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한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском Elections in Europe demonstrate the growing popularity of far right parties as key outsiders gain on critical votes. In France, President Emmanuel Macron has moved to dampen Marine Le Pen’s success in the European Parliament with a snap national election. The election calendar for June has already thrown up some surprises, particularly in the northern hemisphere. To be sure, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was re-elected, though with a much-reduced majority which will place limits on his power. But the biggest shock is in Europe where French President Emmanuel Macron decided to call a snap election for 30 June after his most notorious far-right rival, Marine Le Pen, pulled off a decisive victory in the French election for the European Parliament. Macron is taking a massive gamble—that in a national election he can recover some of the popularity he has lost since his re-election as president in 2022, squashing Le Pen’s challenge to his leadership. The initial reaction of the commentariat is that Macron will manage a return to the Élysée palace, largely because the centrist parties holding the middle ground were the overall winners and the Left and the Greens failed to increase, or lost, shares of the vote. “I’ve decided to give you back the choice,” Macron said in an address to the electorate from the Elysée palace. In France, the Rassemblement National (RN) party led by Le Pen won 31.5 percent of the country’s vote, according to early results. In Germany, the three parties in Olaf Scholz’s fragile coalition—the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and the liberal FDP—were all overtaken by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which came in second behind the conservative CDU-CSU opposition. Significant gains by nationalist and ultra-conservative parties were also anticipated by exit polls in Austria, Cyprus, Greece, and the Netherlands. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni cemented her position in her governing coalition, and potentially her hand in negotiations with other European leaders, with her hard-right Brothers of Italy party taking over 28 percent of the vote in the European parliamentary elections. Attention will now turn to the campaign by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, to win another five-year term in office. She has a good record and currently no obvious challenger. Nonetheless, her re-election will hinge on her ability to make uncomfortable choices and deals, taking into account the EU’s clear shift to the right in parliamentary elections on 9 June. Though her centre-right European People’s party won the election, securing 189 seats in the 720-strong assembly, von der Leyen’s allies fared worse and the hard right surged from a fifth to nearly a quarter of seats. Her fate is likely to be decided at an EU summit on 27 June when she will seek the personal backing of the EU’s 27 leaders and aim to demonstrate to them that she has the required support in the European Parliament. Mexico Another remarkable election result this month was in Mexico where the ruling left-wing Morena party won a landslide victory in presidential, congressional, and state elections. While president-elect Claudia Sheinbaum and Morena’s victory on 2 June was not a surprise, the scale of it was. Sheinbaum won more votes than the centre-right Xochiti Galvez across genders, age groups, and in every state bar one, coming in 31 points clear of her rival. After decades of high poverty, glaring inequality, and low wages, the ruling Morena party more than doubled the minimum wage and expanded social programs, endearing itself to Mexico’s long-neglected have-nots. The result has left Mexico’s conservative elite struggling to understand the left’s landslide win, living as they do in gated communities far removed from the lives and feelings of average Mexicans. There are unlikely to be any surprises in the other major election this month—that of Iran on 28 June. Iranian authorities have disqualified prominent moderates as candidates in the snap presidential election, called following the helicopter crash that recently claimed the life of Ebrahim Raisi, the country’s president, and other senior ministers. The field of candidates has been narrowed to five hardliners and one mid-ranking reformist. The United Kingdom has seen a frenzy of election activity this month following Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s surprise decision to call an early election on 4 July. Polls show that there is likely to be a change of government to the opposition Labour party, which is currently holding a 22 percent lead, after 14 years’ Conservative government.

한국어로 읽기Leer en españolIn Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربيةLire en françaisЧитать на русском French and German credibility has reached new lows on the Ukraine issue, risking European security as each seeks to sure up political and geopolitical influence. Solidarity is weak, and arms corporations have proven influential in national decisions for EU integration on security matters. In the numerous crises that hit the European Union (EU) in the 21st century – the role of the so-called “integration engine,” as the French-German duopoly is called – was crucial. However, after Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022, both integration leaders from Western Europe receded into the background. The leaders of aid for fighting Ukraine were mainly the countries of NATO’s eastern flank, led by Poland and the Baltic states. Germany and France defended themselves against too radical sanctions imposed on Moscow, did not support Kiev, and did not want, among other things, either Ukraine’s accession to the EU nor to NATO. Why did Paris and Berlin distance themselves from Russian aggression in 2022, which violated European values and human rights and also threatened the EU itself? In short, the war hit various economic interests that France and Germany conducted with Vladimir Putin’s regime. An example of this was the expansion of Nord Stream, a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea, after Putin’s first military aggression against eastern Ukraine in 2014. It is worth recalling that the entire climate transformation in the EU in its initial phase was based on cheap Russian gas. Economic ties were not the only reason for the strange behavior of Berlin and Paris in the face of Moscow’s aggression. Geopolitical considerations were even more important. The elites of Western Europe have traditionally, with minor interruptions, cooperated with Russia and considered it an important economic and political partner. The geopolitical goal of both Western European countries was to seek strategic autonomy from Washington and rapprochement with Moscow and Beijing. Historically, Central Eastern Europe has been treated as an area of influence of Berlin and Moscow, which they share or (less frequently) compete for. Before 2022, for Berlin, this sphere of influence included the Central European countries and the Baltic states; for Moscow, this included Belarus and Ukraine. This is why, among other things, Western Europe distanced itself from Moscow’s aggression in 2022. It did not want to spoil relations with Moscow. It also did not want to provoke even greater Russian aggression, fearing a full-scale war with NATO. Western Europe wanted to reach an agreement with Putin as quickly as possible and return to the previous economic and geopolitical arrangement. However, in 2024, there was a clear change in Western Europe’s position towards the war in Ukraine. First, Germany increased its financial and military assistance, although it continued to block the delivery to Kiev of the most modern weapons requested by President Volodymyr Zelensky. France and Germany increased the scope of sanctions imposed on Moscow, although they were still full of loopholes that allowed the Kremlin to avoid them. Meanwhile, Berlin and Paris unblocked their veto on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, nevertheless they continued to maintain their opposition to Kiev’s membership in NATO. Under the influence of both Western European countries, the EU’s financial and military assistance to Kiev increased. It was still too small in relation to Ukraine’s needs, and Brussels faced great problems and delays in fulfilling aid declarations. The most radicalized person was President Emmanuel Macron who announced in 2024 that he would send troops to Ukraine. In the same year, German politicians proposed that NATO troops should protect the sky over western Ukraine from the territory of Romania and Poland. What caused this radical turn in Berlin and Paris? First of all, it turned out that both countries were losing credibility in NATO and the EU, and thus political influence in Central Europe and Ukraine. What was no less dangerous – especially for German politicians – was the growing dissatisfaction with their attitude in the US. The Germans feared that Washington would lose trust in Berlin and focus on NATO’s eastern flank, mainly Warsaw. Furthermore, Germany and France believed less and less in renewing good relations with Moscow. They also had little hope that their “neutral attitude” could protect Europe from further aggression by Putin, including his attack on NATO and EU countries. At this point, both Western European countries launched a diplomatic offensive to introduce changes in the European Union. It was primarily about revising EU treaties to strengthen the political influence of the two largest countries in Western Europe. Therefore, it was proposed, among others, the abolition of voting based on unanimity in foreign and defense policy, which gave a decision-making advantage to the countries with the greatest voting power (Germany and France). In addition, efforts were made to strengthen the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The main goal was to increase the production of ammunition and weapons from EU funds. Typically, such actions were aimed at strengthening the potential of arms corporations in Western Europe, as well as limiting arms exports from outside the EU, including from the US and South Korea. It goes without saying that in the event of a real threat from the East, the EU should not limit the transportation of weapons from non-European allies, because Europe itself produces too little ammunition and weapons. Nevertheless, subsequent actions of the European Commission after 2022 clearly rewarded aid for German and French corporations, as well as restricting access to arms imports from outside the EU. These attempts to strengthen the strategic autonomy of the EU against Washington are short-sighted in the face of a real threat on the EU and NATO. Moreover, instead of primarily supporting coordination within NATO, France and Germany have sought to duplicate the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, focusing on the expansion of EU’s rapid reaction forces (rather than NATO’s rapid reaction forces), which were much more modest in terms of numbers and equipment. In other words, their goals were political, not real defense. The idea was to strengthen Franco-German leadership in Europe, and this was to be achieved by supporting the development of EU structures in the area of security. All these aspirations to expand the CSDP could encounter serious obstacles in implementation. First, Germany and France often disagree on EU security considerations, particularly when it comes to their own national interests. For example, the French were disappointed with Germany’s decision to purchase the American F-35 multi-role fighter capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This affected plans to build a sixth-generation aircraft in cooperation between German, French, and Spanish corporations. Moreover, Berlin was developing its own anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense project in the EU (European Sky Shield Initiative), to which it did not invite the French, and even competed with their own European defense program (La défense aérienne du continent). Therefore, Macron criticized the German shield initiative, which he considered hasty and incomplete. Instead, he promoted a truly “European initiative,” where the French arms industry is the dominant force. Secondly, the actions of France and Germany in the field of defense have been delayed and ineffective. More than two years after the announcement of the famous Zeitenwende, the modernisation of the Bundeswehr, the federal government in Berlin managed to order only eighteen Leopard 2 tanks and twelve Panzerhaubitz 2000. Thirdly, it became increasingly clear early on that Germany and France were not ready to defend NATO’s eastern flank in solidarity, wanting rather to show initiative and leadership in order to maintain geopolitical influence in Europe. In terms of real security, their subsequent ideas were controversial. They were certainly beneficial to their arms corporations. For all these reasons, the credibility of Germany and France has been trending downwards on eastern EU security considerations. For the time being, it is difficult to predict whether the plans of Paris and Berlin will ultimately be implemented and whether cooperation within the CSDP will be strengthened. However, if this does not happen, it will paradoxically be a good solution for the security of the eastern flank. Efforts to defend it will be focused within NATO and, above all, located in the countries most at risk from Moscow’s aggression. This analysis is based on a recent article published by the Journal of International Affairs.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In a few days, an election campaign for the European elections will begin, and you can bet that migration will dominate the debates. Unfortunately, we won't hear any proposals to improve the situation in Africa. There is very little time left until the European elections. Voting will take place next Sunday, June 9, and in just one week, on Friday, May 24th, the election campaign will begin. Towns and cities across Spain and the EU countries will be filled with posters containing messages to attract citizens' votes. And during these campaign days, across Europe, there will be a lot, a great deal, of talk about immigration. It's no coincidence that two days before the start of the campaign across Europe, fifteen countries, led by Denmark, published a joint document calling on the European Union, that vague 'Brussels' so often used as a subject in European information, to explore the measure of creating centers outside the community territory to which migrants rescued at sea can be taken. Denmark, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, and Finland, through a joint letter agreed upon by their interior ministers, call on the European Commission to implement “innovative formulas” to curb the arrival of migrants in Europe. They seek more agreements like those signed with Tunisia, for example, and the establishment of such centers in third countries, inspired by the agreement reached by the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, to take migrants rescued at sea to a non-EU country like Albania in exchange for money, even violating the globally accepted precepts since the early '80s, as outlined in the Montego Bay Convention regarding the rescue of lives at sea, the definition of international waters, and disregarding the humanitarian concept of ‘shipwrecked.’ The United Kingdom, already outside the European Union after the Brexit, began to pave the way by announcing an agreement with Rwanda, which, although initially challenged by British judges, is on its way to become a law. That the European Union, as a consequence of socially misguided policies, has created the ideal environment for the growth of the far right (fueled further by the indiscriminate use of disinformation) is neither new nor surprising. In fact, the recently approved European Pact on Migration and Asylum, which received final approval just two days ago, is clear evidence of this. Faced with the upcoming elections and the highly predictable rise of the far right, they facilitated an agreement that many countries (most of them signatories of the document calling for innovative ways to externalize borders) considered weak: what they really want is to achieve a ‘Fortress Europe’, an isolated continent where entry is not possible, even though they are aware that our economic system will require many, many thousands of migrants in sectors such as agriculture, for example. That's why I have mentioned several times in these articles that this issue, migration, will be one of the main topics, if not the most important, dominating the debates and arguments of candidates eager to secure the well-paid seats in Brussels and Strasbourg, the two locations of the European Parliament. What is also becoming increasingly evident to me is that the more we talk about migration, the less we talk about Africa. It might sound like a contradiction, but it's true. Within the narrative framework about the African continent that the far right has managed to impose around migration, migration is a nebulous threat, with hundreds of thousands of 'military-aged young men' desperate to reach our land and do whatever it takes to survive at the expense of our well-being, our health, and our privileges. I trust you have understood my irony and the anger it causes me to see that beyond these simplistic and stereotyped statements, there is no real conversation about Africa, about Africans, and about the need for us to radically change our policies to stop turning our backs on them and focusing everything on the threat of boats and rafts. In this campaign, there will be no talk about conflicts like the one in Sudan, cruelly fueled by the spurious interests of global geopolitics, nor will there be much discussion about insecurity in the Sahel, exacerbated after the departure of European missions (even if they were little or not at all effective). There will be no talk about climate change in Africa, its brutal impact it is having, and the famines it generates. Africa will not be discussed in terms of economic potential, the necessary development of its electrical infrastructure, its privileged position to develop renewable energies, or generate green hydrogen. There will be no talk of African technological development, startups, or the significant advances they are making through mobile phone payments, an area in which they are pioneers. For long time, by Europeans, Africa has been seen as the separate continent, as a region distant from the rest of the world and simply described as a passive victim of the slave trade that has not been compensated for the human and natural exploitations it has suffered. Future Members of the European Parliament must be aware that African citizens are tired of European paternalism and have become aware of their power and capacity as peoples. Africa is the second-largest continent in the world, also the second most populous, with spectacular population growth. However, it is indeed the poorest region on the planet, with a GDP that barely represents 3% of the global total. Sadly, despite our geographical proximity, Europe has been diminishing the intensity of its ties with Africa, resulting in increased political connections with other powers such as Russia, China, Turkey, or with the United Arab Emirates or Qatar’s petrodollars. In the new Cold War between the European Union and Russia, African countries have become valuable pieces from a political-military perspective. From past European paternalism, we have moved to new situations in which China has become the primary investor in the African continent, displacing Europe, and the United States. As we mentioned in previous articles, China has done this by exchanging infrastructure for raw materials, but also leaving behind a financial debt that creates absolute dependence, a trap for many African countries. Ladies and gentlemen, future Members of the European Parliament: Europe cannot afford to become a secondary actor in an Africa that has decided to seek new partners to support its legitimate aspiration to play a greater role in world politics, as evidenced by its demand for presence in the G-20 and the United Nations Security Council. If Europe continues to cease being a priority partner for the African continent, the problem will affect Europeans more than Africans. The Africa-Europe relationship requires a new strategy that entails a more equitable balance of benefits and responsibilities, with a shared and long-term vision. We need to strengthen the European Union-African Union relations, and I doubt that this improvement can be achieved by implementing cruel "imaginative measures" that involve subcontracting migrant prisons in third countries, no matter how secure they claim to be. Who can build trust that way? In the Canary Islands, don't forget, we have a lot at stake. Geographically, our islands are African; it's our neighborhood and, in a way, our close family. And family needs to be treated and cared for properly. Article published in Kiosco Insular, eldiario.es, and Canarias 7 on May 17th and 18th, 2024.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Press statement on the occasion of the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron Full statement to the press by the President of the Republic, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, following the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron in Brasília (DF), on March 28, 2024 It is a great joy to reciprocate the hospitality with which my delegation and I were received in Paris when I participated in the Summit for a 'New Global Financial Pact' last June. Over the past three days, we have carried out an extensive agenda that included stops in Belém, home to COP30; Itaguaí, where we have Prosub; and now Brasília, for a State visit. This true marathon gives a sense of the breadth of the cooperation and friendship ties between France and Brazil. Among traditional powers, none are closer to Brazil than France. And among emerging powers, you tell me if any are closer to France than Brazil. In today's highly complex international landscape, the dialogue between our nations serves as a vital bridge connecting the Global South to the developed world, fostering efforts to overcome structural inequalities and achieve a more sustainable planet. Brazil and France are committed to collaborating in advancing a shared global vision through democratic dialogue. A vision grounded in the priority of production over unproductive finance, solidarity over selfishness, democracy over totalitarianism, and sustainability over predatory exploitation. President Macron was able to personally witness that our commitment to the environment is not merely rhetorical. In the past year, we have reduced illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 50%, and we aim to eliminate it entirely by 2030. As a symbol of the revitalization of our partnership, today we embraced a New Action Plan, broadening our collaboration into new arenas. These include financing the ecological and energy transition, advancing in bioeconomy, agriculture, public administration, digital issues, artificial intelligence, and reinforcing human rights and gender equality on our bilateral agenda. This range of topics is reflected in the more than 20 agreements we celebrate today. We discussed the success of the Brazil-France Economic Forum, held yesterday in São Paulo, which had not convened presentially since 2019. We explored ways to expand and diversify trade, which reached 8.4 billion dollars last year and has the potential to grow even further. France is the third-largest investor in Brazil, with a strong presence in sectors such as hospitality, energy, defense, and high technology, which generate employment and income in our country. I presented to President Macron the new investment opportunities in infrastructure and sustainability facilitated by the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC) and the Neoindustrialization Program. I presented our commitment to combating inequalities as the cornerstone of Brazil's G20 Presidency. Within this context, we are launching a Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty. As we mark the 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions this year, President Macron and I concur on the imperative for the G20 to send a clear message advocating for global governance reform and the reinforcement of multilateralism. We also agree that it is time for the super-rich to pay their fair share of taxes, in line with the proposal for fair and progressive international taxation that Brazil advocates within the G20. As strategic partners, we exchanged views on the major dilemmas facing humanity. Across the globe, democracy is under the shadow of extremism. The denial of politics and the dissemination of "hate speech" are growing and concerning. For this reason, Brazil joined, in 2023, the French initiative Partnership for Information and Democracy and will continue to work to promote and protect the circulation of reliable information. It is time to promote a truly multilateral debate on the governance of artificial intelligence. It is unacceptable for a new divide to emerge, segregating wealthy nations, possessors of this technology, from developing countries where basic internet access remains precarious. I reiterated to President Macron Brazil's unwavering belief in dialogue and the defense of peace. My administration will continue working diligently to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remain a conflict-free zone, where dialogue and international law prevail. The Security Council's paralysis in response to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza is both alarming and inexplicable. The arguments questioning the obligation to comply with the recent ceasefire directive in Gaza during the month of Ramadan once again undermine the authority of the Council. Discussing a world governed by rules that are not collectively agreed upon signifies a regression of centuries, reverting back to the law of the jungle. Brazil categorically condemns all forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. We cannot permit religious intolerance to gain ground among us. Jews, Muslims, and Christians have always lived in perfect harmony in Brazil, contributing to the construction of the modern nation we see today. Dear friend Macron, the Strategic Partnership with France embodies our joint endeavor to modernize and invigorate our economies, prioritizing sustainability and upholding human rights. I am convinced that, even after three intense days, there is still much work ahead of us. The future holds countless possibilities for our countries to cooperate, develop, and create together I look forward to seeing you again soon at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Thank you very much.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Emmanuel Macron’s second Sorbonne speech showed that the French leader wants to shape a European legacy that will outlast his presidency. In doing so, he also highlighted the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship. In the end, it was a typical speech by French President Emmanuel Macron that members of the government and MPs, journalists and students heard on Thursday morning at the Sorbonne in Paris. It was too long, as the president himself admitted after about an hour. It was also too complicated, many listeners agreed: for almost seven years, translators, analysts, and often Macron’s own advisors have struggled with the metaphors and the convoluted three, four or five-point plans expounded by the president, who has been frequently accused in France of no longer being able to reach his fellow citizens. And yet it was a speech that no other current top politician in Europe would likely be capable of delivering. An emotional speech, sometimes angry and disappointed, then confident again, at times even rousing. A courageous speech, with a firework of analyses and proposals that addressed many pressing issues for the future of the EU. In between defense policy, the green and digital transformations of the economy and international trade policy, the protection of borders and asylum policy, and the threats to the liberal democracies of the West, one central concern dominated this long speech: the sovereignty of the European Union—an echo of his first Sorbonne speech of 2017, which has remained the obsession of the youngest and most pro-European president in French history. Disappointments in Defense Policy Right from the start, Macron measured himself against his own promises, particularly in security and defense policy, where strengthening the EU’s sovereignty is most urgently needed. In 2017, he proposed an EU intervention force, a defense budget, a doctrine for the armed forces, and the promotion of a strategic culture. Global political developments have since proved him right; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has left Germany and other countries “bare” in terms of security policy since 2022. However, the EU has still not implemented Macron's proposals and so the security of 450 million EU citizens could once again depend on a few thousand voters in US swing states in the November presidential election there. If Macron is to be believed, however, there have been successes since 2017 that need to be built on after the forthcoming European Parliament elections this June. In terms of security policy, he included the European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which 13 EU member states have joined since 2017. The initiative only delivered a real operational impact in the form of the Takuba special forces mission, which fought terrorist groups in the Sahel from 2020 under French leadership. Berlin refused to take part in Takuba and it ended after a few months. The mission was also unable to prevent the EU from being ousted by Russia and other states in the Sahel and suffering a massive loss of influence. If Takuba is presented as a success, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is in bad shape. Achievements to Be Built on in Future By contrast, the initiative to strengthen European sovereignty in economic policy, which Macron predictably emphasized in his speech, was truly successful from a French perspective. The fact that the German government agreed to take on joint EU debt in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is seen across party lines in Paris as the president's biggest European policy victory since 2017. Macron recalled that the then finance minister and current German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, even spoke of a “Hamiltonion moment” in an interview, alluding to a permanent joint EU budget. For Macron, this remains the prerequisite for genuine EU sovereignty and therefore a goal for the remaining three years of his presidency.
 

France is confident that it will be able to persuade the German government to take this step in the coming years. In his speech, Macron referred several times to a recently published report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, which contains proposals for strengthening the EU single market and for joint investments and is likely to influence the agenda of the next European Commission. While Macron was giving his Europe speech, journalists in Brussels were speculating about the French president's support for Mario Draghi, another former Italian head of government who has ambitions for the commission presidency. The current president, Ursula Von der Leyen, who is German, was not mentioned at all in the speech. Draghi will also present recommendations for increasing EU competitiveness—very much in line with Macron. Signals to the German Partner Joint debt issuance will inevitably lead to renewed conflict between Germany and France in the coming months. Perhaps that is why Macron praised the relationship with Germany so frequently, emphasizing the value of the Aachen Treaty signed in 2019, cooperation during the pandemic and two joint arms projects that have recently made progress. Nevertheless, the French president could not resist a few digs. He emphasized the importance of nuclear power for the EU’s energy supply, praised French initiatives to form a “nuclear alliance” at the EU level, and called for the expansion of the “Europe of the atom.” More surprising than this old conflict was his allusion to the cannabis legalization introduced by Germany’s coalition government. He said some partners believed that the liberalization of drug policy was right, while he believed it to be wrong. Instead, the authority of the state should be strengthened. Fault Lines in the Franco-German Relationship Beyond these policy issues, the major fault lines in the Franco-German relationship also became evident in the second Sorbonne speech: Macron repeatedly emphasized the danger of the EU becoming a “vassal” of the United States, losing its independent voice in the world, and degenerating into a “corner of the West.” Macron said the era of free trade and globalization was coming to an end and he referred to the triad of European dependencies often cited in France these days, most of which are particularly aimed at Berlin: Russian gas, Chinese export markets, and US security guarantees. Both the US and China were increasingly ignoring international rules that only the EU abided by, he claimed. The EU was acting “naively,” endangering the competitiveness of its industries and risking being responsible for its own failure in the process. The palpable fear of decline that ran through Macron’s speech did not only refer to the economy. The old fear of the Europeans, especially the French, of being culturally dominated by the US also flared up in many places. The multilingualism of Europe's youth, which Macron had invoked in 2017, is in a bad way. Despite Brexit, English dominates the EU institutions in Brussels. This is unlikely to change in the future, on the contrary. Thanks to Netflix and TikTok, young people all over Europe speak the same language. The EU, Macron said, barely controlled this digital space anymore and produced no content. Even worse than the withering of multilingualism was the fact that the EU no longer offered any positive narratives. For observers of French politics, this clearly echoed Macron’s concerns about opinion polls ahead of the European elections. His party alliance is lagging far behind the far-right Rassemblement National party, whose 28-year-old leading candidate Jordan Bardella is particularly popular with first-time voters and on social media. Macron’s second Sorbonne speech was therefore also intended to boost the campaign of his party’s leading candidate in the European elections, Valérie Hayer. However, Macron confined himself to a few allusions, probably also because he is for the first time being perceived as a burden for his party’s chances in the election campaign. Departure from Macron While preparing his speech, Macron must have thought back more than once to his first Sorbonne speech in 2017. The new speech heralds the beginning of his farewell as president of France. He has around three years left to turn the optimistic promises made at the beginning of his first term into a European policy legacy that will outlast his presidency. At the end of his speech, Macron quoted Hannah Arendt: “The only way to influence the future” was to “make promises and keep them.” Macron has promised a lot since 2017. No matter what else one might think of him: he is a visionary, the likes of whom has not been seen in the German chancellery for many years. Perhaps that is why the great European, the former German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who died in December, wanted Macron to give a speech in recognition of his life's work. However, Macron still owes the EU the second part of Arendt's quote—the fulfillment of promises—in many areas. He knows that. And so, in parts of his speech, he came across as a driven man, one who is running out of time. This was also evident in another quote that Macron placed at the end of his speech, which raises the biggest question of all, the answer to which is anything but certain in France: Referring to Ernest Renan’s famous lecture, also delivered at the Sorbonne, in 1882, entitled: “What is a nation?” Macron called for the EU to ask itself the same essential question. If he succeeds in providing this impetus over the next three years, the EU would once again have something to offer, including to the young listeners of his speech. And Macron would have kept his big promise on European policy.


한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français English translation of this Article was done by Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations  Sweden and Finland personified successful neutrality in international relations for decades. Does their accession to NATO mean that the policy of neutrality will no longer have any prospects in the modern world? Sweden becomes the 32nd member of the North Atlantic Alliance. As we predicted a few weeks ago, the Hungarian parliament ratified the accession protocol of this Scandinavian kingdom relatively quickly and removed the last obstacle to its official NATO membership. This ends the almost two-year story of the Alliance’s enlargement in northern Europe, which was initially expected to have a much more rapid development. Stockholm’s finish line Of the 30 member states that were part of NATO when Sweden and Finland submitted their applications in May 2022, 28 carried out domestic procedures to ratify accession protocols in a tick. But two countries – Türkiye and Hungary – had questions for the candidates. In particular, Ankara said that it was impossible to have allied relations with countries that have become “guest houses for terrorists” and impose sanctions against Türkiye. This referred primarily to Stockholm’s policy, so Finland joined the Alliance in March 2023, while Sweden was left in the “waiting room”. After twenty months of negotiations and a series of concessions from Sweden itself, as well as the USA, which agreed to unblock the deal to sell F-16 fighter jets to Türkiye, the Turkish parliament passed a positive decision on Stockholm’s application on 23 January. After that, Sweden faced the final obstacle – Hungary’s lack of ratification. In Budapest, as the speaker of the Hungarian parliament put it, Stockholm was expected to show “some respect” and prove that it “takes Hungary seriously”. As a result, in recent weeks the drama has come down to whether Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson will accept his Hungarian counterpart Viktor Orban’s invitation to visit Budapest and personally discuss all issues that concern Hungary. At first, the Swedish government responded sharply and unambiguously that its head had nothing to discuss with Orban, at least until there was a positive decision on the kingdom’s admission to NATO. In the end, however, Kristersson did fly to Budapest on 23 February. After the negotiations, Viktor Orban said that the agreements reached in the field of military-technical co-operation “help restore confidence between the two countries”. In particular, an agreement was reached on Hungary’s purchase of four new Gripen fighter aircraft and a 10-year extension of the maintenance service of 14 Swedish fighter jets already in the Hungarian Air Force. Three days later, on 26 February, the Hungarian parliament ratified the protocol on Sweden's accession to NATO: 188 deputies voted in favour and only 6 against. Thus, supporters of the Alliance’s Northern European enlargement can calmly exhale. Within days, the Swedish flag-raising ceremony is expected to take place at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It will draw a line under Stockholm’s two hundred years of non-alignment with military blocs, a period during which Sweden has become one of the most recognisable avatars of the very idea of neutrality. No country for neutrals? Sweden’s decision to end its non-aligned policy, as already discussed, can hardly be called completely spontaneous and breaking all the foundations and trends of the past decades. Indeed, it was made under the extraordinary conditions of public shock after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, but Stockholm has been slowly moving towards it for a long time. This is important to know and understand, because against the background of NATO’s North European enlargement in 2023-2024, several natural questions arise about the significance of this event in the broader international context. For example: What does Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO mean for the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment? Are the decisions of Stockholm and Helsinki indicators that place for neutrality in today’s world is shrinking? And should states that are still outside political-military blocs look closely at the example of Sweden and Finland and perhaps follow it? These questions are not just theoretical. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine and the imposition of the first anti-Russian sanctions, both in the media and from high political tribunes, the thesis began to be heard that there is no place for neutrality in the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine. At least, in this way Kyiv itself and its Western partners have formulated their position. The explanation is simple: Russia’s actions, they emphasise, must be qualified as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, which means that any form of neutral attitude to the conflict would encourage these violations and is therefore immoral and illegitimate. Based on this logic, they called on the nations of the world to condemn Moscow’s actions and join the Western sanctions regime. Since not all countries were willing to take sides in a conflict they do not consider their own, Ukraine and the West expectedly (but with varying success) used various instruments of convincing and pressure. This can be clearly seen in the dynamics of voting on war-related resolutions at the UN General Assembly. In general, the thesis “No country for neutrals” is as old as the world. It always sounds especially loud at the initial stages of large-scale geopolitical and military confrontations. This was the case, for example, in the early years of the Cold War, when the position of traditionally neutral states and leanings towards neutrality by countries such as Yugoslavia caused a harsh reaction both in the Kremlin and in the White House. Both considered them not only harmful in the fight against ideological enemies, but also deeply immoral. It is now once again difficult for small states to argue the importance of maintaining a neutral policy on the basis of their historical traditions or even their desire to help resolve conflicts; not to mention their own interests, which are not necessarily similar to those of the conflicting parties. The case of Switzerland is illustrative. Even with the naked eye one can see how difficult it is for Bern to implement its natural policy of neutrality, which, unlike Sweden, did not succumb to significant erosion either during the Cold War or after its end. On the one hand Switzerland is under enormous Western pressure, and on the other – under slightly different but also pressure from Moscow, which has been quick to include Switzerland among unfriendly states for joining some of the EU sanctions. Revealingly, in mid-2022, Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis, who was then also the country’s president, even proposed that a new concept of neutrality be enshrined in law. The idea was to transform the classic Swiss neutrality into “cooperative neutrality”. However, what exactly the new concept meant remained a mystery (although the name already makes it more or less clear), as the members of the Swiss Federal Council rejected the proposal. But the very fact that such an initiative emerged is a good illustration of the challenges that neutral states face today. The future of neutrality The Cassis initiative also suggests that neutral states will not abandon their policies easily if they consider them optimal under the specific structural conditions that define their security environment. True, they will adjust to changing circumstances and adapt their foreign policy positioning accordingly, because, unlike major powers, small states cannot independently shape their own security environment and by definition are forced to adjust, look for vague wording, and manoeuvre. But they will not simply abandon a policy that has been tested for decades or even centuries. That is, the national interest of these countries remains at the centre of everything, rather than pressure, wishes and appeals to morality on the part of the participants in certain conflicts, even if they are superpowers. This is how the cases of Sweden and Finland differ from those of Switzerland, Austria, Malta, Ireland, and other countries that continue to adhere to neutrality and/or non- alignment: they define their national interest in fundamentally different ways in the specific geopolitical conditions that are developing here and now. At the same time, a simple rule always applies in international relations. The more uncompromising and fierce the confrontation between key actors becomes, the less opportunities and room for manoeuvre neutral states have. Therefore, in Europe, these are very hard times indeed for neutrals. But in some other parts of the world, the structural conditions are different, and the incentives for non-aligned policies in many countries, on the contrary, are only growing. India is a vivid example of this. It is now a welcome guest everywhere, and the main geopolitical antagonists are literally competing in inviting Delhi to co-operate. In such a situation, it is quite natural for India to skim all the cream with the help of neutral positioning, which she successfully does. European neutrals, however, now have to fight for the right to retain as many elements of the policy of non-alignment as possible and hope that their position will soon be in demand again. In this process, the forms and methods of neutrality are inevitably evolving. One of the leading theorists of neutrality, Austrian Professor Heinz Gärtner, has estimated that there are more than 20 different types of neutral policies. There is no doubt that this list will only grow over time. From the legalistic forms enshrined in the Hague Conventions in the early 1900s, neutrality will evolve further and further towards hybrid political forms such as hedging. It is important that in any case, a neutralist policy, no matter what forms it occasionally takes, will always have a place in international relations. Especially given the level of globalisation that has been achieved, which distinguishes the modern world from the realities of the Cold War. The great powers opposing each other will themselves eventually have an interest in linkages in the form of neutral and non-aligned countries. In addition, without neutral states and non-state actors, many practices basic to international relations would be impossible. For example, it is difficult to imagine the full implementation of international humanitarian law without them.

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 43 Executive Summary: • The political rigidity associated with Western reactions to Minsk has limited any positive impact and is now sacrificing the “strategic foundation of Belarus’s statehood” on the altar of “present-day concerns.” • Official Minsk has limited economic options due to Western sanctions, leading to a stronger reliance on Russian businesses and trade routes. • Whether Belarus will retain its statehood or become a Russian colony depends on how long Minsk and Moscow remain on the same side of the Iron Curtain. By all indications, Western policy toward Belarus is in need of fresh ideas. The crackdown on the post-election protests in 2020, as well as Belarus’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, has elicited stern reactions in the West to Minsk and a wholehearted embrace of the opposition. Still, the political rigidity associated with these Western reactions has limited their positive impact and is now sacrificing the “strategic foundation of Belarus’s statehood” on the altar of “present-day concerns” (see EDM, March 14). Acting on some of these concerns may be counterproductive. For example, on March 1, Lithuania closed two more Belarusian border crossings and has been questioning Belarusian migrants based on the frequency of their trips to Belarus and their stance on the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime (LRT, February 28). Such concerns limit Belarusians’ contact with the West and are used as fodder for hostile interpreters of outside actions toward Minsk. Russian historian Alexander Dyukov, in an interview with RuBaltic, notes that, until 2020, “Vilnius used to be a ‘weekend capital’ for some Belarusians. But people in expensive clothes and good cars who moved to Lithuania for permanent residence thereafter are a completely different matter.” Moreover, those newcomers appear to embrace the ideology that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, headed by Vilnius, was a proto-Belarusian state whose name modern-day Lithuania usurped (RuBaltic, March 10). Whether such an ideology is dominant among Belarusians in Lithuania remains an open question, but it is unlikely to constitute any threat to the country. Perhaps even more critical than Dyukhov’s hostile interpretation of Litvinism are the strategic implications of the semi-blockade from Belarus’s Western neighbors (Russia.post, August 30, 2023; see EDM, March 14). Some opposition-minded Belarusian commentators appear to take these implications seriously and use them to educate members of the Belarusian émigré community. In his recent weekly question-and-answer session with Zerkalo, Artyom Shraibman responded to the question: “There is an opinion that, in the event of the disappearance of the Putin regime, Russia will be too busy to care about Belarus, so the Belarusian regime will fall. However, as Russian businesses are taking over all the valuable assets in Belarus, the country is unlikely to be willing to let go of these businesses. And if so, does Belarus have a chance to not become a Russian colony in the foreseeable future?” Shraibman dispelled the notion that Russian business assets in Belarus are conducive to Belarus becoming a Russian colony. Shraibman referenced hostile takeovers of Russian holdings by Minsk, such as Belagazprombank in 2020 and the Belarusian authorities’ arrest of Russian potash company Uralkalii CEO Vladislav Baumgaertner in 2013 (see EDM, September 4, 2013). In both cases, Moscow did not retaliate. Shraibman believes it is important that Russia has become the primary buyer of Belarusian goods and that all remaining Belarusian exports are now in need of exclusively Russian transit, as Lithuanian, Latvian, and Polish transit routes are blocked. It is this sort of dependency that makes Belarusian entrepreneurs overly accustomed to Russian business practices and norms (YouTube, March 7). Whether Belarus will retain its statehood depends on how long Minsk and Moscow remain on the same side of the Iron Curtain. Developments on the other side of this new divide in Belarus are not as straightforward as they may seem. In mid-February, Elvira Mirsalimova, a Vitebsk-based ardent supporter of Russia’s war against Ukraine and of the view that Belarusians are Russians, was arrested for propagating Nazi symbols on her Telegram account. She republished a post about the “trophies of the Ukrainian army” supposedly found by Russian pro-war journalist Vladlen Tatarsky, who was killed in St Petersburg last year. These “trophies” included a flag with a swastika allegedly found in dugouts abandoned by the Ukrainian army, which Tatarsky was pictured standing on (Facebook/Mirsalimova, March 8). The irony of the situation is that both the late Tatarsky and Mirsalimova are champions of Russia’s expansionism, contrary to their “anti-Nazi” rhetoric (Zerkalo, March 5; Belsat, March 8). Valer Karbalevich of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty attributes the Mirsalimova episode to the fact that demonstrating support for Belarus-Russia integration, though officially enshrined, has limits in Minsk. Crossing these limits is fraught with punishment. Karbalevich recalls the 2016 imprisonment of three Belarusian citizens who insulted the Belarusian nation in three articles in the Russian media (Svaboda, March 11). He also notes that Lukashenka has monopolized the pro-Russian flank of the Belarusian political scene. Unfortunately, neither Karbalevich nor Shraibman acknowledges that, in Belarus itself, there are essentially two communities in one that adhere to different historical narratives, and both communities claim to represent “Belarusianness.” On the one hand, many Belarusians subscribe to the Russo-centric interpretation of Belarusian statehood; on the other hand, most of those Belarusians in the opposition abide by the “Westernizing” narrative (The Jamestown Foundation, December 20, 2019). Lukashenka claims leadership of the Russo-centric segment of society. West-friendly pollsters, however, have shown the latter segment to be numerically stronger than its counterpart (Belorusskaya Natsionalnaya Identichnost, December 2022). If this is the case, the answer to who is better equipped to protect Belarus from being absorbed by Russia is unclear. After all, while protesting the rigged 2020 election, the opposition did not favor any geopolitical orientation whatsoever. They became manifestly pro-Western when they found themselves forced out of Belarus. The opposition has little to no influence on developments within the country. Lukashenka’s track record, however, includes declarations and actions opposing Russia’s expansionism. For example, the Russian ambassador to Minsk, Mikhail Babich, was ousted in April 2019 because he appeared to confuse an independent country with a subdivision of the Russian Federation (see EDM, May 1, 2019). Ruling out the possibility of engaging official Minsk no longer makes sense for the West. Not only would such an engagement prop up Belarusian statehood, but nothing short of it can facilitate the release of Belarus’s political prisoners and limit the country’s integration with Russia.

Today, the EU and the United States held the sixth meeting of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in Leuven, Belgium. The meeting allowed ministers to build on ongoing work and present new deliverables of the TTC after two and a half years of cooperation. The TTC is a key forum for close cooperation on transatlantic trade and technology issues. The Commission was represented by Executive Vice-Presidents Margrethe Vestager and Valdis Dombrovskis, joined by Commissioner Thierry Breton. On the US side, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai were present. The meeting took place in a challenging geopolitical context, including Russia's illegal war against Ukraine and global economic pressures. In addition, the acceleration of the digital and green transitions opens opportunities for growth and innovation but also requires transatlantic cooperation towards joint approaches. The meeting showed that there is a strong commitment to advance transatlantic leadership on emerging technologies and in the digital environment, facilitate bilateral trade and investment, cooperate on economic security and defend human rights and values. Transatlantic cooperation on artificial intelligence, quantum, 6G, semiconductors and standardisation The EU and US reaffirmed their common commitment to a risk-based approach to artificial intelligence (AI) and support for safe and trustworthy AI technologies. Both partners believe in the potential of AI to help find solutions to global challenges. A short overview document published today on AI for the Public Good identifies milestones on which the EU and US are cooperating in the areas of extreme weather, energy, emergency response and reconstruction. The partners also announced a new Dialogue between the EU AI office and the US Safety Institute on developing tools, methodologies and benchmarks for measuring and evaluating AI models. Since the launch of the TTC in 2021, the EU and US have worked on transparency and risk mitigation to reap the benefits of AI for their citizens and societies and continue to implement the Joint Roadmap for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management. The EU and US have adopted today a common 6G vision setting out a path for leadership on this technology, and have signed an administrative arrangement for research collaboration. This builds on the 6G outlook adopted in May 2023, and the industry roadmap on 6G of December 2023. In the semiconductors area, the EU and the US are extending for three years their two administrative arrangements, under which they have been cooperating fruitfully to identify early-on supply chain disruptions and ensure subsidies transparency. They will commit to cooperating on legacy semiconductors and join forces in research to find alternatives to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in chips, including by leveraging AI capacities. On emerging technology standards, the EU and US are releasing a Digital Identity Mapping Report with the aim of identifying use cases for transatlantic interoperability and the cross-border use of digital identities. In 2023, the EU and the US endorsed a common international standard on megawatt charging systems for the recharging of electric heavy-duty vehicles. The partners will continue to work on standards as enablers of the green transition. Boosting digital skills and talent is fundamental for the success of the digital transition. The Talent for Growth Task Force launched in April 2023 with a one-year mandate, has served as a platform for rich exchanges on innovative skills development and actionable solutions to address skills shortages in the technology sector in both the EU and the US. The Task Force presented the outcomes of these discussions in the margins of the TTC. Promoting easier, more sustainable and more secure trade on the transatlantic marketplace Promoting sustainable trade as part of the green transition is a priority for both parties and the TTC remains a key forum for the EU and the US to cooperate on this. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade (TIST), which since its inception in 2022 frames the TTC's work in this regard. At today's meeting, ministers took stock of the work taking place under TIST including on conformity assessment, to facilitate trade in goods and technologies that are vital for the green transition. They agreed to publish a Joint Catalogue of Best Practices on Green Public Procurement to help accelerate the deployment of publicly financed sustainability projects, and to advance their cooperation on solar supply chains. The EU and the US have declared their intention to make transatlantic trade easier and to continue growing their unique economic partnership. To this end, both sides have agreed to facilitate digital tools in trade. In particular, they have taken steps to ease digital trade for companies by coordinating and aligning their respective technical standards for e-invoicing systems, which should considerably cut down on time and red tape. This will also reduce paper usage and carbon emissions associated with traditional invoicing methods. Furthermore, both parties reaffirmed the importance of the EU-US Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue as a platform for exchange to avoid zero-sum competition and trade and investment distortions in the clean energy sector. They also welcomed the publication of recommendations for greater transatlantic e-vehicle charging infrastructure compatibility, which complement the previously published Transatlantic Technical Recommendations for Government Funded Implementation of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure. Moreover, the EU and the US hold that sustainable trade is not only about cutting greenhouse gas emissions, but also about ensuring a fair transition for workers and firms up and down the supply chain. This aim is encapsulated by the work of the Trade and Labour Dialogue (TALD), which, building on the discussions during a workshop with social partners organised at the fifth TTC meeting in January 2024 held its third meeting at today's TTC ministerial meeting. In addition, the EU and US have intensively engaged on critical minerals, which are indispensable for a wide set of technologies needed for EU strategic sectors such as the net-zero industry, and the digital, space and defence sectors. The EU and the US are advancing negotiations toward a Critical Minerals Agreement This agreement aims to strengthen EU-US supply chains in critical minerals for electric vehicles batteries and to reinforce the protection of labour and environment in international critical minerals supply chains. The EU and the US also welcomed the launch of the Minerals Security Partnership Forum (more information will be available later here), which they will co-chair, and look forward to a fruitful future cooperation with a wide range of partners around the world. Ministers also discussed partnering on economic security. In this regard, the EU and the US reaffirmed their shared concerns over the challenges posed by economic coercion and non-market practices employed by third countries and resolved to continue their efforts to de-risk and diversify their trade and investment relations. They also recognised the important role that the TTC has consistently played to optimise EU-US work on export controls against Russia and Belarus. They resolved to further align their respective priorities in this regard and to continue work on facilitating secure high-technology trade while maintaining an effective export controls regime. The EU and the US have carried out joint work to identify and promote best practices on foreign investment screening and will continue to exchange information to address threats to security and public order. Both parties also agreed to continue to exchange information on how to respond to the risks posed by outbound investments in certain critical technologies. Defending human rights and values in a changing geopolitical digital environment The EU and the US concur that online platforms should exercise greater responsibility in ensuring a fair, transparent, and accountable digital environment including by addressing gender-based violence and protecting human rights defenders online. The partners have developed a set of joint principles on gender-based violence on online platforms which complement the list of high-level principles on the protection and empowerment of minors and data access for researchers, which are in line with the EU's Digital Services Act. Both partners are determined to support democracies across the world and to defend human rights, free and independent media and combat foreign information manipulation and interference, especially in a year when many elections take place in the world. Following suit, they have published joint Recommended Actions for Online Platforms on Protecting Human Rights Defenders Online. The EU and US committed to facilitating data access from online platforms and published a report on mechanisms for researcher access to such data, which builds upon efforts undertaken by the academic and research community. Moreover, the EU and the US reiterated their commitment to support secure and resilient digital infrastructure and connectivity projects in third countries and announced a joint support package for Tunisia. This adds to the implementation of projects underway in Costa Rica, Jamaica, Kenya, and the Philippines. Next Steps The wide-ranging fruits of the TTC's work since its launch in 2021 attest to the value of this transatlantic policy forum, and principals agreed on the need to continue this work. Therefore, as both sides enter their respective electoral processes, the EU and US will reflect on the lessons learned so far and possible ways forward. In the meantime, the technical work under the TTC will continue. Building on the lessons learnt from our cooperation so far, we intend to use the remainder of 2024 to engage with EU and U.S. stakeholders to gather their views on the future of the TTC. Background The EU and the US launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) at their summit in Brussels on 15 June 2021. It has served as a forum to discuss and coordinate on key trade and technology issues, and to deepen transatlantic cooperation on issues of joint interest. The inaugural ministerial meeting of the TTC took place in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2021. Following this meeting, ten working groups were set up covering issues such as technology standards, AI, semiconductors, export controls and global trade challenges. This was followed by a second meeting in Paris on 16 May 2022, a third meeting in College Park, Maryland, in December 2022, a fourth meeting in Luleå, Sweden, in May 2023 and a fifth meeting in Washington DC in January 2024. The EU and the US remain key geopolitical and trading partners. EU-US bilateral trade is at historical highs, with over €1.6 trillion in 2023 and with bilateral investment stocks topping €5 trillion. Quote(s) “In today’s fast-moving and uncertain world, our partnership with the United States on trade and technology allows us to deal with some of the most crucial challenges of our time. I am proud of the results delivered so far and we will keep working to enhance economic security and build a fair digital environment that reflects our values.” Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age “The TTC has injected new dynamism into transatlantic trade relations. It is the first forum of its kind that has allowed the world’s two largest economies to set new standards and cooperate on current challenges - such as sanctions against Russia - based on shared democratic values. The TTC has made important inroads in terms of bolstering our economic security and enhancing the resilience of supply chains. We have also made valuable progress in jointly forging the green transatlantic marketplace.” Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President, and Commissioner for Trade

That there is a miscommunication between Paris and Berlin is something that is already being unreservedly acknowledged even among the power leaders in the two capitals. The rift caused by the war in Ukraine is the arena in which tensions are being played out. But there are underlying factors that have contributed to making this gap a major concern for the European stability. We point out the following: The strategic factor Geography determines strategic choices. Germany has always looked to the East as a pole of concern, but also as a pole of opportunity. The former has almost always outweighed the latter. Wars have historically conditioned coexistence with Rusia, regardless of the political regime that has existed in each historical stage. There is one incontrovertible fact: Germany has never won a war against Russia. On the other hand, when talking about peace, German interests have prevailed. Hence in Berlin (or in Bonn, during the first Cold War) there has always been a tendency towards appeasement towards Moscow. Earlier, Hitler wanted to postpone the inevitable confrontation with Stalin’s Russia with a tactical, not a strategic pact (in 1939), a move to gain time and consolidate his domination of Western Europe. With the victory of the Soviet Union, Germany endured the division of the country for almost half a century, a punishment even more humiliating than the previous ones. The western part prospered, and the eastern part stagnated. However, this underhand triumph did nothing to facilitate the reconciliation. Willy Brandt understood this very well when he launched his ‘Ostpolitik’ (Eastern policy) in the early 1970s. The initiative caused concern in Washington, not so much because it was opposed to a thaw it shared, but because of the risk of losing control of the process. There was also some reluctance in Paris. De Gaulle and his heirs had always maintained an open channel of cooperation with Moscow but were distrustful of German overtures. With the crisis of the Soviet system, Franco-German tensions surfaced again. A united and strong Germany awakened the ghost of three devastating wars for France. The Chancellor at that time, Kohl was Gorbachev’s main supporter and acted as a fundraiser for a Soviet Union that was falling apart at the seams. Germany’s repeated commitment to peace and European integration did not seem to be a sufficient antidote to the vision of an Eastern Europe, ‘germanized’ by the economic weight of the new political and territorial power. Germany’s actions in the Yugoslav wars, initially perceived in Paris as ‘dynamiting’, contributed to increase those fears. After the failure of the democratization trial in the ‘new’ Russia, largely caused by a predatory capitalism encouraged from the West, Germany continued to cultivate very close relations with Moscow to prevent an undesirable drift in the Kremlin. Until the successive crises in Ukraine have brought this strategic project to a halt. In France, there has always been an interest in an autonomous relationship model with Moscow, whether in collaboration with Germany or the United States, but in no way subordinate. Gaullist nationalism has survived, both on the right and on the left. Somehow, the French elites have tried to avoid Paris from playing a secondary role in relations with the Kremlin, whether in cooperation or confrontation. Hence Macron (‘more papist than the Pope: more Gaullist than the General’), will attempt a risky mediation game with Putin after the phantom intervention in Crimea and the more obvious one in the Donbas, in 2014; and eight years later, when the invasion of Ukraine was consumed. There has been much speculation about the true intentions of the French president’s trip to Moscow. Macron is anything but naive. Perhaps it was indeed the inevitable need of the Elysée Palace to leave its mark. Now that any conciliation with Moscow seems distant, Macron takes the lead among the ‘hawks’ and pretends to forget that he once wanted to look like a ‘dove’, by suggesting that, although there is no allied consensus, sending soldiers to Ukraine cannot be ruled out to prevent a Russian military triumph. Of all Macron’s gambits, this has been the most or one of the riskiest. And the one that has provoked the most irritation on the other side of the Rhine [1]. Since February 2022, Germany has buried the various branches of the ‘Ostpolitik’, a task falling to a Social Democratic chancellor, perhaps the most unremarkable and least suited for high-level leadership. Olaf Scholz announced the ‘zeitenwende’ (translatable as “change of era, or time”). Half a century of rapprochement with Russia was called into question. The economic equation (energy raw materials in exchange for machinery and capital goods) in bilateral relations was dissolving under the weight of Western sanctions against Moscow. Moreover, the pacifist post-Hitler Germany committed to a military effort of $100 billion (to start with), aimed rejuvenating, strengthening, and expanding the Germany military apparatus. But in everything there is a limit, or a red line. Germany has not been shy with Putin, despite being the European country most harmed by embargoes, limitations and constraints in the Russian oil and gas consumption. Economic war was accepted as inevitable in Berlin. However, caution has been exercised, particularly in the supply of arms to Ukraine. Nonetheless, Germany is, after the United States, the largest net contributor to Kiev’s arsenals [2]. Let’s not forget that. France has also taken its precautions in pressuring the Kremlin, as has the US, despite the rhetoric and the cold war propaganda prevailing for the past two years. That is why Macron’s latest ‘provocation’ has annoyed Berlin so much. Moreover, as usual in his boasts, the French president added insult to injury by suggesting that Ukraine’s delicate fragility demanded more “courage” and less timidity from the allies [3]. Scholz replied with diplomatic and bureaucratic discretion, without any outbursts, recalling that NATO’s decisions ruled out ‘boots on the ground’ (sending troops to Ukraine). But his Defense Minister, Pistorious, could not resist returning the favor and admonishing him for his new moral lesson. The foreign ministers of both countries attempted to ‘diplomatically’ solve the crisis days later, but did not risk holding a joint press conference in order not to show that the political wound between Berlin and Paris was still open. The leak of a meeting of senior German military commanders, spied on by Russian agents, further clouded the atmosphere [4]. Another element unchanged since the Cold War: Berlin may support the European autonomous defense project, but it has never ceased to consider it as subordinate to NATO. The American nuclear umbrella is untouchable, then and now. And not even an eventual (and only speculative, for now) strategic availability of the French nuclear arsenal is capable of changing that axiom [5]. Political factors Apart from strategic considerations, domestic political factors have also played a role in this latest crisis. Macron faces the European elections with the apprehension of a seemingly inevitable victory of the far-right ‘Rassemblement National’. It was once considered a pro-Russian party and even generously funded by the Kremlin. In recent years, the party’s chairwoman has tried to distance herself from the Kremlin but has not entirely succeeded. And Macron wants to exploit this supposed vulnerability of a woman he has defeated twice in the presidential elections, but who seems destined to occupy the Elysée Palace in 2027 if she achieves successful results in this year’s European elections. In this week’s parliamentary debate on the bilateral security agreement with Kiev, Marine Le Pen ordered an abstention. She made it clear that she supports the Ukraine resistance, so that there would be no doubt about her change of attitude towards Russia. But he saw in the initiative of the President’s party a clear intention for electoral gain. Divisions were evident on the left: rebels and communists voted against, while socialists and ecologists voted in favor, but the latter rejected the suggestion of troops deployment. Scholz also faces a challenge from the far right, with elections this autumn that could consolidate the dominance of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) in the eastern states (Eastern Länder). This party has won over citizens who do not have such negative memories of the GDR, but in its rise, it has also bitten into the social democratic base. The chancellor does not want to appear too hostile to an electorate that does not participate in the anti-Russian discourse. Institutional factors In this Paris – Bonn clash, as in previous ones, the structure of the respective political systems also exerts a disturbing influence. The French political system is presidential; the German one is parliamentary. In France, the President has exclusive and personal authority over foreign policy. He does not even need his own majority (in this case, the minority that supports him) to formulate his international proposals. In Germany, by contrast, the Chancellor has to negotiate foreign policy with the coalition partners, and even on rare occasions when there has been a single-party majority government, the Bundestag has exerted considerable influence. Personal factors Finally, personal style is also not to be dismissed. It is not unusual for the Elysée Palace and the Chancellery to be inhabited by like-minded characters. The French President is conditioned by the aura of a political system that relies on an exalted figure and demands real, but also impactful, leadership. Both being and appearing so. The Chancellor, on the other hand, is a sort of ‘primus inter pares’, no matter how prominent. Therefore, since 1945, the personal stature of German leaders has always been framed in firm structures that prevent hyper-leadership. It is the Chief’s (Fuhrer) chastisement. This limitation (historical and political) is sometimes reinforced by a purely personal style. At present, the gap is perhaps the widest in the last eighty years. A French President who likes to talk and a Chancellor who is perhaps the most discreet since the post-war period. De Gaulle and Adenauer cultivated little personal relationship, but neither intended to. Pompidou and Brandt never got along particularly well, although the German took great care that his growing popularity did not irritate in Paris… until the Guillaume scandal ended his career. Giscard and Schmidt gave their cooperation a technical character, forced by the oil crisis following the wars in the Middle East. Mitterrand and Kohl raised the tone of the bilateral relationship but did not always adjust their personal dynamics. The German was the longest-serving post-war chancellor and so, the most mediatic, but the Frenchman never renounced, on the contrary, the solemnity with which the office was exercised. Merkel played down Sarkozy (and later Hollande), but not to highlight her personal qualities, but to put them at the service of Germany’s undisputed economic leadership in post-Cold War Europe. Macron wanted to put an end to this French ‘inferiority’, with difficulty. It is not clear that he succeeded against a retreating Merkel, but he thinks he has it easier with the unremarkable Scholz. Notes [1] “France-Allemagne, un tándem secoué par l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine”. PHILIPPE RICHARD & THOMAS WIEDER. LE MONDE, 9 de marzo. [2] “German Chancellor pledges to boost [ammunition] production for Ukraine”. DER SPIEGEL, 5 de febrero (versión en inglés). [3] “Le débat sur l’envoi de soldats en Ukraine révèle les profondes differences de vision de la guerre parmi les allies”. LE MONDE, 6 de marzo. [4] “Now It’s Germany’s turn to frustrate Allies over Ukraine”. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 de marzo. [5] “Dans cette nouvelle ère où l’affrontement a remplacé la cooperation, la question de la dissuasion nucleaire reprend tout son sens”. SYLVIE KAUFFMANN. LE MONDE, 7 de febrero.

Portugal and Spain are two countries that share the same geopolitical position and parallel histories too. This makes mutual knowledge a source of information that should be valued by both countries, because one has much to learn from the experiences of the other. Unfortunately, as in the last century, it seems that getting to know oneself by studying one’s neighbor has little audience in both Spain, and Portugal. That is why it is worth it to insist on paying attention to what is at stake in the upcoming Portuguese legislative elections on March 10, 2024. The first thing to note is that this is an early election since the President of the Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, decided to dissolve the Parliament because of the corruption scandal involving António Costa, the socialist prime minister, who resigned on November 7, 2023. Costa´s resignation was agreed with the President of the Republic, and this explains the long period of time given to the Socialist Party so that it could recompose its leadership and face elections. The President of Portugal, elected by direct suffrage, has the power to dissolve the Parliament, even if the Government enjoys majority support as was the case, a prerogative reminiscent of the monarch in the old constitutional monarchy. The new leader of the Socialist Party is Pedro Nuno de Oliviera Santos, former Minister of Infrastructure and Housing under Costa and an enthusiastic supporter of the government agreements with the far left, known in Portugal as the “geringonça”. This data is important because it signifies that the radical sector of the Socialist Party has triumphed over the traditional moderate wing, and therefore, if the parliamentary numbers add up, a government like Costa’s first one in 2015 could be repeated. In that scenario, after losing elections, the Socialist Party was able to form a government with the support of the Communist Party and the Bloco de Esquerda. A novelty that deeply altered what had been until then the Portuguese party system. It is also relevant that, as a minister, Santos blocked the high-speed connection between Madrid and Lisbon, an infrastructure that should have been completed decades ago, and displayed a provocative and swaggering rhetoric in his relations with Spain. As a compliment, he has been dubbed as the Portuguese Pedro Sánchez. However, the chances of him reaching the government seem remote. That is why Santos has stated that if the center-right, which is running under the acronym of its historic coalition Democratic Alliance (AD), were to win the elections, he would allow them to govern as a minority, so they could not have to rely on the far-right Chega! Party. But these manifestations neither express moderation nor political generosity because, in fact, the only possibility for the PS to govern is, precisely, that, as was the case before 2015, the right-wing would allow it to govern in a minority if it wins the elections, that is, if it manages to be the force with the most votes and seats. Santos has demanded reciprocity from the AD after making his attractive offer. Meaning that, if the PS comes out on top, it should be able to govern. It is somewhat ironic that this approach is taken by an enthusiastic supporter of what happened in 2015 when Passos Coelho was ousted from the government after winning the elections thanks to an agreement between the PS and the far left. However, if the PS was able to capitalize on the results of 2015 to achieve an absolute majority in the 2022 elections, at the expense of the weakening of the far left – it came close to doing so in the 2019 elections –, things are quite different today. 2015 was an exceptional moment for the Portuguese far left as it garnered nearly 20% of the votes. But since then, it has continued to decline, and polls for these elections confirm the demise of the Communist Party, whose voters have moved to Chega!, and the likely confirmation of the weakness, if not irrelevance, of the Bloco de Esquerda. The latest Portuguese elections of 2022 resulted in the following outcomes shown in table 1: But recent polls from the last few days show the PS with between 20 and 30% of the vote, indicating a severe blow with the loss of half or at least a quarter of its votes; the Alianza Democrática between 21 and 33%, a slight increase compared to the last elections. The party that is growing the most is Chega!, which would go from 7.28 to 15 or even 19% of the votes, according to the polls. In contrast, the far left would be annihilated. If the 2022 elections were already one of the worst results in their history, these could still worsen. The latest polls indicate that the Communist Party would reach between 2 and 4%, with most surveys placing it at 2%, and the Bloco de Esquerda between 3 and 8%, with most polls placing the vote for this party between 3 and 4%. In short, even if the PS were to win, it would not have the option of repeating the “geringonça” of 2015, so strongly defended by its current leader Santos. That is, Santos could only govern if the old tradition of allowing the party with the most votes to govern were to be revived, a tradition he helped to destroy. But on the right side, things are also not clear. Although recent polls consistently indicate that the AD will surpass the PS, it seems difficult for them to reach a sufficient majority with the seats of IL Iniciativa Liberal, center-right, which polls give between 2% and 6.6%, although polls that give it 6% dominate. Luis Montenegro, the leader of the PSD who presents himself as the head of the AD coalition, along with the CDS-PP and the PPM, has established a political exclusion with Chega!; and André Ventura, its popular leader, has indicated that he will not support an AD government if they are not allowed to be part of it. So, as things stand, there could be the paradox in Portugal where the Assembly of the Republic is largely dominated by the right-wing parties, yet the AD government would be extremely weak. Paulo Raimundo, leader of the Portuguese Communist Party, says that their former voters now support Chega! because they are desperate. But something must have to do with the fact that Chega! has voted in favor of all social policies of the Costa government, particularly regarding the increase in the minimum wage, pensions, and other benefits. Portugal’s evolution in its party system shows a closer proximity to the European trend than Spain: the decline of the far left, the rise of the far right, and a certain fragmentation and weakening of the central bloc of governing parties. This means that in a context of weakness in the left Portuguese, the governing right may not be able to capitalize on it, despite being majority, due to being divided and having incompatible projects. The Democratic Alliance points the way to the necessary unity of the right to win elections and form a solid government, but its components are weakened parties whose main asset is their history, something that, according to the polls, lacks sufficient appeal to halt Chega! and thus offer a consistent government alternative.