a limit of 600,000 troops on Ukraine’s military; • It prevented Ukraine from having long-range missiles; • It placed a permanent ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO; • It included protections of Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It also explicitly gave the entire Donbas region of eastern Ukraine to Russia, and called on the international community to recognize full Russian control of the Donbas and Crimea and control of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on the front lines. In return, there would be “reliable security guarantees” envisioned by U.S. President Donald Trump: a NATO-style “Article 5” for Ukraine. This would mean if Ukraine was purposefully attacked by Russia in the future, the U.S. and other parties involved would come to Ukraine’s defence through sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military support, if necessary. In many of the economic and security arrangements that could emerge from the agreement, Russia and the United States would manage them together under the terms of the 28-point plan. The original plan also offered amnesty to all parties for any crimes and atrocities committed during the war, meaning Russia would not be brought to justice for war crimes. It also called for Russia’s return to European and global affairs, ending its political isolation with the West by reforming the G8. In short, the agreement would essentially act as if the war in Ukraine never happened. Was this a joint U.S.-Russia plan? The origins of the peace plan have been widely debated. The stilted language in the English version has led some to speculate it was translated from Russian. American senators said U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, when briefing them, called the deal a “Russian wish list.” The draft reportedly came as a result of meetings held in Florida between Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev, a noted Putin supporter. Rubio has insisted it was a U.S.-crafted document while Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia could accept the peace plan. The fact that the document tended to mirror many of Russia’s demands immediately put Ukraine, and Europe, on the defensive. Trump declared that Ukraine would have until American Thanksgiving — Thursday, Nov. 27 — to agree to the plan. He has since softened his stance. But he’s also lambasted Ukraine’s leadership for not showing sufficient “gratitude” for American efforts to bring peace to Ukraine. Details of Europe’s plan In response, European leaders offered their own peace plan. They largely removed some of Russia’s most egregious demands, keeping some of the 28 points, while placing sensitive issues like NATO membership as something to be determined by NATO members and Ukraine. But it also acceded to some Russian demands, including accepting a cap on Ukraine’s military and offering Russia re-entry into the G8. It included a provision for territorial swaps with negotiations starting from the current front lines instead of recognizing Russia’s annexations. European proposals include using frozen Russian assets as reparations for Russia’s aggression, eliminating any of the amnesty clauses and making the European Union and NATO the key players in any future political, economic and military security arrangements. The European deal also removes key qualifiers in the original 28-point plan that could be manipulated by Russian misinformation — namely that Ukraine would be forced to face Russia alone if it struck either St. Petersburg or Moscow with a missile or it failed to “de-Nazify”, a common and erroneous Russian line of attack against Ukraine. The Kremlin rejected the European counter-plan outright. Where does the deal stand now? Ukrainian and American officials recently met in Geneva to discuss the peace plan. Emerging from the meeting, European leaders were cautiously optimistic while insisting a lot more work needed to be done. Trump stated that “something good just may be happening.” So, what resulted from that meeting? Few details have been leaked. Sources have shared that the 28-point plan has now been pared down to 19. It has also been suggested that key issues like territorial swaps and NATO accession have been left for Trump and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy to discuss at a future meeting. Ukrainian officials have said the plan has been substantially revised and reflects Ukraine’s concerns. The Russian response has been cagey, to say the least. Since there’s been no formal presentation of any revised peace plan, they are electing to say nothing firm. But U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll recently met with Russian delegates in Abu Dhabi. Russian sources, meanwhile, have restated their preference for the original 28-point plan. Seeing is believing While this appears to be the most notable progress in the peace process in months, expectations should be tempered until there’s a presidential summit between Zelenskyy and Putin and until their signatures are on a treaty. Such momentum for peace has happened in the past. And it has often been scuttled by the key sticking points of both nations. Ukraine has continued to demand extensive security guarantees, justice for Russian war crimes, and has rejected territorial swaps. Russia has wanted a pliable Ukraine and one that could remain in its orbit politically and economically. Fundamentally, these positions haven’t changed. At this point, it appears the Ukrainians have managed to bring the Americans to their side in the latest peace talks, which reflects the importance Ukraine places on U.S. support in their fight against Russia. Russia has elected to say little, but if it was to agree to the revised deal, it would represent a seismic shift. For those reasons, believe in success in the peace process when you actually see it.

Diplomacy
Washington, DC – March 04, 2025: Ahead of President Trump's speech to Congress, protestors gathered at the US Capitol calling attention to his autocratic ways and to stop Fascism.

Democratic erosion in the United States: a red alert for the region

by Laura Gamboa

The accelerated authoritarian drift of the United States under the Trump administration poses serious risks to democracy and stability throughout Latin America. The United States is undergoing a rapid process of democratic erosion. Despite its limitations, until January 2025 it still had a democratic regime with relatively free and fair elections (though more so in some states than others), universal suffrage, no tutelary authorities, protection of political rights and civil liberties, and a series of checks and balances that restricted executive power. Today, that regime has changed substantially. Following the playbook of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, over the past ten months the administration has dismantled the federal bureaucracy, usurped legislative powers, used government agencies to attack, censor, and extort universities, media, and opponents, and violated due process for immigrants (and African American citizens). The shift has been so extreme that political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have declared that the United States is no longer a democracy but a competitive authoritarian regime. The implications of this autocratization process in the U.S. for Latin America are catastrophic. Empowered by a submissive Congress and Supreme Court — whose majorities are more concerned with ideological victories than with the rule of law or civil and political liberties — Trump has been able to operate with minimal constraints. Despite efforts by district, state, and federal courts to block executive orders and actions that violate the Constitution, the president has managed to find ways around adverse rulings or inconvenient requirements. This is particularly true in areas where the presidency has traditionally enjoyed great flexibility — especially those affecting Latin America — such as foreign aid, immigration, and drug enforcement. In one of his first acts, Trump suspended or eliminated U.S. international aid programs previously approved by Congress. The 2024 budget included, among other things, $90 million for democracy promotion in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua; $125 million to combat fentanyl flows in Mexico and cocaine trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Costa Rica; and $82.5 million for programs to prevent human trafficking and reduce violence against women in Central America. The dismantling of USAID and the State Department’s human rights programs has been accompanied by measures to end immigration from the Global South. Early in his term, Trump abruptly suspended the asylum and refugee programs and terminated temporary protection for more than 600,000 Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants. Worse still, since March, the administration has used Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain and deport immigrants without due process. By September 2025, ICE had detained more than 59,000 people — 71.5% of them without criminal records — and deported 234,210, many without judicial orders. The process has been so arbitrary that ICE raids have even captured 170 U.S. citizens. Those detained — citizens or not, with or without legal status — are subjected to cruel and inhumane treatment, often disappearing into the immigration detention system or being deported without contact with lawyers or family. For those of us who grew up in Latin America hearing about the human rights abuses of dictators like Rafael Videla or Augusto Pinochet, the images of masked ICE agents refusing to identify themselves or present warrants while loading people into unmarked cars are disturbingly familiar. The consequences of these immigration policies are especially severe for Latin America. They not only endanger our compatriots but also reduce the number of Latin Americans living and earning in dollars — whether through deportation or voluntary departure driven by fear. Over time, fewer migrants in the U.S. mean fewer remittances, closing a vital economic valve for fragile economies. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances range from 0.1% of GDP in Argentina to 27.6% in Nicaragua. Countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala derive around one-fifth of their income from remittances — 60% of which come from North America. The crackdown on migrants, the closure of legal entry routes, and the elimination of economic aid coincide with the U.S. government’s decision to use military force against Venezuela. Over the last three months, U.S. forces have attacked Venezuelan (and Colombian) vessels allegedly carrying drugs. These attacks violate international law and expose worrying changes in the rule of law within the U.S. In a liberal democracy, security forces cannot act as prosecutor, judge, and executioner. Even if evidence of drug trafficking existed — which is not entirely clear — due process requires that the ship be detained, evidence collected, and suspects tried in court. The administration’s warlike rhetoric, combined with increased military presence in the Caribbean and the authorization of covert intelligence operations in Venezuela, signals a dangerously inflammatory policy. Some senators fear that the president may even declare war unilaterally — an unprecedented and devastating step for the region. This brings a final reflection. U.S. support for democratic (or authoritarian) leaders and regimes has long been essential to the stability of democracy (or dictatorship) in the Americas. Over the last two decades, democracy has been threatened and weakened in several countries. Overthrowing dictatorships in Venezuela or El Salvador and protecting democracy in Argentina, Colombia, or Guatemala requires strong democratic allies capable of exerting pressure to complement pro-democracy movements. Trump’s erratic policy toward Venezuela, unconditional support for authoritarian-leaning leaders like Nayib Bukele or Javier Milei, and hostility toward populist figures such as Gustavo Petro all contribute to political polarization, impunity, and the growing influence of autocratic powers like China and Russia — undermining democratic actors and institutions across the region. It is difficult to predict how far the erosion of democracy in the U.S. will go. Despite important resistance, the administration’s authoritarian excesses are mobilizing domestic opposition. With some luck, this mobilization may curb its authoritarian impulses. But until that happens, it is hard to rely on the U.S. to defend democracy and human rights in the region. So far, the regional response has been fragmented and, in some cases, improvised. Latin America would do well to seek collective responses, strengthen democratic leadership, and prepare jointly for the repercussions of the Trump administration.

Diplomacy
Isometric Ballot boxes with completed bulletins with check marks. Counting of votes of the democratic and republican candidate. Ballot boxes with us american flag on the red and blue background.

US Electoral System

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

I. Introduction Elections in the United States are held for government officials at the federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, the head of state, the President, is elected indirectly by the people of each state, through an Electoral College. All members of the federal legislature, the Congress, are directly elected by the people of each state. There are many elected offices at state level, each state having at least an elective governor and legislature. In addition, there are elected offices at the local level, in counties, cities, towns, and villages, as well as for special districts and school districts which may transcend county and municipal boundaries. The US election system is highly decentralized. While the US Constitution sets parameters for the election of federal officials, state laws regulate most aspects of elections in the US, including primary elections, the eligibility of voters (beyond the basic constitutional definition), the method of choosing presidential electors, as well as the running of state elections. All elections-federal, state, and local-are administered by the individual states, with many aspects of the electoral system’s operations delegated to the county or local level. [1] Under federal law, the general elections of the president and Congress are held in even-numbered years, with presidential elections occurring every four years, and congressional elections taking place every two years. The general elections that are held two years after the presidential ones are referred to as the mid-term elections. General elections for state and local offices are held at the discretion of the individual state and local governments, with many of these races coinciding with either presidential or mid-term elections as a matter of cost saving and convenience, while other state and local races may occur during odd-numbered “off years.” The date when primary elections for federal, state, and local races take place are also at the discretion of the individual state and local governments; presidential primaries in particular have historically been staggered between the states, beginning sometime in January or February, and ending about mid-June before the November general election. [2] With this basic information in mind, this paper explores the US electoral system. This paper first provides an overview of the US electoral system and then explains the US Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) and features of US electoral systems. Finally, the paper compares the US electoral system with Canadian and Mexican electoral systems.  II. US Elections  1. Federal elections The United States has a presidential system of government, which means that the executive and legislature are elected separately. Article II of the US Constitution requires that the election of the US president by the Electoral College must take place on a single day throughout the country; Article I established that elections for Congressional offices, however, can be held at different times. Congressional and presidential elections are held simultaneously every four years, and the intervening Congressional elections, which take place every two years, are called mid-term elections. The US constitution states that members of the US House of Representatives must be at least 25 years old, a US citizen for at least seven years, and be a legal inhabitant of the state that they represent. Senators must be at least 30 years old, an US citizen for at least nine years, and be a (legal) inhabitant of the state that they represent. The president and vice president must be at least 35 years old, a natural born US citizen, and a resident in the US for at least 14 years. It is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate the qualifications for a candidate appearing on a ballot paper, although in order to get onto the ballot, a candidate must often collect a legally defined number of signatures or meet other state-specific requirements. [3] A. Presidential electionsOverview of the presidential election process The presidential election process in the US follows a typical cycle as Table 1 shows. Table 1: US Presidential Election Cycle (source: USA In Brief: ELECTIONS. https://www.usa.gov/presidential-election-process) The president and the vice president in the US are elected together in a presidential election. It is an indirect election, with the winner being determined by votes cast by electors of the Electoral College. The winner of the election is the candidate with at least 270 Electoral College votes. It is possible for a candidate to win the electoral vote, but lose the nationwide popular vote (receive fewer votes nationwide than the second ranked candidate). This has happened five times in US history: in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. [4] Electoral College votes are cast by individual states by a group of electors; each elector casts one electoral college vote. Until the Twenty-third Amendment to the US Constitution in 1961, citizens from the District of Columbia did not have representation in the electoral college.  State laws regulate how states cast their electoral college votes. In all states except Nebraska and Maine, the candidate that wins the most votes in the state receives all its electoral college votes (a “winner takes all” system). From 1996 in Nebraska, and from 1972 in Maine, two electoral votes are awarded based on the winner of the statewide election, and the rest (three in Nebraska and two in Maine) go to the highest vote-winner in each of the state’s congressional districts. [5] The Electoral CollegeOverview of the Electoral College  In the US, the Electoral College is the group of presidential electors that is formed every four years for the sole purpose of voting for the president and vice president in the presidential election. This process is explained in Article Two of the US Constitution. The number of electors from each state is equal to that state’s congressional delegation which is the number of senators (two) plus the number of Representatives for that state. Each state appoints electors using legal procedures determined by its legislature. Federal office holders, including US senators and representatives, cannot be electors. In addition, the Twenty-third Amendment granted the federal District of Columbia three electors (bringing the total number from 535 to 538). A simple majority of electoral votes (270 or more) is required to elect the president and vice president. If no candidate receives a majority, a contingent election is held by the House of Representatives, to elect the president, and by the Senate, to elect the vice president. [6] The states and the District of Columbia hold a statewide or district-wide popular vote on Election Day in November to choose electors based upon how they have pledged to vote for president and vice president, with some state laws prohibiting faithless electors. All states except Nebraska and Maine use a party block voting, or general ticket method, to choose their electors, meaning all their electors go to one winning ticket. Nebraska and Maine choose one elector per congressional district and two electors for the ticket with the highest statewide vote. The electors meet and vote in December, and the inaugurations of the president and vice president take place in next January. The merit of the electoral college system has been a matter of ongoing debate in the US since its inception at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, becoming more controversial by the latter years of the 19th century, up to the present day. More resolutions have been submitted to amend the Electoral College mechanism than any other part of the US constitution. An amendment that would have abolished the system was approved by the House in 1969, but failed to move past the Senate. [7] Supporters of the Electoral College claim that it requires presidential candidates to have broad appeal across the country to win, while critics argue that it is not representative of the popular will of the nation. Procedure of Electoral College Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the US Constitution directs each state to appoint a number of electors equal to that state’s congressional delegation (two senators plus the number of members of the House of Representatives). The same clause empowers each state legislature to determine the manner by which that state’s electors are chosen but prohibits federal office holders from becoming electors. Following the national presidential election day on Tuesday after the first Monday in November, each state, and the federal district, selects its electors according to its laws. [8] After a popular election, the states identify and record their appointed electors in a Certificate of Ascertainment, and those appointed electors then meet in their respective jurisdictions and produce a Certificate of Vote for their candidate; both certificates are then sent to US Congress to be opened and counted. [9] In 48 of the 50 states, state laws mandate that the winner of the plurality of the statewide popular vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. In Nebraska and Maine, two electoral votes are assigned in this manner, while the remaining electoral votes are allocated based on the plurality of votes in each of their congressional districts. The federal district (Washington, D.C.) allocates its 3 electoral votes to the winner of its single district election. States generally require electors to pledge to vote for that state’s winning ticket; to prevent electors from being faithless electors, most states have adopted various laws to enforce the electors’ pledge. [10] The electors of each state meet in their respective state capital on the first Tuesday after the second Wednesday of December, between December 14 and 20, to cast their votes. The results are sent to and counted by the Congress, where they are tabulated in the first week of January before a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, presided over by the current vice president, who is the president of the Senate. [11] Should a majority of votes not be cast for a candidate, a contingent election takes place: the House of Representatives holds a presidential election session, where one vote is cast by each of the fifty states. The Senate is responsible for electing the vice president, with each senator having one vote. The elected president and vice president are inaugurated on January 20. Since 1964, there have been 538 electors. States select 535 of the electors, this number matches the aggregate total of their congressional delegations. [12] The additional three electors came from the Twenty-third Amendment, ratified in 1961, providing that the district established pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 as the seat of the federal government (namely, Washington, D.C.) is entitled to the same number of electors as the least populous state. In practice, that results in Washington D.C. being entitled to three electors. [13] Figure 1: Current number of presidential electors by state in US (Source: Wikipedia)B. Congressional electionsOverview of US Congress The US Congress is the legislative branch of the federal government of the United States. It is a bicameral legislature, including a lower body, the US House of Representatives, and an upper body, the US Senate. They both meet in the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. Members of Congress are chosen through direct election, though vacancies in the Senate may be filled by a governor’s appointment. As Figure 2 shows, Congress has a total of 535 voting members, a figure which includes 100 senators and 435 representatives. The vice president of the United States, as president of the Senate, has a vote in the Senate only when there is a tie. [14] Figure 2: Current US Congress Structure (Source: Wikipedia) Congress convenes for a two-year term (a Congress), commencing every other January. Each Congress is usually split into two sessions, one for each year. Elections are held every even-numbered year on Election Day. The members of the House of Representatives are elected for the two-year term of a Congress. The Reapportionment Act of 1929 established that there be 435 representatives, and the Uniform Congressional District Act requires that they be elected from single-member constituencies or districts. It is also required that the congressional districts be apportioned among states by population every ten years using the US census results, provided that each state has at least one congressional representative. Each senator is elected at-large in their state for a six-year term, with terms staggered, so every two years approximately one-third of the Senate is up for election. Each state, regardless of size and population, has two senators, so currently, there are 100 US senators for the 50 states. [15] Article One of the US Constitution requires that members of Congress be at least 25 years old for the House and at least 30 years old for the Senate, be a US citizen for seven years for the House and nine years for the Senate, and be an inhabitant of the state that they represent. Members in both chambers may run for re-election an unlimited number of times. [16] Figure 3: US House of Representatives Seats by State (source: Britannica) Congress was created by the US Constitution and first met in 1789, replacing the Congress of the Confederation in its legislative function. Although not legally mandated, in practice members of Congress since the late 19th century are typically affiliated with one of the two major political parties, the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, and only rarely with a third party or independents affiliated with no party. Members of Congress can also switch parties at any time, though this is uncommon. [17] Role & Power of US Congress Article One of the US Constitution states that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a US Congress, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” [18] The House and Senate are equal partners in the legislative process – legislation cannot be enacted without the consent of both chambers. The US Constitution grants each chamber some unique powers. The Senate ratifies treaties and approves presidential appointments while the House initiates revenue-raising bills. The House initiates and decides impeachment while the Senate votes on conviction and removal of office for impeachment cases. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is required before an impeached person is removed from office. [19] US Congress has authority over budgetary and financial policy through the enumerated power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.  The Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 extended congressional power of taxation to include income taxes without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. The US Constitution also grants Congress the exclusive power to appropriate funds, and this power of the purse is one of Congress’s primary checks on the executive branch of the United States. Congress can borrow money on the credit of the US, regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, and coin money. Generally, the Senate and the House of Representatives have equal legislative authority, although only the House may originate revenue and appropriation bills. [20] In addition, Congress has an important role in national defense, including the exclusive power to declare war, to raise and maintain the armed forces, and to make rules for the military. Some critics charge that the executive branch has usurped Congress’s constitutionally defined task of declaring war. While historically presidents initiated the process for going to war, they asked for and received formal war declarations from Congress for the War of 1812, the Spanish–American War, the Mexican–American War, World War I, and World War II, although President Theodore Roosevelt’s military move into Panama in 1903 did not get congressional approval. In 1993, Michael Kinsley wrote that “Congress’s war power has become the most flagrantly disregarded provision in the Constitution,” and that the “real erosion of Congress’s war power started after World War II.” Disagreement about the extent of congressional versus presidential power regarding war has been present from time to time throughout US history. [21] US Congress can establish post offices and post roads, issue patents and copyrights, fix standards of weights and measures, establish courts inferior to the US supreme court, and make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the US, or in any Department or officer thereof. Article Four gives US Congress the power to admit new states into the Union. One of Congress’s foremost non-legislative functions is the power to investigate and oversee the executive branch. Congressional oversight is usually delegated to committees and is facilitated by Congress’s subpoena power (see Tables 2 & 3). Some critics have charged that the US Congress has in some instances failed to do an adequate job of overseeing the other branches of government. In the Plame affair, critics including US Representative Henry A. Waxman charged that Congress was not doing an adequate job of oversight in this case. [22] Table 2: Major Senate committees (source: Wikipedia)Table 3: Major House committees (source: Wikipedia)Power of US Senate Senate approval is required to pass any federal legislation. The US Constitution provides several unique functions for the Senate that form its ability to “checks and balances” the powers of other elements of the federal government. These include the requirement that the Senate may advise and must consent to some of the president’s government appointments; the Senate must also consent to all treaties with foreign governments; it tries all impeachments, and it elects the vice president in the event no person receives a majority of the electoral votes. Legislation Bills may be introduced in either chamber of Congress. However, the Constitution’s Origination Clause provides that All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. [23] Accordingly, the Senate does not have the power to initiate bills imposing taxes. Moreover, the House of Representatives holds that the Senate does not have the power to originate appropriation bills, or bills authorizing the expenditure of federal funds. The constitutional provision barring the Senate from introducing revenue bills is based on the practice of the British Parliament, in which money bills approved by Parliament have originated in the House of Commons per constitutional convention. Although the US Constitution gave the House the power to initiate revenue bills, in practice the Senate is equal to the House in the respect of spending. As Woodrow Wilson wrote: [24] The Senate’s right to amend general appropriation bills has been allowed the widest possible scope. The Senate may add to them what it pleases; may go altogether outside of their original provisions and tack to them entirely new features of legislation, altering not only the amounts but also even the objects of expenditure, and making out of the materials sent them by the popular chamber measures of an almost totally new character. The approval of both chambers is required for any bill, including a revenue bill, to become law. Both the House and the Senate must pass the same version of the bill; if there are differences, they may be resolved by sending amendments back and forth or by a conference committee that includes members of both bodies. Appointment confirmations The president can make certain appointments only with the advice and consent of the Senate. Officials whose appointments require the Senate’s approval include members of the Cabinet, ambassadors, heads of most federal executive agencies, justices of the Supreme Court, and other federal judges.  The powers of the Senate concerning nominations are, however, subject to some constraints. For instance, the US Constitution provides that the president may make an appointment without the Senate’s advice and consent during a congressional recess. The recess appointment remains valid only temporarily; the office becomes vacant again at the end of the next congressional session. Nonetheless, presidents have frequently used recess appointments to circumvent the possibility that the Senate may reject the nominee. Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Myers v. United States, although the Senate’s advice and consent are required for the appointment of certain executive branch officials, it is not necessary for their removal. However, recess appointments have faced a significant amount of resistance and in 1960, the US Senate passed a legally non-binding resolution against recess appointments to the Supreme Court. [25] Treaty ratification Moreover, the Senate has a role in ratifying treaties. The US Constitution provides that the president may only “make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur” in order to benefit from the Senate’s advice and consent and give each state an equal vote in the process. However, not all international agreements are considered treaties under US domestic law, even if the agreements are considered treaties under international law. Congress has passed laws authorizing the president to conclude executive agreements without action by the Senate. In a similar way, the president may make congressional-executive agreements with the approval of a simple majority in each House of Congress, rather than a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Neither executive agreements nor congressional-executive agreements are mentioned in the Constitution, leading some scholars such as John Yoo and Laurence Tribe to suggest that they unconstitutionally circumvent the treaty-ratification process. However, US courts have upheld the validity of such agreements. [26] Impeachment trials  The US Constitution empowers the House of Representatives to impeach federal officials for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors” and empowers the Senate to try such impeachments. If the sitting president of the United States is being tried, the US chief justice presides over the trial. During an impeachment trial, senators are constitutionally required to sit on oath or affirmation. Conviction requires a two-thirds majority of the senators present. A convicted official is automatically removed from office. In addition, the Senate may stipulate that the defendant is banned from holding office. No further punishment is permitted during the impeachment proceedings; however, the party may face criminal penalties in a normal court of law. The House of Representatives has impeached sixteen government officials, of whom seven were convicted (one resigned before the Senate could complete the trial). Only three US presidents have been impeached: Andrew Johnson in 1868, Bill Clinton in 1998, and Donald Trump in 2019 and 2021. The trials of Johnson, Clinton and both Trump trials ended in acquittal; in Johnson’s case, the Senate fell one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction. [27] Election of the vice president Under the Twelfth Amendment, the Senate has the power to elect the vice president if a vice-presidential candidate does not receive a majority of votes in the Electoral College. The Twelfth Amendment requires the Senate to choose from the two candidates with the highest numbers of electoral votes. But Electoral College deadlocks are rare. The Senate has only broken a deadlock once; in 1837, it elected Richard Mentor Johnson. The House elects the president if the Electoral College deadlocks on that choice. [28] Power of US House of Representatives  The US House of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate all revenue bills, impeach federal officials, and elect the US president if the Electoral College is tied. Along with the Senate, it also shares the power to make laws. [29] The organization and character of the House of Representatives have evolved under the influence of political parties, which provide a means of controlling proceedings and mobilizing the necessary majorities. Party leaders, such as the majority and minority leaders, as well as the speaker of the House, play a central role in the operations of the House. However, party discipline (for example, the tendency of all members of a political party to vote in the same way) has not always been strong due to the fact that House members, who must face reelection every two years, often vote the interests of their districts rather than their political party when the two diverge. A further dominating element of House organization is the committee system, under which the membership is divided into specialized groups for purposes such as preparing bills for the consideration of the entire House, regulating House procedure, and holding hearings. Each committee is chaired by a member of the majority party. Almost all bills are first referred to a committee, and ordinarily the full House cannot act on a bill until the committee has “reported” it for floor action. There are approximately 20 standing committees, organized mainly around major policy areas, each having subcommittees, staffs, and budgets. They may hold hearings on questions of public interest, propose legislation that has not been formally introduced as a bill or resolution, and conduct investigations. Among important standing committees are those on appropriations, on ways and means (which handles matters related to finance), and on rules. In addition, there are select and special committees, which are usually appointed for a specific project and for a limited period of time. The committees also play an important role in the control exercised by Congress over governmental agencies. Cabinet officers and other officials are frequently summoned before the committees to explain policy. The US Constitution (Article I, section 6) prohibits members of Congress from holding offices in the executive branch of government—a major difference between parliamentary and congressional forms of government. [30] 2. State elections Overview State laws and state constitutions, controlled by state legislatures regulate elections at state level and local level. Various officials at the state level are elected. Since the separation of powers applies to states as well as the federal government, state legislatures and the executive (for example, the governor) are elected separately. Governors and lieutenant governors are elected in all states, in some states on a joint ticket and in some states separately, some separately in different electoral cycles. The governors of the territories of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands are also elected. In some states, executive positions such as Secretary of State and Attorney General are also elected offices. All members of state legislatures and territorial jurisdiction legislatures are elected. In some states, members of the state supreme court and other members of the state judiciary are elected. Proposals to amend the state constitution are also placed on the ballot in some states. [31] As a matter of cost saving and convenience, elections for many of these state and local offices are held at the same time as either the federal presidential or mid-term elections. There are a handful of states, however, that hold their elections during odd-numbered “off years.” Governors  As state managers, governors are mainly responsible for implementing state laws and overseeing the operation of the state executive branch. As state leaders, governors advance and pursue new and revised programs and policies using a variety of tools, among them executive orders, executive budgets, and legislative proposals and vetoes. As chiefs of the state, governors serve as the intergovernmental liaison to the federal government on behalf of the state. [32] Governors carry out their management and leadership responsibilities and objectives with the support and assistance of agency & department heads, many of whom they are empowered to appoint. A majority of governors have the power to appoint state court judges as well, in most cases from a list of names submitted by a nominations committee. Although governors have many roles and responsibilities in common, the scope of gubernatorial power varies from state to state in accordance with state constitutions, legislation, and tradition. Governors often are ranked by political historians and other observers of state politics according to the extent and number of their powers. States, commonwealths, or territories vary with respect to minimum age, US citizenship, and state residency requirements for gubernatorial candidates and other state office holders. The minimum age requirement for governors ranges from no formal provision to age 35. The requirement of US citizenship for gubernatorial candidates ranges from no formal provision to 20 years. State residency requirements range from no formal provision to 7 years. [33] State legislature  In the United States, the state legislature is the legislative branch in each of the 50 US states. A legislature generally performs state duties for a state in the same way that the US Congress performs national duties at the national level. Generally, the same system of checks and balances at the federal level also exists between the state legislature, the state executive officer (governor) and the state judiciary. In 27 states, the legislature is called the legislature or state legislature. In other 19 states, the legislature is called the general assembly. In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the legislature is called the general court, while North Dakota and Oregon designate the legislature the legislative assembly. [34] The responsibilities of a state legislature vary from state to state, depending on the state’s constitution. The primary function of any legislature is to make laws. State legislatures also approve budgets for state government. They may establish government agencies, set their policies, and approve their budgets. For example, a state legislature could establish an agency to manage environmental conservation efforts within that state. In some states, state legislators elect other state officials. State legislatures often have the power to regulate businesses operating within their jurisdiction. They also regulate courts within their jurisdiction. This includes determining types of cases that can be heard, regulating attorney conduct, and setting court fees.With respect to other responsibilities of a state legislature, under the terms of Article V of the US Constitution, state lawmakers have the power to ratify Constitutional amendments which have been proposed by both houses of Congress and they also retain the ability to call for a national convention to propose amendments to the US Constitution. [35] After the convention has concluded its business, 75% of the states will ratify what the convention has proposed. Under Article II, state legislatures choose the manner of appointing the state’s presidential electors. In the past, some state legislatures appointed the US Senators from their respective states until the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913 required the direct election of senators by the state’s voters. Sometimes what the legislature wishes to achieve cannot be done simply by the passage of a bill, but rather requires amending the state constitution. Each state has specified steps intended to make it difficult to revise the constitution without the sufficient support of either the legislature, or the people, or both. Organization All states except Nebraska have a bicameral legislature. The smaller chamber is called the senate, usually referred to as the upper house. This chamber usually has the exclusive power to confirm appointments made by the governor and to try articles of impeachment. (In a few states, a separate executive council, composed of members elected from large districts, performs the confirmation procedures.) Nebraska originally had a bicameral legislature like other states, but the lower house was abolished following a referendum, effective with the 1936 elections. The remaining unicameral (one-chamber) legislature is called the Nebraska Legislature, but its members are called state senators. During the 20th century, state legislatures further emulated the activities and structures of the US Congress as institutions at both levels grew in size and complexity, often accompanied by increases in staffing and member pay. While most state legislatures remain part-time institutions, a handful of states have expanded theirs to meet year-round. [36] Local elections At the local level, county and city government positions are usually filled by election, in particular within the legislative branch. The extent to which offices in the executive or judicial branches are elected vary from city-to-city or county-to-county. Some examples of local elected positions include sheriffs at the county level and mayors and school board members at the city level. Like state elections, an election for a specific local office may take place at the same time as either the presidential, mid-term, or off-year elections. III. Features of US electoral system Voting methods A number of voting methods are used within the various jurisdictions in the US, the most common of which is the first-past-the-post system. In the first-past-the-post system, the highest-polling candidate wins the election. Under this system, a candidate who achieves a plurality (that is, the most) of votes wins. But the State of Georgia uses a two-round system, where if no candidate receives a majority of votes, then there is a runoff between the two highest polling candidates. [37] Since 2002, several cities such as Burlington in Vermont have adopted instant-runoff voting. Voters rank the candidates in order of preference rather than voting for a single candidate. Under this system, if no candidate receives more than half of votes cast, then the lowest polling candidate is eliminated, and their votes are distributed to the next preferred candidates. This process continues until one candidate receives more than half the votes. In 2016, Maine became the first state to adopt instant-runoff voting (known as ranked-choice voting) statewide for its elections, although due to state constitutional provisions, the system is only used for federal elections and state primaries. [38] Figure 4: US voting methods (source: Wikipedia)Eligibility The eligibility of an individual for voting is set out in the US constitution and also regulated at state level. The constitution states that suffrage cannot be denied on grounds of color, race, sex, or age for citizens eighteen years or older. Beyond these basic qualifications, it is the responsibility of state legislatures to regulate voter eligibility. Some states ban convicted criminals, especially felons, from voting for a fixed period of time or indefinitely. The number of adults in the US who are currently or permanently ineligible to vote due to felony convictions is estimated to be 5.3 million. In addition, some states have legacy constitutional statements barring those legally declared incompetent from voting; such references are generally considered obsolete and are being considered for review or removal where they appear. [39] About 4.3 million US citizens that reside in Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico and other US territories do not have the same level of federal representation as those that live in the 50 US states. These areas only have non-voting members in the US House of Representatives and no representation in the US Senate. Citizens in the US territories are also not represented in the Electoral College and therefore cannot vote for the US President. [40] Those in Washington, D.C. are allowed to vote for the president because of the Twenty-third Amendment. Voter registration While the federal government has jurisdiction over federal elections, most election laws are decided at the state level. All US states except North Dakota require that citizens who wish to vote be registered. In many states, voter registration takes place at the county or municipal level. Traditionally, voters had to register directly at state or local offices to vote, but in the mid-1990s, the federal government made a lot of efforts to make registering easier, in an attempt to increase turnout. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the “Motor Voter” law) required state governments that receive certain types of federal funding to make the voter registration process easier by providing uniform registration services through drivers’ license registration centers, disability centers, libraries, schools, and mail-in registration. Other states allow citizens same-day registration on election day. An estimated 50 million Americans are unregistered. It has been reported that registering to vote poses greater obstacles for low-income citizens, Native Americans, racial minorities and linguistic minorities, and persons with disabilities. International election observers have called on US authorities to implement measures to correct the problems of the high number of unregistered citizens. [41] In many states, citizens registering to vote may declare an affiliation with a political party. This declaration of affiliation does not cost money, and does not make the citizen a dues-paying member of a party. A political party cannot prevent a voter from declaring his or her affiliation with the party, but it can refuse requests for full membership. In some states, only voters affiliated with a political party may vote in that party’s primary elections. Declaring a party affiliation is never required. Some states, including Georgia, Virginia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington, practice non-partisan registration. [42] Non-citizen voting Federal law prohibits non-citizens from voting in federal elections. As of 2024, 7 state constitutions specifically state that “only” a citizen can vote in elections at any level in that state: Florida, Alabama, Arizona, North Dakota, Colorado, Louisiana, and Ohio. [43] Absentee and mail voting Voters unable or unwilling to vote at polling stations on election day may vote via absentee ballots, depending on state law. Originally these ballots were for people who could not go to the polling place on the election day. Now some states let them be used for convenience, but state laws still call them absentee ballots. Absentee ballots can be sent and returned by mail, or requested and submitted in person, or dropped off in locked boxes. About half the states and territories allow “no excuse absentee,” where no reason is required to request an absentee ballot; other states require a valid reason, such as travel or infirmity. Some states let voters with permanent disabilities apply for permanent absentee voter status, and some other states let all citizens apply for permanent status, so they will automatically receive an absentee ballot for each election. Otherwise a voter must request an absentee ballot before the election takes place. [44] In Colorado, Utah, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington state, all ballots are delivered through the mail; in many other states there are counties or certain small elections where everyone votes by mail. [45] As of July 2020, 26 states allow designated agents to collect and submit ballots on behalf of another voter, whose identities are specified on a signed application. Such agents are usually family members or persons from the same residence. 13 states neither enable nor prohibit ballot collection as a matter of law. Among those that allow it, 12 states have limits on how many ballots an agent may collect. Americans living outside the US, including active duty members of the armed forces stationed outside of their state of residency, may register and vote under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). Almost half the states require these ballots to be returned by mail. Other states allow mail along with some combination of e-mail or fax; four states allow a web portal. [46] A significant measure to prevent some types of fraud has been to require the voter’s signature on the outer envelope, which is compared to one or more signatures on file before taking the ballot out of the envelope and counting it. Not all states have standards for signature review. There have been concerns that signatures are improperly rejected from young and minority voters at higher rates than others, with no or limited ability of voters to appeal the rejection. For other types of errors, experts estimate that while there is more fraud with absentee ballots than in-person voting, absentee ballots have affected only a few local elections. [47] Following the US presidential election in 2020, amid disputes of its outcome, as a rationale behind litigation demanding a halt to official vote counting in some areas, allegations were made that vote counting is offshored. Former Trump Administration official Chris Krebs, head of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) during the election, said in a December 2020 interview that, “All votes in the United States of America are counted in the United States of America.” [48] One documented trend is that in-person votes and early votes are more likely to lean to the Republican Party, while the provisional ballots, which are counted later, trend to the Democratic Party. This phenomenon is known as blue shift, and has led to situations where Republicans were winning on the election night only to be overtaken by Democrats after all votes were counted. But Foley did not find that mail-in or absentee votes favored either party. [49] Early voting Early voting is a formal process where voters can cast their ballots before the official election day. Early voting in person is allowed in 47 states and in Washington, D.C., with no excuse required. Only Alabama, New Hampshire and Oregon do not allow early voting, while some counties in Idaho do not allow it. [50] Voting equipment The earliest voting in the US was through paper ballots that were hand-counted. By the late 1800s, paper ballots printed by election officials were nearly universal. By 1980, 10% of American voters used paper ballots that were counted by hand, and then dropped below 1% by 2008. [51] Mechanical voting machines were first used in the US in the 1892 elections in Lockport, New York. Massachusetts was one of the first states to adopt lever voting machines, doing so in 1899, but the state’s Supreme Court ruled their usage unconstitutional in 1907. Lever machines grew in popularity despite controversies, with about two-thirds of votes for president in the 1964 US presidential election cast with lever machines. Lever machine use declined to about 40% of votes in 1980, then 6% in 2008. Punch card voting equipment was developed in the 1960s, with about one-third of votes cast with punch cards in 1980. New York was the last state to phase out lever voting in response to the 2000 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) that allocated funds for the replacement of lever machine and punch card voting equipment. New York replaced its lever voting with optical scanning in 2010. In the 1960s, technology was developed that enabled paper ballots filled with pencil or ink to be optically scanned rather than hand-counted. In 1980, about 2% of votes used optical scanning; this increased to 30% by 2000 and then 60% by 2008. In the 1970s, the final major voting technology for the US was developed, the DRE voting machine. In 1980, less than 1% of ballots were cast with DRE machines. Prevalence grew to 10% in 2000, and then peaked at 38% in 2006. Because DREs are fully digital, with no paper trail of votes, backlash against them caused prevalence to drop to 33% in 2010. [52] The voting equipment used by a given US county is related to the county's historical wealth. A county’s use of punch cards in the year 2000 was positively correlated with the county’s wealth in 1969, when punch card machines were at their peak of popularity. Counties with higher wealth in 1989 were less likely to use punch cards in 2000. This supports the idea that punch cards were used in counties that were well-off in the 1960s, but whose wealth declined in the proceeding decades. Counties that maintained their wealth from the 1960s onwards could afford to replace punch card machines as they fell out of favor. [53] Multiple levels of regulation Elections in the US are actually conducted by local authorities, working under local, state, and federal law and regulation, as well as the US Constitution. It is a highly decentralized system. The secretary of state in about half of US states is the official in charge of elections; in other states it is someone appointed for the job, or a commission. It is this person or commission who is responsible for certifying, tabulating, and reporting votes for the state. Ballot access Ballot access refers to the laws which regulate under what conditions access is granted for a candidate or political party to appear on voters’ ballots. Each state has its own ballot access laws to determine who may appear on ballots and who may not. According to Article I, Section 4, of the US Constitution, the authority to regulate the place, time, and manner of federal elections is up to each state, unless Congress legislates otherwise. Depending on the office and the state, it may be possible for a voter to cast a write-in vote for a candidate whose name does not appear on the ballot, but it is extremely rare for such a candidate to win office. [54] Primaries and caucuses In partisan elections, candidates are chosen by primary elections and caucuses in the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands. [55] A primary election is an election in which registered voters in a jurisdiction (nominating primary) select a political party’s candidate for a later election. There are various types of primary: either the whole electorate is eligible, and voters choose one political party’s primary at the polling booth (an open primary); or only independent voters can choose a party’s primary at the polling booth (a semi-closed primary); or only registered members of the political party are allowed to vote (closed primary). The blanket primary, when voters could vote for all parties’ primaries on the same ballot was struck down by the US Supreme Court as violating the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of assembly in the case California Democratic Party v. Jones. In addition, primaries are used to select candidates at the state level, for example, in gubernatorial elections. Caucuses also nominate candidates by election, but they are very different from primaries. Caucuses are meetings that occur at precincts and involve discussion of each political party’s platform and issues such as voter turnout in addition to voting. Eleven states: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia use caucuses, for one or more political parties. [56] The primary and caucus season in presidential elections lasts from the Iowa caucus in January to the last primaries in June. Front-loading – when larger numbers of contests take place in the opening weeks of the season—can have an impact on the nomination process, potentially reducing the number of realistic candidates, as fund-raisers and donors quickly abandon those who they see as untenable. However, it is not the case that the successful candidate is always the candidate who does the best in the early primaries. There is also a period dubbed the “invisible primary” that takes place before the primary season, when candidates attempt to solicit media coverage and funding well before the real primary season begins. A state’s presidential primary election or caucus usually is an indirect election: instead of voters directly selecting a particular person running for president, it determines how many delegates each party’s national political convention will receive from their respective state. These delegates then in turn select their party’s presidential nominee. Held in the summer, a political convention’s purpose is also to adopt a statement of the political party’s principles and goals known as the platform and adopt the rules for the party’s activities. [57] The day on which primaries are held for congressional seats, and state and local offices may also vary from state to state. The only federally mandated day for elections is the election day for the general elections of the president and Congress; all other elections are at the discretion of the individual state and local governments. Criticism and concernsA. Voter suppression and subversion Voting laws and procedures between the states vary as a consequence of the decentralized system, including those pertaining to voter IDs, voter registration, provisional ballots, postal voting, voting machines and vote counting, felony disenfranchisement, and election recounts. Thus the voting rights or voter suppression in one state may be stricter or more lenient than another state. After the 2020 US presidential election, decentralized administration and inconsistent state voting laws and processes have shown themselves to be targets for voter subversion schemes enabled by appointing politically motivated actors to election administration roles with degrees of freedom to subvert the will of the people. One such scheme would allow these election officials to appoint a slate of “alternate electors” to skew operations of the electoral college in favor of a minority political party. [58] B. Vote counting time As detailed in a state-by-state breakdown, the US has a long-standing tradition of publicly announcing the incomplete, unofficial vote counts on election night (the late evening of election day), and declaring unofficial “projected winners,” despite that many of the mail-in and absentee votes have not been counted yet. In some states, in fact, none of them have yet been counted by that time. This tradition was based on the assumption that the incomplete, unofficial count on the election night is probably going to match the official count, which is officially finished and certified several weeks later. A basic weakness of this assumption, and of the tradition of premature announcements based on it, is that the general public is likely to misapprehend that these particular “projected winning” candidates have certainly won before any official vote count has been completed, whereas in fact all that is truly known is that those candidates have some degree of likelihood of having won the election; the magnitude of the likelihood (all the way from very reliable to not reliable at all) varies by state because the details of election procedures vary from state to state. This problem has impacts on all non–in-person votes, even those cast weeks before election day—not just late-arriving ones. [59] C. Structural problems In 2014, political scientists from Princeton University did a study on the influence of the so-called “elite,” and their derived power from special interest lobbying, versus the “ordinary” US citizen within the US political system. These scientists found that the US looked more like an oligarchy than a real representative democracy; thus eroding a government of the people, by the people, for the people as stated by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address. In fact, they found that average citizens had an almost nonexistent influence on public policies and that the ordinary citizen had little or no independent influence on policy at all. [60] Sanford Levinson claims that next to the fact that campaign financing and gerrymandering are seen as serious problems for democracy, also one of the root causes of the American democratic deficit lies in the US Constitution itself. For example, there is a lack of proportional representation in the Senate for highly populated states like California, as regardless of population all states are given two seats in the Senate. [61] Partisan election officials in the US can give an appearance of unfairness, even when there are very few issues, especially when an election official like a secretary of state runs for an election that they are overseeing. Richard Hasen claimed that the US is the only advanced democracy that lets partisan officials oversee elections, and that switching to a nonpartisan model would improve trust, participation and effectiveness of the elections. [62] The Electoral College has been criticized by some people for being undemocratic (it can select a candidate who did not win the popular vote) and for encouraging campaigns to mainly focus on swing states, as well for giving more power to smaller states with less electoral votes as they have a smaller population per electoral vote compared to more populated states. This can be seen through one electoral college vote representing 622,000 voters in California, compared to one electoral college vote representing 195,000 voters in Wyoming. [63] The first-past-the-post system has also been criticized for creating a de facto pure two-party system (as postulated in Duverger’s law) that suppresses voices that do not hold views consistent with the largest faction in a major political party, as well as limiting voters’ choices in elections. [64] IV. Comparison of US Electoral System with Mexican and Canadian electoral systems US electoral system has both similarities and differences with Canadian and Mexican systems. All of three countries have federal systems and bicameral legislatures. All elections in these three countries are on a fixed schedule. In addition, Us and Canada have first-the-post voting systems.  However, there are many differences among these three countries. The elections in Canada and Mexico are managed and administered by a national election agency. Thus elections in both Canada and Mexico are carried out the same way across the country. By contrast, elections in the US are managed and carried out by each state in different ways. The biggest difference is that unlike Canada and Mexico, the US elect the head of government (President) though the Electoral College. In addition, unlike the US and Canada, Mexico has a hybrid system across first-past-the-post voting (single-member district), party-list proportional representation, and/or mixed-member proportional representation. Moreover, unlike Mexican members of Congress, members of US congress do not have term limits. Table 4, 5, and 6 show the similarities and differences among the US, Canada, and Mexican electoral systems. Table 4: Federal elections comparison, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 5: Federal elections comparison II, US vs Canada (Elections Canada, 2025)Table 6: Comparison of Federal elections, US vs Mexico (source: Wikipedia)Table 7: Political parties in the Mexican Senate (source: Wikipedia)Table 8: Political parties in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (source: Wikipedia) V. Conclusion This paper explained US electoral systems and its features. The paper also explained federal elections in the US, including presidential and congressional and state elections, including local elections. In addition, the paper described the power and role of the US Congress. Moreover, this paper compared US electoral systems with Canadian and Mexican systems and showed the similarities and differences among these three countries’ electoral systems.  Referencias [1] "Elections & Voting". whitehouse.gov. April 2, 2015. [2] For more information, see Wikipedia [3] "Constitutional requirements for presidential candidates | USAGov". www.usa.gov. [4] "Electoral College History". National Archives. November 18, 2019. [5] "Maine & Nebraska". FairVote. Retrieved December 31, 2023. [6] For more information, see Wikipedia [7] Ziblatt, Daniel; Levitsky, Steven (September 5, 2023). "How American Democracy Fell So Far Behind". The Atlantic. [8] Statutes at Large, 28th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 721. [9] Neale, Thomas H. (January 17, 2021). "The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline". Congressional Research Service. [10] "Faithless Elector State Laws". Fair Vote. July 7, 2020. [11] Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session, Including Objections by Members of Congress (Report). Congressional Research Service. December 8, 2020. [12] Neale, Thomas H. (May 15, 2017). "The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections" (PDF). CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. p. 13. [13] Murriel, Maria (November 1, 2016). "Millions of Americans can’t vote for president because of where they live". PRI's The World. [14] For more information, see Wikipedia [15] For more information, see Wikipedia [16] For more information, see Wikipedia [17] For more information, see Wikipedia [18] For more information, see Wikipedia [19] John V. Sullivan (July 24, 2007). "How Our Laws Are Made". U.S. House of Representatives. Archived from the original on May 5, 2020. [20] Davidson, Roger H. & Walter J. Oleszek (2006). Congress and Its Members (10th ed.). Congressional Quarterly (CQ) Press. [21] "The Law: The President's War Powers". Time. June 1, 1970. [22] David S. Broder (March 18, 2007). "Congress's Oversight Offensive". The Washington Post. [23] "Constitution of the United States". Senate.gov. [24] Wilson Congressional Government, Chapter III: "Revenue and Supply". Text common to all printings or "editions"; in Papers of Woodrow Wilson it is Vol.4 (1968), p.91 [25] Pyser, Steven M. (January 2006). "Recess Appointments To The Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitutional Transformation Of Senate Advice And Consent". Journal of Constitutional Law. 8 (1): 61–114. [26] For an example, and a discussion of the literature, see Laurence Tribe, "Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation [27] "Complete list of impeachment trials". United States Senate. Archived from the original on December 2, 2010. [28] For more information, see Wikipedia [29] For more information, see Britannica [30] The Legislative Branch Archived January 20, 2013, at the Wayback Machine, The White House. [31] For more information, see Wikipedia [32] For more information, see Wikipedia [33] See https://www.nga.org/governors/powers-and-authority/ [34] For more information, see Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_legislature_(United_States) [35] For more information, see Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_legislature_(United_States) [36] "States with a full-time legislature". Ballotpedia. Retrieved September 25, 2025. [37] Dunleavy, Patrick; Diwakar, Rekha (2013). "Analysing multiparty competition in plurality rule elections" (PDF). Party Politics. 19 (6): 855–886. [38] For more information, see Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_U nited_States [39] DeFalco, Beth (January 9, 2007). "New Jersey to take 'idiots,' 'insane' out of state constitution?". Delaware News-Journal [40] Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), "ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report" VIII. Voting Rights, p. 13. [41] Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), "ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report" IX. Voter Registration, p. 12-13 [42] "Voter Registration Resources". Project Vote Smart. Archived from the original on October 30, 2011 [43] "Louisiana Amendment 1, Citizen Requirement for Voting Measure (December 2022)". Ballotpedia. [44] "Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options". www.ncsl.org. [45] "VOPP: Table 18: States With All-Mail Elections". www.ncsl.org. Retrieved July 2, 2020. [46] "Electronic Transmission of Ballots". www.ncsl.org. [47] "Who Can Vote? - A News21 2012 National Project". [48] Krebs, Christopher Cox (November 29, 2020). "Fired director of U.S. cyber agency Chris Krebs explains why President Trump's claims of election interference are false". [49] Graham, David A. (August 10, 2020). "The 'Blue Shift' Will Decide the Election". The Atlantic [50] "Early Voting Calendar - Vote.org". www.vote.org. [51] Stewart, Charles (2011). "Voting Technologies". Annual Review of Political Science. 14: 353–378. [52] Stewart, Charles (2011). "Voting Technologies". Annual Review of Political Science. 14: 353–378. [53] Stewart, Charles (2011). "Voting Technologies". Annual Review of Political Science. 14: 353–378. [54] For more information, see Wikipedia [55] see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_United_States [56] see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_United_States [57] see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_United_States [58] Stanton, Zack (September 26, 2021), "What If 2020 Was Just a Rehearsal?", Politico [59] Parlapiano, Alicia (October 29, 2020), "The Upshot: How Long Will Vote Counting Take? Estimates and Deadlines in All 50 States", The New York Times, [60] Gilens, Martin; Page, Benjamin I. (September 1, 2014). "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens". Perspectives on Politics. 12 (3): 564–581. [61] Sanford Levinson (LA Times article available on website) (October 16, 2006). "Our Broken Constitution". University of Texas School of Law -- News & Events. [62] Hasen, Richard L. (2020). "Chapter 2". Election meltdown: dirty tricks, distrust, and the threat to American democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press [63] "Representation in the Electoral College: How do states compare?". USAFacts. [64] McDonough, Bryanne (November 4, 2016). "Our Elections Are Stupid: How to Make Them Less Dumb". Reporter.

Diplomacy
President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal, Thursday, October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Between Tactical Easing and Strategic Confrontation: The Busan Moment in China-US Relations

by Bo Ma , Yiyi Xu

On 30 October 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan. The encounter marked a cautious “tentative reengagement” after six years of sustained friction, signalling neither a diplomatic thaw nor a substantive breakthrough, but a forced recalibration. Both sides recognised that prolonged confrontation was increasingly costly, yet neither was willing to display strategic vulnerability or compromise on core interests. The central challenge of this “six-year reunion” was how to balance unavoidable competition with limited cooperation. The Busan meeting did not resolve long-standing disputes, but it did illuminate the evolving structure of bilateral engagement: limited economic de-escalation coexisting with sustained tensions in security and technology. Trust remained thin, and risk management defined the tone. Within this framework of cautious interaction and enduring rivalry, both sides resumed dialogue while leaving key structural contradictions unresolved. Tactical Easing: A “Mutual Ceasefire” over Rare Earths and Tariffs Building on preliminary understandings reached during earlier Kuala Lumpur discussions, the Busan meeting yielded limited but concrete outcomes. Washington agreed to suspend part of its planned tariff increases and delay the expansion of export restrictions. Beijing, in turn, postponed implementation of newly announced controls on rare earth elements and related technologies. These reciprocal measures were explicitly time-limited, with a one-year horizon.While framed as mutual concessions, the steps reflected pragmatic political calculations within each country’s domestic context. President Trump sought short-term economic calm to support financial markets and reassure key Midwestern constituencies ahead of the election cycle. Beijing, for its part, aimed to preserve a stable external environment through managed openness, gaining room for continued economic restructuring and technological adaptation. Yet the truce was fragile. China’s decision to delay export controls was not a concession but a strategic withholding of leverage. As the supplier of roughly 60 percent of the world’s mined rare earths – critical to semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and US defence platforms such as the F-35—Beijing retains significant influence over global supply chains. The Busan easing was therefore less a structural breakthrough than a tactical pause: a deferral of escalation rather than a resolution of underlying tensions. Diplomatic Silence over Taiwan: Strategic Caution and Latent Risks The Busan meeting made no reference to the Taiwan issue—an omission that is rare in the history of China–US summitry. Following the talks, President Trump remarked that President Xi “understands the consequences” of attempting to seize Taiwan but declined to clarify whether the United States would intervene militarily. Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly emphasised that Washington would not trade Taiwan’s interests for economic concessions. Taiwan thus became the “elephant in the room”: too consequential to ignore, yet too politically volatile to confront directly. For Beijing, Taiwan constitutes an inviolable sovereignty red line. For Trump, raising the issue risked derailing trade-focused dialogue and undermining his image of diplomatic control. Both leaders chose strategic silence as a means of avoiding escalation. This silence did not indicate convergence, but rather mutual restraint under high pressure. Taiwan has become a latent variable in every round of China–US engagement: absent from formal discussions, yet structurally embedded in the broader strategic equation. The longer it is avoided, the more its political cost accrues. In the future, renewed tensions—whether triggered by trade disputes or maritime incidents in the South China Seas—could rapidly return Taiwan to the center of bilateral confrontation. Taiwan’s “absence” in Busan does not reduce its relevance; it only signals that the crisis has been temporarily displaced from public diplomacy rather than defused. Institutionalised Decoupling: From Policy Choice to Structural Reality The diplomatic silence over Taiwan reflected tactical caution, while at a deeper level, the Busan meeting underscored the entrenched technological and institutional divergence between China and the United States. Trump signalled that US firms such as NVIDIA might engage in selective transactions involving mid-range AI chips, but reaffirmed that the most advanced semiconductor products would remain tightly restricted. This reaffirmed Washington’s “technology defense logic,” in which high-tech rivalry is governed by national security imperatives rather than market access concerns. In Beijing’s view, technological self-sufficiency is equally central to national resilience and regime security. Both sides now frame their strategic contest as a “struggle over national trajectory,” where concession is viewed as structural vulnerability. As a result, each is doubling down on domestic institutional insulation rather than pursuing negotiated guardrails. This bifurcation has produced a dual trajectory: modest stabilisation in trade flows paired with accelerating fragmentation in high-end technologies. Both governments are using this brief “technological cooldown” to advance structural measures. Washington is deepening coordination with allies and expanding export control and investment screening regimes. Beijing, for its part, is formulating new legal instruments—including draft frameworks akin to a Science and Technology Security Law and prospective regulations on critical technologies—to consolidate oversight over strategic sectors. While these initiatives are not yet fully codified, they reflect a clear intent to embed technology governance within national security architecture. In this context, technology has lost its value as a bargaining lever in diplomacy. Both sides tacitly acknowledge that strategic technologies can no longer be traded without compromising sovereignty. Technological decoupling has thus evolved from a temporary response into a systemic condition. The Busan “easing” did not reflect progress toward convergence, but rather a managed pause in an increasingly institutionalised contest. From High-Intensity Confrontation to Managed Competition The Busan meeting marked a shift in China–US relations from high-intensity confrontation to limited management. The two sides temporarily stabilised trade and exercised restraint on political and security fronts, while competition in technological and institutional domains remained entrenched. This was not reconciliation, nor a turning point, but the formation of a provisional equilibrium. For China, Busan offered a space for economic adjustment and accelerated efforts toward technological autonomy. For the United States, it maintained strategic pressure while averting short-term escalation. Beneath the optics of diplomacy, structural divergence and strategic mistrust persist. Across the Indo-Pacific, this “uneasy coexistence” is increasingly becoming the regional default. The significance of Busan lies not in concrete outcomes, but in the shared recognition that strategic confrontation must be managed, even if it cannot yet be resolved. This article was published under a Creative Commons license and may be republished with attribution, check original source for more information.

Defense & Security
Soldier UAV operator launches army drone with bomb to drop into enemy fortifications and trenches. Concept using military robots in modern warfare.

Unmanned aerial vehicle: geopolitical influence, industrial potential and future perspectives

by World & New World Journal

Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. The War Zone (TWZ). https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-creates-new-military-branch-dedicated-to-drone-warfare Amazon. (2023). Prime Air: The Future of Drone Delivery. Amazon Corporate Publications. Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Age of Drones. Council on Foreign Relations. Deloitte. (2022). Drones in Industrial Operations: Transforming Asset Inspection and Performance. Deloitte Insights. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2023). Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System. U.S. Department of Transportation. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2025). Drones. https://www.faa.gov/uas Fischer, S. (2020). China’s Military–Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Washington. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kania, E. B. (2020). Learning Warfare from the Laboratory: China’s Progress in Military Innovation. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Kesteloo, H. (2025, September 29). Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). (2023). Autonomous Delivery Networks and Future Logistics. Wing Technical Publications. Zipline. (2022). Operational Impact of Automated Medical Delivery by Drone. Zipline International Case Studies.

Energy & Economics
Automated AI industry robot and robotic arms assembly in factory production. Concept of artificial intelligence for industrial revolution and automation manufacturing process NLP

Seven emerging technologies shaping the future of sustainability and innovation

by World & New World Journal

Introduction Technological innovation is accelerating at an unprecedented pace, reshaping how societies generate energy, transport people and goods, produce food, fight disease, and explore space. Across multiple sectors, groundbreaking solutions are emerging in response to global challenges such as climate change, public health threats, energy insecurity, and resource scarcity. This article examines seven transformative technologies — from wireless electric-vehicle charging roads and regenerative ocean farming to graphene applications and disease-eliminating robots — each demonstrating how science and engineering are redefining sustainability, resilience, and human capability in the 21st century. 1. Wireless Electric Vehicles Charging Roads Electric Vehicles (EVs) have become key technology to decarbonise road transport, a sector that accounts for over 15% of global energy-related emissions. The increase of their sales globally exceeded 17 million in 2024, and it is forecasted to surpass the 20 million units by 2025. (IEA, 2025) Source: IEA analysis based on country submissions and data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO), EV Volumes and Marklines. Despite this growth, several concerns continue to slow down their widespread adoption. Limited charging infrastructure, battery-related autonomy issues, high purchase costs, slow charging times, and the environmental impact of the battery productions remain major obstacle. The broader EV industry, however, is actively developing new technologies to overcome these challenges. (Automotive Technology, 2025) In this context, one of the most pressing challenges is energy supply – specifically, the need for better batteries and more accessible charging points. To address this bottleneck, a promising new trend has emerged: wireless roads capable of charging EVs while they drive. This technology could fundamentally transform the charging experience and significantly reduce dependence on stationary chargers. The idea is simple, a system that supplies power to EVs while driving, using embedded inductive coils (wireless charging) or conductive rails on the road, in other words a dynamic or in-motion charging on the road. In fact, this technology already exists and there are several examples worth mentioning: - South Korea: introduced in 2013, the first road-powered electric vehicle network, in which electrical cables were buried below the surface and wirelessly transfer energy to the electric vehicles via magnetic resonance. An electrified road has the advantage of eliminating the plug-in infrastructure and vehicles usually require a smaller battery, reducing weight and energy consumption. In 2009, KAIST introduced the OLEV (online electric vehicle), a type of EV that uses wireless dynamic charging through inductive coils embedded in the road. The OLEV public transport buses were later used in the 2013 first electric road in the city of Gumi, which consisted of a network of 24 km, by 2015 the number of OLEV buses increased to 12 (Anthony, 2013) and another bus line was launched in Sejong that same year. (SKinno News, 2021)- Sweden: a 1.6 km road linking Stockholm Arlanda airport to a logistic site outside the capital city was a pilot project achieved in 2016. (The Guardian, 2018), (Carbonaro, 2022) However, the Swedish government didn’t stop there and by 2020 they built a wireless road for heavy trucks and buses in the island city of Visby, and they are planning to expand it to the 13-mile E20 highway – logistic hub between Hallsberg and Örebro – and even have a plan of further 3,000 km of electric roads in Sweden by 2035. (Min, 2023), (Dow, 203)- USA: a quarter mile (400 m) section of road through the Corktown area of Detroit was changed to a wireless electric road. Electreon was the company in charge of the project. (Paris, 2024), (6abc Philadelphia, 2025)- France, Norway and China: Electreon – a leading provider of wireless charging solutions for EVs – has partnered and gained projects for wireless highways in France – a section of the A10 highway (Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure, 2023) –, Norway – evaluation of wireless charging for AtB’s BRT routes in Trøndelag (Foster, Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway, 2023) – and China – not wireless but in an 1.8 km electrified highway in Zhuzhou. (Foster, China demonstrates electrified highway, 2023) While all these examples show a “tendency” to switch into wireless roads, it is important to highlight three points to keep that are decisive and have slowed down the transition: in first place, these wireless roads are being targeted mainly for freight trucks and buses, the second point is the initial cost of the infrastructure is high and third point is the technology that should be added to the EVs. 2. Fire Suppression Using Sound Waves Seth Robertson and Viet Tran, engineering students from George Mason University in Virginia designed a fire extinguisher that uses sound waves to put out flames. Their device emits low-frequency sound waves that disrupt the conditions necessary for a fire to sustain itself, meaning that no foam, powder, chemicals or water are needed to extinguish a fire, just sound. In order to understand how it can be possible to extinguish fire with sound it is necessary to remember that a fire needs heat, fuel and oxygen to survive, if one of these elements does not appears, there is no fire, under this principle, Robertson and Tran’s prototype uses sounds to separate the oxygen from the flame, as a result, the fire extinguish. The interesting part is that the sound must have the right frequency, specifically between 30 to 60 Hz – low frequency sounds. The sound waves will act as pressure waves moving the air molecules back and forth, and in the right frequency, the movement will disrupt the flames’ structure, separating the oxygen molecules and the fire will simply die out with the lack of these molecules. Potential applications include small kitchen fires or small fires, while unfortunately, large-scale structural or wildland fires still remain a challenge, mostly due to the environmental factors, like wind, air density and flame intensity, that can be a hurdle in uncontrolled environments. Moreover, the generation of low-frequency sound waves powerful enough to suppress fires requires a significant amount of energy. Nonetheless, an early prototype consists of an amplifier to generate low-frequency sound and a collimator to focus the sound waves directly on the fire, and as mentioned before, one limitation is that specialized equipment is required to produce the high-pressure sound waves. Still, research has been carried out recently and it is expected that this technology could be a non-destructive and less damaging method for firefighters soon. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM 3. Regenerative Ocean Farming Regenerative ocean farming is a climate-friendly model of aquaculture where seaweed and/or shellfish are grown in a way that requires no freshwater, feed or fertilizer, as the crops naturally filter nutrients from the water and capture carbon and nitrogen. This farming model can benefit coastal ecosystems and communities by increasing food security, creating jobs, improving water quality, protecting coastlines, supporting ocean justice (Urban Ocean Lab, 2023) and most importantly, mitigating climate change. Ocean farming can rely on a polyculture system – cultivate a mix of shellfish and seaweeds – or just a single species system. While the climate conditions determine the species to grow, it does not affect the system itself. The system follows a vertical layer farming way, in which farms use ropes that extend vertically from the surface to the seabed, in addition to the use of different levels and cages for scallops, oysters or clams, for example, as shown in Figure 2. Other species like kelp, abalone, purple sea urchins or sea cucumbers can also be harvested. Figure 2: Ocean farming diagram. Source: Urban Ocean Lab The big advantage is the maximization of the ocean space, producing more food in a smaller footprint, in addition to the use of the benefits of the species – seaweed and shellfishes – which are both natural filters that help to clean the water and absorb excess nutrients, combating ocean acidification and reducing marine pollution (Hassan, 2024) naturally. Moreover, the versatility of these species allows them to use them in other areas, such as biofuels, soil fertilizers, animal feed or cosmetics and not only for human food. Around the world, there are several projects that have adopted this methodology (Hassan, 2024): 1. GreenWave (USA): increased biodiversity by 50%, reduced nitrogen level in water by 20% and created sustainable job opportunities for locals.2. Ocean’s Halo (Ireland): annual harvest of 500 tons of kelp, creation of 20 jobs in rural areas and carbon footprint reduction by 30%3. Kitasaku Marine (Japan): Nori production increased by 25%, coastal water quality improved by 15% and local support of 50 locals.4. Catalina Sea Ranch (USA): harvested 1 million pounds of mussels annually, increased local biodiversity by 20% and created 10 new jobs.5. Blue Ventures (Madagascar): harvested 146 tonnes of red seaweed, plus they have created a sea cucumber market with a value of $18,000 and 700 farmers have been trained to farm in the ocean. (Blue Ventures Conservation, 2015)6. Havhøst (Ocean Harvest) (Denmark): they are growing seaweed, mussels and the European flat oyster in 30 communities along the Danish coast. In addition, they focus on educational activities to introduce ocean farming to more people. (Waycott, 2022) Overall ocean farming creates a positive environmental impact; it provides a sustainable food source and economic opportunities for the local people and the industry. Of course it faces challenges, but it has become a way to mitigate climate change and protect the ocean. 4. Wave Energy Generators There are two types of waves. Surface waves are generated by a combination of wind passing over the sea’s surface raising up water and gravity pulling it back down. In a technical way, warm air rises and expands, creating areas of low pressure compared to places with cooler air. Air then moves from high-pressure areas to low-pressure areas. This movement of air is wind and when it rushes across the surface of the Earth it creates waves in oceans. (Lumley, 2025) On the other hand, underwater waves are sound waves produced by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions; these waves travel by compressing and expanding the water. (Kadri, 2025) In both cases temperature variations and other factors can affect the nature of the waves. For instance, wave energy or wave power harnesses the ocean’s waves to generate energy by converting a wave’s kinetic energy into electricity. Wave power is a form of renewable and sustainable energy which has potential cost benefits over solar and wind but faces technological challenges limiting its large-scale adoption in electricity generation and water desalination. (Lumley, 2025) The nature of the waves makes wave energy the world’s largest source of energy with a potential of annual global production of 29,500 TWh, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012). In addition, it works well in tandem with other renewables such as wind. (Ocean Energy Europe, s.f.) In terms of technology itself, wave energy has relied on the next devices: 1. Point absorbers: floating buoys that capture the vertical movement of waves, which then is harnessed through a cable anchored to the seabed. The vertical movement of the waves is subsequently transformed into electricity via converters (alternators, generators or hydraulic systems). These are usually mounted on the seabed in shallower water and are connected to the floating buoys.2. Oscillating water columns (OWCs): a partially submerged, hollow structure connected to an air turbine through a chamber. These devices use the rise and fall of the waves to compress air, the air is forced to move back and forth in the chamber and creates a strong air flow that powers the turbine, generating electricity.3. Overtopping devices: a floating structure made of segments linked together, which lifts up and down with the waves. These devices harness wave energy by allowing waves to flow into a reservoir, which then releases the water through turbines to generate electricity. Design, flow dimensions, turbine efficiency and structural elements influence their efficiency. Source: BKV Energy Despite its huge potential and considering it as a clean energy source with no GHG emissions, the main concern related to wave energy is the marine life affectation – including habitat alteration, noise pollution or collision risks for marine life. On the other hand, high costs, complex design, maintenance and technological constraints also have become a problem, still, the potential of this continuous energy is huge compared to the more limited wind energy, for example. (Lumley, 2025) Despite all that, there are some active projects being developed in different parts of the world, for example: Azura Wave Power (tested in Hawaii), Anaconda WEC (UK’s prototype), CalWave (in California), CETO (tested in Australia and expected to be tested in Spain too), Crestwing (tested in Denmark), HiWave-5 (Swedish-based tested in Portugal), the Wave Energy Program (in India) or the Ocean Grazer WEC (developed in The Netherlands), among many others. (Wikipedia, 2019) 5. SpinLaunch SpinLaunch is a spaceflight technology development company working on mass accelerator technology to move payloads to space. This innovative space company is known for their Meridian Space and their Suborbital Accelerator. The Meridian Space is a low-cost, highly differentiated LEO satellite communications constellation which offers speed, reliability and flexibility (SpinLaunch, 2025). The company has partnered, and investments have been achieved in order to launch 280 satellites (Berger, 2025) as part of their satellite constellation, which will satisfy the needs in any area needed such as maritime, national security, communications, corporate networks, aviation, military, etc. The highlight of these satellites is their mass that is only 70 kg, and its facility to be launched in one or two rockets. On the other hand, SpinLaunch is aiming to build a kinetic launch system that uses centrifugal force instead of traditional rockets and spins a rocket around at speeds up to 4700 mph (7,500 km/h) before sending it upward toward space. At 60 km or so altitude, the rocket would ignite its engines to achieve orbital velocity. To achieve this, they have built a Suborbital Accelerator prototype, in Spaceport America, New Mexico. This prototype is a 33-meter vacuum chamber that can launch payloads from 800 to 5000 mph. Several tests have already been carried out, being the 10th the latest on September 27th, 2025. (Young, 2025) SpinLaunch hopes to have a 100-meter Orbital Lauch system by 2026. The engineering behind these systems is as follows: both systems are circular accelerators, powered by an electric drive that uses a mechanical arm to sling payloads around in circles to reach incredibly high speeds of up to 5,000 mph. They then release the payload through a launch tube and spaceward. (Young, 2025) The company claims that their method is cheaper as it eliminates 70% of the fuel compared to the traditional rocket launch, in addition, the infrastructure is less, and it is more environmentally friendly than the traditional methods. However, the limitations are seen in the payload weight (no more than 400 kg per payload) and their resistance (payloads must be able to withstand up to 10,000 G’s of force during the centrifugal acceleration process) Source: SpinLaunch. 6. Disease-Eliminating Robots “Disease-eliminating robots” encompass a diverse set of robotic and AI-driven systems designed to prevent, monitor, and treat infectious diseases while minimizing human exposure to risk. These technologies operate at multiple scales — from environmental disinfection in hospitals to microscopic interventions inside the human body. Environmental disinfection robots are among the most established applications. Devices such as Xenex and UVD Robots utilize pulsed ultraviolet (UV-C) light to destroy viral and bacterial DNA, effectively sterilizing hospital rooms within minutes (UVD Robots, 2023; Xenex, 2024). Others deploy vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) to disinfect enclosed environments like train carriages and operating rooms (WHO, 2022). These systems substantially reduce hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) and cross-contamination risks. In medical and clinical settings, robotics contribute to precision and safety. Surgical robots such as Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci and Ion platforms enable minimally invasive operations with reduced infection risk and faster recovery times (Intuitive Surgical, 2024). At the microscopic level, nanorobots are under development for targeted drug delivery, capable of navigating the bloodstream to deliver chemotherapy agents directly to tumor sites, thereby minimizing systemic side effects (Lee et al., 2023). Meanwhile, biofilm-removing microbots are being engineered to eradicate bacterial colonies on medical implants and dental surfaces (Kim et al., 2022). Automated systems are also emerging for precise injections, such as intravitreal therapies for ocular diseases, helping reduce clinician workload and human error (Zhou et al., 2024). Beyond clinical contexts, robots support public health surveillance and disease prevention. Prototypes like MIT’s “Luigi” sewage-sampling robot autonomously collect wastewater data to monitor community-level infections and anticipate outbreaks (MIT News, 2025). In precision agriculture, AI-guided robotic systems detect infected crops early, controlling plant disease spread and protecting global food security (FAO, 2023). Collectively, these robotic systems demonstrate the increasing convergence of automation, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence in safeguarding human and environmental health. By taking on tasks that are dangerous, repetitive, or biologically hazardous, disease-eliminating robots represent a pivotal advancement in the global strategy for infectious disease control and public health resilience. 7. Graphene Graphene is the world’s thinnest material, consisting in a single layer of carbon atoms arranged in a hexagonal honeycomb lattice. Despite its thinnest it is stronger than steel and diamond. In addition, graphene is flexible, transparent, conductive, light, selectively permeable and a 2D material. In summary it is a versatile material with many different applications and that has gained attention since its isolation in 2004 by Russian and Nobel prize scientists Andre Geim and Konstantin Nocoselov. (Larousserie, 2013) The characteristics of graphene make them an important player in the energy, construction, health and electronics sectors. In a deeper analysis, its high conductivity is valuable for battery life, autonomy and energy efficiency. Its lightness is suitable for manufacturing drone batteries, which reduce their weight, and the drone’s weight too. Graphene’s transparency and flexibility could be used in screen devices including cell phones, televisions or vehicles – Samsung already produced a flat screen with graphene electrodes. In addition, its high resistance and excellent heat and electric conductivity make them valuable for the light industry. Other sectors that are beneficial from graphene include the construction and manufacturing sector. For example, adding 1 g of graphene to 5 kg of cement increases the strength of the latter by 35%. Another example refers to Ford Motor Co., that is adding 0.5% of graphene to increase their plastic strength by 20%. (Wyss, 2022) Graphene has become a promising material, and it has been studied and tested to be used as a replacement or equivalent of silicon in microelectronics. It has been used in sports, like tennis rackets made by Head or in electric cars concepts like BASF and Daimler-Benz Smart Forvision. Bluestone Global Tech partnered with mobile phone manufacturers for the first graphene-based touchscreen to be launched in China. (Larousserie, 2013) Paint with graphene for a better thermal regulation in houses; bones, prosthesis, hearing aids or even diagnosis of diseases could also rely on graphene. (Repsol, 2025) Nowadays, its costs are high, but the graphene is going through a moment of intense academic research that surely in some years will end up with even more promising results and applications. Conclusion Together, these seven emerging technologies form a powerful snapshot of the future. Their diversity — spanning transportation, renewable energy, aquaculture, aerospace, robotics, and advanced materials — reflects the multi-sectoral nature of today’s global challenges. Yet they share a common purpose: to create more sustainable, efficient, and resilient systems capable of supporting a rapidly changing world. Wireless charging roads challenge the limits of mobility; ocean farming and wave energy reimagine how we use marine ecosystems; SpinLaunch and graphene redefine what is physically possible; and disease-eliminating robots transform public health. These innovations are still evolving, but they show that the solutions to some of humanity’s most pressing problems already exist — they simply need investment, scaling, and political will. By embracing these technologies and continuing to pursue scientific discovery, societies can accelerate the transition toward a cleaner energy future, safer communities, healthier ecosystems, and a more equitable and technologically advanced world. References 6abc Philadelphia. (2025, Juky 11). Electric vehicle tech: The rise of wireless charging roads. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NzJO67JIUE Abing, H. (n.d.). The Sonic Fire Extinguisher That’s Changing Firefighting. Retrieved from Rareform Audio: https://www.rareformaudio.com/blog/sonic-fire-extinguisher-sound-waves Anthony, S. (2013, August 6). World's first road-powered electric vehicle network switches on in South Korea. Retrieved from ExtremeTech: https://www.extremetech.com/cars/163171-worlds-first-road-powered-electric-vehicle-network-switches-on-in-south-korea Automotive Technology. (2025). What Are the Biggest Challenges Facing Electric Vehicle Adoption Today? Retrieved from Automotive Technology: https://www.automotive-technology.com/articles/what-are-the-biggest-challenges-facing-electric-vehicle-adoption-today BBC Earth. (2023, March 3). Are Underwater Farms the Future of Food? | Our Frozen Planet | BBC Earth. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=93nk2xIRcbk&t=11s Berger, E. (2025, April 4). SpinLaunch—yes, the centrifuge rocket company—is making a hard pivot to satellites. Retrieved from Ars Technica: https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/04/spinlaunch-yes-the-centrifuge-rocket-company-is-making-a-hard-pivot-to-satellites/ Blue Ventures Conservation. (2015). Community-based aquaculture. Pioneering viable alternatives to fishing. Retrieved from Blue Ventures: https://blueventures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BV-Aquaculture-Factsheet-2015.pdf Carbonaro, G. (2022, June 24). Wireless charging for electric cars is already here - but the technology isn’t for everybody yet. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/06/24/wireless-charging-roads-for-electric-cars-ev-technology-is-here-fiat-stellantis Dow, C. (203, May 16). Sweden will build the world's first EV charging road. Retrieved from TopGear: https://www.topgear.com/car-news/electric/sweden-will-build-worlds-first-ev-charging-road Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure. (2023, July 20). Electreon, together with Vinci, wins tender for first wireless electric road in France. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-together-vinci-wins-tender-first-wireless-electric-road-france Ellen MacArthur Foundation. (2024, March 20). 3D Ocean Farming | Transforming tradition. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PqvHaaL6EQ&t=225s Emergent Team. (n.d.). Using Sound Waves to Put Out Fire: The Story of Two George Mason University Students. Retrieved from Emergent: https://www.emergent.tech/blog/sound-waves-to-put-out-fire FAO. (2023). AI and Robotics in Precision Agriculture: Combating Plant Diseases. Foster, J. (2023, March 29). China demonstrates electrified highway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/china-demonstrates-electrified-highway Foster, J. (2023, June 28). Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-install-first-wireless-electric-road-norway George Mason University. (2015, February 6). Pump Up the Bass to Douse a Blaze: Mason Students' Invention Fights Fires. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM Greenwave. (2025). Regenerative Ocean Farming. Retrieved from Greenwave: https://www.greenwave.org/our-model Hassan, T. (2024, October 15). Vertical Ocean Farming. Retrieved from AgriNext Conference: https://agrinextcon.com/vertical-ocean-farming-sustainable-and-shellfish/ IEA. (2025). Electric Vehicles. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/transport/electric-vehicles Intuitive Surgical. (2024). da Vinci and Ion Robotic Systems Overview. IPCC. (2012). Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Retrieved from IPCC: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SRREN_Full_Report-1.pdf Kadri, U. (2025, April 7). Wave energy’s huge potential could finally be unlocked by the power of sound – new research. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/wave-energys-huge-potential-could-finally-be-unlocked-by-the-power-of-sound-new-research-253422 Kim, J. et al. (2022). “Microbotic Eradication of Biofilms on Medical Implants.” Nature Biomedical Engineering, 6(11), 1215–1226. Larousserie, D. (2013, November 22). Graphene - the new wonder material. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/nov/26/graphene-molecule-potential-wonder-material Lee, S. et al. (2023). “Nanorobotic Drug Delivery Systems for Cancer Therapy.” Science Advances, 9(4), eabq1234. Lumley, G. (2025, March). What Is Wave Power? Retrieved from BKV Energy: https://bkvenergy.com/learning-center/what-is-wave-energy/ MIT News. (2025). “Luigi: A Robot for Wastewater Epidemiology.” Min, R. (2023, July 06). Sweden is building the world's first permanent electrified road for EVs to charge while driving. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/05/09/sweden-is-building-the-worlds-first-permanent-electrified-road-for-evs NOAA. (n.d.). 3D Ocean Farming. Retrieved from NOAA: https://oceantoday.noaa.gov/fullmoon-3doceanfarming/welcome.html Ocean Energy Europe. (n.d.). Wave energy. Retrieved from Ocean Energy Europe: https://www.oceanenergy-europe.eu/ocean-energy/wave-energy/#:~:text=Wave%20energy%20technology Paris, M. (2024, January 31). Wireless charging: The roads where electric vehicles never need to plug in. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240130-wireless-charging-the-roads-where-electric-vehicles-never-need-to-plug-in Porter, A. (2024, June 20). What is Aquaculture? An Overview of Sustainable Ocean Farming. Retrieved from PBS: https://www.pbs.org/articles/a-guide-to-hope-in-the-water-and-aquaculture Repsol. (2025). An innovative and revolutionary material. Retrieved from Repsol: https://www.repsol.com/en/energy-move-forward/innovation/graphene/index.cshtml SKinno News. (2021, July 8). Charging while driving – electrified road for electric vehicles. Retrieved from SKinno News: https://skinnonews.com/global/archives/6253 SpinLaunch. (2025). Pioneering The Next Generation of Satellite Broadband. Retrieved from SpinLaunch: https://www.spinlaunch.com/meridianspace The Guardian. (2018, April 12). World's first electrified road for charging vehicles opens in Sweden. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/12/worlds-first-electrified-road-for-charging-vehicles-opens-in-sweden Urban Ocean Lab. (2023, November). What is Regenerative Ocean Farming? Retrieved from Urban Ocean Lab: https://urbanoceanlab.org/resource/regenerative-ocean-farming-factsheet UVD Robots. (2023). Next-Generation UV-C Disinfection Systems for Hospitals. Waycott, B. (2022, January 10). Regenerative ocean farming is trending, but can it be a successful business model? Retrieved from Global Seafood Alliance: https://www.globalseafood.org/advocate/regenerative-ocean-farming-is-trending-but-can-it-be-a-successful-business-model/ WHO. (2022). Guidelines on Hydrogen Peroxide Disinfection in Healthcare Settings. Wikipedia. (2019, June). List of wave power projects. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wave_power_projects Wyss, K. (2022, November 29). Graphene is a proven supermaterial, but manufacturing the versatile form of carbon at usable scales remains a challenge. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/graphene-is-a-proven-supermaterial-but-manufacturing-the-versatile-form-of-carbon-at-usable-scales-remains-a-challenge-194238 Xenex. (2024). LightStrike Germ-Zapping Robot: Clinical Outcomes and Use Cases. Young, C. (2025, October 18). SpinLaunch just catapulted a NASA payload into the sky for the first time. Retrieved from Interesting Engineering: https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/spinlaunch-catapulted-a-nasa-payload Zhou, Y. et al. (2024). “Automated Injection Robots for Ophthalmic Care.” Frontiers in Medical Robotics, 5(2), 45–57.

Diplomacy
WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 20: President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House on January 20, 2025 in Washington, DC. Trump takes office for his second term as the 47

Donald Trump: Reconfiguring Global Order

by Jeffrey Sommers , Zoltán Vörös , István Tarrósy

Chaos seems to mark US policy under President Donald Trump at first blush. But behind what appears (and sometimes is) capricious Trump Administration decision making are policymakers with serious plans. They intend to engage perceived threats to the United States power, while transforming its economy in ways making it less dependent on global supply chains and “reserve assets.” Recognizing festering wounds to the US economy while seeing areas of strength, Trump policymakers look to cauterize the former while pivoting more fully to the latter. Trump’s presidency has openly engaged in criticizing past US liberal interventionist and neoconservative foreign policy. Branded as “America First” Trump’s US does not seek isolationist  withdrawal from the globe, but rather a dismantling of institutional structures and alliances that no longer benefit Washington. The United States can and should continue projecting power far but, not wide, according to America Firsters. Under America First, the national interest does not always align with the “international community,” a term America Firsters would regardless see, borrowing a line from Benedict Anderson, as a fictitious “imagined community.” America First means dismantling the liberal hegemonic world order, or at minimum the US offloading the bill for it. The cost of that liberal order, with some 750 US military bases abroad, combined with growing power of the BRICS (China chiefly, but not only), signals to America Firsters America’s need to retreat from some parts of the world, while continuing to exercise dominance in others. Related to national security is the fallout from a generation of globalization in labor markets. US offshoring of manufacturing in the post-Bretton Woods period lowered production costs. Cheap goods produced abroad were then purchased by Americans even more cheaply courtesy of the overvalued dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This worked great for US consumers, albeit with the intention of also pushing down US labor costs. Globalization enabled the United States to vacuum up global manufactures, while also running up massive government fiscal deficits. As former Vice-President Dick Cheney described it during globalization’s heyday, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.” What was once, however, a massive advantage for the United States later became its “twin deficits” problem.   In short, the best fit for the US is a realist spheres of influence model, according to the Trump Administration. The criticism of the liberal world order, of course, circles back to the aforementioned economic challenges: on the one hand, the negative economic processes related to global labor organization and America’s indebtedness, and on the other hand, the strengthening of emerging international actors. Amongst these entities, the People’s Republic of China has long been high on the agenda. During the first Trump administration the president escalated tariffs on goods imported from Asia’s giant, which then led to a trade war. According to a Pew Research Center survey from mid-April 2025, although Americans believe that this bilateral trade relationship benefits China more than the US, they are “skeptical that increased tariffs on Chinese imports will have a positive effect on the country or on their own lives.” The Trump Administration thinks otherwise. America’s economy entering Trump’s presidency looked strong. On the cusp of the great 2008 financial shock, the European Union’s dollar GDP was $16.4 trillion, the US’ was $14.8 trillion. But by 2024, EU GDP was $18.7 trillion, while the United States posted a GDP of $28 trillion. Thus, in the span of less than a generation, the US went from having a GDP 9.8% short of the EU’s in 2008 to leaping ahead with a GDP 32% larger by 2024. These impressive US GDP gains were built on the foundations of financial services, corporate high-value added HQ (headquarters) functions, intellectual property, higher education, and information technology. Yet, there were problems: Maintaining world order, or empire, was, as we asserted above, expensive. In 2024 the US military budget was $824 billion. This figure does not even count huge “off (or black) budget” items related to security, etc., for which costs are not precisely known. Besides these numbers, we should not forget about the military’s global presence: The US paid for global security costs, protecting important maritime trade routes, chokepoints – not just supporting the American interest, but for instance chiefly helping China trade with the world. These costs were covered, in part, through US borrowing, much of it from abroad. In 2024, the US government deficit stood at $1.8 trillion, or 6.4% of GDP. While the total US debt reached $38 trillion. The last time the US federal budget was in surplus was in the last term of President Bill Clinton, when there were both reduced military expenditures (post-Cold War “peace dividend”) and top marginal income tax rates of 39.6%. And before Clinton’s second term, US budgets were only in surplus in 1969 and before that only for several years in the 1950s. Decelerating US decline also requires addressing these areas. First is the area of domestic costs. US public pension costs (Social Security and Medicare) face a fiscal crisis. The dedicated taxes (Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or “FICA”) will soon be insufficient to pay for pension costs. FICA taxes in the late 20th century, under President Ronald Reagan, were raised above pension costs. The surplus (a de facto tax on labor) was to finance costs of a future changed 21st century demographic mix creating lower ratios of workers to pensioners. This funding forward model could only work if surplus revenues were invested in productivity enhancing infrastructure creating larger future economic growth and productivity. Instead, the FICA tax surpluses levied on labor were largely used to reduce budget deficits resulting from tax cuts to the wealthy and corporate sectors. In short, to be blunt, the money was taken from labor, with continued borrowing now to pay pension costs running up against the limits of the US to borrow. Second, reserve assets. Lack of ground rents, given the US had no centuries long accumulation of land ownership from feudalism, meant low land prices and reduced inequality generally in the United States. Additionally, the United States applied tariffs to protect domestic markets and promote industrialization generally starting with their first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures in 1791 that gave the US high tariffs, only later rivaled by Russia under the economic leadership of Sergei Witte and Pytor Stolypin in Russia’s late Czarist Russia period. Third, after the 2008 US financial shock it became clear that China was not limited to being merely a supplier of lower-tier consumer goods to the world, but risked becoming a power that could challenge the United States (an idea encapsulated in the Thucydides trap). Rather than markets paving the path toward liberal democracy, as many US policymakers previously assumed, the ascendancy of Xi Jinping signaled China’s fealty to an autonomous route to development. However, China still depends on the global system, the institutions, and structures that have ensured and continue to ensure its participation in global trade, for example. China does not yet possess the global capabilities that would allow it to defend its interests beyond its borders. Therefore, taking action against Beijing as a rival could cause difficulties in time for a country that is dependent on numerous structures maintained by Washington. The Trump administration’s goals and responses to the US crises are to: • Offload costs of US “empire” to other states currently benefiting from it• Recovery through fall in commodity prices (energy, food, metals, etc.)• Move from globalization to regional spheres of influence• Postpone “Armageddon” of global exit from US dollar• Widen leads in AI, thus requiring cheap energy• Reduce US government debt levels• Widen US lead in space• Reshore US industry To achieve these goals, a tariff policy was established that fundamentally shapes American economic and foreign policy, to which Washington has put forward the following proposals: First, other countries can accept tariffs on their exports to the United States without retaliation, providing revenue to the U.S. Treasury to finance public goods provision. Critically, retaliation will exacerbate rather than improve the distribution of burdens and make it even more difficult for us to finance global public goods; Second, others can stop unfair and harmful trading practices by opening their markets and buying more from America; Third, they can boost defense spending and procurement from the U.S., buying more U.S.-made goods, and taking strain off our service-members and creating jobs here; Fourth, they can invest in and install factories in America. They won’t face tariffs if they make their stuff in this country; Fifth, they could simply write checks to the Treasury that help us finance global public goods. Or more passively, accept conversion of their Treasury Bills into century-long non-interest bearing bonds. American foreign policy actions can generate results that are drastically different from expectations, and in certain cases can accelerate and amplify problems Washington faces. Although it is evident classic free trade agreements have not formed the basis of American foreign and economic policy for some time, the tariffs introduced and then implemented (and periodically suspended) by the Trump administration, imposed challenges to the United States on several fronts: First, tariffs have severely affected or even targeted states that have traditionally been in partnership with the United States (e.g. EU, Japan, South Korea), which Washington could rely on for support, for example during its international interventions. Such steps can, on the one hand, harm and jeopardize American global and economic interests, and on the other hand, push actors towards a multipolarity that Washington fears. Similarly questionable are trade actions against states that could be pillars of a coalition against China (e.g. Vietnam and the Philippines). American weaponization of trade and unilateral military expectations make Washington an unattractive, if not unreliable, partner, thus encouraging multilateralism. Second, Washington’s demands that states sever trade relations with China, or even with Russia, as Trump asked India to do, is accelerating states decoupling from the United States not on ideological grounds but primarily based on realistic economic policy considerations. Third, these steps could also threaten the dominance of the US dollar, and even accelerate decline in confidence of the dollar – further complicating the financing of the deficit. The Trump Administration (Treasury Department) are aware of the dangers (the “Triffin” reserve currency dilemma) but think the crisis is so acute that they must do something even if they risk accelerating the dollar’s collapse. However, it is also true that a drastic decline in confidence in the US currency would require an alternative reliable currency, and currently, the currency of no potential player can be considered perfectly reliable or transparent. Finally, on a global scale, the America First slogan is not necessarily guaranteed to win partners for Washington. It is evident that in the short term, several actors will not be able to free themselves from the security architecture guaranteed by the Americans (see: NATO), but most actors will strive to advance by developing and building their own capacities. In conclusion, Washington under Trump looks to downsize and rightsize. American economic and military power, while strong, has declined from its post-Cold War unipolar moment. Reduced power has diluted American confidence, thus resulting in the US taking at times a more aggressive posture in an increasingly multipolar world. Meanwhile, the rest of the world grows wary at how the Trump Administration reacts to these changed global ‘‘adjustments” that are creating confusion over where spheres of influence begin and end. The days of America acting to, in the phrasing of Joseph Nye Jr., “winning the hearts and minds” of the world, seems off the table. The United States now retreats from soft power with dramatic cuts to foreign aid and international exchanges, such as its Fulbright program. Rather than winning the world over, under Trump, demands for deference to US authority and power now mark its preferred relations with the world, while it disengages from other parts of the globe.