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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The alliance between Trump’s expanding deportation campaign and Salvadoran President Bukele’s carceral authoritarianism has major implications for human rights and the future of democracy. In February 2023, the Salvadoran government released drone footage of thousands of shirtless men with shaved heads, shackled and crouched in tight formation, being herded into a newly built prison called the Center for the Confinement of Terrorism – CECOT.  The high-tech mega prison was constructed at breakneck speed under the rule of President Nayib Bukele, as he declared victory in the so-called “war on gangs” in the country.  As the largest prison in the world, CECOT can hold up to 40,000 people. However, plans to double the mega prison’s capacity (80,000) are already underway, with the US expected to “send enough to fill it,” as reported by the Wall Street Journal.  From state of emergency to state of exception The year before CECOT’s inauguration, President Bukele declared a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights like due process, legal defense, and freedom of assembly, and allowing measures like mass arrests, and indefinite pretrial detention.  “CECOT is nothing more than an extermination prison for the poor,” says Marisel Ramírez, a member of the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, a coalition of Salvadoran trade unions, civil society groups, and political organizations. “The regime invests in mega-prisons instead of health, education, or structural reforms.” Today, El Salvador’s detention rate has outpaced that of the United States – the former world leader in incarceration by far. 1 in every 57 Salvadorans is now incarcerated, triple the rate of the US.  In March 2025, various human rights organizations in El Salvador, such as Human Rights Institute of the Central American University (IDHUCA); Foundation for the Study and Application of the Law (FESPAD); Passionist Social Service, among others, produced a report compiling documented cases of mistreatment, torture, and the inhumane conditions of detainees over the three years of the “state of exception.” Their findings include: • 85,000+ people have been detained by the state during this period• 6,889 cases of human rights violations have been filed by human rights organizations• 52% of detainees are 19–30 year-old men• 265–375 deaths in state custody have been verified by different data agencies Their report demands the repeal of the “state of exception,” reparations for the families and victims of human rights violations, and independent investigations of all human rights abuses. Welcome to CECOT Many of CECOT’s prisoners are denied due process. Visitation is prohibited. Communication with family, friends, and even lawyers is prohibited. Inmates are also completely stripped of privacy. Cells are packed with up to 80 people for 23.5 hours a day. They share metal bunks and an open toilet, under constant surveillance by prison guards. There is no form of education or recreation offered at the facility. Letters and reading material are prohibited. And there are no reports of any inmates being released. CBS News reported El Salvador’s justice minister saying, “the only way out is in a coffin.” In fact, Google Earth images and videos have recently circulated social media showing a CECOT courtyard that appears to be stained with blood.  CECOT has become a symbol of a global trend towards militarization, mass incarceration, and political repression under the pretense of “domestic security.” As Trump’s offshore detention of migrants in CECOT shines an international spotlight on Bukele’s policies, urgent questions are arising: 1. How far will the US go in utilizing Bukele’s repressive infrastructure for its own agenda?2. How did a self-described “dictator” rise to power in El Salvador?3. How are communities in El Salvador responding? The US – Bukele alliance While CECOT was built for domestic repression and incarceration, it is now a site of international collaboration between extreme-right-wing governments. Bukele’s prison has been openly endorsed – and now directly funded – by the US government.  On March 15, in an unprecedented move, the Trump administration deported roughly 250 Venezuelan migrants to CECOT prison in El Salvador, ignoring a federal judge’s order to halt the deportations. Invoking the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) of 1798 against Venezuelan nationals accused of being part of the gang Tren de Aragua, Trump attempted to pave a “legal” pathway for his policy of mass deportations. Yet a report from CBS News claims that the majority of those deported have no criminal record in the US, and human rights and advocacy groups have rejected any legal basis for Trump’s use of the AEA.  One of the deportees, a Maryland resident and union worker named Kilmar Abrego Garcia, has become a central figure in the broader legal and political crisis surrounding Trump and Bukele’s authoritarian alliance.  The case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia Kilmar was born in El Salvador and holds protected status in the US, where he has lived for over 14 years. The Trump administration admitted he was deported in error and the Supreme Court has ordered the US government to facilitate his return. Nevertheless, Trump has defied the order, and Bukele refuses to release Abrego. Recently, Trump has accused Abrego of being part of the Salvadoran gang, MS-13, without evidence or due process. Since the day CECOT was inaugurated, the government has used social media to promote positive ideas about the prison and Bukele’s iron-grip approach. Far-right politicians and YouTube influencers are regularly welcomed to tour CECOT, posing in front of groups of detainees for their online audiences. However, Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen was denied entry to the facility on April 16, when he traveled to El Salvador to advocate for Kilmar’s release. In the late hours of April 17, the senator was finally able to meet with Abrego off-site from the prison. In a press conference held on April 18 in Dulles International Airport, the Senator told reporters that the Maryland father is not being held at CECOT but is still being illegally detained in a different Salvadoran prison. “The reason they relented is pretty clear — they were feeling the pressure,” said the senator. Kilmar’s wife credited the growing movement for justice for the small win in a statement released by the advocacy group CASA:  “Now I know that my husband is alive…Thank you to everyone, including Senator Van Hollen, my CASA family, all our Union’s, faith leaders and community for continuing this fight for my family to be reunited.” The USD 15 million deal behind CECOT The detention of migrants in El Salvador’s prison system has faced heavy criticism. Many are asking, why is the Salvadoran government continuing to hold migrants at CECOT without any evidence that they have committed a crime? During his visit to El Salvador, Maryland Senator raised this very question to Vice President Félix Ulloa in regard to Abrego Garcia, who said that the Trump administration is paying El Salvador to keep migrants like Garcia at CECOT. The Trump administration has reportedly agreed to pay El Salvador USD 6 million to house hundreds of migrants deported from the US for up to a year. In Van Hollen’s press conference on April 18, he told reporters that the deal between Trump and Bukele may be for as much as USD 15 million. “Homegrowns are next” Migrants are not the only ones being targeted for deportation to CECOT. During Bukele’s White House visit on April 14, Trump was recorded saying he wants to send US citizens to CECOT too. The “homegrown criminals” are next. “You’ve got to build about five more places,” he said. To which Bukele responded, “we’ve got space.”  Legal experts and human rights organizations have asserted that the offshore detention of US citizens is illegal, but Trump confirmed later that “We are looking into it, and we want to do it.” The US – Bukele alliance represents a convergence in the growing international authoritarian trend. But this alliance didn’t emerge overnight. It is the result of a deliberate political project that Bukele has been advancing for years. But to understand how the country got to this point, we have to look back at how Bukele transformed El Salvador into, as he calls it, a dictatorship.  The world’s “coolest dictator” For years, El Salvador faced one of the highest homicide rates in the world, driven by the extortion practices of gangs, like MS-13. The gang started in Los Angeles, California, initially to defend Salvadoran immigrants from other established gangs in the area, but became more structured and violent over time. After mass deportations in the 1990s, MS-13 expanded throughout Central America, gaining a high level of territorial control in El Salvador. Communities were often caught in the crossfire, with widespread insecurity and little trust in state institutions to protect them. Bukele rose to power promising an end to the violence, using harsh anti-gang rhetoric and militarization to appeal to the widespread fear and frustration, ultimately winning popular support. However, according to organizers with the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc, Bukele’s security policy is based on a pact with the gangs – not a war on them. They explain that while the president claims there are 80,000 gang members and terrorists in prison, the National Civil Police only reports the seizure of 4,000 weapons, 20,000 cell phones, and USD 4 million. There have been no arrests of top gang leaders, nor have those who have committed crimes in the US been extradited to that country.  Suppression of the left Movement leaders describe Bukele’s rise as one of clear authoritarianism – cloaked in anti-gang rhetoric, backed by the US, and enforced through mass repression. He enjoys popular support “because people perceive improved security, and he has imposed the idea that traditional parties were corrupt and waged a war that led to tragedies.” Activists assert that eliminating the left in the country as a viable political option has been a deliberate goal of Bukele’s “business clan.” They say Bukele has specifically targeted the FMLN, a former guerilla group that led the armed struggle against US-backed dictatorship in the 1980s, and later helped secure key democratic reforms through the Peace Accords.  “The FMLN is a victim of a smear campaign by the regime…whose influence in the state and society has significantly diminished. After governing for 10 years, the FMLN has no presence in the Legislative Assembly and no longer governs any mayoralties,” reads a statement by the Bloc. To better understand how Bukele consolidated power and suppressed his opposition, activists point to key moments in recent history. Here is a brief timeline of Bukele’s regime: 2019 – Bukele elected president• Breaking with the two dominant parties (ARENA and FMLN), he formed the party Nuevas Ideas, and presented himself as a young, social media savvy reformist.  2020 – Bukele storms Legislative Assembly with military• Flanked by heavily armed soldiers and police, Bukele enters the Legislative Assembly to pressure lawmakers to approve a USD 109 million loan, in order to militarize his police and soldiers to allegedly combat gangs. • International human rights groups condemn the action, while activists draw connections to El Salvador’s history of military dictatorships. 2021 – Removes Constitutional Court judges, adopts Bitcoin• Replacing judges in the Constitutional Court with loyalists, and removing the Attorney General, Bukele gains unchecked control over all three branches of government.• El Salvador becomes the only country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as a legal tender, despite mass protests.• Bukele’s new court rules that presidential reelection is now legal, ignoring a constitutional ban. Bukele announces his intent to run for reelection in 2024. • The US government applies some pressure on Bukele to maintain legal appearances.• Critics argue that a major part of Bukele’s propaganda is the idea that he’s “changing the country,” using symbolic gestures, minor public projects, and some changes to the state like reducing the number of provincial and municipal governments.  2022 – “State of emergency” declared• Following a spike in homicides, Bukele declares a “state of emergency,” suspending constitutional rights, and launching a so-called “war on gangs.”• Mass arrests without warrants begin. Many are detained without evidence or due process. Activists call the state of emergency a “mechanism of social containment.” They report popular leaders being targeted, generating fear and limiting popular protests. 2023 – CECOT prison unveiled• The 40,000 person-capacity mega prison is inaugurated with a propaganda blitz displaying prisoners in dehumanizing ways.• Bitcoin investment loses over 50% of its value, costing El Salvador hundreds of millions.• Irregularities around public procurement connected to the Bukele family arise. The public procurement law is practically repealed, limiting public access to details about government spending and contracts.• Political opposition in government has been practically eliminated. 55/60 representatives are from Bukele’s party, NI. 43/44 mayoralities are controlled by NI and its allies. The majority of the population rejects the FMLN and even the traditional, non-governing right parties.  2024 – Bukele wins reelection• Despite a constitutional ban on reelection, Bukele runs for president and wins. He is backed by his courts and military, amid a climate of fear and mass imprisonment justified by “domestic security” rhetoric.• The US government supports his illegal reelection.• Investigations reveal that the Bukele family has significantly increased their land holdings during Nayib Bukele’s presidency (USD 9.2 million in value), placing them among the top 2% of large coffee producers in El Salvador.• Bukele reverses a landmark ban on metal mining, sparking a nationwide protest movement. Today, Bukele’s “state of exception” continues indefinitely. Reports of torture, disappearances, and political arrests grow. Meanwhile, the Salvadoran President is promoting himself worldwide as a model far-right leader and enjoying a lucrative alliance with the US government.  As the repression intensifies, so too does grassroots resistance. People’s movements for the freedom of political prisoners, and against the “state of exception” continue to build, the most important of these being the Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc.  Salvadoran resistance The Popular Resistance and Rebellion Bloc is an organization of 35 social organizations from various sectors of society: students, women, peasants, unions, professionals, and more.  Marisel Ramírez, an organizer with the Bloc, told Peoples Dispatch: “These organizations came together in January 2021 to denounce the major setbacks we have suffered since the Bukele business clan took office, and to demand an end to the government’s repressive policies.” Explaining the Bloc’s strategies and tactics, Marisel said that “the organizations that belong to the bloc act according to their own demands, highlighting the serious human rights violations committed under the state of emergency.” In her words, the resistance doesn’t take just one form – it plays out across a range of interconnected fronts. Here are just a few examples: 1. Movement of Victims of the State of Emergency (MOVIR)• Families of the detainees mobilize their communities and protest the arbitrary arrests, demanding justice and freedom for their loved ones. 2. Salvadoran Student Force• Students are consistently fighting back against the arrests of university students under the state of exception. 3. Feminist Resistance • Women are organizing and mobilizing around the economic, emotional, and familial impacts of the arbitrary arrests of innocent people, as well as the abuse of power by the military and police.These forces, Marisel said, “demand ‘sexual favors’ in exchange for ‘benefits’ – not taking people away, expediting judicial processes, and access to personal hygiene products.” 4. The Confederation of Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Federations (CONFRAS)• Mobilizes peasants and farm workers and denounces the shortage of agricultural labor caused by the high migration triggered by the state of exception. Despite Bukele’s iron-grip approach and mass incarceration campaign, resistance in El Salvador is growing – led by families of the detained and disappeared, student organizers, feminist collectives, and peasant unions who refuse to be silenced. Their struggle aims to demonstrate that CECOT is not just a prison – it is a weapon of political power aimed at the poor and fueled by international complicity.  What’s becoming increasingly clear is that the US is seeking to expand its deportation machine and outsource incarceration and repression to third countries like El Salvador. As these transnational policies develop, urgent questions remain: To what extent will Trump bulldoze legal obstacles in order to utilize this repressive model? Will US citizens begin facing deportation and detention in CECOT? And, how will the people in the US respond to this deepening authoritarian alliance? Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском South Sudan’s fragile peace deal is unravelling as political tensions flare and violence resurfaces. More than a broken trust is the cause, and the nation’s leaders will need to be pressured into peace.  South Sudan is once again on the edge of a civil war. In March 2025, Vice President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest by President Salva Kiir’s government. His party, the SPLM-IO, quickly declared that the 2018 peace deal, the agreement that ended five years of brutal conflict, had effectively collapsed. The United Nations has warned that the situation looks dangerously similar to the lead-up to South Sudan’s past civil wars. Armed clashes between rival groups have already broken out. Kenya sent former Prime Minister Raila Odinga to mediate the crisis, but so far, tensions remain high. South Sudan has been here before. After gaining independence from Sudan in 2011, it quickly plunged into civil war just two years later. What began as a power struggle between Kiir and Machar turned into a deadly ethnic conflict. By the time a peace deal was signed in 2018, more than 400,000 people were dead, and millions had been forced to flee their homes. The 2018 peace agreement, formally known as the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), was meant to end that war for good. It brought Machar back as vice president and called for national elections, the integration of armed forces, and the formation of a permanent constitution. It looked promising at first. But six years later, many of its key promises remain unfulfilled, and the country is once again on the brink. What went wrong with the 2018 deal? The biggest problem with the 2018 deal is that it focused too much on power-sharing between Kiir and Machar, and not enough on the root causes of the conflict. It brought the two rivals back into government but did little to heal the ethnic divisions or build trust between their followers. Most importantly, it failed to fully integrate their armed forces. Instead of one national army, South Sudan still has multiple rival groups loyal to different leaders. This failure made the peace fragile from the start. Without a unified army or a functioning justice system, violence could return at any moment, and now it has. The deal also suffered from constant delays. Elections that were supposed to happen in 2022 were pushed to 2024 and have now been delayed again to 2026. The transitional government has been slow to draft a new constitution or set up key institutions. Critics say Kiir’s government has little interest in real democratic reform. Why is the crisis escalating now? Machar’s house arrest was the breaking point. His party accuses the government of undermining the agreement, and reports suggest that fighting has already started in some areas, including Unity State and Jonglei. The UN has expressed alarm, and several foreign governments have urged South Sudan to de-escalate before the violence spreads further. The government, meanwhile, claims Machar is supporting local militias, a charge he denies. This growing distrust is making it harder to bring both sides back to the negotiating table. Kenya has stepped in to help mediate, but with little progress so far. Odinga’s visit is a positive step, but the situation on the ground remains volatile. Could this lead to another civil war? Unfortunately, yes. All the warning signs are there. Armed groups are mobilising. The central government is cracking down on political opposition. And most of the peace deal’s reforms have stalled. If full-blown war breaks out, the humanitarian consequences will be devastating. South Sudan is already struggling with hunger, flooding, and mass displacement. Millions rely on humanitarian aid, and new fighting would make it even harder for that aid to reach those in need. South Sudan’s youth, who have grown up knowing little but war, risk losing any hope for a peaceful future. Many feel abandoned by leaders who promised peace and delivered more political games. The international community played a big role in securing the 2018 peace deal. But since then, global attention has faded. While donors continue to fund humanitarian work, they’ve largely backed away from holding South Sudan’s leaders accountable for delays and violations. That needs to change. The African Union, IGAD, the UN, and Western governments still have influence, if they choose to use it. They can apply diplomatic pressure, impose sanctions, and demand real reforms. More importantly, any future deal must include voices beyond Kiir and Machar: civil society leaders, women, youth, and religious figures who understand what peace means at the community level. What does South Sudan need now? South Sudan doesn’t need another temporary fix between two politicians. It needs deep, long-term change. That means building a functioning government, creating a unified army, and setting up systems that can hold leaders accountable. The country also needs truth and reconciliation. Thousands of families are still waiting for justice, and no peace deal will hold unless those wounds are addressed. Ordinary South Sudanese citizens must be part of this process, not just political elites. At its heart, this is a story of broken trust. South Sudan’s leaders promised to end a war and build a country. Today, those promises are in ruins. But the future isn’t written yet. With the right pressure, the right leadership, and the right voices at the table, a peaceful future is still possible. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Ecuador shows the red card to a possible return of the Correísmo. Daniel Noboa remains president of Ecuador. The young head of state won the run-off election for the highest state office against his left-wing populist challenger Luisa González by a surprisingly clear margin of over eleven percent. The refusal of the loser to acknowledge her defeat once again demonstrates the great polarization in the country. After a peaceful election, this division into two camps is one of the biggest challenges facing the winner of the election, alongside curbing organized crime and the complicated economic situation. When the National Electoral Council announced an "incontrovertible trend" in favor of President Daniel Noboa just a few hours after the polling stations closed on 13 April, his supporters erupted in jubilation. This was particularly great, as the victory of 55.65% to 44.35% after more than 99% of the votes had been counted was much clearer than all the polls had predicted. The expected close election result had given rise to general concern that the election could have unpleasant repercussions in the form of electoral disputes, which would be detrimental to Ecuadorian democracy. The strong result for incumbent Daniel Noboa is beyond question but should not be read as total approval of Noboa's policies by the electorate. Rather, it clearly shows that, despite all the criticism of the government, Ecuadorians do not want to return to the "socialism of the XXI century" and its Ecuadorian figurehead Rafael Correa, from whose all-consuming shadow the defeated presidential candidate Luisa González was unable to emerge. Correismo's resistance to recognizing the election result on election night seems more than questionable given Noboa's clear lead of more than one million votes. The election campaign While Noboa was clearly committed to retaining the dollar as a means of payment, a further opening towards the USA and a relentless fight against organized crime in the run-up to the run-off election, González stood for a completely different course. She questioned the dollarization of Ecuador, proposed recognition of the Maduro regime in Venezuela with the resumption of diplomatic relations and, with regard to the fight against drug-related crime, wanted to follow the example of former Mexican President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, whose policy of "abrazos, no balazos" ("hugs, no bullets") was more of a sham pacification and a modus vivendi with the drug gangs than a real approach to the issue. Businessman's son Daniel Noboa, who has only been in power since November 2023 thanks to an extraordinary election following the end of former President Guillermo Lasso's government, has been characterized by a pragmatic approach in his brief time in office since November 2023. His government prioritized concrete and high-profile measures, particularly in the fight against crime, over ideological discourse. However, due to his short time in office, many of his actions were characterized more by campaign tactics than strategy. In contrast, Luisa González attempted to link her program to the legacy of former President Rafael Correa but made certain nuances and strategic distancing. In particular, she was critical of the Communications Law (also known as the "muzzle law"), which had been used as the basis for the persecution of journalists and the media during Rafael Correa's time in office (2007-2017). In the weeks leading up to the run-off, the focus of the election campaign was on the economy, security, and organized crime. There was no shortage of mutual accusations and all too often polemics took precedence over arguments. In view of the continuing catastrophic security situation, in which people are losing their lives in violence every hour and kidnapping rates in the country have risen by 73.9% between 2023 and 2024,[i] concepts are urgently needed. Clever marketing After the young electorate between the ages of 18 and 29 voted for the 37-year-old Noboa in the first round of voting, this time the older population groups also appear to have voted for the president. The general voter turnout was 83.76%, around two percentage points higher than in the first round of voting. In a country where many people have lost confidence in politics and its representatives, Noboa still seems to represent their hopes of overcoming the grievances, the outdated elites and the Correísmo. With his presence in the social media and a renewed self-presentation with giant papier-mâché figures distributed throughout the country, he once again managed to achieve a strong public presence. People of all ages and social classes could be seen roaming the streets of the capital Quito, for example, taking selfies with the papier-mâché Noboas, which were then shared millions of times on social networks. With such marketing tricks, his determined and youthful appearance and the fear of large parts of Ecuador of a return of the Correísmo, Noboa was able to extend his lead compared to the virtually undecided first round of elections on February 9 and win five provinces that had previously gone to Luisa González - El Oro, Guayas, Imbabura, Orellana and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas. Major construction sites For Ecuador and its old and new president, however, Noboa's election victory means only a brief respite in a situation that remains tense. The challenges remain enormous. The new National Assembly elected in February is divided into two large blocs that support Noboa and González (or Correa). There are also a number of smaller blocs and individual deputies, on whose support Noboa will be dependent due to the lack of a majority of his own. Noboa will have to demonstrate his ability to act and make convincing political proposals in order to achieve governance that serves the common good. The future of the country will depend on how well it manages to identify points of consensus and tackle the structural challenges. In this context, technical and non-partisan initiatives that manage to bundle the country's national priorities offer an opportunity. A national deficit of more than five billion US dollars, high foreign debt, and too few sustainable sources of revenue for the state will make governing difficult. Debt repayments and difficult renegotiations with the International Monetary Fund regarding the granting of further loans are also on the cards. The new government must therefore also aim to create jobs and get people into regular employment. Around 70 percent of the population still lives from the informal sector. In other words, only around 30 percent of the population work in the context of a formal employment relationship and pay taxes regularly. The president must also develop a coherent strategy for restructuring the energy system in order to avoid the hours-long power cuts that plagued the country last year. A supply system that is dependent on hydropower, dilapidated infrastructure, and a lack of diversification in the energy mix hang like a sword of Damocles over the president and could soon earn him the displeasure of the population. Last but not least, the Noboa government must get to grips with the enormous security problem associated with organized crime and various forms of illegal economic activity. The support of the USA and international cooperation in general will play a significant role in this. However, a clear and sustainable strategy for anti-mafia legislation on the part of the government is also needed. Concrete proposals are also needed to remove criminal elements from organs of the partly infiltrated state security apparatus. Outlook For Europe and Germany, Noboa's victory and the associated four-year term of office represent a fantastic opportunity to tackle the phenomenon of organized crime in a structured and targeted manner through coordinated cooperation with international allies. Noboa wants to bring his agenda closer to the USA, particularly in the areas of security and trade. As far as the European Union is concerned, strengthening cooperation and investment in areas such as the environment and energy could also be crucial for his government's future positive multilateral orientation. One sign of hope is Noboa's clear support for the port security initiative launched by EUROPOL as well as EU projects to promote comprehensive prison reform and the fight against the mafia. Cooperation on trade, economic and security issues could make Ecuador a stable partner in the Andean region in the face of left-wing authoritarian systems such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This is particularly important in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, especially in view of the fact that over 70 percent of all cocaine exports reach Europe via Ecuadorian ports. However, without a clear ethical awareness among Europeans of the drama and the effects of drug trafficking in Ecuador and Latin America, the situation in the Andean country will not improve, but rather worsen due to the demand effect, with all the social and violent consequences for the population. A litmus test for Daniel Noboa's ability to act could be his promise to start a new constitutional process. Ecuadorian institutions are still hampered by the authoritarian legacy of Rafael Correa's constitution, which is still in force. A transparent process with the participation of civil society could give Noboa legitimacy and help the country to leave the Correa legacy behind for good.  References [i] Un asesinato por hora desde el 1 de enero: Ecuador vive el inicio de año más violento desde que hay registros.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском For over a decade, the world has witnessed mounting evidence of internment camps, forced sterilizations, family separations, religious and cultural persecution, organ harvesting, forced labor, and high-tech surveillance emerging from East Turkistan—an occupied nation China refers to as the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” These atrocities, targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, have led multiple governments, including the United States, to designate China’s actions as genocide, while the United Nations has identified them as crimes against humanity. The genocide of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Turkic peoples is routinely framed as mere human rights violation or a symptom of authoritarian overreach. Such framing obscures the root cause: the illegal occupation and ongoing colonization of East Turkistan by China. To end the genocide and achieve lasting peace, dignity, and justice for the East Turkistani people, the world must recognize that this is not a question of human rights or religious persecution—it is a colonial crisis. And like all colonial projects, it demands not reform, but an end. East Turkistan, home to the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples, has a long and distinct sovereign history, culture, and identity separate from that of China. While the Manchu Qing Empire occupied the nation in 1759, Qing occupation over East Turkistan has never been continuous or consensual. The people of East Turkistan persistently resisted, launching 42 uprisings between 1759 and 1864, and regained independence as the State of Yette Sheher (1864–1877), before being re-occupied by the Qing Empire in December 1877. In 1884, Beijing renamed the country “Xinjiang” (meaning “New Territory”)—a colonial term imposed to normalize its conquest, and Chinese settlers were encouraged to alter the nation’s demographics. These were not merely administrative measures—they were calculated steps in the construction of a colonial regime. Yet, the people of East Turkistan continued to resist the occupation and sought to re-establish their independence. The people of East Turkistan re-declared their independence twice in the 20th century—in 1933 and again in 1944—establishing the East Turkistan Republic.  before falling victim to geopolitical deals and military occupation. Both republics were short-lived, undermined by geopolitical maneuvering and military aggression. n 1949, following the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power, the People’s Liberation Army invaded East Turkistan with Soviet support. Under the pretext of “peaceful liberation,” the PLA dismantled East Turkistan’s sovereignty and imposed a colonial regime that persists today. Since then, Beijing has implemented long-term strategies aimed at erasing East Turkistan’s national identity and integrating the nation into its Han-centric nation-building project. These strategies have included mass settlement of Han Chinese colonists, criminalization of East Turkistani history and identity, suppression of cultural and religious freedoms, the dismantling of native institutions, and the violent suppression of dissent. Although some observers refer to these policies as “assimilation,” such language understates the scope and violence of China’s actions. This is not cultural integration—it is national erasure and demographic replacement. The ongoing Uyghur genocide is the latest phase in this decades-long campaign. It has moved beyond political repression into a full-fledged effort to destroy the East Turkistani nation physically, culturally, and psychologically. Millions of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic peoples have been arbitrarily detained in concentration camps, where they are subjected to indoctrination, torture, sexual violence, and forced labor. Furthermore, experts estimate that at least 25,000 to 50,000 Uyghurs are being killed annually solely for their organs. Uyghur and other Turkic women are forcibly sterilized or forced to undergo abortions to prevent the birth of future generations. Over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children are separated from their families and placed in state-run boarding schools designed to sever their cultural and linguistic ties. Over 16,000 Mosques, cemeteries, and historic sites have been demolished, while Uyghur and other Turkic language instruction has been eliminated from public education. In international law, these actions meet the criteria outlined in the UN Genocide Convention. China’s campaign fulfills all five of the acts defined as genocide. This includes killing members of the group through executions, massacres, deaths resulting from torture and neglect in concentration camps, and systematic organ harvesting. It also involves causing serious bodily or mental harm, through forced labor, indoctrination, physical and sexual abuse, and long-term psychological trauma. The Chinese regime has deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction, including mass internment, surveillance, forced separation of families, and deprivation of basic needs. Additionally, China has imposed measures intended to prevent births, such as forced sterilizations, abortions, birth prevention policies, and the destruction of Uyghur family structures. Finally, it has forcibly transferred children of the group to another group by removing over a million Uyghur and other Turkic children from their families and placing them in Chinese state-run boarding schools and orphanages. What makes this genocide even more insidious is its bureaucratic and technological sophistication. The CCP uses AI surveillance, biometric data collection, and big data policing to monitor and control every aspect of East Turkistani life. Genocide in East Turkistan is not committed with bombs or mass graves—it is executed with facial recognition cameras, QR codes, “predictive policing” apps, forced sterilizations, forced abortions, organ harvesting, and crematoriums to hide the evidence. The answer lies not in ideology alone but in geopolitical calculation. East Turkistan is central to Beijing’s global ambitions. It serves as the strategic linchpin of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which China seeks to reshape global trade and influence. Over 60 percent of China’s overland trade passes through the region. Rich in oil, natural gas, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements, East Turkistan is not only a corridor—but a resource base essential to China’s industrial economy. Chinese strategists have long seen East Turkistan as a buffer protecting the Chinese state from perceived threats to its west and north. This logic continues to shape Beijing’s approach today: the occupation of East Turkistan is central to advancing China’s geopolitical ambitions, including control over critical infrastructure, access to Central Asia, and the stability of its broader colonial system. The erasure of East Turkistan is not about internal security—it is about imperial consolidation and expansion. The Uyghur genocide is therefore not a domestic or regional issue—it is an international one. It is rooted in a colonial model of domination that has broad implications for global security, trade, and human rights. Yet the international community continues to treat East Turkistan as a part of China’s “internal affairs,” even as it condemns the crimes taking place there. This contradiction lies at the heart of the global failure to stop the genocide. By framing the issue merely as one of “human rights” or “religious repression,” leaders obscure the core truth: East Turkistan is an occupied country, and the Uyghurs are not a “minority group,” but a nation under siege. This framing benefits Beijing by allowing it to invoke sovereignty and non-interference to shield itself from accountability. In reality, China is misusing the language of sovereignty to justify colonization. This distortion of international norms must be challenged. Addressing the Uyghur genocide requires a shift in global thinking. First, East Turkistan must be recognized as an occupied country, with its people’s right to external self-determination affirmed under international law. The UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other legal instruments affirm the right of all peoples to determine their political status. Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples have never chosen to be part of China; their subjugation has been enforced through military occupation, demographic engineering, systemic repression, and a campaign of cultural and national erasure—not integration or coexistence, but elimination. Second, the genocide must be understood as part of a broader colonial project, not merely an episode of repression. This includes recognizing mass enslavement, demographic engineering, and physical and cultural erasure as fundamental tools of colonial domination. Efforts to address these violations must be paired with political actions to end China’s illegal occupation of East Turkistan. Third, the voices of East Turkistani institutions and leaders in exile must be included in international discussions about the future of the nation. The East Turkistan Government in Exile, along with rights groups and diaspora communities, have been calling for recognition, justice, and decolonization for decades. Their perspectives are essential to any serious solution. Finally, international legal mechanisms must be pursued with urgency. This includes supporting East Turkistan’s case at the International Criminal Court and filing additional cases at the International Court of Justice, sanctioning Chinese officials and entities involved in the genocide, and supporting investigations under universal jurisdiction laws in national courts. The failure of the international community to stop the genocide in East Turkistan is not merely a failure of will—it is a failure of principle. So long as governments, media, and international institutions continue to treat this as an “internal issue” for China, the genocide will continue. Only by reframing this as a crisis of occupation, colonization, and national survival can the path to justice become clear. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise to power in 2002, one might ask whether we can speak of an Erdoğan Doctrine in Turkish foreign policy. The answer is no. Unlike classical doctrines that follow a consistent ideological or strategic framework, Erdoğan’s approach to both domestic and international politics is marked by pragmatic opportunism, transactional maneuvering, and tactical adaptability. His foreign policy does not stem from a fixed set of principles but rather from a fluid, recalibrated strategy designed to ensure political survival, power consolidation, and economic self-preservation. Yet, despite this adaptability, Erdoğan has consistently instrumentalized Islamism, Ottoman nostalgia, and Turkish nationalism as mobilizing forces, shaping both Turkey’s domestic landscape and its global positioning. These ideological currents serve not as doctrinal foundations but as strategic tools, deployed selectively to consolidate power and justify an increasingly interventionist and authoritarian foreign policy. Rather than an Erdoğan Doctrine, what we observe is a dynamic political strategy, one that shifts according to regional and global realities, balancing ideological rhetoric with realpolitik pragmatism. Erdoğan’s political trajectory has been characterized by extreme opportunism. Early in his tenure, he presented himself as a pro-Western democrat, championing Turkey’s EU membership and economic liberalization. However, as his grip on power consolidated, he shifted towards authoritarian populism, discrediting Western institutions and embracing an anti-Western, neo-Ottomanist discourse. His ability to manipulate ideological positions for strategic gain suggests that Erdoğan’s doctrine is less about consistent principles and more about sustaining power through ideological fluidity. This transactional nature extends to foreign policy, where Erdoğan has engaged in contradictory alliances. Turkey has simultaneously sought stronger ties with Russia while maintaining a position in NATO, balancing relations with Iran while confronting it in Syria, and denouncing Western imperialism while leveraging economic ties with the EU. The 2016 failed coup attempt marked a pivotal moment, after which Erdoğan’s rhetoric became deeply anti-Western, securitizing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political struggles. One of the defining characteristics of the Erdoğan strategy is the obliteration of the traditional boundary between domestic and foreign policy. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, foreign policy decisions are primarily driven by domestic political calculations rather than long-term strategic considerations. Military operations in Syria and Libya were framed as nationalist victories, consolidating Erdoğan’s support base while deflecting attention from economic crises. Political rivals and dissidents are routinely accused of being Western puppets or linked to foreign conspiracies, reinforcing anti-Western nationalism. Erdoğan actively uses the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a political tool, portraying himself as the protector of Muslims abroad and positioning Turkey as the leader of a global Islamic movement. This lack of distinction between internal and external affairs means that every foreign policy move is designed for domestic legitimacy. Military interventions, diplomatic crises, and economic policies are all packaged for domestic consumption to maintain Erdoğan’s image as a leader defying Western hegemony. Erdoğan has strategically invoked Islamist rhetoric and Ottoman nostalgia to mask domestic corruption, repression, and economic mismanagement. His use of Islamism is highly pragmatic rather than ideological. While Erdoğan once promoted a pro-business, moderate Islamist stance, he has increasingly aligned with more radical Islamic groups to rally conservative voters. Neo-Ottomanist narratives have been used to justify interventions in the Middle East and Africa, portraying Turkey as the rightful heir to regional leadership. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has become an ideological tool for Erdoğan, framing his rule as divinely sanctioned while attacking secular and Western influences. Erdoğan’s economic policies reflect the same transactional nature. He has oscillated between free-market policies to attract Western investment and state-led crony capitalism to consolidate his own economic elite. However, his militarization of foreign policy has created deep economic vulnerabilities. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 missiles resulted in U.S. sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program, exacerbating Turkey’s economic downturn.  Aggressive gas exploration efforts isolated Turkey from the EU and regional actors, worsening trade relations. While Erdoğan has relied on Qatari financial support, recent Gulf rapprochements have left Turkey geopolitically and economically vulnerable. Turkey’s economic dependence on Western markets and capital contradicts Erdoğan’s anti-Western rhetoric, further proving that his doctrine is driven by short-term political survival rather than a coherent strategic vision. Rather than a structured geopolitical vision, the Erdoğan strategy is best understood as a political survival mechanism that combines: Extreme pragmatism and transactionalism, shifting alliances and ideological positions as needed; the fusion of domestic and foreign policy, where foreign affairs are a continuation of domestic power struggles; the instrumentalization of Islamism and Ottoman nostalgia, masking authoritarianism and economic decline; short-term opportunism at the cost of long-term strategy, leading to Turkey’s increasing diplomatic and economic isolation. Erdoğan’s rule has been marked by ad-hoc decisions, contradictions, and reactive policies that serve his immediate political needs rather than a grand vision for Turkey’s future. This transactional-opportunism makes the Erdoğan Doctrine an impossibility—while he projects an image of Islamic, nationalist leadership, his foreign policy is dictated by opportunism, insecurity, and personal political survival. The consequences of this approach are a weakened economy, diplomatic isolation, and an increasingly authoritarian state, making the long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s model highly uncertain.  Another major characteristic of Erdoğan’s strategy is the securitization of domestic and foreign policy. Since Erdoğan ascended to the presidency in 2014, and particularly after the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. These changes are marked by a growing reliance on securitization—the framing of domestic and international challenges as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures. Erdoğan’s approach has been shaped by three key factors: Islamist ideology, Ottoman nostalgia, and the deep-seated trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres. These factors have driven Turkey into high-risk foreign policy ventures, many of which have backfired, leading to strategic isolation, economic instability, and declining influence on the global stage. Erdoğan’s political strategy has been centered on constructing an image of perpetual threat to the Turkish state and nation. This approach is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of betrayal and encirclement—most prominently symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which sought to partition Anatolia and subject it to foreign control. This “Sèvres Syndrome” has been instrumentalized to justify an aggressive foreign policy, military interventions, and an increasingly authoritarian domestic stance.  Erdoğan has fused Turkish nationalism with political Islam, portraying Turkey as both the heir to the Ottoman Empire and the champion of Sunni Muslims. This synthesis has fueled a revisionist foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. However, these ambitions have often led Turkey into conflicts with former allies and regional powers, undermining its strategic position. Erdoğan’s foreign policy, shaped by securitization, Islamist nostalgia, and historical trauma, has backfired spectacularly in multiple arenas. While he has sought to redefine Turkey as a great power, his tactics have instead led to growing regional isolation, economic instability, and internal discontent. The failure to balance nationalist rhetoric with pragmatic diplomacy has left Turkey more vulnerable than ever—caught between Western skepticism, Russian opportunism, and Middle Eastern volatility. Unless Erdoğan recalibrates his approach, Turkey risks further decline in both regional and global affairs. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdoğan came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation, shifting from a Western-oriented, EU-focused trajectory to a more assertive, independent, and, increasingly, anti-Western stance. While initially adopting a “thin populist” approach that emphasized regional engagement, neo-Ottomanist rhetoric, and Turkey’s role as a bridge between East and West, the AKP’s foreign policy has evolved into a “thick populist” approach dominated by a strong anti-Western narrative. This transformation was solidified after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and, even more so, after the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, which the Turkish government blamed on the West-backed Gülen Movement. The growing securitization of Western powers and the increasing emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic and civilizational identity have led to an overt de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. Erdoğan’s securitization of foreign policy has manifested in several high-risk ventures that have largely failed to achieve their intended objectives: Turkey’s military interventions in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring) were aimed at eradicating the Kurdish YPG, which Ankara views as an extension of the PKK.  However, this policy has led to severe tensions with the United States, which has supported the YPG as a key ally against ISIS. The result is a diplomatic impasse that has weakened Turkey’s influence in Syria while increasing its military entanglements. Turkey’s intervention in Libya, backing the Government of National Accord (GNA) against Khalifa Haftar, was an extension of Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. While it temporarily secured Turkish energy and maritime interests, it alienated Egypt, the UAE, France, and Greece, leading to counteralliances that have restricted Turkish maneuverability.  Erdoğan’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system was framed as a move for strategic autonomy but resulted in sanctions from the United States and exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet program. While this was meant to demonstrate Turkey’s independence, it has made the country increasingly reliant on Moscow, further complicating relations with NATO. Erdoğan’s aggressive posture has damaged Turkey’s relations with Western allies, leading to economic consequences, loss of diplomatic leverage, and isolation in Europe. Erdoğan’s confrontational approach—such as threatening to flood Europe with refugees—has eroded trust and reinforced perceptions of Turkey as an unpredictable and transactional partner. Erdoğan’s security-driven foreign policy has had dire economic consequences. The Turkish lira has suffered dramatic depreciation, foreign investment has declined, and inflation has soared. The Turkish public, initially supportive of Erdoğan’s assertiveness, is increasingly disillusioned as economic hardship worsens. Erdoğan’s securitization of policy has created short-term political gains but long-term strategic vulnerabilities. No one takes Turkey as a credible ally. His nationalist-Islamist rhetoric has been effective in consolidating domestic support, especially among conservative and nationalist voters, but it has also deepened Turkey’s diplomatic and economic isolation. Finally, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has been anti-Western.  A key driver of Erdoğan’s anti-Western foreign policy has been the gradual populist transformation of the AKP and consolidation of his power by purging other prominent personalities within the party.  Initially, under the leadership of Erdoğan, the party adopted a moderate, reformist discourse that prioritized EU membership, economic liberalization, and cooperation with Western allies. However, over time, populist tendencies became dominant, with Erdoğan increasingly portraying himself as the true representative of the “real” Turkish people against both domestic and international elites. Populist foreign policy, as seen in Turkey and elsewhere, follows a binary logic that pits “the virtuous people” against “the corrupt elite.” In the Turkish context, this binary has been extended to the international arena, with the West—Europe and the United States—constructed as the foreign equivalent of the corrupt elite, standing in opposition to Turkey’s rightful role as a global power.  The early years of AKP rule were marked by a pragmatic approach that balanced Turkey’s Western orientation with a regionalist vision. This period saw active engagement with the EU, NATO, and the U.S., while at the same time expanding relations with the Middle East, Balkans, and Africa under Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine. During this era, anti-Western rhetoric was limited, and Turkey’s regional activism was framed as complementary to, rather than a rejection of, its Western ties. Following the Gezi Park protests and, more dramatically, the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan’s rhetoric became openly hostile toward the West. Western governments were accused of plotting against Turkey, harboring terrorists, and undermining Turkey’s sovereignty. Erdoğan framed his leadership as a struggle against an imperialist West determined to prevent Turkey’s rise. As he declared in 2019, “Turkey is now a country whose agenda is not determined [by others] but who determines her own agenda.” Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy became an extension of Erdoğan’s domestic populist struggle, where anti-Westernism served as both an ideological tool and a strategy for political survival. Another major factor behind Turkey’s anti-Western turn is the fusion of Islamist and nationalist discourses, which have become the defining ideological pillars of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. This ideological shift is best understood through the contrast between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism. Traditionally, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by Westernization, secularism, and nationalism. The country’s founding ideology sought integration with Europe, NATO membership, and alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War. However, Kemalist elites were also skeptical of foreign entanglements, leading to a cautious and isolationist diplomacy. Neo-Ottomanism and the “New Turkey” Vision of Erdoğan is anti-Western, Islamists, and serves for Erdoğan’s regime survival rather than national interest of the country. Under Erdoğan, a revisionist historical narrative emerged, portraying the Ottoman Empire as a great civilization that was undermined by Western colonialism and internal betrayals. In this vision, modern Turkey is the rightful heir of the Ottoman legacy and should reclaim its leadership role in the Islamic world. Erdoğan has repeatedly invoked the trauma of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920)—which proposed partitioning Turkey—as evidence that the West continues to conspire against Turkish sovereignty.  This ideological framework has shaped Turkey’s new foreign policy identity, positioning it as a leader of the Muslim world rather than a subordinate member of the Western alliance. As Erdoğan’s government became more authoritarian and Islamist, relations with the EU steadily deteriorated. The post-2016 crackdown on opposition figures, journalists, and academics led to increasing criticism from European leaders, reinforcing Erdoğan’s narrative that the EU is hypocritical, biased, and Islamophobic. While Turkey officially remains an EU candidate country, Erdoğan has openly questioned the sincerity of European leaders, arguing that the EU is a “Christian club” that will never accept a Muslim-majority country.  Erdoğan’s government has rejected Western liberal values, reversing democratic reforms and undermining the independence of judicial institutions, the media, and civil society. As a result, Turkey has moved closer to authoritarian models seen in Russia, China, and the Gulf states. Erdoğan’s anti-Western and de-Europeanized foreign policy is not just a reaction to specific diplomatic disputes—it is a structural transformation rooted in populism, ideology, and strategic recalibration. By casting the West as Turkey’s primary “other,” Erdoğan has crafted a nationalist-Islamist narrative that legitimizes his power, mobilizes his base, and redefines Turkey’s role in the world.  While this approach has granted Turkey short-term strategic flexibility, it has also left it increasingly isolated, economically vulnerable, and diplomatically constrained. The long-term sustainability of Erdoğan’s foreign policy remains uncertain, especially as domestic economic troubles and shifting global dynamics continue to reshape Turkey’s geopolitical landscape. One of the key arguments in understanding Turkey’s foreign policy shift is the interaction between domestic authoritarianism and international behavior. Unlike traditional middle powers, which pursue stability, Turkey’s domestic political dynamics—specifically Erdoğan’s populist authoritarian rule—have fueled its unusual, risk-prone foreign policy choices. Erdoğan has increasingly used foreign policy as a tool for domestic political survival, framing Turkey as a besieged nation fighting Western imperialists. Opposition parties are often accused of being aligned with “foreign agents” or Western powers, further deepening polarization. Nationalist rhetoric has been amplified during military operations, boosting public support for interventions in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском First months of the 2025 year were uneasy for Canada, it started with waves of changes. The era of Justin Trudeau, who was the leader of the country for 10 years from 2015 to 2025, and the beginning of the new presidential term of Donald Trump made things different for Canada and added uncertainty. On the ninth of march the new leader of the Liberal Party has been chosen, Mark Carney became the new prime minister of Canada. It remains unclear how long he will stay in his position, because Canada is standing on the threshold of federal elections. The end of era Like any leader, Justin Trudeau had certain achievements but also enough failures that affected the decline in his popularity among the population, lack of trust from fellow party members and opposition parties, which in the best years were even ready to collaborate with him together. In 2022 the New Democratic Party (NDP) and Liberal Party make an agreement to build trust and solidify a position on significant socio-economic issues. However, by the end of autumn 2024 the leader of the New democratic party Jagmeet Singh said that Justin Trudeau was not coping with the tasks facing the country and announced the NDP withdrawal from the agreement. This statement had a negative impact on the rating of the Liberal Party while they were passing decisions through Parliament. In the end of December Jagmeet Singh asked Justin Trudeau to resign and state that he is ready to support a vote of no confidence in the government, which the Conservative Party has been systematically calling for by that time. In the end of December of 2024 suddenly minister of finance and deputy prime minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland unexpectedly announced her resignation. This action raised a wave of negative sentiments around Justin Trudeau. The greatest criticism of the Prime Minister was caused by the failed migration policy, shortage of housing stock coupled with the sharp increase in housing prices, high inflation, and unemployment and the introduction of unpopular carbon tax. As a result of severe pressure of fellow party members and leaders of opposition parties Justin Trudeau was forced to announce the resignation on 6th of January, from the moment when a successor will be found within the liberal party. At the same time, he noted that if he must wage and internal party struggle, he does not consider himself as a suitable candidate for the role of a leader for the party during the next elections.  Beginning of New Uncertainty The era of political uncertainty in Canada worsened when Donald Trump repeatedly “attacked” the country’s sovereignty by verbally proposing Canada to become the 51st state of the United States. He also threatened to impose a 25% tariff on Canadian products, although he canceled this decision several times. On December 1st, Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on products coming from Canada and a 10% tariff on energy from Canada. The U.S. stated that this was a measure to combat emerging threats due to high levels of migration and fentanyl trafficking across the U.S.-Canada border. In response, Canada threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs on critically important minerals and fossil, electricity supplies, energy resources, and other products. Justin Trudeau, who was in the final days of his term, achieved some success during negotiations on February 3rd between Canadian and American leaders. As a result, Donald Trump agreed to postpone the imposition of tariffs on Canadian products for 30 days. This decision followed Canada’s promise to strengthen border security measures and invest an additional $1 million into those efforts. The tariffs were imposed on March 4th, and Justin Trudeau responded with retaliatory measures targeting U.S. products. However, on March 5th, Donald Trump canceled the tariffs on the automobile industry, and on March 6th, after a phone call with the leaders of Mexico and Canada, he signed an executive order temporarily suspending tariffs on Canadian and Mexican products that comply with the terms of the USMCA (United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement). If the tariffs were imposed in full, they would have had a negative impact on the Canadian economy. Supply chain channels would suffer, leading to an increase in the prices of various goods traded between Canada and the U.S. Additionally, the tariffs would reduce the competitiveness of Canadian products in the U.S. market. The most harmful consequences would be felt by sectors and products highly dependent on the American market. Trust credit The topics related to tariffs and bilateral agreements with the USA during the last two months became the main subject of discussion in Canada and in the main election campaign for the leader of the Liberal Party. On the 9th of March, the successor of Justin Trudeau was selected. It was Mark Carney, who received 85.9% of the votes. During the final stage, there were four candidates for the position of leader of the Liberal Party. The second after Mark was the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Chrystia Freeland. She did not get many votes, receiving only 8% of the votes from the electorate. The other two candidates — Karina Gould, the leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and Frank Baylis, who was a member of Parliament, received 3.2% and 3%, respectively. The main topics of Mark Carney’s internal party campaign were the economic development of Canada, climate change, and a green incentive program. He proposed a carbon tax from consumers to large companies, removing trade barriers between Canadian provinces and territories, increasing the pace of housing construction and investments in this sphere while cutting the government budget. The success of Mark Carney can be attributed to a few reasons. He is the only candidate who did not hold any official position in Justin Trudeau’s Cabinet and did not have a position in Parliament. So, he represents some distance from the course of the prime minister, which Canadians did not like during the post-pandemic times. Canadians associate Mark Carney with new opportunities and changes for Canada. He is not a person from politics; he is related to the economy and business sector. Among his numerous roles, he was the Governor of the Bank of Canada during the 2008 crisis, when Canada avoided the worst impacts due to good financial and banking policies. In 2013, he was appointed as Governor of the Bank of England. He handled the economic processes during Brexit and the following economic and political crises. This experience casts Mark Carney in a positive light for voters and provides him with trust during tough times in the country, marked by unfriendly statements and actions from the closest partner — the US. Carney himself highlights his success in crisis management and believes that he would be able to negotiate with Trump, even though he agrees that the 25% tariff and policy that Trump has stated are a serious challenge in modern Canadian history. In his victory speech after being elected as the leader of the Liberal Party, he highlighted that: "The United States of America are not Canada. Canada will never become a part of the US in any form, in any way." All other political elites are in solidarity with him. Carney states that Canada must fight Trump’s tariffs using retaliatory measures in the form of "dollar for dollar." The main goal is the diversification of trade agreements in the medium term. Both goals are important. For now, Canadian analysts are concerned that Trump’s tariffs in the short term may cause a recession in the Canadian economy. It is important to remember that Donald Trump is a businessman, and in political discussions, he has often said that he is ready for deals. Maybe Carney, with his experience in the economy and finance, will find a way to make such a deal — if he has time. What is next? For how long Mark Carney will stay in the prime minister position is hard to predict now. According to the schedule, another federal election in Canada should take place no later than October 2025, however, the Canada Elections Act provides the opportunity for long-term elections. There is a high probability that Mark Carney will use his popularity and announce voting in the next few weeks. According to the law, the pre-election period must last from 37 to 51 days. The main opposition for Carney will be the leader of the Conservative Party, Pierre Poilievre. For the last 1.5 years, the rating of the Conservative Party has been significantly higher than the rating of the Liberal Party. According to the data, the popularity rate of the Conservative Party on January 6th was equal to 44.2%, and the Liberal Party had 20.1%. However, the rating of the Liberals started to grow after Justin Trudeau announced his resignation. According to the data on March 5th, the rating of the Conservative Party was equal to 40.3%, and the Liberal Party had 30.8%. Pierre Poilievre, with his views, is close to the ideas of right-wing populism. He is a supporter of the Freedom Convoy — the protest movement that spread across Canada in early 2022. People often say that his positions and approaches are similar to those of Donald Trump. Even though the pre-election campaign has not officially started yet, Pierre Poilievre unofficially began his campaign in January.  After Justin Trudeau announced his impending resignation, Pierre Poilievre changed his political slogan “Axe the Tax” (which referred to the unpopular carbon tax) to “Canada First,” which is similar to Trump’s slogan “America First.” Poilievre promises that he will remove trade barriers for provinces, tighten punishments for fentanyl dealers, strengthen border security, construct a base in the Arctic, the construction of which will be financed by cutting foreign aid. Border security, fentanyl contraband, and low defense costs in Canada are the main complaints of Donald Trump. Mark Carney, talking about his opponent Pierre Poilievre, said: “Donald Trump is trying to weaken our economy, but there is also another person who is doing the same. And this person is Pierre Poilievre. Pierre Poilievre’s plan will leave us divided and ready for conquest because he is a person who worships Trump, and he will stay on his knees in front of Trump, not oppose him.” The election on March 9th for the leader of the Liberal Party is not the final stage of the political situation in Canada. It remains to be seen who will become the new prime minister for the next four years.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Cook Islands' recent deals with China sees shift from soft to hard-edged diplomacy embedded in Pacific. Strategic engagement between the Pacific and its partners has now well and truly switched to overt security transactionalism, from soft to hard diplomacy. The explicit position emanating from the United States under the Trump administration reflects what has already been happening in the Pacific, particularly with the region’s largest aid donor Australia. When the Cook Islands and China signed deals this month, they sidelined New Zealand, leaving it to reassess how to do business with Pacific island nations. In recent years there’s been a flurry of agreements, MoUs, treaties and more between Pacific island countries and their partners, both established and emerging. The recently confirmed Papua New Guinea rugby league deal with Australia introduced “strategic trust” into the lexicon. Grafted on to the prized spot in the Australian National Rugby League competition is an undertaking by PNG to rebuff any kind of security agreement with China. Similar trade-offs form part of Australia’s deals with Nauru last year and Tuvalu in 2023.  How this transactionalism can or should be accommodated, or even countered, by Pacific island states has the region talking. Professor Transform Aqorau in his keynote speech to last week’s Pacific Islands Political Science Association (PIPSA) conference in New Zealand stated: “The question that we must ask ourselves is, ‘how do we assert agency in this space while we avoid being drawn into the conflicts that are not of our making?’” Many who spoke at PIPSA agreed that conversations about security and strategy must be led by Pacific voices and underpinned by Pacific norms. There were numerous calls for partner countries (of all stripes) to do better - listen, focus on relationships, work more ‘Pacifically’.  The other side of the asymmetrical power dynamic remained largely unaddressed – what can and should Pacific leaders and officials do to shift partners’ behaviour to what is wanted and needed? And if business-as-usual is already getting these partners what they want, where is the incentive for them to change?  Unlike the successes Pacific nations have had when taking a united regional posture, guided by the Pacific Islands Forum and advancing their Blue Pacific Strategy 2050, the bilateral deals see them operating without the benefit of collective support.  There are some ‘green shoots’ of Pacific assertiveness. In a Facebook post over the weekend, Vanuatu’s newly-elected Prime Minister Jotham Napa said, “climate change is very critical to our survival. Moving away from (the) Paris agreement by (the) Trump administration is like committing suicide. Climate change must be part of any security agreement in the future.” The message to the U.S. is clear. It is also a message to Australia, who have long sought a security agreement with Vanuatu and will no doubt continue to press that with Napat. That is not to say partners’ approaches are not evolving. When it comes to engaging with China, the overall picture is that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now focused on smaller projects with greater use of grant financing rather than loans. Of course, it is often the case that the exception proves the rule. The recent agreement (and associated MoUs) between Cook Islands and China envisages serious infrastructure investment in the maritime sector, including ports. Cue “dual-use” alarm bells in Canberra, Wellington and beyond. The New Zealand government is now contemplating a more transactional approach with Pacific partners. Its relationships with Kiribati and Cook Islands have deteriorated markedly in the last few weeks, following what could be termed “assertive” actions by Pacific leaders. After months of trying, New Zealand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Winston Peters was all set to meet President Taneti Maamau in Kiribati in January. The arrangements were upended at the last minute resulting in a public diplomatic tiff. Peters has now initiated a review of New Zealand aid to Kiribati as an expression of his frustration. Meanwhile, Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown also raised the ire of Wellington. Peters has claimed that there was insufficient consultation by Cook Islands (which is in free association with New Zealand) about entering into a strategic partnership agreement with China and signing of other MOUs. Peters has now called for a “reset” of the relationship. Whilst much has been made of the geopolitical aspects of these tensions, the most significant implications are in the domestic spheres.  In Kiribati, opposition leader Tessie Lambourne has argued that the falling out with New Zealand is part of a pattern of isolationism on the part of Maamau, which is harming the interests of the i-Kiribati population. His government switched allegiance from Taiwan to China in 2019 and has become increasingly withdrawn, including a ban on diplomatic visits last year. A New Zealand aid cut would have a significant impact on health, education, and climate resilience projects in Kiribati. In Cook Islands, Brown’s bullish approach has come back to bite him. Last week around 400 people marched in protest, and he faced a motion of no confidence in the Parliament, which failed. Whilst the strategic partnership with China was part of what prompted Cook Islanders to take the streets, they were also enraged at the debacle surrounding Brown’s attempt to introduce a Cook Islands passport, in addition to the New Zealand passport they currently hold. The geostrategic environment in the Pacific is becoming increasingly complex and the tempo of bilateral offers shows no sign of slowing. The calculated nature of relations offered by partners poses a huge challenge to Pacific leaders, negotiating in relative isolation, often in secret, while they try to maintain their “friends to all, enemy to none” positions. Pacific states will have to work harder than ever and expend precious resources to strike the right balance as they assert their agency while managing strategic partnerships. Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In Brief Despite its increasingly repressive domestic rule, more countries than ever are engaging with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. India’s first official meeting with the Taliban in January 2025 encapsulates a broader global trend of once-reluctant countries now engaging with the Taliban. Credible terrorism concerns, worsening humanitarian conditions and geopolitical rivalries are pushing governments toward quasi-acceptance and recognition of Taliban rule. When the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, the prevailing sentiment was that the regime would be an international pariah if it did not moderate its hardline positions. The Taliban’s violent past also made it inconceivable for some states to engage with it as the government of Afghanistan. Despite the Taliban’s repressive rule worsening considerably since it seized control in 2021, with restrictions on women taken to a new extreme and the reintroduction of brutal punishments for alleged moral crimes, the regime is overcoming its international isolation. More governments are prepared to look past the ethical dilemma of dealing with the Taliban and quasi-recognise it as the government of Afghanistan. India stepped up its outreach to the Taliban in January 2025, with India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi holding their first meeting. This is the highest level meeting between the two sides since India began small and indirect engagements with the Taliban after its return to power in 2021. For the Taliban, its meeting with India’s foreign secretary is a major diplomatic breakthrough given its tense and fractious relations with India since the 1990s. After this January 2025 meeting, the Taliban referred to India as a ‘significant regional and economic partner’. The sea change in relations likely stems from New Delhi not sensing any significant terrorist threats from the Taliban or groups allegedly linked to the Taliban. Worsening Taliban–Pakistan relations may have played a role in India’s outreach to the Taliban. Pakistan firmly backed the Taliban when it was mounting a comeback in Afghanistan. But since the Taliban’s return, border disputes and the rise of Pakistani Taliban militancy inside Pakistan have sent their relations into a downward spiral. The souring Pakistan–Afghanistan relations suggest New Delhi’s interests may not be as affected as feared when the Taliban took over in 2021. Despite India’s growing outreach, its relations with the Taliban are still very calibrated and limited — paling in comparison to China’s. Yet India’s outreach may be more diplomatically significant for the Taliban than China’s as it sets a precedent for Western democracies that also seek to strike a balance between not recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government, while engaging with it on necessary matters. Western governments, particularly the United States, were unfazed by some of India’s initial engagements, but now seem to recognise the necessity of limited engagements with the Taliban. It was revealed in January 2025 that the former Joe Biden administration negotiated with the Taliban to secure the release of two US prisoners in Afghanistan. In 2024, the Biden administration debated expanding direct engagements and cooperation with the Taliban to mount more effective counterterrorist activities. The return of US President Donald Trump is likely to change US–Taliban relations. Under Trump’s first administration, the United States pursued talks with the Taliban, culminating in the 2020 Doha Agreement that facilitated the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump’s return increases the possibility of greater US engagements with the Taliban, though it has also created uncertainties. President Trump was critical of how the US departure from Afghanistan was handled under the Biden administration. In January 2025, Trump said that the Taliban needed to return US military equipment in Afghanistan as a precondition for future financial assistance. The Taliban have also said that they seek a ‘new chapter’ in their relations with the United States under the second Trump administration. The biggest roadblock for the West engaging with the Taliban has been its repressive policies and human rights violations. But there are now compelling reasons for the West to engage with the Taliban. Western sanctions, in addition to having no effect on the Taliban’s draconian governance, have worsened humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Despite the sanctions’ ineffectiveness, it is unclear whether the West would go as far as to lift the sanctions. Instead, Western countries might find ways to work with the regime on specific issues. Foremost among these issues is addressing the growing presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan — such as Al-Qaeda, a Taliban ally, and the reviving Islamic State–Khorasan Province. The growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan also has Western countries concerned that turning their backs on Afghanistan may work to China’s advantage. China perceives Afghanistan as a gateway for China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Central Asia and seeks to exploit the country’s vast and untapped natural reserves. Though more governments are now prepared to engage with the Taliban, the Taliban’s most strategic relationship will likely remain with China. China–Taliban relations are comprehensive and long-term, spanning economic, political and security cooperation. China does not recognise the Taliban but was the first to accept a Taliban envoy. China and the Taliban have inked several notable agreements, including China granting the Taliban tariff-free trade access in October 2024, which could provide an economic boost to the cash-strapped regime. But China’s relations with the Taliban are also not without problems. Some Afghanistan-based terrorist groups have China on their radar and pose security concerns in the sensitive Chinese border provinces. The Taliban’s affiliates have previously attacked Chinese interests in neighbouring Pakistan. Despite these concerns, Beijing appears committed to strengthening its relationship with the Taliban, focusing on mutual security, technological exchanges and investments. Another diplomatic breakthrough for the Taliban is its improving relations with Russia. Russia invited the Taliban to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, among other meetings held in Russia in 2024. Russia also decided to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. These overtures suggest Russia is seeking closer relations with the Taliban. The Taliban played a long waiting game, biding its time since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It ultimately prevailed by returning to power as soon as the United States withdrew 20 years later. Growing diplomatic engagements prove that the Taliban is again capable of playing a long game to wear down governments into a quasi-acceptance and recognition of its draconian rule. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1741341600

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Political sociologists concur that no society exhibits complete homogeneity in its structure; however, the degree of internal variation differs significantly across societies. Subcultures—defined by linguistic, religious, tribal, sectarian, racial or national distinctions—can serve as points of leverage in managing interstate conflicts, with states potentially exploiting these divisions either positively or negatively. This fragmentation leads to a spectrum of loyalties, ranging from the immediate family unit to broader affiliations such as clan, tribe, nationality, or religion, encapsulating the essence of the Pyramidal Segmentary theory.[2] This issue arises when individuals or groups experience a dispute between loyalty to a higher affiliation and loyalty to a lower one. Such disputes provide an entry point for political exploitation by other states, especially since the theory suggests that, in cases of dispute, lower loyalties often take precedence over higher ones. The intensity of these disputes can escalate when they develop into full-blown conflicts. This dynamic is further elucidated by Elizabeth Colson’s theory of Conflicting Loyalties. Colson argues that there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the priorities of loyalty—whether lower loyalty or higher loyalty should take precedence. If higher loyalty prevails, subcultures will face significant pressure to conform to the demands of the higher loyalty. However, if lower loyalty prevails, societal unity is at risk of geographic and political fragmentation.[3] These dynamics are central to strategic planning by international actors, particularly in their engagement with minority issues and their potential utilization. This study aims to elucidate the potential resurgence of Israel’s historical projects in this domain, identifying indicators of such revival, and examining mechanisms to counteract these developments, as well as their implications for Palestinian rights. First: Arab Pyramidal Segmentary A comparison between the Arab region and other geopolitical areas reveals significant differences in the level and dimensions of Pyramidal Segmentary, as shown in the following table:[4] The table indicates that: 1. The Arab world exhibits a moderate level of ethnic diversity compared to other global regions. However, since 2014, it has experienced the highest levels of political instability.[6] This disparity suggests that ethnic diversity alone does not account for the region’s instability. Therefore, it is essential to examine additional factors contributing to this instability, while still acknowledging the role of minority groups. 2. If we examine the relationship between the level of democracy and ethnic diversity in Arab countries, we observe that the extent of ethnic diversity does not align with the degree of democratic governance. While the Arab region ranks lowest in terms of democracy, its ethnic diversity is not as pronounced as that of Africa. However, despite this, democracy in Africa surpasses that in the Arab region.[7] The above indicates that external powers recognize that instability and the absence of democracy provide an entry point to exploit the grievances of minorities in the Arab world, especially when ethnic diversity is combined with variables governing minority separatism. In a previous study, we found that the geographical variable is the most important factor in promoting the separatist tendency of any minority. This variable is represented in three dimensions:[8] 1. Minorities situated on the periphery of a state, such as the tribes of South Sudan and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, often find it easier to engage with neighboring regions and the international community. This peripheral location facilitates the arrival of international aid and foreign intervention. In contrast, minorities located in the heartland, like the Amazigh in the Maghreb countries, may experience different dynamics due to their central position within the state. 2. The concentration of a minority population in a specific geographical area, such as the Kurds in Syria or Iraq, can reinforce their sub-identity. Conversely, minorities like Christians in Egypt or Shiites in Saudi Arabia, who are dispersed across various regions, may experience a different dynamic. In these cases, the lack of a concentrated territory can lead to a more fragmented sense of identity. 3. The presence of significant economic resources in regions predominantly inhabited by minorities can lead to economic benefits being concentrated among a smaller segment of the population, rather than the majority. This concentration can foster separatist sentiments, as seen with oil in Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and petroleum in South Sudan prior to its secession. Second: The Historical Record of Israeli Infiltration into the Structure of Minorities in Arab Countries Israeli studies and reports document facts about Israel’s cooperation with Arab minorities, while official Israeli literature has promoted political projects aimed at integrating minorities into its broader penetration strategies. This is evident in the following examples: 1. An Israeli study indicates that, before the Camp David period, relations with Arab minorities and certain Arab countries were overseen by Israeli security agencies rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the fundamental hostility between Israel and the Arabs. Furthermore, some interactions with minorities required confidentiality, as was the case with the Kurds, the Maronites and certain groups in the Maghreb.[9] 2. A dissertation traces the development of contacts between the Jewish Agency and minorities, particularly the Kurds, in the early 1930s. It examines Israel’s efforts to instill the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” among Kurdish minorities, with an initial focus on Iraq. However, these attempts faced opposition from the countries with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The study then examines how the extent of Zionist penetration into Kurdish society was linked to the political regime’s stance toward Israel in the Middle Eastern country. Accordingly, Zionist plans emphasized that Kurds and Jews share a common enemy—the Arabs—framing cooperation between the two as necessary in confronting this shared adversary.[10] 3. At a later stage, the issue of the relationship with minorities in the Arab world evolved into declared projects, occupying the focus of research circles in Israel. This was evident in the work of Oded Yinon, who was responsible for the long-term planning division in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His central idea was to divide Arab countries based on sub-identity lines, even very narrow ones.[11] 4. The effort to perpetuate the sub-identities of minorities—sectarian, religious, ethnic, and others—by disseminating extensive literature on each group. The ultimate goal is to position the Jewish identity in the Middle East as an integral and consistent part of the region’s broader ethnic landscape.[12] In his book, Kamal Jumblatt discusses Israel’s relationship with certain sub-identities in Lebanon, including its provision of weapons, and highlights studies published by various institutions to reinforce subcultural identities. He references correspondence between former Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his ambassador in Rome, which outlines a strategy to fragment the region—Lebanon in particular—into sectarian states, thereby establishing Israel as the dominant power while aligning its political geography with the social composition of neighboring countries.[13] 5. In his October 2024 appointment speech, Israel’s current foreign minister, Gideon Sa‘ar, emphasized the need to re-establish relations with the Kurds, whom he viewed as being “victims of repression and hostility on the part of Iran and Turkey.” He highlighted that “they enjoy autonomy…in Syria it is de facto, and in Iraq it is also de jure, in the Iraqi constitution.” Sa‘ar also advocated for strengthening ties with the Druze in both Syria and Lebanon, presenting this strategy as a counterbalance to what he described as Iran’s use of minorities to further its regional policies.[14] He believes that “an alliance with the moderate Sunni Arab countries will ensure Israel’s security against the Iranian axis,” effectively aligning along sectarian lines.[15] He has advocated for the division of Syria into several states: a Sunni state in the center, a Druze one in the south, an Alawite state along the coast, and a Kurdish in the north.[16] Third: Utilizing the Variables Governing Israel’s Relationship with Minorities in the Arab World Israeli policy towards sub-identities in the Arab world is characterized by clear duplicity. On one hand, it aims to dismantle Palestinian refugee camps (RCs) in the Arab diaspora, particularly in neighboring Arab countries, as these RCs have been a key factor in strengthening Palestinian national identity, which Israel views negatively. Simultaneously, it seeks to assimilate Palestinian refugees into the societies of the diaspora. In October 2024, Israel took steps to disrupt the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in RCs in the occupied territories, intending to push these RCs toward social disintegration due to economic hardship. The Knesset passed two laws that ban all UNRWA activities and services in Israel, sever all ties between government employees and UNRWA and strips its staff of their legal immunities.[17] This position has been supported by the US since the first Trump presidency. A document titled Concept Paper, published and prepared by Israeli security agencies, outlines plans to integrate Palestinians into both Arab and Western societies.[18] This aligns with President Trump’s February 2025 proposal to relocate Gazans and resettle them in non-Palestinian communities.[19] On the other hand, Israel actively works to revive sub-identities within Arab society to encourage separatist movements and further geopolitical fragmentation. It is among the strongest supporters of separatist tendencies, as seen in its growing ties with South Sudan following its secession, its relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, and its engagement with certain Christian factions in Lebanon. This highlights the political exploitation of sub-identities to serve Israeli interests. This means that the Israeli strategy relies on contradictory approaches. On one hand, it aims to assimilate and integrate Palestinians into diaspora societies, while on the other, it seeks to revive the historical identities of subcultures in Arab countries to dismantle these nations. Furthermore, it strives to revive Jewish sub-identities in societies worldwide, encouraging disconnection from their original communities and migration to Israel based solely on religious identity. This is further evidenced by Netanyahu’s calls for Israel to be a “Jewish state.”[20] Fourth: Israeli Infiltration Mechanisms within Sub-Identities Israel’s strategy of infiltrating sub-identities within the Arab world is founded on several key principles: 1. Awareness of the Phenomenon of Arab Minorities: Scientific research on ethnicity, sectarianism, and other sub-identities is central to a broad network of research centers. One key institution in this field is the Shiloah Institute, which was founded in 1959 and was named after Reuven Shiloah, the first director of the Mossad and a specialist in Kurdish affairs. The institute was to be linked to the Hebrew University but was duly established to Tel Aviv University in 1965, where it became known as the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies. It includes departments focused on central Middle East regions, each headed by an expert assigned to a specific region.[21] Notably, current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa‘ar was among those involved in this academic work. 2. Direct Communication with the Elites and Party Leaders of Some Minorities: A review of studies on this issue reveals that Israel has historically exploited the sensitivities between sub-identities to engage with their leaders, amplifying their fears and offering support to confront the “tyranny of the Arab majority.” Initially, covert and semi-public channels were the primary strategy for Israel. However, as the base of normalization expanded with several key Arab countries, these methods became less covert, with a focus on engaging with sub-identity elites in the countries neighboring Israel.[22] However, this does not mean Israel overlooked minority elites in other countries such as Sudan or Morocco. Many Israeli studies highlight rounds of secret talks with Sudanese leaders during the intense periods of Arab nationalist movements, which lasted from 1954 to 2019. These efforts ultimately paved the way for full normalization between the two parties, with the secession of South Sudan being one of the significant outcomes of Israel’s involvement in this regard.[23] 3. Exploiting Minority Grievances and Authoritarianism on Sub-Identities and Income Misdistribution: The Israeli focus is primarily on minorities where the geographical determinant encompasses three key dimensions: peripheral location, significant economic resources, and demographic concentration. This focus is most evident in relations with the Kurds and South Sudan, though the political exploitation of other minorities remains significant as well. The gaps in democracy and the unequal income distribution across groups or regions within Arab societies provide an easy loophole for exploitation. The Arab region, being the least democratic globally and one of the most unequal in terms of wealth distribution (according to the Gini Index), faces a situation that fosters political instability and promotes separatist tendencies. 4. Israel seeks to dismantle the social fabric of historic Palestine through the Pyramidal Segmentary theory, dividing Palestinian society into three groups: the Arabs of 1948, the inhabitants of what it calls “Judea and Samaria,” and the residents of Gaza Strip (GS). It then further fractures Palestinian identity within each group, classifying the Arabs of 1948 into Christians, Muslims, Druze and Bedouins (Negev).[24] In the West Bank (WB) and GS, it promotes local government administrations based on tribal and clan affiliations, fostering lower loyalties at the expense of the higher loyalty.[25] Furthermore, it has announced a Shin Bet plan to divide GS into small local districts, assigning their administration to tribal or clan leaders based on the size of each tribe or clan.[26] Despite tribal and clan leaders rejecting this Israeli concept, research in this direction continues intensively. Notably, discussions on this matter are not isolated from past precedents, such as Village Leagues in WB. In fact, research on this topic dates back more than a decade and a half before Operation al-Aqsa Flood.[27] This demonstrates that Israeli policy applies the Pyramidal Segmentary theory to serve political objectives rather than adhering to international norms and conventions. The table below highlights this contrast:   The table above reveals the following: 1. Israel encourages Jews abroad to maintain their sub-identity in anticipation of future immigration to Israel, while simultaneously weakening their broader national identity in favor of religious or ethnic affiliation. In contrast, it pushes the Palestinian diaspora countries toward policies of integration, assimilation and naturalization. 2. In Israel, the Jewish community is focused on promoting common values that define Jewish identity, striving to create unity by employing the Melting Pot approach to eliminate sub-identities (such as Ashkenazi/ Sephardic, white/ black, Russian, African, Arab, and others). At the same time, efforts are being made to revive sub-identities among Palestinians in WB, 1948 Palestinians, and those in GS, through distinctions such as tribe, clan, sect, religion, nationality (Arabs/ Druze), or place of residence (urban/ Bedouin/ peasants). 3. Efforts to strengthen the collective identity of Israeli society, rooted in the Jewish religion, are reflected in the growing influence of Jewish religious forces and their increasing political weight in decision-making. Meanwhile, there is a push to assign local authorities and administrations in Palestinian areas based on social divisions, such as village leagues, clans and tribes, etc. 4. Weakening the geographical determinant in its three dimensions, as discussed previously, aims to push the Palestinian individual to emigrate. Fifth: Conclusions and Recommendations Based on the above, any revival of sub-identities within Palestinian society contributes directly to Israel’s project of fragmenting the Palestinian social fabric, which underpins all forms of resistance. Whether the fragmentation occurs on regional, ethnic, sectarian, religious, tribal, or clan lines, it significantly serves Israel’s political strategy, which calls for: 1. Intensifying scientific studies and the content of Palestinian political discourse should focus on fostering general loyalty to Palestinian identity, rather than special or lower loyalty (such as organizational, tribal, regional, or religious), as outlined in the Pyramidal Segmentary theory. This responsibility falls on universities, research centers, Palestinian organizations, and civil society bodies. 2. Palestinian organizations should consider how to adapt Israeli political practices to target Israeli sub-identities. In a previous study, we highlighted the significant diversity of Israeli sub-identities, which could be leveraged to destabilize the Israeli social structure.[28] 3. There is a need to strengthen and institutionalize communication between Palestinian organizations and Palestinians in the Diaspora, encouraging the establishment of civil society organizations that aim to preserve Palestinian identity through educational tools and various social symbols. This approach mirrors the method employed by Israel with Jewish communities worldwide. 4. Supporting political trends in the Middle East, particularly those that eliminate binary narratives of sub-identities and counter trends that deepen fragmentation. The uniqueness of the Palestinian situation necessitates a stronger focus on the literature of national identity within Palestinian society, with loyalty to it serving as the foundation. This applies not only to Palestinians in historic Palestine but also to those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and the Palestinian diaspora abroad. References [1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.[2] T.V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 74–76.[3] Gay Elizabeth Kang, “Conflicting Loyalties Theory: A Cross-Cultural Test,” Ethnology journal, vol. 15, no. 2, April 1976, pp. 203–207.[4] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran journal, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, pp. 67-68. (in Arabic)[5] Encyclopedia Britannica defines ethnicity as “the identification of a group based on a perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes the group into a ‘people.’ This distinctiveness is believed to be expressed in language, music, values, art, styles, literature, family life, religion, ritual, food, naming, public life, and material culture,” see ethnicity, site of Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnicity[6] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” Sydney, June 2024, https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf[7] Democracy Index 2023, Age of conflict, site of Economist Intelligent (EIU), https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy-Index-2023-Final-report.pdf[8] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “A Model for the Measurement of Secessionist Tendencies among Minorities in the Arab World,” Omran, vol. 1, no. 4, 2013, p. 61. (in Arabic)[9] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment journal, Institute for National Security Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023, pp. 142–145, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Inbari.pdfSee also the relationship with the Berber (Amazigh) in Morocco: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Morocco’s Berbers and Israel,” Middle East Quarterly journal, Middle East Forum (MEF), December 2011, pp. 82–84[10] Scott Abramson, “Early Zionist-Kurdish Contacts and the Pursuit of Cooperation: the Antecedents of an Alliance, 1931-1951” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 2019), pp. 14–25 and 29–41, https://escholarship.org/content/qt2ds1052b/qt2ds1052b_noSplash_b0b0087d30def88f05e48b5dc022997b.pdf?t=py0wm5[11] Israel Shahak, The Zionist Plan for the Middle East (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1982), Special Document No.1, https://archive.org/details/the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east-by-oded-yinon-israel-shahak-yinon-oded-shah[12] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd edition (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp.13–23.[13] Kamal Jumblatt, Hazihi Wasiyyati (This is My Will), 1st edition (Paris: Arab World Institute, 1978), pp.76–77.[14] Newly-Appointed Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar: We Still Aim For Peace With The Arab World; We Must Seek Out Natural Alliances With Minorities In The Region, Such As The Kurds, Druze, site of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 10/11/2024, https://www.memri.org/tv/israeli-fm-gideon-saar-appointment-speech-natural-alliances-minorities-region[15] Sam Sokol, Sa’ar says Israel should seek alliances with Kurds and Druze in the region, site of The Times of Israel, 27/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-says-israel-should-seek-alliances-with-kurds-and-druze-in-the-region/[16] Gideon Sa‘ar and Gabi Siboni, “Farewell to Syria,” INSS Insight, no. 754, site of The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 13/10/2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/farewell-to-syria/[17] Joseph Krauss, Julia Frankel and Melanie Lidman, Israel approves two bills that could halt UNRWA’s aid delivery to Gaza. What does that mean?, site of Associated Press (AP), 29/10/2024, https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-un-aid-refugees-16bc0524adc947b95abe25d7d9eca038[18] Amy Teibel, AP and TOI Staff, Intelligence Ministry ‘concept paper’ proposes transferring Gazans to Egypt’s Sinai, The Times of Israel, 31/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/intelligence-ministry-concept-paper-proposes-transferring-gazans-to-egypts-sinai/[19] What is Trump’s Proposal for Gaza?, site of American Jewish Committee (AJC), 12/2/2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza[20] To examine the issue of Jewish minorities worldwide and Israel’s approach, with particular emphasis on the dichotomy between Judaism and nationalism—specifically, the distinction between ethnicity and religious affiliation. See William Safran, “Israel and the Diaspora, Problems of Cognitive Dissonance,” International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Paper, no. 53, April 2012, pp.4–6 and 13–16.[21] Reuven Shiloah (Saslani), site of Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/shiloa-x1e25-zaslani-reuben; and Haggai Eshed, The Man Behind the Mossad, translated by David & Leah Zinder (Abingdon: Frank Cass & Co, 1997), pp. 33–34.[22] Pinhas Inbari, “Why Did the Idea of an Alliance between Israel and Minorities in the Levant Collapse?,” Strategic Assessment, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2023.[23] For details on the depth of penetration of elites and minorities in Sudan, see Elie Podeh and Andrew Felsenthal, “Israel and Sudan: The Origins of Clandestine Relations 1954–1964,” Israel Studies journal, vol. 28, no. 2, June 2023, passim.[24] On these issues, see Kay Zare, “Permanent Transitions: Collective Identity Formation in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine,” site of American University, 2010, https://www.american.edu/spa/publicpurpose/upload/permanent-transitions-2.pdf; and Mia Heapy, Complex Identity Politics In Israel/Palestine, site of The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 10/6/2021, https://theowp.org/reports/complex-identity-politics-in-israel-palestine[25] Hisham Motkal Abu-Rayya and Maram Hussien Abu-Rayya, “Acculturation, religious identity, and psychological well-being among Palestinians in Israel,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Elsevier, vol. 33, no. 4, July 2009, pp. 325–331, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S014717670900056X[26] Nagham Mohanna, Gaza tribes helping Israel to administer territory would be recipe for chaos, experts say, site of The National, 14/3/2024, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/palestine-israel/2024/03/14/gaza-tribes-helping-israel-to-administer-territory-would-be-recipe-for-chaos-experts-say/; and Yaniv Voller, The Inevitable Role of Clans in Post-Conflict Stabilization in Gaza, site of War on the Rocks, 24/5/2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/the-inevitable-role-of-clans-in-post-conflict-stabilization-in-gaza/[27] Extensive discussions among Israeli elites address this topic, and a review of these papers and their referenced sources should be sufficient to illustrate Israel’s interest in this concept. See Dror Ze’evi, “Clans and Militias in Palestinian Politics,” Middle East Brief series, no. 26, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 2008, pp. 3–6.[28] Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, The Correlation Between Social Deviance and Political Violence in Settler Colonial Societies: Israel as a Model, site of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 10/12/2020, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2020/12/10/academic-paper-the-correlation-between-social-deviance-and-political-violence-in-settler-colonial-societies-israel-as-a-model/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Less than a fortnight after Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky had their now-notorious row in the Oval Office and US-Ukrainian relations appeared irretrievably damaged, the two countries have reached an agreement. After nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiators signed off on a US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, allowing the resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing by the US. This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties – Russia and Ukraine – has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials. Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward. From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement – on hold since the White House shouting match on February 28 –is back on. Trump has extended an invitation to Zelensky to return to Washington to sign it. Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia. By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the arguably more strategically important goal of rapprochement with the US. Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington – including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no Nato membership for Ukraine. These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia’s isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country’s economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is also likely to be keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.   Putin is therefore likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal was announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American – let alone Ukrainian – terms. This indicates a willingness to talk but also signals that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will still require further negotiations. Pressure points Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine – and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end of the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps – pressure on Ukraine and on Russia – are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defenses to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a cease-fire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls. That’s because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the balance of power, at least on some parts of the front line. The most likely scenario going forward is a two-pronged Russian approach. The Kremlin is likely to engage with the White House on the American ceasefire proposal that has now been accepted by Ukraine while pushing hard for further territorial gains before US-Russia talks conclude. The peculiar set-up of the negotiations also plays into the Kremlin’s hands here. Short of direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, Washington has to shuttle between them, trying to close gaps between their positions with a mixture of diplomacy and pressure. This has worked reasonably well with Ukraine so far, but it is far less certain that this approach will bear similar fruit with Russia. The temporary ceasefire currently on the table may, or may not, be an important step towards a permanent cessation of violence and a sustainable peace agreement. Whether it will become a milestone on the path to peace will depend on Trump’s willingness to pressure Russia in a similar way to Ukraine. It’s important to remember that Ukraine has already paid a huge price as a result of Russia’s aggression. Any further delay on the path to a just peace will inflict yet more pain on the victim instead of the aggressor. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/]