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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract The BRICS group emerged at the beginning of the current century as one of the important economies in the international system based on the hegemony of Western powers led by the United States of America. With the emergence of this group, political and economic writings have diversified, trying to explain the extent of this group's ability to compete globally facing the Western powers to rise to the top of the hegemony pyramid on the one hand, and the role of this group and its political and strategic influence in confronting economic, political and security challenges on the other hand. With the holding of the sixteenth presidential summit of the group in the Russian city of Kazan during the period 22 - 24 October 2024 under the slogan "Strengthening multilateralism for development, security and fair worlds" and with the participation of the group’s members and a number of other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations, many theories of international relations have tried to provide explanations for the emergence and rise of this group, including the Power Transition Theory. From this perspective, this study comes to investigate the BRICS group by relying on the interpretation of the Power Transition Theory as one of the most important theories of international relations that can contribute to developing interpretations of this group. KeywordsBRICS, International Relations Theories, Power Transition Theory, Kazan Summit Introduction Since the establishment of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in September 2006, and its first summit meeting in 2009, and with the accession of South Africa in 2011 to become an entity that includes the fastest growing economies in the world, and its name became the "BRICS Group", the group has appeared on the horizon as a diplomatic and financial alliance that is increasingly important for development in many countries, and it has also appeared as an attempt to escape Western control at the economic level. Despite the differences between the BRICS countries in terms of geographical affiliation, economic disparity and their levels of production, and ethnic, religious and linguistic disparity, they have succeeded in finding a formula for agreement among themselves and finding global geostrategic influence. In this context, it is easy to notice the serious and ambitious endeavor of the countries of this group to formulate a new international system within the framework of the important radical changes that the world is witnessing. The countries currently under the group's banner: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, present themselves as an alternative to the existing international financial and political entities. The countries of the group are trying to present themselves as representatives of the countries of the South and as "the alternative model to G7". From this perspective, the BRICS group has received great attention from a wide sector of researchers and scholars in various science fields despite the recent history of this group. Accordingly, this study attempts, by relying on the statements and assumptions of the Power Transition Theory, to determine the nature of this group. Can BRICS achieve success in shaping a new global order? The problem of the study This study believes that understanding of the BRICS group does not only require applied analysis, but also requires theoretical understanding, as theoretical thinking helps to avoid the limitations of purely empirical interpretation of the nature, mechanisms & perspectives of the BRICS countries' development. Accordingly, this study focuses on interpreting the theory of power transition for the rise of the BRICS group, and its position in the international system facing the Western powers led by the United States. How does this theory view this group through its propositions and assumptions, by answering the following questions: Are the BRICS countries just another institution for international cooperation that fits the structure of the existing international system, or is it a radically different way of international relations that could seriously change current global politics? What are the motives of the BRICS countries? Can the BRICS group become an alternative to the hegemony of Western powers that has been formalized in the current system of international institutions and systems? Will this institution provide fundamentally new conditions that may lead to the development of international cooperation in contrast to the power policies pursued by the United States and its allies? Can the BRICS countries be considered as a new mechanism for global governance, or are they nothing more than a temporary/short-lived international governmental arrangement? Accordingly, through the previous questions, this study examines a main question that revolves around how to interpret the Power Transition Theory for the BRICS group. First, Power Transition Theory Despite the many writings that have addressed the future of global hegemony in light of the remarkable rise of the role of the BRICS group, these writings have not paid much attention to placing the issue of the impact of the power transition process on the future of that hegemony within its theoretical framework, which is a framework that may shed useful light on the nature of the challenges imposed on the Great Power as it exercises its hegemony. Here, the study discusses this theory and its ability to explain the rise of the BRICS countries and its potential to bring about changes in the current international system. This is done by addressing the concept of power transition, its indicators, and its application to the BRICS group. (1) The concept of power transition Organski proposed the Power Transition Theory in an attempt to analyze global politics by presenting a hierarchical system of powers or states in light of the proportions of power resources and the possibility of war. Thus, he describes a hierarchical system through which all states are known according to the relative power distribution. The distribution of power varies between units, so at the top comes the group of Dominant Nations in which power is concentrated, and thus they are at the top of the pyramid, and thus they control the largest proportion of resources in it, but they are not considered the dominant power, because they cannot control the behavior of other powerful actors on their own, but they maintain their position as a dominant power by ensuring the preponderance of power in their favor in the face of the potential competing power, as well as their ability to manage global politics according to the rules that help ensure the profit of their allies [1].   This, and in the next tranche of the pyramid of power, come those countries called "Great Powers", which are the major countries that are not as powerful as to dominate global politics, but they have the capabilities that make them a potential competitor to the dominant power. This group of great powers is generally satisfied to remain in its position as long as there is an alliance with it and with the dominant or hegemonic power. However, in many cases, a number of these great power countries are not satisfied to remain in the same tranche following the hegemonic power, and therefore seek and try to make a change in its current international status (Kai, J. (2017)). Accordingly, the concept of a great and not satisfied power - according to Organiski's description - is the group of countries that have grown to their maximum power after the current international system has been completely entrenched, and they have not - therefore - had a share or a portion in establishing this current international system, the benefits of which have already been distributed. In addition, the dominant power and its supporters are generally unwilling to grant newcomer countries more than a small fraction of the advantages they derive from the status quo, and thus these newcomers seek to establish a new position for themselves on the international stage, these countries are noted to be growing rapidly in power and are expected to continue to grow, which gives them reason to believe that they can compete with - and sometimes surpass - the dominant nation in terms of power. Also, one of the characteristics of this category of great powers is that they do not accept the marginalization of the international stage, especially if their pursuit of hegemony and dominance will contribute to granting them greater benefits and privileges [2]. In this, and at the third and lowest stage of the pyramid of international power comes this group of countries called "middle powers", which are considered relatively strong countries in specific geographical regions, but they do not have the ability to challenge the dominant nation or the structure of the international system as a whole. At the base of the pyramid of power comes this group of states called "small powers" and colonies. Accordingly, the concept of "Power Transition" refers to "the loss of a hegemonic country’s leadership position in the international system to another newcomer whose power is rapidly growing." Thus, this newcomer seeks to reach a position of hegemony. In order for a power transition to occur, the rising country must possess power components that are greater than those of the dominant country, or at least equal to them, and thus the rising country must work to narrow the gap between its national capabilities and the capabilities of the hegemonic country. (2) Applying the Power Transition Theory to the BRICS groupThe power transition theory (PTT) is considered the most popular theoretical approach to studying the BRICS group among Western scholars. PTT is based on a number of assumptions, including: that changes in the balance of power in world politics occur systematically, and that disputes and wars are usually the result of the increasing influence of countries competing with the hegemonic powers. In this regard, all countries are divided into two groups: those that support the status quo, and "revisionists", which are the group of emerging countries that are dissatisfied with the status quo. Powerful and influential countries, such as the United States, enjoy the advantages of the existing world order and fall into the status quo category, while countries that are dissatisfied with their status and role in the international relations system are considered revisionists. According to PTT, the latter favor radical changes in the current international order. In this sense, Russia and China are the main candidates for revisionist powers, while PTT supporters view Brazil, India and South Africa as countries with “moderate” revisionist ambitions (mostly regional in nature, although Brazil and India have some global aspirations such as their intention to become permanent members of the UN Security Council). In the following, the study examines the application of traditional and non-traditional indicators of the power transition theory to the BRICS group. A- Indicators of military power transition for Russia and ChinaAs for Russia, it has succeeded in modernizing its military force and doubling its military spending through huge oil revenues, which has placed the Russian army in the second place globally among the 138 most powerful armies in the world after the United States army [3]. Moreover, Russia’s military spending is expected to increase in light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, and in March 2021, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute issued a report on arms exports for 2020, in which it confirmed the growth of the American, French and German arms exports against a decline in Russian-Chinese arms exports, but the report expects the arms boom for 2020, especially in the wake of the billions of dollars in military aid provided by Europe to Kiev. The Russian Ukrainian war highlighted the inevitability of increasing military spending, which is directly proportional to the growth of the arms market. As for China, its defense budget has been revealed, especially in light of the escalation of external threats to suppress and contain it, as it will increase by 7.2% during 2023 in order to support and develop its military capabilities, bringing total military spending to $225 billion, according to the draft budget report issued by the annual meeting of the National People's Congress of China, making this increase the fastest in China's history since 2019 in light of the escalation of tensions with the United States of America. B - Indicators of the transition of the economic power of Russia and ChinaThe economic development that Russia witnessed during the Putin era represented a pivotal point for political decision independence, which was clearly evident in the Russian national security strategy, and in Russia's approach in dealing with the challenges it faced on the international stage. Russia's domestic production in 2020 amounted to about $1.67 trillion, ranking second among the world's strongest economies (4), and it also ranks third in oil production with an estimated 12.1% of global production, in addition to being the second largest producer of natural gas with 17%. Despite the economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia following its war with Ukraine, the Russian economy remains able to bounce back and remains one of the major powers on the international stage. As for the Chinese economy, it recorded higher-than-expected growth in the first quarter of 2023, reaching 4.5% year-on-year, supported by policymakers’ moves to boost growth after lifting strict anti-Covid-19 restrictions in January 2023. Retail sales in the first two months of the year jumped 3.5% compared to 2022, a turnaround from the 1.8% year-on-year decline recorded in January 2023. This consumption will lead the economic recovery at a time when weak global demand is weighing on China’s exports. Infrastructure investment also increased by 9% year-on-year in early 2023, driven by government spending aimed at supporting the economy (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2023). According to PTT, today’s Russia is a typical revisionist country that creates many problems for the United States and its allies. Especially the threats it poses to countries friendly to the United States, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden. The problem is also exacerbated because of Russia’s cooperation with “rogue countries,” such as Syria, Iran and North Korea. While revisionist powers – Russia and China – are seen as a source of destabilization of the international system and their activities are automatically associated with negative consequences, the behavior of hegemonic or dominant countries (status quo) is considered positive because they perform protective functions within the above system. C- Indicators of power transition for Brazil, India, and South AfricaAs for explaining the “moderate” revisionist policies of Brazil, India, and South Africa as middle powers, it is primarily through their ambitions to play the role of “regional hegemony” in South America, South Asia, and Africa, respectively. However, unlike Brazil and South Africa, which do not have “hot” conflicts with their neighbors and mainly use their soft power arsenal to achieve hegemonic positions in their areas of influence, India faces more serious security challenges, including territorial disputes with China and Pakistan – and sometimes – military confrontation with the latter. It should be noted that the policies of individual BRICS countries are assessed differently. A number of PTT advocates see BRICS as a tool that allows some of its members to secure their status as great powers and balance the West at the regional and global levels. However, another group of PTT adherents see the international position of the BRICS countries differently: while Brazil and China are seen as rising powers, Russia and South Africa are seen as declining powers due to their economic problems. However, in response to the challenges posed by China and Russia, a group of push-and-talk advocates have proposed various types of containment policies, yet not all PTT theorists see the BRICS countries as revisionist powers. Some even see Putin’s policy in Ukraine as a status quo strategy aimed at securing Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and counterbalancing NATO’s eastward expansion [5]. These analysts believe that the same (status quo) motivations drive Beijing and Moscow’s behavior at the global level. For example, Beijing and Moscow are quite skeptical about reforming the United Nations, preferring to preserve its structure and powers. As for the rest of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, South Africa), on the contrary, they express their interest in reforming the UN in the hope that their status in the Security Council in particular and in the UN system in general will be raised. The advocates group of BRICS countries’ behaviour of PTT theorists who interpret the status quo believe that many of the problems with the BRICS countries stem from the fact that they have not been equally integrated into the international security system that emerged in the post-Cold War era. That is, Western countries led by the United States and Europe have crossed some of the “red lines” set by Russia in the post-Soviet space. For example, the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008 was a clear manifestation of this Western policy 1. The Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 with a crisis and is still ongoing, is another example. When the Kiev authorities that came to power after the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime publicly declared their intention to join the European Union and NATO, Moscow reintegrated Crimea into Russia and supported pro-Russian rebels in Donbass (southeastern part of Ukraine). From the point of view of this group, Russia's policy is determined not only by its geopolitical interests but also by its geographic & economic interests, in particular, there is a constant competition between two integration projects - Russian and EU - in the post-Soviet space: the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow and the Eastern Partnership program led by the EU [6]. Supporters of this point of view believe that it is better to cooperate than to confront Russia. The same approach has been proposed in relation to other BRICS countries including, for example, the Chinese "Belt and Road" initiative or the "New Silk Road" initiative.  D- Soft power in BRICS countries’ policies as an unconventional indicator in the concept of power transitionWithin the framework of the principles and assumptions of the liberal perspective that help understand international relations, dating back to John Stuart Mill, Giuseppe Mazzini, Woodrow Wilson and John Maynard Keynes, as well as to the perceptions of Immanuel Kant in the 18th century, neoliberal IR theorists believe that the BRICS group can be better explained through the concept of soft power, and they emphasize that in contrast to the Cold War era, when many countries preferred to rely on hard (military) power, soft power tools have become more effective nowadays. Neoliberals note that the soft power strategy is attractive to the BRICS countries for a number of reasons: First, it can help them overcome their negative image in the international stage, an image that resulted from their systematic involvement in a series of international conflicts (Russia versus Georgia and Ukraine; China versus its neighbors in the South China Sea; India versus Pakistan, South Africa versus Angola and Namibia). Second, the soft power arsenal can also be useful in diversifying the BRICS countries’ methods of geopolitical and geoeconomic expansion and making these methods more effective. It is worth noting some specific details in the BRICS countries’ interpretation of the concept of soft power. First, the BRICS countries interpret soft power differently from its initial meaning given by Joseph Nye, who defined soft power as the power of attraction. In fact, however, the soft power policies of the BRICS countries (especially Russia and China) are often dominated by pragmatic interests rather than being attractive to other countries. For this reason, these soft power strategies do not always consider the preferences of international partners. In Nye’s view, this is often unacceptable to the BRICS partners and may provoke a hostile reaction to their soft power initiatives [7]. Moreover, several studies have found that the BRICS countries’ reading of the concept of soft power is much broader than Nye’s. While Nye believes that a country’s soft power depends primarily on three resources: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies that should be attractive to foreign partners, BRICS theorists believe in the need to include the problem of soft power in everything that cannot be attributed to the security (military) agenda. That is, for BRICS countries, the concept of soft power is synonymous with the concept of soft (non-military) security, which includes not only diplomatic, social, and cultural components - according to Nye - but also other elements, such as economic and/or financial power. In contrast, this belief is unacceptable to Nye, who believed that economic and financial tools can be tools of coercion and push rather than attraction. Moreover, for BRICS theorists, soft power is a comprehensive concept that covers other closely related concepts: public diplomacy, peoples’ diplomacy, the humanitarian dimension of politics, and NGO diplomacy. Among the soft power tools, economic and financial tools, cultural cooperation, ethnic diaspora, educational and religious institutions are the preferred methods of the BRICS countries. In this context, the BRICS countries have created special bodies to implement soft power: the Chinese Confucius Institutes, the Russian Rossotrudnichestvo (agency for cooperation with citizens abroad), the “Russian World”, the Gorchakov and Andrei Pervozvani foundations, among others. It is worth noting here that in the BRICS countries, the governments of the countries play a major role in controlling and directing soft power policy, which makes it less flexible and effective.  In general, it can be said that the BRICS countries use soft power in their own way, trying to avoid imitating the Western experience and going beyond Nye’s interpretation - which can be described as narrow - of the concept of soft power. Policymakers and experts/academia in these countries have not yet developed a clear terminology regarding soft power and this negatively affects both the theoretical understanding of this political tool and its effectiveness. At the same time, the BRICS countries have enormous soft power potential that can enhance their international positions if used properly. This is what the BRICS countries have demonstrated in the successful use of their soft power arsenal through: China’s economic, financial and cultural expansion in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Beijing’s “Belt and Road” initiative; the rather successful Russian integration projects in the post-Soviet space (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization). From the perspective of what was mentioned before, it can be argued that, although there are several advantages put forward by the power transition theory, it has many shortcomings. This theory was most applicable in the Cold War period, when two superpowers were interested in preserving the status quo due to the risk of mutual destruction in the event of a nuclear war. The current system of international relations, including its structure, is still in its formative stage, and in this context, the PTT can explain little about the behavior of the BRICS countries. Moreover, the PTT does not take into account the existence of a third type of countries - reformers who do not fully agree with the current system of international relations but prefer not to radically change the “rules of the game”. Instead, they try to adapt these rules to the dynamic changes in the world system in order to make them more fair and comfortable for all members of the international community. Often, these countries do not act as revisionists but it prefers the status quo by demanding that the "rules of the game" and international legal standards be observed. For example, the BRICS countries strongly oppose any attempts to revise the UN Charter regarding the use of military force and the principles of inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (in contrast to the Western doctrine of “humanitarian intervention”). It is clear from the above that if PTT supporters want this theory to better fit current realities and retain its explanatory power, they need to revise the classification of states they use and supplement it with a new (“reformist”) type of authority. Second: The Kazan Summit and its dynamics and interactionsDuring the period 22-24 October 2024, the Russian city of Kazan hosted the sixteen Presidential Summit under the slogan "Strengthening Multilateralism for Fair Global Development and Security", with the participation of members of the bloc and several other countries and representatives of international and UN organizations. This summit witnessed several dynamics and events, which can be summarized in the following elements: 1. Continuing requests to join the group: The group represented about 36.7% of the global economy in 2024, which is more than the share of the G7 countries, which amounted to 30% in 2023. In this context, many countries expressed their desire to join, most notably Turkey, which submitted an official request to join in September 2024, while countries such as Azerbaijan and Belarus also applied to join the group.  2. Wide participation by heads of state: 38 countries participated in the BRICS summit held in the Russian city of Kazan, and most of the participation was at the level of leaders and heads of state; The participations came mainly from the heads of the bloc’s member states, namely His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, in addition to the participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Antonio Guterres, and the participation of some the head of the heads of states that showed interest in the bloc, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and, Vietnamese Minister Pham Minh Chinh. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia participated with a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, as an invited country to join the group, and not as a full member as is the case for countries that have recently joined at the beginning of 2024. 3. Focus on international issues: The main focus of that summit's agenda was focused on the governance of the global system and its institutions, especially financial institutions that have begun to harm developing countries and tend to achieve the interests of Western powers alone; and the severe damage caused by Western sanctions to the economy and their conflict with the values of globalization, in addition to addressing raging international and regional issues such as the war in Ukraine and the Middle East. Views were also exchanged on cooperation between the BRICS countries on the international stage, including with regard to resolving ongoing regional conflicts. The agenda included discussing the conclusions of the previous summit in Johannesburg, especially deepening financial cooperation within the group, and discussing expanding the scope of the group and including new members in light of more than 30 countries expressing the desire to join. 4. Holding several meetings on the sidelines of the summit: Several meetings were held on the sidelines of the summit between the participants, perhaps the most prominent of which was a direct meeting between the Chinese president and his Indian counterpart for the first time. This came shortly after the two countries reached an agreement on conducting patrols on the disputed border in the Himalayas, after four years of military confrontation that led to an escalation of tensions between the two countries. As the host president, Putin also held bilateral meetings with all participating member states, as well as heads of invited states such as: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani, and Bolivian President Luis Arce. 5. Moscow presented cooperative proposals: These included the creation of an online information exchange mechanism to resolve disputes related to e-commerce; with the aim of creating a proactive framework before litigation; an initiative to establish a BRICS Investment Arbitration Center; and the development of an agreement to settle investment disputes, it also proposed the establishment of a BRICS grain exchange, which would help discover fair and predictable prices for products and raw materials; to ensure food security and protect national markets from harmful external interference, speculation, and attempts to create artificial food shortages. That summit concluded with several outcomes and results, and the Kazan Declaration was formulated as the final statement of the summit. The most prominent of these outcomes were: 1. Financial and monetary cooperation: by moving forward towards establishing an independent infrastructure to regulate the settlement of cross-border payments and financial transactions (BRICS Clear), with the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM) focusing on facilitating and expanding innovative financial practices and methods for projects and programs, including finding acceptable mechanisms for financing in local currencies. With the study of establishing a unified transportation platform to ensure multi-modal logistics services between the countries of the association, and welcoming the establishment of a new investment platform that uses the infrastructure of the New Development Bank. 2. Reforming the governance of the global system: by endorsing the call launched by the G20 during Brazil’s presidency of the group regarding reforming global governance, while endorsing dialogues and partnerships that enhance cooperation with the African continent, such as the China-Africa Cooperation Forum Summit, the India-Africa Forum Summit, and the Russia-Africa Summit, while working to build on the outcomes of the second Johannesburg Declaration of 2023, and supporting the call for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including its Security Council; with the aim of making it more democratic, representative, effective and efficient, and increasing the representation of developing countries in the membership of the Council so that it can respond appropriately to prevailing global challenges, and support the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America.  3. Stance regarding Palestinian events: The bloc stressed the urgent importance of launching a comprehensive political process to address the entire Middle East problem, stop the violence, provide vital assistance to those affected, and work to establish a two-state solution and correct the historical injustice that the Palestinian people suffered from, and which is the only guarantee for establishing peace in the Middle East, while supporting Palestine's accession to the bloc as a member state.  4. Strengthening nuclear security: The bloc countries call for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for the Middle East region to be free of nuclear weapons, while stressing the need for all parties to renew the Iranian nuclear agreement. Support for the initiative to establish a center for research and vaccines development was also announced, as well as continuing to develop the integrated early warning system for the BRICS group to prevent the risks of diseases and epidemics. 5. Regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war: The bloc members stressed the importance of resorting to a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis and resorting to dialogue. The summit, its dynamics and its outcomes carry many implications and may have some repercussions, which can be explained as follows: 1. Russian flexibility and vitality: The success of Russian diplomacy and the Kremlin in hosting this summit at this time and mobilizing broad international participation, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations, represents a challenge to Western efforts to represent Putin as an isolated leader under Western sanctions and threatened with arrest, under the ruling of the International Criminal Court; as Russia has proven the flexibility and vitality of its regional and international partnerships as a system that enjoys international acceptance and trust. 2. The balance of Turkish foreign policy: Perhaps Turkish participation has provoked many reactions; given that it has the largest army in the ranks of NATO, which is hostile to Russia, this comes as an extension of its balanced approach in its foreign policy in order to diversify alliances while maintaining relations with the West, and it also reflects Turkish discontent with European policy regarding Ankara's membership in the European Union, and Turkey's joining the BRICS group would achieve strategic gains for the group; this will give it a balanced character instead of viewing the group as anti-Western, and this will achieve gains for Turkey, which will benefit from the flexibility of its relationship with both the East and the West. 3. Establishing a unified currency: The symbolism that Putin used during the summit regarding a unified currency for the bloc was not accepted by some of the bloc’s members themselves, who fear identifying with the Russian-Chinese orientation at the expense of their interests and their relationship with the West, most notably India and Brazil. There is a degree of exaggeration in imagining the possibility of eliminating the dollar’s position in the global system and moving towards removing it from the global economy. 4. Resolving the balance of power: We cannot ignore what is reflected in the interest of the countries of the South in participating in the activities of the BRICS summit, as well as the emerging international powers, and what it represents in terms of a trend among those countries to express their desire to change the balance of power in the global system based on Western hegemony, and to express dissatisfaction with the prevailing system, which reflects the interest in the efforts of China and Russia to direct the international community against the Western system due to its double standards, especially after the fragility of the international community organizations entrusted with implementing the rules of international law regarding the war in the Middle East became clear, in addition to their exposure of the flaws in the rules of international trade, and the frameworks of economic sanctions that harm the economies of the countries of the South in favor of the West.  In estimation, the importance of the development represented by the BRICS group and what it reflects in terms of a rapid transformation in the global system cannot be overlooked, within the framework of what it includes in terms of economy, markets, natural and industrial resources, and a huge human mass, but exaggerating the impact of the group's movements deviates from reality, especially considering that the group carries within it many contradictions that prevent the group from moving effectively, and in light of the divergence of the interests and goals of its members themselves, which can be inferred from the nature of the outcomes of the presidential summit, which are limited to announcements and visions regarding general cooperative projects without the existence of timetables and realistic implementation plans for many of them; the effectiveness of the group remains questionable. Third: Economic cooperation between the BRICS countriesData indicate that the ratio of the BRICS countries' GDP to the global GDP is witnessing a continuous increase during the period (2000-2023) to the point that it surpassed the G7 countries for the first time in 2020, as the BRICS share reached 31.02% for the G7 countries.   It is notable that the GDP rate of BRICS countries has witnessed declines during the mentioned period (2000-2024), and this decline can be explained by a number of reasons, including: the global financial crisis of 2009, the economic conditions experienced by a number of BRICS countries such as: Brazil 2015, represented by a high budget deficit and high inflation rates, Russia 2014, the decline in South Africa's GDP due to the collapse of raw material prices, and the decline in the GDP growth rate of the group's countries due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the global economy. As for the trade exchange volume, it witnessed a growth of 95.2% during the period from 2010-2022, recording about $10.52 trillion in 2022 compared to $5.39 trillion in 2010 [9]. On the side of foreign direct investment flows, according to UNCTAD data, we find that foreign direct investment flows to the BRICS group more than quadrupled during the period from 2001 to 2021, recording about $355 billion in 2021 compared to about $84 billion in 2001. In addition, the share of these flows in total global flows reached about 22% in 2021, compared to about 11% in 2001 [10]. UNCTAD data also indicate an increase in foreign direct investment among the group’s countries to reach about $167 billion in 2020, compared to about $27 billion in 2010, and China played a pivotal role in this increase by being the largest investor and recipient of investments within the BRICS group. On the other hand, Brazil and India witnessed strong growth among the group’s countries, while Russian growth declined and South Africa's foreign direct investment balance declined [11]. ConclusionThere are many theories of international relations that have tried to explain the emergence and development of the BRICS group, one of these theories is the power transition theory. The power transition theory has several analytical advantages that explain the rise of the BRICS group, but one of its biggest shortcomings is its greater applicability to the conditions of the Cold War era, where the status quo was maintained and there was fear of a nuclear war. However, the current international system is completely different, as it is in a new birth phase that hinders the power transition theory in explaining the behavior of the BRICS countries. This necessitates the interest of researchers and academics in several theories of international relations that explain the BRICS group, such as the peaceful coexistence theory, the state theory, and the global regionalism theory. In addition, supporters of the power transition theory should review the classification of countries they use to classify countries, and they should establish another type, which is reformist countries, as stated in the study. The concept of soft power as defined by Joseph Nye is completely different from that used by the BRICS group, as the group adheres to a pragmatic and practical approach to using soft power directed at promoting and protecting national interests rather than considering the preferences of international partners. The BRICS member states apply different methods in their pursuit of status - from mobility and competition strategies - to different types of policies. The BRICS group is one of the most important global economic groups that is characterized by a large number of advantages that qualify it to play a vital role in bringing about changes in the global economy due to the diversity of its member economies: Among these advantages are: - The growing economic weight of the group as a result of its association with the economies of emerging countries, which contributes to improving its ranking within the economies of the G20 countries. - The vital role played by the group in global food security through the occupation of Russia, Brazil, and India as the largest producers and exporters of wheat, soybeans, and rice - respectively - - It has adopted several important initiatives to promote and encourage investment within the group, especially with the increasing concern about the conditions of the global economy and the challenges associated with tensions on the international stage. - The BRICS countries are interested in establishing alternative development financial mechanisms to those of the West, such as: the New Development Bank (NDB), and the establishment of a Contingency Reserve Fund (CRA). - Establishing the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2025, which defines the path for the group’s development and sets the framework for cooperation between its members in accordance with current economic trends and conditions. References 1. تعتبر الحرب الروسية الجورجية التي اندلعت في أغسطس 2008 أحد الأدلة على بدء سعي روسيا للسيطرة واستعادة نفوذها السابق سواء إقليميا أو عالمياً، حيث أن تلك الحرب مثلت لموسكو فرصة كبيرة لتحقيق نصالحها عبر استعادة نفوذها في جورجيا من جهة، وإيصال رسالة للغرب وللدول السوفيتية السابقة التي تحاول الخروج من دائرة النفوذ السوفيتي بأنها قادرة على حماية مصالحها ونفوذها ولا يمكن الاستهانة بقوتها وقدرتها العسكرية والتعامل معها كدولة كبرى لها دور فاعل ومؤثر.لمزيد من التفاصيل حول الحرب الروسية- الجورجية 2008، أنظر: عودة،جهاد (2017)، الحرب الروسية- الجورجية: استعادة النفوذ الروسي في جورجيا، المجلة العلمية للبحوث والدراسات التجارية، المجلد ،31 العدد .1  [1] Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. [2] A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. Pp. xii, 292. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980 [3] Stockholm international Peace2020 ، [4] Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020 [5] Samuel Charap & Keith Darden, Russia and Ukraine, Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 56, 2014, Issue 2. [6] Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 41, 2015. [7] Joseph S.Nye, JR, The Limits of Chinese Soft Power, The World’s Opinion Page, Jul 10, 2015. [8] http://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/#:~:text=By%202023%2C%20the%20difference%20had,held%20by%20the%20G7%20countries[9] World Development Indicators Database. [10] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report [11] UNCTAD. 2023. BRICS Investment Report

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The implementation of yet another U.S. initiative may allow it to interfere in the information policy of ASEAN and control the cyberspace of all of Southeast Asia. Two sides of the same summit The annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States was held in Vientiane in October. Meetings in this format are routine for ASEAN and are held with each of the non-regional powers, i.e. the dialogue partners of the association. They discuss plans for cooperation and exchange views on international issues. This time, the U.S., represented by A. Blinken, again tried to use dialogue to impose its vision of global issues. The statements of the US Secretary of State were anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean in nature, and were aimed at increasing tensions vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the internal political situation in Myanmar. The timing of the meeting was no accident; it took place before the East Asia Summit (EAS), which is a platform for multilateral negotiations between ASEAN countries and external partners. In this way, Washington hoped to force representatives of Southeast Asian states to reconsider the agenda of the EAS and planned to use the upcoming event to provoke regional conflicts and consolidate their role as the ‘chief gendarme’ of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. However, as the EAS showed, the U.S. failed to do so: no one except U.S. allies supported the attempts to undermine the regional architecture of security and cooperation. Following the results of the US-ASEAN summit, the divergence of views was also notable. The parties did not adopt any joint document of a political nature. Such a result was natural; for ASEAN, any external imposition of views is traditionally unacceptable. In general, the ASEAN leaders’ talks with Anthony Blinken were held among other meetings with Russia, India, China etc., and they would not have attracted much attention if a very narrow joint statement (‘Statement on Promoting Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence’ (AI)) had not been adopted in the aftermaths. With good intention According to the terms of this statement, under the plausible pretext of ‘achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals’, the United States intends to implement a whole range of plans together with ASEAN. Thus, it is planned to ‘discuss the further development of ASEAN’s AI projects’ (although, why should ASEAN discuss its plans with someone?), ‘interaction with the ASEAN Working Group on AI Governance (again, a direct intention to enter the decision-making process in the association), ‘creating an ASEAN roadmap for responsible AI’ (and, thus, inclusion in the internal planning process of its activities). In addition, the parties will ‘cooperate on approaches and standards in the field of AI’ (these approaches and standards will be based on similar U.S. ones), ‘knowledge exchange, technology transfer’ (the saying about ‘free cheese in a mousetrap’ is involuntarily recalled), ‘strengthening the collective digital and cyber potential’ (again based on the United States and built according to their rules), ‘the expansion of education in the field of AI’ (also according to U.S. norms) and ‘the development of interrelated approaches to AI management’ (AI management is a serious issue and it must be understood that external participation equals a direct threat to national sovereignty). Even more ambitious tasks include ‘supporting the development of national digital and AI strategies, discussing its management and regulation’ (for the United States, gaining access to national strategies will provide new tools for interfering in the internal affairs of others), ‘implementing initiatives in cooperation with the ministries of digital development of ASEAN countries’, as well as ‘ensuring information security support for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework’ (its adoption is planned in 2025; here the U.S. is again interfering in intra-ASEAN affairs). We were not snubbed of the traditional American demagoguery in the field of ‘human rights’. The statement supposes ‘ensuring human rights and protection from all forms of discrimination and prejudice when using AI’ and  ‘ensuring the inclusiveness and accessibility of AI’ in the near future. Whether the mass use of AI will be safe for the population is a question the authors of the document are not considering, instead occupying themselves with other tasks. Another component is ‘dealing with foreign manipulation of information, disinformation and training in the field of technologies to counter this’ (of course, the U.S. initiators do not doubt their right to assign labels to information sources). Finally, it is expected to ‘stimulate the improvement of the population’s digital literacy via the private sector’, although, it would seem, in such sensitive areas as AI, digital technologies and cyberspace, only the state can protect the interests of its citizens. The name of the game When analysing these agreements, it becomes clear that the United States is aiming to take control not only of the economy or technology, but of the information space of Southeast Asia and the information policy of both ASEAN as a whole and individual members countries and their national sectoral departments. Such a radical deepening of interaction includes direct interference in the affairs of the association – unprecedented in its arrogance and openness – and searching for opportunities to reduce the role of states in controlling AI and the cyber sphere, as well as access to scientific and technological work of Southeast Asian countries in the field of AI and monopolisation of the Southeast Asian media sphere, which is absolutely a colonial approach of deciding which information people from ASEAN are allowed to read and see and which is declared ‘foreign manipulation’. The U.S. has already demonstrated its seriousness. On November 1, Rumman Chowdhury, an AI specialist and the U.S. Special Representative for Science, flew to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta to remind Southeast Asian countries of the need to implement the joint statement. Here it should be understood that U.S. sectoral cooperation with ASEAN will be executed by a system of highly specialised institutions that objectively does not depend on the change of the presidential administration. Agreements have been made, obligations have been established and the implementation mechanism has been launched. Moreover, the U.S. will have a separate and individual approach to each country in terms of fulfilling and implementing these agreements. It is planned to work with the sectoral ‘digital’ ministries of the Southeast Asian states, which is nothing more than the selection of loyal future agents of influence. However, the question is to what extent the political and expert circles in Southeast Asia understand the long-term risks of granting a foreign partner large-scale access to the sensitive cyber sphere – even one whose interests in the region have long been known to everyone: inciting conflicts, ‘dividing and ruling’, searching for and luring highly qualified specialists (brain drain), exclusively imposing their own view on international issues, linking countries and markets to their technologies with the transfer of all kinds of useful data to intelligence services. *  *  * It would seem that ASEAN has always opposed neo-colonialism and supported a multi-vector course, equidistant from any external interests of its dialogue partners. Most likely, the association could only allow the appearance of info-colonial encroachments from its U.S. counterpart due to hopes for disinterested financing of its development from the United States (which in itself sounds like an oxymoron) and counting on some kind of abstract technology transfer. However, the consequences of the adoption of U.S. policy by Southeast Asian countries (if they do not ‘hit the brakes’ on the commitments they have made) could be deplorable, disastrous for their digital sovereignty, technological development and their independent course in general.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском If there is a central theme to this year, it is the world getting accustomed to the lack of predetermined scenarios. Discussions focusing on the international order are fading; the former order no longer functions, and there is no knowledge of what the new one, if it ever materializes, will look like. When the authors of an annual Valdai report suggested1 several years ago that order, as we know it, was unlikely to ever emerge, their hypothesis drew restrained comments at best. How can we do without order?  However, the habit of living in a structured international system was formed recently by historical standards. Unregulated international relations have marked political history. These relations took shape in the process of interaction between the countries and quickly changed. What we now habitually call a multipolar or a polycentric world is reminiscent, in its form, of a return to an environment last seen before the Great War that broke out in the early 20th century. However, such parallels are misleading because international relations today are structured in a whole different manner.  First, despite stark differences, the world remains an integral and interconnected place. Conflicts do not sever ties but warp them, quite badly at times.  Second, compared to the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, or even 1945 when the most robust so far known global order was established, the number of significant players influencing international processes has increased by order of magnitude. That includes more than just major countries.  Previous approaches to establishing the global balance through peaceful or military means are no longer effective, and the countries have yet to see innovative tools make their way to their arsenals. We will be compelled to make do with what we have and accommodate this toolset to deal with the changed circumstances. This will require everyone to re-interpret the ongoing developments and to forgo the stereotypes that defined our perspectives in the previous era. In last year’s report,2 we suggested that the impossibility of structuring international relations around a hierarchy-based approach would be a hallmark of the coming era. The ensuing events showed that things have indeed taken this course.   Avert an all-out cold war.  In 1945, when the international order that we view to this day as exemplary was emerging, writer and essayist George Orwell made a disappointing conclusion in his essay You and the Atomic Bomb3 to the effect that the formidable military capabilities of the countries with massive nuclear arsenals made perpetual cold war unavoidable. This goes beyond confrontation between them and includes − an even more consequential factor − their confrontation with other countries that do not possess weapons of mass destruction. In the hierarchy of international priorities, the relations between the great nuclear powers will always top other kinds of relations, and their conflict will prevent a system of cooperation, global or regional, from ever being created and will only allow creating a system of competition instead. All initiatives put forth by these powers bear the imprint of their relations with those who match them in destructive capabilities. Thus, international politics appeared to him doomed to a perpetual state of not a war, but “peace that is no peace.”  So far, the fate of global stability has indeed been falling prey to differences among the most powerful countries, such as the United States, Russia, and China. But does this provide enough ground to believe we should “bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of?”4 Especially so since, even amidst intense confrontation, the world is not splitting into rivalling blocs as it did in the past century. The bloc system experience, like that of the Western community, is not replicated despite its perceived success. This suggests that binding alliances marked by ideology and stern discipline are an exception than the rule. There is no indication that other countries are seeking to form alliances like the West in terms of like-mindedness.  New rules emerge from shifts in the balance of power and, if we take the modern-day world, the fact that small groups of countries are no longer able to tell the rest of the international community what to do. The drive for independence relying on mutual respect that we see in most countries around the world has become the structural foundation underlying an emerging regional and international order. Today’s situation is ironic. On the one hand, a profound shift is unfolding on the international stage. It is greater in size and depth than the previous one that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, these changes are not revolutionary by nature. They are not leading to collapse and evanescence, but rather to transformation of the erstwhile rules and norms. Truth be told, no one is really interested in seeing a radical scenario play out. The current and anticipated international escalation looks less like a premeditated strategy and more like an outcome of hare-brained actions or a lack of alternative ideas. The key point is that there is no going back, and what lies ahead will look nothing like recapitulation of the past.  There is a demand for stabilizing mechanisms that would not only expand existing capabilities of the countries, but also function as safeguards against the woefully tragic scenarios, such as those playing out around Ukraine and in the Middle East. The search for such mechanisms will be most widespread in Eurasia, which is the world’s largest continent in terms of its territory and population. This is where the most favorable prerequisites for that have developed. Eurasia’s connection to the rest of the world is so deep that Eurasian processes will have a decisive impact on the other parts of the planet and on approaches to addressing crucial security and sustainability issues, such as food, energy, and the environment. Development of each means security for everyone From the particular to the general  Building a Eurasian system of security cooperation, both as an ideal and a practical project, runs into numerous obstacles. Yet it is possible within this vast expanse, if the goals of each nation’s development can be prioritized over the factors that drive conflict and competition. In Greater Eurasia, conflicts impact only peripheral areas and do not go deep inside the territory, which means that preserving stability through leveraging new forms of security coordination appears quite achievable.  Global events of the past three years clearly show that individual countries’ push to pursue diverse paths of development and to avoid confinement within specific blocs is stronger than the inertia of division along ideological or even strategic lines. Even at the peak of the ideological and military rivalry in the latter half of the 20th century, many “third world” countries chose not to align with either side of the binary universe, even though the two opposing blocs formed the core of international politics. This reluctance has become even more natural now that rivalries have lost their structured character, and the ideology-driven attempts to divide the world into democracies and autocracies are artificial to the point where they fail to hold up to the international real-world test.  With varying degrees of confidence and assertiveness, most countries are upholding their right to their unique place in global affairs, aiming to determine their own paths to achieve their development and security goals. Modern history provides examples of cooperative initiatives aimed at shared prosperity, of which ASEAN is the best known one. Such cooperation is grounded in ruling out diktat in political matters and expanding practical interactions to address each country’s unique needs. These principles offer a starting point for reflections on what regional security might look like in the modern world. Collectively, regional security systems form a foundation of universal security.  Eurasia’s security is inseparable from global security, which makes it particularly special.  First, the security of Russia and China directly depends on their respective relations with the United States. This is a crucial element of international politics that defines its content. Accordingly, the strategic ambitions of the United States have a direct impact on Eurasian security. Furthermore, the western edge of Eurasia − Europe − remains part of the collective West and pursues its group interests.  Europe’s future is a crucial factor which will affect international politics in the decades to come. Even though the era of Europe as the global center is ending, it remains an attractive partner for achieving development goals in other regions due to its economic power and technological capacities. The 2022−2024 events reinforced transatlantic ties and diminished Europe’s agency in international affairs, as the latter continued to follow unwaveringly in the wake of US politics. However, given the pace and scale of global changes, this situation may not last forever. The key Eurasian powers are operating on the premise that the positioning of Europe can shift in the coming years in the wake of the international system transformations, potentially drawing some European countries into embracing broader Eurasian projects. Second, the security of a group of Eurasian countries also makes up part of the collective security. Many of these countries find key financial, technological, and cultural resources for their development outside of Eurasia. They also play important roles in international politics and have influence on numerous developments around the world. Their global importance and involvement in the highest level “great game” ensure that they have a stake in maintaining peace in Eurasia. This helps explain the relative stability within Eurasia’s borders and supports the efforts to establish common security platforms in Eurasia. Notably, not a single major military conflict involving Eurasian countries has ever broken out after WWII (the western edge is an exception due to the European “zero-sum game” approach that has dominated that part of the world for centuries).  The historical paths and itineraries across Eurasia and around it, which predate the Age of Discovery and European colonization, are being revitalized as the global political and economic system continues to diversify. Ironically, the punitive economic measures imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia help develop alternative global trade networks, promote economic flexibility and the search for alternative solutions.  Third, Eurasia objectively covers a sizable portion of habitable land and is home to multiple civilizations and dozens of countries that accommodate 70 percent of the world’s population. It is no coincidence that this region intrigued classical geopolitical theorists who saw Eurasia’s Heartland as the center of global processes.  Eurasian security is inseparable from global security, and its specific principles, mechanisms for country-to-country cooperation, and institutional forms can hardly be defined specifically for just one region. Eurasia is complex in terms of country-to-country relations, but holds vast potential, given its quest for a sustainable interrelations system and absence of obsolete institutions. It has the potential to develop alternatives to the principles and institutional forms of European security,5 which cannot be universal due to Europe’s unique cultural and historical background. The Helsinki framework, which created the Conference and then the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was Europe’s most significant achievement in establishing security for all. However, the OSCE was unable to adapt to the new balance of power following the 1946–1990 Cold War, which spawned ongoing major military and political crisis in Europe.  From the general to the particular  Eurasia is a region that may give birth to a new concept of international security. This potential is supported by, on the one hand, its inseparability from global security and development issues and, on the other hand, by the countries’ interest in a stable environment that is free from existential threats. Eurasia’s position in the global economy does not require nations to unite solely to reap the benefits of unification, as is the case with the Western countries. However, the creation of well-defined geopolitical and civilizational barriers is unlikely in Eurasia. The continent’s vastly different experiences in new international trends may eventually provide a foundation for global transformation.  Factors that underlie Eurasian security are the following:  Recognition of the continent’s spatial integrity and the impossibility of drawing dividing lines there.  Acknowledgment of shared interests and collective leadership.  Political equality of all countries of the region, regardless of their size or potential. There are no revolutionary or revisionist countries in Eurasia that feel compelled to export their political systems (exporting socio-political models as the Soviet Union or the United States did) to survive. Radical ideas come not from the countries, but from transborder extremist groups. Containing and eliminating them is a common objective.  The Eurasian regional security system aims to address issues separately from global security concerns which are, according to Orwell, dominated by relations between major nuclear powers, and to enhance the region’s resilience to external challenges, which implies resilience of each country. Defence against external threats and preventing internal conflict from getting worse are achieved through multilateral cooperation rather than rigid bloc discipline. A practical objective at hand is to identify external threats that will not force Eurasian countries into picking sides in an Orwellian Cold War with the involvement of nuclear powers.  A shared understanding that independent countries form the basis of order helps articulate the core principle of mutual renunciation of any moves that may violate the region’s integrity and equality of the countries in that region. The core value lies in unconditional respect for each other’s socio-political systems and firm rejection of the efforts to change them. This approach may seem self-evident and is in stark contrast with the practices used in the 1990s–2010s when forceful transformation of sovereign countries with active external involvement up to military intervention was cast as a standard approach by Western political leaders.  Sovereign equality enables justice, a concept that, while subjective, is central to international politics. Future international order will center on ensuring just relations, even if past institutions, which were designed to smooth power imbalances, get dismantled. The more the future rules can guarantee fairness, the more effective they will be at preventing armed conflicts. The collective goal is to uphold justice regarding the core interests and values of all Eurasian nations. Not like in Europe  It is unrealistic to expect that the next stage will somehow replicate the circumstances which were typical of Europe in the past centuries or decades. Speaking of future regional security, it is essential to break free from traditional patterns of perception and all-too-familiar solutions. Unlike Europe where the interests of Russia and the West overlap, Eurasia lacks a common fundamental challenge that could be resolved by establishing a Helsinki-like model of collective regional security. In this case, there will be no opposing great powers or blocs, whose balance will prioritize interests. In Eurasia, there are no second-grade countries or second-grade interests, because even the largest countries are incapable of imposing their own rules on any other country.  As we have seen, the balance of power underlying the European system cannot be considered a solution simply because major Eurasian countries do not compete in issues that are critical to their survival. In other words, the balance of power and influence between Russia, China, and India − even if tensions arise occasionally − does not affect their chances of survival or their chances to achieve their development goals. The differences implicating major Eurasian powers do exist, but they manifest on a global level of international politics. They are not of paramount importance in Eurasia, which is critically important when it comes to cooperation. Power and its emotions  Even though Eurasia’s make-up is unique, and it is an integral part of the international system, it is not detached from the international context and historical patterns. After a period of high regulation and reliance on institutions (this order of things was established in 1945), international relations have reverted to the “original settings.” Power remains a key category, and the use (or the threat of use) of power is back in demand. Moreover, the emotions and personal qualities of leaders, combined with national strategic cultures, now shape interactions among major powers even more than the established order, norms, and rules that date back to the era of the bipolar face-off, which persisted throughout the transitional period.  Fear and anger are two emotions that matter in international affairs. In addition to existing circumstances, they are identified in each case by a nation’s historical experience. Fear, ranging from apprehension to anxiety and dread, is one primary driver behind the countries’ behaviour.6 Anger, spanning from irritation and resentment to rage, also drives international relations and manifests itself in acts of retribution and violence that include terrorism. Fear and anger often drive not only political leaders, but entire societies as well. These emotions impact the way security is arranged and understood.  Occasionally, countries are observing the evolution of international processes from a position of force and the position of force-derived emotions, such as tranquility and firmness. The sense of power is a vital driving force in relations among leading military powers. The basic emotions such as fear and anger, as well as tranquility rooted in the sense of one’s own superior strength once again, as in previous historical eras, determine the choice between two key strategies: annihilation and positional strategy.7  The annihilation strategy invariably relies on significant superiority in assets and military force, initiative-taking moves, and swift overpowering of an opponent. By contrast, the positional strategy concedes the initiative and allows the advancing party to act. It relies on the importance of concentrating and gradually building the resources up. Anyone employing this strategy avoids decisive battles for as long as they can and engages only when they believe they cannot lose. Typically, time favors those who employ positional strategy.  Traditionally, most Eurasian countries prioritize the positional strategy. Classical Eurasian military thought is captured, for example, in the Chinese treatise The Art of War, which outlines the principles of positional strategy: “Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans, the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the fi eld.”8 In Russia, patience and willingness to endure lengthy confrontations have always been part of the military and political tradition, which manifested itself, for example, in the tactic of medieval Moscow princes or the generals of the 1812 Patriotic War.  These speculations are related to the ongoing international developments. Amid profound shifts in the balance of power, the United States, striving to maintain its hegemony, increasingly chooses offensive and provocative policies. This policy is not rooted in quiet confidence in its own strength but stems from anger and frustration at being challenged by its antagonists and resentment aimed at the internal opposition that underestimates the scale of this challenge. In addition to anger, there is fear and anxiety that the unfolding trends could lead to a scenario that is unfamiliar and unsettling for the United States where the balance of power will shift towards East.  The clash of emotions is a hallmark of the post-institutional world. 9 A different conference  Eurasia lacks conditions where any power can become dominant. This does not mean, however, that rivalry is out of the question here. Each power pursues its own interests, and balances of power will form over time and with difficulty. However, Eurasia’s advantage lies in the fact that − with few exceptions − there are no long-standing or deeply rooted conflicts between the countries overfilled with fear or anger. Major Eurasian powers do not have an objective need to be at feud with each other to achieve their vital goals. Vast and rich expanses of land can accommodate diverse cultures, civilizations, and foreign policy priorities. This is why Eurasia can reach a balance relying on a patient positional strategy rooted in quiet confidence, firmness, and mutual interest.  The Eurasian collective security system cannot rely on the principles of a military alliance with clear-cut obligations. Bloc discipline or a rigid institutional structure are ruled out as well. As mentioned above, the model established in Europe in the 1970s as part of the pan-European process cannot be used, either. However, the concept of a “conference on security and cooperation,” which emerged back in the day, fits the Eurasian space well as a mechanism for ongoing multilateral consultations involving interaction on all issues. The key difference from Europe is that the CSCE/ OSCE was originally created to defi ne spheres of influence in Europe and later morphed into a tool to maintain Atlantic monopoly. Neither is a viable option in Eurasia. An equal distribution of responsibility for stability and security among Eurasian powers is based on forgoing any nation’s dominance.  The principles of polycentricity, first outlined in the 1997 Russia China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,10 include non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for mutual interests, equality, and a commitment to a collective approach to addressing security issues, such as demilitarization of shared borders or provision of security guarantees to small and medium-sized buffer countries located between major powers. These principles are now taking on a multilateral dimension. The Eurasian security cannot rely on a closed architecture. It is embodied not in a single international organization, but rather in a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements and diverse associations that collectively cover all (not just military and political) aspects of collective security. Downsizing the presence of external forces, which leverage fears and anger of small and medium-sized countries to stir up tensions in Eurasia, and mitigating chances for their intervention is an important goal. The security system will focus on resolving all major conflicts with the involvement of regional actors.  The mutual nuclear deterrence between major powers makes achieving absolute political goals an unviable proposition. Now is the time for relative victories; achieving an absolute victory is out of the question. All major conflicts that we observe in Eurasia, such as between Russia and the West, the United States and China, India and Pakistan, and Iran and Israel, to name a few, are rooted in positional confrontations, where a strategy of annihilation is fraught with high risks and is largely unproductive. The architecture of Eurasian security in its military and political and force-based aspect will rely precisely on the sense of quiet confidence in one’s strength and the general drift of international relations. Security and advantages  Modern-day international security is a complex construct that transcends the military and political framework. Just like competition embraces all spheres of activity, including culture and the economy, so too does security with its compound nature. Common sense suggests that economic cooperation creates a foundation for confrontation-free political relations. However, things tend to be more complicated in the real world.  The Russia-EU economic relations were remarkably strong. Even in 2022, trade amounted to $258.6 billion.11 The EU was Russia’s key trading partner and the primary market for its energy. Deeper integration, such as allowing Russian companies to own EU pipeline asset shares, or shares in individual companies, such as Opel, was held back for political reasons long before Ukraine crisis broke out in 2014.12 High trade volumes did nothing to prevent degradation, and the political dialogue collapsed. Russia-Ukraine relations were likewise marked by elevated levels of mutual dependency even after 2014. In 2021, trade amounted to $12.2 billion, which did not alleviate, but rather exacerbated political differences. A peaceful matter about exclusivity of economic relations with Europe dating back to the early 2010s led to an onset of a deep crisis that ended in an armed conflict. The highest level of economic interdependence between China and the United States (with trade hitting $690 billion in 2023)13 goes hand in hand with an escalation of political competition and Washington’s attempts to throw a wrench in China’s technological growth, including by way of imposing restrictive measures.14 Conversely, complex political relations between China and India are unfolding amid trade numbers in excess of $100 billion.15  Examples of the non-linear relationship between the economy and international politics, particularly in matters of security, abound. Economic benefits may create enabling conditions for political cooperation but cannot shield countries against confrontation when it comes to fundamental security issues. Politicization and ways to fight it.  The modern-day world economy is highly globalized in terms of finance and trade. Globalization has significantly brought down costs, streamlined supply chains, and integrated multiple economies into technological and value-added chains, thus promoting their growth and modernization. The US dollar has become a convenient tool for making international payments and creating reserves, while technological platforms have brought countries together into a single economic organism. However, the “vital organs” of the global networks in the form of financial, technological, and communication hubs have remained under the jurisdiction of Western, primarily US, state bodies. The United States is losing credibility, because it takes advantage of economic interdependency networks for political gains, yet there are no full-fledged alternative solutions in sight.16 With the US dollar dominating the international scene, disconnecting individual companies or individuals from payments in dollars can result in heavy economic damage. According to SWIFT, the US dollar accounts for 48.03 percent of transactions handled by this international payments network, while the share of euro has plummeted to 23.2 percent.17 Blocking financial sanctions feature prominently in the US toolset, and are widely used by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries as well. Russia has become a primary target for such measures, although individuals from Iran, North Korea, China, and even US allies and partners like Türkiye or the UAE are also on the receiving end of these sanctions, albeit to a lesser extent. Trade and technological ties have become hot-button political issues as well. Sanctions on Russia include sweeping bans on exports and imports. US legislation imposes export control compliance on countries that use US-made technologies, manufacturing equipment, and software. Import restrictions cover Russian petroleum, refined products, gold, diamonds, steel, and other products. Export controls regarding China, especially in electronics and telecommunications, are tightening. Chinese electronic services are banned in the United States and some companies face contract restrictions in Western countries. Iran is under a total exports and imports ban, with even stricter bans imposed on North Korea. Even EU companies are forced to comply with the US export controls to avoid secondary sanctions.  Transport and digital infrastructure are affected as well. Tools include setting price thresholds for transporting Russian oil, sanctions for sizable transactions with Iran’s oil sector, and restrictions on the use of maritime space and airspace, ports, airports, gateways, and other infrastructure facilities. Sanctioned individuals are cut off from access to what are now customary services, such as email, audio, and video file aggregators, not to mention more applied online solutions in the sphere of engineering and other technical areas.  The targeted countries do provide a response. Russia and China have incorporated instruments to block financial sanctions into their legislation. Russia has imposed a ban on exports of manufacturing equipment and has implemented extraordinary measures against economic agents from unfriendly countries. China is implementing a “dual circulation” system in strategic economic areas and investing in developing its own technology. Iran and even more so North Korea have long lived under partial or near-total autarky. The US allies are pondering diversification of financial assets. Back to market  The above developments have become quite widespread and continue to expand. They transfer the cutthroat zero-sum-game-like military and political competition to the economy. It cancels market principles that are based on mutual advantages. With the economic ties and interdependence networks weaponized, severing such ties or at least diversifying them appears a sensible response. Even if such steps are deficient from a market perspective, they are inevitable as a means of mitigating security risks.  Diversifying financial settlements implies using currencies other than the US dollar. National currencies partially address this issue. Using the renminbi in trade with China is a rational choice given the availability of a vast Chinese market. However, difficulties with investing rupees arise when it comes to Russia-India trade. Even more challenges arise from trade with less developed or more specialized economic systems. Strategically, a more universal mechanism is needed that could be used by several major economies, a BRICS mechanism.  The quest for ways to diversify payments is ongoing but expecting to see a “BRICS currency” emerge any time soon is premature for technical reasons, among other considerations. A better path is not to introduce an alternative reserve “anti-dollar,” but to create diverse bilateral or multilateral settlement arrangements that can bypass the US financial service monopoly. Russia is at the forefront of these efforts given its economy size and the number of sanctions imposed on it.  The same applies to creating innovative technological chains and domestic production capacities, as well as looking for alternative suppliers of manufactured goods and technologies. More recently, we had the chance to witness critical vulnerabilities when it comes to using products that include Western-made components. The domestically made substitutes can be less effective and more expensive but are unparalleled in terms of security. Amid bans and restrictions, such alternatives provide a solution, as does searching for replacements in other markets. Today, we see new chains pop up in places where they could hardly be expected to exist just a few years ago, especially when it comes to Russia-China relations. The US stick policy has defeated its purpose when economic agents around the globe became more ingenious and improved their economic flexibility. The infrastructure constraints have spurred the emergence or scaling of various phenomena, including “shadow” tanker fleets, alternative insurance systems, exchanges, communication, and online communication services.  Large transport projects in Eurasia are back on the agenda. Progress can be clearly seen in the North-South corridor. Moving such initiatives forward and creating a single system across the Eurasian region is a challenge, since Eurasian countries vary among themselves and maintain different relations with the United States and the Western countries. Significant economic disparities are also a factor to be reckoned with. More likely, such a system might incorporate a multitude of decentralized bilateral and multilateral formats and include financial tools for transactions between individual countries, as well as settlement systems for international associations such as BRICS, technological projects in niche areas, and targeted infrastructure solutions. However, the number of such innovations will inevitably give rise to qualitative changes.  The Eurasian economy will inevitably move away from the nets of West-centric interdependence which are being used as weapons. There is no need to forget them, but there is a need for backup tools as safeguards against arbitrary politicization. Eurasian economic security can be a flexible and decentralized set of mechanisms to reduce “dependence on interdependence.” While this may seem strange now, Eurasia could indeed become a flagship in global processes for returning to a much more market-based system of economic ties. Trust without coercion  Peaceful and productive relations between countries, whether bilateral or multilateral, can only be built on trust, which holds equally true for the prospects of development and matters of security.  What underlies trust in international relations? The Western answer to this question emphasizes cultural and ideological homogeneity, with the North Atlantic Alliance as a product of this approach. Modern Western countries display a strict bloc (self-)discipline about key international issues, which can be seen in their voting as one at the UN General Assembly and the G20, as well as their unified policies. Those who break the ranks, if any, are quickly put back in their place. On the face of it, this approach presents a competitive advantage in a multipolar world, which is further proof of internal strength. However, it lacks flexibility and is marked by ideology-driven dogmatism, which is an irritant for the non-Western world.  The World Majority countries18 (a term used in Russia to refer to non-Western Global South and Global East countries) do not have to follow bloc discipline. In the face of acute geopolitical conflicts that seek to split the modern world, this can be perceived as weakness, which fact is occasionally exploited by our Western counterparts, for example, on the G20 platform. However, this phenomenon should be approached differently: as a striving of various countries to achieve ultimate flexibility, which will allow them not to limit their options and to attract every development resource within their reach.  An important question arises in this regard, though: how can relationships be built within a diversified community torn by numerous contradictions? The tradition of independent cooperation among non-Western countries spans decades, and is rooted in the 1955 Bandung Conference, where the countries then categorized as part of the Third World or the Non-Aligned Movement proclaimed shared goals and objectives. The declaration affirmed a commitment to the common cause of resisting Western colonialism and imperialism, recognized the equality of all participants regardless of differences between them, and promoted shared interests in the name of development. Later, ASEAN adopted a similar set of principles, which has now made its way to BRICS and the SCO platforms.  Similar processes are observed in Africa as well. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was based on shared values and objectives facing African countries, such as opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism. Statements by the OAU founding figures come to mind. Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, had the following to say: “Only with unity can we be sure that Africa really governs Africa.”19 In his opening remarks at the 1963 summit in Addis Ababa, where the OAU was founded, Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie I also emphasized the importance of unity and setting aside individual differences to achieve solidarity: “Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means we discuss alternative paths to the same objectives; we engage in debates about techniques and tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We are determined to create a union of Africans.”20 This keynote address also highlighted the direct link between Africa and Asia: “We stand united with our Asian friends and brothers. Africa shares with Asia a common background of colonialism, of exploitation, of discrimination, of oppression. At Bandung, African and Asian states dedicated themselves to the liberation of their two continents from foreign domination and affirmed the right of all nations to develop in their own way, free of any external interference. The Bandung Declaration and the principles enunciated at that Conference remain today valid for us all.”21.     Much has changed since the Bandung and Addis Ababa conferences, and the world has changed out of recognition as well. Yet, the principles and goals declared there have not only remained relevant, but are now getting a second wind, especially because they imply mutual trust. As we sum up the experiences of Asian and African countries, we can pinpoint several principles that have been tested and approved by political practices in the non-Western world.  First: Recognizing a common goal, which unites different countries, and advancing towards it is an undeniable priority of their policies.  Second: Recognizing that differences should not hold back progress towards common goals.  Third: Acknowledging the fact that differences will not vanish. Each country has its unique specifics and a path to follow. Trust implies tolerance for differences and trade-offs to make sure differences do not lead to conflict.  Fourth: Flexible institutional and procedural mechanisms. The combination of trust and acknowledgment of differences takes rigid institutional frameworks and restrictions off the list of priorities. Coexistence and intertwining of different structures with various formats of membership and commitments thus becomes the practical outcome. Fifth: Gradual internal consolidation fostering the necessary conditions.  Sixth: Strengthening trust-based solidarity among the World Majority countries.  Seventh: Commitment to seeking local solutions to regional problems and addressing global issues as a sum of regional approaches to ensure that individual countries’ right to development is not hostage to new global constraints.  This path is longer and more complex than conventional bloc discipline, but, in an increasingly diverse world, it may be the only viable path, as fewer countries out there are willing to align in a single column. Is agreeing on the world order principles possible?  The post-World War II era brought forth new, never used approaches to structuring the international political and economic system. The achievements of the then created institutions are undeniable, yet no product is everlasting. The ongoing profound transformation of the global landscape calls for an effort to deeply rethink the accumulated experience rather than discard it. The events of the second quarter of the 21st century will not draw a line under the previous world structure but will pave the way to enhance and to adapt it to new realities. After all, the ideals that guided the architects of the post-war world remain in force and align with the global trends.  An open world space that ensures the rights to peaceful development, prosperity, and self-realization for all nations and countries is a shared goal in today’s world. In fact, we are now much closer to this goal than we were eighty years ago when the post-war order was being discussed. Back then, much of the world was still under colonial rule, and major powers were entrenched in systemic ideological confrontation. Today, neither of these conditions exists, though remnants of the past are still there. Addressing these remnants should be part of the efforts to create a renewed world architecture.  The emergence of new global organizations is highly unlikely. However, at the level of large regions, unilateral efforts will be insufficient, and the push for more stable forms of cooperation is likely to prevail. Currently, new constructs of that kind − the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Organization of Turkic States, and the Belt and Road Initiative − are being tested in Eurasia. All these initiatives, as well as any existing or future ones, are experimental in nature. Time will tell how effective and functional they really are. In the future, universal regional platforms might be able to encompass different cooperation institutions in specific areas whose objectives will not conflict with one another.  In the middle of the 20th century, the world was built from the top down, from the peak of the hierarchical pyramid down to its base. The new system will not be that consistent, but it will be far more democratic. It is being built from the bottom up and relies on self-organization and cooperation between countries within individual regions, where they must jointly address pressing, practical issues. If humanity avoids making the mistakes that will set it back as was the case in the past, then practical interaction at the regional level will give rise to a new system that will capture the planet’s complexity and diversity and be able to transform these qualities from obstacles on the way to development into a foundation for growth. References 1: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Living in a Crumbling World. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 15, 2018. URL: https://valdaiclub. com/a/reports/living-in-a-crumbling-world/  2: Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, Ivan Timofeev. Maturity Certificate, or the Order That Never Was. Valdai Club Annual Report. October 2, 2023. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/maturity-certifi cate-or-the-order-that-never-was/ 3: Orwell G. You and the Atomic Bomb // Tribune, October 19, 1945.  4: William Shakespeare, Hamlet. 5: For four hundred years, the latter has served as a global security system: the Westphalian rules of the game, the balance of power, and Metternich’s rule, which holds that international security is achieved when one country considers the security concerns of another country as its own. 6: Pace M., Bilgic A. Studying Emotions in Security and Diplomacy: Where We Are Now and Challenges Ahead // Political Psychology. 2019. Vol. 40. No. 6. Pp. 1407–1417. Lebow R.N. Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations // International Affairs. 2006. Vol. 82. No. 3. Pp. 431–448. 7: Стратегия в трудах военных классиков. Edited and commented by A. Svechin. Moscow, 1924; Carr A., Walsh B. The Fabian Strategy: How to Trade Space for Time // Comparative Strategy. 2022. Vol. 41. No. 1. Pp. 78–96.  8: From the treatise The Art of War commonly attributed to the legendary military commander and strategist Sun Tzu (6th-5th century BC).  9: Dominique Moisi. The Clash of Emotions. January 31, 2007. URL: https://www.ifri.org/en/external-articles/ clash-emotions 10: Russia-China Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902155?ysclid=m27d9a94wj720511004 11: Товарооборот между Россией и ЕС оказался максимальным за восемь лет. March 7, 2023. URL: https://www. rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/6406ceed9a7947b3912b3c98?ysclid=m0l0zgm3hl844648897  12: Беликов Д., Егикян С. Magna и Сбербанк прокатили мимо Opel. November 5, 2009. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1268884?ysclid=m0l145995v673478546 13: Козлов А. Объем торговли США и Китая обновил исторический рекорд. February 10, 2023. URL: https:// www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2023/02/10/962429-obem-torgovli-ssha-i-kitaya-obnovil-rekord  14: Тимофеев И.Н. Политика санкций США против Китая: сравнительный анализ //Мировая экономика и международные отношения. 2023.Т.67, №11. p. 70–79.  15: СМИ: Китай стал главным торговым партнером Индии в 2023–2024 финансовом году May 13, 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20778213  16: See more about the phenomenon of weaponising interdependence in: Farrell H. and Newman A. Weaponized Interdependence. What Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion // International Security. 2019. Vol. 44, No 1. P. 42–79. 17: Доля доллара в расчетах через систему SWIFT достигла рекордного уровня в 48%. September 28, 2023.URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6239234?ysclid=m0l1mzg1fu656162416 18: The World Majority and Its Interests. Valdai Club report, ed. by Timofei Bordachev. October 10, 24, URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/the-world-majority-and-its-interests/   19: Quotable Quotes of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere / collected from speeches and writings by Christopher C. Liundi. Dar es Salaam: Mkukina Nyota Publishers. 2022. P. 68. 20: Important Utterances of H.I.M. Emperor Haile Selassie I. 1963-1972. Addis Ababa: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information. 1972. P. 352.  21: Ibid. P. 361–362.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The outcome of the G20 leaders' summit held in Rio de Janeiro undoubtedly marks a series of victories for Brazilian foreign policy and also for the international community if we understand what is considered a success in terms of global governance. Firstly, the G20 summit declaration is a major achievement for Brazilian diplomacy, as it brings together twenty countries around agendas that not all of them support (such as human rights). Reaching this consensus required a year of intense negotiations to reach the final result. Brazil obtained support on the main themes it proposed: hunger and poverty, always off the radar of rich countries; sustainability; the bioeconomy , reaching the first multilateral treaty on the subject. Another consensus was the taxation of the super-rich , an issue that touches on the issues of inequality between countries and tax havens. Reaching the support of the G20 members around these proposals represented the reconstruction of the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy, which had been mocked during the Bolsonaro government, and crowned Brazil's return as a relevant country in the international community after years of self-inflicted isolation. Two other points that went unnoticed by some analyses is that the G20 summit allowed dialogue with Venezuela to return to normal, avoiding enormous damage to the Brazilian government and preserving good relations with the tumultuous neighboring country. And what can we say about the turbulent presence of the newest representative of the Latin American extreme right, Argentine President Javier Milei, who until the last moment tried to undo the consensus reached and was skillfully circumvented by Brazilian diplomacy? Returning to the proposals made by the presidency and supported by the other members of the group, are they “more of the same”, “undefined”, that do not change at the international level, as some analysts and part of the press said yesterday? Understanding the nature of international forums such as the G20 may answer this question. Outlined in 1999 and formalized in 2008, the G20 was created to bring together finance ministers and central bank governors from the twenty largest economies on the planet to discuss the financial crises of those periods. The crises of the 1990s, in particular, brought a new factor: it was the first time that economic problems in developing countries affected the central economies. It was therefore necessary to expand the discussions beyond the restricted Group of Seven (G7), a group of rich countries created in 1975, and to bring emerging economies to the negotiating table. Over the years, the G20 began to discuss other topics besides finance, and today sustainability is at the center of the work. The G20 emerged as an informal group with a flexible structure, dependent on a rotating presidency among its members to organize summits and working groups. In addition, it does not have a constitutive treaty and does not have the capacity to impose standards. When reading this brief description, most people wonder why a forum of this kind should exist if it “serves no purpose.” But informality and flexibility are a demand of the member countries that voluntarily chose to participate. These are the characteristics that allow ministers and other representatives of countries with divergent interests, such as the United States and Russia, to discuss issues that affect humanity, such as the eradication of hunger or climate change, for almost a year. The concrete actions that we so desperately need will depend on the efforts of each country and the corresponding pressure from their civil societies. The commitments exist, and now it is necessary to demand their implementation. Imagining a world without any kind of coordination is difficult because we have lived under the weak governance of the United Nations (UN) since the end of the Second World War, which, by the way, will be 80 years old in 2025. The memories of an international system under constant threat of global wars and in which common problems were not even discussed are a pale memory and, perhaps for this reason, so many people disdain the advances of international forums such as the G20. There are political forces today that oppose these alliances and the minimum level of global governance that we have managed to achieve, as Milei’s criticisms in his speech at the leaders’ meeting made clear. In line with the thinking of other far-right politicians, the Argentine president called global governance a “corset” that suffocates countries that think differently. It is contradictory that international regimes are criticized for restricting the freedom of States while at the same time being accused of being weak and ineffective, which demonstrates empty criticisms that serve only to encourage their supporters against imaginary enemies. Leaders like Donald Trump and Miley defend the “every man for himself” rule in international relations. This idea is gaining more and more followers among the people, a situation that makes declarations like the one by the G20, which defends basic principles of human rights and sustainability, an important manifesto for those who still defend an international order based on rules and cooperation. The Brazilian presidency has achieved important achievements for our foreign policy and also for the international order that it seeks to preserve.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Rio de Janeiro, world leaders are gathering for a historic summit. The G20, the symbol of global governance, is at a crossroads. The planet is waiting. The climate, economic and geopolitical challenges are urgent.Since yesterday, at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, under the strategic engagement of Russia, Foreign MinisterSergey Lavrov, guided by the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, has been playing a key role in discussions on combating inequality, hunger and poverty, as well as reforming global institutions. Together with the BRICS Alliance, innovative initiatives are being put forward to strengthen economic cooperation and global stability, including sustainable development projects and strategic trade agreements. This Summit is proving to be a crucial platform for addressing pressing global challenges such as security and climate change, while potentially influencing global governance and international relations in the years to come.Geopolitical context of the summit, the madness of the Biden administrationAs the G20 group meets in Rio de Janeiro to reconcile the positions of the balance of power in the global chessboard, the recent antithetical decisions of the United States, held on the very eve of the summit and supported by France and Great Britain, are once again dispersing the positions to be reconciled. The Western minority, accustomed to living off the labor of the planetary majority, is lamentably trying to redefine the dynamics of the international community in its favor, by authorizing deep strikes on Russian territory. This approach, adopted by the Biden administration, reflects both madness and a vision of resistance in the face of the potential defeat of Ukraine and NATO allies against Russia, while seeking a reaction that could exacerbate global tensions. This audacious geopolitical calculation, perceived as a last-ditch attempt to consolidate Ukrainian positions before a potential change in American leadership, marks a turning point towards a dangerous escalation of hostilities. It can also be compared to a very big step taken towards the start of the Third World War.The 2024 G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro is therefore taking place in a complex geopolitical context, marked by key global issues. International conflicts, exacerbated in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan, and tensions over the role of the United States, France, Great Britain and the collective West are at the heart of discussions on global security. While António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) urges the G20 to adopt actions aligned with the UN Charter – although Western ambitions of domination are being challenged by the rise of the BRICS Alliance – the Western minority continues to pour oil on the embers precisely to satisfy its ambitions of eternal domination.The climate crisis, meanwhile, is forcing more ambitious policies, as the G20, responsible for 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions, must revise its commitment to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Also, growing economic inequality and the need for reforms to a perceived unfair international financial system underscore the urgency of changing the global financial architecture. Despite the political challenges, the summit embodies a push towards stronger multipolarism, with key players such as Sergei Lavrov, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, etc., advocating for international cooperation. The political transition in the United States, with the imminent departure of Joe Biden and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, adds uncertainty, potentially impacting global cooperation and sustainability efforts. This nineteenth summit of the Group of Twenty powers (G20) is crucial to encouraging collective action in the face of complex challenges related to security, climate, the economy and international cooperation.Russia’s engagement in the world chessboardRussia’s participation in this Rio de Janeiro Summit is of major strategic importance. Led by Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and mandated by the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian delegation demonstrates the country’s strong commitment to global discussions. Russia aims to take a leading position in addressing global challenges such as combating inequality, hunger and poverty, and reforming international institutions. Mr. Sergey Lavrov’s interventions at the plenary sessions are essential, while his bilateral talks with other world leaders could lead to decisive agreements, strengthening international relations. Capitalizing on its long history of global engagement, Russia is ideally placed to influence these crucial debates for the future of the planet.Positive initiatives of the BRICS Alliance in global dynamicsThe BRICS, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and expanded over time to BRICS+ – represent an undeniable emerging force in global economic cooperation, as demonstrated by their landmark initiatives at the Rio Summit yesterday. By establishing the New Development Bank, these nations are demonstrating their commitment to financing joint infrastructure projects, strengthening their synergy and displaying a clear desire for de-dollarization. The significant progress made in social security also demonstrates their determination to improve social protection on a large scale. Looking ahead, the BRICS countries are committed to driving reform of international financial institutions, placing their economic weight at the heart of global decisions, while working towards sustainable development and the fight against climate change. Speeches by representatives such as Mr. Sergei Lavrov at the summit captured attention, underscoring the BRICS’ determination to impact global governance and promote a more equitable and sustainable economic future.The impact of the summit on global governanceAs mentioned above, the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, represents a crucial opportunity to transform global governance and have a lasting impact on the future of the planet and international relations. Since yesterday, this strategic meeting has been addressing major issues such as the reform of international institutions, requested in particular by the member countries of the BRICS Alliance, the proactive fight against climate change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and international security requiring enhanced cooperation in the face of current geopolitical tensions. Through decisive decisions, the summit could establish a new multipolar world order and decide on the choice between cooperation and global confrontation. The challenge lies in reconciling national and global interests, strengthening trust between international partners, and finding innovative solutions to address the complex challenges of our era. The G20 Summit in Rio thus offers a unique platform for leaders to demonstrate their leadership and vision, thereby shaping a multipolar and sustainable future for future generations.It can be said that the 2024 edition of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro marks a turning point where world leaders are called upon to choose: cooperation or confrontation, progress or stagnation. The future of the planet is now in their hands. Today’s decisions, contained in the Summit Declaration, will shape the world of tomorrow. History will judge.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Russian President Vladimir Putin last week hosted the BRICS summit, where Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia became official partner members – the first step toward full membership.  Putin had two main goals at the summit, where he tried to build up more international support for Russia against the backdrop of its invasion of Ukraine. First, he wanted to convey that Moscow is far from isolated on the world stage despite being targeted by United States-led sanctions, and that some of the largest economies don’t see the war in Ukraine as an impediment to closer ties with Russia.  Second, Putin was trying to build up consensus to create an alternative to the U.S. dollar-led trading order, which has made Russia and a host of other countries, including Iran, vulnerable to sanctions from the West. Putin made considerable progress on the first goal, but far less with the second one.  The four Southeast Asian states help explain why this is the case. Multipolar? Although Russia’s trampling of international law and use of military force to change borders sets a dangerous precedent for the countries of Southeast Asia, most states in the region see Russia as the path to a multipolar global order. And for Southeast Asian states that are always trapped in an increasingly zero-sum competition between Washington and Beijing, Moscow presents itself as a guardian of multipolarity. To them, it is a model for standing up to the West, or at least charting a more independent foreign policy.  For countries, whose foreign policy is largely transactional, pursuing ties with Russia increasingly makes sense.  Indonesia – arguably, the country in the region that is most protective of its sovereignty – has repeatedly voted against Russia at the United Nations, but barely spoken of Russia’s invasion.  Former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo hosted foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and met with Putin. But his Russia policy was extremely unprincipled and transactional. Russia has now supplanted Ukraine as Indonesia’s largest source for wheat imports. The country also is a major importer of oil from Russia, which has an internationally imposed price cap and sells below market rates. Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s new president, is set to continue this policy. Before his inauguration, he met with Putin and Prabowo’s foreign minister, Sugiono, made clear at the BRICS summit that Indonesia was seeking full membership in the grouping founded by Brazil, Russia, India and China. While Jokowi cared little about foreign policy, Prabowo seeks to assert Indonesia on the world stage with a much more active international policy and clout commensurate with its economic size. Russia is key to realizing this ambition. While Malaysia voted against Russia in two U.N. votes, its policy now is shaped by the conflict in Gaza, and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s seething anger towards the United States for its support of Israel.  Foreign corporations have recently pledged over U.S. $6 billion in investment to Malaysia’s semiconductor industry, one of the world’s largest.  Malaysia has angered Washington by repeatedly offering to sell semiconductors to sanctioned countries, including Russia and Iran. Anwar bristles at the unilateral imposition of U.S. sanctions on what he deems is a sovereign right to conduct foreign trade. Anwar views BRICS as not only a hedge against Western sanctions, but also as an alternative source of capital. Vietnam’s relations with Russia are long-standing and deep, and should be seen as part of its studiously neutral “bamboo diplomacy.” Vietnam voted with Russia in two U.N. votes, and abstained in a third. In July, Hanoi hosted Putin for a brief state visit.  Russia remains essential to Vietnamese security. Roughly 80% of its existing arsenal is Russian-made. While Vietnam seeks to diversify its supply chain, that will be difficult to do quickly.  The People’s Army leadership is close to Moscow. Its military is familiar with Russian equipment and produces many spare parts. Russia also allows licensed production of key weapon systems. In 2023, Moscow and Hanoi concluded an agreement to use proceeds from a Vietnamese investment in Siberian oil to fund the next generation of weapons. This alternative payment system was established to evade U.S. dollar transactions and thus Washington’s ability to impose sanctions. Thailand’s motivation in becoming a BRICS partner state has more to do with geopolitics than anything else.  A U.S. treaty ally, Thailand has been angered by Washington’s repeated imposition of sanctions as a result of military intervention in politics, including coups in 2006 and 2014.  China tried to fill that vacuum by maintaining close ties to the military leadership and increasing arms sales. Thailand feels caught between a rock and a hard place.  De-dollarization doubts Putin’s second goal, of de-dollarization, was far more divisive at the BRICS summit.  Luckily for the four Southeast Asian states, which depend so much on trade with the United States and which have no interest in creating a dollar alternative, they had India to hide behind.  Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar firmly rejected Moscow’s de-dollarization agenda and made clear that India would continue to settle the majority of its trade in U.S. dollars. That was all the cover the Southeast Asian states needed. In sum, Jakarta, Putrajaya, Hanoi, and Bangkok are not seeking to upend the U.S.-led liberal international order through BRICS. They describe the grouping not as an “either-or” but an “and.”  A distant war For Southeast Asia, the war in Europe is far away. And the countries remain in deep denial about the international legal precedent being set or what Russian success in achieving its war aims would mean for global security. But Putin’s confidence presupposes the economic realities. While Russia has seemingly defied international sanctions and there’s still positive economic growth, expected to be 3.6% for 2024, this is now a war economy. Foreign investment has fled and is unlikely to return. More than 600,000 of Russia’s educated urban middle-class has emigrated in a massive brain drain.  Domestic production, meanwhile, is geared solely to support the war effort. Interest rates are now 21% to help counter the 13.4% inflation rate.  With an estimated 1,000 battlefield losses a day, and over 70,000 new hires in Russia’s primary defense contractor, Rostec, the labor market is tight. The IMF is predicting the Russian economy to finally feel the weight of prolonged sanctions and the war economy with GDP expected to fall to 1.3% and 1.2% in 2025 and 2026, respectively.  And even Moscow’s arms exports to Southeast Asia – one of its primary instruments of statecraft – are in doubt, as domestic demand surges. Between 2022-2024, Moscow’s arms exports fell by 60%, compared to the previous three-year period, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.  While Moscow sees the BRICS as the key to a multipolar world that would erode the dominant position of the United States, his moves to weaken the dollar’s grip is too confrontational for many of the new partner states. Putin’s own bravado may be undermined by Russia’s isolated wartime economy and inability to be the security partner of choice for many developing states. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ushering in a multipolar order requires a streamlined and coherent political agenda – not unfocused expansion.  The 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, concluded last week with the usual grand declaration of the group’s commitments, concerns and aspirations.  Many media headlines, particularly in Western countries, focused on how the summit and BRICS generally, symbolised Moscow’s ability to circumvent the fallout of sanctions by turning to the global south. In this way, BRICS is indirectly viewed as a threat to Western efforts to isolate Russia, weaken its power projection capabilities, and end its invasion of Ukraine.  Western governments and analysts often struggle to frame BRICS’s evolution beyond a binary, zero-sum narrative in which the group is a key geopolitical challenge to the Western-dominated international order. This interpretation places the forces of democracy and liberal political values in one camp and authoritarian governments in another, with certain developing countries caught in the middle, trying to play one side off the other for their own benefit.  There is some merit to these kinds of headlines. Russia and China are primarily major status-quo powers. Both have been permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members since its establishment. Moscow was the ‘other pole’ in the international order for most of the 20th century, a position Beijing is working towards. And the foreign policy goals of both place them in confrontation with the United States and its Western allies.  BRICS may be on a path towards unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  So, are these two countries in a position to champion the global south’s cause, and why haven’t more representative bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement played a more prominent role?  The preoccupation with Russia and China detracts from BRICS’s broader, underlying geopolitical project – the need for global south countries to reform and shape the international order’s future direction on their own terms.  These include greater representation and agency in global policy- and decision-making bodies and facilitating greater freedom to trade, invest and borrow money outside the Western-dominated financial system. They also include a more just and equitable global power balance that reflects modern realities.  In pursuing these aims, BRICS countries have made steady progress on developing a shared strategic agenda for increased cooperation across various policy domains.  The Kazan summit’s 32-page outcomes declaration covers almost everything from reforming the UNSC and Bretton Woods institutions to climate change, biodiversity and conservation. It also covers challenges from global crises, conflicts and terrorism and a suite of economic development, health, education, science and cultural exchange-related issues.  A group of democracies, autocracies and theocracies speaking with one voice on human rights and democracy is absurd.  The group’s ballooning cooperation agenda may indicate progress. But it could also signify the limits of its diverse members’ ability to agree on ‘hard’ political and security matters central to the core business of reforming the international order.  The expansion of BRICS’ substantive agenda and its membership dilutes its primary purpose and reinforces the binary, zero-sum Western narrative its members constantly try to shed.  Tangible, albeit gradual, progress on establishing intra-BRICS institutions and processes such as the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the cross-border payment system and its independent reinsurance capacity suggest that BRICS’ clout and credibility are growing.  These initiatives could enable members to pursue their international economic objectives without the constraints and transactional costs associated with traditional financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Ideally, this would improve their relative positions of global power and influence, and help deliver a more multipolar international order.  In contrast, deepening cooperation on big cat conservation, while important, doesn’t serve that purpose. Nor does facilitating youth exchanges on sports and healthy lifestyles or championing a BRICS alliance for folk dance. Including these kinds of initiatives in BRICS’ growing agenda detracts from its core objectives.  A streamlined agenda would divert attention from the contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring of BRICS’ members.  More worryingly, this suggests that BRICS’ diverse constellation of member states is pursuing the path of least resistance – expanding their cooperation in every direction, hoping something eventually sticks.  Instead of doubling down on hard strategic questions about a shared conception of multipolarity, and the steps necessary to reform global governance and security institutions, BRICS seems to be heading for greater expansion and formalisation. And with that come the risks, challenges and institutional dependencies that have led to the stagnation and ineffectiveness plaguing more established international organisations in recent years.  Perhaps the group’s core members recognise that they have very different ideas of what constitutes multipolarity. Russia (and China to an extent) envisage much more than global institutional reforms, focusing instead on reimagining international norms and core principles.  These differences are also reflected in BRICS’ expanding membership. It seems Russian and Chinese enthusiasm has been curbed by other founding members, who prefer a ‘partner country’ model for future growth. This contrasts with the full membership offers to Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2023. (Argentina’s new political administration declined, and the Saudis have remained non-committal.)    Most worrying, however, is BRICS’ preoccupation with promoting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is no doubt that these terms are increasingly politicised and rife with double standards – among developing nations with mixed political systems and traditionally liberal, Western democracies. However, for BRICS to meaningfully champion normative values, its members must at least attempt to commit to common political governance systems in their own countries.  Having a group of partner nations composed of progressive constitutional democracies and closed repressive autocracies and theocracies attempting to speak with one voice on promoting human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms is absurd. It reeks of empty political rhetoric at best, and Orwellian double-speak at worst.  This again dilutes BRICS’ key messages, undermines its important core business, and detracts from the significant progress being made towards a common strategic agenda.  BRICS primary goal moving forward should be to trim the fat.  A streamlined annual working agenda would divert attention away from its individual member states' contradictions and geopolitical manoeuvring. With a focus on addressing the international system’s failures, institutional reform and greater representation for global south countries in policy- and decision-making bodies could be prioritised.  This seems unlikely though, if this year’s summit is anything to go by. By following the path of least resistance, BRICS may be setting itself on a course towards increasing and unnecessary substantive bloat, and away from its core business.  Only time will tell if certain members are willing to be more assertive and correct course before they are too far down a path impossible to pivot away from. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, combined with a Republican-led US Senate, was widely feared among international allies and will be cheered by some of America’s foes. While the former put on a brave face, the latter are finding it hard to hide their glee.  On the war in Ukraine, Trump is likely to try to force Kyiv and Moscow into at least a ceasefire along the current front lines. This could possibly involve a permanent settlement that would acknowledge Russia’s territorial gains, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the territories occupied since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  It is also likely that Trump would accept demands by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to prevent a future Ukrainian Nato membership. Given Trump’s well-known animosity to Nato, this would also be an important pressure on Kyiv’s European allies. Trump could, once again, threaten to abandon the alliance in order to get Europeans to sign up to a deal with Putin over Ukraine.  When it comes to the Middle East, Trump has been a staunch supporter of Israel and Saudi Arabia in the past. He is likely to double down on this, including by taking an even tougher line on Iran. This aligns well with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current priorities.  Netanyahu seems determined to destroy Iran’s proxies Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen and severely degrade Iranian capabilities. By dismissing his defence minister, Yoav Gallant, a critic of his conduct of the offensive in Gaza, Netanyahu has laid the ground for a continuation of the conflict there.  It also prepares for a widening of the offensive in Lebanon and a potentially devastating strike against Iran in response to any further Iranian attack on Israel.  Trump’s election will embolden Netanyahu to act. And this in turn would also strengthen Trump’s position towards Putin, who has come to depend on Iranian support for his war in Ukraine. Trump could offer to restrain Netanyahu in the future as a bargaining chip with Putin in his gamble to secure a deal on Ukraine.  Pivot to China  While Ukraine and the Middle East are two areas in which change looms, relations with China will most likely be characterised more by continuity than by change. With Chinese relations being perhaps the key strategic foreign policy challenge for the US, the Biden administration continued many of the policies Trump adopted in his first term – and Trump is likely to double down on them in a second term.  A Trump White House is likely to increase import tariffs, and he has talked a great deal about using them to target China. But Trump is also just as likely to be open to pragmatic, transactional deals with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Just like in relations with his European allies in Nato, a serious question mark hangs over Trump’s commitment to the defence of Taiwan and other treaty allies in Asia, including the Philippines, South Korea, and potentially Japan. Trump is at best lukewarm on US security guarantees.  But as his on-and-off relationship with North Korea in his first term demonstrated, Trump is, at times, willing to push the envelope dangerously close to war. This happened in 2017 in response to a North Korean test of intercontinental ballistic missiles.  The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang makes another close brush of this kind as likely as Trump’s unpredictability makes it conceivable that he would accept a nuclear-armed North Korea as part of a broader deal with Russia, which has developed increasingly close relations with Kim Jong-un’s regime.  Doing so would give Trump additional leverage over China, which has been worried over growing ties between Russia and North Korea.  Preparing for a Trump White House  Friends and foes alike are going to use the remaining months before Trump returns to the White House to try to improve their positions and get things done that would be more difficult to do once he is in office.  An expectation of a Trump push for an end to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East is likely to lead to an intensification of the fighting there to create what the different parties think might be a more acceptable status quo for them. This does not bode well for the humanitarian crises already brewing in both regions.  Increasing tensions in and around the Korean peninsula are also conceivable. Pyongyang is likely to want to boost its credentials with yet more missile – and potentially nuclear – tests.  A ratcheting-up of the fighting in Europe and the Middle East and of tensions in Asia is also likely to strain relations between the US and its allies in all three regions. In Europe, the fear is that Trump may make deals with Russia over the head of its EU and Nato allies and threaten them with abandonment.  This would undermine the longevity of any Ukrainian (or broader European) deal with Moscow. The relatively dismal state of European defence capabilities and the diminishing credibility of the US nuclear umbrella would not but help to encourage Putin to push his imperial ambitions further once he has secured a deal with Trump.  In the Middle East, Netanyahu would be completely unrestrained. And yet while some Arab regimes might cheer Israel striking Iran and Iranian proxies, they will worry about backlash over the plight of Palestinians. Without resolving this perennial issue, stability in the region, let alone peace, will be all but impossible.  In Asia, the challenges are different. Here the problem is less US withdrawal and more an unpredictable and potentially unmanageable escalation. Under Trump, it is much more likely that the US and China will find it hard to escape the so-called Thucydides trap – the inevitability of war between a dominant but declining power and its rising challenger.  This then raises the question of whether US alliances in the region are safe in the long term or whether some of its partners, like Indonesia or India, will consider realigning themselves with China.  At best, all of this spells greater uncertainty and instability – not only after Trump’s inauguration but also in the months until then.  At worst, it will prove the undoing of Trump’s self-proclaimed infallibility. But by the time he and his team come to realise that geopolitics is a more complicated affair than real estate, they may have ushered in the very chaos that they have accused Biden and Harris of. 

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Australia and Indonesia have long had an uneasy relationship, over issues ranging from Timor-Leste’s independence to asylum seekers and bans on live cattle export to the aftermath of the Bali bombings. While the politics have long been challenging, there’s reason to believe a change may be coming. One of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Indonesia has long been powered by coal. Now, it’s endeavouring to go green through renewables, grid modernisation, electric vehicles and geothermal. That’s where Australia comes in. In March this year, the two nations formalised a climate partnership, named KINETIK. Through the agreement, Indonesia will secure supplies of lithium for EV batteries, and Australia will gain more export markets for its critical minerals, as well as potential access to the batteries’ industry supply chain. Why has the relationship been rocky? Since winning independence from the Dutch, Indonesia has focused heavily on keeping its many islands and ethnic groups united. But Australia’s role has sometimes been destabilising. During the Cold War, Australian agencies backed the Indonesian army’s bloody purges of communists. Australia also backed the cause of East Timorese secession. In 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Indonesia’s President, B.J Habibie, pushing for East Timorese independence. A year later, over 5,500 Australian soldiers arrived as peacekeepers during a tense referendum over the region’s future. Many people in Indonesia saw Australia’s involvement as a threat to national unity and cohesion. Before Howard and Indonesia’s next president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, had time to restore the relationship, tensions ramped up again after the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali which killed 88 Australians. Four years later, the Australian decision to grant temporary protection visas to 43 asylum seekers from Papua, which has long sought independence from Indonesia, led Indonesia’s ambassador to Canberra to be recalled. This diplomatic incident bore positive fruit, resulting in improved dialogue and, the same year, the signing of the Lombok Treaty, in which both countries promised not to interfere with the sovereignty of the other. Since then, Australia has been diplomatically silent on other Indonesian territorial issues, such as the separatist movement in Papua. Despite these efforts, many differences remain. Experts have often warned the relationship is tenuous. In 2019, the two nations signed a new Comprehensive Economic Partnership after a tortuous negotiation period. With a focus on climate change and energy transition, this paved the way for this year’s announcement. In a broader context, this partnership also illustrates Australia’s approach as a middle power nation to counterbalance China’s increasing economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Could the green transition help the relationship? In 2022, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Indonesia, where he promised A$200 million to kickstart climate and infrastructure projects. Now we have a formalised partnership. This is an important step, which should improve the political relationship. The two nations already trade $18 billion of goods and services yearly, centred on Australian coal and beef and Indonesian fertilisers and petrol. But there is room for much more growth. Indonesia’s population is young and large, with almost 280 million people. By 2030, estimates suggest it could be the world’s fifth-largest economy. If the KINETIK partnership works, it will be because it offers both nations what they need – Australia gets a new export market for green minerals, technology and know-how, and Indonesia starts to shift away from coal. The agreement builds on a memorandum of understanding on electric vehicles and another between Export Finance Australia and Indonesia’s State-owned Electricity Company last year. What are we likely to see as tangible outcomes? Indonesia perches on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with a number of active volcanoes and frequent earthquakes. This also means the archipelago nation has huge geothermal resources, estimated at 40% of the world’s total. Many geothermal plants are already running. But making the most of the resource faces many technological challenges. The best underground heat resources tend to be located in mountains or in isolated areas. The KINETIK partnership could help through connecting Australian mining expertise to Indonesia’s deep heat resources. Australia’s expertise in using renewables to power isolated communities will be vital to make exploration easier. And Australian investors will be allowed to own a majority share of Indonesian geothermal plants. The partnerships are expected to align with Indonesia’s National Energy Policy, which aims in part to shift from exporting raw energy resources and critical minerals to exporting value-added energy products through downstream projects such as EV and battery industries. Australia is home to the world’s largest hard-rock lithium mine, Greenbushes. The new partnership will open up options for Indonesian battery manufacturers to access this key metal. Indonesia, in turn, is rich in nickel, which will be needed in great quantities for green technologies. In fact, cheaper Indonesian nickel has pushed some Australian producers out of the market. Indonesia has already secured commercial deals with EV and battery manufacturers such as Hyundai and LG from South Korea, as well as Foxconn from Taiwan. Will this be enough? Politically, the relationship between Indonesia and Australia has long been thorny. A new focus on mutual advantageous investment could help, especially given the deal has strong political backing on both sides. Developing electric vehicles in Indonesia was also a key campaign issue for the newly elected Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto. From the Australian side, the agreement bolsters the Albanese government’s push to make the nation a green energy superpower. Of course, many agreements stay on paper and don’t shape the real world. But this one has a better chance, given the alignment between Indonesia’s efforts to make itself part of the electric vehicle supply chain, and Australia’s dream of becoming a green superpower. Bilateral agreements like these also show how the world is changing. More and more, middle power cooperation is emerging as a counterbalance against the intensifying Chinese-American rivalry. It’s also a positive sign Australia has realised the need to more actively build alliances across the Indo-Pacific region.

In the first two months of the year, general elections (presidential and/or legislative) were held in three countries of the Indo-Pacific, the area towards which the center of gravity of the world balance is shifting, according to experts: Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Together they account for nearly 700 million inhabitants, almost 9% of the world’s population, and host the largest number of Muslims in the world. The authoritarian bias there is so significant that the elections are mere ceremonies of power legitimization, more directed outside than inside of the country. The same happens in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, etc. Dynastic democracies, tutelary democracies, or both at the same time. False democracies. Bangladesh: a party-state? In Bangladesh, the Awami League won three out of four seats in the Parliament in January, a slightly lower percentage than in the 2018 elections, but with no diminution of its overwhelming power. The country’s prime minister is Sheikh Hasina Wajed, daughter of the father of independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman [1]. Abstention, estimated at 60%, best explains the electoral result. The main opposition parties boycotted the elections in protest against the lack of transparency of the process and, above all, against the attacks on basic freedoms. Some of the opposition leaders are serving prison sentences for unjustifiable reasons. Reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions are frequent [2]. Hasina claims to maintain the progressive line of her father, but the evolution of her regime indicates otherwise. The Awami League has maintained a power alternation with the conservative nationalists. But lately, her most feared enemy has been the Islamist radicals. In this fight, Hasina has counted on the support of India. The current government of Narendra Modi was more sympathetic to the nationalists, but pragmatism has imposed a close collaboration. Authoritarian drift in both countries has favored this convergence. Pakistan: a dictatorship in disguise In Pakistan, the elections have been even more controversial and stormy. The army is the real – if not the only – effective political actor [3]. The parties have wielded power since the military formally ceded it to them in 1998. Only nominally. The military domination over the institutions of the State remains unchanged. The reactive coup d’état has been replaced by preventive actions that determine or strongly condition the electoral result. Those who deviate or threaten to step out of the military script are discredited. It happened again this year. The populist movement of Isham Khan (a former cricket champion, the national sport) was until just two years ago the ruling party, having won the 2018 election. But he was covertly accused of a series of crimes, convicted, and imprisoned in 2022. Ironically, Khan had been the military’s preferred candidate, without whose favor he could hardly have secured victory. He believed that with his popularity, he could sideline his former protectors. Grave mistake. The military pulled the strings of justice, and Khan’s party was prevented from contesting in the elections [4]. The cricketer did not give up. From jail he denounced the military tutelage (which he had previously accepted with better or worse taste) and promoted candidacies related to his party under the label of “independents”. The challenge has been successful but insufficient. The “independents'' won a hundred seats, which are not enough to form a government majority [5]. The two parties that have been alternating in power in the last decades, the Muslim League (led by the conservative Sharif Brothers) and the People’s Party (political structure of the Bhutto family, of a confused and debatable center-left) hastened to agree to form a coalition government. Between them they have more than 130 deputies [6]. The cynicism of Pakistani politics is more than remarkable. The two parties now joining forces have been close enemies with a shared fate: both have been battered by the military, which has imprisoned and forced their leaders into exile on several occasions. In fact, the founder of the Bhutto dynasty (Zulfikar Ali) was overthrown after a military coup in 1971, charged and convicted in 1974 for the alleged murder of a political opponent and finally executed in 1979. His daughter Benazir was twice prime minister, deposed, exiled, and assassinated by an alleged Islamic extremist in 2007, when she was returning to her country. The Sharifs, powerful businessmen, have had a less tragic fate, but they have lived between favor and disgrace. Corruption has been the legal basis for their downfalls, with no little foundations. But it has been used as a weapon when it was convenient for the headquarters. Nawaz Sharif has now preferred to step back from the front line and reinstate as prime minister his brother Shehbaz, who held the post after the fall of Khan. The head of the clan went into exile in Saudi Arabia and only when he successfully negotiated the cancellation of the penalties, he returned to Pakistan to control the political process after the partial liquidation of Imran Khan. The post-election pact also has a prize for the Bhutto family. Although the formal leader of the PPP is Bilawal, Benazir’s son, who really pulls the strings is his widowed father, Asif Ali Zardari, who has also served sentences for corruption, of which there are few doubts. Zardari will be the new President, a more ceremonial position, but not without power to maintain his privileges. The outlook for the two now coalited dynasties is frightening. By 2026, Pakistan will have to pay $78 billion in foreign debt service, one of the highest in the world. This represents almost a quarter of its GDP (340 billion). Negotiations with the IMF are a dogfight, but the room for maneuver is almost nil [7]. Economic deterioration has been unstoppable in recent decades. At the beginning of the century, Pakistan’s economy was five times smaller than that of its rival, India; today it is one tenth [8]. Neither the military nor the political elites have been able to redirect the successive crisis. Pakistan is a ship adrift, in a permanent state of war with India. Both enemies have nuclear arsenals, which adds an enormous factor of danger to their recurrent disputes. Pakistan has been a major player in the protracted war in Afghanistan, as both, an ally and a rival of the United States, successively or alternately. In Washington they never knew whether the Pakistani military was helping or boycotting them. Bin Laden was killed by an American commando while hiding in Abbottabad, a city where many officers live, but the powerful military intelligence always denied knowing his whereabouts. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, relations between Pakistan and the United States have lost weight. In Washington, the “Indian card” is now a priority. However, the traditional economic and military ties between Pakistan and China compel Americans not to neglect this elusive and chaotic partner. Indonesia: Duo of former rivals In Indonesia, things are not looking any better. In the presidential elections, the winner was Prabowo Subianto, an authoritarian military officer who played an outstanding repressive role during the military dictatorship of his father-in-law, General Suharto, who led the country in the last third of the century, amid atrocious violations of human rights [9]. If the pacts in Pakistan lack any political ethics, in Indonesia it is three quarters of the same. Or worse. Five years ago, the current President, Joko Widowo (known as Jokowi), abandoned the pale progressivism of the ‘Democratic Party of Struggle’, founded by Megawati, Sukarno’s daughter, and joined the populist current in vogue. With this tactical shift he managed to defeat the conservative nationalist of GERINDRA (Great Indonesia Movement), who had turned to Prabowo as a ‘strongman’ figure to seize power. Widowo consolidated his hold on power with a populist policy of large infrastructure projects, partly financed by China, a tough hand against crime and radical Islamism, and an ambiguous balance in relations with Washington and Beijing. When he felt strong, Widowo integrated Prabowo into his government as no less than the Minister of Defense. Sukarno would have turned in his grave. That was not all. Jokowi wanted to form his own dynasty, but his son Gibran was still too young to inherit his post. He even had to twist the law (with the complicity of a judge who was his brother-in-law) so that he could be a candidate… but not for his party, from which he definitely separated, but as Prabowo’s second [10]. Success was guaranteed. The duo of former rivals has won the presidential elections by a wide margin. But in the legislative elections the result was more disputed. According to provisional data, the former general will not be able to count on an aligned Parliament. In any case, in such a corrupt and institutionally fragile country, cohabitation could be smoother than expected [11]. The director of the Asia-Pacific program at London’s renowned Chathan House anticipates changes, but he is confident that Prabowo’s pragmatism will limit his authoritarian instincts [12]. This ‘wishful thinking’ by Western analysts when assessing authoritarian regimes with a democratic façade is very recurrent and responds to the persistent logic since the Cold War. After all, what determines their blessing is not the democratic quality of political systems but their willingness to defend or act in accordance with Western interest. And in today’s times, being on the “right side” of history essentially means taking sides with the West in the strategic dispute with China. NOTES [1] https://www.cidob.org/biografias_lideres_politicos/asia/bangladesh/hasina_wajed [2] “Bangladesh is now in effect a one-party state”.THE ECONOMIST, 8 de enero. [3] “The Military is still pulling the strings in Pakistan’s election”. MUNEEB YOUSUF & MOHAMAD USMAN BHATTI. FOREIGN POLICY, 5 de febrero. [4] “Pakistan’s real test begin after elections”. AL JAZEERA, 8 de febrero. [5] “The rise and fall, and rise again of Imran Khan”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 de febrero. [6] “Imran Khan’s opponents reach deal to shut his allies out of government”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 de febrero. [7] “Pakistan can’t stop the cycle of discontent”. HUSAIN HAQQANI. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 16 de febrero. [8] “Pakistan is out of friends and out of money”. THE ECONOMIST, 14 de febrero. [9] “Indonesia’s election winner has a dark past and a cute image”. JOSEPH RACHMAN. FOREIGN POLICY, 14 de febrero. [10] “Indonesia’s election reveals its democratic challenges”. THOMAS PEPINSKY. BROOKINGS, 12 de enero. [11] “La démocratie indonésienne résistera-t-elle à la presidence de Prabowo Subianto?” COURRIER INTERNATIONAL, 16 de febrero; “The world’s third-biggest democracy could be sliding backwards”. ISHAAN THAROOR. THE WASHINGTON POST, 14 de febrero. [12] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/continuity-prabowo-means-change-indonesia; “Indonesia’s democracy is stronger that a strongman”. BEN BLAND. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 13 de febrero.