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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/] 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The question of migration occupies a central and divisive place in US politics. Yet critical questions are rarely asked about why migrants decide to leave their homes in the first place and what role US foreign policy might play in that decision. This oversight is especially glaring when it comes to one of the most common tools of US foreign policy: broad economic sanctions. There is overwhelming evidence (1) that migration1 is driven in large part by adverse economic conditions and (2) that sanctions can have severe, harmful economic and humanitarian consequences for civilians in targeted countries. The cases of Cuba and Venezuela demonstrate this relationship clearly: The imposition or tightening of sanctions by the US government have, in recent years, fueled economic crises that in turn have led to record migratory outflows. Addressing migration at its roots will require rethinking US sanctions policy as part of a broader research and policy agenda that considers the role of US foreign policy in fueling migratory push factors abroad. Economic Hardship Drives Migration The decision to emigrate — often involving leaving one’s home, family, and community to undertake a perilous journey to a new country with a different language and culture, without any guarantee of safety, accommodation, or employment — is not typically one that is taken lightly. Such a life-altering decision is rarely reducible to a single factor but is rather made in the context of multiple and interrelated push and pull factors. However, one of the most well-established sets of factors that impact migration are economic. There is broad consensus that economic conditions in the country of origin are a major determinant of the desire to migrate. A recent review of 72 peer-reviewed, survey-based analyses of migration aspirations found an overwhelming relationship between the desire to migrate and economic factors, including perception of national economic conditions, employment opportunities, household financial situation, food security, contentment with public services, and expectations of future economic conditions. A similar relationship holds true of realized migration. Many have hypothesized an inverted U-shaped relationship between development and migration, whereby higher GDP per capita is associated with increased migration as would-be migrants gain the means to do so, until a certain point — after which higher income is associated with decreased migration. However, recent research suggests that this U-shaped relationship, though observed in cross-sectional analyses, does not hold for a given country over time.2 Rather, the relationship is clearer: poor or deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions cause people to migrate from developing countries while growth and stability lead people to stay home. Sanctions Fuel Economic Hardship Over the past two decades, the number of US-imposed sanctions has grown nearly tenfold. The United States is by far the most prevalent user of sanctions, with one-third of all countries — and over 60 percent of low-income countries — facing US sanctions in some form. While many sanctions are narrowly targeted against particular individuals or entities, others target entire sectors or even the entire economy of a country. Such broad-based sanctions are indiscriminate and can have profound impacts on the economies, and therefore civilians, of targeted nations (and even purportedly targeted sanctions can have significant spillover effects). Broad-based sanctions can impede economic growth, potentially triggering or extending recessions and even depressions; restrict access to critical resources like medicine, food, and energy; disrupt humanitarian aid (despite nominal exemptions); and consequently exacerbate poverty, illness, and hunger. As a result, sanctions can lead to a significant number — in some cases tens of thousands — of preventable deaths. In a 2023 literature review for CEPR, economist Francisco Rodríguez determined that 94 percent of peer-reviewed econometric studies on the subject found substantial, statistically significant “negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality, and human rights” as a result of sanctions. One study associated sanctions with, on average, a 26 percent drop in GDP per capita — roughly the size of the Great Depression. Another tied sanctions to a 1.4-year decline in female life expectancy — comparable with the global impact of COVID-19. Yet another found a 2.5 percent increase in childhood HIV infection rates. While such indiscriminate impacts are often denied by the policymakers that impose sanctions, it is difficult to reconcile this denial with the fact that major macroeconomic factors such as growth rates, oil production, foreign reserves, currency stability, and the cost of essential goods are widely used — often by these very same policymakers — as metrics of “success” of sanctions. That these macroeconomic factors would in turn impact civilians is all but undeniable. In fact, there are significant reasons to believe that the broad economic and humanitarian impacts of certain sanctions regimes are intentional — and therefore are not a matter of calibration, but are inherent to the policy itself. Sanctions Induce MigrationIf migration is driven in part by economic hardship and sanctions can cause great economic and humanitarian suffering, then it follows that sanctions can substantially contribute to migration. This is not just borne out logically, but can be seen in the data. In October 2024, the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization published what may be the first and only systematic cross-national empirical analysis of how such sanctions impact international migration. The findings are striking. Using data on migration flows from 157 countries over more than half a century, the authors find that Western multilateral sanctions3 have increased emigration from target countries by, on average, 22 to 24 percent. Notably, they also find that “migrant flows return to their pre-sanction level once sanctions are lifted.” In few cases is this relationship between sanctions and migration clearer than in the cases of Cuba and Venezuela. Trump-Biden Sanctions Spur Cuban Depopulation The US embargo against Cuba — referred to by many as a blockade due to its extraterritorial impacts — is the US’s oldest and most comprehensive sanctions regime. Beginning in 1960 with export prohibitions in response to the Castro government’s agrarian reforms and nationalizations, successive administrations soon escalated this embargo into a comprehensive ban on nearly all trade, travel, and financial transactions, with the goal of destabilizing and ultimately toppling the Cuban government. While these sanctions have been periodically tightened or relaxed over the years, this foundational, comprehensive embargo has remained intact for over six decades and has since been enshrined into law through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. During his last two years in office, President Barack Obama took significant steps toward the normalization of bilateral relations with Cuba by, among other things, formally resuming diplomatic relations, loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, and removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSOT) list, a measure that had effectively cut the island off from much of the global financial system. However, under the first Donald Trump administration, these policies were largely reversed, and the embargo was expanded to an unprecedented level. President Joe Biden, despite campaign promises to change the course of Cuban policy, maintained most of President Trump’s measures. Days before leaving office, Biden issued executive orders undoing Trump’s harshest sanctions measures only to see them predictably rescinded immediately following Trump’s return to the White House. In the case of both Trump and Biden, Cuban policy appears to have been driven in large part by electoral considerations in Florida, where hawkish Cuban American voters have long (and questionably) been seen as a key demographic in both parties’ efforts to win the state. The US embargo has long hindered Cuban economic growth and development, particularly since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union and its COMECON partners discontinued economic support for the island. In 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean validated the Cuban government’s estimates that the six-decade embargo had cost the country $130 billion. By 2024, that estimate had grown to $164 billion. A recent econometric study on changes in US policy toward Cuba between 1990 and 2020 found a “substantial negative impact of sanctions policy shifts on Cuban economic growth.” Further, “this impact on GDP is concentrated in the component of household consumption” — in other words, Cuban citizens bear the highest burden. Over the last few years, Cuba’s economic situation has deteriorated further, in large part as a result of Trump-Biden policies. Measures such as returning Cuba to the SSOT list (despite no evidence of Cuban support for terrorism), restricting remittances, and prohibiting US citizens from doing business with dozens of “restricted entities” have greatly limited Cuba’s access to foreign exchange. This has, in turn, prevented Cuba from importing many essential goods (including critical pharmaceutical and agricultural inputs) and services (including maintenance services for Cuba’s ailing energy infrastructure), servicing its external debt, and perhaps most crucially, stabilizing the local currency following a major monetary reform in 2021. Another Trump measure — his decision to implement Title III of the LIBERTAD Act — has had a significant chilling effect on foreign investment in Cuba only a few years after the enactment of a reform opening up most sectors of the economy to foreign investors. This controversial provision, which allows for lawsuits against US or foreign persons doing business with Cuban entities that use or benefit from property expropriated at the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, had been waived by prior presidents and by Trump himself, until April 2019. The far-reaching negative impact of these and other Trump measures are part of the reason why Cuba’s economy has failed to significantly recover from the global economic downturn triggered by the COVID pandemic. Cuba has been plunged into the most serious economic and humanitarian crisis of its contemporary history, characterized by repeated blackouts, water shortages, fuel shortages, rising food costs, the deterioration of basic services such as garbage collection, and the spread of preventable diseases. Cuba’s fledgling private sector, which greatly expanded following Obama’s normalization measures and domestic liberalization measures in 2019 and 2021, is facing an uncertain future as a result of the crisis and new, stricter Cuban regulations designed in part to offset the effects of sanctions by capturing increasingly scarce foreign exchange. This economic crisis has in turn spurred a migration crisis. Data from the national statistics office of the government of Cuba shows skyrocketing net emigration following 2020 (see Figure 1). By August 2022, the outflow of migrants had surpassed that of the famous 1980 Mariel boatlift and the 1994 Balsero/Rafter crises combined.   Independent research — later confirmed by the Cuban government — estimates an even larger increase than those published by the national statistics office: the departure of over one million people, representing 10 percent of the country’s entire population, in 2022 and 2023 alone. As one researcher warned in 2022: “Cuba is depopulating.” While not all of these migrants ended up in the United States, the years 2022 and 2023 saw record-breaking numbers of encounters with Cuban migrants by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In 2022, the CBP encountered more Cubans than any other nationality except Mexicans. Cubans constituted more than 10 percent of all encounters.4 Given the Trump administration’s, and particularly Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s, apparent commitment to maintaining the current policy toward Cuba — and perhaps even hardening it with yet more sanctions — we can expect out-migration from the island to continue at record levels for the foreseeable future. “Maximum Pressure” Sanctions Fueled Venezuelan Exodus While the US has maintained limited sanctions on Venezuela since 2005, the current sanctions regime is defined by the “maximum pressure” campaign initiated during the first Trump administration in an attempt to push President Nicolás Maduro out of office. In August 2017, Trump blocked the government of Venezuela, including the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), from accessing financial markets. In late 2018, Trump sanctioned the gold sector. Perhaps most significantly, the oil sector and PDVSA were designated as sanctioned entities in January 2019. Additional sanctions on the financial and defense sectors and the central bank soon followed, alongside the escalation of secondary sanctions against third parties. The US’s and many of its allies’ policy of nonrecognition of the Maduro government has also led to effective sanctions, such as the loss of access to roughly $2 billion in reserves held at the Bank of England and $5 billion in Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund. These “maximum pressure” policies were largely maintained under the Biden administration, with a few significant exceptions. Since November 2022, Chevron Corporation has been permitted to produce and export oil from Venezuela. In October 2023, Biden issued a General License temporarily lifting most oil sector and PDVSA sanctions but allowed the license to expire six months later (while leaving a wind-down period). Though Venezuela’s economic crisis — driven in part by both misguided economic policies and falling global oil prices — began prior to the imposition of sanctions, US sanctions have substantially contributed to the severity and longevity of the contraction. Sanctions impact the Venezuelan economy through numerous channels, but perhaps none more significantly than through oil. The Venezuelan economy is highly dependent on oil exports, historically relying on the sector — and its main actor, PDVSA — for 95 percent of its foreign exchange. From 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd) prior to the crisis, oil output hit a low of 0.4 million bpd in mid-2020 — an 83 percent collapse. Even with today’s Chevron license, output has yet to break 1 million bpd. A 2022 analysis by Francisco Rodríguez attributes 797,000 bpd of this decline to the 2017 sanctions alone. Other assessments point to similar figures, with some attributing more than half of the decline to sanctions. As Rodríguez points out, new sanctions are associated with marked downward inflection points in Venezuelan oil output (see Figure 2).   Ultimately, the Venezuelan crisis saw a 71 percent collapse in GDP per capita. As Rodríguez notes, this was the equivalent of three Great Depressions and the largest peacetime economic contraction in modern history. By Rodríguez’s assessments, more than half of this decline was attributable to sanctions and related political acts. Whatever claims policymakers may make about the targeted nature of sanctions, such broad macroeconomic effects inescapably and indiscriminately impact civilians. In addition to the general effects of economic contraction and the loss of foreign exchange with which to import essential goods such as food and medicine, sanctions have also inhibited shipments of COVID vaccines and other medical supplies; contributed to the degradation of the energy grid and frequency of electrical shortages; and otherwise furthered the deterioration of public health, education, and water services. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures reports that sanctions on Venezuela have “prevented the earning of revenues and use of resources to maintain and develop infrastructure and for social support programs, which has a devastating effect on the entire population of Venezuela, especially — but not only — those living in extreme poverty, women, children, medical workers, people with disabilities or life-threatening or chronic diseases, and the indigenous population.” According to one CEPR estimate, sanctions likely led to tens of thousands of excess deaths in one year alone. Unsurprisingly, such a dire humanitarian crisis has contributed to an unprecedented mass exodus. In the last decade, over seven million Venezuelans have left the country. In one of the few direct quantitative studies on the impacts of sanctions on migration, Francisco Rodríguez finds that over four million of these seven million left “as a result of the economic deterioration caused by sanctions and toxification effects.” Rodríguez further estimates that a return to “maximum pressure” policies would result in the emigration of an additional one million Venezuelans in the coming five years. While the vast majority of these Venezuelan migrants ended up in countries closer to home, such as Colombia and Peru, a growing number have made their way to the US border as well (see Figure 3).   In 2023 and 2024, CBP encountered more migrants from Venezuela than any other country except Mexico.5 According to survey data from the Migration Policy Institute, Venezuela is the single fastest growing country of birth of immigrants to the US since “maximum pressure” began in 2017 (alongside other sanctioned countries, such as Afghanistan — number 2 — and Nicaragua — number 7). The Trump administration was repeatedly warned that mass migration was a likely consequence of its sanctions policy, yet pursued it anyway. According to one senior US Department of State official: “This is the point I made at the time: I said the sanctions were going to grind the Venezuelan economy into dust and have huge human consequences, one of which would be out-migration.” To Address Migration, Lift Economic Sanctions Though migration has many causes, and it is difficult to precisely quantify the contribution of sanctions to overall emigration levels, the following are nonetheless clear: 1. Migration is driven in large part as a reaction to adverse economic conditions.2. Economic sanctions often have profound adverse economic impacts.3. Econometric evidence indicates that sanctions directly contribute to migratory flows.4. In Cuba and Venezuela, economic sanctions are associated with mass migration. While fearmongering and anti-migrant sentiment should be flatly rejected, it is plainly preferable that people in other nations not be forced into circumstances that compel their displacement. To achieve this goal, broad economic sanctions must be lifted. Recognition of the link between sanctions and migration has been growing among US policymakers. In May 2023, 21 members of Congress — led by members representing border states that have witnessed an influx of large numbers of migrants — sent a letter to President Biden urging the easing of sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela to mitigate push factors for migration. A separate letter from over 50 economists and other scholars shortly followed, corroborating the claim that lifting sanctions would help ease migration. Former Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose country is also impacted by migratory flows, has said the same. An Alternative Approach to Migration Is Available This relationship between US economic sanctions and migration further suggests the need for a research and policy agenda that considers migration within the context of global inequalities and underdevelopment and critically considers the role of US foreign policy — including but not limited to sanctions — in reproducing and exacerbating migratory push factors. In other words, addressing migration at its root requires rethinking and rectifying the US’s approach to Latin America as well as other parts of the Global South. While the Biden administration proclaimed a “root-causes” strategy toward addressing migration from Central America, intending to address push factors in countries of origin, including corruption, crime, and economic insecurity, the strategy failed to consider how the US’s own policies might exacerbate these conditions. In contrast, the recently established Congressional Caucus to Address Global Migration and the Migration Stability Resolution introduced by its co-founder, Rep. Greg Casar (D-TX), take a more comprehensive approach, aiming to — in Rep. Casar’s words — “[change] the failed US policies that cause displacement abroad and force people to flee their home countries.” Tackling broad economic sanctions, anti-worker trade agreements, US security assistance for repressive governments, inequalities in the global financial system, and more, these efforts offer an alternative path toward addressing migration: a path that is both more humane and more effective. Footnotes 1. For the purposes of this article, “migration” is used to refer specifically to international migration.2. Moreover, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodríguez explains, even if there were truth to the U-shaped hypothesis, it would be a story of the long-run structural and societal transformations that accompany development and would not contradict a thesis that short-run economic contractions — such as those that might result from the imposition of sanctions — fuel migration across income levels. Indeed, short-run fluctuations in growth and employment are observed to significantly impact migration.3. While this study assessed joint US-EU sanctions specifically, one can expect a similar relationship to hold in unilateral US sanctions, given the dominant role of the United States in the global financial system and given that EU sanctions policy often follows the lead of US policy.4. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.5. Authors’ calculations based on CBP nationwide encounters data, converted from fiscal to calendar years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Latin America has been a long-standing policy focus for the United States, aimed at keeping external influences out and maintaining stability in the region. This commitment began with the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary and continued through the Cold War. Under the current administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on Latin America due to rising Chinese influence, drug cartel activity, and immigration issues. The most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) states that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere and emphasizes the need to “protect against external interference or coercion, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” However, the United States has not had a coherent strategy or policy toward Latin America in decades, leading to outcomes contrary to its stated goals. The PRC has been rapidly expanding its influence in the region. Since 2010, China has nearly tripled its trade with Latin America, with several nations signing on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to affect the United States through drug, weapon, and human trafficking, while also forcing migrants north due to unsafe living conditions in their home countries. Given this situation, the United States must develop a coherent two-pronged strategy toward Latin America. This strategy should involve expanding economic investments to counteract Chinese influence while also strengthening regional security to address the threats posed by TCOs. Recognizing that the PRC and TCOs are different from the Soviets and Marxist guerrillas, US policy during the Cold War provides valuable lessons on what this two-pronged approach could entail. US Cold War Policy in Latin America In the early days of the Cold War, the United States was concerned about the spread of communism in Latin America but initially failed to take meaningful action. It relied instead on outdated policies from the 1920s. This approach continued until the late 1950s, when significant changes occurred in the hemisphere. By then, ten of thirteen dictators had been replaced, economic challenges had intensified, and the prices of Latin American exports had plummeted. This social and political unrest carried over into the 1960s, as the region became “aflame” with Marxist revolutions. The CIA reported that twelve out of twenty-three nations in the southern hemisphere were at risk of falling to communism. This urgency prompted the United States to act, determined to prevent the region from succumbing to Soviet influence and instability. The Kennedy administration identified economic struggles and monetary insecurity as the principal vulnerabilities that could allow communism to take root. To address these issues, the administration launched the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year initiative where the United States would provide $20 billion in loans, grants, and investments, while Latin American governments aimed to generate $80 billion in funds and implement land reforms, tax systems, and other socio-political changes. In tandem with economic initiatives, the United States employed covert actions, counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics, and military support to suppress Marxist revolutions. For instance, in Guatemala, US-backed military forces fought against Marxist revolutionaries with American military assistance. Similar operations took place in El Salvador, Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil. Although not executed flawlessly, this two-pronged strategy ultimately succeeded in keeping Soviet and communist influences largely at bay in the region. Economic assistance and support helped stabilize democracy in Venezuela, while land redistribution and reforms from the Alliance for Progress undermined financial support for Marxist guerrilla groups in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Despite being conducted with a certain level of negligence, US-backed COIN operations across the region weakened guerrilla movements, leading to factional splits and self-defeating behaviors. Notably, US-supported operations included the capture of Che Guevara by a US-trained Bolivian military unit in 1967. Applying a Cold War-like Policy Today Economic challenges are once again prevalent in Latin America, and China is seizing the opportunity. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has expanded its influence and bolstered regional ties. Twenty Latin American countries have signed onto the BRI, while Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru have established free trade agreements with the PRC. In 2010, trade between China and South America amounted to $180 billion, which surged to $450 billion by 2021. The United States needs to consider a strategy similar to the Alliance for Progress to effectively compete with the PRC and maintain its influence in the region, as it is currently falling short in this area. In 2023, China invested $9 billion in Latin America through its Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), while the United States contributed only $2 billion for the same year. As the new administration shapes its foreign policy, it is essential to allocate more economic investment to Latin America. This should involve a deliberate economic policy and investment plan that focuses on trade, port infrastructure, and technological development—all areas where the PRC is currently providing support. The bipartisan Americas Act of 2024 is a good starting point, but it is insufficient to counteract the PRC’s advances. While some might argue that boosting economic investment is too expensive, such efforts would enable the United States to compete with China while stabilizing the region and reducing northward immigration. In tandem with economic investment, the United States must advocate for stronger regional security to combat TCOs, thus fostering stability and improving living conditions. Specifically, the United States should collaborate with Latin American countries to enhance security institutions by expanding advisory and assistance operations with regional militaries, similar to COIN operations during the Cold War. In recent years, the United States military has maintained a significant presence in countries like Colombia, Panama, and Honduras to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations, aimed at preparing partner forces to effectively combat TCOs. FID and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations should include US military support for other nations in the region, such as El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico. Historically, countries like Mexico have been hesitant or resistant to accepting US military support; however, this trend has recently shifted. In a positive development, the Mexican Senate has approved a small contingent of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assist Mexican SOF personnel. In addition to expanding FID operations, the United States might explore granting broader authorities to allow US military forces to assist regional partners in targeting and operational planning against TCOs. While some may oppose this option, expanded authorities should not come as a surprise, given that the new administration has designated several TCOs as terrorist organizations. This designation opens the door for discussions on expanded authorities. Conclusion During the Cold War, Latin America was a primary focus of US policy. The United States worked diligently to maintain regional hegemony and prevent the spread of communist ideology in the Western Hemisphere. Today, Latin America and the southern border have again become focal points for the current US administration. With the rising influence of China in the region and the ongoing impact of TCOs on American life, the United States must develop deliberate policies and strategies to maintain its hegemonic influence while promoting stability. This strategy should consist of a two-pronged approach that emphasizes both economic investment and regional security. Such an approach could disrupt Chinese influence while fostering a safer and more stable region, ultimately reducing migration northward—a key objective for the current administration. Article, originally written by and published in Small Wars Journal under the title "Same But Different: Cold War Strategy in 21st Century Latin America." Consult here: https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/03/06/same-but-different-cold-war-strategy-in-21st-century-latin-america/. This translation is shared under the same Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This departs from an assumption that the EU is an outstanding example of liberal institutionalism. It has been very successful in providing lasting peace for Europeans who are now facing a series of existential challenges.The central hypothesis of this paper is that if these challenges are not addressed effectively, the EU may not survive in the long term.The first part of the analysis explores five external challenges that affected the macroeconomic and political environments of the EU in the third decade of the 21st century.The second part of the analysis signals five internal and more profound challenges the EU must face if it wants to continue in any viable form.The author concludes that the future of the world order and, by extension, the environment of the EU will most likely be decided by three great powers: the US, China, and Russia. Keywords: EU, Great Powers, World Order, US, China, Russia Introduction 2024 is exactly 20 years since the so-called ‘Big Bang enlargement’, which is why the author of this paper takes the liberty of looking at the future of the European Union (EU). The EU is, according to voluminous literature, the best working example of Liberal Institutionalism, which at its very core is about prescribing peace and security. Yet, the EU project seems derailed in the last few years and is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. This lack of internal cohesion is arguably based on several political phenomena: overregulation, ideologisation, and bureaucratisation being the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This paper examines the EU's economic and political environment and then lists five most pressing challenges it must face to survive as an institution. British citizens have already shown the first ‘red card.’ Core external challenges - the macroeconomic and political environments To say that the contemporary world is complex is to state an obvious truism. However, five phenomena should be outlined here as significant variables regarding the EU’s environment. Firstly and most fundamentally, the changes in the international political economy and corresponding structural changes that undermine states’ positions. What we are witnessing is the emergence of non less than the New World Order, which not only challenges the so-called traditional great powers by shifting the centre of gravity to the East but, perhaps most importantly, challenges the position of state actors as ‘shakers and movers’ of the international system. The Great Reset and the Fourth Industrial Revolution are phenomenal examples of the challenges ahead. Secondly, the ongoing war in Ukraine. Apart from obvious regional European relevance, it should also be analysed globally. Russian invasion threatens principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If allowed and left unchecked, it encourages other acts of aggression, and in doing so, it confirms a worrying trend according to which the so-called great powers stand above international law. The war draws attention to Ukraine's strategic importance as a large European country. In that sense, the outcome of the conflict will shape the balance of power on the continent. It tests the Western alliance and its response to such challenges. Moreover, it bears global economic consequences—Ukraine & Russia are significant exporters of grain, energy, and raw materials. Prolonged conflict involving these two risks, long-term inflation and food/fuel shortages abroad, is equivalent to the global spread of instability. The Ukrainian-Russian conflict bears an uncanny resemblance to a proxy war between the East and the West competition. An argument could be made that it can be seen as a battle between democracy and authoritarianism, where Russia’s victory strengthens authoritarianism abroad. Finally, let us not forget the nuclear aspects of the conflict. A risk of direct Western involvement would raise the threat of nuclear escalation. The outcome could influence nonproliferation norms for security assurance. Thirdly, and partly as a response to the above two phenomena, there comes the question of German leadership/vision of the future of the EU. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two stand out among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[1] Fourthly, and again in significant part as a response to the first two phenomena, we are witnessing unprecedented resistance among large sections of European societies. In particular, the now openly verbalised and physically demonstrated dissatisfaction mainly, but not exclusively by the farmers, to the seemingly inevitable plan for the green transition as heralded by the ‘Fit-for-55’. It is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 [2]. This ambitious initiative includes actions in fourteen areas, from the reform of the EU’s emissions trading system through reducing emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, and waste to regulation on methane emissions reduction. Effectively, this means that EU farmers will have to accept an unprecedented and unequal burden. On top of that, there is a question of Ukrainian farming products that enter the European market in equally unprecedented quantities. This prompts many farmers to demonstrate their objections towards their governments and the European Commission by blocking capital cities and transportation arteries across the block. The protests are massive in their character, with thousands upon thousands across most EU member states. Political elites in Europe probably had not expected this and possibly have not experienced such a level of dissatisfaction and resistance towards their policies since the creation of the European Union. Farmers have been aided by other professional groups, from truckers to taxi drivers and even ordinary citizens. Notably, the protests are a bottom-up initiative, though they have also drawn the attention of right-wing parties.[3] Last but not least, there is the question of massive immigration to the EU from outside Europe and consequent challenges to social cohesion in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium. As of the writing of this paper (2025), more and more members of the societies of Western EU countries challenge the official narrative of their governments based on the assumption that massive immigration is primarily positive for the economies and that large numbers of non-Europeans pose no threat to the quality of life and security of ordinary citizens (the phenomenon referred to earlier by the author of this paper as ‘a-securitisation’ – Sliwinski, 2016).[4] Worse still, the differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ members of the EU, namely Hungary under Victor Orban, pose a formidable challenge to the immigration policy of the entire EU and, consequently, the future of the EU's integrity. It is not unimaginable at this stage to fathom a day when Hungary, like Britain before, decides to leave the EU,[5] pressured by Brussels and Berlin to accept thousands of immigrants from the Middle East or Africa. Slovakia could follow suit. Core internal challenges – the weakness from within Many of these problems were accidentally quite openly expressed by J. D. Vance, US Vice President, during his speech at the latest Munich Security Conference (February 14th, 2025). Vance did not spare strong criticism directed at European elites and, in a typical ‘American fashion’, called a spade a spade. His criticism of the EU included six general points: retreat from democratic values, censorship and limitations on the freedom of speech, limitations of religious liberties, lack of election integrity, uncontrolled mass migration, and the general unwillingness of the political elites to engage with views other than those of the left and even tendency to suppress dissent.[6] - Centralisation (Federalisation) Today, the EU continues to centralise, particularly in response to challenges like the economic crisis COVID-19, taking on more fiscal policy, health, and security responsibilities. This trend is evident in recent proposals, such as the European Commission’s role in determining budgetary paths, but it faces resistance from member states concerned about losing sovereignty. Historically, the EU has been moving to a federation through recent treaty revisions: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). According to Alberto Mingardi from the GIS, there is a so-called ‘creeping power grab’ phenomenon.  “It assumes that Brussels should become more powerful while Rome, Berlin and Paris less so. [...] europhiles tend to look for opportunities that might allow them to give carte blanche to Brussels, albeit beginning with apparently limited endeavours. Hence, the EU is supposed to grow through crises, and thanks to crises, whatever the problem or issue, it could foster a slice of national sovereignty that can be cut and brought up to a higher level. Behind this, there is an overarching belief in the higher efficiency of centralisation, which is perhaps the true landmark of modern politics. Politicians trust themselves more than the taxpayers; they seek a single control room, and the more it controls, the better. This approach fits well with a protectionist outlook of economics, which sees Europe (‘fortress Europe’, as some say) as one trading bloc set to countervail others (the US, China).”[7] The centralisation (federalisation) logic rests heavily on the arguments presented by legalism. On the one hand, it derives from the strict and literal reading of regulations. On the other, it implies that no sphere of life should be left unregulated. Consequently, overregulation has become a characteristic feature of the European Union.[8] Additionally, the overregulation leads to the often cited democratic deficit,[9] exemplified by the fact that the majority of European legislation that EU member states are obliged to follow is proposed by nonelected technocrats working for the European Commission. - Demographic Decline and Social Welfare An ageing population and falling birth rates threaten the EU’s long-term economic stability and social welfare systems. With a shrinking workforce, funding pensions, healthcare, and social services is increasingly difficult, particularly in weaker economies. This demographic shift also amplifies labour shortages, prompting debates over immigration as a solution—yet one that risks further political backlash as it will inevitably affect European identity. According to available data, Europe is the only continent projected to experience population decline until 2070, with the EU's working-age population (20–64 years) expected to decrease by around 20%. Concurrently, the share of older individuals (65 years or older) will be the second highest globally among large economies. This demographic shift poses significant challenges, potentially undermining the EU's economic and social model, exacerbating existing disparities, and creating political divisions among Member States if not adequately addressed.[10] According to Eurostat, The natural population change (difference between live births and deaths) has been negative since 2012. This is primarily due to the ageing population described in this publication and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2022.[11] - Economic Competitiveness and Growth After the so-called Big Bang Enlargement, all available data suggests that the gap between the EU and the US with regards to GDP output has been steadily growing, that is to say, that the US economy, which recently has been experiencing huge problems, still has been developing faster than the EU.[12] Contemporary the EU is grappling with stagnating economic growth and a loss of competitiveness compared to global powers like the United States and China. High regulatory burdens, internal market fragmentation, and insufficient investment in innovation and technology hinder its ability to keep pace. The growing threat of US tariffs under a second Trump administration will only likely exacerbate these issues, disrupting supply chains and increasing costs. Additionally, the EU’s energy dependence—highlighted by the shift away from Russian gas after the Ukraine invasion—has driven up costs, further straining industries and economies, particularly in countries like Germany.[13] - Weakness as an international actor Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose a significant security challenge. The conflict has exposed the EU’s reliance on NATO and the US for defence while increasing pressure to bolster its own military capabilities—sometimes referred to as a ‘European Defence Union’. Tensions with China, particularly over trade and technology, and uncertainty about US commitment to transatlantic alliances add to the geopolitical strain. The EU must also address hybrid threats (e.g., cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting critical sectors like energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. In light of this, Americans are already calling for much more input from the European members of NATO regarding their defence budgets (5% of GDP).[14] This will most likely reinvigorate calls for creating a European Army,[15] which no doubt will be dominated by Germany and France. German domination will be met with considerable unease by some Central and Eastern European Countries (members of the EU). At the same time as the recent meeting, Ryiad shows the US is not even treating the EU as a partner worthy of a place at the negotiating table.[16]When pressed by the likes of Trump and charged with not sharing a fair part of their own security costs, European political leaders invoke the notion of Europe as a normative power. Supposedly, though weak militarily, the EU and its members are a beacon of values such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In his seminal publications, Iaan Manners, argued that the EU's unique historical context, hybrid political structure, and legal constitution enable it to promote norms that go beyond state-centric concerns, particularly in areas such as human rights and the abolition of the death penalty. Manners claims that the EU's ability to define what is considered 'normal' in world politics is a significant aspect of its power, and this normative approach is crucial for understanding the EU's role in shaping international relations.[17] As nice as it sounds, it does not seem to bear much weight in the practice of international security in recent decades. It is the EU, in fact, as an institution and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the European Commissioner, who stand accused now of contradicting all of the above-mentioned values. The latest visit by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Kiev, and her strong support for the continuation of war against Russia is a case in point.[18]   - Ideologisation 'Europeanism' has become an ideology shared among intellectual, political, judicatory, societal,  and even dominant economic elites that influence or shape the European Union as an institution and its major policies. As an ideology, 'Europeanism' is a somewhat exotic mixture of various seemingly incoherent trends that give the current European Union its intriguing characteristics. On the one hand, economically, one can easily identify numerous elements of neoliberalism, especially regarding the financial aspects of European integration. Likewise, arguments used by the major proponents of European integration vis-à-vis the USA, China, or Japan are of neoliberal character. At the same time, regarding international trade in agricultural products, intellectual property, or internal (single market) competition (freedom of labour), one quickly spots distinct elements of protectionism and overregulation. Finally, regarding philosophical outlook and especially moral issues, 'Europeanism' seems to focus mainly on the progressive agenda and a particular ‘obsession’ with climate change revocation. Conclusion As the Munich Security Conference confirmed, EU political elites are way out of touch with reality and a rapidly changing world. Their proverbial Europocentrism is based on, among others, self-precepted moral high grounds, a history of economic and political domination and exploitation, and an undiscerning belief in bureaucratic, if not technocratic, policy-making and regulation of every sphere of life and institutionalism. Their weakness is probably most accurately depicted by the reaction of the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Christoph Heusgen, who broke down during his closing remarks, unable to finish his speech.[19] He was patted on the back and given a hug. (This reaction must have undoubtedly caused bewilderment, if not pity, in Washinton, Beijing, and Moscow.) The original integration goals have little to do with today’s Eureaucrats’ obsessions with saving the planet or pushing for Diversity, Equality, and Inclusivity (DEI). With the election of Donald Trump, the world of the ‘Davos Men’ seems to be stalled. Interestingly, the EU is now one of the last standing actors to represent the ideology of globalism, with its tenets based on neoliberalism - unlimited free trade and the capturing role of international transnational companies. The rest of the world, including the US, seems to be moving in the opposite direction – the world driven by state actors. The world order, therefore, is likely to be directed by strong and nationally based governments from no, possibly the US, China and Russia – a ‘Concert of Powers’ of sorts. References ________________________________________[1] The Federal Government (2022) Speech By Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at The Charles University In Prague On Monday, August 29 2022. Available at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752[2] “Fit for 55”, European Council. Council of the European Union. European Green Deal. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/fit-for-55-the-eu-plan-for-a-green-transition/[3] Tanno, Sophie and Liakos, Chris. “Farmers’ protests have erupted across Europe. Here’s why.” CNN, World, Europe. Last modified February 10, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/03/europe/europe-farmers-protests-explainer-intl/index.html[4] Sliwinski, Krzysztof. “‘A-Securitization’ of Immigration Policy - the Case of European Union.” Asia–Pacific Journal of EU Studies 14, no. 1: 25 -56.[5] Körömi, Csongor. “Hungary reveals plan to send asylum-seekers to Brussels.” Politico August 22. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-asylum-plan-brussels-migration-refugees-gergely-gulyas/[6] Pangambam, S. “Full Transcript: VP JD Vance. Remarks at the Munich Security Conference”. The SIngju Post. https://singjupost.com/full-transcript-vp-jd-vance-remarks-at-the-munich-security-conference/?singlepage=1[7] Mingardi, Alberto, “The EU’s future: Like Switzerland or more like Italy?”GIS, May 20, 2022. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-future/ see also: Dunleavy, P., and G. Kirchgässner. “Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis.” Edited by P. Moser, G. Schneider, and G. Kirchgässner. Decision Rules in the European Union, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_7.[8] Van Malleghem, Pieter-Augustijn. “Legalism and the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis.” European Law Open 3, no. 1 (2024): 50–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/elo.2024.5.[9] Neuhold, C. Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.1141.[10] Zalai, Csaba. “Too Little Too Late?” Európai Tükör 27, no. 1 (December 13, 2024): 169–93. https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2024.1.9.[11] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/demography-2024#population-change[12] See more at: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/wld/world/gdp-gross-domestic-product[13] See more at: https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-outlook-2025-the-impact-of-a-new-US-presidency?utm_campaign=MA00001133&utm_medium=paid-search&utm_source=eiu-google&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiA8fW9BhC8ARIsACwHqYqwk_M8I--YkZ_fiDS6leiOiRLjPXlG63SHjKwQZgP2kaovx_sc4qIaAkGYEALw_wcB[14] See more at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/trump-says-nato-members-should-spend-5-of-gdp-on-defence/ and https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-tells-allies-spend-5-percent-gdp-defense-nato/[15] See more at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgl27x74wpo[16] See more at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-russia-meeting-improving-relations-ukraine-war/[17] Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 235–58. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.[18] See more at: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/24/ursula-von-der-leyen-arrives-in-kyiv-with-35-billion-in-fresh-aid-for-weapons[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BhNy0u5-ijY

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском War is a numbers game. Each side involved must marshal the supplies, troops and firepower needed to sustain the fight, thwart advancing armies and, hopefully, prevail. But it’s also a game of uncertainty. For the past three years, Ukraine’s military planners have had to approach every battle with a series of cold calculations: How much ammunition is left? How many air defense interceptors can be fired today, without running short tomorrow? Do we have the men and equipment needed to advance or hold position? But now, with U.S. military assistance on hold and European support constrained by economic realities, that uncertainty is growing. As an expert on warfare, I know this isn’t just a logistical problem; it’s a strategic one. When commanders can’t predict their future resource base, they are forced to take fewer risks, prioritize defense over offense and hedge against worst-case scenarios. In war, uncertainty doesn’t just limit options. It shapes the entire battlefield and fate of nations. Trump orders a pause On March 3, 2025, President Donald Trump announced a suspension to all U.S. military aid to Ukraine. It followed a fractious Oval Office meeting between the U.S. president and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after which Trump declared the Ukrainian leader “not ready for peace.” Two days later, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe announced Washington was also pausing all intelligence sharing and ordered key allies such as the United Kingdom to limit the information they give Kyiv. National security adviser Michael Waltz has linked the pause to ongoing U.S.-Ukrainian negotiations, stating that weapons supplies and intelligence sharing will resume once Ukraine agrees to a date for peace talks with Russia. A critical supplier of weapons Any pause, no matter how long, will hurt Ukraine. The U.S. has been the largest provider of military assistance to Kyiv since Russia’s 2022 invasion, followed by the European Union. While the level of support is debated – it is often skewed by how one calculates equipment donations using presidential drawdown authority, through which the president can dip into the Department of Defense’s inventory – the U.S. has undoubtedly delivered critical weapons systems and a wide range of ammunition. Though this assistance has decreased U.S. military stockpiles, it has helped Washington invest in its domestic defense industry and expand weapons production. In addition, while Europe is starting to increase its own defense expenditures, EU members are stuck with flat economic growth and limits on how much they can borrow to invest in their own militaries, much less Ukraine. This makes the U.S. a critical partner for Ukraine for at least another two years while Europe expands its military capacity. These conditions affect the design of Ukraine’s military campaigns. Planners in Kyiv have to balance predictions about the enemy’s strengths and possible courses of action with assessments of their own resources. This war ledger helps evaluate where to attack and where to defend. Uncertainty skews such calculation. The less certain a military command is about its resource base, the more precarious bold military maneuvers become. It is through this fog of uncertainty that any pause in assistance shapes the course of the war in Ukraine and the bargaining leverage of all parties at the negotiating table. A new uncertain world The White House has indicated that the pause in military aid and intelligence sharing will be lifted once a date for peace talks is set. But even if U.S. weapons and intel begin to flow again, Ukrainian generals will have to fight the duration of the war under the knowledge that its greatest backer is willing to turn off the taps when it suits them. And the consequences of this new uncertain world will be felt on the battlefield. Ukraine now faces a brutal trade-off: stretch limited resources to maintain an active defense across the front, or consolidate forces, cede ground and absorb the political costs of trading space for time. Material supply has shaped operational tempo over the course of the war. When Moscow expects Kyiv to be low on ammunition, it presses the attack. In fact, key Russian gains in eastern Ukraine in 2024 coincided with periods of critical supply shortages. Russia used its advantage in artillery shells, which at times saw Moscow firing 20 artillery shells to every Ukrainian artillery shell fired, and air superiority to make advances north and west of the strategic city of Avdiivka. Looking to the front lines in 2025, Russia could use any pause in supplies to support its ongoing offensive operations that stretch from Kherson in southern Ukraine to Kharkiv in the north and efforts to dislodge Ukrainian units in the Russian Kursk region. This means Ukraine will have to decide where to hold the line and where to conduct a series of delaying actions designed to wear down Russian forces. Trading space for time is an old military tactic, but it produces tremendous political costs when the terrain is your sovereign territory. As such, the military logic of delaying actions creates political risks in Ukraine – sapping civilian morale and undermining support for the government’s war management. A horrible choice This dilemma will drive where and how Ukraine weights its efforts on the battlefield. First, long-range strike operations against Russia will become increasingly less attractive. Every drone that hits an oil refinery in Russia is one less warhead stopping a Russian breakthrough in the Donbas or counterattack in Kursk. Ukraine will have to reduce the complexity of its defensive campaign and fall back along lines deeper within its own territory. Second, Russia doesn’t fight just on the battlefield – it uses a coercive air campaign to gain leverage at the negotiating table. With U.S. military aid on hold, Moscow has a prime opportunity to escalate its strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, forcing Kyiv into painful choices about whether to defend its front lines or its political center of gravity. From Vietnam to Ukraine, airpower has historically been a key bargaining tool in negotiations. President Richard Nixon bombed North Vietnam to force concessions. Russia may now do the same to Ukraine. Seen in this light, Russia could intensify its missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure – both to weaken defenses and to apply psychological and economic pressure. And because Kyiv relies on Western assistance, including intelligence and systems such as U.S.-built Patriot surface-to-air missiles to defend its skies, this coercive campaign could become effective. As a result, Ukraine could be faced with a horrible choice. It may have to concentrate dwindling air defenses around either key military assets required to defend the front or its political center of gravity in Kyiv. Interception rates of Russian drones and missiles could drop, leading to either opportunities for a Russian breakout along the front or increased civilian deaths that put domestic pressure on Ukrainian negotiators. Uncertainty reigns supreme The real problem for Ukraine going forward is that even if the U.S. resumes support and intelligence sharing, the damage is done. Uncertainty, once introduced, is hard to remove. It increases the likelihood that Ukraine’s leaders will stockpile munitions to reduce the risk of future pauses, rather than use them to take the fight to Russia. And with battlefield decision-making now limited, Ukraine’s military strategists will increasingly look toward the least worst option to hold the line until a lasting peace is negotiated.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the resolutely pro-Moscow approach of the new team in Washington mean that Russia is the big winner in the Ukrainian war at this stage? That Ukraine will have resisted for three years for (almost) nothing? That the United States will reap the long-term benefits of this strategic position in Europe? And will the EU be marginalized and reduced to a secondary role on its own continent? Visible success should not obscure the strategic setbacks of the self-proclaimed winners. Ever since the second Trump administration unilaterally opened direct and exclusive talks with Russia on the fate of Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on 18 February, MAGA communicators everywhere have heralded the end of the conflict. Even if a simple ceasefire now seems highly unlikely, the new American president proclaims that he will soon lead the "peace side" to victory, since he claims to be its leader. Who knows if he will have the courage to apply for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize himself? After three years of war, if the terms of negotiation announced last week are confirmed, we must return to the essential question of victory and the corollary question of defeat: who can claim the title of victor in this armed conflict? And, conversely, who is to be condemned to the status of the vanquished? The war of narratives has long since doubled and intensified the military war: European geopolitics is now confronted with a viral narrative that portrays Russia and the United States as winners to relegate Europeans and Ukrainians to the status of "losers". But if geopolitics feed on narratives, narratives - especially propaganda narratives - do not exhaust the strategic situation. As Machiavelli noted in Chapter XVII of The Prince: "The politician knows how to create illusions, but when it comes to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of an enemy, he must avoid relying solely on his eyes (which judge appearances) and instead use his hands (which feel reality). Let us be clear: at this stage of Ukraine debate, the reality of victory and the irreversibility of defeat are still matters of narrative. Let us plunge into reality. Ukraine, now vilified and resilient According to the Trumpian narrative broadcast everywhere today, Ukraine and its president must be treated as losers, even defeated. Everything about the behaviour of the American president and his team is aimed at hastening and consecrating the country's defeat: After having been asked to surrender its rare earth resources at rock-bottom prices, Ukraine, like the vanquished in the two world wars, is being excluded from the negotiating table on its own destiny by its self-appointed protector; its legitimate government is being openly denigrated and its legitimacy undermined; it is even being threatened with "war sanctions" to compensate the United States for the financial effort it has made to support it in the face of an illegal invasion. Beneath the strategic shift and the military evasion lies a continuity: for the United States, Ukraine is not a participant but a stake. Ukraine's symbolic defeat - that of history - is obviously compounded by its real setbacks. In addition to the 80,000 to 120,000 soldiers killed on the battlefield, the country of forty-three million people has lost more than six million refugees and millions of citizens who have been incorporated into the Russian Federation. And more than 20% of its territory is now in danger of officially falling under Russian sovereignty. Deprived by the Trump administration of the prospect of NATO membership, it risks a demilitarization comparable to that imposed on Germany after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At a time when symbolic defeat seems destined to go hand in hand with human and material misery, Ukraine can only save itself from despair by remembering that it has manifested its national identity - so often denied - with arms in hand. The narrative is that of a failed, slaughtered state, while the strategic reality is that of a state that has repelled the total occupation of its territory. The Ukrainians may not be the winners, but they are not "losers" reduced to an international minority. The United States, strategically discredited Can Washington, for its part, claim the trophy of strategic victory in Ukraine? Is the second Trump administration not determining the destiny of the old continent just as the Biden administration claimed to do, but in a different direction? Can't the United States now, more than ever, claim to be Europe's arbiter? Nothing is less certain: Ukraine's policies over the past decade (the Obama, Trump 1, and Biden administrations) have indeed demonstrated the United States' refusal to play a leadership role in Europe. They encouraged Ukraine's inflexibility towards Russia but failed to prevent it from annexing Crimea in 2014, escalating tensions under the first Trump administration, and then invading in 2022. It then supported it for almost three years, only to disown it in a political transition. Washington has behaved not as a leader but as an arsonist in Ukraine, declaring on the one hand that Kyiv should be free to pursue its alliance policy but ruling out any concrete prospect of NATO membership on the other. One of the main lessons of Washington's Ukraine policy is that being one of the United States' "allies" is a risky business: not only does it leave you at the mercy of sudden shifts in alliances, but it also exposes you to constant admonishment and vilification on the international stage. The Europeans have paid the price: criticized by the Biden administration for their pacifism at the start of the war, they are now being criticized, along with the Ukrainians, for failing to bring the war to an end. The United States has made no major strategic gains in this war: it has undermined its own network of allies, damaged its largest military alliance in the world, NATO, and failed to dislodge its strategic regional rival, Russia. Trump's communication tricks will not change this: the United States has suffered undeniable structural strategic setbacks in this conflict. The long Ukrainian crisis, from the Orange Revolution to the current talks, via Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea, is the opposite of a show of strength for US international strategy: it is a financially costly and strategically ruinous fiasco. The contamination effect on Asian alliances is likely to be massive and rapid: who will want to rely on the American umbrella against the People's Republic of China? Russia, permanently "de-Europeanized What about Russia? Is it the big winner in all this? After all, hasn't it received the promise of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, its demilitarization, and its transformation into a rump state between Russian and EU territory? In addition to the 20% of Ukrainian territory (population and natural resources) it has seized, it wants to enjoy the prestige of being treated as a strategic peer by the United States. But is this a victory, even a Pyrrhic one? In historical terms, Moscow has lost in just a few years all the investment it made in its dialogue with the West between 1990 and 2000. It has deliberately squandered its relations with its natural economic outlet: Europe. Russia has been permanently de-Europeanized and will pay the price of this divorce in the form of lower growth potential (loss of markets, investors, assets) and in the form of a substantial defence effort that it will have to maintain in the long term throughout its western part, unless political forces favorable to it come to power simultaneously in the main EU countries, which seems unlikely. Again, we must measure this success with our hands, not our eyes: Russia has not achieved all its war aims, far from it. It did not make Ukraine disappear, and it did not make NATO retreat. Will this strategic hiatus - deliberately pursued by Russia in this war - be compensated for by a successful "pivot to Asia"? At best, the People's Republic of China could give Russia the role of "brilliant second" that Prussia gave Austria-Hungary. It is not so much a Pyrrhic victory as a strategic gamble that China has taken, the payoff of which is neither certain nor substantial. The EU faces up to its responsibilities Despite the condescending statements of the second Trump administration, can the EU claim to have made any strategic gains in this war? Again, the gains are meagre and the costs high: it has made great strides in terms of its capabilities but has not moved into a war economy; it is supporting the Ukrainian state at arm's length but has not forced its way to the negotiating table. If it proves reactive and creative, it can, in the medium term, take advantage of the gaping holes left by Russia and the United States on the European scene. As a result, it can no longer attract states to its side without the threat of arms. The Union must therefore quickly resume its enlargement efforts in order not to leave any space on its doorstep. On the other hand, the United States has openly renounced its status as Europe's protector: it wants to be its ideological dynamo, its industrial and technological supplier, and its strategic dominator. If Europe does not want to be among the losers in the Ukrainian war, it must therefore resolutely take full responsibility for its own defence. The time has come.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Trump escalates his trade war rhetoric and has just begun his second term. In response to the Colombian government's protest over the conditions of its citizens' deportation, the 47th U.S. president retaliated with a furious announcement of a 25% tariff hike, forcing Petro to withdraw his demands. Against Canada and Mexico, his neighbors and trade partners, he has just signed another 25% tariff increase. The reasons? According to Trump, their borders are a sieve for drugs and illegal immigrants. As for China, he has so far imposed a 10% tariff, though his campaign promise was 60%. In the 21st century, trade wars are one of the most controversial strategic tools in international relations. The Economy: A Geostrategic Factor Tariffs have historically been used to protect local industries and balance trade deficits. However, their current use goes beyond their original purpose. These policies have transformed global economic dynamics, reshaping supply chains and markets, and profoundly impacting geopolitical, social, and financial structures. Competitiveness and Technological Strength The contemporary use of trade wars follows a more complex and multifaceted logic. In the case of the United States, for example, the tariffs imposed by recent administrations have aimed both to limit China’s competitiveness and to preserve U.S. technological and economic supremacy. This strategy, however, is not limited to a bilateral confrontation. The United States has also imposed trade barriers on traditional partners such as the European Union and Canada. As a result, traditional alliances have become secondary to the unilateral goal of maximizing profits. This policy has been justified under national security arguments, a legal tool that has generated tensions within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and challenges the principles of non-discrimination and multilateralism that have underpinned the global trade system since the mid-20th century. The impact of these policies affects both intergovernmental relations and, directly, consumers and producers. Tariffs and the Domestic Economy The implementation of tariffs on products from China, such as technological goods and manufactured equipment, has driven up their prices in markets like the United States. As always happens when goods become more expensive, this has especially harmed the most vulnerable sectors of the population by exacerbating economic inequalities and reducing their purchasing power. To maintain competitiveness, many companies have opted to relocate their operations to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, or Mexico, which entails transition and adaptation costs. Regionalization against Protectionism At a global level, trade wars have triggered a phenomenon of regionalization, leading to the creation of agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), led by China and signed by countries in Asia and Oceania, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which includes nations from the Pacific coasts of Asia and Latin America. Through these agreements, the signatory countries seek to counteract the effects of U.S. protectionist policies. Since 2019, the United States has blocked the appointment of new members to the WTO Appellate Body, weakening its ability to resolve disputes and increasing uncertainty, as well as the likelihood of escalating trade tensions. While regionalization forces a reassessment of the sustainability of the multilateral trade system, in this climate of instability and uncertainty, countries are searching for alternatives that ensure economic stability — though these solutions ultimately reinforce the fragmentation of global trade. Trade War and Geopolitics The impact of trade wars is also evident in the geopolitical sphere. The rivalry between the United States and China, driven in part by tariffs and technological restrictions, is redefining international alliances. On one hand, countries like Japan and South Korea have strengthened ties with the United States to counter China’s influence. On the other hand, emerging economies in Latin America, such as Mexico and Brazil, face pressure to align with one of these blocs, limiting their maneuverability and autonomy on the global stage. In Europe, tensions with the United States have led the European Union to prepare new tariffs and strengthen regulations to protect its strategic industries, such as the automotive and technology sectors. Uncertainty and Volatility While the imposition of tariffs can provide immediate benefits to the countries that implement them — whether in terms of tax revenue or political influence — their social and economic costs can be significant. Trade wars impact the flow of goods and services but also financial stability. Trade tensions increase stock market volatility, influence investment decisions, and weaken global economic growth prospects. The uncertainty generated by protectionism forces companies to adapt to an ever-changing and unpredictable environment. Trade wars have exposed the fragility of global supply chains, underscored the importance of diversifying production sources, and highlighted the need to strengthen multilateral institutions that promote fair and equitable trade. What to Do? The solution goes beyond simply removing tariffs or reversing protectionist policies; a more strategic and resilient approach is needed. This involves fostering international cooperation to address trade tensions, reforming the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanisms, and promoting the relocation of supply chains to more stable regions. Countries that impose tariffs must also consider the impact of these measures on households. Rising prices should prompt policies to mitigate growing social inequalities and protect the most vulnerable sectors. The trade wars of the 21st century reflect a complex balance between protecting national interests and preserving global stability. The key to progress lies in adopting a cooperative and sustainable approach that, beyond immediate economic benefits, also considers collective well-being and international cohesion in the medium and long term.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ukraine is no longer in control of its own war; great power politics have overtaken its struggle for sovereignty, as seen in its exclusion from key diplomatic negotiations and its increasing reliance on external military and economic aid. While Kyiv fights for survival, the U.S. and Russia pursue larger strategic goals, reshaping the global order. This is not a war of democracy versus autocracy—it is a battle over power and influence, with Ukraine caught in the middle. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. has framed the war as a defense of democracy, shaping public perception and policy decisions by justifying increased military aid and economic sanctions against Russia. This framing has also strengthened NATO cohesion and rallied Western support for Ukraine, though critics argue it oversimplifies the conflict’s geopolitical realities. But this narrative masks a deeper reality: a geopolitical contest over Eastern Europe’s balance of power. The U.S. strengthens NATO to contain Russia; Russia fights to keep Ukraine in its orbit. As a result, Ukraine’s ability to act independently is shrinking. At the core of the conflict is a long-standing power struggle between Washington and Moscow. The U.S. aims to maintain dominance over European security, while Russia seeks to dismantle the post-Cold War order that placed NATO on its borders. The Kremlin has repeatedly warned that Ukraine’s Western alignment is a red line, but U.S. policymakers have dismissed these concerns as revisionist grievances rather than legitimate security threats. This deadlock has turned Ukraine into the focal point of an escalating power struggle. For Russia, the war is not just about territory—it is about status. Vladimir Putin frames the conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, citing NATO’s expansion and U.S. military aid to Kyiv as provocations. Moscow’s broader goal is to force a realignment in European security, one that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence and weakens U.S. hegemony. Under Joe Biden, the U.S. provided billions in military and economic aid to Ukraine, arguing that supporting Kyiv was essential for upholding the liberal order. However, as the war drags on and domestic concerns over foreign spending grow, this approach is being reassessed. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, U.S. policy has shifted toward a transactional approach, a shift that became evident when he excluded Ukraine from recent U.S.-Russia negotiations in Saudi Arabia, dismissal of NATO allies’ calls for a unified stance against Russia, and willingness to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin—effectively sidelining Kyiv from key discussions that will determine its future. His strategy prioritizes economic agreements over direct military support, shifting U.S. engagement toward a pragmatic recalibration of interests. This shift was further highlighted during the recent confrontation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House. The meeting, originally intended to finalize a U.S.-Ukraine rare-earth minerals deal, devolved into a heated exchange. Trump accused Zelenskyy of being “disrespectful” and “gambling with World War III,” revealing deep fractures in U.S.-Ukraine relations. The cancellation of a planned joint press conference underscored the breakdown in diplomatic relations, signaling that Ukraine’s leverage in negotiations with Washington is diminishing. The Trump administration’s treatment of Zelenskyy serves as a stark warning to smaller nations reliant on Western support. It highlights the precarious nature of alliances based on strategic convenience rather than genuine commitment to democratic values or sovereignty. Ukraine, once a symbol of Western resolve against Russian aggression, is now being subjected to political maneuvering that undermines its struggle for self-determination. The world is witnessing how great powers prioritize their own interests above the survival of their supposed allies, reinforcing the notion that smaller states can never fully trust the policies of global hegemons. This behavior is not just characteristic of Trump and his administration but is a fundamental aspect of how great powers operate. They perceive their own interests and ideological positions as superior to those of smaller nations, imposing their will under the guise of strategic necessity. The treatment of Ukraine illustrates this dynamic vividly—portraying Ukraine’s justified struggle for sovereignty as though it were a reckless endeavor rather than an existential fight against aggression. The U.S. and its allies, despite claiming to defend Ukraine, have manipulated its war effort for their own geopolitical advantage while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for the very crisis it was forced into. Trump recently emphasized this approach in a statement following a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit. He highlighted a proposed “Critical Minerals and Rare-Earths Deal” between the U.S. and Ukraine, describing it as an “Economic Partnership” aimed at recouping American investments while aiding Ukraine’s economic recovery. Simultaneously, he revealed discussions with President Vladimir Putin regarding an end to the war and potential U.S.-Russia economic cooperation, signaling a shift away from military support toward economic and diplomatic agreements. However, tensions flared when Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelenskyy during his February 28 visit, accusing him of ingratitude and pressuring him into a peace deal on U.S. terms. The heated exchange led to the cancellation of a joint press conference and minerals deal signing ceremony. Zelenskyy left the White House abruptly, further deepening the rift between Ukraine and its supposed ally. The public fallout reinforced how great powers prioritize their own strategic interests over the sovereignty of smaller nations, leaving Ukraine increasingly sidelined in decisions that determine its fate. As global power struggles intensify, Ukraine finds itself increasingly excluded from decisions about its own future. Kyiv remains committed to its defense, but external actors—Washington and Moscow—are negotiating their interests over Ukraine’s fate. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s exclusion from key diplomatic discussions, such as the Saudi-hosted talks, underscores this reality. While Biden framed Ukraine as a vital partner in the West’s struggle against Russia, Trump’s approach suggests that Kyiv’s role may be reduced to a bargaining chip in a larger geopolitical realignment.  The Ukraine crisis illustrates the brutal calculus of great power politics, where smaller states become instruments of broader strategic struggles. The U.S.-Russia rivalry has dictated the war’s course, with shifting U.S. policies—from Biden’s interventionism to Trump’s pragmatism—reshaping its trajectory. As Washington and Moscow explore possible diplomatic realignments, Ukraine’s sovereignty risks becoming secondary to great power interests. Great powers dictate the terms of war and peace, leaving Ukraine with fewer choices of its own. The question is not whether Ukraine will survive, but under whose terms it will exist. The text of this work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.  For proper attribution, please refer to the original source

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском It was to be expected, and we were poorly prepared for it, Donald Trump’s phone call to Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly ended 75 years of transatlantic relations. We, the French, had long warned that our security interests with the United States were not always aligned and that these differences could lead to serious disputes. There was the Suez Canal in 1956, there was Iraq in 2003, and there was, in a more moderate sense, Macron’s brain-dead stance on a dispute arising from Turkey’s actions in Syria in 2019. From now on, there will be February 12, 2025. But today, the situation is more serious because it is the security of Europe itself that is at stake, the very security that forms the heart of the existence of the Atlantic alliance. One can understand that the war in Ukraine is unwinnable and that a solution must be found to stop this war. One can understand that Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a red line for Russia. One can also understand that the United States wants Europeans to take a more significant share of the burden of their defence. However, the problem is that the United States made Ukraine’s NATO membership a goal of the Atlantic alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, against the advice of France and Germany at the time, thus worsening a relationship with Russia that was already deteriorating. The problem also is that Trump wants to negotiate peace between Ukraine and Russia without inviting the European Union and other European countries to the negotiating table, while Europe’s security is at stake. The risk is now clear: a form of bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia, benefiting the interests of both countries, could leave Ukraine severely weakened and an easy prey for Moscow, thereby weakening other European countries consequently. As a consolation prize, we will have to ensure Europe’s conventional security, as US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth announced to Europeans at the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting held in Brussels on 12–13 February 2025. This situation will place Europeans in a terrible dilemma: Either they do not wish to give security guarantees to Ukraine and completely discredit themselves in the eyes of powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, as Europeans will have shown that they are unable to defend the continent, while also creating a significant long-term risk to Europe’s security.Or they provide security guarantees to Ukraine, accepting the cost of a financial burden that will affect the European Union’s competitiveness in the long term.In light of this situation, some advocate for the establishment of a European pillar within NATO. This solution, however, seems outdated given the new context. If one considers that the United States is negotiating peace in Europe without and against the Europeans, and that they no longer wish to defend Europe with conventional military means (will they respect the NATO Defence Planning Process?), it is better for Europeans to fully take on Europe’s security. This would mean taking control of NATO: Europeans must quickly discuss this option and communicate their decision to Secretary General Mark Rutte. It will also be easier to make NATO and the European Union work together with a more Europeanised organisation.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The commitment to free trade is based on the competitive advantage that nations gain from possessing certain material and human resources that are scarce in other countries. The exchange of goods under the umbrella of free trade results in a global benefit, as it fosters economic growth, improves the quality of goods, and diversifies supply. The free trade doctrine, which has governed international trade in recent decades, is opposed by protectionism, which seeks to favor domestic producers over foreign competition. Above All, Protectionism Trump's campaign to win votes from the U.S. automotive and agricultural sectors was based on extreme protectionism – which we could call the ‘Trump Doctrine’ – centered on the promise of raising tariffs on products from competing countries. The increase in tariffs to boost domestic production in non-competitive sectors clashes with the rules of the World Trade Organization and the already established trade relations with exporting countries. On the other hand, those who silently suffer from Trump's protectionist measures are American consumers, who will have to pay higher prices for imported products that are currently cheaper. The need to reorganize international trade flows had already been raised due to the existence of ecological, social, or economic dumping. In response to violations of competition rules and the presence of discriminatory situations, agricultural groups have demanded mirror clauses to ensure that imported products comply with the same regulations as domestic ones. However, all these proposals have been made within a negotiating framework and not in a disruptive and unilateral manner, as the Trump Doctrine does. Tariff Increases Specifically, the U.S. has formalized a 25% tariff on steel and aluminum from other countries, set to take effect on March 4. This impacts the Spanish industrial sector, which exports aluminum worth 500 million to the U.S. market. There are still no details on which Spanish agri-food products (such as wine, olive oil, meat, and dairy) may be affected and to what extent by the Trump Doctrine. Latin American countries are also at risk: in 2021, 86% of their agri-food exports were destined for three regions — the U.S. (23%), the EU (18%), and China (13%). The EU and Latin American countries belonging to Mercosur have the advantage of having signed an agreement in December 2024, which will allow them to strengthen their trade relations and potentially offset losses in the U.S. market. In response to these tariff attacks, countries have reacted by attempting to reach agreements among the affected nations. The European Union and Canada have met to design a joint strategy against the Trump Doctrine, and China is also considering reorganizing its trade flows, which could provide some relief for its exports. However, the damage caused by tariffs is global and does not only affect exporting countries. In the United States, there will be negative impacts on consumers and businesses in the form of higher prices and even shortages or the disappearance of some imported products. United States-Europe Trade Relations There is no free trade agreement between Europe and the United States, although an attempt was made, without success, to establish the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, progress has been made in harmonizing food safety regulations, quality standards, and data privacy rules. Nevertheless, Trump accuses Europe of "treating the United States very badly" and has warned that they must balance the "$350 billion" trade deficit. In Europe, the most exposed sectors to the threat of U.S. protectionism are aerospace, automotive, and agri-food. The countries at the highest risk include Germany (automotive), France (aerospace), the Netherlands (petrochemical), Italy (pharmaceutical), Ireland (technology), and Spain (agri-food), as they have the most open economies to foreign trade. On the other hand, the United States exports high-tech products, machinery, chemicals, and agricultural goods (corn, soy, meat) to Europe. In the digital sector, major U.S. companies (Amazon, Google, Apple, Meta) are well-positioned in the Old Continent, often engaging in market dominance abuses that the EU has attempted to curb through fines and legislative changes. Spanish exports to the United States focus on automobiles, machinery, and pharmaceutical and agri-food products (wine, olive oil, meat, dairy, and horticultural products). U.S. imports into the Spanish market primarily consist of machinery, electronic products, pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agricultural goods. The U.S. has invested in Spain in the automotive, technology, energy, distribution, and finance sectors. In turn, Spain has a presence in the North American market in the distribution sector (Inditex, Mango), renewable energy (Iberdrola, Acciona, Naturgy), communications, and infrastructure (Ferrovial, ACS, Sacyr). The Technological Battle A fierce competition is emerging in the development of space travel, military technology, and integrated artificial intelligence. In the geopolitical landscape, development cooperation, armed conflicts, climate change, and environmental sustainability are key issues to consider. We have just witnessed how restrictions on the supply of microprocessors stimulated China's creativity in the tech sector. China welcomed the new year with DeepSeek, its own AI model — with similar capabilities to ChatGPT but significantly lower costs — which has shaken the U.S. tech industry and triggered a stock market upheaval. Meanwhile, the EU is now trying to shake off its role as a mere spectator in the development of these new technologies and has just announced a €200 billion investment in the development of European AI. It is important to remember that Europe has been a pioneer in AI legislation, with the Artificial Intelligence Act approved by its Parliament at the end of 2023.  Outlook and Solutions The impact of trade wars depends, on one hand, on the measures imposed (tariff, fiscal, or regulatory) and the volume of existing trade flows. However, the characteristics of the regions, economic sectors, and affected social groups also play a crucial role. In the final countdown, before the implementation of the new tariffs, the United States reached a preliminary agreement with Mexico and Canada, granting a one-month pause before enforcing the announced tariffs. In the case of China, its response to the U.S. threat was to announce similar tariff increases on American products. Among European countries, there are different strategic approaches to the Trump Doctrine. The positions of the Paris-Berlin axis — ready to respond to U.S. tariff threats — and the Rome-Budapest axis are opposed. It remains to be seen whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who attended Trump's inauguration on January 20, will act as a mediator between the EU and the U.S. or if she will focus solely on securing a favorable position for Italy. Volatility, Uncertainty, Fluctuations A trade war affects foreign investments and creates volatility in financial markets due to the uncertainty it generates. Additionally, it reduces trade exchanges (imports-exports) and causes fluctuations in currency markets. The dilemma of “restructuring or rejection” posed by the Trump Doctrine involves the option of readjusting the existing order or entering into direct competition. For now, tensions remain high, and The Wall Street Journal, one of the major U.S. media outlets, describes the trade war as “absurd,” “unnecessary,” and “stupid.” The reality is that an atmosphere of international insecurity has been created regarding future investments, and stock markets have suffered losses. Meanwhile, the threatened countries insist they will enforce countermeasures, to which Trump responds by threatening to raise tariffs even further.