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Dear colleagues, Dear guests, This Summit, for which I thank the leadership of the United Arab Emirates, is a key moment in our efforts to contain global temperature rise to within 1.5°C. We have reached the first Global Stocktake, and while there are reasons to be optimistic, the goal remains far off. COP28 must be a turning point. We are called upon to set a clear direction and enact concrete actions – reasonable but concrete - such as tripling the world’s renewable energy generation capacity by 2030 and doubling the global rate of annual energy efficiency improvements, as also outlined by the Presidency. Italy is doing its part in the decarbonization process, and it does it in a pragmatic way, that means with a technology-neutral approach, free from unnecessary radicalism. My idea is that if we want to be effective, if we want environmental sustainability that does not compromise the economic and social sphere, what we must pursue is an ecological transition, and not an ideological one. We are gradually replacing coal-fired power generation with renewables, we have adopted a new Energy and Climate Plan, and we are investing resources and attention on biofuels, so much so that we are among the founders of the Global Biofuels Alliance. In the European context, we have charted a path to carbon neutrality by 2050 and to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030. But we are also committed to ensuring, through the EU "Fit for 55" program, a multi-sectoral approach that strengthens labor markets and mitigates the impact on our citizens. And this is an essential point, because if we think that the green transition can result in unbearable costs, particularly for the most vulnerable, we condemn it to failure. Italy intends to direct an extremely significant share of the Italian Climate Fund – whose overall endowment is 4 billion euro – to the African continent. Not, however, through a charitable approach, because Africa does not need charity. It needs to be put in the condition to compete on an equal footing, in order to grow and prosper thanks to the multitude of resources that the continent possesses. A cooperation between equals, rejecting paternalistic and predatory approaches. Energy is one of the cornerstones of the Mattei Plan for Africa, the cooperation and development plan on which Italy is working with great determination to build mutually beneficial partnerships and support the energy security of African and Mediterranean Nations. And we are also, in this way, working towards becoming a strategic hub for clean energy, by developing the necessary infrastructure and generation capacity, in our homeland and in the Mediterranean. After the Rome Conference on Development and Migration, two new financial instruments were established to address the root causes of migration, combat human traffickers, and guarantee the right not to emigrate. We will continue to support the Green Climate Fund also in the next cycle, and as I’ve already announced yesterday, we will contribute with 100 million euro to the new loss and damage fund, strongly pursued by the Emirates’ Presidency. And all these priorities will also be at the heart of Italy's G7 Presidency, in 2024. I want to thank, in conclusion, the Emirati Chair and Sultan Al Jaber and express my congratulations for a COP28 of absolute success. We are all aware, colleagues, that many of the efforts we are making today will likely produce visible results when many of us no longer have roles of responsibility. But doing it anyway – not for ourselves but for those who will come after us – defines the value of our leadership. As Warren Buffet wrote, "There is someone sitting in the shade today because someone else planted a tree long ago." Thank you.

The Israel/Hamas war poses some issues for International Relations scholars which we perhaps tend to downplay. For example, the desire to act or demonstrate solidarity, to fulfil the imperative to ‘decolonise’ or ‘to call out the oppressors’, can often clash with the desire to deconstruct or oppose claims to political or moral authority. Today many people are becoming increasingly aware of our shared imbrications and entanglements, where all ‘our livelihoods are underwritten by colonial violence and unsustainability’. If coloniality is not something that can just be wished away but is at the heart of the international system, the best of intentions can often result in reducing decolonising to a metaphor or taking shortcuts – ‘decolonial washing’ via publishing appeals, petitions and statements – rather than initiating transformative change. For example, one minute we’re reading or writing critical studies of the ways that international institutions gain moral authority through international humanitarianism, but the next minute, when something dreadful happens in the world, it seems that there is no alternative but to demand that our governments act ‘progressively’ in the world. This problem perhaps is most acute when it comes to the demand that ‘something must be done’ about international outrages, such as war crimes and genocide. In these cases, it appears that our ethical and political desires to decolonise have no avenue of expression without reinforcing the existing domestic and international hierarchies. The danger is magnified in the cases of international policy discourses that assert their humanitarian and universal underpinnings, seeking legitimacy for interventions to protect victims of violence. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins writes: ‘…race and racism need to be taken seriously as features within the structures of humanitarian thought and practice. Alongside this, it is necessary, for scholars and practitioners alike, to acknowledge that humanitarianism, with its universalist claims, acts as a salve for sustained racial discrimination and violence, working if not to entirely invisibilize racial hierarchies within suffering, then to make the racial underpinnings of such suffering acceptable through supposedly universal practices of care.’ In such cases, the moral imperative to ‘decolonise’ can be particularly paradoxical. If ‘decolonising’ is to be more than a managerial buzzword, the global structures of power and domination, built on colonial exploitation, indigenous dispossession, and chattel slavery, would need to be dismantled. This would seem to rub up against the desire that dominant world powers and international and domestic institutions demonstrate their ‘decolonial’ credentials. Perhaps it could be argued that we have already rehearsed this problem of international institutions garnering moral and political credibility on the back of wars and atrocities. Most recently in the international attention to the Ukraine/Russia conflict, making some (white, European) lives more grievable than others. It seems particularly difficult to take colonial legacies and continuing international hierarchies of power out of international calls for humanitarian action in the Israel/Hamas conflict. For example, many University schools and departments are drawing up their own petitions on the conflict. Staff are not merely left to sign one of the many petitions already in existence, calling for peace and justice in Gaza, but are encouraged to organise their own workplace petitions. The reason for this bypassing of existing demands for the British government to act as a force for peace has little to do with Britain’s key colonial role in the establishment of Israel as a settler-colonial state. The need for a separate petition arises in order for colleagues to make solidarity demands upon their university employers and to “show that our stated commitment to progressive values and decolonising education actually means something”. It becomes a problem when the desire to demonstrate ‘decolonial’ or ‘progressive’ credentials takes the form of petitioning the British government and University and other employers to involve themselves in international conflicts as a way of demonstrating that they somehow share or can lead political and ethical work in this area. This is particularly the case when many leading states and educational institutions would find it much more difficult to discuss their own financial dependency on endowments from the profits of coloniality and chattel slavery. As leading authorities on ‘decolonial washing’ write, ‘we contend that engaging in complicated conversations is a necessary condition for decolonising university curricula’. It is doubtful that conversations about these institutions own colonial complicities can be short-cut through petitioning them to become decolonial actors elsewhere in the world. As Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang argued, not taking decolonising seriously ends up in settler ‘moves to innocence’ and ‘settler futures’ where leading colonial institutions and beneficiaries are reimagined in non-oppressive terms. As the editors of Decolonising the University state: ‘the foundations of universities remain unshakably colonial’. Therefore, focusing on the British government and leading employers and institutional benefactors in ways that problematise assumptions of their moral authority would presumably be more useful than calling upon these institutions to demonstrate their commitment to decolonising. As Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti powerfully argues – ‘Potholes in the Road toward Decolonization (For People in Low-Intensity Struggle)’ – coloniality is so baked into Western state powers and institutions that attempts to take ‘short cuts’ through making ‘decolonial’ claims and statements can easily feed into existing hierarchies, reproducing ‘colonial entitlements’ rather than challenging them.

The attacks on shipping in the Red Sea is a test for the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy to deal with China In a House Armed Services Committee hearing in March 2023 on the US posture and security challenges in the Middle East and Africa, it was acknowledged that “…President Biden’s decision to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan has undermined our national security.” The developments of the past few weeks in the Red Sea have made this assertion seem prophetic. Yemen’s Houthi rebels have strategically positioned themselves to exploit less monitored zones in the Red Sea and the broader Arabian Sea. With numerous naval vessels navigating this critical route linking the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, countering the Houthi rebels and their assaults on global shipping has become exceedingly challenging for the US. The Houthi rebels have connected these attacks to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, tying the halt in hostilities along shipping lanes to a ceasefire negotiation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Their strategy involves increasing attacks on ships and holding them as leverage to prompt the US to pressure Israel for a ceasefire. The timing of the Houthi actions aligns with Israel’s focused operations in southern Gaza and a waning Congressional backing in the US for continuous financial support for overseas conflicts. Tactically, the Houthis see an opportunity to open a third front in the maritime domain, even as the Israeli air defence systems are overwhelmed by combined rocket attacks of Hamas and Hezbollah in the north and south. In an offensive barrage last week, the Hezbollah carried out six attacks in eight hours. In the maritime domain, the Houthis have carried out multiple UAV, rocket and missile attacks targeting a dozen merchant ships in the larger Indian Ocean. Iran has conducted attacks on US and Israeli vessels in the region as well. A recent attack on an Israeli vessel off the west cost of India near Veraval is a red flag for safety and security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Indo-Pacific. With unmanned aerial vehicles and use of other technological capabilities, the attacks on ships could be rapid, discreet, damaging and, most of all, with little or no accountability. Often, the vulnerabilities associated with international strategic choke points have always been assessed from the perspective of State complicity, resting States’ conviction on limited capacities of non-State actors to exact huge costs. If anything, the Red Sea crisis shows that even with little but calculated external support, non-State actors could indeed significantly disturb the predictability of global supply chains and bring merchandise flow to a halt. The economic impact of increased attacks in the Red Sea is already being felt, as many ships have begun to avoid the route through the Red Sea and prefer the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. This has caused worries of delay in the global freight markets and pricing concerns in energy dependent countries beside the security concerns for shipping companies such as Maersk. Since the Israel-Hamas war began, the US Central Command has been active in preventing a slew of UAV attacks by the Houthi rebels. For the US, the situation developing in the Red Sea presents a combination of political, economic and strategic challenges. The ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza has politically isolated the US at the global level as the only country to oppose a UNSC ceasefire resolution. The political heat from the Israel-Hamas war is being felt at home with dwindling youth support for President Biden as presidential elections near. The economic costs of the two wars – one in the Middle East and the other in Ukraine – is already tearing the US Congress apart. At the strategic level, coordinated attacks on international shipping threatens to force a rebalancing of the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific. The US currently has two aircraft carriers positioned in the Middle East since the Israel-Hamas war began. While a strong US military presence in the region may have prevented the war from spreading through the region, any additional and long-time concentration of force posture in the Gulf may be detrimental to Washington’s Indo-Pacific intent. Indeed, America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is being tested in the Middle East through five core ideas. Firstly, the recentring of US forces in the Middle East contradicts the intended pivot towards Asia. Secondly, the attacks orchestrated by the Houthis and Iran highlight the unpredictable threats that can disrupt supply chains in the region. Thirdly, the US faces challenges in executing counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts in the Indo-Pacific, especially while collaborating with allies. Moreover, integrating the Middle East into an Indo-Pacific connectivity project appears increasingly challenging. Lastly, China’s refusal to join the US in protecting the Red Sea shipping lanes reveals Beijing’s divergent strategy for engaging with the Middle East from that of the US.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, issued the following statements at the start of the expanded meeting with the members of the War Cabinet: Prime Minister Netanyahu: “Mr. Secretary, it's good to welcome you and your delegation again. We're fighting a war of civilization against barbarism. I can say that when we spoke, I expressed again our commitment, Israel's commitment, to achieve total victory against Hamas. And we think this is not only our war but in many ways your war because you are leading the forces of civilization in the world. This is a battle against the Iranian axis, the Iranian axis of terror, which is now threatening to close the maritime strait of Bab el-Mandeb. This threatens the freedom of navigation of the entire world. I appreciate the fact that you're taking action to open that strait. It's not only our interest, it is the interest I think of the entire civilized community. I want to thank you for the support that you have shown consistently, and I welcome the opportunity to talk about what else we're doing to have our common interests served." US Secretary of Defense Austin: "Prime Minister Netanyahu, thanks for hosting us again. This is my fourth visit to Israel as Secretary of Defense and my second since the terrible day of October 7th. I'm here to underscore what President Biden has said again and again: our commitment to Israel is unshakeable. I know that Israel is a small, tightknit country and I know that all Israelis were touched by the vast evil committed by Hamas. So I'm here to mourn with you for the innocent souls taken from you on October 7th and I'm also here to stand alongside the families of those still missing in Gaza, including US citizens. America's commitment to Israel is unwavering and no individual, group or state should test our resolve. So in the Red Sea, we're leading a multinational maritime taskforce to uphold the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation. Iran's support for Houthi attacks on commercial vessels must stop. Now, we'll continue to provide Israel with the equipment that you need to defend your country, Mr. Prime Minister, including critical munitions, tactical vehicles and air defense systems. We'll continue to support Israel's mission to find and free all of the hostages. I'm also here to discuss how we can best support Israel on a path to lasting security and that means tackling urgent needs first. We must get more humanitarian assistance in to the nearly two million displaced people in Gaza and we must distribute that aid better. We want to thank you for the recent initiatives that you've taken, Mr. Prime Minister. We applaud that and hopefully that will enable us to move even more in. Thanks for again being a great host and I look forward to a great discussion, Mr. Prime Minister." Also participating in the meeting are: For the Israeli side – Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Minister Benny Gantz, Minister Gadi Eisenkot, MK Aryeh Deri, National Security Council Director Tzachi Hanegbi, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff Tzachi Braverman, Government Secretary Yossi Fuchs, IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, the Prime Minister's Military Secretary Maj.-Gen. Avi Gil, and the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser Ophir Falk. For the American side – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown, Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs David Satterfield, Secretary Austin's Chief of Staff Kelly Magsamen and Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Israel Stephanie Hallett. *** The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

Originally published by Hlib Parfonov at The Jamestown Foundation on 13. December 2023 Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 190 Over the past month, as many as ten forced landings of civilian aircraft have taken place in Russia. The most serious of these happened over the past week. On December 7, a fire on board an Aeroflot Airlines Boeing 777 forced the aircraft to make an emergency landing. The plane was flying from Kamchatka to Moscow when a passenger noticed smoke coming from under his seat. The preliminary investigation attributed the fire to a short circuit of wiring in the main cabin (T.me/aviatorshina, December 7). That same day, a Tu-204S cargo plane of Aviastar-Tu Airlines with registration number RA-64024 was returning from Zhengzhou airport in China. After takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic controllers that the left engine had stalled and requested an emergency landing at Ulan-Ude airport (Ruavia.su, December 7). And on December 8, a Siberian Airlines Boeing 737 traveling from Novosibirsk to Moscow made an emergency landing in Tolmachevo. Immediately after takeoff, both of the aircraft’s engines caught fire (T.me/aviatorshina, December 8). These incidents highlight growing problems for Russia’s civilian and commercial aviation. Many of the technical difficulties are tied to Western sanctions prohibiting the import of critical components for the proper maintenance of aircraft. The recent forced landings represent another example of the war in Ukraine increasingly being brought home to Russia. Western sanctions and a critical shortage of technical personnel have hampered Russian civilian aviation since the beginning of the war (see EDM, July 3, September 8). Due to a lack of specialists and necessary spare parts, negligence of management, and Moscow’s fundamental departure from the rules for servicing foreign-made aircraft, much of the Russian civilian fleet could be grounded over the next year, with few prospects for reversing that trend. This is evidenced by the fact that, compared to 2022, the number of flight delays for the Urals MTU of the Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) increased by 44 percent this year (880 in 2023 compared to 490 in 2022). At the same time, there have been 739 cases of flights being unable to depart on time due to technical malfunctions (Insightnews.media, December 7). The lack of access to software updates and proper technical advice, as well as skipping regular maintenance intervals, have led many of Russia’s civilian aircraft to gradually break down. Most often, engines, landing gear, and brakes are the first to fail. Problems with flaps, air conditioning and de-icing systems, or internal wiring are less common but have been seen increasingly in recent weeks. Thanks to the Kremlin’s orders not to record any defects in pilots’ logbooks, all civilian aircraft appear to be perfectly serviceable on paper (Insightnews.media, December 7). Moscow’s problems with domestic aviation extend beyond civilian flights to the commercial sector. Russia’s air freight industry is stagnating fast, as it is dominated by the outdated Soviet Ilyushin Il-76 and Ukrainian Antonov AN-24 and AN-26 cargo aircraft. On November 8, the Federation Council held a roundtable discussion on the state of the country’s air transit capabilities (Gazeta.ru, November 9). Some participants expressed fear that up to 25 percent of the commercial fleet will be inoperable in less than five years. The average age of Russian commercial cargo aircraft is 50 years old. These aircraft have not been properly upgraded and maintained due to the mass transfer of foreign aircraft to Russia before the war; the lack of economic feasibility in completing such an overhaul, with costs estimated at billions of rubles; and the inability to gain access to necessary parts to upgrade the Ukrainian cargo planes. The repercussions of Moscow’s war against Ukraine have forced Russian operators to pay minimal attention to the maintenance of civilian and commercial aircraft. While companies can still source some spare parts for the 50-year-old aircraft, they have run into problems tracking down components for more modern equipment, such as parts for Motor Sich engines. In another example, the aircraft of Abakan Air, which operates international flights for Russian entities and provides transportation services for clients from other countries, are constantly out of order. According to internal documents, engines, air conditioning systems, and even radios often fail, and the company has been unable to bring in the necessary parts and technical expertise to solve these issues (24tv.ua, December 5) Similar problems also extend to helicopter aviation. The main bottleneck involves flagging production of modern engines. For example, in April, Russian Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov announced that a shortage of VK-2500 engines was slowing down the production of Mi-8 transport helicopters. For VK-2500 engines, only a single production center was created in St. Petersburg, with a maximum volume of 200 engines annually. Manturov pointed out that Russian officials had tried increasing the volume to 300, though production has struggled to keep up. Today, demand sits at over 500 for these engines (Interfax, April 11). In addition, extending the service life of transport helicopters has further hurt the industry. As early as 2022, Russian airline Utair asked Rosaviatsia to extend the maximum allowable service life of engines for the Mi-8 and Mi-172 helicopters. The airline asked to increase the period from 7,500 to 9,000 hours, arguing that “the resource condition of TV3-117 engines” is already close to the maximum permissible level. According to aviation experts, such a request is madness and will likely lead to more serious technical issues in the near future (RBC, August 16, 2022) All this points to Moscow’s war against Ukraine increasingly coming home to the Russian public, disrupting their everyday lives. The current trend in Russian civilian and commercial aviation points to the possibility that these two sectors cannot adequately support the country’s transit demands. This will result in a redistribution to the already overloaded Russian railways. That reality will have severe economic consequences and further limit the effectiveness of military logistics in resupplying the frontlines with manpower and munitions in a timely fashion.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are facing one of the worst financial scandals in decades, resulting in growing public distrust of the party and threatening the stability of his government. The Kishida government, which took office in October 2021, was already facing headwinds as its cabinet’s popularity declined due to concerns about the economy, social security and the LDP’s links to the Unification Church. The assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2022 during an election campaign further complicates matters. The assailant claimed that Abe supported the Unification Church, which he said caused his family’s bankruptcy and forced his mother into making donations. Many other LDP parliamentarians are known supporters of the Church. Kishida and the LDP are yet to be transparent about this issue. Despite falling popularity, the LDP’s approval ratings hovered in the 30s between October and November 2023. Analysts suggested that, despite his low popularity, Kishida would continue and that there were no imminent threats to his prime ministership. That scenario changed dramatically at the close of November 2023. One poll suggests that Kishida’s cabinet approval rate has plummeted to 17 per cent, marking the lowest prime ministerial approval rating since the LDP regained power in 2012. The drop in popularity occurred after it was revealed that LDP factions and the individual parliamentarians associated with them had failed to report all revenues from ticket sales at fundraising events. The slush fund, estimated to be millions of dollars, was used for political purposes, violating the Public Funds Control Law. The Public Prosecutors Office has launched investigations into the LDP’s largest and most influential faction, the Seiwakai, commonly referred to as the Abe faction. Reports suggest that four other major factions, including the one led by Kishida, might also be implicated. Kishida has replaced four key cabinet ministers from the Abe faction. The position of Chief Cabinet Secretary — which serves as the face of the government — has gone to Yoshimasa Hayashi. Kishida had removed Hayashi from his position as foreign minister and, facing difficulty in persuading other colleagues to assume the Chief Cabinet Secretary position, Kishida opted for Hayashi, a member of his own faction. The other three ministerial positions went to factions led by Taro Aso, Toshimitsu Motegi and Hiroshi Moriyama. The cabinet reshuffle does not address the core problem — money politics. Money politics remains endemic in Japan’s political system, despite past reforms. In the 1970s, former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka resigned due to a bribery scandal. Following Tanaka’s resignation, the LDP sought to regain public trust by turning to ‘Mr Clean’, former prime minister Takeo Miki. But it was not long before another large-scale financial scandal — the Recruit Scandal — emerged in the late 1980s. The scandal led to former prime minister Noboru Takeshita’s resignation, his secretary’s suicide and the resignation of many high-profile politicians. Takeshita’s successor, former prime minister Sosuke Uno, resigned within months following revelations of sexual misconduct. Amid the scandals, the LDP called in another Mr Clean, former prime minister Toshiki Kaifu. But the LDP’s troubles persisted. The 1993 Sagawa Kyubin financial scandal resulted in the arrest and subsequent imprisonment of LDP ‘strongman’ Shin Kanemaru on tax evasion charges. These scandals ultimately led to the LDP’s electoral defeat in 1993, marking what was supposed to be a new era in Japanese politics. But opposition parties have struggled to win government and sustain it. The LDP regained power within two years of its 1993 defeat. Similarly, the LDP returned to government within three years by defeating the Democratic Party of Japan in 2012. Even during the Abe administration, reports of financial scandals emerged. But Abe’s strong popularity allowed him to survive. The current fundraising scandal and its scale are still unfolding. More resignations are likely. Many details regarding the unlawful accumulation of political funds remain unknown. The Public Prosecutors Office may shed light on the scandal after its investigation. Regardless of the outcome of the investigation, Kishida’s position appears untenable. Though not directly implicated like Tanaka, Takeshita and Uno in the past, the public expects Kishida, as President of the LDP, to own up to the rot in the party and step down. Despite the reshuffle of his cabinet and his statement committing to spearhead reforms in the LDP, it will be a political miracle if he survives this scandal ahead of the LDP presidential election in September 2024. The LDP and its Prime Minister face a choice. They can follow the same path as their predecessors by temporarily presenting a ‘clean’ face and then reverting back to business as usual. Alternatively, the new generation of LDP politicians can challenge the established path and set a different course for the party, one that is policy-focused, transparent, less factional and not hereditary. But it remains uncertain whether the new generation of LDP politicians is inclined to take on this challenge. The opposition parties remain weak, fragmented and unable to replace the LDP. Yet they play a crucial role in keeping the LDP government accountable. Without the Japanese Communist Party’s scrutiny, the present fundraising scandal might never have come to light.

BOTTOM LINE • Taiwan’s presidential election is scheduled for January 13, 2024. • A down-to-the-wire effort by two of the three opposition candidates to unite against front-runner William Lai Ching-te failed dramatically, while the third candidate made a grand last-minute exit. • Disarray among the opposition will not necessarily guarantee Lai’s election, with the latest polls showing him barely ahead of his two remaining challengers. • Both challengers, though averring their preference for a strong relationship with the United States, favor warmer relations with Beijing in a manner that may portend some degree of willingness to accept unification with China that would adversely impact US and Japanese security interests • Chinese efforts to influence the vote have included military intimidation, veiled threats of invasion, and disinformation. On Saturday, January 13, 2024, Taiwan will go to the polls to choose itsa next president and 113 seats in the country’s unicameral Legislative Yuan (LY). Current president Tsai Ing-wen is term-limited and at first four, now three, contenders are seeking to succeed her, making this the most contested election since 2000. What’s at Stake for the United States The United States is significantly involved in one war in the Middle East, another in Eastern Europe, and is hence at pains to avoid confrontation in Asia. It has sent two aircraft carrier groups and ammunition to support Israel as well as large quantities of weapons to the Ukrainian government, leaving concerns in both America and Taiwan about how much assistance it could give the country should Xi Jinping decide to attack. Given China’s avowed desire to annex the island by force if Taiwan’s citizens do not agree to unification amicably, and Beijing’s strong reaction to anything that it construes as moves to further legitimize Taiwan’s de facto independence, the Biden administration prefers a Taiwanese president who will avoid both actions that could prompt an attack and measures that would bring the island under Beijing’s control. More than democracy and human rights are at issue: Since Taiwan sits astride sea lanes that are vital for international commerce and security, ceding the country to China would enhance Beijing’s control of both. An estimated 40 percent of world trade passes through the South China Sea, which China has increasingly asserted its control over. Japan, a US treaty ally, has what is arguably an even greater stake in stability in the Taiwan Strait since a Taiwan under Chinese control would bring its territorial waters perilously close to Japan as well as potentially adversely impact the shipping that is so vital to its economy. China also contests control of areas of the East China Sea with Japan. Since Okinawa hosts the only US bases within 500 miles (the unrefueled combat radius of US fighters) from Taiwan, China might well strike those bases at the outset of a conflict. Japanese leaders have explicitly said that a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency and therefore an emergency for the Japan-US alliance. The Dramatis Personae Lai Ching-te (English name William Lai) is Taiwan’s incumbent vice-president and the nominee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Born in 1959 and the son of a coal miner, he is a medical doctor with expertise in spinal cord injuries, though he has dedicated his later career to politics. Regarded as a lackluster campaigner, he can however point to his extensive record in office as a legislator, then premier, and most recently as vice-president. Hou Yu-ih, born in 1957 and the son of pork sellers, represents the Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party. After graduating from the Central Police Agency and obtaining a doctoral degree in crime prevention and corrections, he had a long career in law enforcement before becoming deputy mayor and later mayor of New Taipei City. Hou says that his background in police work is excellent preparation for service as president. Ko Wen-je, born in 1959, is a medical doctor known for his expertise in organ transplants before going into politics. Ko successfully ran for mayor of Taipei as an independent, though with the endorsement of the DPP. In 2019, Ko founded the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) as a challenge to the KMT and DPP. Terry Gou (Chinese name Guo Tai-ming) was born in 1950. A late entry into the race and formerly a KMT member who twice sought and was twice refused the party’s endorsement for nominee, he then announced he would run as an independent backed by the $7 billion fortune he made as founder of Hon Hai Precision Industries. Hon Hai, known abroad as Foxconn, is the world’s largest contract manufacturer of electronics. His parents, from Shanxi, fled to Taiwan in 1949, with his policeman father having fought for the KMT during the war. Gou believes that his extensive business experience makes him ideally suited for the presidency. Where They Stand All candidates face the dilemma of having to solicit the support of voters who overwhelmingly reject unification with China while not antagonizing China with its oft-repeated vow to achieve the “sacred task” of unification by whatever means. A poll released in late November showed almost no support for this: only 0.7 percent of respondents replied that they supported independence as soon as possible with 11.5 percent advocating maintaining the status quo while working toward unification. By contrast, 35.8 percent supported maintaining the status quo while working toward independence and 44.3 percent favored forever maintaining the status quo. On other issues, as do politicians worldwide, they must be wary of making promises they will find difficult to deliver on if elected. Lai, who has previously described himself as an advocate of Taiwanese independence, is careful to qualify the statement by adding that, since Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state known as the Republic of China, there is no need for a declaration of independence. He has rejected the so-called 1992 Consensus and pledged to continue Tsai Ing-wen’s non-confrontational policies. The 1992 Consensus refers to the outcome of a meeting in Singapore between the allegedly unofficial representatives of the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT, which then governed in the name of the Republic of China. Members of the opposition party objected. The Consensus, a term that did not exist until 2000, eight years later, holds that each side agreed that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, but that each side has its own understanding of what China is: for the CCP, it is the People’s Republic of China; for the KMT, it is the Republic of China. KMT supporters continue to accept the latter definition, while the opposition DPP reject it, arguing that Taiwan is a sovereign state independent of the PRC. In 2010, newly elected president Tsai Ing-wen offered a concession in that she accepted the historical fact of the conference, but Beijing immediately rejected it as “an incomplete test paper.” The only one of the four candidates to support gay marriage, which has been legal in Taiwan since 2019, Lai wore a rainbow-colored scarf and spoke at a large parade in October to celebrate the law, declaring that equal marriage was not the end but the starting point for diversity. None of the other three presidential candidates attended, although the KMT’s youth wing did, with its members shouting that their party also supported equality as they passed by Lai. Hou Yu-ih accepts the 1992 Consensus, though adds that he objects to both a formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence and China’s offer to rule the country under Beijing’s interpretation of the one-country, two-systems formula. In a Foreign Affairs article that was obviously aimed at a US audience, Hou stressed the importance of urging both sides of the Taiwan Strait to jointly promote democracy, human rights, and mutual trust. He accepts, however, the need for deterrence against invasion and that Taiwan must deepen collaboration with the United States in areas such as intelligence sharing and regular joint training exercises. Hou has vowed to defend the Republic of China if it were attacked. It is significant that he did not use the word Taiwan, thereby implicitly endorsing his party’s position on the One China policy. On healthcare, Hou has promised to raise spending levels on national health insurance to 8 percent from its current 6.5 percent. Observers were puzzled at his choosing to emphasize this policy against two rivals who are medical doctors. Lai immediately countered that rather than announce a spending target, Hou should explain specifically what areas should be targeted for improvement and then suggested several that he, Lai, would pursue. Ko Wen-je emphasizes his pragmatism and rationality. On cross-strait relations, he advocates a middle-of-the-road approach that is neither anti-China nor overly pro-China. Ko has called for regular security talks among senior officials from Japan, Taiwan, and the United States regarding China’s intimidation of Taiwan. He argues that cutting off communication with China increases the risk of war and has expressed willingness to sign economic agreements with Beijing while also advocating that Taiwan follow the United States in de-risking. Agreements would be reviewed and referred to the Legislative Yuan for ratification—a backhanded reference to former president Ma Ying-jeou’s effort to push through a trade agreement with China that aroused a massive protest and closed down the Legislative Yuan for weeks. Ko has called on China to propose a new framework for engagement with Taiwan that explains what Beijing has to offer, telling inquisitive foreign reporters that “it’s their obligation [to do so] not mine” and adding that Beijing must also define exactly what it means by One China, whether it be political or economic. While economic cooperation with China is negotiable, he claims that politically there is “nothing we can do,” though he has said elsewhere that confrontation can be eased through dialogue and cultural, sports, and economic exchanges. Ko has also proposed turning the small offshore island of Jinmen, also known as Kinmen, into an experimental zone for peace between Taiwan and China. Critics immediately pointed out that, apart from being unconstitutional, Ko has not explained whether he would countenance suspending Jinmen’s elections, regulating its residents’ freedom of speech due to Beijing’s censorship and insistence on “internet sovereignty,” or imposing social controls on them to conform with Chinese practice. Terry Gou, whose Foxconn has over a million employees in its factories in China, has denounced the Taiwan independence movement while calling for de-escalating Sino-American tensions. He accepts the 1992 Consensus and advocates positioning Taiwan as equidistant from both the United States and China. As of now, it is “like prey on a tightrope”: If either America or China increases tensions even a little bit, Taiwan “will die a horrible death.” Critics believe that Foxconn’s heavy presence in China would make him vulnerable to pressures from Beijing; Gou responded that he has not managed the company’s operations since 2019 and in fact resigned from Foxconn’s board of directors in September 2023. Denying that he has ever been controlled by China, Gou vowed to reply “yes, do it!” if Beijing threatens Foxconn’s assets. As if to test his mettle, two months later, China announced an investigation into the tax and land use of Foxconn subsidiaries in several provinces, without supplying details. Foxconn management replied that it would “actively comply” with the investigators. Gou is an avowed opponent of gay marriage. Now no longer formally a candidate, he has vowed to keep advocating for these policy views. Taiwan does not possess indigenous fuels, so the energy issue is highly controversial. Opponents of nuclear energy argue that a Fukushima-type meltdown would devastate the much smaller and similarly earthquake-prone island. Proponents point out that without nuclear power, Taiwan would become still more vulnerable if it completely depended on imports to keep its heavily trade-dependent economy healthy. Due to a 2016 government decision to phase out nuclear power by 2025, usage has declined from over 20 percent to about 9 percent at present. Most citizens voted in 2021 to reject finishing a partially built plant whose completion has been suspended for three decades. Only Lai has vowed to make Taiwan a nuclear-free country by 2025, although he has not ruled out retaining some nuclear capability in case of emergencies like a Chinese invasion or blockade. All three other candidates claim that the nuclear-free homeland policy has failed, with Hou explicitly saying that he would revive nuclear power, including restarting two already decommissioned units, extending the operational period of a third, and evaluating whether to revive an abandoned fourth nuclear power plant. While warning of power shortages, no candidate has addressed the questions of safety or of finding a long-term solution for storing nuclear waste. Who’s Ahead? Taiwan, perhaps one of the most extensively polled countries in the world, has so many organizations collecting data that the Taiwan News regularly reports a poll of polls. Lai has been the consistent front-runner. Except for briefly exceeding 40 percent after a stopover trip to the United States en route to Paraguay, he until recently polled in the mid-thirties, with Ko and Hou in the mid-to-high twenties and Guo in the low teens. But Lai’s lead has been eroding. More concerning to the DPP, at the end of October Ko and KMT head Eric Chu reached an uneasy agreement—notably, Hou was not present— to share candidates in some constituencies in order to get a majority in the Legislative Yuan. If this succeeds and Lai is elected, the coalition could block Lai’s initiatives, leading to gridlock, as indeed happened during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. It would also encourage Beijing to court them, as it has done during previous DPP administrations. Since the DPP has been in power for eight years, it has a track record that its opposition and non-committed voters can criticize. Rural citizens interviewed by a Canadian researcher believe that the party has forgotten about them while urbanites complain about inflation and lack of affordable housing and point out that wages have remained stagnant despite healthy growth rates. The youth vote, which had previously been a mainstay of DPP strength, has shown signs of shifting to the TPP. Many, including supporters of the party, believe that a social justice program is badly needed. They accuse the DPP of positioning itself as a progressive party but not behaving like one, urging it to enact policies that meaningfully tax the rich and invest the money in green technology, infrastructure, and innovation. The opposition has said that a DPP victory would mean war with China. Chinese Efforts to Influence the Election Beijing’s least favorite candidate is surely Lai. Rather than overtly interfere, a strategy that backfired badly in the 1996 election, it has tried a mixture of sticks and carrots. Sticks include Chinese fighter jets so regularly crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait that a new normal now exists, ominous warnings from high military figures, and covert attempts such as disinformation. Carrots include hosting youth delegations to visit China, and a plan to make Fujian province a zone for integrated development with Taiwan, including encouraging Taiwanese firms to list on Chinese stock exchanges and supporting innovative ways of cross-strait capital cooperation. Entry and exit visas for “Taiwan compatriots” are being eased. While such initiatives are above board, some others are not. In late October, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau seized $354.6 million in illegal remittances to candidates regarded as sympathetic to China. Among the conduits were businesspeople, contributions to temple charity events, dummy accounts through unregistered banks, and cryptocurrency. It is difficult to tell how successful these tactics are, with anecdotal evidence indicating that while some people are intimidated by China’s threats, others respond negatively. Taiwanese are well aware of the fate of Hong Kong, where the party-state ruthlessly quashed civil liberties in contravention of the promises it was treaty-bound to honor and often used as a cautionary tale to those few who view unification more favorably. Unexpected Last-Minute Developments At the meeting to discuss cooperation on fielding candidates for the Legislative Yuan, Ko and Hou also discussed having one of them agree to become vice-president while the other would be the presidential nominee. Assuming—a big if—that most of the supporters of one would agree to vote with supporters of the other, they would comfortably beat Lai. The possibility of an alliance at the top was always risky: In addition to each man having a healthy ego that would make subordinating himself to the other difficult, Ko was on record as saying that the things he hates most are “mosquitoes, cockroaches and the KMT.” He founded the TPP as a counterweight to both KMT and DPP, attracting many supporters, particularly among the young, who were disenchanted with the two. While some of the young voters might accept an alliance, others would likely feel betrayed. Whether Ko or Hou would get top billing, they pledged to abide by the opinion polls on who was the stronger. After much discussion, the two settled on accepting six of the nine major polls, but then disagreed on who was ahead based on differing interpretations of the margins of error. Former president Ma Ying-jeou then stepped in to mediate, summoning Ko and Hou to his office on November 24, the deadline for filing for the election. Only Hou appeared, waiting several hours fruitlessly. Ko later agreed to meet at a hotel and even then arrived late as a gaggle of media waited impatiently outside. The result was a dramatic failure with the candidates sniping at each other live on the country’s television networks: They will run separately. The event even upstaged Terry Gou’s also dramatic departure wherein the typically flamboyant Gou announced that although he “might be forgotten by the people,” he had chosen to sacrifice himself for the greater good, showing his “utmost dedication to his homeland.” With barely five weeks before the election, analysts have scrutinized the newly announced vice-presidential picks of the remaining three candidates. Lai has chosen Hsiao Bi-khim, the highly regarded woman who has served as Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Washington for the past several years. But whether and by how much the choice will increase Lai’s popularity remains to be seen. Beijing has denounced Hsiao as a “diehard secessionist” and says the decision could “mean war for Taiwan,” which could scare some voters. Asked about this at a television interview soon after her selection, Hsiao responded carefully, saying that all Taiwanese reject war and that any candidate “must approach [relations with China] with utmost responsibility.” Hou’s choice for vice-president, the avowed pro-unificationist media executive Jaw Shaw-kong, also has negatives as well as positives. Presumably chosen to appeal to the KMT’s conservative base, Jaw is apt to alienate more moderate KMT members and voters who fear unification. His more assertive personality and markedly different view of unification raise the possibility of friction between him and Hou. Kou’s vice-presidential pick, Cynthia Wu, is likewise problematic. With very little political experience, she has been an executive of a family-founded major life insurance company that has been fined for speculation and questionable land deals. This undercuts the TPP’s claim to be the party that represents the interests of the young and underprivileged. Meanwhile, polls show Lai’s lead over Hou shrinking to about one point, with Ko less than four points behind Hou. At this point, the election is too close to call. Expect the Unexpected? Should it have to live with Lai, Beijing’s least bad scenario would be a divided Legislative Yuan, which would enable it to work with the opposition, as it also has done with previous DPP-led administrations. Assuming, as is likely, that Lai can be trusted to keep his promise to continue his predecessor’s nonconfrontational policies, he is certainly Washington’s preferred candidate. But, as evidenced by the events of the past few weeks, Taiwan’s politics are full of surprises: Neither the United States nor China can be sure that the election will go in its preferred direction. Dealing with democracies is inherently uncertain, for both autocracies and other democratic countries.

History of Bashur and Israel Kurds, mainly Bashuris, and Israelis share notable similarities that would foster a natural alliance. Since the inception of Bashur, in South Iraq, as a polity in 1991, it has grappled with a hostile neighbourhood intent on weakening and erasing its polity—paralleling Israel’s challenges with Arab states that often deny its recognition. Moreover, the Kurds and Israelis exhibit political, cultural, and historical similarities. However, the precarious nature of their relations, given the hostile neighbourhood, renders the existing literature on Kurdish-Israeli relations sparse. Importantly, this literature fails to address a crucial question: how Bashur politics has shaped these relations? The Lost Israeli Tribes and The Kurds The origins of the Kurds are a subject of dispute among scholars, with various theories linking them to different peoples (Limbert 1968, 40-1). However, scant attention has been given to the connections between the Jews of Israel and Kurds in Bashur. In the seventh century BCE, eight of the ten Israeli tribes residing in ancient Israel migrated and have been considered lost. Various nations, from Mexico to Japan, have claimed descent from these tribes (Lyman 1998, 7). Despite the publication of a DNA research project on the origin of Bashuris in 2001, revealing that “Kurdish and Sephardic Jews were indistinguishable from one another” (Nebel et al. 2001, 1095), such findings might not be well-received among Kurds due to nationalist and Islamist sentiments. Furthermore, Hennerbichler argues that the Kurds constitute one of the oldest nations in the Middle East, highlighting the remarkable similarity between the Modal Kurdish Haplotype DNA and that of Ashkenazi Jews (2012, 69-70). Additionally, Mcdowell suggests that many Iranicized Kurds are of Semitic origin (1992, 9). Despite these perspectives, Kurds generally consider themselves a distinct group that has inhabited the region for an extended period. Hemeres contends that the Kurds are one of the oldest people in the Middle East, possessing their alphabet and predating many present-day Middle Eastern nations (2022). However, Hemeres’s reliance on ancient sources and observations from scholars centuries ago may need to be more scientifically credible. A more scholarly and scientific approach to understanding the origin of the Kurds would be preferable. Both Israelis and Kurds, fearing potential Islamic backlash, face challenges in acknowledging shared ties. Given that a significant portion of Bashuris are Muslims, Israeli policymakers may find it difficult to consider them as similar to Jews, who are both an ethno-religious group—where an Israeli Jew follows Judaism and is ethnically Jewish (Greenspoon 2014, 129). Despite these commonalities, the literature suggests that such shared characteristics have played a limited role, primarily because Iraq and Israel do not share a border, and the risk of Islamic backlash outweighs any potential benefits from their ties. In existing literature, there is no evidence of Israel seeking to aid the Kurds solely due to a perceived kinship but rather to counter strategic threats. However, the Bashuris find themselves in a strategically significant position in Israeli calculations. Even if both Israelis and Bashuris acknowledge such a tie, they may deny it due to the ongoing state of war between Iraq and Israel (Romano and Rojhelat 2019, 171). As recently as 2022, the Iraqi parliament passed a law criminalizing relations with Israel; if found guilty, one could face the death penalty (AP 2022). Throughout much of their history, Bashuris have not identified with Israelis and have generally shown more sympathy towards Palestinians. Despite the emergence of a pro-Israeli sentiment in the region today, it is challenging to establish a direct link between this shift and Israeli involvement in the Kurdistan region. The region’s increasing Westernization since 2005 and improved access to education may also contribute to this change. Moreover, Bashur-Israeli relations have predominantly involved a specific faction of Iraqi Kurds rather than being under the purview of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This is attributed to political, economic, and, to a lesser extent, social divisions within the region. Bashur The presence of a weak state in Iraq, coupled with Baghdad’s historical disputes with its neighbors, has provided the Bashuris with a unique advantage in terms of organization and access to the outside world compared to other Kurds in the Middle East. Notably, Bashuris were the only ones legally recognized as a minority (Edmonds 1959), particularly the Barzanis, who gained international recognition as leaders of the Kurdish revolution against the Iraqi government in the 1920s. In 1946, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was established but eventually dissolved (Edmonds 1959, 2). Mustafa Barzani played a pivotal role in attempting to save the republic, leading followers in a protracted battle with the Iranian Army before seeking refuge in Soviet territories (Reisinzadeh 2019, 65). Following the republic’s collapse, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was founded in 1946 by four Kurdish officers of the Iraqi army, inviting Mala Mustafa to lead the party (Hevian, Rodi 2013, 97). After the 1958 July Revolution in Iraq, Barzani and other Kurdish Peshmerga were allowed to return to Iraq, welcomed by Baghdad in an effort to centralize power under Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim (Rubin 2007, 354). Relations improved, and Iraq was declared a unity between Kurds and Arabs (Bagley 1959, 288-9). Barzani quickly asserted control over much of Kurdistan, prompting fear in Baghdad (Lortz 2013, 39). The strength of the KDP and Barzani, recognized by Baghdad, was evident in their ability to rally people and maintain control over Kurdistan. However, conflicting interests emerged as the KDP sought autonomy while Baghdad aimed to centralize the state against Nasser’s Pan-Arabism. In 1961, the Kurds, led by Barzani, revolted against the Iraqi government, marking the first Kurdish-Iraqi war (Rubin 2007, 353-5). The Kurdish revolt gained strength, with significant defections from Kurdish soldiers in the Iraqi army (Pollack 2004, 219-20). The revolution was successful, controlling many cities and engaging the Iraqi army in 1961 (Paul 2013, 214-5). Despite the revolutionary success, internal divisions within the KDP, involving conservative, Marxist, and nationalist factions, challenged Barzani’s control. The main factions were the Malayyis (Barzani supporters) and the Jalalyis (Talabani followers), proving to be a hindrance to Kurdish unity and their pursuit of rights (Abbas 2020). Hence, when the Israelis arrived in Bashur, the Kurds were already divided. Israeli-Kurdish Reproachment The historical development outlined above explains Israel’s inclination to assist the Kurds. However, proving that the Kurds successfully convinced both the Iranians and Israelis to aid them is challenging. In the case of Iran, the fear of a potent Kurdish revolution spilling over from Iraq likely motivated their alignment with Israeli interests. Israel, valuing its relations with Iran and Turkey and considering any assistance to Kurdish groups within these countries as foreign intervention, strategically supported the Kurds during a crucial time. Efforts by the Kurds to secure Israeli assistance were extensive before Israel agreed to help. Ismet Sharif Vanly notes that the first Bashuri to visit Israel was not Mustafa Barzani or his associates but the General Secretary of the KDP, Ibrahim Ahmad (Bengio 2017), who, at the time, balanced against Mustafa Barzani by controlling the KDP politburo. Ahmad, serving as the de facto president of the party, played a crucial role in approaching Israel, visiting the country during Barzani’s absence. His influence was significant, as evident from his leadership in the KDP and renaming the party from the Kurdish Democratic Party to the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1955 (Reisenzadeh 2019, 65). Barzani, concerned about Qassem, sent Kamuran Ali Baderkhan to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in 1959, seeking political support (Alvand 2016, P: 71). However, tangible support from Israel did not materialize immediately. Israel, prioritizing relations with Turkey and Iran, needed their consent before assisting the Kurds, making their support a tactical move to keep Baghdad occupied without allowing the revolution to escalate beyond control, something that Iran and Turkey were concerned about (Alvandi 2016, 72). Despite the tactical nature of Israeli support, it was unique in its multifaceted approach, encompassing diplomatic, financial, and military aspects. The Kurds’ persistence and the strategic alignment of interests among Iran, Israel, and the United States during this period provide insights into the intricate dynamics that shaped the Israeli-Kurdish relationship. Assisting non-state actors in the Middle East has typically involved arms deliveries and financial support. For instance, Iran initially supported Shiite groups across the region, with assistance being predominantly political. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that Iran began providing military training to these groups (Reisinezhad 2019, 61-70). However, Israeli assistance to the Kurds stands out as a unique example in Middle Eastern history, where a state actively helped a non-state actor to enhance organization and adaptability. Israeli support for the Kurds went beyond supplying weapons and cash. Initially, the Israeli foreign intelligence service Mossad and the Iranian intelligence service Savak collaborated to establish the KDP Parastin in 1966, aiming to gather military intelligence on the Iraqi army, a departure from previous practices (Ghareeb 1981: 133, Hennerbichler 2012, 254). This was a significant change for the Kurds, as internal challenges, including betrayal, had historically impeded Kurdish revolutions. Additionally, Israel provided diplomatic assistance by attempting to facilitate meetings between the Kurds and Americans despite facing some challenges (Alvandi 2016, 74). Furthermore, Israel extended substantial financial assistance, and its military advisors were stationed at KDP headquarters from 1965 to 1975 (Mamikonian 2005, 395). This comprehensive assistance from Israel played a pivotal role in transforming the Kurds from traditionally organized armed tribesmen relying on instinct to a more organized group employing intelligence and modern warfare techniques. Notably, the Kurds typically sought assistance rather than training. When Barzani’s representative, Bedir Khan, returned to Israel in 1963, his meetings with top Israeli leaders, including Golda Meir, focused on securing money, weapons, and a radio transmitter (Alvandi 2016, 72). The assistance provided by Israel likely influenced the Iranians to adopt a similar approach in their dealings with groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. Israel’s deep involvement in the fighting was exemplified in a battle where Israeli commander Tsuri Sagay assisted the Kurds in planning and supervising the war, resulting in significant casualties for the Iraqi forces. Following this success in 1965, Baghdad agreed to grant autonomy to the Kurds, leading to a coup. The Iraqi military refrained from launching another offensive in Kurdistan until January 1969 (Alvandi 2016, P:70). Despite facing setbacks in 1975, their leaders remained intact, and the KDP continued as a political force. One of the main contributing factors to this resilience was the way Israel assisted the Kurds in reorganizing. Therefore, Israel’s aid can be viewed as a state actor’s support to a non-state actor, fitting within the framework of Israel’s external balancing strategy. The Periphery Doctrine The periphery doctrine conceived by Israeli leaders like Ben Gurion emerged as a response to the challenges posed by Israel’s hostile Arab neighborhood. This strategy aimed at cultivating ties with non-Arab states and political entities, including the Kurds and Christian Arabs (Romano and Rojhelat 2019, 165-6; Samaan 2019, 384; Kaye and Roshan 2011, 22). Despite the significant demographic presence of Kurds in the Middle East, Israeli-Kurdish relations were the weakest link in the Periphery Doctrine. Israel primarily engaged with state actors like Iran and Turkey, limiting its support for Kurdish movements in those countries while focusing on assisting Bashuris, given Iraq’s hostility towards Israel (Romano and Rojhelat 2019, 172). The unique relationship between Israel and the Kurds was strategically designed to weaken Iraq in its ongoing conflict with Israel, primarily as Iraq remained in a state of war with Israel, particularly after coming under Iranian influence. Although Israeli-Kurdish relations include business within the framework of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (Romano and Rojhelat 2019, 76-7), they have yet to expand to include other Kurdish groups substantially. From the perspective of Israeli-Kurdish ties, the doctrine appears successful as it contributed to the Kurds maintaining political influence even in the face of military defeat and remaining as a political force in Iraq against Baghdad. The establishment of Parastin and the training of KDP Peshmerga were pivotal in solidifying the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and averting internal splits. Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that one of the earliest divisions, resulting in the de facto existence of two mini-states in the Kurdistan region, predates Israeli involvement in Bashur. This early schism continues to pose a substantial obstacle, limiting the ability of the Bashuris to capitalize on the assistance provided by Jerusalem fully and vice versa. Kurdish Division as An Impediment After the success against the Iraqi government, internal divisions among the Kurds became pronounced. The KDP politburo, specifically the Jalalyis faction, chose to negotiate with Baghdad and even participated in the Baathist government of 1966. This government brought about with assistance from Barzani and Israelis, retained KDP members in Baghdad until the late 1960s (Rashid 2017, 49-52). The consequences were far-reaching, leading to the eventual split of the KDP. The politburo faction, led by Jalal Talabani, became distinct, and the term “Jash,” meaning foal, gained popularity, denoting traitors within the Kurdish community. This internal strife left the Kurds divided, unable to fully capitalize on the foreign support from Israel, Iran, and the United States. It created two conflicting proxies in the Kurdistan region—one aligned with the West and the other with the Eastern Bloc. This exacerbated intra-Kurdish conflicts in Bashur, allowing external powers to manipulate their factions rather than assisting them in realizing their national aspirations. Barzani heavily relied on Iran and, through them, on Israel and the United States for logistics, financial, and military assistance. The revolution faced imminent collapse in 1975 when Baghdad and Tehran signed a deal to end hostilities (Mcdowal 1992, 21-23). Consequently, Barzani called on all fighters to go home, preventing further resistance against the Iraqi government. However, Mahmoud Othman, sometimes referred to as Barzani’s right-hand man, expressed in an interview that it was a failure of the leadership that the revolution collapsed, stating, “We had everything, arms, money, territory, and Baghdad was not that powerful. The Shah told us we could continue fighting” (The Best Video News 2023). Despite having the resources and potential support, Barzani decided unilaterally to halt the fight. After 1975, the KDP transformed into a police force for Iraq and Iran in Bashur, preventing the emergence of any armed group from fighting against Baghdad. While there was limited influence Israel could exert to prevent this, the split had already occurred. Barzani’s monopolization of relations and other international ties compelled him to cease fighting unilaterally. For example, in 1978, approximately 1700 PUK peshmerga attempted to move into the Iran-Iraq-Turkey triangle to establish bases along the Syrian border, where they received weapons and ammunition. This led to a clash with KDP forces, resulting in the death and capture of many PUK fighters (Rizgar 2021, Pencemor 00:26:00-00:29:00). Since its establishment in 1976, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and Syria. According to Jalal Talabani, the founder of the PUK, the Soviets reached out to him in 1975 when Mustafa Barzani declared the end of the revolution. They requested a meeting in East Germany, where Talabani met with a Russian agent. Talabani recounts in his autobiography that during the meeting, the Russian agent asked, “Do you know Alexander?” to which Talabani replied, “Yes, I know him very well.” They both started laughing (Rashid 2016, 20-31). The founding of the PUK was decided in the Soviet Union, contrary to the official PUK history that claims its seven founding members did so in Damascus in 1976. Co-founder Omar Sheikhmous states that Talabani had already formed the PUK on May 22nd, 1976 when it was announced on Syrian national radio. They were informed later (Pencemor 2017, 00:10:40 – 00:12:00). Talabani further mentions, “I met President Hafiz Assad, and he promised to help us and said, Syria is your own country” (Rashid 2017, 38). Most of the PUK’s funding came from Libya, amounting to millions of dollars (Pencemor 2017, 00:40:00 – 00:41:00). Interestingly, the strategic moves that Israel made in the 1960s now fell into the hands of their adversary, the Syrians, who shared similar interests in Iraq. Today, the region remains politically and economically divided socially, to a lesser degree, between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK. Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) enjoys de facto internal sovereignty, it operates as a confederacy between the PUK, which controls the security services and economy of Sulaimani and Halabja provinces, and the KDP, which oversees the security services and economy of Erbil and Duhok (Namdar 2021; Greaves 2019). Consequently, Israeli relations predominantly align with the KDP. Traditionally allied with Iran, the PUK has refrained from fostering such relations with Israel. Nevertheless, the PUK has tacitly consented to Israel’s presence in the KRG, allowing Israeli assistance and shipments to the region, given that the PUK controls half of the KRG. For instance, Israel has trained peshmerga forces and dispatched machinery to the region over the last two decades (Romano and Rojhelat 2019, P:175). Despite these engagements, the primary diplomatic relations with Israel are upheld by the KDP. Kurdish-Israeli Relations Today When Israel lost access to Bashur following the Iranian revolution, the most likely opportunity for a return presented itself after the ousting of Saddam Hussein. Reports of Israeli intelligence presence in Bashur emerged after 2003, indicating an interest in monitoring Syria, Iran, and Iraq (Hersh 2004). In 2022, Iran claimed responsibility for bombing a mansion in Erbil, alleging it housed a group of Israeli spies (Yahya and Abdul-Zahra 2022). Despite the risks, the Kurdistan region, as Iran grows more muscular, sees potential benefits in maintaining ties with Israelis to exert influence on Washington through the pro-Kurdish Jewish lobby in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) (Bengio 2014, P: 3). Although Israel openly supported the Kurdistan region’s independence referendum, this backing, while significant publicly, did not match the level of support on the ground. The referendum contributed to increased pressure from Baghdad, bringing the region to the brink of collapse, and justified an anti-Kurdistan alliance among Middle Eastern Shiites led by Iran (Bengio 2017). Additionally, Bashur lacks the necessary conditions to sustain itself as an independent state, being landlocked in a neighborhood that perceives a Kurdish state as an existential threat. Consequently, constitutionally guaranteed autonomy within Iraq could better protect the rights of the Kurds and serve as a more favorable ally for Israel. Israel’s support for the Barzanis could have been more beneficial if directed towards the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) rather than solely to the Barzanis in the 1960s and now only the KDP, who had centralized military power. Ibrahim Ahmad and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) exposed Barzani’s relations with Israel for similar reasons, not implicating the KDP as they were leaders within the party (Bengio 2014). As a result, relations between Israel and the broader Bashuri factions never fully developed. Furthermore, present-day Israeli-Kurdish relations can be more accurately characterized as Israeli-KDP relations, especially within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) framework, where the KDP dominates critical positions within the KRG. Israel’s support has been used by the KDP to consolidate power, leading to a weakened KRG. The KDP’s security services have become more oppressive, and KDP-controlled areas face criticism from the international community for suppressing journalists and activists (Human Rights Watch 2021). This strain on KDP-PUK relations has further weakened the Kurdistan region, undermining the goals of Israel’s Periphery Doctrine. Moreover, the KDP champions an independent Kurdistan, although practical feasibility could be better due to the region’s landlocked status. Israel’s assistance to the KDP in exporting oil independently from Baghdad, a policy tested to demonstrate survival capabilities, ultimately failed, leaving the Kurdistan region more vulnerable (Henderson et al. 2023). Now, the region is more divided, with a weaker economy and a shrinking population due to immigration (Namdar 2021) As a result, Kurdish-Israeli relations have become monopolized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), creating increased risks for both sides. While it could be argued that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) may not actively seek relations with Israel, as mentioned earlier, the PUK has been part of the overall relations within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In 2008, when Jalal Talabani, Secretary-General of the PUK and President of Iraq, briefly met with Ehud Barak, he faced criticism. He clarified that the meeting was in his capacity as the general secretary of the PUK, not as the president of Iraq (Aljazeera 2008). Moreover, as Israel and the United States have distanced themselves from the PUK, the party has moved closer to Baghdad and Iran. This shift has weakened the KRG and could make Israel’s presence in the region tenuous, introducing increased uncertainty. Erbil has placed considerable expectations on AIPAC, believing it can persuade Washington to adopt policies it might not otherwise consider. It is important to note that while the Israeli lobby is influential, the assistance the U.S. provides to Israel is not solely because Israeli lobbyists convince Washington. Instead, it stems from recognizing that Israel is an indispensable ally to the U.S. in the region (Bar-Siman-Tov 1998). Israel remains the United States’ primary ally in the Middle East, possessing a robust military and contributing significantly to the development of advanced military and technological capabilities. On the other hand, the KRG remains a deeply divided polity without a considerable military force, where it is divided among many factions and parties, and many of the peshmerga lack basic training. An additional implication of a weakened Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), where the secular model has faltered, is the increasing religious orientation among Bashuris. This shift occurs amid severe financial sanctions from Baghdad, and religious discourse has gained prominence in the region’s social media and media outlets. This failure of the KRG has partly resulted from the KDP-PUK divide, where they have yet to present a united front in Baghdad to secure the region’s budget share, making life more difficult for Bashuris over the past eight years. Exposing ties with Israel could further damage the already weakened legitimacy of the KRG, particularly considering the rising religious sentiments among the Kurdish population. Conclusion The Kurds, despite being one of the most significant nations globally, face challenges with fundamental political and social rights. There are three Kurdish polities in the Middle East—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Rojava. These entities have achieved substantial internal sovereignty, but their division has resulted in challenges and a renewed threat to Kurdish self-rule. The Kurds find themselves in a precarious position as their primary ally, the United States, is disengaging from the region, leaving them vulnerable to the interests of neighboring states. Israel, recognizing historical, cultural, and political affinities with the Kurds, has sought to establish strategic relations with them. However, the geopolitical complexities of the region and Kurdish internal divisions have hindered their ability to leverage these relations to secure their political survival. Despite Israel’s assistance in helping the Kurds reorganize and adapt to regional realities, the Kurds have yet to capitalize on these opportunities fully. Bashuri politics have provided justifications for regional powers to take action against the Kurds due to their relations with Israel.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso is an outspoken advocate of Japan’s joining AUKUS – as reflected in his recent speech in Canberra to the AIIA. He also has a record of hawkish comments on Taiwan, but how much influence does he wield within the Japanese government and in his own party? Vice-President of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Taro Aso, was typically outspoken in his speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs Gala Dinner in Canberra in November, advocating that Japan be added to the AUKUS group. Not only did he claim that Japan’s participation in AUKUS would “contribute greatly” to Australia’s moves to strengthen its submarine capabilities, but he also advanced a strategic argument to justify his position asserting: “Australia is a clear choice” as a new ally for Japan in countering China. He reasoned that as China was out “to control the second line of islands (from Japan’s Izu Islands to Guam) with its maritime power,” this would serve to restrain US naval activities in the region, hence the need for more cooperation among Japan, Australia, and the United States. While explaining that the establishment of a group called “JAUKUS” was “his personal idea,” Aso also argued that it would be “symbolic” and would “send a message” to deter China. He added that Australia and Japan could build allied relations (domei kankei) based on three commonalities: they were both located on the same “vertical line” in the Pacific Ocean; they shared the same democratic philosophy, and they were both US allies. If the three countries were to join forces, “US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would be doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled.” Japan’s joining AUKUS would also “allow the United States, Australia and Japan to speak with one voice to signal their opposition to a change of Taiwan’s status through force.” Aso has a record of making hawkish comments on Taiwan and a reputation for being one of Taiwan’s strongest supporters among Japanese politicians. In early August 2023 he conducted a three-day visit to the country – the highest ranking LDP official to visit the island since 1972 when Japan officially severed diplomatic ties. The objective of his visit was to underscore Japan’s support for Taiwan by holding talks with President Tsai-Ing Wen and other senior politicians as well as discussing regional security issues, semiconductor supplies critical to the Japanese economy, and other issues relating to economic security. At Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry Aso delivered a lecture on Japan’s defence policy and in a keynote speech at a security forum in Taipei, he argued that “Japan, the United States and other likeminded countries making it clear that they would be prepared to go to war to defend Taiwan…[was] the best way to deter a Chinese invasion.” He declared: “Friendly nations must be prepared to defend the island in the event of a Taiwan emergency….Beijing needs to be convinced that if push comes to shove, we will use our defensive capabilities to defend Taiwan….[adding] Clearly conveying that intention to the other side will serve as a deterrent….for Japan, Taiwan, the United States and other like-minded parties, displaying the resolve to fight will serve as a strong deterrent.” While his remarks appeared to be out of sync with the Japanese government’s “strategic ambiguity” on its response to a Taiwan contingency, Japan’s Mainichi newspaper claimed that Aso had consulted in advance with the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei), Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Secretariat about what to say in his speech. Pointing out that Aso was Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s so-called “guardian,” and that the LDP political heavyweight had played a key diplomatic role in the Kishida administration, the newspaper interpreted Aso’s message as a “carefully worded” warning from the prime minister that although Tokyo was strongly committed to pursuing bilateral reconciliation with China, it had no intention of compromising when it came to national security, including on the issue of Taiwan. These remarks echoed Aso’s clear statement in July 2021 when speaking at an LDP fundraising event as deputy prime minister, finance minister, and member of the National Security Council. He argued that “If a major incident happened [in Taiwan], it would not be strange at all if it touches on a situation threatening [Japan’s] survival. If that is the case, Japan and the U.S. must defend Taiwan together.” In January 2023, he had also called for a drastic strengthening of Japan’s defence capabilities, pointing out that if China were to invade Taiwan, the result could be a military conflict on Japanese territory, including Okinawa, and emphasising to the Japanese public that “one must defend one’s own country.” In his words, “In the event of a Taiwan contingency, it is only natural that the flames of war would fall on Japanese territories close to Taiwan, such as Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Prefecture.” In June 2023 Aso had also met with the Taiwanese Vice-President Wen-tsan Cheng during the latter’s visit to Tokyo where they discussed East Asian security, including the Taiwan situation. In terms of policy standing Aso wields influence as a former prime minister, deputy prime minister, and finance minister, and in terms of political authority wielded within the LDP, he has served as chairman of the party’s Policy Affairs Research Council – its highest policymaking body – and is currently vice-president of the ruling LDP as well as being the leader of the third largest faction in the LDP – the Shikokai. He also ranks second to the LDP’s secretary-general among the top six LDP executives who meet most frequently with the prime minister. He was one of a group of top LDP executives that Prime Minister Kishida consulted in early December 2023 about when to begin collecting the higher taxes necessary to finance a bigger defence budget. Aso, however, opposed the option of submitting legislation to the Diet that would set a schedule for legislation to raise taxes to fund the planned increases in defence spending. Moreover, he will not stay on as LDP vice-president when his current term expires in September 2024. However, having now reportedly “given up” on Kishida and looking to elect current Secretary-General Toshimitsu Motegi as his successor, Aso is endeavouring to remain the “kingpin” in a post-Kishida administration. At the same time, Aso’s views on JAUKUS are far from reflecting a consensus in his own party. In a domestic political context, the option is currently non-viable. Support for Japan’s participation in AUKUS extends no further than a few key figures in the LDP such as Digital Affairs Minister and possible successor to Kishida, Taro Kono, who has expressed strong support for Japan’s participating in AUKUS. Kono was one of the candidates in the race to become prime minister in October 2021 (a month after the launch of AUKUS), and when asked whether Japan should also seek to build nuclear-power submarines with assistance from the US and UK, he stated: “As a capability, it is very important for Japan to have nuclear submarines.” For the time being, however, far from support for the AUKUS option, there would be active resistance from within the LDP led by Kishida against Japan’s participating in AUKUS Pillar One – acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. As long as Kishida is prime minister, he will continue to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation given his well-known “nuclear allergy,” reflected in his 2020 book entitled Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons [Kakuheiki no nai Sekai e]. In early December he also vowed to “exercise leadership for the abolition of nuclear weapons” at a meeting of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons held in Nagasaki. Moreover, Kishida believes strongly in maintaining a segregated framework of bilateral security relations with each of the AUKUS partners. In the short-to-medium term, the only politically viable option for Japan might potentially be to participate in the expanding field of so-called AUKUS Pillar Two hi-tech, military technology-related capabilities such as artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, defence innovation, and undersea capabilities. The Japanese government, for example, is currently promoting the development and use of autonomous underwater vehicles.

Beijing seeks normalisation of ties with Europe; however, for Brussels, reconciliation will be conditional on Beijing’s willingness to address fundamental divergences On 7-8 December, European Commission President von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel will be in Beijing for the 24th European Union (EU)-China summit, but the first in-person one in four years, taking place at a critical juncture in EU-China ties. At the previous EU-China virtual summit in April 2022, the Ukraine conflict was the primary talking point for the Europeans and other issues such as climate and economics were relegated to the back burner. This time, the focus is likely to be economics. A relatively constructive meeting between United States (US) President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 15 November, which led to the resumption of US-China high-level military dialogue and Xi’s assurances on Taiwan, has contributed to paving the way for the EU to focus on ironing out economic irritants. Deficits, dependencies and de-risking With daily EU-China trade amounting to 2.2 billion euros, the EU is concerned about its widening goods trade deficit with China—400 billion euros in 2022—referred to by EU Ambassador to China, Jorge Toledo, as the “highest in the history of mankind”. In the context of China’s restrictive environment for foreign companies, the EU is keen for a level playing field and greater reciprocity in trade. Another major area of contention is Chinese overcapacity through subsidies in key industrial export sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs) that are undermining European automotive industries. The European Commission has already launched a probe for the EVs sector and is now considering other major sectors including wind energy and medical devices. In addition, Europe is heavily dependent on critical raw materials such as lithium and gallium from China, which are intrinsic to its green transition. While over 90 percent of the EU’s supply of raw materials comes from China, the EU aims to address this dependency through its Critical Raw Materials Act. Factors such as Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, human rights violations in Xinjiang, and pandemic-era supply chain disruptions have deteriorated European perceptions of China. The downswing in EU-China ties was further accentuated by Beijing’s posture in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the failure of European leaders to coax China to positively use its influence with the EU’s most immediate security threat, Moscow. Thus, a major trust deficit has accompanied the trade deficit. On 6 November, only a month before the summit, von der Leyen in her speech warned against “China’s changing global posture” with its “strong push to make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China”. While acknowledging China as Europe’s most important trading partner, she emphasised the “explicit element of rivalry” in the relationship. Another dialogue of the deaf? The EU and its member states are recalibrating their China policies, with countries such as Germany even releasing China-specific documents outlining their approach. The EU’s “de-risking” strategy aims to reduce dependencies in critical sectors, and through an expansion of its policy toolbox, the Union is implementing a range of measures including greater scrutiny of inbound-outbound foreign investments, anti-coercion instruments, and export controls for dual-purpose technologies. In this context of an evolving European approach, the upcoming summit is a much-anticipated one for EU-China watchers. Despite the strain in relations, high-level diplomatic exchanges have continued in full swing, many of which, such as von der Leyen’s visit to China in April, EU Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis’s visit in September, and EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell’s visit in October were conducted in preparation for this summit. A sluggish Chinese economy gives Europe room to wield its economic leverage. However, grey areas in Europe’s China policy remain, especially with regard to the implementation of measures and the need for more effective coordination, often compromised by a lack of unity amongst member states and tendencies of leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to prioritise business interests over all else. Thus, straddling the fine balance between economic opportunities and security risks will continue to be a test for how Europe manages its interdependence with the lucrative Chinese market. Previous EU-China summits have not produced a joint statement, and according to sources, this summit is unlikely to produce one as well. Yet it is an opportunity for the EU to put forward unresolved concerns and forge some common ground. Without concrete deliverables, the upcoming summit risks being another “dialogue of the deaf” as Borrell famously described the previous one. Amidst renewed transatlantic solidarity, Beijing’s rhetoric indicates that it seeks normalisation of ties with Europe and a more independent European policy towards China away from Washington’s influence. Yet for Brussels, reconciliation will be conditional on Beijing’s willingness to address fundamental divergences.