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Diplomacy
The tenth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting

Who speaks for the Pacific?

by Kerryn Baker , Theresa Meki

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As the Pacific Islands Forum came to an end, the underlying questions remain: who has a voice and legitimacy to influence the region, and who doesn’t  The Pacific Islands – a grouping largely made up of small island developing states – is in the middle of an increasingly contested strategic space, making regional politics an important, and closely observed, site. At the end of August, Pacific Islands Forum heads of government met in Tonga for the organisation’s annual leaders’ meeting. Along with the Pacific heads of government, other dignitaries were also present, including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. This is the apex event on the regional calendar, and it came with a crowded agenda, including issues like climate change, transnational crime and health security. But one of the pressing issues facing the Forum is an existential one, as membership debates and geopolitical tussles highlight: the question of who and what the Forum represents. In recent years, divisions within the region have become apparent, including the perceived marginalisation of North Pacific countries in what was initially called the South Pacific Forum. These tensions culminated in the decision by five Micronesian states to leave the Forum in 2021, although this was later reversed. Yet, the final Forum communiqué demonstrates that Pacific leaders are on the same page on many issues, covering agreed outcomes relating to health, education, fisheries and other key issues. Climate change was highlighted as ‘a matter of priority to the Pacific region’ and as an intersecting and broad-ranging issue affecting Pacific states. A new Pacific Policing Initiative – a proposal to create a multinational Pacific police force and invest in subregional policing hubs – was endorsed, although in a nod to some debate surrounding its implementation, leaders emphasised the need for further consultation. Emerging geopolitical frictions  A controversy over the final version of the communiqué, however, highlights enduring divisions in the Forum. In the communiqué initially published online on Friday afternoon, paragraph 66 read that ‘Leaders reaffirmed the 1992 Leaders decision on relations with Taiwan/Republic of China.’ This refers to Taiwan’s established status as a ‘development partner’ of the Forum. After public statements from China’s special envoy for the Pacific Qian Bo criticising this language, the communiqué was taken offline and revised, with the paragraph referencing Taiwan removed. Forum officials blamed the confusion on an administrative error. Three of the 18 full members of the Forum recognise Taiwan: Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu. While the Pacific was once a key focus of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, its influence has waned in the region in recent years with moves from Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Nauru to shift recognition to Beijing, prompted by a diplomatic offensive by the People’s Republic of China. In an increasingly contested geopolitical context, Taiwan’s status in regards to the Forum is likely to remain a difficult topic for member countries. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not UN member states. In light of rising strategic competition, issues of membership of the Forum also raise existential questions for its future. In 2016, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full Forum members. But their political status does pose interesting questions for the Forum, especially considering the recent riots and ongoing tensions in New Caledonia. In the Forum communiqué, leaders reaffirmed a decision to send a mission to New Caledonia, a move that has been fraught; prior to the meeting, the French Ambassador to the Pacific had asserted that ‘New Caledonia is French territory and it is the [French] State which decides on who enters’. The communiqué also endorsed the applications for associate member status for Guam and American Samoa, two US territories with clear ambitions to accede to full membership status in the future as New Caledonia and French Polynesia have. The concept of sovereignty has always been relatively flexible in the Forum: founding members include the Cook Islands and Niue, which are countries in free association with New Zealand and are not United Nations member states and also do not issue their own passports. Yet, the 2016 decision represented a substantive shift in the principles of Forum membership, one likely to bolster the claims to full membership of other territories. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Forum is becoming more representative in encompassing more Pacific polities and acknowledging the remarkable diversity in political status that exists in the region. On the other, an expanding membership raises questions of the influence of metropolitan powers like France and the US in the Forum. This is an already fraught conversation given the perceived outsized influence of founding member states Australia and New Zealand. Pacific leaders have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. France and the US, along with Australia and New Zealand, all have colonial histories – and, for many, an enduring colonial presence – in the region. Given this context, their present and prospective roles in the Forum have been critiqued as preventing the institution from being a truly Pacific space. Pacific leaders like former Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama have in the past been outspokenly critical about the role of larger countries in the Forum, given the power differentials and differences in policy on key issues like climate change. Behind all of these decisions and controversies are fundamental questions: who has a voice in the Forum and who does not; who has the legitimacy to exert influence in the region and who does not. Resolving these issues in a way that strengthens the Forum’s own legitimacy as the primary regional institution is a pressing and existential matter. In the midst of this, what was not on the Forum agenda is also worth considering. Even in the presence of two elected women heads of government – President Hilda Heine of Marshall Islands and Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa of Samoa – and even following last year’s endorsement of a Revitalised Pacific Leaders Gender Equality Declaration, gender equality is absent from the 2024 communiqué.

Defense & Security
American nuclear button concept. USA missile launches from its underground silo launch facility, 3D rendering

Revision of US Nuclear Operational Guidelines

by Kim Tae-Woo

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Kim Tae-woo, former head of the Institute for Unification Studies Today, I would like to tell you that the US nuclear strategy is changing . As President Biden’s term draws to a close, the US is changing its nuclear weapons operational guidelines. President Biden , like President Obama, originally argued for a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons. That is why, when he took office as president in 2020, he advocated for sole purpose nuclear use and no first use (NFU). ‘Sole purpose nuclear use’ means that the US will only use nuclear weapons when it is directly attacked by nuclear weapons, and NFU is an abbreviation for ‘No First Use’, which means that it will not use nuclear weapons before its adversary. When a president changes, the US publishes a strategy document called the ‘Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)’, which declares its nuclear strategy and nuclear operational policies to the outside world. Allies were concerned that if President Biden included such content in the NPR, they would distrust the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Perhaps conscious of these concerns, the 2022 NPR did not include such content, but President Biden’s nuclear philosophy was reflected throughout the strategy book. As a result, the United States decided to stop developing submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and retire the B83-1 (1.2 mt) missile, an aircraft-delivered nuclear weapon. The Biden administration has changed. In March, it ordered the US military to create nuclear operational guidelines to prepare for a situation in which China, Russia, and North Korea cooperate to launch a nuclear attack on the US, and approved the newly created guidelines. At the same time, it also ordered the development of necessary new weapons and the modernization of the nuclear operational system. In June, the director of the White House National Security Council (NSC)’s nonproliferation office also said, “If the nuclear threat from China, Russia, and North Korea increases, the US will also increase its deployed nuclear weapons,” and hinted at the possibility that “nuclear weapons can be used in conventional warfare.” This is a reversal of President Biden’s policy of giving up preemptive nuclear use. In this way, President Biden is adopting new nuclear operational guidelines and nuclear doctrine while changing his previous position with less than a year left in his term. The reason for this change in the US nuclear doctrine is that he is taking the nuclear arms buildup of China, Russia, and North Korea very seriously in the new Cold War situation, and the strategic focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is changing from ‘North Korea’s nuclear abandonment’ to ‘prevention of nuclear use.’ Although the sensitive parts of the newly created nuclear weapons operational guidelines have not been made public, it is known that they contain explicit concerns about China’s nuclear arms buildup. The guidelines are based on the US Department of Defense’s estimate that China’s nuclear weapons will increase to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, and are intended to prepare for the possibility that China could threaten the US by cooperating with Russia and North Korea on nuclear weapons. The same goes for North Korea. In March, the US, through the NSC and experts, mentioned the need for “interim steps” that are a step back from the goal of “denuclearization,” and said, “We are willing to talk to North Korea unconditionally for negotiations.” The terms “denuclearization of North Korea” and “CVID,” or “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea,” disappeared from the platforms of the US Democratic and Republican parties announced ahead of the November presidential election. North Korea may say that “the US has recognized our possession of nuclear weapons,” but that is a misinterpretation. It does not mean accepting, or tolerating, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but rather recognizing, and is trying to lower the nuclear threat through dialogue, recognizing that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons immediately, but responding strongly if North Korea refuses. As such, the nuclear issue is now reaching a dead end. As the military closeness and nuclear cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea intensifies, it is ultimately triggering a response from the US. Naturally, South Korea cannot just keep watching. In Korea, civic groups are currently conducting a campaign to collect 10 million signatures calling for nuclear armament, but it is unclear how much this movement will change national policy in the future. If this trend continues, there may be countermoves in Japan and Taiwan as well. It is difficult to understand why North Korea should really increase its nuclear weapons and strengthen its military power with drones and artillery, even though food shortages are starting again, the youth are opposing the one-party dictatorship, and the elite are increasingly defecting to seek freedom. “Copyright © 1998-2023, RFA. Used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036. https://www.rfa.org.”

Energy & Economics
The concept of a fragile, vulnerable, unstable world order.

World Order Transformation: Economy, Ideology, Technology

by Aleksandr Dynkin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The concept of a multipolar (or polycentric) world order [1] was first coined by Academician Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 [Primakov 1996]. Like everything new, it was not immediately accepted, but ultimately became a significant contribution to both domestic and world theory of international relations, offering a compelling alternative to Western approaches, particularly the one proposed in Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations [Huntington 1993]. It informed the idea of trilateral cooperation between Russia, China and India, implemented by Primakov and later embodied in the BRICS group. By now, the idea of multipolarity has been recognized in global political science, has entered the conceptual framework and the language of international diplomacy and is used in Russia’s doctrinal documents. In 2015, we proposed the scenario of a new bipolarity [2] as one of the possible trajectories for global development. Today, many scholars, both Chinese and American, [3] suggest that China-centric and U.S.-centric poles are emerging. This article discusses the “multipolarity — new bipolarity” dichotomy. Long Global Macro-Transformations World history shows that a new world order typically emerges after the end of a major war (see Table 1). Table 1. International system (world order)    Source: systematized by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS Europe was usually the “kitchen” where the world order was cooked. Take the last 200 years. After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe emerged and lasted for 100 years. The century-long stability of that system could be explained by the homogeneity of the political organization of its guarantor states. All members of the Concert of Europe were monarchies. World War I produced the Versailles system, which lasted only 20 years. One of the reasons for its short life was the exclusion of the Soviet Union, Germany and China. The Yalta-Potsdam system was formed by the victors in World War II. Its guarantors were the “Big Three” powers—the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the UK—along with France and China. The three defeated powers—Germany, Japan and Italy—were discriminated and disenfranchised. This system existed for 45 years and was initially thought to be polycentric, but quickly degenerated into a bipolar order, and the Cold War commenced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the system became unipolar, dominated by the West, primarily the U.S. It disregarded Russia’s interests and, from 2018 onward, began discriminating against China as well. February 2022 can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s demise. However, today’s predictions suggest it will take at least 10 years before the new post-unipolar system becomes stable. The economic center of gravity is a spatial indicator of the economic strength of states, borrowed from physics. To put it simply, this is a geographical point of equilibrium for GDP, trade and investment flows of different countries. Figure 1 shows a map of how the world’s economic center of gravity shifted for over a thousand years. It appeared in Central Asia, on the territory of the Ghaznavid Empire (modern-day Afghanistan). The center then migrated northwest, while the devastation in post-war Europe forcefully pushed it (within just 10 years) to the West, toward Greenland. Then it turned east again. The sharpest shift, to the southeast, occurred in 2000–2010 and is associated with the rise of China. The economic center of gravity has almost returned to the same meridian but remained more than 2,000 km north of the starting point, which indicates a return to the millennial balance of economic power between the West and the East. Figure 1. “Journey” of the three-dimensional economic center of gravity    Source: Dobbs R., Remes J., Manyika J. et al. Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class. McKinsey Global Institute, 2012. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/urbanization/urban-world-cities-and-the-rise-of-the-consuming-class. Statistic calculations by IMEMO RAS for 60 years of peace (1960–2021) indicate the stability of the center’s latitudinal (horizontal) position. This suggests a relatively consistent proportion of GDP production by the countries in the Global South and Global North, under the economic leadership of the Northern Hemisphere. The shift to the East has also been clearly confirmed. According to our projections up to 2050, the future position of the globe’s center of economic activity will lie on the border of India and China. This method of analysis reveals a high level of inertia in time and geographic monotonicity of changes in the balance of economic power of states. It also shows that wars can drastically disrupt the natural course of events. The center of gravity method can also be applied to the arsenals of strategic and tactical weapons (see Figure 2). For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. had a huge advantage, but then there was a clear pivot to the northeast—the creation of superior nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union. With the onset of arms control in 1993, a reversing loop emerged, heading southwest. This was followed by a curve to the east with an implied southward inclination, which reflects the growing nuclear stockpiles of India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the rapid buildup of strategic and tactical nuclear forces in China. The military center of gravity follows its economic peer with a lag of 20 years, reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of Asian powers. These interpretations also clearly demonstrate the end of unipolarity and point to the rise of multipolarity. Figure 2. Movement of the nuclear center of gravity Source: calculations by K.V. Bogdanov, Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/. Technology. Politicians tend to be techno-optimists. Barack Obama predicted that 3D printing would transform the entire world. [4] George W. Bush promised that decoding the human genome would revolutionize medicine. [5] All false starts. Economists traditionally measure the rate of technological progress (TP) using the total factor productivity (TFP) index. To put it simply, this is the part of economic growth driven not by an increase in inputs—labor and capital—but rather by improvements in the efficiency of their use. Technological progress means not only the generation of new scientific and technological ideas but also their mass replication. Without economic validation of the impact of wide dissemination of innovations, scientific or technological achievements remain in history as brilliant breakthroughs with only local economic effects, giving rise to journalistic generalizations at best, such as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” or “the sixth techno-economic paradigm.” Statistical metrics rely on data of technologically advanced nations, while catching-up countries have room for growth by approaching the TP frontier, i.e. adopting and improving existing ideas and technologies. Technological leaders spend more resources pushing the TP frontier, while those catching up can accelerate at lower costs, effectively staying in the “wind shadow” of the leaders. The TFP index growth rate has been steadily declining in developed countries for many years, but this has been especially conspicuous since the mid-2000s. Today, the growth is below 1.5% and even 1% per year (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Average annual growth of total factor productivity, % Source: calculations by IMEMO RAS based on the data from the International Productivity Monitor. No. 38, Spring 2020. http://www.csls.ca/ipm/ipm38.asp#:~:text=Martin%20Neil%20Baily%2C%20Barry%20P.%20Bosworth%20and %20Siddhi%20Doshi%0ALessons%20from%20Productivity%20Comparisons%20 of%20Germany%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States%C2%A0; Innovative China: New Drivers of Growth. World Bank Group, and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R. China. 2019. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1335-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-Growth.pdf. A similar pattern of dramatic TFP deceleration was observed in China. The consensus interpretation of these figures is that the main effects of the Third Industrial (i.e., computer) Revolution have largely been exhausted, and no new general-purpose breakthrough technologies (such as electricity, internal combustion engines, or computers and mobile communications) have emerged. However, it seems that the intellectualization of technologies and approaches to project management, as well as informatization, simply do not fit into the traditional factor-based view of progress that was established many years ago. The scale of knowledge is growing, new professions are springing up, the role of emotional intelligence and cognitive functions is increasing. All this dramatically changes the structure of capital assets (see Figure 4). From the beginning of the 21st century and until the 2008 crisis (2000–2007), equipment accounted for over 50% of the increase in capital’s contribution (investment) to output growth, whereas in 2019–2021, almost 63% of this increase was attributable to intellectual property assets. This result of our research suggests a refocusing of technological progress from final products to intellectual technologies, enabling the production of a range of innovative goods and services tailored to highly segmented demand. Figure 4. Transformation of the capital structure in the U.S. private sector Source: Total Factor Productivity for Major Industries—2022. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prod3_03232023.htm. There are now hopes that the pace of technological progress may accelerate due to the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, which will spark a new industrial revolution. An indirect sign of its imminence is the sharp rise in the rate of business births and deaths in the U.S. economy in 2020–2022. [6] The spillover of labor from companies that are losing efficiency to corporations with increasing market shares has also accelerated. These are some sort of leading indicators that suggest the structural results of TP are approaching. Similar developments occurred 30 years ago, on the cusp of the computer revolution. The above-mentioned intellectualization of fi ed capital, where trusted AI will be applied, adds credibility to these hopes. In addition, AI is one of the critical areas of technological sovereignty. It is no coincidence that Vladimir Putin described AI as “crosscutting, universal and essentially revolutionary technology.” [7] The Russian President announced the preparation of a new edition of the National AI Development Strategy and a respective decree. I believe that this prioritization is justified. China’s experience in the semiconductor race is a good model to be emulated (see Figure 5). Its distinguishing feature is the focus on companies as drivers of development, with massive, cumulatively growing state support. Figure 5. Focusing on China’s priorities (nanometer chip race) Source: Systematized by I.V. Danilin, IMEMO RAS The U.S. strategy of curbing technological development of Russia (in all areas) and China (in semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and electric cars) leads to stiff competition in high technology, which is fraught with fragmentation, diversification of technical standards, legal norms and rules. And this is another argument in favor of a new bipolarity. Demographic processes. According to UN projections, by the middle of the 21st century, Russia will drop from its current 9th place to 14th in terms of population, while remaining the most populous country in Europe. [8] A more significant problem for Russia is population aging. The proportion of elderly people, who are typically not part of the labor force, is increasing. Japan, Spain and Italy are leading this process today, but neither China nor India will be spared. Nigeria appears to be the only major country where population and the share of young people will continue to grow until the end of the 21st century. As of December 2023, one in 10 people worldwide was aged 65 or over, with health spending taking up 10% of global GDP. [9] In this context, the importance of medical technologies cannot be overstated, as they can extend not only people’s life expectancy but also the duration of their healthy and socially active life, thereby easing labor market pressures. Needs always steer technological progress toward overcoming economic growth constraints tied to the scarcest resource in any given historical period. A serious risk associated with the problem of aging is a slowdown in innovation, since it is people under 40—the age group that will shrink throughout the 21st century—who are the primary drivers and consumers of innovation. So far, this risk has been mitigated by the large youth cohorts in China and India. This is why these two nations are experiencing almost exponential growth in patenting, massive reengineering and, consequently, in middle-class numbers. Demographics give India an edge until around 2060, which is already evident in the growth rates of Indian economy. Combined with the influx of hi-tech investments and the contribution of the Indian diaspora, India has good prospects, making its position crucial to the future architecture of the world order, regardless of how it evolves. The U.S. understands this and has been figuratively “clinging” to this nation for the past 20 years. I believe that the Russian Academy of Sciences should significantly bolster scientific and educational ties with India and its dynamically developing neighbors in Southeast Asia—Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. The anticipated tension in the global market of new generations of innovators aggravates inter-country competition for this scarcest resource. I think that the international reputation of the Russian Academy of Sciences is a powerful tool to attract and retain young people and foster their creative motivation. We should reassert this as we celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences. Ideology. Dirigisme [10], or statism, is the main trend in both economic theory and economic policy of the West. A pivot to a more state-controlled economy began with the disappointing outcomes of the Washington Consensus, which aimed to guide post-socialist countries from planned to market economies. The 2008–2009 financial crisis cemented the trend toward statism, and the COVID-19 pandemic elevated it to unprecedented proportions. In the U.S., Democrats are among the most vocal proponents of greater government intervention in all spheres of life, but they are not alone. Republicans are also actively advocating industrial policy, repudiation of free trade, as well as strict control over Big Tech, among other measures. The popularity of the so-called cultural Marxism is on the rise. [11] Its origins go back to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (H. Marcuse, E. Fromm and others). These ideas are moving from the realm of ideological and theoretical confrontations into political activism. For example, the leaders of the BLM movement publicly self-identify as “trained Marxist organizers.” The essence of the strategy inspired by “cultural Marxism” is the rejection of direct political struggle on the barricades, since the proletariat has been “bought off by the bourgeoisie and is no longer capable of anything,” and the ranks of the classic proletariat are rapidly thinning. The direction of social change is set, on the one hand, by intellectuals with personal power and, on the other hand, by marginalized groups seeking to assert their “right to identity.” The strategy of activists who form this paradoxical combination of intellectuals and marginalized individuals is the creeping takeover of the main institutions of power and society by planting “correct” ideas in the mass consciousness. In the U.S., the fighters for political correctness have already hijaked the school system, university campuses, major media outlets and the entertainment industry (Hollywood). Civil servants are forced to take courses in critical race theory, which postulates not only the socially constructed nature of race and the recognition of systemic racism [Delgado, Stefancic 2017: 45] but also a sense of guilt in one part of society toward another. This, in turn, allegedly requires addressing moral and material injustices by organizing public life in line with such an ideology. Similar concepts are being pushed into public discourse as well. It is already dominated by the ideas of radical feminism, cancel culture, anti-systemic racism and postcolonialism, the fight against global warming and the green agenda, which claims to be universal and non-negotiable. As a result, the energy transition is motivated more by ideology than by the comparative market efficiency of energy supplies. Different environmental-political discourses—eco-nationalism, eco-imperialism and green growth—are competing in shaping the green agenda, eroding the attractiveness of the dominant sustainable development model. Another universal weapon in fighting any dissent is political correctness. Large corporations, government agencies and universities are developing and implementing strategies to promote DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) principles, which are nothing but tools of ideological control over employees. Universities are required to fi reports on their compliance with such principles and efforts to promote them, which causes mounting criticism as they violate academic freedom and cultivate ideological conformity. [12] However, ideological censorship has already taken deep root in various spheres of public life, and questioning its compatibility with democracy is deemed politically incorrect. Revising cultural norms has become a cultural norm in and of itself, deepening divisions in modern polarized societies, primarily in the U.S., but also in Old Europe [Semenenko 2023: 27-35]. Another curious phenomenon is associated with the new agenda. In the 20th century, the left championed progress, advocating faster economic growth, rapid technological advancement and better social welfare. Now the ideas of zero or even negative growth and post-growth are popular among them. [Buchs, Koch 2017: 218]. Such ideological narratives exacerbate the question of how to treat the poor countries of the South, but also their own poor: the welfare state for all no longer fit into this agenda. On the contrary, it becomes a selective tool of backing the “right” minorities. This creates a breeding ground for stronger positions of populist forces. Such contradictory internal political processes distort public consciousness as well as domestic and foreign policy decision-making. The new elites are extremely ideologized. The U.S. political system is becoming less effective at regulating the economy. Two rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, have downgraded the U.S. credit rating to AA+ from the top mark of AAA. In November 2023, Moody’s lowered its outlook on the U.S. credit rating to “negative” from “stable.” All three agencies agree on the main reason for the downgrade: the growing dysfunctionality of the political system. In foreign policy, the U.S. has withdrawn from 16 major international treaties and agreements on arms control, global trade, climate and the Arctic since the beginning of the century [Dynkin 2020]. In other words, the unipolar world order with its unbridled appetite for expansion has brought the world into a zone of extra-high risks. And the paradigms that are dominant in the West have proven incompatible with either Russian or Chinese value-oriented political projects. Therefore, the ideological sphere will inevitably see increased confrontation, marking another step toward bipolarity. IMEMO RAS researchers have repeatedly warned about the West’s miscalculated strategic hopes: 1) that Russia would face an economic catastrophe because of an unprecedented sanctions war in modern history; 2) that the unipolar world order would remain unchallenged; 3) that a global blockade of Russia’s export-oriented economy would be feasible. And we were not the only ones who made these warnings. In response, we only heard propagandistic clichés like “a gas station masquerading as a country,” “a regional power” and “Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters”. This kind of “expertise” led the Washington establishment to believe that Russia is a “declining power” whose strategic interests could be safely neglected. This “strategic lunacy” is a consequence of a universalist mindset—a product of the West’s political experience and culture, which tends to elevate Anglo-Saxon and European historical tradition to absolutes—and of a failure to understand the shifts in the balance of power in the 21st century. Today, Russia is the world’s fourth-largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP), while the top fi e global economic powers include three BRICS nations and none from the blooming “garden” of Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief who has recently been fired. Now a new narrative has been launched into the propaganda orbit: “Russia is about to attack Eastern Europe.” The logical gap between the image of a declining power and that of an “aggressive bear” is conveniently ignored. This primitive, one-dimensional perception of complex non-linear processes can only lead to disappointment—just as it did when the West lulled itself into believing that Chinese reforms would eventually lead to political pluralism. As a result, the West has an inexhaustible stream of surprises. It appears that their experts are increasingly out of touch with Russian (and any other non-Western) realities. Figuratively speaking, they are staring into a distorting rearview mirror constructed by their own rhetoric and propaganda. But the main real surprise was the fantastic resilience of the Russian economy. I dare say that no other economy in the world, not even China’s, could withstand such aggressive pressure. The high resistance of the Russian economy to external shocks can be explained by three fundamental reasons. First, it is the result of difficult, sometimes agonizing institutional and structural reforms. These efforts have ultimately produced a self-sufficient, adaptive and highly diversified market economy. Second, the crisis of 2022 was the fifth (!) in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The government, federal regulators and the Bank of Russia have accumulated hard-earned professional experience in crisis management and counter-cyclical strategies. The same can be said about business. Our economic entities have demonstrated time and again that there are always more effective solutions than there are problems. Finally, the West miscalculated its ability to isolate our economy. The dual containment of Russia and China, in fact, only strengthens ties between the BRICS member states. Transformations of the 2020s. The first half of the 2020s has fi y buried what was once known as “European security.” It is impossible to glue this “broken cup” back together without Russia. The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side and the West to stop the armed conflict at its very beginning, the dangerous escalation, NATO’s constant violation of its own “red lines” and the accession of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Alliance are all symptoms of the European security system transforming into a transatlantic one. Meanwhile, the Eurasian security system is taking shape. The outcomes of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China hint that the “political East” is starting to form, if not as an alternative to the long-standing “political West,” then at least as an equal partner. Without considering its interests, any debate about “rules-based” global security will be mere fantasy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Moscow after his recent reelection is in the same vein. Of course, geography cannot be changed, and Russia has been and will remain a European power. However, it is also the geographic center of Eurasia, providing the infrastructure backbone for the Eurasian partnership—from the Northern Sea Route and up to the Trans-Siberian Railway, Baikal–Amur Mainline, Trans-Asian Highway and cross-continental pipelines. The “post-Ukrainian” world seems to be moving toward a new, indivisible Eurasian security architecture, relying on existing institutions: the Union State, CSTO, EAEU, CIS, BRICS, SCO and ASEAN. Minsk has put forward an initiative to develop a Eurasian Charter for Diversity and Multipolarity—a strategic vision for a new system of international relations to replace the “rules-based” world order. An important event of 2024 in this context is the expansion of the BRICS club (see Figure 6). Its combined economic power could potentially reach $67 trillion, surpassing the total GDP of the G7 countries. Figure 6. Economic potential of BRICS countries Source: calculations by A.A. Dynkin, IMEMO RAS, based on the data from the IMF, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Steel Association, Energy Transition Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, International Energy Agency. And there are still 28 more countries on the “waiting list”. In several important markets such as metals, automotive industry, oil and mineral fertilizers, BRICS already matches or exceeds the potential of the G7 nations. Russia, which took over the BRICS rotating presidency in 2024, faces the task of energizing the harmonized economic and technological policies of the members. This approach is the institutional cornerstone of the future polycentric world. What will the coming world order look like? It is difficult to say which of the two trends—bipolarity or polycentrism—will prevail in the end. It is more likely that they will coexist: for example, rigid bipolarity in the Global North and polycentrism in the Global South. Signs of military, economic and technological bipolarity are already visible in the North. Interestingly, New Delhi tends to categorize China as a country of the North [Jaishankar 2020: 240]. This viewpoint has substance, as China is far ahead of other countries of the Global South in terms of GDP per capita ($12,541). For comparison, India’s GDP per capita is $2,612. [13] The decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies has not affected trade flows yet, but only technology and investment. In 2023, China saw a reversal of foreign direct investment inflows, with funds previously invested being withdrawn. Negative trends took hold, and the outflow approached negative $1.5 trillion (see Figure 7). Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific macro-region is gaining greater internal dynamics, unlike Europe or North America. Figure 7. U.S.–China Economic Decoupling Source: UN Comtrade Database. https://comtradeplus.un.org/; State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/. Meanwhile, the trend toward political polycentricity persists. For example, New Delhi and Ankara were initially poles apart on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. This is also the dawning of post-unipolarity, where the new centers of power are increasingly guided by their own interests in decision-making rather than by any “rules” or advice from Washington, Beijing or Moscow. It would be unrealistic to expect that the future world order will be free of conflict. The world will retain its diversity, with different potentials of countries and their competition. It is crucial that, despite their differences, the interests of larger and smaller nations are respected, and problems are solved through constructive dialogue. Russia was the first to challenge the notorious unipolar world order. Today we can state that most countries in the Global South have responded to this challenge and refused to subscribe to the Western interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine . The future world order is taking shape right before our eyes. I am sure that a multipolar world is preferable for Russia as a developed, self-sufficient and sovereign nation. But this world also requires a new system of global governance, development and strengthening of its institutions, such as BRICS, G20, SCO and EAEU. For instance, the EAEU member states (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan) are faring much better than the five other post-Soviet countries. In 2022, GDP per capita in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union was 3.5 times higher than the average for the fi e other CIS states that are not part of the EAEU (Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (see Figure 8). Our strategy in these organizations requires a solid approach and “stereoscopic” vision from socio-economic, scientific, technological and political perspectives. Here, the Russian Academy of Sciences should play a major role as a leader of scientific and expert community. Figure 8. Economic trends of EAEU and CIS countries Source: EEC. https://eec.eaeunion.org/?ysclid=lr7rtdg7np631919243; IMF. https://www.imf.org/; World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/.  Conclusion In conclusion, there are compelling arguments both for multipolarity and for a new bipolarity. Leading U.S. experts are asking similar questions: “What order will replace the crumbling US-led system is far from certain. Will China push aside the United States as the global hegemon to lead a world according to rules written in Chinese characters? Will the world become bipolar, divided between two more or less rigidly defined blocs led by the United States and China? Will a genuinely multipolar world emerge based on several states or coalitions of more or less equal strength?” [Graham 2023: 272]. These questions are yet to be answered, and definitive conclusions in this case are premature. Given this high uncertainty, one should be prepared for any scenario. The essential prerequisite for such readiness is Russia’s strategic autonomy based on military-strategic parity with the U.S. The fundamental question to which the author has no answer today is: how likely is the emergence of a new world order without a major war? In 2024, presidential or parliamentary elections will take place (or have already taken place) in 50 countries, which account for more than 45% of the world’s GDP and population. Perhaps their results will clarify our vision of the near future. Dynkin A.A. (2024). World order transformation: economy, ideology, technology. Polis. Political Studies, 5, 8-23. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2024.05.02 This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and regional centers of power in the emerging world order”. The author expresses gratitude to his colleagues at IMEMO RAS R.I. Kapelyushnikov, V.D. Milovidov, I.S. Semenenko, I.V. Danilin, S.V. Zhukov, K.V. Bogdanov, A.P. Guchanova for consultations and assistance in preparing this article. References Büchs, M., & Koch, M. (2017). Critiques of growth. In M. Büchs, & M. Koch. Postgrowth and Wellbeing: Challenges to Sustainable Welfare (pp. 39-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3319-59903-8_4 Delgado, R.,& Stefancic, J. (2017). Critical race theory. Anintroduction. New York: New York University Press. Graham, T. (2023). Getting Russia right. UK: Polity Books. Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations Jaishankar, S. (2020). The India way: strategies for an uncertain world. New Delhi; New York: Harper Collins Publishers India. Kupchan, C. (2021). Bipolarity is back: why it matters. The Washington Quarterly, 44(4), 123-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457 Yan Xuetong. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow002 Dynkin, A.A. (2020). International turbulence and Russia. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(2), 127-137. https://doi.org/10.1134/S101933162002001X. Primakov, E.M. (1996). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya nakanune XXI veka: problemy, perspektivy [International Relations on the eve of 21st century: problems, prospects]. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10, 3-13. (In Russ.) Semenenko, I.S. (2023). Razdelyonnye obshchestva [Divided societies]. In I.S. Semenenko (Ed.), Identichnost’: lichnost’, obshchestvo, politika. Novye kontury issledovatel’skogo polya [Identity: The Individual, Society, and Politics. New Outlines of the Research Field] (pp. 27-35). Moscow: Ves’ Mir. (In Russ.) https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf Литература на русском языке Дынкин А.А. 2020. Международная турбулентность и Россия. Вестник РАН. Т. 90. № 3. С. 208-219. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0869587320030032. EDN: WINCQO. Примаков Е.М. 1996. Международные отношения накануне XXI в.: проблемы, перспективы. Международная жизнь. № 10. С. 3-13. Семененко И.С. 2023. Разделенные общества. Идентичность: личность, общество, политика. Новые контуры исследовательского поля. Отв. ред. И.С. Семененко. М.: Весь Мир. С. 27-35. https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/ru/publ/2023/Identichnost-Semenenko-2023.pdf. EDN: NTQYRB. 1. The world order or international system is a stable set of institutions and norms of military-political and economic relations, which is institutionalized and legitimate in the international legal sense. The world order remains stable during the active life of at least one generation—a universal measure of social time. However, in the wake of geopolitical macro-crises, illegitimate systems emerge, forcibly imposed by the winner. This was the case with the unipolar world order. 2. Dynkin A., Burrows M. Here’s the Playbook for Getting U.S.–Russian Cooperation Back on Track. The National Interest. 07.12.2015. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-the-playbook-getting-us-russian-cooperation-back-track-14527. 3. For example, see: [Yan Xuetong 2016; Kupchan 2021]. 4. Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address. The White House. President Barack Obama. 12.02.2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 5. President Bush Calls on Senate to Back Human Cloning Ban. Remarks by the President on Human Cloning Legislation. The East Room. The White House. President George W. Bush. 10.04.2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020410-4.html. 6. Private sector establishments birth and death, seasonally adjusted. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 25.10.2023. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.t08.htm. 7. Artificial Intelligence Journey 2023 conference. President of Russia. Official website. 24.11.2023. http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/72811. 8. World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024). https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/. 9. Global Health Expenditure database. World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/nha/database. 10. Dirigisme is a policy of active state intervention in the national economy, pursued by France and the UK in mid-1940s. 11. Mendenhall A. Cultural Marxism is Real. The James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal. 04.01.2019. https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/01/cultural-marxism-is-real/. 12. AFA Calls for an End to Required Diversity Statements. Press Release. AFA. Princeton, NJ. 22.08.2022. https://academicfreedom.org/afa-calls-for-an-end-to-required-diversity-statements/. 13. World Economic Outlook Database (October 2023 Edition). International Monetary Fund. 10.10.2023. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October.

Energy & Economics
offshore oil platform and gas drillship with illumination

Undersea geopolitics and international law: Deepsea mining in the Indo-Pacific

by Abhishek Sharma , Udayvir Ahuja

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment; a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action The world is looking at a potential geopolitical and environmental point of conflict, which will affect every country in more ways than one. This dispute stems from a search for critical minerals in the deep sea. Critical minerals are considered the building blocks of contemporary technology. To say that they are crucial to the economic and national security of every country would be an understatement. Due to the inherited complexities of mining and attaining critical minerals from challenging geographies, the hunt for them has intensified. Beyond land, many countries are now looking at space as an alternative. Finding and commercially harnessing minerals from celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids, however, is still a challenge. Therefore, the search for critical minerals in the deep sea has now entered a new phase of competition, where countries are no longer waiting but are actively engaged in the process of deep-sea mining. In this race, while some countries such as China, India, and South Korea (see Table 1) are preparing to grab the opportunity and are trying to build capacities and capabilities, others have raised the environmental and ecological impacts of deep-sea mining. Against this background, it is crucial to identify the key players in this race and understand the accompanying international legal nuances. Table 1: Exploration Contracts issued by the International Seabed Authority (ISA)   Source: ISA. What’s the rush? The urgency of the critical mineral problem is exacerbated by two factors: Fast-depleting reserves of critical minerals for human use and their rising demand. Behind this sudden rush are two important reasons: Firstly, the focus on clean and renewable energy, which is crucial in driving the green energy transition, and secondly, the increasing consumption of high-technology products, which depends on the heavy use of critical minerals. As an illustration, consider its application in high-tech items of various sizes, such as smartphones, electric car magnets, and intricate machinery like F35 stealth aircraft. A F35 aircraft, for example, needs 920 pounds of rare earth elements, demonstrating the significance of these minerals for any nation. Although deep-sea mining is not an exclusively Indo-Pacific phenomenon, competition is most felt in this region due to the high stakes involved. The major actors involved in this race are China, India, South Korea, and even non-state actors, such as private companies such as the Metals Company (TMC, a Canada-based company, which have considerable stakes in the space. International Seabed Authority: China and influence politics Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was constituted with the mandate to ‘organise and control all mineral resources-related activities’ and guarantee ‘effective protection of the marine environment’ on the seabed of international waters, which are a global commons. ISA is constituted by the Assembly, Council, and Secretariat. ISA’s key advisory body, the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), should help the authority frame the rules, regulations and procedures (RRPs) to govern mining activities on the international seabed. While the conversation on setting a legal framework for undersea mining has been in process since 2016, ISA has garnered increasing international attention due to the triggering of the ‘two-year rule’ by the island nation of Nauru back in 2021. As per UNCLOS, if the Council of ISA fails to adopt the relevant RRPs within two years of receiving the application for approval of a plan of work for exploitation, the council will have to consider and approve such plan ‘based on the provisions of the Convention and any rules, regulations and procedures that the Council may have adopted provisionally, or based on the norms contained in the Convention and the terms and principles contained in this Annex as well as the principle of non-discrimination among contractors.’ Since this incident, negotiations have naturally picked up, with China playing the leading role in shaping the deep sea mining code, as it wants to influence and is eager to push forward the negotiations in its infancy phase. In the 2023 ISA Council’s July meeting, China blocked the motion introduced by France, Chile, and Costa Rica to discuss a moratorium on deep sea mining. The absence of the United States (US) from the ISA elevates Beijing's role to a prominent position. This discussion will likely have severe implications for the future of the high seas, which cover 60 percent of the world’s oceans. At the ISA’s Council meeting in July 2023, China and other states like Nauru, Japan, Australia, India, Norway, and Russia supported deep-sea mining against a group of 20 countries that opposed it due to lack of scientific evidence and are pushing to put a moratorium in place. France was the exception, calling for a total ban on deep-sea mining. Apart from nation states, many international Multinational Corporations (MNCs) like Google, Samsung, BMW, Volvo Group, and Tesla have also joined the call for a moratorium on deep-sea mining. This call includes 804 marine science and policy experts from 44 countries recommending a ‘pause until sufficient and robust scientific information’ is obtained. The call for a moratorium has increased since the discovery of “dark oxygen” on the seafloor. Even the European Union has adopted a resolution to support a moratorium in response to Norway’s decision to initiate deep-sea mining in the Arctic . Stuck in a limbo As commercial deep-sea mining comes closer than ever to being a reality, it is critical to analyse and take stock of the complex interplay of geopolitical, environmental, and legal challenges that will define the future of international relations and environmental stewardship. As nations such as China, Norway, South Korea, and even India accelerate their efforts to exploit these untapped resources, the world faces a crucial decision: To prioritise immediate economic and technological gains or the fragile ecosystems of the deep ocean. China's geopolitical and strategic goals and its growing influence on international organisations, including the ISA, must be kept in mind while taking a call when the stakes are undeniably high, not just for the Indo-Pacific but for the entire planet. The moratorium is also being proposed as per the established precautionary approach. This approach is a broad legal and philosophical principle that suggests a pause and reassessment in case of a human innovation/activity that could potentially result in harm given the lack of scientific knowledge. In light of the pressing concerns raised by scientists, environmentalists, and several nations, a global moratorium on deep-sea mining should be the natural course of action. While some have argued that such a precautionary pause would not be in accordance with UNCLOS, including the current Secretary General of ISA, it would be an obligation under the constitution of the oceans. In an advisory opinion, the International Tribunal on Law of Sea (ITLOS) has confirmed a trend of precautionary approach becoming a part of customary international law and stated that it is a ‘binding obligation’ on both states and the ISA. This approach is enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. An example of such a moratorium under international law is the International Whaling Convention, which was adopted based on the precautionary approach and has been largely followed for the past 35 years. As the global community navigates this uncharted territory, it must ensure that the pursuit of critical minerals does not come at the expense of the environment that sustains us all. The choices made today will have far-reaching consequences, shaping the geopolitical landscape and determining whether the international community can unite in the face of shared challenges or whether the race for resources will lead to further fragmentation and conflict.

Defense & Security
japan,australia,usa and india friendship against china.Quad plus countries flags Quad plus countries flags over china flag.Quad plus countries. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific

by Liviu Horovitz , Elisabeth Suh

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity. European and Pacific US allies share similar concerns about a potential second Trump administration: allies everywhere fear that Trump would once again pursue a trans­actional approach to US foreign policy. Disputes between allies would play out in public, unsettling domestic populations, delighting adversaries, and endangering the perceived credibility of the common defence policy. Given Trump’s penchant for cosying up to autocrats, both European and Pacific allies worry that Washington will either trade away key shared interests to extract questionable concessions from dictators or, if negotiations fail (again), that Trump will drag them into unwanted conflicts. However, beyond these shared concerns, policymakers in Canberra, Seoul, and Tokyo seem to be more confident. They believe they know how to manage Trump’s ego and can offer him lucrative deals. Furthermore, they assume that a second Trump adminis­tration will remain engaged in the Western Pacific, necessitating the presence of reli­able partners to maintain influence and contain China. These assumptions do not lead to fewer concerns, but to less fundamental concerns in trans-Pacific relations. However, European allies express fear that Trump may seek to undermine or even ter­minate NATO, which would result in the withdrawal of US nuclear assurances. Even in South Korea, public debate about its own nuclear weapons is primarily focused on the perceived threat from North Korea, rather than on concerns within the alliance. It is primarily the changed regional bal­ance of power and China’s ambitions that worry the trans-Pacific allies. On the one hand, the extensive competition between the US and China gives rise to the expectation that Washington will remain engaged and that the security relationship and extended nuclear deterrent in the Pacific will remain stable. On the other hand, this com­petition demonstrates to Pacific allies that the actions of the current and subsequent US administrations will have a decisive impact on the evolution of the balance of power and the regional constellation in the decades to come. There is therefore concern that a transactional second Trump adminis­tration could undermine protracted joint efforts to maintain order, laying the ground­work for eventual Chinese dominance in this strategically important region. A changing military balance of power Regional and global economic, political, and technological developments are shift­ing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in very different ways than in Europe. After all, the starting position is completely different: Russia’s economy is only one-tenth the size of the EU’s, and Europe lacks political resolve and operational military capabilities rather than resources per se. The critical questions are whether the United States would defend Europe in a geographically limited crisis, whether the Western European nations would go to war for their Eastern European allies, and whether the current forces are adequate to deter or repel Russian aggression. In contrast, China’s economy is almost two and a half times larger than the com­bined economies of Australia, Japan, and South Korea – a difference that roughly mirrors the disparity in military spending. While Europeans have consciously delegated their security to Washington, US allies in the Western Pacific have limited options for developing their own conventional capa­bilities to counterbalance China. Hence, the US allies are primarily concerned with China’s determination to re­shape regional dynamics. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has pursued a more confrontational foreign policy designed to advance China’s regional interests and diminish, if not eliminate, US influence across the Pacific. China has proved willing to underpin its combative diplomacy through both costly economic measures and the rapid modernisation of its armed forces. It is still assumed that the US will continue to play the lead­ing military role for the time being, as Washington retains superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities as well as in many other areas. However, China is rapidly catching up and asserting its regional claims, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to effectively project power so far from its own shores. This is why allies fear that China could dominate the Asia-Pacific region in future. Against this backdrop, many see Taiwan’s future as the harbinger of the region’s pos­sible development. If Beijing were to con­trol this central component of the first island chain, it would gain both military and political leverage over the East and South China Seas – both of which are stra­tegically important. To signal its resolve, Beijing frequently conducts demonstrations of military power such as in the airspace separating the mainland from Taiwan. The trans-Pacific allies suspect that China could (soon) leverage both conventional and nuclear capabilities to present them with a fait accompli, thus gaining control over Taipei before the US could intervene. This would also damage Washington’s credibility as the guardian of regional order. Whether Beijing would indeed wage war against the United States over Taiwan, or whether it merely seeks to alter the military balance of power by exposing Washington, Taipei, and regional US allies to unacceptable escala­tion risks remains unclear – but the very fact that China keeps its intentions ambigu­ous raises worst-case fears. Nuclear threats In recent years, Beijing has been engaged in a major expansion of its nuclear arsenal. According to US forecasts, China could double the number of its nuclear warheads from the current estimate of 500 nuclear warheads by 2030. While Russia and the United States would still dwarf China’s nuclear forces numerically, Beijing appears to be aiming for the same qualitative league of strategic nuclear weapons systems as possessed by Washington and Moscow. The exact motives behind China’s nuclear build-up remain controversial. Yet the types of weapons and the pace of their development suggest that Beijing would at least like to weaken Washington’s escalation dominance in a crisis. Such developments could theo­retically strengthen the mutual nuclear deterrent between China and the US. On the one hand, it could reduce the risk of a global war. On the other hand, for Washing­ton’s Pacific allies this means that their protective power could no longer credibly threaten nuclear escalation and effectively deter Beijing. As a result, they would be outgunned in a conventional war with China. North Korea’s foreign policy, coupled with its nuclear build-up is a further cause for concern. According to estimates, Pyong­yang could currently have 90 nuclear war­heads at most at its disposal. However, it has significantly diversified its delivery systems. North Korea emphasizes a nuclear doctrine with which it could drive a wedge between the Pacific allies by threatening South Korea with tactical nuclear strikes and the US with strategic nuclear strikes. In addition, Washington and its allies perceive North Korea’s threshold for using nuclear weapons to be very low, as they assume that Pyongyang is also trying to deter con­ventional attacks in this way. Finally, the policy changes Moscow has implemented are intensifying regional con­cerns with respect to the future behaviour of China and North Korea. Russia maintains important military facilities in North-East Asia, militarises the Kuril Islands, and con­ducts strategic air and naval patrols with China across the Western Pacific. Moscow’s focus, however, is clearly on Europe. Never­theless, Australia, Japan, and South Korea fear the concrete consequences of Russia’s cooperation with Beijing and Pyongyang. It is clear that this cooperation fuels Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, closer military cooperation could result in more coordination and opportunistic be­haviour to exploit each other’s conflicts or challenge the US and its allies with addi­tional crises. What is more likely, however, is not a trilateral front, but a triangular dy­namic that remains susceptible to mistrust, power calculations, and priority setting by the respective rulers – and which can none­theless boost existing challenges to regional security and non-proliferation. Moreover, the outcome of Moscow’s on­going war of aggression in Ukraine could set risky precedents for revisionist agendas in East Asia. At this point, China and North Korea could learn from Russia’s nuclear rhetoric how allies can be unsettled and deterred from going “too far” in supporting Ukraine. Converging interests and (radical) alternatives The challenges in the Asia-Pacific region could have a more serious impact on the regional and global order than the conflicts in Europe. They are therefore already influ­encing the balance of interests and thus the room for manoeuvre of the actors involved. First, there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that American influence in the Pacific must be preserved. Most see the larger Indo-Pacific as the strategic centre of gravity, perceive US influence in the region as key to sustaining America’s preeminent position in international relations, and conclude that containing China is a must. Thus, even in a highly partisan political environment, the status of Taiwan and its treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea remain essentially of unques­tioned importance to the United States. Second, Washington needs its allies in the Western Pacific. As the military gap with China narrows, the US military must rely on the critical bases, logistical support, and complementary capabilities of regional allies. Consequently, Australia, Japan and South Korea host significant US military forces, facilitating rapid deployment and sustained operations in the region. The US is not only seeking to strengthen bilateral security cooperation and can also work with Australia and Japan as indispensable partners for regional formats – such as the Quad that includes India – to pool resources to contain Beijing’s ambitions. Conversely, given China’s considerable economic power, any attempt to constrain its technological or financial capabilities requires wide-ranging cooperation. It is thus unsurprising that the Biden adminis­tration has actively sought to garner sup­port across the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic partnerships, supply chain resili­ence, technology transfers and research collaborations. Third, allies in the Western Pacific are prepared to contribute to more effective military action. Many European govern­ments, on the other hand, take US security measures for granted and are reluctant to divert funds from social and other purposes to their armed forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea each have extensive trade rela­tions with China, having tied their prosper­ity to Beijing. To ensure that this beneficial balance can be maintained, Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul have reliably invested in allied deterrence and defence. Australia and South Korea have done and continue to do so, even under governments that are more sceptical about relations with Washington. Fourth, although US allies in the Western Pacific greatly benefit from the current strategic arrangements, they have alter­native (even if not attractive) options avail­able – and Washington is acutely aware of this reality. On the one hand, policymakers in Washington suspect that if mistrust of US commitment were to reach an intoler­able level, its Pacific allies might decide to bandwagon with China. As Australia has no territorial dispute with Beijing, and Japan and South Korea have only one limited territorial dispute respectively with China, their concerns are more economic and po­liti­cal in nature. A different regional archi­tecture, though significantly less attractive, would not directly threaten their funda­mental interests and, therefore, would probably be tolerable. On the other hand, Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities and sufficiently limited regional institutional ties – in Seoul also significant domestic political support – to constrain China’s coercive capabilities by acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the absence of US reassurance, they could combine the two alternatives and side with Beijing from behind their own nuclear shield. Given these four fundamentals, there is relative confidence in Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul that the US will continue with its secu­rity architecture in – and therefore with its extended nuclear deterrent for – the Western Pacific, whether or not Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, both Trump and his supporters have repeatedly struck a confrontational tone toward China, emphasising their wil­lingness to increase US power projection through military means. Counter-balancing by the United States and its allies Amid a shifting politico-military landscape and aligned US and allied interests in pre­serving the status quo, a concerted effort to counterbalance China’s military expansion is evident. These efforts are extremely ex­pensive. The sunk costs of this effort strongly suggest to all concerned that, regardless of who occupies the White House, the major strategic question facing the future admin­is­tration will likely be how to effectively con­tain China while both maintaining stra­tegic deterrence against Russia and avoiding the escalation of potential crises. For now, the United States seems to pursue a four-pronged strategy that involves developing additional nuclear capabilities, building up conventional options, enhancing allies’ capabilities, and expanding security co­operation. First, planners and pundits in Washington are assessing how to make better use of US nuclear options. While a major nuclear modernisation effort is underway, a grow­ing number of experts and politicians have concluded that the US arsenal needs to be expanded. In addition, the legislative branch has been pushing the Pentagon to pursue additional nuclear options, such as a nuclear-armed cruise missile (SLCM-N). The Trump administration already called for this in 2018 and would likely continue to pursue it, if it returns to power. More­over, some in the hawkish Republican camp are even calling for the first use of such low-yield nuclear weapons to be con­sidered in order to offset China’s operational advantages and prevent an invasion of Taiwan – but it is unclear how much weight such voices could carry in a second Trump term. Second, and more importantly, the US government is building up its conventional capabilities. Although many Democrats criticised the Trump administration’s 2019 decision to abandon the legal prohibition on deploying intermediate-range missiles, the Biden administration has pursued this same course. As a result, US armed forces will soon be deploying such missile systems to their European and Pacific bases; a planned relocation to the US base in Wies­baden was recently announced. For Asia, it has already been announced that the Dark Eagle hypersonic system will be fielded on Guam. In order to equalise the conventional balance of power with China, however, the various other US medium-range systems would have to be stationed on allies’ terri­tory. Given the high probability that Beijing would respond with harsh economic retalia­tion, it remains unclear whether – or under what conditions – Canberra, Tokyo, or Seoul would agree to such deployments. Third, the US government has been work­ing with its allies in the region to im­prove their own military capabilities. First, Australia, Japan, and South Korea continue to develop their national capabilities, par­ticularly where long-range strike capabilities and strategic naval assets are concerned. Sec­ond, the US government seeks to strengthen its allies’ early warning and missile defence capabilities. It is especially relevant that Washington appears to have shifted its posi­tion to weigh deterrence challenges more heavily than proliferation concerns. Indicative of this is the unprecedented technology transfer involved in providing Australia with stealthy nuclear-powered submarines. This transfer requires an un­paralleled level of verification to make it transparent that Canberra does not divert some of the highly enriched uranium needed for submarine propulsion to build its own nuclear weapons. Another example is the US decision from 2021 to lift all restrictions that had long been placed on South Korea’s missile development programs. Equally important is the widespread sale of Toma­hawk cruise missiles in recent years, includ­ing to Australia and Japan. Finally, while bilateral alliances with Washington continue to be characterised by patron-client relationships, Washington appears committed to empowering regional powers not only by helping enhance their capabilities, but also by expanding security cooperation and allies’ roles therein. For instance, the Biden administration wants Japanese shipyards to regularly overhaul US warships, which allows for their constant presence in East Asia. It also upgraded bi­lateral consultations which carve out a South Korean role in US nuclear operations. Further, it is pursuing technology transfers in advanced military capabilities that will buttress Australia’s strategic reach. Although these alliance initiatives bear the hall­marks of the Biden administration, they fit the “burden-sharing while preserving influ­ence” mantra. This tactic characterised Trump’s term in office and is currently aspired to by broad segments of the Repub­lican Party. Thus, while officials and experts in Australia, Japan, and South Korea expect communication and coordination mishaps, procedural quibbles, funding challenges, and implementation delays, these individ­uals strongly believe that bipartisan US sup­port for these measures will remain strong. Nevertheless, concerns abound Although some of Trump’s domestic sup­porters would welcome any reduction in US commitments abroad, a second adminis­tration would have to face the reality that abandoning extended nuclear deterrence remains fundamentally at odds with its primary goals. Abandoned by their long-time protector and facing massive threats, former allies would likely seek to appease China, and could acquire nuclear arsenals independently. Such developments would run counter to the interests of any US ad­ministration, including a Trump White House. Fears of nuclear abandonment are therefore not the dominant concern, leav­ing plenty of room for allies’ other worries. The Pacific allies invest relatively heavily in national and joint deterrence, and defence. But they are also worried about Trump’s penchant for pressuring allies to make con­cessions. Most in Seoul, for example, expect at least a repeat of the tough cost-sharing negotiations of the first term. Trump and his supporters have been vocal about demand­ing increased financial contributions from Seoul for the US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, frequently coupled with threats to withdraw some or all of those forces, references to the trade imbalance, and downplaying the threats posed by North Korea. Congressional support ensures the presence of US soldiers, but the White House has considerable leeway in determin­ing the size and mandate of these deployments – and many expect Trump to use security commitments to extract economic concessions from allies. Conversely, some in Canberra and Tokyo worry that a Trump administration would seek to renegotiate various military procurement agreements to shore up US financial gains – but few believe that existing agreements would be revoked in the course of such disputes. Another fear in Australia, Japan, and South Korea is that a second Trump admin­istration will reduce or abandon the Biden White House’s various regional security cooperation initiatives and want all rela­tions to again go through Washington first. On the one hand, Trump and his advisers may be pleased with the burden-sharing benefits associated with these new forms of cooperation and continue to pursue them. On the other hand, a GOP-led administration might seek a return to the traditional centralising “hub-and-spokes” system in order to exert more control over allies. The allies therefore fear that without US leader­ship, these intergovernmental initiatives are likely to stagnate, and competition among protégés for the attention of the common patron will be reignited. This might apply particularly to the very practical, but politi­cally sensitive, trilateral partnership be­tween Japan, South Korea and the United States. Less pronounced than the aforemen­tioned fears are concerns about Trump’s “deal-making” tendencies, such as being abandoned in a costly crisis or entangled in a regional conflict. Ambiguity surrounding Trump’s policies vis-à-vis China, North Korea and Russia reflect general uncertainties about future developments in Europe and East Asia as well as Trump-specific inconsistencies. With regard to China, most expect confrontational security and eco­nomic policies, while a few fear that Trump will seek a grand bargain with Xi. Trump has kept his stance on the status of Taiwan ambiguous: he could either reject all sup­port for Taiwan or, if faced with Chinese intransigence, decide to explicitly commit to defending Taipei. While the former would expose US allies to potential Chinese coercion, the latter could lead to an open military conflict with Beijing – and many allies do not trust Trump’s resolve in such a crisis. Regarding North Korea, most hope that Trump’s failed summitry with Kim Jong Un served as a sufficient lesson. How­ever, some worry he may seek to prove that personal relationships facilitate agreements that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. For example, he could again try to persuade Kim Jong Un to stop his nuclear build-up by offering economic incentives (thus effec­tively breaking sanctions). As a quid pro quo for Seoul, Trump could go so far as to quietly accept South Korean nuclear pro­liferation. Finally, concerning Russia, many fear that Trump might propose a deal to Putin to freeze the conflict in Ukraine, an approach from which Xi could draw con­clusions for revisionism in East Asia. Implications for Europe As Trump is prone to miscalculations and erratic behaviour, caution is required when trying to predict his future policy after re-election. Nevertheless, it is important to understand why Australia, Japan, and South Korea are less concerned about US nuclear assurances. Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for Europe. First, even if Trump is re-elected, fundamental changes in Washington’s relations with its Pacific allies are unlikely – which is good news for Europe. For one thing, European economic success depends on the absence of open conflict between China and the US. For another, stable relations in the Asia-Pacific are indirectly a boon to NATO, since US security provision in Europe is heavily dependent upon the success of its more important commitments across the Pacific. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties remain due to structural challenges as well as Trump’s political agenda and per­sonal idiosyncrasies. However, the pressure from Washington on Europe to adapt its China policy is likely to increase under a second Trump administration, especially as it is likely to be almost exclusively com­posed of China hardliners (China hawks). Second, in the face of these risks, Europeans should recognise that Washington and the Pacific allies will expect economic-political rather than military contributions from Europe. It would therefore be advan­tageous if European governments could use their weight within the global economic system to support the US in containing China’s military expansion. If Europe now helps to influence Beijing’s technological and financial capabilities, it could imply European willingness to impose sanctions on China in the event of war. This would also send a strong signal against revisionism in East Asia. Given Trump’s unpredictability, steps that seem costly today may prove worthwhile in retrospect if regional stability in Asia is severely damaged. Last but not least, one valuable lesson can be gleaned from understanding why US allies in Asia hold more optimistic expec­tations about a potential second Trump administration. Ultimately, the source of their optimism lies in Washington’s depend­ence on its allies and their readiness to take on greater responsibility. Arguably, this particular equation is primarily a result of exogenous factors – such as the region’s strategic importance und China’s ambitions. But it should also now be clear to Europe’s decision-makers, experts and public that the more they invest in their own capabil­ities to influence regional security policy, the less they will have to worry about Washington’s vacillations. Dr Liviu Horovitz and Elisabeth Suh are researchers in the International Security Research Division. This paper is published as part of the Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order (STAND) project.

Diplomacy
Meeting with President of Mongolia Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh

Putin's visit to Mongolia could set precedent for Russian president's trip to G20

by Sergei Monin

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Signatories were supposed to execute arrest warrant against the Russian president, but the successful visit undermined the Court's jurisdiction. Russian President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to Mongolia earlier this week. As the Asian country is a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant against Putin for alleged war crimes related to the conflict in Ukraine, Mongolia should technically have carried out the arrest of the Russian leader. Instead, Putin was warmly welcomed upon landing in the country, with a guard of honor and a grand reception in Genghis Khan Square in the center of the capital, which was adorned with the flags of both countries. Mongolia’s stance has drawn criticism from Ukraine, but there has been no explicit condemnation from the West. As a result, the successful trip to an ICC signatory country has opened a gap in the credibility of the Court’s discretion in third countries and could set a precedent for giving the green light to further trips by the Russian president. In an interview with Brasil de Fato, the deputy director of the Institute of History and Politics at Moscow State Pedagogical University, Vladimir Shapovalov, noted that the position Mongolia took was a “quite adequate reaction,” which reaffirmed its independence and sovereignty in the international arena. At the same time, the political scientist highlighted that “the ICC cannot be seen as an objective legal body”. According to him, the Court is “a simulacrum created by the Western world, by the collective West, to promote and achieve its objectives”. During the meeting with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh, Putin highlighted the development of bilateral relations between the countries, stressing that “in the first seven months of this year, trade turnover increased by more than 21%.” “In addition, trade agreements between our two countries are now almost entirely made in currencies other than the dollar and the euro,” he added. The visit to Mongolia was Putin's first trip to a country that recognizes the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court since the arrest warrant was issued in March last year. The charge against Putin concerns the alleged deportation and illegal transfer of children from Ukraine to territories annexed by Russia during the war. A similar arrest warrant was issued for the Russian Federation's Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova. The reason for the indictment dates to May 2022, when Putin signed a decree on a simplified procedure for orphans from Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship. Precedent for the G20 in Brazil? Putin's visit to a country that is a signatory to the ICC brings to mind the dilemma of Brazil - which is also a signatory to the Rome Statute - since President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has already expressed his desire for the Russian president to participate in the G20 summit, which will be held in Rio de Janeiro in November. Lula even presented a document to the UN International Law Commission with a legal framework to support the possibility of Putin's visit, but, at the same time, the leader said that the Russian president himself must evaluate the consequences of his visit. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said this week that Putin had not yet made a decision on the G20. “No decision has been made on this issue yet. Our Sherpa continues to work actively with his colleagues. We are defending our interests there, but the president has not yet made any decision,” Peskov said. For political scientist Vladimir Shapovalov, the Mongolia case “really creates a serious precedent and of course this opens up a field for future state visits” for the Russian president. However, there is a complicating factor for Putin's eventual presence at the G20, which is the interference and pressure from other states during the event in Rio de Janeiro, considering that the G20 is largely composed of all the countries that make up what Russia calls the “collective West”. In other words, a multilateral conference with a large presence of countries that antagonize Russia is more complex for a Putin visit than a bilateral visit. “As far as Brazil and other countries are concerned, the situation here is ambiguous. We must take into consideration several factors, understanding that providing unconditional security guarantees to the Russian president is the country’s top priority. If such conditions are guaranteed, a visit to this or that country may make sense. If such guarantees do not exist, it is better for Russia to receive visits from other leaders,” Shapovalov says. In this sense, the leaders of Brazil and Russia have already set a date for a meeting on Russian soil together with other leaders from the Global South. The BRICS Summit, which will take place in Kazan from October 22 to 24, has confirmed the presence of President Lula. This event may provide the next signs about Putin's chances of visiting Brazil. “Mongolia is a sovereign country” For political scientist Vladiimr Shapovalov, Mongolia's position of ignoring the International Tribunal is related to the country's independent and sovereign position in the world, but at the same time reveals a tendency towards strengthening relations with Russia and China rather than the West. “First of all, it is important to emphasize that Mongolia is a sovereign, neutral country. It does not join any military alliances or military-political blocs and seeks to promote a multi-vector policy. However, we see that the current visit proves that the course of strengthening relations with Russia is clearly becoming predominant. It is important to note that the priorities here are very well defined. For Mongolia, Russia, along with China, is one of the key partners,” he says. Regarding Mongolia’s position on the war in Ukraine, Shapovalov points out that the Asian country “takes the same position as most countries in the ‘global majority’.” “That is, Mongolia distances itself from supporting this or that country, does not participate in Western sanctions to any extent. And Russia appreciates this position and expresses gratitude to the Mongolian side for its courage and readiness to follow its national interests, not the interests of the West,” he adds. Mongolian authorities justified their refusal to comply with the international court's arrest warrant by claiming that the country is energy dependent, importing 95% of its petroleum products and more than 20% of its electricity from its closest neighbors. According to government sources cited by Politico magazine, these supplies are essential for the country's survival. In addition, the publication highlighted the country's history of neutrality in its diplomatic relations. "Mongolia has always maintained a policy of neutrality in all its diplomatic relations," says the source. Between Russia and China Mongolia’s refusal was not a surprise, since the country has never condemned Russia for the war in Ukraine and has strong historical ties with Moscow. During the Soviet period, the Asian country remained a kind of “satellite state” of the socialist bloc. Furthermore, the Soviet Union fought alongside Mongolia against the Japanese in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939, a landmark battle in the history of defending Mongolia's territorial integrity. The 85th anniversary of this battle was celebrated during Putin's visit. And during World War II, Mongolian troops also served the Soviet army in the fight against Nazism. Vladimir Shapovalov points out that in the post-Soviet period, unlike, for example, North Korea, Mongolia “began to pursue a multi-vector policy,” in which not only Russia and China, but also the United States and the European Union countries participated. According to him, the Asian country’s relations developed quite actively on several fronts. “Mongolia is not the type of country that follows Russia, or China, but it is a country that, precisely because it is located between Russia and China, has made an effort to diversify the vectors of its movement and, at a certain point, even bet on the US, on strengthening its friendship with the US,” he says. The Asian country, which has always maintained good relations with the West, has always been known for respecting the norms of the international system and its main institutions. Putin's visit, however, shows that Mongolia is willing to challenge the authority of the International Criminal Court, prioritizing its national interests. “All this shows that Mongolia is taking a very active course of strengthening its interaction with Russia. In fact, a trilateral interaction, together with Russia and China. I do not think this means that Mongolia will now abandon its Western vector, refusing to have relations with the United States. But it does mean that Mongolia is taking more active steps towards Russia and China, towards the countries that it calls itself the ‘global majority’, as opposed to the West,” he argues. “The decision adopted by Mongolia is not only a decision that sets a precedent and discredits the ICC as a body that claims to have agency, but it is a decision that very clearly establishes the significant changes that are currently occurring in the world on a global scale,” added the political scientist. US reaction The analyst also notes that the US reaction “was very restrained” and there was no explicit condemnation from the White House regarding Mongolia’s reception of the Russian president. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said the United States “understands the difficult situation Mongolia finds itself in, but we nevertheless remind the country of the importance of meeting its international obligations.” “We understand the position Mongolia finds itself in, sandwiched between two much larger neighbors, but we think it is important that they continue to support the rule of law around the world,” Miller said, adding that the United States will continue to support Mongolia. Ukraine's reaction was more severe. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Georgy Tikhy called the Mongolian authorities' refusal to execute the International Criminal Court's warrant "a severe blow to justice" and threatened Mongolia with retaliation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reacted to the Ukrainian diplomat's remarks, calling the statements of Ukrainian officials "rude." The foreign minister said that "the ICC issue is being artificially exaggerated," adding that the West resorts to double standards in this area. Lavrov cited as an example the way in which ICC judges were criticized for merely “suggesting” that Israel’s leadership be included on the court’s list of convicts. He also recalled how the United States threatened the ICC with sanctions for trying to investigate the US bombings in Afghanistan. For political scientist Vladimir Shapovalov, this case reveals that international organizations are largely instrumentalized by Western interests and are "a form of instrument of containment, expansion, pressure and influence of the West in the world." "And this is how it has been, at least in recent decades, especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now we see that the role of these organizations, their influence and their authority, is significantly diminishing," he concludes.

Energy & Economics
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

China promises to expand cooperation with Africa and invest US$ 51,4 billion by 2027

by Mauro Ramos , Ana Paula Rocha

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Picture: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ China now has strategic partnerships with 53 of the 54 African countries; investments range from industry to agriculture After holding bilateral meetings with 25 African heads of state in less than a week, China's President Xi Jinping announced on Thursday (5) the project to implement ten partnership actions with the continent that will be financed by the Chinese government to the value of 360 billion yuan (US$ 51,4 billion). According to the Chinese president, the projects should affect various areas of infrastructure and the transfers should be carried out by 2027. He has been meeting with presidents of African countries in Beijing since Monday (2), before and during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, in English), which began on Wednesday (4) and runs until Friday (6). In the current edition, China has decided to sign strategic partnerships with all the African countries with which it has diplomatic relations – or 53 of 54. Raising the level of partnerships is a growing practice in Chinese foreign policy to strengthen ties with countries, mainly in the so-called Global South. The total investment will be divided into a credit line of 210 billion yuan (around US$ 29,8 billion), 80 billion yuan (US$ 11,3 billion) in assistance, and 70 billion yuan (US$ 9,9 billion) of investment by Chinese companies in Africa. Regarding health cooperation, it was planned for the joint creation of an alliance of hospitals and medical centers. China has promised to send 2,000 health workers to the continent and launch 20 programs for health facilities and malaria treatment. According to the WHO, in 2022 Africa had 94% of the world's malaria cases (233 million) and 95% of the deaths caused by the disease (580,000). In agriculture and food, China will provide African countries with 1 billion yuan (around US$ 142,1 million) for emergency food assistance, the construction of standardized agricultural “demonstration areas” of more than 6,600 hectares, the sending of 500 agricultural experts and the creation of a “China-Africa agricultural scientific and technological innovation alliance.” In this sector, the Chinese president said that “two-way investments will be encouraged for new businesses of Chinese and African companies”, to help them gain added value and create at least 1 million local jobs. Common security is the tenth area of cooperation announced. Xi said China will offer 1 billion yuan to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers, “and invite 500 young [African] military officers to visit China”. It also announced the creation of a digital technology cooperation center to start 20 digital projects and 30 infrastructure connectivity projects in Africa. This week, the presidents and heads of state of Libya, Mali, Comoros, Togo, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Chad, Malawi and Mauritania signed an agreement to upgrade diplomatic relations with China to the level of strategic partnership. Other countries, such as Nigeria and Cameroon, have adopted what is known as comprehensive strategic partnerships. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa signed a “new era comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” with the Asian giant, which is now the highest relationship with China among African countries. In addition, two documents were signed, the “Beijing Declaration on Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era” and the “Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)” of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The long name of this Beijing Declaration is part of the country’s diplomatic terminology and is the highest used for a partnership with an entire region. Right to modernization On Thursday (5), Wang Yi, China's foreign minister held a press conference with his counterpart from Senegal, Yassine Fall, and from the Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Gakosso, to comment on the partnership, results and prospects. Wang Yi emphasized the need to build multilateralism with Africa. “We must always listen to Africa's voice [...] without being condescending.” The Beijing document argues that Africans “are qualified to serve as heads of international organizations and institutions.” African countries, in return, highlighted in the document their appreciation that China was the first country to support the African Union's entry into the G20. China welcomes the fact that more African countries are joining the BRICS, since in addition to South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia joined the group last year. At the press conference, Wang Yi also called for China and Africa to face together challenges such as “small gardens and high fences”, about the U.S. strategy of protectionism against China. Referring to cooperation with the continent, Wang Yi said the country does not want to “play geographical games, or confront blocs”. “We want to reach a consensus in the international community [...] everyone has the right to modernization.” For his part, Yassine Fall emphasized China's commitment to increasing the supply of exports from African countries to China, the elimination of customs barriers for the least developed countries – which include 33 African countries – and financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Translated from Portuguese to English by: Ana Paula Rocha

Energy & Economics
The flags of China and Japan on the world map.

Beijing's reach for the Sea of Japan

by Johann C. Fuhrmann

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском China's geopolitics and Russia's concessions While the Western media continues to speculate about China's role in the Russian war of aggression, Beijing is seeking to maximize its benefits: from China's point of view, the aim is to exploit Moscow's dependence on the People's Republic and expand cooperation in its own interests - and not just in economic terms. In geopolitical terms, this relates in particular to China's access to the Sea of Japan, but Beijing's plans extend as far as the Arctic. A paragraph from a joint statement by Presidents Xi and Putin, which at first glance seems inconspicuous, could have far-reaching geopolitical implications and become a serious security policy challenge for Japan and South Korea. New balance of power opens up room for maneuver for Beijing The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced a premiere of a special kind on July 24: for the first time, fighter jets from the USA and Canada had to take off over the Bering Sea as two Chinese H-6K bombers approached the coast of Alaska. These were accompanied by two Russian Tupolev Tu-95MSs.[i] Just a few days earlier, Russia and China had held a joint naval and air force exercise called "Joint Sea-2024" near the southern Chinese province of Guangdong. But while these joint military exercises attracted media attention, Beijing and Moscow are creating facts in the background that could have far-reaching consequences for the security architecture in the Sea of Japan and around the Korean peninsula: Russia's ruler Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping recently published a joint declaration on deepening their strategic partnership.[ii] The background to the paper was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, or the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, 75 years ago. It contains the following resolution: "Russia and China wish to conduct a constructive dialog with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the navigation of Chinese ships across the lower reaches of the Tumen River." What seems inconspicuous could, from Seoul and Tokyo's perspective, change the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China to their own disadvantage and have a decisive impact on the sensitive security architecture in the region. The Tumen River: will China's maritime impasse disappear? The 521-kilometre-long Tumen River forms the border between China and North Korea and becomes the border river between North Korea and Russia downstream before flowing into the Sea of Japan. At present, Chinese ships can only navigate the river freely as far as the village of Fangchuan at the eastern end of the inland province of Jilin. Permission from both Russia and North Korea is required for the remaining 15 kilometers to the Sea of Japan. A Soviet-era "Friendship Bridge" less than ten meters high also blocks the passage of larger ships. Historically, China held the area until the Russian Empire gained control in the 1860s. China has repeatedly called on Russia and North Korea to permanently allow Chinese ships to navigate the river to the Sea of Japan and has proposed the creation of a special economic zone along its banks. China's goal is clear: Beijing is keen to gain access to the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River. Japan and South Korea: concerns about geopolitical implications There is concern in Japan that the strategic balance of power vis-à-vis China could shift to Japan's disadvantage: In an interview with the daily newspaper Nikkei Asia, Chisako Masuo, professor of Chinese foreign policy at Kyushu University, warns that in the future, Chinese coast guard patrol vessels could enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River alongside larger ships. "This could force the Japanese navy to withdraw its coast guard vessels from the Senkaku Islands, which would weaken surveillance in the East China Sea."[iii] Japan and China are in dispute over the Senkaku Islands. Japan controls them, China calls them Diaoyu and claims them for itself. Recently, the presence of Chinese ships in the waters around the islands has increased again. "There are likely to be similar concerns in South Korea. Chinese ships could now reach the Korean peninsula from both sides. In addition, both Japan and South Korea are close allies of the USA. A deterioration in the security situation - even if it is only perceived - would therefore also have an impact on the plans of the US armed forces," analyses journalist Michael Radunski, who reported from Beijing as a correspondent for several years[iv]. The Sea of Japan: Gateway to the Arctic Beijing is pursuing a much broader goal beyond access to the Sea of Japan: access to the Arctic. In a paper published on May 13, 2024, researchers from northern China's Dalian Maritime University argue that access to the Sea of Japan could strengthen China's position in the Arctic and significantly advance Beijing's vision of a "Polar Silk Road."[v] If the Arctic is indeed largely ice-free by mid-century, new and shortened sea routes would open up for Chinese shipping. "With the Polar Silk Road, China is also embedding the Arctic region in the so-called New Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), a large-scale Chinese project to expand an intercontinental infrastructure and trade network. The potential shipping routes of the "Polar Silk Road" run west of Greenland along the Canadian coast (Northwest Passage), from Scandinavia along the Siberian coast of Russia (Northeast Passage) and centrally between Spitsbergen and Greenland (Transpolar Route) into the Bering Strait," states David Merkle, China expert at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in a comprehensive analysis of Chinese policy in the northern polar region. [vi] Currently, a significant proportion of Chinese trade has to pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia. A blockade of this strait, which is only around 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, would pose a serious threat to China's energy security. In addition, an ice-free Arctic would shorten the existing sea routes from Asia to Europe by around 8,000 kilometers and to North America by around 4,500 kilometers. Overcomeable challenges or deliberate uncertainty? Russia and North Korea have so far been extremely sceptical of China's plans. Moscow fears that China's influence in North-East Asia could increase. Meanwhile, North Korea also has a lot at stake: until now, all Chinese goods have crossed the Tumen River via a bridge and been transported overland to the port of Rajin. "Therefore, the idea of allowing China to ship directly to the Pacific via the Tumen River would make this port redundant. North Korea would lose a lot of revenue as a result," states Melik Kaylan from the business magazine Forbes.[vii] He points out that massive dredging and widening would be required to make the Tumen navigable for large ships. In his view, the idea of restoring Chinese access seems like a fantasy, "an improbable one". So why did Putin and Xi bring up this idea? His explanation: "The coastal strip was ceded to Russia by the Qing dynasty in the 19th century and the People's Republic of China has been demanding it back for decades. Putin is running out of incentives he can offer Beijing to support his war in Ukraine. Such an offer goes down well with the Chinese public - but triggers anger in Moscow among supporters of the Putin regime, who are filled with Great Russian fanaticism. (...) But Putin is making a certain point: if Beijing gains direct access to the Sea of Japan, the strategic equation will change radically. Currently, the Chinese navy has to sail around the entire Korean peninsula to get to this area. Suddenly, Beijing could directly threaten Japan (and various disputed islands)."[viii] Consequently, the burden on the US and its allies to expand maritime projection, protection, readiness and resources would increase dramatically. So is it all just a PR stunt designed to create uncertainty among the US and its allies - and also generate applause among the Chinese public? This theory is contradicted by the fact that there are hardly any reports in the state media of the People's Republic that address the issue. Furthermore, there is increasing movement in the matter: Chinese online portals have reported that Putin agreed further resolutions at his meeting with North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un in mid-June. Accordingly, North Korea and Russia are said to have already signed a bilateral agreement on the construction of a new bridge over the Tumen River. "It can be seen that cooperation between Russia and China is becoming ever closer in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and increasing Western sanctions. The redesign of this bridge is not only an infrastructure project, but also a symbol of strategic cooperation between the two countries [Russia and China] and heralds a new era of economic cooperation," judges Yi Dan Qing Cheng, who writes under a pseudonym and is one of the few commentators from China to have dealt with the issue in a journalistic capacity.[ix] Outlook There is no question that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the balance of power and relations between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang in June. Putin traveled to North Korea for the first time in a quarter of a century to personally deepen relations between the two states. Meanwhile, Russia is dependent on Chinese goods: in 2023, goods worth a record value of more than 240 billion US dollars were traded between Russia and China, an increase of 26.3 percent compared to the previous year. These shifts in Russia's power and dependencies open up new opportunities for the People's Republic, including geopolitically. If the project to provide Chinese access to the Sea of Japan is successfully pursued, China could develop the Tumen Delta as a secondary shipyard for its naval and patrol vessels and position them strategically close to Japan's international maritime borders. The region appears to be preparing for growing tensions: The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan and the USA announced in Tokyo at the end of July that they would be expanding their cooperation within the framework of the so-called Quad. Specifically, this involves the area of cyber security - but also maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. References [i] Siehe ausführlicher: Zwerger, Patrick 2024: Uralt-Bomber aus Russland und China treffen auf US-Jets, abrufbar unter: https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/tupolew-tu-95ms-und-harbin-h-6-uralt-bomber-aus-russland-und-china-vor-alaskas-kueste/, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [ii] Außenministerium der Volksrepublik China 2024: Gemeinsame Erklärung der Volksrepublik China und der Russischen Föderation zur Vertiefung der umfassenden strategischen Kooperationspartnerschaft im neuen Zeitalter anlässlich des 75. Jahrestages der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern, abrufbar unter: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iii] Tajima, Yukio 2024: China eyes Sea of Japan access via Russia-North Korea border river, Nikkei Asia, abrufbar unter: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [iv] Radunski, Michael 2024: Chinesisch-russische Partnerschaft: Wie Peking sich Zugang zum Japanischen Meer verschaffen will, China.Table, 28.06.2024. [v] Chang, Yen-Chiang, Xingyi Duan, Xu (John) Zhang & Ling Yan 2024: On China’s Navigation Rights and Interests in the Tumen River and the Japanese Sea, abrufbar unter: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08920753.2024.2347817?src=exp-la, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vi] Merkle, David 2023: Der selbsternannte Fast-Arktisstaat: Chinas Politik in der nördlichen Polarregion, in: Auslandsinformationen, abrufbar unter: https://www.kas.de/de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der-selbsternannte-fast-arktisstaat, letzter Zugriff: 30.7.2024. [vii] Kaylan, Melik 2024: Russia Offers China A River To The Sea In The Pacific, abrufbar unter: https://www.forbes.com/sites/melikkaylan/2024/06/25/russia-offers-china-a-river-to-the-sea-in-the-pacific/, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024. [viii] Ebd. [ix] Yi Dan Qing Cheng 2024: Was er unserem Land versprochen hat, hat Putin eingehalten. Die Umgestaltung der Tumen-Brücke hat die Sorgen der chinesischen Seite gemildert, abrufbar unter: https://www.163.com/dy/article/J6JBCD8K0552P34A.html, letzter Zugriff 30.7.2024.

Diplomacy
Russian Flag with Chinese Flag and North Korean Flag

Kim-Putin deal: why this is a coded message aimed at China and how it worries Beijing

by Chee Meng Tan , Chi Zhang

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, paid a visit to Pyongyang this week and signed a defence pact with reclusive North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, as he looks for new allies who can help him increase Russia’s supply of munitions for the war in Ukraine. As part of this mutual aid deal, the two leaders promised that each country will come to the defence of the other if attacked. Kim also promised North Korea’s full support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. What’s interesting about the entire Russia-North Korea showy display of camaraderie is China’s response: silence. China has misgivings about how things are unfolding, which reports suggest prompted Chinese president Xi Jinping’s call to Putin to call off the latter’s visit to Pyongyang. Obviously, Putin didn’t heed Xi’s request. Why would Beijing be so rattled by the Russian-North Korea defence treaty? After all, China has its own defensive pact with North Korea, which was inked in 1961 and renewed in 2021. Beijing also has a “no limits” partnership with Russia. Logically, if China could sign its own defence treaty with North Korea, so can Russia. But the pact made by Putin and Kim severely threatens Chinese security. China was already worried that whatever control it has over North Korea was weakened when Pyongyang reportedly supplied almost 7,000 containers worth of weapons to Moscow. And this is why, in April, the Middle Kingdom sent its third most senior leader within the Chinese Communist party hierarchy, Zhao Leji, to assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing was still a strong ally. Now the defensive pact that draws Moscow and Pyongyang closer threatens to further diminish China’s influence over Kim. The Kremlin knows that one of Beijing’s greatest fears is that a renegade North Korea may one day point its weapons at China. And this is a key reason behind Putin’s peace treaty with Pyongyang. China and North Korea’s turbulent past For decades, China had tried to maintain its influence over Pyongyang by being the mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world. This included attempting to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Beijing does so to safeguard its own safety and survival, and probably believes that as long as North Korea remains dependent on China, it wouldn’t bite the hand that feeds it. China also remains North Korea’s biggest trade partner. This all sounds awfully bizarre, since China’s mutual defence pact with North Korea suggests that both nations are close allies. But North Korea has a tradition of defying China, and this deal with Russia might embolden it further – and that will be worrying Beijing. In 2017, for instance, Kim Jong-un, in clear defiance of China, ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, in Malaysia. And when China retaliated by halting all coal imports from North Korea into China, North Korea not only condemned Beijing for “dancing to the tune of the United States”, but also vented its anger by firing missiles in the direction of Japan. But where the missiles originated from in North Korea and the distance that it covered towards the direction of Japan provided China with a rather grim check on reality: North Korea’s weapon capabilities extend to major Chinese cities. The Sino-Korean animosity dates back centuries and took shape when Korea was a vassal state of imperial China. Unfortunately, this animosity extended to modern times when Mao Zedong decided to station Chinese troops in North Korea even after the conclusion of the Korean war, and when Beijing did not aid Pyongyang in its nuclear ambitions. It didn’t help either that the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was suspected of espionage and was nearly executed by the Chinese Communist party in the 1930s. All this history plays a part in what decisions and alliances are being made today, and why. It would be a serious mistake to think that the Russians, even in desperation, would believe that making North Korea an ally would turn the tide of the Ukrainian-Russian war in Russia’s favour. But this move, and his recent trip to Vietnam, shows Putin’s desperation. Even if Pyongyang continues to supply Russia with much-needed ammunition and weapons, Moscow will need greater technology and firepower to win against a Ukraine that uses weapons supplied by the US and Europe. Putin’s agenda This fact is not lost to Putin, and he knows that for Russia to stand a winning chance in the war that he started in 2022, requires its partner of “no limits” to stand firmly by Russia’s side. But beyond supplying Russia with the dual-use technology (which could be used for civilian or military purposes) to fuel Russia’s industrial war complex, China appears to have fallen short of supplying actual weapons to Russia. Even if China wanted to provide weapons to Russia it can’t. This is because it fears further antagonising the west, and triggering economic sanctions would prove lethal for an already ailing Chinese economy. China knows that it needs a strong Russia so that the west doesn’t consolidate its resources to deal with the perceived Chinese threat. But on the other hand, helping Moscow may prove too much for Beijing to stomach since that would harm China’s economy. So, Putin needs to force Beijing’s hand, and the peace treaty that he just signed with North Korea might just do the trick.

Diplomacy
As part of Xi Jinping's state visit, Russia and China signed the package of documents.

Russia: From China’s Big Brother to Vassal

by Jack A. Jarmon , Alexander J. Motyl

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском While the flurry over Vladimir Putin’s visit with Xi Jinping last May caused a gush among many media outlets, the public declarations of an enduring alliance is more of the same old bluster rather than a serious démarche. A longer view of Sino-Russo relations tells a far more serpentine story. Future historians will be amused by the irony of how quickly, in world historical time, China and Russia changed places. In 1949, China was the Soviet Russian empire’s vassal, a victorious Communist state that tried to emulate all things Soviet. By 2024, a mere 75 years later, Russia had become China’s vassal, a stale dictatorship hoping to survive a pointless war it had initiated a year before. Rising from the misery of World War II and its own civil war, China entered the succeeding era adrift. Its economy was in ruins, its military vulnerable. As leader of the Communist bloc, the USSR appeared as the natural strategic big brother. The mutual benefits were obvious. China was in desperate need of assistance. The USSR required access to Chinese rail links and ports in the Far East. Moscow felt it needed to defend its interests against potential armed attacks from Japan, while China was wheeling toward international isolation. Both countries feared the growing dominance of the United States. Since that time, relations between Soviet Union/Russia and China have undergone a unique push and pull. The interplay has shift from patron/client state to a formal military alliance (1950-59), schism (1960s), open conflict (1969), détente (1970s), rapprochement (1980s) and, normalisation (after the collapse of the Soviet Union). Now, the war in Ukraine has set loose a new politesse between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a “no limits” partnership. Or so the Russians would like to believe. The Chinese disagree: their EU ambassador Fu Cong characterised the partnership in 2023 as “nothing but rhetoric.” To be sure, Russia’s need of a market for its natural resource wealth and China’s energy intensive growth have certainly impelled them to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have met 40 times since 2012. Both men share a similar family story as well as similar views about civilisational wars, the decline of the West, color revolutions, and the threat posed by the United States and NATO. However, despite these personal, philosophical, and trade complementarities, the PRC and Russia are moving on diverse tracks. Fu Cong’s dismissive attitude is on the mark. To start, the economic synergy is exaggerated. Russia is fourteenth among China’s largest trading partners. Its trade with Russia is relatively inconsequential. Each is more dependent on third countries than on the other. Russia needs the EU. China relies on other Asian countries and the United States. Further, despite its economic heft, China cannot match Europe’s potential as a driver of industrial and commercial modernisation for Russia. Secondly, due to its monopsonistic position, China forces Russia to sell oil, natural gas, and coal at heavily discounted prices. These discounts are so deep that Russian gas exports to China often do not cover the operational costs of their extraction and transportation. Additionally, the PRC makes payments to Russia in Chinese renminbi and uses these transactions to leverage its position over non-Russian suppliers. Unsurprisingly, direct Chinese investment in Russia has almost exclusively focused on the energy and other extraction industries. Sectors with the greatest potential for productivity gains, such as high-tech manufacturing, utilities, construction, financial services et al, go undeveloped. In addition to trade priorities, another reason for this neglect is that the Chinese have found that doing business in Russia is as daunting for them as it is for western investors. The infrastructure in Russia’s Far East is so underdeveloped that the PRC has had to make substantial investments to get access to the resources it wants. By all reports, these investments have underperformed. Further, the lack of rule of law and the absence of a business-friendly ecosystem leave even the Chinese frustrated and grumbling. Russia wants investments but not investors—a common refrain often directed at the PRC. The Russian economy has long been beset by structural problems: low diversification, a faltering industrial base, uncontrolled corruption, the absence of an entrepreneurial class and now, inflation. The mounting costs of the war in Ukraine exacerbates existing matters and will probably prolong the economic dysfunctionality far into the future. In short, Putin’s hunger to reconstitute the Soviet empire is “making Russia a smaller, worse-educated and poorer country.” China’s own economy has its challenges, too. Rising corporate debt, labour shortages and, poor investment efficiency are driving it into stagnation. In 2012, the PRC launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to link its economy with under-developed regions from Central Asia, Africa, and Europe. The dream was to provide its export-oriented economy with markets. There have been several major defaults, and recipients of Chinese loans are subject to falling into debt traps. In light of the current pressures on the economy, the risk is even more intense. By most analyses, the PRC will need cooperation from the West if the scheme has any hope of success. In Central Asia, a confrontation with Russia may be percolating. China’s Belt and Road could compete with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From the beginning, the Eurasian Union was a token attempt at economic regionalism and a veiled instrument of Russian geopolitics. Many contend it survives as merely another façade to reconstitute the Soviet Union. While it offers little incentive in the way of any real political or market institutions, it represents Russia’s bid to bolster its influence in the region and beyond. Although its threat to the BRI is not significant, it has prompted one regional expert to conclude China may fear a Russian victory in Ukraine because it could strengthen Moscow’s influence in Central Asia. In a move that diminishes Russian energy policy as a source of political influence, Chinese companies have taken stakes in Central Asian oil and gas fields and have built a network of pipelines. Beijing also abandoned its interest in investing in the Power of Siberia II pipeline. Additionally, the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) froze lending to Russia and Belarus in 2023. As a vassal state, there is little Moscow can offer Beijing except for its agency as a counterbalance against the United States. The fundamental difference is that Xi wants to reform the global economy, while Putin wants to upend it. As one Chinese analyst puts it, “Russia is seeking to subvert the existing international and regional order by means of war, whereas China wants to resolve disputes peacefully.” Russia’s war against Ukraine has troubled the Chinese. The global economy on which China depends so greatly is being disrupted. Indeed, Beijing may be preparing for a Russian defeat. A recent analysis by Beijing University’s Feng Yujun is worth quoting at length for what it surely reveals about the current Chinese leadership’s views of Moscow: “Russia’s eventual defeat [is] inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea…. Ukraine may yet rise from the ashes. When the war ends, it can look forward to the possibility of joining the European Union and NATO. “The war is a turning-point for Russia. It has consigned Mr. Putin’s regime to broad international isolation. He has also had to deal with difficult domestic political undercurrents, … Mr. Putin may recently have been re-elected, but he faces all kinds of possible black-swan events.” At some point the Kremlin will become a liability for Beijing. Putin and his circle can bray at the moon about the constant state of siege between nations and societies, invoke other nuggets of Leninist doctrine, and even claim how Poland attacked Nazi Germany and, thus, began World War II. But when the time comes, Xi, rather than conjure up Lenin, will take counsel from another source – Sun Tzu: “There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare.” When that moment finally arrives is uncertain. However, the sway China holds over Russia and the tide of events suggest it is approaching.