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Defense & Security
Dugu beach, Donghae-myeon, Nam-gu, Pohang-si, South Korea - October 1, 2021 : South Korean Navy Jangbogo submarine at Dogu Coast for 2021 Armed Forces Day

Development of South Korea’s Submarines and Future Prospects

by World & New World Journal Policy Team

In the 21st century, the maritime security environment in Northeast Asia is changing more rapidly than ever, with information superiority and covert operational capabilities at sea emerging as core components of national security. At the heart of this shift lies the submarine force, which possesses both strategic deterrence and surveillance/reconnaissance capabilities. As China, Japan, and North Korea advance their submarine technology, South Korea finds itself in a situation demanding independent maritime strategic assets to counter these developments. The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) submarine force, which initially relied on foreign technology, has now grown into a submarine technology powerhouse capable of indigenous design and construction. The introduction of the KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, in particular, has equipped South Korea with SLBM operational capability and advanced AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) and electric propulsion technology, establishing a strategic-level submarine force.  This technological advancement not only strengthens national defense but also elevates the international status of the Korean defense industry, leading to enhanced export competitiveness. Concurrently, amidst the military expansion of surrounding countries, the need for nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs)—which offer far greater strategic survivability and sustained operational capability—is being raised in South Korea. Despite the high cost, the SSN is a strategic asset that provides overwhelming stealth, range, and operational endurance in the long run.  This article will comprehensively examine the importance and technical characteristics of submarines, followed by an analysis of South Korea's submarine force development, its international standing, and comparisons with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it will explore the implications of the nuclear submarine acquisition debate for South Korea's future security strategy. 1. The Importance of Submarines  The submarine is an extremely important weapon system in the defense industry from strategic, technological, and economic perspectives.  1) Strategic Deterrence and Control: Submarines act as a strategic deterrent to covertly check the enemy's maritime activities and protect a nation's sea lines of communication and security. The strategic deterrence of a submarine is based on its 'stealth' and 'lethality'.  - Stealth (Psychological Pressure): A submarine can move and be deployed secretly underwater without being exposed to the enemy, placing psychological pressure on the enemy's maritime operations and strategic weapon deployment during peacetime. Because it is extremely difficult for an attacking enemy to predict or neutralize the submarine's location, the enemy always harbors the fear of a potential strike. - Lethality (Retaliatory Capability): If the enemy attempts an actual invasion or provocation, the submarine can conduct a sudden and precise strike with high-power weapons like torpedoes or missiles. Specifically, a Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN), equipped with strategic weapons like the SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile), provides a 'second-strike capability' to retaliate against the opponent's core targets at any time. - Maximizing Deterrence: The mere existence of strategic submarines maximizes the 'psychological deterrent effect', making the enemy's political and military leaders hesitate to initiate an attack. Due to the nature of submarines being covertly deployed anywhere in the ocean, the enemy is constantly exposed to threats, making it difficult to attempt military provocations recklessly. In essence, the core principle of strategic deterrence is the creation of a 'deterrence effect through uncertainty', combining the submarine's covert and unpredictable operational methods, its powerful striking capabilities, and the psychological fear it instills.  2) Enhancing National Defense and Economic Effects: The development of advanced submarines is central to a nation's naval power. It enhances defense self-reliance by securing indigenous design and construction technologies and promises enormous economic benefits through overseas exports. - Asymmetric Warfare Power: With its stealth and lethality, the submarine wields the most potent deterrent force and asymmetric warfare effect among all maritime forces. When surface fleet power is relatively insufficient, an advanced submarine can effectively check large enemy vessels or aircraft carriers and deny access to maritime domains. - Advanced Mission Capabilities: Advanced submarines are deployed for various missions, including long-duration submerged operations, strategic surprise, and special warfare support, utilizing cutting-edge technologies like next-generation guided missiles and sophisticated sonar/navigation systems that make detection and tracking difficult. - Increased Defense Industry Competitiveness: When advanced submarines are developed and operated with indigenous technology, it not only boosts the nation's defense industry capacity and technological self-reliance but also significantly increases related industry development and economic effects. In short, the advanced submarine is the qualitative and strategic linchpin of national naval power, encompassing defense, offense, intelligence deterrence, and the securing of cutting-edge technology. 3) Driving Advancement in Overall Defense Technology: The development of highly sophisticated weapon systems (e.g., SLBMs, advanced sonar, low-noise technology, etc.) also promotes the advancement of overall cutting-edge defense technologies. - SLBM Development: Developing SLBMs is not just missile technology; it complexly requires materials engineering to withstand the extreme pressure of the underwater launch environment, precise guidance systems, and miniaturized propulsion technology. The technology secured during this process naturally transfers to other fields, such as space launch vehicles and precision strike weapons. - Advanced Sonar Technology: The process of increasing the precision of underwater acoustic detection advances capabilities in signal processing, AI-based pattern recognition, and big data analysis. Such technology can also be utilized in civilian sectors, including marine resource exploration, underwater communication, and seismic detection systems. - Low-Noise Technology Development: The ripple effect of low-noise technology development is even greater. Vibration reduction in propulsion systems, special hull coatings, and hydrodynamic optimal design enhance the competitiveness of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Propeller noise reduction technology, in particular, contributes to improving the fuel efficiency of commercial vessels and protecting the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, the process of developing these advanced technologies fosters high-level research personnel, strengthens industry-academia-research cooperation networks, and promotes the domestic production of materials, components, and equipment. Consequently, the single weapon system of a submarine has the effect of elevating the nation's overall scientific and technological capabilities to the next level. 4) High Competitiveness and International Credibility: The limited number of nations capable of manufacturing submarines ensures high competitiveness and international credibility in the global defense market. Currently, only about 12 countries are capable of independently designing and building submarines: the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, India, Japan, and South Korea. This technical rarity offers several strategic advantages. - Favorable Negotiation Power: Due to the high barrier to entry, a limited supplier market is formed, securing favorable negotiation power during exports. - Proof of Overall Defense Technology: Submarine construction capability serves as proof of comprehensive defense technology, raising the credibility of other weapon systems. South Korea, in particular, has demonstrated strengths in technology transfer and localization by successfully achieving domestic production after introducing German technology. This establishes South Korea as an attractive partner for middle-power countries that desire advanced submarines but find self-development difficult. The interest shown by nations like Indonesia and the Philippines in South Korean submarines is within this context. - Sustainable Economic Effects and Strategic Ties: Submarine projects lead to long-term follow-up businesses, including maintenance, upgrades, and crew training, ensuring sustained economic effects and strengthening strategic ties between nations. As such, the submarine is considered a core capability of the defense industry in terms of national security, industrial competitiveness, technological innovation, and economic benefits. 2. Technical Characteristics of Submarines The technical characteristics of submarines can be broadly divided into three key domains: stealth and survivability, propulsion and power systems, and weapons and combat systems. 2.1. Stealth & Survivability This is the technology area most directly tied to the fundamental purpose of submarines. In underwater environments, radar (radio-wave detection) cannot be used, so detection relies on sonar (sound-wave detection). While radar can detect surface targets from up to 500 km, sonar detection of a quiet, stealthy submarine is typically limited to around 30 km. - Acoustic Quieting Technology is essential for avoiding enemy sonar detection. Submarine noise reduction involves suppressing mechanical noise (machinery vibration), flow noise, structural vibration, and propeller noise through an integrated set of technologies. This is not just a matter of equipment but a comprehensive quieting process that spans the entire lifecycle of a submarine—from design and manufacturing to operation and maintenance. - Non-Acoustic Stealth Technology minimizes physical signatures other than sound—such as magnetic fields, heat/infrared emissions, radar/optical reflections, and surface disturbances—to prevent detection by non-acoustic sensors. Figure 1. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) sonar system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.2. Propulsion & Power System This system is key to determining a submarine's range and submerged operational endurance. It is broadly divided into conventional (non-nuclear) and nuclear propulsion. 1) Conventional Submarines (Diesel-Electric) - Diesel-Electric System: This is the traditional method where a diesel engine powers a generator to charge batteries, and an electric motor provides propulsion. It is favored for its cost-effectiveness and quietness, making it the standard for small and medium-sized submarines. However, because the diesel engine requires oxygen from the atmosphere, the submarine must periodically surface or use a snorkel, which severely limits continuous submerged endurance (to a maximum of about 3 days). Submarines equipped with the latest Lithium-ion batteries can extend this submerged time up to 7 days. - Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP): An innovative technology that produces power underwater without relying on an external oxygen supply. The main types include the Fuel Cell (PEMFC), Stirling Engine, and Closed-Cycle Diesel. AIP is used in conjunction with the diesel-electric system and significantly extends submerged endurance, often up to 3 weeks. Because it is cheaper than nuclear power while offering high strategic value, many nations have adopted it. - Hybrid Propulsion System (Cutting-Edge Technology): The integrated operation of three systems—the diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion), and Lithium-ion batteries—allows for continuous submerged operation for up to 4 weeks. South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) utilizes the integrated operation of these three systems: a diesel generator, Fuel Cell AIP, and Lithium-ion batteries. Excluding nuclear power, the current cutting-edge technology is considered to be the Fuel Cell AIP + Lithium-ion battery hybrid system. Each propulsion system is selected based on operational range, mission sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and technological sophistication. South Korea is actively pursuing the development of next-generation submarines that combine both AIP and Lithium-ion battery technologies. However, the maximum continuous submerged endurance (up to 4 weeks) is only achievable when operating at low speeds (5–10 knots, or approx. 9–18 km/h). When operating at maximum speed (around 20 knots, or approx. 37 km/h), the battery consumption is extremely high, causing the submerged time to sharply decrease: - Older Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for only 1–2 hours. - Li-ion/AIP Submarines: Can sustain maximum speed for 3–6 hours. After high-speed maneuvering, the submarine requires snorkeling for recharging, which significantly increases the risk of detection by the enemy. Figure 2. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) lithium battery system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 3. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (Jangbogo-III) fuel cell AIP system (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2) Nuclear-Powered Submarines (SSN/SSBN) Nuclear-powered submarines use nuclear fission reactors to generate steam, which drives turbines and provides virtually unlimited propulsion. Because they do not require refueling for months, their submerged endurance and operational range are effectively unlimited, enabling them to operate anywhere in the world. Only a small group of states—including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and India—possess such submarines. Nuclear propulsion is used in both strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN: nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN: fast attack submarines powered by nuclear reactors). However, nuclear submarines are extremely expensive to build and operate, require large hull sizes (especially SSBNs), and demand sophisticated reactor noise-management technologies. Compared to conventional submarines, nuclear submarines can operate at much higher sustained speeds for long periods. Their average top speed is typically 25–30 knots (46–55 km/h), while specialized Soviet/Russian designs such as the Alfa-class have demonstrated speeds exceeding 40 knots in trials. This makes nuclear submarines more than twice as fast as most conventional submarines, with the added advantage of being able to maintain high speeds for extended durations without limitations. 2.3. Weaponry & Combat Systems This category encompasses the submarine’s offensive capabilities and intelligence-gathering functions. Submarine weapons and combat platforms can be divided into four major types: 2.3.1. Launch Weapons Launch weapons are categorized as follows: - Torpedoes: Underwater weapons fired from a submarine’s horizontal launch tubes, used to attack underwater targets such as other submarines, surface ships, and mines. - Missiles: This includes anti-ship missiles (ASM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) designed to strike surface or land targets. Some missiles are launched through Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). - Nuclear Weapons: The primary example is the SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile), equipped with a nuclear warhead. These form the core of a nation’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Table 1. Types of Launch Weapons Table 2. Ballistic/Guided Missiles Table 3. Submarine-Launched Weapon Systems Figure 4. Weapon systems of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III): Torpedoes/Mines (Horizontal Launch) and Missiles (Vertical Launch) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) Figure 5. Vertical Launch System of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class (Jangbogo-III) (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.2. Underwater Drones / Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV/AUV) Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are unmanned underwater platforms deployed from submarines. They can perform missions such as intelligence collection, reconnaissance, mine detection, and even underwater attacks. In the latest technology trends, AUVs serve as important auxiliary assets for submarines, used for tasks such as detecting specific targets, locating and neutralizing naval mines, and tracking enemy submarines. Figure 6. Combat Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (Source: Hanwha Ocean) 2.3.3. Electronic Warfare Systems A submarine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems defend against enemy detection through electronic surveillance countermeasures. By transmitting deceptive or disruptive signals, these systems help conceal the submarine’s presence and significantly enhance survivability. Capabilities such as electronic deception, electronic jamming, and counter sonar/radar measures enable the submarine to evade enemy tracking and maintain strategic advantage. In addition, electronic attack (EA) capabilities can inflict direct damage on enemy military assets by disrupting or degrading their electronic systems. 2.3.4. Naval Mines Naval mines are explosive devices used by submarines to block enemy sea routes or hinder the approach of surface vessels. Submarines can deploy underwater mines or launch them from dedicated systems, allowing them to disrupt maritime traffic and defend against the movement of hostile fleets through area denial tactics. 3. Economic Impact of Submarine Strategy Submarine capabilities are not only crucial for military security but also represent a high-value industry that generates substantial direct and indirect economic effects for the nation. 3.1. Direct Industrial Impact (Manufacturing and Employment) Submarine construction is a highly technology-intensive, large-scale project, creating significant economic effects for the shipbuilding and defense industries: • Development of high-value shipbuilding: Submarines require extremely high precision and complex construction within much tighter spaces than commercial ships. The construction process itself represents the pinnacle of shipbuilding technology, directly enhancing the competitiveness and qualitative growth of the shipbuilding industry. • Job creation: Building a single submarine involves thousands of workers over several years, from design and component production to final assembly and sea trials, creating a large number of highly skilled technical jobs. • Activation of component and partner industries: Submarines consist of numerous precision components (sonar systems, propulsion units, special alloys, batteries, etc.), which stimulates supply chains largely composed of small and medium-sized defense companies and elevates technological capabilities across the sector. 3.2. Indirect Economic Impact (Security and Exports) The existence of a submarine fleet generates invisible economic benefits and opportunities: • Reduction of national security costs: Submarines are one of the most effective tools of asymmetric deterrence — a military strategy where a country at a disadvantage in conventional forces or numbers neutralizes an adversary’s attack intentions and deters war through unique and unpredictable means. Maintaining submarine capabilities helps prevent potential economic damages in crises (trade disruptions, destruction of industrial facilities) and raises the cost of potential aggression, effectively reducing national security expenditures. • Protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs): As a highly trade-dependent nation, Korea relies critically on maritime routes. Submarines deter hostile naval forces threatening these routes during crises and protect major trade arteries, ensuring the continuity of economic activity. • Opportunities for defense exports (K-Defense): o Demonstrating Korea’s ability to independently design, build, and operate submarines (Dosan Ahn Changho-class / Jangbogo-III KSS-III) establishes technological credibility in global markets. o This capability generates high-value defense export opportunities, not only for the submarines themselves but also for related components, maintenance, and training systems (Korea has already exported submarines to Southeast Asia). In conclusion, submarine capabilities serve as a form of national security insurance while fostering domestic advanced technology industries and opening export markets, providing significant economic value as a future growth engine. 4. History of South Korea’s Submarine Forces Although the history of the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarines is relatively short, it has made significant leaps in both independent technological development and force enhancement. The following outlines the chronological development and progress of Korea’s submarine forces. Figure 7. Timeline of Submarine Acquisition and Operations of the Republic of Korea. Note: SSM: Submersible Ship Midget (small submarine), KSS: Korea Submarine System (the systematic development plan for the ROK Navy’s submarine force) 4.1. Early Stage (1975–1990): Direct Acquisition of Cosmos-class and Foundation of Submarine Forces Starting in 1975, the ROK Navy acquired seven small Italian-made Cosmos-class submarines (70-ton class) for intelligence missions and special operations, laying the foundation for Korea’s underwater capabilities. These submarines were primarily used for special operations, such as special forces infiltration, mine-laying, and intelligence gathering, rather than as conventional warships. Crew members of the Cosmos-class submarines later became key personnel in the development of the Dolphin-class indigenous submarines in the early 1980s. 4.2. Formative Stage (1983–1991): The Dolphin-class Small Submarine Era In the beginning in 1977, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a submarine modeled after Italy’s Cosmos-class. Construction took place at Tacoma Korea’s Masan Shipyard, and a total of three submarines were commissioned starting in 1983. This marked Korea’s first domestically built submarines, and the experience gained became the foundation for developing South Korea’s own underwater weapons. Based on operational results from the first submarine delivered in 1984, the second and third units were designed and built, being commissioned in 1990 and 1991, with reinforced pressure hulls and improved armament: SSM-051 1985 commissioned, 2003 decommissioned, SSM-052 1990 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned, SSM-053 1991 commissioned, 2016 decommissioned. The experience with the Dolphin-class played a critical role in advancing domestic submarine construction technology, serving as the stepping stone for the introduction and deployment of medium- to large-sized submarines. Table 4. Specifications of the Dolphin-class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) 4.3. Development Stage (1992–2006): Introduction and Localization of the Jangbogo-class (Jangbogo-I) In 1987, the ROK Navy signed a contract with the German company HDW for three Type 209 submarines (license for design acquisition), officially launching the Jangbogo-class (KSS-I) 1,200-ton program. Among these, one submarine was delivered as a complete unit from Germany in 1992, while the other two were assembled and constructed at Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering’s Okpo shipyard using imported German parts, delivered in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Subsequently, six additional submarines were built, bringing the total to nine in service by 2001. This program was not merely an import project; the core goal was to transfer German technology and secure domestic assembly and construction capabilities. It laid the foundation for Korea’s submarine technology independence and advanced development. Leveraging the experience gained from constructing the Jangbogo-class, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) signed a contract in 2011 to build three 1,400-ton submarines for Indonesia. Known as the DSME1400, these submarines are named the Nagapasa-class in the Indonesian Navy, marking Korea’s advancement in export capabilities. Table 5. Specifications of the Jangbogo-class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki). Note: A batch refers to a group of submarines of the same model built in series, with incremental performance improvements applied in each production run. Table 6. Development Stages of the Jangbogo-Class Submarine 4.4. Leap Period (2007–2020): Son Won-il Class (Jangbogo-II) and AIP Technology In 2000, the Republic of Korea Navy signed a contract with Germany’s HDW to acquire three Type-214 submarines under a design-license arrangement, launching a full-scale 1,800-ton Son Won-il–class program with Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first submarine, Son Won-il, was delivered in 2007, and an additional six submarines were subsequently built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). The key feature of the Son Won-il class is its AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which uses fuel cells to allow submerged operations for 2–3 weeks without surfacing. Construction was divided between Hanwha Ocean (formerly DSME) and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The vessels are named Son Won-il, Jeong Ji, An Jung-geun, Kim Dae-geon, Hong Beom-do, Yu Gwan-sun, Yun Bong-gil, Ahn Chang-ho, and Baekdusan. Table 7. Specifications of the Son Won-il Class Submarines (Source: Namuwiki) Table 8. Development Stages of the Son Won-il-Class Submarine   Over time, the armament and electronic systems have progressively advanced. Below is a simplified cross-sectional diagram of the HDW Type 214, which was used as a reference for the construction of the Son Won-il class submarines. The diagram helps to easily understand the complex internal structure by showing the main components. Here, the Fuel Cell Plant represents the AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) technology. Figure 8. Simplified cross-section of the Type 214 Submarine (Source: TKMS) Figure 9. Cross-section of the Son Won-il-class Submarine (Source: Defense Mirror) 4.5. Independent Period (2021–Present): Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class (Jangbogo-III) Indigenous Design Achievements of Complete Domestic Design In December 2012, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) signed a contract with Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) for the construction of two Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarines. The contract amount for the two submarines was approximately 1.675 trillion KRW (1.14 billion USD). The project was based on the construction experience of the Jangbogo-class and Son Won-il-class submarines, as well as the technology transferred from HDW and the experience in developing the DSME-1400 submarine (Nagapasa-class submarine) based on the Type 209 design. Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (launched in August 2021) is the first submarine fully designed, built, and equipped with its own weapon systems by South Korea. It has a displacement of 3,000 tons, making it a large submarine. It is the first in the world to be equipped with lithium-ion batteries, enabling long-term submerged operations without the need for an AIP system. Strategic Weapon Deployment Capability The most notable feature of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class is the vertical launch system (VLS) with 6 launchers (Batch-II will have 10 launchers), which allows the operation of the Hyunmoo-4-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This capability is considered the most powerful strategic strike capability among non-nuclear nations. Currently, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, Kim Jong-seo, and Yun Bong-gil have been commissioned, with a total of 9 submarines planned: 3 from Batch-I, 3 from Batch-II, and 3 from Batch-III. Table 9. Specifications of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine (Source: Namuwiki)   The following is information on the improvement projects for Batch 2 and Batch 3. Table 10. Development Stages of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho Class Submarine   Over time, the missile payload and electronic systems continue to evolve. Below is a cross-sectional diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarine, including a comparison of its size with the North Korean Romeo-class and the German Type 214 submarines. It also includes the proposed diagram by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (now Hanwha Ocean) for the BrahMos missile-equipped version, which was part of their bid for the Indian next-generation submarine construction project. Figure 10. Cross-sectional Diagram of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class Submarine (Source: Naval News) 4.6. Comparison of 3 Generations of ROK Submarines Table 11. Development Stages of South Korean Submarines 5. Exports and International Status The history of South Korean submarines follows a trajectory of introduction, indigenization, technological accumulation, advancement, and international expansion. In 2011, South Korea became the first Asian country to export submarines by selling three Jangbogo-class derivative Nagapasa-class submarines to Indonesia for 1.1 billion USD. Currently, South Korea owns 18 submarines, making it the 8th largest submarine-owning country in the world. When it comes to conventional (diesel-electric) submarines, South Korea is regarded as one of the top global powers, along with Germany and Japan. Current Submarine Power Rankings 1. United States (68 nuclear submarines) - Overwhelming leader 2. Russia (45 nuclear submarines + 20+ diesel submarines) 3. China (12 nuclear submarines + 50+ diesel submarines) 4. United Kingdom (11 nuclear submarines) - Entirely nuclear-powered submarines 5. France (10 nuclear submarines + diesel) 6. India (2 nuclear submarines + 15 diesel submarines) 7. Japan (22 diesel submarines) 8. South Korea (18 diesel submarines) 9. Germany (6 diesel submarines, export power) 10. Sweden (5 diesel submarines, technological powerhouse) Detailed Classification by Country A. Nuclear Submarine Exclusives B. Nuclear + Conventional Submarine C. Conventional Submarine   The following are the rankings of the leading countries in conventional submarine exports: 1. Germany - 100 years of tradition, top exporter 2. Japan - Highest technological capabilities 3. South Korea - Only country with VLS/SLBM capability 4. Sweden - Specializes in stealth technology 5. France - Combines nuclear and diesel capabilities The following compares the key features of export submarines from each country. Table 12. South Korean KSS-III Competitor Submarines Export Competitiveness Evaluation Top Exporting Countries 1. Germany - Type 209/214 series, more than 100 units exported 2. France - Scorpène, 16+ units (additional orders in progress) 3. South Korea - 3 units exported, actively competing in various tenders Latest Trends • Lithium-ion Batteries: South Korea (Jang Yeong-sil class), Japan (Taigei class), France (Scorpène Evolved) • VLS (Vertical Launch System): South Korea (SLBM), Sweden (Cruise Missiles) • Stealth Technology: Germany (Diamond hull), Sweden (Ghost), Japan (Low noise) Hanwha Ocean, the builder of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class KSS-III submarines, and the South Korean government are actively engaging with the following countries for submarine exports: • Canada: The Canadian Navy's Submarine Replacement Program (CSCP) is a major project worth up to 40 billion USD (with an acquisition cost of about 14 billion USD and operation and maintenance costs of around 27 billion USD). Canada plans to introduce 12 new submarines. The KSS-III, at 4,000 tons, is considered a strong candidate due to its suitability for Canada’s operational environment (including the Arctic). South Korean defense companies are offering technical cooperation and local construction options in an effort to secure the deal. • Poland: Poland is pursuing the Orka project to modernize its navy, aiming to acquire 3 new submarines project worth about 14 billion USD. The KSS-III is consistently mentioned as one of the main contenders by the Polish government. • Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries: The Philippines is focused on strengthening its naval power to counter China. Other Southeast Asian nations are also looking to enhance maritime security through submarine acquisitions. South Korea, having previously exported submarines (e.g., the Nagapasa-class to Indonesia), is actively pursuing KSS-III sales in the region. 6. Comparison of the Latest Submarine Capabilities of Countries Surrounding South Korea This section examines the key features of the latest submarine technologies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan. Table 13. Comparison of the latest submarines of South Korea and neighboring countries Overall Assessment • Military Ranking: Evaluated as top-tier in Asia in the order of China > Japan > South Korea > North Korea. • Advanced Technology: Japan, South Korea, and China are rapidly advancing in technological innovation, while North Korea focuses on strategic threat capabilities. • Operational Capability: Japan and South Korea excel in maritime route defense and blockade capabilities, whereas China’s strength lies in ocean-going and strategic power projection. Asian military experts particularly regard South Korea’s KSS-III, Japan’s Soryu-class/Taigei-class, and China’s latest submarines as the pinnacle of their respective national defense technologies. North Korea, while still relatively underdeveloped, raises the threat level through the public display of its strategic nuclear-powered capabilities. 7. Future Prospects: Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines South Korea is considering the development of next-generation submarines over 4,000 tons in the 2030s, with nuclear-powered submarines being a key option under discussion. In the past, in 2003, the basic design for a 4,000-ton reactor was completed, but at that time, cooperation with the United States was essential due to restrictions such as the Korea–U.S. nuclear agreement (“123 Agreement”). Recently, with the revitalization of Korea–U.S. shipbuilding cooperation through Hanwha Ocean and Philly shipyards, the possibility of acquiring nuclear submarine technology has increased. In particular, following the official U.S. approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction at the 2025 APEC Summit, technical, fuel, and policy cooperation with the U.S. is expected to move forward in earnest for South Korea’s project. 1. Scope of Future Cooperation • The U.S. has agreed to share key technologies for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines. • Cooperation will also include securing nuclear fuel for propulsion (highly enriched uranium or HALEU – high-assay low-enriched uranium) and the design and fabrication of small reactors for submarine use. • Both countries have agreed to expand mutual investment and technical collaboration in shipbuilding, marine plants, and submarine construction industries. 2. Technology Transfer and Conditions • South Korea has requested U.S. approval and supply for submarine propulsion nuclear fuel, and the U.S. is reported to have approved the use of nuclear fuel for South Korea’s submarine construction. • However, based on currently available information, this does not automatically include the full transfer of submarine reactor design or propulsion systems; the scope and method of technology transfer (joint development vs. full transfer) are still under discussion. • If South Korea transitions to third-country technology transfer or domestic development under U.S. cooperation, there could be restrictions linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 123 Agreement. 3. Potential Timeline • According to the fact sheet released at the APEC Summit, this cooperation is linked to investment in the shipbuilding industry, and South Korea is reported to have pledged around US$150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding. • South Korean government reports indicate the goal is to secure four or more medium-sized (approximately 5,000-ton or larger) nuclear-powered submarines by the mid-2030s. • However, specific milestones such as design completion, project start, construction, and delivery dates have not been officially finalized, and Korean officials have stated that detailed schedules are still under coordination. 8. Comparison of Nuclear Submarines and Conventional Submarines & the Importance of Nuclear Submarines Nuclear submarines can be broadly divided into two types based on their primary missions: 1) Strategic Nuclear Submarine (SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic missile Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Equipped with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying nuclear warheads, SSBNs patrol covertly for extended periods to maintain nuclear deterrence. This means deterring adversaries from using nuclear or major conventional attacks by maintaining the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, thereby preventing war. • Characteristics: Large in size, prioritizes extreme stealth and long-range operational capability. 2) Torpedo-Attack Nuclear Submarine (SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear) • Primary Mission: Engage enemy submarines (Sub Hunter) or surface ships (Ship Killer), conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), support special operations forces, or carry out land-attack missions using cruise missiles. • Characteristics: Smaller and faster than SSBNs, emphasizes agility and maneuverability. Summary: • SSBN: Strategic missions with nuclear missiles. • SSN: Tactical attack missions with torpedoes and cruise missiles. 8.1. Nuclear-Powered Submarines vs. Conventional (Diesel-Electric) Submarines – Propulsion Comparison The most fundamental difference is in the power source: • Nuclear propulsion: Uses a reactor; heat from nuclear fission boils water to produce steam, which drives turbines to generate propulsion and electricity. • Diesel-electric submarines: Operate differently on the surface/snorkeling versus submerged. o Surface / Snorkeling: Diesel engines are run to propel the submarine or charge the batteries. The submarine must surface or use a snorkel to intake air and expel exhaust gases, reducing stealth. o Submerged: Diesel engines are turned off; the submarine runs solely on large charged batteries powering electric motors. This allows for very quiet, stealthy operation, but operational endurance is limited. Once the batteries are depleted, the submarine must surface to run diesel engines and recharge. Table 14. Comparison of Nuclear Submarine and Conventional Submarine Specifications Key Points • A nuclear-powered submarine is similar to an aircraft carrier: it provides long-range, high-endurance capability and serves as a powerful tool for global power projection. It is designed to dominate the open ocean. • A conventional submarine is comparable to a coastal patrol craft or a hunter-killer submarine: a stealthy and cost-effective weapon optimized for controlling regional waters and coastlines. Its greatest advantage is extremely low noise during battery-powered operation, making it a deadly threat in shallow waters—like “a hole in the water.” • Choosing a submarine type is not about absolute superiority, but about selecting the model best suited to a country’s strategic goals, budgetary limits, and geographic operational environment. 8.2. Maintenance Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Which force should a nation prioritize: Nuclear submarines, the backbone of strategic deterrence thanks to their unlimited underwater endurance, or conventional submarines, which offer excellent cost-effectiveness and are easier to field in larger numbers? One of the core factors in this decision is operational cost-efficiency. Beyond construction cost, the long-term burden of decades of maintenance, training, reactor refueling, and life-cycle logistics must be considered. The comparison below outlines these sustainment requirements. Table 15. Maintenance Comparison: Nuclear vs. Conventional Submarines 8.3. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Between Nuclear-Powered and Conventional Submarines Let us compare two submarines of similar class size as examples: • Dosan Ahn Changho–class (KSS-III, South Korea) — conventional (diesel-electric + AIP) • Virginia-class (SSN, United States) — nuclear-powered Between these two types, the Total Lifetime Cost is 3 to 4 times higher for the nuclear-powered submarine. Below, we analyze the causes of this massive cost difference using concrete figures. Table 16. Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison: Nuclear Submarine vs. Conventional Submarine 8.4. Importance of Nuclear-Powered Submarines for the Republic of Korea Navy Despite the enormous cost gap shown earlier, the South Korean government has strong reasons for wanting to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. These reasons are rooted in national security, strategic autonomy, and enhanced maritime defense capability. Key strategic motivations include: 1) Responding to North Korea’s SLBM Threat North Korea: Developing the Sinpo-class SSBN (armed with SLBMs). If a North Korean SLBM submarine hides in the deep waters of the East Sea, it becomes impossible to track with conventional submarines. Only nuclear-powered submarines can conduct continuous 24-hour tracking due to their unlimited underwater endurance 2) Monitoring Chinese Submarine Activity: China has ~12 nuclear submarines + ~50 diesel-electric submarines and is increasing activity in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. To monitor Chinese submarines operating in the open ocean, nuclear-powered submarines are essential 3) Strengthening Strategic Deterrence: Current South Korean SLBM range: ~500 km, requiring operations near the Korean Peninsula. A nuclear submarine can launch from anywhere in the Pacific, drastically expanding deterrence. Provides a “survivable second-strike capability”—a retaliatory force that cannot be located or neutralized 4) National Prestige: Nations that operate nuclear submarines are considered major military powers. Only six countries currently possess them. Strengthens technological sovereignty and diplomatic leverage South Korea’s desire to operate nuclear-powered submarines is driven by strategic and security needs that far outweigh cost considerations. For over 30 years, South Korea has pursued nuclear submarine capabilities as part of a long-term defense strategy, aiming to achieve: enhanced nuclear deterrence, increased strategic autonomy, breakthroughs in defense technology, effective countermeasures against the expanding submarine forces of North Korea and China. Nuclear-powered submarines are seen as essential platforms capable of long-duration, high-speed, and highly covert operations—capabilities that are crucial in Korea’s security environment. Figure 11. Conceptual Cross-Section of the Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarine (KSS-N) Conclusion The Republic of Korea began with the small Dolgorae-class submarines in 1983, and in 42 years has risen to become the world’s 8th-largest submarine operator and one of the “Big Three” diesel-electric submarine powers (Germany, Japan, Korea). The Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class (KSS-III), in particular, is the world’s only diesel-electric submarine equipped with 10 VLS cells for SLBMs, and with its combination of AIP and lithium-ion batteries, it possesses some of the strongest underwater endurance and operational capability in the world. It has proven its real-world combat performance by eluding detection from a U.S. aircraft carrier during the RIMPAC exercises, and has demonstrated strong export competitiveness—Korea has already secured a 1.1 billion USD contract with Indonesia, and is competing for additional tenders in Canada, Poland, and the Philippines. Despite the overwhelming cost burden of nuclear-powered submarines, they remain essential for South Korea to counter North Korea’s SLBM-equipped SSBNs, and China’s expanding submarine fleet. Only nuclear-powered submarines can perform unlimited submerged operations and maintain high-speed, long-duration tracking of North Korean SSBNs 24/7. They also allow South Korea to exercise strategic deterrence across the entire Pacific, not just near the Korean Peninsula. While challenges remain—such as restrictions from the U.S.–Korea 123 Nuclear Agreement and various technological barriers—ongoing Korea–U.S. naval cooperation through Hanwha Ocean’s Philadelphia Shipyard significantly increases the likelihood of acquiring nuclear-submarine technology. Securing 4 to 6 nuclear-powered submarines would mark a transformational leap for the ROK Navy and a historic turning point in Korea’s rise as a true maritime power. South Korea’s submarine industry is not just a weapons program—it is an advanced technology sector and a driver of economic growth. It represents a core capability for self-reliant defense and national security. Based on its world-class diesel-electric submarine expertise, if Korea succeeds in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines as well, it will firmly establish itself as one of the world’s top five submarine powers. As history teaches that “those who command the seas command the future”, the continued advancement of South Korea’s submarine capabilities will serve as the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

Defense & Security
Electric car made in China. Duty for EV cars made in China. Trade, tariffs, duty and customs war

Connected Cars as Geopolitical Weapons: The National Security Battle Over Chinese EVs

by World & New World Journal

According to the IEA by 2024, more than 20% of new cars sold worldwide were electric, exceeding 17 million and positioning China as the leader in the market with more than 11 million sales. In comparison, the European and US markets also saw a growth in the sector, but not comparable to the Chinese counterpart. Figure 1: Global EV sales, 2014-2024. Source (IEA, 2025) Figure 2: EVs registrations share in China, US and Europe: 2018-2023. Source: IEA, 2025. On the other hand, autonomous vehicles, whose market value size was estimated at USD 68.09 billion in 2024, are also trending worldwide, North America being the largest market in 2024 (market share of 37.1% and passenger vehicles leading the market with 69% of the global revenue), while the Asia Pacific region is the fastest-growing market. Figure 3: Autonomous Vehicle Market. Source: Grand View Research. (Grand View Research, 2025) Recently, despite the data and market share, discussions and analysis of the vehicle industry have moved into new concerns related to security risks, trade protectionism and unfair competition. Why? Because the vehicle industry has evolved and adopted new technologies, at the same time, concerns have shifted accordingly. These changes have relied on or prioritized human convenience and connectivity over everything else. A New Security Paradigm for Mobility: Are Connected Cars Data Weapons A simple answer is no, but there are elements that can change the answer into a yes in the future. Vehicles are evolving into connected machines, with software-driven platforms, sensors, cameras, connectivity modules and AI systems. Thus, the vehicle industry is entering a new era where data is key, and whoever controls it, is likely to control the market itself. As mentioned before, vehicle-related security risks have sparked discussions in recent years. Nowadays, practically any vehicle sold has a certain degree of connectivity, naturally this leads to a continuous and massive collection of information (sensitive or not), including for example: real-time location, driving patterns, biometric data, audio recordings, images from the Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) and more. For common people this might pass unnoticed but for governments, the fact of collecting and storing data or having the possibility to do so has become a critical point and a threat to their national security. After all, fear is real, and the more connected a vehicle is, the higher the chances that it can become a surveillance device, for example. The speculations can grow as much as our/their imagination leaves them, but after all, security risks and fear related to them exist. In line with the security risks, the possibility of software backdoors hidden in operating systems or telematic units is another possibility. Naturally, if exploited this possibility, these vulnerabilities could allow a remote shutdown of vehicles or fleets, manipulation of navigation systems or even data extraction could occur. In simple terms, this could open the door to cyberattacks, including the potential loss of control of a vehicle. Once again, the possibility of these ideas has reshaped and changed the paradigm of connected vehicles Actual measures and global regulatory trends As governments start recognizing these security threats associated with connected vehicles, many have begun implementing several regulations to protect their national security. For instance, the UK, Israel, the USA and the EU are among the most active actors. One of the branches of the economic war between the US and China is exactly the mobility industry, the fierce competition between both nations has tightened the nationalist policies of President Trump, in fact the US has rapidly adopted a national-security lens for automotive imports. There have been discussions in Congress and even the Commerce Department has proposed rules allowing Washington to prohibit connected car technologies linked to foreign adversaries. In addition, there is huge pressure over the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), specifically in the encouragement to revise the vehicles entering the US and the promotion of US vehicle-manufacturing companies. For those reasons, the US had imposed tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles (from 25% up to 100% on 2024 during Biden’s administration and later a 35.5% extra tariff on Chinese-made EVs) and had set several rules in line with the USMCA, to limit or protect the American market from Chinese vehicles, as it argued that China is taking advantage of the USMCA by using Mexico or Canada as the entry points to the American market, avoiding tariffs and minimizing costs. According to experts, this Chinese circumvention of US tariffs can occur in three main ways. First through transshipment – products enter Canada or Mexico and then they are shipped to the USA. The second way is by incorporating the Chinese products into the North American supply chains. And the third way is through direct Chinese investments in manufacturing facilities in Mexico or Canada. At the same time, across the Atlantic the EU has also been working on tightening regulations through the Cyber Resilience Act, as well as strengthening the General Safety Regulations, both focusing on the application of rigorous standards to vehicle cybersecurity, data governance, and supply-chain transparency. Also in Europe, recently, a British newspaper reported that military and intelligence chiefs had been ordered not to discuss official business while riding in EVs, and cars with Chinese components had been banned from sensitive military sites. In addition, the former head of the intelligence service MI6 claimed that Chinese-made technology, including cars, could be controlled and programmed remotely. Consequently, the UK has begun evaluating supply chains for hidden dependencies in infotainment systems, telematics, and semiconductors. In the same line, Israel has adopted rigid measures, the Israeli army has begun withdrawing Chinese-made vehicles from officers, citing espionage concerns. Other measures implemented include auditing imported vehicles to ensure no remote-access pathways existence, plus the encouragement of local automakers and tech firms to develop secure telematics modules to minimize foreign reliance. What is China’s role in this new paradigm? To understand the role of China in the EVs and connected vehicles is important to highlight the low labor costs in China, coupled with government subsidies and a well-structured and established supply chain, these three factors gave the Chinese firms huge advantages over their competitors. However, those are not the only factors involved in the equation, the promotion of EVs over internal combustion vehicles and the adoption and development of technologies that turn “simple” vehicles into connected vehicles are important to mention too. All these factors have been well capitalized by Chinese firms, in consequence, China has become the world’s largest EV exporter and somehow a threat for the West. As mentioned throughout the article, the security risks have sparked discussions and concerns, and it is fair, as Chinese-made vehicles have become competitive and technologically well-connected, much, that nowadays are in conditions to fight for the global automotive market. Therefore, there is a clear sense of concern among Western governments, especially in conditions of a politicized world that we live in nowadays. Naturally Beijing argues that bans and investigations on their Chinese-made vehicles are forms of economic protectionism and rejects any claims related to espionage, data leaks or misuse. While, it has also responded by tightening its own domestic rules: foreign vehicles are prohibited from accessing sensitive regions, including areas near government buildings and military facilities. Benefits and challenges for other key players and global automakers Automakers from Korea, Japan or the European and American are being directly benefited from the rising Chinese scrutiny of connected cars, meaning that new export and investment opportunities could be achieved by them. If these countries can materialize transparent software supply chains, strong cybersecurity frameworks, and local data-storage compliance, their advantage would increase. Specifically Korean and Japanese firms – which are proven reliable players with a strong presence worldwide and strengths in battery technology and infotainment systems –, can position themselves as trusted suppliers in those markets that are worried about Chinese-made vehicles and their possible espionage or security risks. On the other hand, however, there are big challenges ahead. If each country or region decides to have proper regulations, major hurdles will appear. For example; compliance costs will rise as automakers must meet different cybersecurity rules across regions; the technology surrounding software auditing, and the transparency of the supply chains itself will require significant investments; the supply chain and design of vehicles will be affected and in consequence production cost will increase; and, if there are different digital standards or rules, it is likely that there could be some limitations in the global interoperability. Conclusions While the rapid growth of EVs worldwide can be considered a good sign for sustainability goals – as they displaced over 1 million barrels per day of oil consumption in 2024 –. Recently there have appeared certain concerns related to security risks – proven or not – trade protectionism and unfair competition. On top of that, the transformation of cars into fully connected digital platforms has created a new paradigm, in which certain nations – mostly western nations – have started to be worried and rethinking their mobility through the lens of national security. In consequence, governments have tightened rules related to data, cybersecurity and foreign software dependencies. This new vision is already changing and transforming the vehicle industry, while the most affected, being the Chinese firms – due the natural competition and geopolitical reasons – there are other global automakers that, if they take the chance, could become key players – as far as they prioritize transparency in supply chains, security and technological trust. The new paradigm has shifted what used to be an ordinary, everyday product into a critical national infrastructure that must be subject to regulation. Finally, this paradigm also highlights the importance of data sovereignty and how important it has become and will be in the future. Referencias Carey, N. (2025, December 2). China floods the world with gasoline cars it can't sell at home. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/china-floods-world-with-gasoline-cars-it-cant-sell-home-2025-12-02/ European Commision. (2025, March 5). Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector . Retrieved from European Commision: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en Financial Post. (2025, December 11). Why China's EVs are dangerous to Canada: CVMA. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV7bn29lpOQ Grand View Research. (2025). Autonomous Vehicle Market (2025 - 2030). Retrieved from Grand View Research: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/autonomous-vehicles-market IEA. (2025). Trends in electric car markets. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2 Introvigne, M. (2024, February 6). Should Chinese Electric Cars Be Banned in the West? Retrieved from Bitter Winter: https://bitterwinter.org/should-chinese-electric-cars-be-banned-in-the-west/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=11726773838&gbraid=0AAAAAC6C3PdZ9Jx_edcTzlW0hHoO8yN2D&gclid=CjwKCAiA3L_JBhAlEiwAlcWO59TNJrosoZkG7MwAid0bRuGKs5KY0P7csiXimfUzLlbYshtFMafkdxoCqvQQAvD_Bw Leggett, T. (2025, June 10). China's electric cars are becoming slicker and cheaper - but is there a deeper cost? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8d4v69jw6o Meltzer, J. P., & Barron Esper, M. (2025, September 23). Is China circumventing US tariffs via Mexico and Canada? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new Navarrete, F. (2024, May 21). Aranceles de EU a autos chinos ponen en aprietos a México. Retrieved from El Financiero: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/2024/05/21/aranceles-de-eu-a-autos-chinos-ponen-en-aprietos-a-mexico/ Oertel, J. (2024, January 25). European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/: https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/ Radio biafra. (2025). Fearing data leaks, Israel bans Chinese-made cars for army officers. Retrieved from Radio biafra: https://radiobiafra.co/ Schuman, M. (2025, November). China’s EV Market Is Imploding. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/china-electric-cars-market/684887/ Zhang, Z. (2025, December 4). China’s EV dominance sparks EU retaliation. Retrieved from East Asia Forum: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/04/chinas-ev-dominance-sparks-eu-retaliation/

Defense & Security
Caracas (Venezuela) Feb. 18, 2009. The President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, arrival to Caracas, Venezuela, on official visit in febraury 18, 2009.

Why China is watching Trump’s Venezuela campaign closely

by Tom Harper

Donald Trump’s campaign against Venezuela escalated recently with the US president announcing that the country’s airspace should be considered “closed”. This is a move that has preceded US military interventions in the past, perhaps most notably in Iraq in 2003. It remains to be seen whether Trump’s declaration will be followed by military action or is just a means of raising the pressure on the Venezuelan leader, Nicolás Maduro, in an attempt to force him from office. But regardless of what happens next, what has been notable is the reaction of China. In a December 3 briefing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that closing Venezuelan airspace would violate international norms and infringe on national sovereignty. Jian added that China rejects interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs “under any pretext” and called on all parties to keep Latin America a “zone of peace”. This stance is no great surprise. China has developed strong relationships with several Latin American countries, including Venezuela, as part of a broader strategy to expand its presence in regions long dominated by the US. Trump’s threats of military action could jeopardise the influence China has built there. China has been involved in Latin America for centuries. But its ties to the region have grown rapidly over the past 25 years or so, with China becoming an indispensable partner to many Latin American countries. Brazil is a clear example of this indispensability. The election of Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in 2018 led to expectations that Brazil would tilt towards Washington. However, such expectations were soon dampened due to China’s role as a major consumer of Brazilian goods. By 2020, China was Brazil’s largest trading partner, accounting for over 30% of total exports from the country. Ties between Brazil and China have only deepened under Bolsonaro’s successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. This has been helped by the intensification of the US-China trade war, which has seen Brazil become a crucial alternative source of agricultural products such as soybeans that China has historically imported from the US. This relationship has enabled China to exert economic pressure on the US. Brazil’s large soybean exports to China have increased the global supply, which has suppressed prices for all suppliers – including those in US. China has been a similarly indispensable partner to Venezuela since the days of Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who took power in the Latin American state in 1999. Chávez was a keen advocate of a multipolar international order, a concept that has gained traction as Beijing’s political and economic power has grown. Over the years, China has become the main destination for Venezuelan oil. In 2024, China bought around 268,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela on average every day – a figure that, in reality, is likely to be higher as Venezuelan oil is routinely mislabelled to bypass US sanctions. Venezuelan oil is key for China. Beijing has been attempting to diversify its sources of natural resources in recent years as part of efforts to retain its global advantage in cheap manufacturing and wean itself off a dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Trump’s threats to intervene militarily in Venezuela may, at least in part, be aimed at challenging Chinese interests. Indeed, the White House issued an official statement on December 2 affirming the Trump administration’s commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Signed in 1823, the doctrine said the US would reject other countries’ influence in Latin America. A new “Trump Corollary” to the doctrine states that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. Challenging Chinese influence Any US military action in Venezuela will probably increase paranoia across the region. Trump warned recently that any country he believes is making illegal drugs destined for the US is vulnerable to a military attack, and singled out Colombia. On December 2, Trump told reporters at the White House that he “heard” Colombia was “making cocaine”. “They have cocaine plants”, he added. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, hit back immediately on social media, saying: “To threaten our sovereignty is to declare war”. But China is unlikely to step in militarily to defend countries in Latin America from US aggression. While China has used its developmental influence there to pursue some political objectives – most notably persuading El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras to renounce diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years – its engagement with Latin America has largely been transactional. China’s strategy in Latin America is driven primarily by economic considerations, and Beijing has generally been reluctant to enter into formal alliances with states there. This hesitance to commit to defending its partners could strain relations with countries in the region that may expect Beijing to support them in the event of a crisis. However, Trump’s Latin America campaign does provide China with some opportunities. Just as European countries concerned about Russia’s expansionist intentions have become a key market for American arms, it’s possible that Latin America becomes a lucrative destination for Chinese weaponry. Venezuela is already buying Chinese arms, varying from riot control equipment to missiles and – possibly in the future – fighter jets. China has also sold military equipment to Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. The US appears to be taking an increasingly active interest in Latin America. As outlined in its recently published National Security Strategy, the Trump administration is looking to readjust the US’s “global military presence to address urgent threats” in the western hemisphere. Having carefully built up its influence in Latin America over many years, China’s leadership will be keeping a keen eye on how events unfold there in the months ahead.

Diplomacy
The Japanese and Chinese flags are being pulled apart, with the Taiwanese flag in the middle. This suggests that Japan's stance is,

Why Japan’s support for Taiwan has gone down so badly in China

by Lewis Eves

Tensions are rising between China and Japan again over a dispute in the East China Sea. Such tensions are usually over the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited chain administered by Japan but claimed by China. The current row, however, stems from international anxiety over a possible Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan. On November 17, in her first parliamentary address since taking office in October, Japan’s prime minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that her country could intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Takaichi’s comments sparked anger in China, with state media framing her rhetoric as reminiscent of Japanese acts of violence towards China during the second world war. Beijing has demanded that Takaichi retract her comments – a call she has rebuffed – and is advising Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan, claiming there has been a deterioration in public security there. China has also introduced a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports as the row continues to escalate. The ruling communist party, which frames itself as the protector of the Chinese nation, has long sought to reunify China following the so-called “century of humiliation”. Starting with the first opium war in 1839 and concluding with the end of the second world war in 1945, this period saw China victimised and partitioned by various foreign powers. Taiwan is thus problematic for the party. The island state broke away from China in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war, and its autonomy from Beijing contradicts the goal of national unity that the party has promised. Some observers fear that China will seek reunification through force, with some predictions suggesting it will be ready to invade Taiwan as soon as 2027. There is no guarantee that an invasion will occur. But the international community, led by the US, is preparing for a confrontation over Taiwan regardless. On the same day Takaichi made her comments, the US government announced it had agreed to sell US$700 million (£535 million) of arms to Taiwan. In this context, Japan’s show of support for a strategic partner in the region is not surprising – yet Takaichi’s remarks about Japanese intervention are particularly provocative for China. One reason is that Japan occupied and colonised Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, contributing to China’s century of humiliation. This makes Japanese threats to intervene in Taiwan’s defence a contentious prospect for China to consider. Another reason is that anti-Japanese sentiment is a prominent characteristic of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese nationalists are vocal in condemning Japan for any provocation, pointing to historical atrocities committed against China as evidence of a need to stay vigilant against renewed Japanese aggression. The idea of Japan intervening to maintain the status quo in what China considers a breakaway province probably falls under their idea of an aggressive act. Will tensions escalate? Outright conflict between China and Japan remains unlikely. It is possible that Takaichi’s remarks were simply an effort to shore up domestic political support, rather than a genuine military threat. Her rightwing Liberal Democratic party (LDP) previously governed Japan in coalition with the centre-right Komeito party. This coalition broke down in October 2025, forcing the LDP to rely increasingly on its nationalist base for support – a group that is generally suspicious of China’s growing military and economic strength. Irrespective of Takaichi’s motive, China has responded assertively. It sent its coast guard to the Senkaku Islands in what it called a “rights enforcement patrol”. The Japanese government has also accused China of flying military drones near Japan’s most westerly territory, Yonaguni, which is close to Taiwan’s east coast. Any misfire risks open hostility between the two nations. The Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands. vadimmmus / Shutterstock Relations between Japan and China are tense, yet I see cause for optimism. Takaichi has positioned herself as a successor to the late Shinzo Abe, who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020.Like Takaichi, Abe promoted an assertive Japanese foreign policy. He oversaw reinterpretations of Article 9, the pacifist clause of Japan’s constitution, to lessen restrictions on his country’s use of military force. This included passing legislation in 2015 which allows Japan’s self-defence force to deploy to protect the country’s allies. This legislation has enabled Takaichi to consider military intervention in Taiwan’s favour. When Abe entered office in 2012, it was also a tense time for China and Japan. Japanese nationalist activists swam to the Senkaku Islands and raised their country’s flag, triggering massive anti-Japanese protests in China. Tensions remained high for several years, with both countries deploying ships and warplanes to the region. This resulted in several near-misses that could have escalated into outright conflict. In 2014, Chinese fighter jets flew extremely close to a Japanese surveillance plane and intelligence aircraft near the islands, passing about 30 metres from one plane and 50 metres from another. However, once tensions passed, Abe and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, oversaw several years of relative calm and cooperation between their two countries. In fact, this is usually linked to the familiarity Abe and Xi developed through their interactions while managing their countries’ mutual animosity over the disputed islands. So, if Takaichi can follow her mentor’s lead and successfully navigate the tensions to build an effective working relationship with Xi, a more stable relationship between China and Japan in the future is still possible.

Diplomacy
President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal, Thursday, October 30, 2025, in Busan, South Korea. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Between Tactical Easing and Strategic Confrontation: The Busan Moment in China-US Relations

by Bo Ma , Yiyi Xu

On 30 October 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019 on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan. The encounter marked a cautious “tentative reengagement” after six years of sustained friction, signalling neither a diplomatic thaw nor a substantive breakthrough, but a forced recalibration. Both sides recognised that prolonged confrontation was increasingly costly, yet neither was willing to display strategic vulnerability or compromise on core interests. The central challenge of this “six-year reunion” was how to balance unavoidable competition with limited cooperation. The Busan meeting did not resolve long-standing disputes, but it did illuminate the evolving structure of bilateral engagement: limited economic de-escalation coexisting with sustained tensions in security and technology. Trust remained thin, and risk management defined the tone. Within this framework of cautious interaction and enduring rivalry, both sides resumed dialogue while leaving key structural contradictions unresolved. Tactical Easing: A “Mutual Ceasefire” over Rare Earths and Tariffs Building on preliminary understandings reached during earlier Kuala Lumpur discussions, the Busan meeting yielded limited but concrete outcomes. Washington agreed to suspend part of its planned tariff increases and delay the expansion of export restrictions. Beijing, in turn, postponed implementation of newly announced controls on rare earth elements and related technologies. These reciprocal measures were explicitly time-limited, with a one-year horizon.While framed as mutual concessions, the steps reflected pragmatic political calculations within each country’s domestic context. President Trump sought short-term economic calm to support financial markets and reassure key Midwestern constituencies ahead of the election cycle. Beijing, for its part, aimed to preserve a stable external environment through managed openness, gaining room for continued economic restructuring and technological adaptation. Yet the truce was fragile. China’s decision to delay export controls was not a concession but a strategic withholding of leverage. As the supplier of roughly 60 percent of the world’s mined rare earths – critical to semiconductors, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and US defence platforms such as the F-35—Beijing retains significant influence over global supply chains. The Busan easing was therefore less a structural breakthrough than a tactical pause: a deferral of escalation rather than a resolution of underlying tensions. Diplomatic Silence over Taiwan: Strategic Caution and Latent Risks The Busan meeting made no reference to the Taiwan issue—an omission that is rare in the history of China–US summitry. Following the talks, President Trump remarked that President Xi “understands the consequences” of attempting to seize Taiwan but declined to clarify whether the United States would intervene militarily. Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly emphasised that Washington would not trade Taiwan’s interests for economic concessions. Taiwan thus became the “elephant in the room”: too consequential to ignore, yet too politically volatile to confront directly. For Beijing, Taiwan constitutes an inviolable sovereignty red line. For Trump, raising the issue risked derailing trade-focused dialogue and undermining his image of diplomatic control. Both leaders chose strategic silence as a means of avoiding escalation. This silence did not indicate convergence, but rather mutual restraint under high pressure. Taiwan has become a latent variable in every round of China–US engagement: absent from formal discussions, yet structurally embedded in the broader strategic equation. The longer it is avoided, the more its political cost accrues. In the future, renewed tensions—whether triggered by trade disputes or maritime incidents in the South China Seas—could rapidly return Taiwan to the center of bilateral confrontation. Taiwan’s “absence” in Busan does not reduce its relevance; it only signals that the crisis has been temporarily displaced from public diplomacy rather than defused. Institutionalised Decoupling: From Policy Choice to Structural Reality The diplomatic silence over Taiwan reflected tactical caution, while at a deeper level, the Busan meeting underscored the entrenched technological and institutional divergence between China and the United States. Trump signalled that US firms such as NVIDIA might engage in selective transactions involving mid-range AI chips, but reaffirmed that the most advanced semiconductor products would remain tightly restricted. This reaffirmed Washington’s “technology defense logic,” in which high-tech rivalry is governed by national security imperatives rather than market access concerns. In Beijing’s view, technological self-sufficiency is equally central to national resilience and regime security. Both sides now frame their strategic contest as a “struggle over national trajectory,” where concession is viewed as structural vulnerability. As a result, each is doubling down on domestic institutional insulation rather than pursuing negotiated guardrails. This bifurcation has produced a dual trajectory: modest stabilisation in trade flows paired with accelerating fragmentation in high-end technologies. Both governments are using this brief “technological cooldown” to advance structural measures. Washington is deepening coordination with allies and expanding export control and investment screening regimes. Beijing, for its part, is formulating new legal instruments—including draft frameworks akin to a Science and Technology Security Law and prospective regulations on critical technologies—to consolidate oversight over strategic sectors. While these initiatives are not yet fully codified, they reflect a clear intent to embed technology governance within national security architecture. In this context, technology has lost its value as a bargaining lever in diplomacy. Both sides tacitly acknowledge that strategic technologies can no longer be traded without compromising sovereignty. Technological decoupling has thus evolved from a temporary response into a systemic condition. The Busan “easing” did not reflect progress toward convergence, but rather a managed pause in an increasingly institutionalised contest. From High-Intensity Confrontation to Managed Competition The Busan meeting marked a shift in China–US relations from high-intensity confrontation to limited management. The two sides temporarily stabilised trade and exercised restraint on political and security fronts, while competition in technological and institutional domains remained entrenched. This was not reconciliation, nor a turning point, but the formation of a provisional equilibrium. For China, Busan offered a space for economic adjustment and accelerated efforts toward technological autonomy. For the United States, it maintained strategic pressure while averting short-term escalation. Beneath the optics of diplomacy, structural divergence and strategic mistrust persist. Across the Indo-Pacific, this “uneasy coexistence” is increasingly becoming the regional default. The significance of Busan lies not in concrete outcomes, but in the shared recognition that strategic confrontation must be managed, even if it cannot yet be resolved. This article was published under a Creative Commons license and may be republished with attribution, check original source for more information.

Defense & Security
Soldier UAV operator launches army drone with bomb to drop into enemy fortifications and trenches. Concept using military robots in modern warfare.

Unmanned aerial vehicle: geopolitical influence, industrial potential and future perspectives

by World & New World Journal

Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. The War Zone (TWZ). https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-creates-new-military-branch-dedicated-to-drone-warfare Amazon. (2023). Prime Air: The Future of Drone Delivery. Amazon Corporate Publications. Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Age of Drones. Council on Foreign Relations. Deloitte. (2022). Drones in Industrial Operations: Transforming Asset Inspection and Performance. Deloitte Insights. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2023). Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System. U.S. Department of Transportation. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2025). Drones. https://www.faa.gov/uas Fischer, S. (2020). China’s Military–Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Washington. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kania, E. B. (2020). Learning Warfare from the Laboratory: China’s Progress in Military Innovation. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Kesteloo, H. (2025, September 29). Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). (2023). Autonomous Delivery Networks and Future Logistics. Wing Technical Publications. Zipline. (2022). Operational Impact of Automated Medical Delivery by Drone. Zipline International Case Studies.

Energy & Economics
Automated AI industry robot and robotic arms assembly in factory production. Concept of artificial intelligence for industrial revolution and automation manufacturing process NLP

Seven emerging technologies shaping the future of sustainability and innovation

by World & New World Journal

Introduction Technological innovation is accelerating at an unprecedented pace, reshaping how societies generate energy, transport people and goods, produce food, fight disease, and explore space. Across multiple sectors, groundbreaking solutions are emerging in response to global challenges such as climate change, public health threats, energy insecurity, and resource scarcity. This article examines seven transformative technologies — from wireless electric-vehicle charging roads and regenerative ocean farming to graphene applications and disease-eliminating robots — each demonstrating how science and engineering are redefining sustainability, resilience, and human capability in the 21st century. 1. Wireless Electric Vehicles Charging Roads Electric Vehicles (EVs) have become key technology to decarbonise road transport, a sector that accounts for over 15% of global energy-related emissions. The increase of their sales globally exceeded 17 million in 2024, and it is forecasted to surpass the 20 million units by 2025. (IEA, 2025) Source: IEA analysis based on country submissions and data from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA), European Alternative Fuels Observatory (EAFO), EV Volumes and Marklines. Despite this growth, several concerns continue to slow down their widespread adoption. Limited charging infrastructure, battery-related autonomy issues, high purchase costs, slow charging times, and the environmental impact of the battery productions remain major obstacle. The broader EV industry, however, is actively developing new technologies to overcome these challenges. (Automotive Technology, 2025) In this context, one of the most pressing challenges is energy supply – specifically, the need for better batteries and more accessible charging points. To address this bottleneck, a promising new trend has emerged: wireless roads capable of charging EVs while they drive. This technology could fundamentally transform the charging experience and significantly reduce dependence on stationary chargers. The idea is simple, a system that supplies power to EVs while driving, using embedded inductive coils (wireless charging) or conductive rails on the road, in other words a dynamic or in-motion charging on the road. In fact, this technology already exists and there are several examples worth mentioning: - South Korea: introduced in 2013, the first road-powered electric vehicle network, in which electrical cables were buried below the surface and wirelessly transfer energy to the electric vehicles via magnetic resonance. An electrified road has the advantage of eliminating the plug-in infrastructure and vehicles usually require a smaller battery, reducing weight and energy consumption. In 2009, KAIST introduced the OLEV (online electric vehicle), a type of EV that uses wireless dynamic charging through inductive coils embedded in the road. The OLEV public transport buses were later used in the 2013 first electric road in the city of Gumi, which consisted of a network of 24 km, by 2015 the number of OLEV buses increased to 12 (Anthony, 2013) and another bus line was launched in Sejong that same year. (SKinno News, 2021)- Sweden: a 1.6 km road linking Stockholm Arlanda airport to a logistic site outside the capital city was a pilot project achieved in 2016. (The Guardian, 2018), (Carbonaro, 2022) However, the Swedish government didn’t stop there and by 2020 they built a wireless road for heavy trucks and buses in the island city of Visby, and they are planning to expand it to the 13-mile E20 highway – logistic hub between Hallsberg and Örebro – and even have a plan of further 3,000 km of electric roads in Sweden by 2035. (Min, 2023), (Dow, 203)- USA: a quarter mile (400 m) section of road through the Corktown area of Detroit was changed to a wireless electric road. Electreon was the company in charge of the project. (Paris, 2024), (6abc Philadelphia, 2025)- France, Norway and China: Electreon – a leading provider of wireless charging solutions for EVs – has partnered and gained projects for wireless highways in France – a section of the A10 highway (Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure, 2023) –, Norway – evaluation of wireless charging for AtB’s BRT routes in Trøndelag (Foster, Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway, 2023) – and China – not wireless but in an 1.8 km electrified highway in Zhuzhou. (Foster, China demonstrates electrified highway, 2023) While all these examples show a “tendency” to switch into wireless roads, it is important to highlight three points to keep that are decisive and have slowed down the transition: in first place, these wireless roads are being targeted mainly for freight trucks and buses, the second point is the initial cost of the infrastructure is high and third point is the technology that should be added to the EVs. 2. Fire Suppression Using Sound Waves Seth Robertson and Viet Tran, engineering students from George Mason University in Virginia designed a fire extinguisher that uses sound waves to put out flames. Their device emits low-frequency sound waves that disrupt the conditions necessary for a fire to sustain itself, meaning that no foam, powder, chemicals or water are needed to extinguish a fire, just sound. In order to understand how it can be possible to extinguish fire with sound it is necessary to remember that a fire needs heat, fuel and oxygen to survive, if one of these elements does not appears, there is no fire, under this principle, Robertson and Tran’s prototype uses sounds to separate the oxygen from the flame, as a result, the fire extinguish. The interesting part is that the sound must have the right frequency, specifically between 30 to 60 Hz – low frequency sounds. The sound waves will act as pressure waves moving the air molecules back and forth, and in the right frequency, the movement will disrupt the flames’ structure, separating the oxygen molecules and the fire will simply die out with the lack of these molecules. Potential applications include small kitchen fires or small fires, while unfortunately, large-scale structural or wildland fires still remain a challenge, mostly due to the environmental factors, like wind, air density and flame intensity, that can be a hurdle in uncontrolled environments. Moreover, the generation of low-frequency sound waves powerful enough to suppress fires requires a significant amount of energy. Nonetheless, an early prototype consists of an amplifier to generate low-frequency sound and a collimator to focus the sound waves directly on the fire, and as mentioned before, one limitation is that specialized equipment is required to produce the high-pressure sound waves. Still, research has been carried out recently and it is expected that this technology could be a non-destructive and less damaging method for firefighters soon. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM 3. Regenerative Ocean Farming Regenerative ocean farming is a climate-friendly model of aquaculture where seaweed and/or shellfish are grown in a way that requires no freshwater, feed or fertilizer, as the crops naturally filter nutrients from the water and capture carbon and nitrogen. This farming model can benefit coastal ecosystems and communities by increasing food security, creating jobs, improving water quality, protecting coastlines, supporting ocean justice (Urban Ocean Lab, 2023) and most importantly, mitigating climate change. Ocean farming can rely on a polyculture system – cultivate a mix of shellfish and seaweeds – or just a single species system. While the climate conditions determine the species to grow, it does not affect the system itself. The system follows a vertical layer farming way, in which farms use ropes that extend vertically from the surface to the seabed, in addition to the use of different levels and cages for scallops, oysters or clams, for example, as shown in Figure 2. Other species like kelp, abalone, purple sea urchins or sea cucumbers can also be harvested. Figure 2: Ocean farming diagram. Source: Urban Ocean Lab The big advantage is the maximization of the ocean space, producing more food in a smaller footprint, in addition to the use of the benefits of the species – seaweed and shellfishes – which are both natural filters that help to clean the water and absorb excess nutrients, combating ocean acidification and reducing marine pollution (Hassan, 2024) naturally. Moreover, the versatility of these species allows them to use them in other areas, such as biofuels, soil fertilizers, animal feed or cosmetics and not only for human food. Around the world, there are several projects that have adopted this methodology (Hassan, 2024): 1. GreenWave (USA): increased biodiversity by 50%, reduced nitrogen level in water by 20% and created sustainable job opportunities for locals.2. Ocean’s Halo (Ireland): annual harvest of 500 tons of kelp, creation of 20 jobs in rural areas and carbon footprint reduction by 30%3. Kitasaku Marine (Japan): Nori production increased by 25%, coastal water quality improved by 15% and local support of 50 locals.4. Catalina Sea Ranch (USA): harvested 1 million pounds of mussels annually, increased local biodiversity by 20% and created 10 new jobs.5. Blue Ventures (Madagascar): harvested 146 tonnes of red seaweed, plus they have created a sea cucumber market with a value of $18,000 and 700 farmers have been trained to farm in the ocean. (Blue Ventures Conservation, 2015)6. Havhøst (Ocean Harvest) (Denmark): they are growing seaweed, mussels and the European flat oyster in 30 communities along the Danish coast. In addition, they focus on educational activities to introduce ocean farming to more people. (Waycott, 2022) Overall ocean farming creates a positive environmental impact; it provides a sustainable food source and economic opportunities for the local people and the industry. Of course it faces challenges, but it has become a way to mitigate climate change and protect the ocean. 4. Wave Energy Generators There are two types of waves. Surface waves are generated by a combination of wind passing over the sea’s surface raising up water and gravity pulling it back down. In a technical way, warm air rises and expands, creating areas of low pressure compared to places with cooler air. Air then moves from high-pressure areas to low-pressure areas. This movement of air is wind and when it rushes across the surface of the Earth it creates waves in oceans. (Lumley, 2025) On the other hand, underwater waves are sound waves produced by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions; these waves travel by compressing and expanding the water. (Kadri, 2025) In both cases temperature variations and other factors can affect the nature of the waves. For instance, wave energy or wave power harnesses the ocean’s waves to generate energy by converting a wave’s kinetic energy into electricity. Wave power is a form of renewable and sustainable energy which has potential cost benefits over solar and wind but faces technological challenges limiting its large-scale adoption in electricity generation and water desalination. (Lumley, 2025) The nature of the waves makes wave energy the world’s largest source of energy with a potential of annual global production of 29,500 TWh, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2012). In addition, it works well in tandem with other renewables such as wind. (Ocean Energy Europe, s.f.) In terms of technology itself, wave energy has relied on the next devices: 1. Point absorbers: floating buoys that capture the vertical movement of waves, which then is harnessed through a cable anchored to the seabed. The vertical movement of the waves is subsequently transformed into electricity via converters (alternators, generators or hydraulic systems). These are usually mounted on the seabed in shallower water and are connected to the floating buoys.2. Oscillating water columns (OWCs): a partially submerged, hollow structure connected to an air turbine through a chamber. These devices use the rise and fall of the waves to compress air, the air is forced to move back and forth in the chamber and creates a strong air flow that powers the turbine, generating electricity.3. Overtopping devices: a floating structure made of segments linked together, which lifts up and down with the waves. These devices harness wave energy by allowing waves to flow into a reservoir, which then releases the water through turbines to generate electricity. Design, flow dimensions, turbine efficiency and structural elements influence their efficiency. Source: BKV Energy Despite its huge potential and considering it as a clean energy source with no GHG emissions, the main concern related to wave energy is the marine life affectation – including habitat alteration, noise pollution or collision risks for marine life. On the other hand, high costs, complex design, maintenance and technological constraints also have become a problem, still, the potential of this continuous energy is huge compared to the more limited wind energy, for example. (Lumley, 2025) Despite all that, there are some active projects being developed in different parts of the world, for example: Azura Wave Power (tested in Hawaii), Anaconda WEC (UK’s prototype), CalWave (in California), CETO (tested in Australia and expected to be tested in Spain too), Crestwing (tested in Denmark), HiWave-5 (Swedish-based tested in Portugal), the Wave Energy Program (in India) or the Ocean Grazer WEC (developed in The Netherlands), among many others. (Wikipedia, 2019) 5. SpinLaunch SpinLaunch is a spaceflight technology development company working on mass accelerator technology to move payloads to space. This innovative space company is known for their Meridian Space and their Suborbital Accelerator. The Meridian Space is a low-cost, highly differentiated LEO satellite communications constellation which offers speed, reliability and flexibility (SpinLaunch, 2025). The company has partnered, and investments have been achieved in order to launch 280 satellites (Berger, 2025) as part of their satellite constellation, which will satisfy the needs in any area needed such as maritime, national security, communications, corporate networks, aviation, military, etc. The highlight of these satellites is their mass that is only 70 kg, and its facility to be launched in one or two rockets. On the other hand, SpinLaunch is aiming to build a kinetic launch system that uses centrifugal force instead of traditional rockets and spins a rocket around at speeds up to 4700 mph (7,500 km/h) before sending it upward toward space. At 60 km or so altitude, the rocket would ignite its engines to achieve orbital velocity. To achieve this, they have built a Suborbital Accelerator prototype, in Spaceport America, New Mexico. This prototype is a 33-meter vacuum chamber that can launch payloads from 800 to 5000 mph. Several tests have already been carried out, being the 10th the latest on September 27th, 2025. (Young, 2025) SpinLaunch hopes to have a 100-meter Orbital Lauch system by 2026. The engineering behind these systems is as follows: both systems are circular accelerators, powered by an electric drive that uses a mechanical arm to sling payloads around in circles to reach incredibly high speeds of up to 5,000 mph. They then release the payload through a launch tube and spaceward. (Young, 2025) The company claims that their method is cheaper as it eliminates 70% of the fuel compared to the traditional rocket launch, in addition, the infrastructure is less, and it is more environmentally friendly than the traditional methods. However, the limitations are seen in the payload weight (no more than 400 kg per payload) and their resistance (payloads must be able to withstand up to 10,000 G’s of force during the centrifugal acceleration process) Source: SpinLaunch. 6. Disease-Eliminating Robots “Disease-eliminating robots” encompass a diverse set of robotic and AI-driven systems designed to prevent, monitor, and treat infectious diseases while minimizing human exposure to risk. These technologies operate at multiple scales — from environmental disinfection in hospitals to microscopic interventions inside the human body. Environmental disinfection robots are among the most established applications. Devices such as Xenex and UVD Robots utilize pulsed ultraviolet (UV-C) light to destroy viral and bacterial DNA, effectively sterilizing hospital rooms within minutes (UVD Robots, 2023; Xenex, 2024). Others deploy vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP) to disinfect enclosed environments like train carriages and operating rooms (WHO, 2022). These systems substantially reduce hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) and cross-contamination risks. In medical and clinical settings, robotics contribute to precision and safety. Surgical robots such as Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci and Ion platforms enable minimally invasive operations with reduced infection risk and faster recovery times (Intuitive Surgical, 2024). At the microscopic level, nanorobots are under development for targeted drug delivery, capable of navigating the bloodstream to deliver chemotherapy agents directly to tumor sites, thereby minimizing systemic side effects (Lee et al., 2023). Meanwhile, biofilm-removing microbots are being engineered to eradicate bacterial colonies on medical implants and dental surfaces (Kim et al., 2022). Automated systems are also emerging for precise injections, such as intravitreal therapies for ocular diseases, helping reduce clinician workload and human error (Zhou et al., 2024). Beyond clinical contexts, robots support public health surveillance and disease prevention. Prototypes like MIT’s “Luigi” sewage-sampling robot autonomously collect wastewater data to monitor community-level infections and anticipate outbreaks (MIT News, 2025). In precision agriculture, AI-guided robotic systems detect infected crops early, controlling plant disease spread and protecting global food security (FAO, 2023). Collectively, these robotic systems demonstrate the increasing convergence of automation, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence in safeguarding human and environmental health. By taking on tasks that are dangerous, repetitive, or biologically hazardous, disease-eliminating robots represent a pivotal advancement in the global strategy for infectious disease control and public health resilience. 7. Graphene Graphene is the world’s thinnest material, consisting in a single layer of carbon atoms arranged in a hexagonal honeycomb lattice. Despite its thinnest it is stronger than steel and diamond. In addition, graphene is flexible, transparent, conductive, light, selectively permeable and a 2D material. In summary it is a versatile material with many different applications and that has gained attention since its isolation in 2004 by Russian and Nobel prize scientists Andre Geim and Konstantin Nocoselov. (Larousserie, 2013) The characteristics of graphene make them an important player in the energy, construction, health and electronics sectors. In a deeper analysis, its high conductivity is valuable for battery life, autonomy and energy efficiency. Its lightness is suitable for manufacturing drone batteries, which reduce their weight, and the drone’s weight too. Graphene’s transparency and flexibility could be used in screen devices including cell phones, televisions or vehicles – Samsung already produced a flat screen with graphene electrodes. In addition, its high resistance and excellent heat and electric conductivity make them valuable for the light industry. Other sectors that are beneficial from graphene include the construction and manufacturing sector. For example, adding 1 g of graphene to 5 kg of cement increases the strength of the latter by 35%. Another example refers to Ford Motor Co., that is adding 0.5% of graphene to increase their plastic strength by 20%. (Wyss, 2022) Graphene has become a promising material, and it has been studied and tested to be used as a replacement or equivalent of silicon in microelectronics. It has been used in sports, like tennis rackets made by Head or in electric cars concepts like BASF and Daimler-Benz Smart Forvision. Bluestone Global Tech partnered with mobile phone manufacturers for the first graphene-based touchscreen to be launched in China. (Larousserie, 2013) Paint with graphene for a better thermal regulation in houses; bones, prosthesis, hearing aids or even diagnosis of diseases could also rely on graphene. (Repsol, 2025) Nowadays, its costs are high, but the graphene is going through a moment of intense academic research that surely in some years will end up with even more promising results and applications. Conclusion Together, these seven emerging technologies form a powerful snapshot of the future. Their diversity — spanning transportation, renewable energy, aquaculture, aerospace, robotics, and advanced materials — reflects the multi-sectoral nature of today’s global challenges. Yet they share a common purpose: to create more sustainable, efficient, and resilient systems capable of supporting a rapidly changing world. Wireless charging roads challenge the limits of mobility; ocean farming and wave energy reimagine how we use marine ecosystems; SpinLaunch and graphene redefine what is physically possible; and disease-eliminating robots transform public health. These innovations are still evolving, but they show that the solutions to some of humanity’s most pressing problems already exist — they simply need investment, scaling, and political will. By embracing these technologies and continuing to pursue scientific discovery, societies can accelerate the transition toward a cleaner energy future, safer communities, healthier ecosystems, and a more equitable and technologically advanced world. References 6abc Philadelphia. (2025, Juky 11). Electric vehicle tech: The rise of wireless charging roads. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NzJO67JIUE Abing, H. (n.d.). The Sonic Fire Extinguisher That’s Changing Firefighting. Retrieved from Rareform Audio: https://www.rareformaudio.com/blog/sonic-fire-extinguisher-sound-waves Anthony, S. (2013, August 6). World's first road-powered electric vehicle network switches on in South Korea. Retrieved from ExtremeTech: https://www.extremetech.com/cars/163171-worlds-first-road-powered-electric-vehicle-network-switches-on-in-south-korea Automotive Technology. (2025). What Are the Biggest Challenges Facing Electric Vehicle Adoption Today? Retrieved from Automotive Technology: https://www.automotive-technology.com/articles/what-are-the-biggest-challenges-facing-electric-vehicle-adoption-today BBC Earth. (2023, March 3). Are Underwater Farms the Future of Food? | Our Frozen Planet | BBC Earth. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=93nk2xIRcbk&t=11s Berger, E. (2025, April 4). SpinLaunch—yes, the centrifuge rocket company—is making a hard pivot to satellites. Retrieved from Ars Technica: https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/04/spinlaunch-yes-the-centrifuge-rocket-company-is-making-a-hard-pivot-to-satellites/ Blue Ventures Conservation. (2015). Community-based aquaculture. Pioneering viable alternatives to fishing. Retrieved from Blue Ventures: https://blueventures.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/BV-Aquaculture-Factsheet-2015.pdf Carbonaro, G. (2022, June 24). Wireless charging for electric cars is already here - but the technology isn’t for everybody yet. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/06/24/wireless-charging-roads-for-electric-cars-ev-technology-is-here-fiat-stellantis Dow, C. (203, May 16). Sweden will build the world's first EV charging road. Retrieved from TopGear: https://www.topgear.com/car-news/electric/sweden-will-build-worlds-first-ev-charging-road Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure. (2023, July 20). Electreon, together with Vinci, wins tender for first wireless electric road in France. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-together-vinci-wins-tender-first-wireless-electric-road-france Ellen MacArthur Foundation. (2024, March 20). 3D Ocean Farming | Transforming tradition. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PqvHaaL6EQ&t=225s Emergent Team. (n.d.). Using Sound Waves to Put Out Fire: The Story of Two George Mason University Students. Retrieved from Emergent: https://www.emergent.tech/blog/sound-waves-to-put-out-fire FAO. (2023). AI and Robotics in Precision Agriculture: Combating Plant Diseases. Foster, J. (2023, March 29). China demonstrates electrified highway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/china-demonstrates-electrified-highway Foster, J. (2023, June 28). Electreon to install the first wireless electric road in Norway. Retrieved from Electric Vehicle Charging & Infrastructure: https://www.evcandi.com/news/electreon-install-first-wireless-electric-road-norway George Mason University. (2015, February 6). Pump Up the Bass to Douse a Blaze: Mason Students' Invention Fights Fires. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPVQMZ4ikvM Greenwave. (2025). Regenerative Ocean Farming. Retrieved from Greenwave: https://www.greenwave.org/our-model Hassan, T. (2024, October 15). Vertical Ocean Farming. Retrieved from AgriNext Conference: https://agrinextcon.com/vertical-ocean-farming-sustainable-and-shellfish/ IEA. (2025). Electric Vehicles. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/energy-system/transport/electric-vehicles Intuitive Surgical. (2024). da Vinci and Ion Robotic Systems Overview. IPCC. (2012). Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Retrieved from IPCC: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SRREN_Full_Report-1.pdf Kadri, U. (2025, April 7). Wave energy’s huge potential could finally be unlocked by the power of sound – new research. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/wave-energys-huge-potential-could-finally-be-unlocked-by-the-power-of-sound-new-research-253422 Kim, J. et al. (2022). “Microbotic Eradication of Biofilms on Medical Implants.” Nature Biomedical Engineering, 6(11), 1215–1226. Larousserie, D. (2013, November 22). Graphene - the new wonder material. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/nov/26/graphene-molecule-potential-wonder-material Lee, S. et al. (2023). “Nanorobotic Drug Delivery Systems for Cancer Therapy.” Science Advances, 9(4), eabq1234. Lumley, G. (2025, March). What Is Wave Power? Retrieved from BKV Energy: https://bkvenergy.com/learning-center/what-is-wave-energy/ MIT News. (2025). “Luigi: A Robot for Wastewater Epidemiology.” Min, R. (2023, July 06). Sweden is building the world's first permanent electrified road for EVs to charge while driving. Retrieved from euro news: https://www.euronews.com/next/2023/05/09/sweden-is-building-the-worlds-first-permanent-electrified-road-for-evs NOAA. (n.d.). 3D Ocean Farming. Retrieved from NOAA: https://oceantoday.noaa.gov/fullmoon-3doceanfarming/welcome.html Ocean Energy Europe. (n.d.). Wave energy. Retrieved from Ocean Energy Europe: https://www.oceanenergy-europe.eu/ocean-energy/wave-energy/#:~:text=Wave%20energy%20technology Paris, M. (2024, January 31). Wireless charging: The roads where electric vehicles never need to plug in. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240130-wireless-charging-the-roads-where-electric-vehicles-never-need-to-plug-in Porter, A. (2024, June 20). What is Aquaculture? An Overview of Sustainable Ocean Farming. Retrieved from PBS: https://www.pbs.org/articles/a-guide-to-hope-in-the-water-and-aquaculture Repsol. (2025). An innovative and revolutionary material. Retrieved from Repsol: https://www.repsol.com/en/energy-move-forward/innovation/graphene/index.cshtml SKinno News. (2021, July 8). Charging while driving – electrified road for electric vehicles. Retrieved from SKinno News: https://skinnonews.com/global/archives/6253 SpinLaunch. (2025). Pioneering The Next Generation of Satellite Broadband. Retrieved from SpinLaunch: https://www.spinlaunch.com/meridianspace The Guardian. (2018, April 12). World's first electrified road for charging vehicles opens in Sweden. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/apr/12/worlds-first-electrified-road-for-charging-vehicles-opens-in-sweden Urban Ocean Lab. (2023, November). What is Regenerative Ocean Farming? Retrieved from Urban Ocean Lab: https://urbanoceanlab.org/resource/regenerative-ocean-farming-factsheet UVD Robots. (2023). Next-Generation UV-C Disinfection Systems for Hospitals. Waycott, B. (2022, January 10). Regenerative ocean farming is trending, but can it be a successful business model? Retrieved from Global Seafood Alliance: https://www.globalseafood.org/advocate/regenerative-ocean-farming-is-trending-but-can-it-be-a-successful-business-model/ WHO. (2022). Guidelines on Hydrogen Peroxide Disinfection in Healthcare Settings. Wikipedia. (2019, June). List of wave power projects. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wave_power_projects Wyss, K. (2022, November 29). Graphene is a proven supermaterial, but manufacturing the versatile form of carbon at usable scales remains a challenge. Retrieved from The Conversation: https://theconversation.com/graphene-is-a-proven-supermaterial-but-manufacturing-the-versatile-form-of-carbon-at-usable-scales-remains-a-challenge-194238 Xenex. (2024). LightStrike Germ-Zapping Robot: Clinical Outcomes and Use Cases. Young, C. (2025, October 18). SpinLaunch just catapulted a NASA payload into the sky for the first time. Retrieved from Interesting Engineering: https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/spinlaunch-catapulted-a-nasa-payload Zhou, Y. et al. (2024). “Automated Injection Robots for Ophthalmic Care.” Frontiers in Medical Robotics, 5(2), 45–57.

Energy & Economics
Collage with two businessmen in suits walking, China flag. Business theme collage with upward trend. Represents China business, and progress. Business collage design

China’s new 5-year plan: A high-stakes bet on self-reliance that won’t fix an unbalanced economy

by Shaoyu Yuan

Every few years since 1953, the Chinese government has unveiled a new master strategy for its economy: the all-important five-year plan. For the most part, these blueprints have been geared at spurring growth and unity as the nation transformed from a rural, agrarian economy to an urbanized, developed powerhouse. The task that faced China’s leaders as they met in early October 2025 to map out their 15th such plan was, however, complicated by two main factors: sluggish domestic growth and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Their solution? More of the same. In pledging to deliver “high-quality development” through technological self-reliance, industrial modernization and expanded domestic demand, Beijing is doubling down on a state-led model that has powered its rise in recent years. President Xi Jinping and others who ironed out the 2026-2030 plan are betting that innovation-driven industrial growth might secure China’s future, even as questions loom about underpowered consumer spending and mounting economic risks. As an expert on China’s political economy, I view China’s new five-year plan as being as much about power as it is about economics. Indeed, it is primarily a blueprint for navigating a new era of competition. As such, it risks failing to address the widening gap between surging industrial capacity and tepid domestic demand. High-tech dreams At the heart of the new plan are recommendations that put advanced manufacturing and tech innovation front and center. In practice, this means upgrading old-line factories, automating and “greening” heavy industry and fostering “emerging and future industries” such as aerospace, renewable energy and quantum computing. By moving the economy up the value chain, Beijing hopes to escape the middle-income trap and cement its status as a self-reliant tech superpower. To insulate China from export controls put in place by other countries to slow China’s ascent, Beijing is doubling down on efforts to “indigenize” critical technologies by pumping money into domestic companies while reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. This quest for self-reliance is not just about economics but explicitly tied to national security. Under Xi, China has aggressively pursued what the Chinese Communist Party calls “military-civil fusion” – that is, the integration of civilian innovation with military needs. The new five-year plan is poised to institutionalize this fusion as the primary mechanism for defense modernization, ensuring that any breakthroughs in civilian artificial intelligence or supercomputing automatically benefit the People’s Liberation Army. Reshaping global trade China’s state-led push in high-tech industries is already yielding dividends that the new five-year plan seeks to extend. In the past decade, China has surged to global leadership in green technologies such as solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles thanks to hefty government support. Now, Beijing intends to replicate that success in semiconductors, advanced machinery, biotechnology and quantum computing. Such ambition, if realized, could reshape global supply chains and standards. But it also raises the stakes in China’s economic rivalry with advanced economies. Chinese prowess in building entire supply chains has spurred the United States and Europe to talk of reindustrialization to avoid any overreliance on Beijing. By pledging to build “a modern industrial system with advanced manufacturing as the backbone” and to accelerate “high-level scientific and technological self-reliance,” the new plan telegraphs that China will not back down from its bid for tech dominance. An elusive rebalancing What the plan gives comparatively modest attention, however, is the lack of strong domestic demand. Boosting consumer spending and livelihoods gets little more than lip service in the communiqué that followed the plenum at which the five-year plan was mapped out. Chinese leaders did promise efforts to “vigorously boost consumption” and build a “strong domestic market,” alongside improvements to education, health care and social security. But these goals were listed only after the calls for industrial upgrading and tech self-sufficiency – suggesting old priorities still prevail. And this will disappoint economists who have long urged Beijing to shift from an overt, export-led model and toward a growth model driven more by household consumption. Household consumption still accounts for only about 40% of gross domestic product, far below advanced-economy norms. The reality is that Chinese households are still reeling from a series of recent economic blows: the COVID-19 lockdowns that shattered consumer confidence, a property market collapse that wiped out trillions in wealth, and rising youth unemployment that hit a record high before officials halted the publication of that data. With local governments mired in debt and facing fiscal strain, there is skepticism that bold social spending or pro-consumption reforms will materialize anytime soon. With Beijing reinforcing manufacturing even as domestic demand stays weak, the likelihood is extra output will be pushed abroad – especially when it comes to EVs, batteries and solar technologies – rather than be absorbed at home. The new plan is cognizant of the need to maintain a strong manufacturing base, particularly among beleaguered industrial farms and other older industries struggling to stay afloat. As such, this approach may prevent painful downsizing in the short run, but it delays the rebalancing toward services and consumption that many economists argue China needs. Ripple effects Beijing has traditionally portrayed its five-year plans as a boon not only for China but for the world. The official narrative, echoed by state media, emphasizes that a stable, growing China remains an “engine” of global growth and a “stabilizer” amid worldwide uncertainty. Notably, the new plan calls for “high-level opening-up,” aligning with international trade rules, expanding free-trade zones and encouraging inbound investment – even as it pursues self-reliance. Yet China’s drive to climb the technological ladder and support its industries will likely intensify competition in global markets – potentially at the expense of other countries’ manufacturers. In recent years, China’s exports have surged to record levels. This flood of cheap Chinese goods has squeezed manufacturers among trading partners from Mexico to Europe, which have begun contemplating protective measures. If Beijing now doubles down on subsidizing both cutting-edge and traditional industries, the result could be an even greater glut of Chinese products globally, exacerbating trade frictions. In other words, the world may feel more of China’s industrial might but not enough of its buying power – a combination that could strain international economic relations. A high-stakes bet on the future With China’s 15th five-year plan, Xi Jinping is making a strategic bet on his long-term vision. There is no doubt that the plan is ambitious and comprehensive. And if successful, it could guide China to technological heights and bolster its claim to great-power status. But the plan also reveals Beijing’s reluctance to depart from a formula that has yielded growth at the cost of imbalances that have hurt many households across the vast country. Rather than fundamentally shift course, China is trying to have it all ways: pursuing self-reliance and global integration, professing openness while fortifying itself, and promising prosperity for the people while pouring resources into industry and defense. But Chinese citizens, whose welfare is ostensibly the plan’s focus, will ultimately judge its success by whether their incomes rise and lives improve by 2030. And that bet faces long odds.

Defense & Security
Lima, Peru - August 12, 2012: Seizure of drug or cocaine cargo in a truck with international destination. Packages filled with cocaine and the fight against drug trafficking.

Drug trafficking as a transnational system of power: origins, evolution, and perspectives

by World & New World Journal

Drug trafficking is the illegal trade, in large quantities, of drugs or narcotics (RAE, 2025). However, while this definition is accurate, it is insufficient to describe the complexity of a global phenomenon that transcends borders and involves the production, purchase, and distribution of illicit substances. Drug trafficking has developed hand in hand with global trade and interconnection (Saldaña, 2024). In other words, the evolution of drug trafficking is closely linked to globalization, which has strengthened the logistical, technological, and financial networks that enable its expansion. Therefore, more than isolated crime, drug trafficking must be understood as a transnational system of power that feeds on globalization itself. Drug Trafficking as a Transnational System of Power Drug trafficking is described by some authors as a profoundly complex transnational phenomenon resulting from globalization (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). This phenomenon involves and connects global networks of production, logistics, financing, and consumption, all made possible by economic interdependence, information technologies, and established global logistical routes. These authors analyze drug trafficking from a multidimensional perspective, identifying seven interrelated spheres that sustain this activity: the economic (money laundering and investment diversification), institutional (corruption and institutional capture), organizational (organized criminal networks and advanced logistics), social (presence in territories with state vacuums and community legitimization), technological (use of cryptomarkets, encryption, and innovation), geopolitical (route adaptability and resilience against state policies), and cultural (narratives and subcultures that normalize illicit practices) (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). These dimensions form a web of relationships in which criminal groups not only control the flow of drugs but also influence economic and political structures. As Interpol (n.d.) warns, this global network undermines and erodes the political and economic stability of the countries involved, while also fostering corruption and generating irreversible social and health effects. Furthermore, drug trafficking is intertwined with other crimes — such as money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and arms smuggling — thus forming a globalized criminal ecosystem, a global issue and a national security concern for nations worldwide. Origins and historical context There are records of the use of entheogenic drugs for ritual or medicinal purposes in Mesoamerican cultures — such as the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs (Carod Artal, 2011) — as well as in Peru (Bussmann & Douglas, 2006), the Amazon region, and even today among the Wixárika culture in Mexico (Haro Luna, 2023). Likewise, there was widespread and diverse drug use among the ancient Greeks and Romans, including substances such as mandrake, henbane, belladonna, cannabis, and opium, among others (Pérez González, 2024). However, modern drug trafficking can trace its origins to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) and the British Empire, marking the first international conflict directly linked to the drug trade. During the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, several drugs —such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines — made their debut in the pharmaceutical field, being used in medicines and therapeutic remedies (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). This period is considered the pharmaceutical revolution, characterized by the emergence of researchers, research centers, and major discoveries in the field. During that time, the term “drug” began to be associated with “addiction.” The pharmaceutical revolution had its epicenter in Germany; however, it was the British and Americans who promoted its expansion (Luna-Fabritius, 2015) and contributed to the normalization of psychoactive substance consumption. Military promotion, use and dependence Armed conflicts — from the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) to the First World War (1914–1918) — played a key role in spreading and promoting the military use of psychoactive substances. For instance, stimulants such as alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and methamphetamines were used to combat sleep, reduce fatigue, boost energy, and strengthen courage, while depressants like opium, morphine, and marijuana were used to relieve combat stress and mitigate war trauma (Marco, 2019). The dependence that developed led to a process of expansion among the civilian population, which entered a period of mass experimentation that often resulted in substance abuse and chemical dependency (Courtwright, 2001). In response, the first restrictive laws emerged, particularly in the United States (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). However, the high demand for certain substances, such as opium, gave rise to the search for markets capable of meeting that demand. Thus, Mexico — influenced by Chinese immigration that introduced the habit of smoking opium in the country — became, by the 1940s, the epicenter of poppy cultivation and opium processing in the region known as the Golden Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). It became the main supplier for drug markets in the United States and other parts of the continent, at times providing up to 90% of the demand during periods of shortage (Sosa, 2025). Even during World War II (1939–1945) — when the traditional supply of heroin and morphine to Europe was disrupted — Mexico strengthened its role in the illicit trade by providing smoking opium and processed morphine or heroin. These developments, alongside the implementation of opiate regulations in Mexico, helped consolidate and structure Mexican drug trafficking, which has persisted for more than sixty years (Sosa, 2025). Social expansion and regulatory restrictions The end of World War II brought stricter restrictions and regulations, but that did not prevent socio-cultural movements such as the hippie movement (in the 1960s) from adopting the use of marijuana, hashish, LSD, and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Kiss, 2025) without facing severe repercussions. That same hippie movement — which promoted pacifism and opposed the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — in one way or another encouraged drug use among young people. Moreover, the demand for substances by returning veterans led to the internationalization of drug markets, fostering, for example, the heroin trade from Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) (Saldaña, 2024). The Nixon administration and the US “War on Drugs” The dependency became so severe that it was considered a public health emergency in the United States. On June 18, 1971, Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” at an international level, labeling drug trafficking as “public enemy number one” (Plant & Singer, 2022). Nixon’s strategy combined international intervention with increased spending on treatment and stricter measures against drug trafficking and consumption (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.), along with the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Although the War on Drugs was officially declared in 1971, it had a precedent in 1969 with the failed Operation Intercept, whose goal was to combat marijuana trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border (M. Brecher, 1972). As part of his international strategy, Nixon launched several operations such as Operation Condor with Mexico (1975 and 1978), Operation Stopgap in Florida (1977), and Operation Fulminante, carried out by Colombian President Julio César Turbay in 1979. Most of these efforts were aimed at combating marijuana trafficking. The results were mixed, but the consequences were significant, as drug traffickers resisted and adapted — giving rise to a more active and violent generation and marking the consolidation of modern drug trafficking. The Consolidation of Modern Drug Trafficking: Colombia and Reagan Era. During the 1980s and 1990s, drug trafficking evolved into a highly organized industry. Figures such as Félix Gallardo [1], Amado Carrillo Fuentes [2], Pablo Escobar [3], Carlos Lehder [4], Griselda Blanco [5], Rafael Caro Quintero [6], and later Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera [7], among others (Wikipedia, 2025), symbolized the growing power of the cartels in Colombia and Mexico. During this period, criminal organizations consolidated their operations, and the profits from drug trafficking fueled violence and corruption. Moreover, the struggle for power — not only in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, or the United States but also in other regions of Latin America — and the competition for markets led to greater sophistication, as well as the construction of infrastructure and distribution networks. Pablo Escobar’s famous phrase, “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”), reflects the immense power and influence that drug traffickers wield, even over governments and authorities. Colombia, through the Cali and Medellín cartels, dominated the production and export of cocaine via a triangulation network that connected through Mexico or the Caribbean, with the final destination being the United States, where the Reagan administration (1981–1989) intensified the War on Drugs, focusing on criminal repression rather than public health. The Reagan’s War on Drugs was characterized for setting aggressive policies and legislative changes in the 1980s which increased the law enforcement and the punishment, as a consequence the prison penalties for drug crimes skyrocketed from 50,000 in 1980 to more than 400,000 by 1997 (HISTORY.com Editors 2017) Mexican cartels consolidation and Mexico’s transition to a consumer nation Around the same time, on the international arena, following the fragmentation of the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1980s, the emergence of new Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, and Juárez Cartel — combined with the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medellín cartels in the mid-1990s, catapulted Mexican cartels into prominence. They seized control of trafficking routes and diversified their operations, thus consolidating their role in the global drug market. Later, the September 11, 2001, attacks altered U.S. security policy, affecting border transit, increasing security measures, and tightening inspections along the southern border with Mexico (Rudolph, 2023) — one of the main drug distribution routes into the United States. Although some studies suggest that U.S. security policies at land ports of entry had only marginal pre- and post-9/11 effects (Ramírez Partida, 2014), in reality, these measures significantly impacted Mexico more than the US. Mexico transitioned from being primarily a producer, distributor, and transit country for drugs to also becoming a consumer nation. In 2002, more than 260,000 people were reported to use cocaine, whereas today the number exceeds 1.7 million addicts, according to data from the federal Secretariat of Public Security (Alzaga, 2010). Likewise, the ENCODAT 2016–2017 survey shows that the percentage of Mexican adolescents who had consumed some type of drug increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2016 (REDIM, 2025). By disrupting one of the main drug distribution routes to the United States, the situation led to drugs being redistributed and sold within Mexican territory. This, combined with the country’s social and economic conditions, facilitated the recruitment of young people by organized crime groups (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) for the domestic distribution of drugs. Mexico and the Contemporary War on Drug Trafficking The escalation of violence caused by the power struggle among Mexican cartels became so critical that President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) declared an open war against organized crime on December 10, 2006 (Herrera Beltrán, 2006). His strategy involved deploying the armed forces throughout Mexican territory, as well as obtaining financial aid, training, and intelligence through the Mérida Initiative from the United States to support the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2011). His successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), shifted the focus toward prevention and civil protection, although he continued the militarization process and the transformation of police institutions (BBC News, 2012). The strategies of Calderón and Peña Nieto — often grouped together — while questioned and criticized (Morales Oyarvide, 2011), achieved significant arrests, including figures such as “La Barbie,” “La Tuta,” “El Menchito,” “El Chapo,” “El Marro,” and “El Ratón.” They also eliminated key figures like Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and Nazario Moreno González. Later, during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), the strategy shifted once again toward a stance of “hugs, not bullets,” showing clear signs of passivity that allowed cartel expansion (Fernández-Montesino, 2025). His successor, Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–2030), on the other hand, has navigated both internal and external pressures (particularly from the United States), seeking to balance intelligence, coordination, and attention to structural causes (Pardo, 2024), although continued militarization suggests a hybrid strategy remains in place. Fentanyl and synthetic drugs: The future of drug trafficking The president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Jallal Toufiq, said that “the illicit drug industry represents a major global public health threat with potentially disastrous consequences for humankind.” In addition, the 2024 INCB Annual Report found that illicit synthetic drugs are spreading and consumption is increasing, moreover, these could overtake some plant-based drugs in the future. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025) The press release before mentioned also points out that Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific drug markets are increasing, while production in Central America, Peru, Colombia and the Caribbean keeps on developing. On the other hand, the opioid crisis (fentanyl) remains a serious problem for North America and the cocaine keeps affecting Europe with a spillover Africa. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025). The fentanyl crisis in North America is well documented. Data show an increase of 540% in overdose deaths between 2013 and 2016 (Katz 2017), with 20,100 deaths in the USA, while by 2023, the number increase to 72,776 deaths (USA Facts 2025). On the other hand, Canada has reported 53,821 deaths between January 2016 and March 2025 (Government of Canada 2025), while Mexico reported only 114 deaths from 2013 to 2023 (Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones 2024). These figures reveal not only the unequal regional impact of the synthetic opioid crisis but also the ongoing adaptation of organized crime networks that sustain and expand these markets. Evolution and Diversification of Organized Crime The phenomenon of adaptation, evolution, and diversification of new illicit markets is not an isolated issue. Experts such as Farah & Zeballos (2025) describe this in their framework Waves of Transnational Crime (COT). The first wave is represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, pioneers in moving tons of cocaine to the U.S. market through Caribbean routes. The second wave is represented by the Cali Cartel, which perfected the model and expanded trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico — still focusing on one product (cocaine) for one main market (the United States). The third wave is characterized by the criminalization of criminal structures, the use of armed groups (such as the FARC in Colombia), and the use of illicit production and trafficking as instruments of state policy, with clear effects on public policy functioning. At this stage, there is product diversification, with the main market remaining the U.S., but expansion reaching Europe (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Finally, the fourth wave — the current stage — is defined by total diversification, a shift toward synthetic drugs, and global expansion, involving extra-regional groups (Italian, Turkish, Albanian, and Japanese mafias), where many operations function “under government protection.” This fourth wave offers clear examples of collusion between criminal and political spheres, which is not new. However, the arrest of Genaro García Luna (Secretary of Public Security under Calderón), the links between high-profile Mexican politicians and money laundering or fuel trafficking (Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI, 2025), and even Trump’s statements claiming that “Mexico is largely governed by cartels” (DW, 2025) reveal a reality in which drug trafficking and criminal organizations are no longer merely producers and distributors of illicit substances. Today, they possess the power and capacity to establish parallel governance systems, exercise territorial control, infiltrate institutions and local economies, and even replace core state functions (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Future Perspectives and Challenges Currently, drug trafficking and organized crime represent structural threats. It is well known and widely studied what drug trafficking means for public security and health, but it has now also become a threat to politics, democracy, and the rule of law. With divided opinions, many analysts argue that the war on drugs has failed — in addition to being costly and, in many cases, counterproductive (Thomson, 2016). Punitive strategies have generated more violence without truly addressing the social causes behind the phenomenon (Morales Oyarvide, 2011). In this context, a paradigm shift is necessary: drug trafficking should not be approached solely as a security issue, but also as a public health and social development problem. Drug use has been a historical constant, and its total eradication is unrealistic. The key lies in harm-reduction policies, international cooperation, and inclusive economic development. Moreover, organized crime demonstrates adaptive resilience, making its eradication difficult — especially given that its operational capacities are so diversified, it maintains alliances with groups worldwide, and globalization and new technologies continually help it reinvent itself. Furthermore, even political and economic tensions among the United States, Mexico, Canada, and China are now intertwined with the trade of synthetic drugs — particularly fentanyl —, revealing the geopolitical magnitude of the problem (Pierson, 2024). Conclusion In summary, drug trafficking has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a transnational structure capable of influencing politics, the economy, and society. Its persistence can be explained not only by the profitability of the business but also by social inequality, institutional corruption, and sustained global demand. History demonstrates that repression has not eradicated the problem but rather transformed it. Today, it is essential to rethink drug policies from a comprehensive approach that integrates security, public health, education, and international cooperation. Only through a multidimensional strategy will it be possible to contain a phenomenon that — more than an illicit economy — constitutes a global form of parallel governance that challenges the very foundations of the modern state. Notes[1] Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, also known as “El Jefe de Jefes” (“The Boss of Bosses”), “El Padrino” (“The Godfather”), or “The Drug Czar”, was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [2] Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “El Señor de los Cielos” (“The Lord of the Skies”), was the former leader of the Juárez Cartel. [3] Pablo Escobar was the founder and former leader of the Medellín Cartel. [4] Carlos Lehder was the co-founder of the Medellín Cartel. [5] Griselda Blanco, known as “The Black Widow,” “The Cocaine Queen,” or “La Patrona” (“The Boss”), was a founder of the Medellín Cartel. [6] Rafael Caro Quintero, known as “El Narco de Narcos” (“The Drug Lord of Drug Lords”), was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [7] Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as “El Chapo,” was the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. ReferencesAlzaga, Ignacio. 2010. 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Press release: The deadly proliferation of synthetic drugs is a major threat to public health and is reshaping illicit drug markets, says the International Narcotics Control Board. 4 de March. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/press-releases/2025/the-deadly-proliferation-of-synthetic-drugs-is-a-major-threat-to-public-health-and-is-reshaping-illicit-drugs-markets--says-the-international-narcotics-control-board.html#:~:text=In%20its%202024%20Annu.Interpol. s.f. Tráfico de drogas. https://www.interpol.int/es/Delitos/Trafico-de-drogas.Katz, Josh. 2017. The First Count of Fentanyl Deaths in 2016: Up 540% in Three Years. 2 de September. Último acceso: 5 de November de 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/02/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-deaths.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur.Kiss, Teresa. 2025. Movimiento hippie. 18 de Octubre. https://concepto.de/movimiento-hippie/.López-Muñoz, Francisco, y Cecilio Álamo González. 2020. 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Defense & Security
New Delhi, India, Jan 20 2025: Indian Army's T-90 Bhishma is a modern main battle tank (MBT) participating in the rehearsal for the Republic Day Parade 2025 at Kartavya Path,

Reforging The Arsenal: India's Defence Industry Transformation

by Darshit Thakar

India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and according to the Global Firepower Index, the Indian Armed Forces are the 4th strongest in the world. But when we look at SIPRI data, we can find that since 2011, India has been the largest defence equipment importer in the world. If we look at India's neighborhood, it's been very hostile since Independence. India fought four major wars with Pakistan — 1948, 65, 71, and 99 — and many skirmishes, Operation Sindoor being the most recent one. With China, it fought a war in 1962 and many skirmishes, the most recent one in Galwan valley in the early 2020s. This kind of environment, and India being a rising global power, demands it to have some self-sufficiency in weapons manufacturing. A Brief History of Defence Policy At Independence, India enjoyed an early advantage over non-western states. India was the crown jewel of the British Empire, and to sustain control over it, Britain established lots of arms factories. But when India got independence, everything changed. Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as the first Prime Minister. He was a member of the Fabian Society and strongly believed in socialism, so he got everything centralized and worked in similar way as the Soviet Union. There was private participation, but it was limited to only small-scale industries. Defence was the government arena. There were DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation), DPSUs (Defence Public Sector Undertakings), and Ordnance Factories. DRDO was responsible for designing, the DPSUs made complex weapon systems, while Ordnance Factories made ammunition, firearms, artillery shells, etc. However, this highly centralised socialist model, though well-intentioned, restricted the flexibility to build upon the industrial base India had inherited from the British era. In 1991, India initiated LPG (Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation) reforms to liberalize the economy. Private players were allowed in the defence sector from 2001 onwards, but there wasn't a lot of momentum for the next 15 years. Momentum began to rise only after 2014 when reforms and policy incentives actively encouraged private participation. Current Reforms Since assuming power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has made a determined attempt to strengthen the Indian arms industry and transform the country’s image from the world’s largest arms importer to a major exporter of defence equipment. To realize this goal, the government has announced many reform measures under the ‘Make in India’ initiative and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan’ (self-reliant India mission). These measures cover virtually every facet of the Indian defence economy, spanning structures, acquisition processes, industrial regulations, and budgetary provisions. During the 1999 Kargil War and 2001 Operation Parakram, India found operational constraints, and there was a recommendation to create a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who would function as the head of all three services. In 2019, the government created the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which is touted as the most significant defence reform since Independence. Among all the responsibilities, the CDS is also assigned the task of “promoting the use of indigenous equipment by the Services.” The Department of Military Affairs (DMA), which works under the guidance of the CDS, made a list of 500 pieces of equipment that should be produced indigenously. These lists include several big-ticket items such as missiles, fighter aircraft, helicopters, warships, radars, and a range of munitions. The government also announced the long-overdue corporatisation of the OFs that were earlier functioning as government arsenals. The decision involved converting 41 OFs into seven distinct DPSUs. As corporate entities, the new DPSUs will enjoy greater autonomy in decision-making and be accountable for their performance. However, while corporatisation has begun to improve accountability, the impact of these changes is still uneven, and many DPSUs continue to face legacy inefficiencies. As the government wanted to increase the acquisition of arms made in India, it announced the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2016. The DPP-2016 emphasized indigenisation by giving primacy to the domestic industry over foreign contractors. It also made an attempt to decrease procurement timelines and increase the overall effectiveness of the procurement process. To enhance the role of the private sector in defence production, the DPP-2016 also simplified the ‘Make’ procedure and created space for new Strategic Partnership (SP) guidelines, which were separately released in 2017. In 2020, the government announced the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Building on the DPP-2016, the DAP-2020 focused on higher levels of indigenisation and innovation through the participation of Indian industry, including startups and small and medium enterprises. New outfits like the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) and the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) have been created to encourage start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to promote defence industrialisation. The government has also introduced several measures to improve the ease of doing business in the defence manufacturing sector. It streamlined the industrial licensing process for the private sector. It also focused on liberalising the defence foreign direct investment (FDI) regime by enhancing the earlier foreign equity cap from a maximum of 26 percent under the automatic route, first to 49 percent and subsequently to 74 percent. The government has also brought out a standard operating procedure to formalise the process of defence export authorisation; allowed the private sector to use government-run facilities to test their equipment; launched two defence industrial corridors; and created a dedicated web portal, SRIJAN, so that the DPSUs and the armed forces can upload previously imported items for indigenisation by domestic entities. Impact of the Policy Following several reforms, the defence industry has made certain progress. The most visible indicator of this progress is the near-continuous increase in production turnover.  The value of defence production has surged to a record high of ₹1,27,434 crore (~$15.2 billion), marking an impressive 174% increase from ₹46,429 crore in 2014-15, according to data from all Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), other public sector units manufacturing defence items, and private companies. The Ministry of Defence has signed a record 193 contracts in 2024-25, with the total contract value surpassing ₹2,09,050 crore (~$24.8 billion), nearly double the previous highest figure. Of these, 177 contracts, accounting for 92 percent, have been awarded to the domestic industry, amounting to ₹1,68,922 crore (~$20.1 billion), which is 81 percent of the total contract value. Defence exports have surged from ₹686 crore in FY 2013-14 to an all-time high of ₹23,622 crore (~$2.76 billion) in FY 2024-25, marking a 34-fold increase over the past decade. India is now exporting arms, ammunition, and related items to over 85 countries, with 100 Indian firms participating in international sales. Some of the major items exported include “Dornier-228, 155 mm Advanced Towed Artillery Guns, BrahMos Missiles, Akash Missile System, Radars, Simulators, Mine Protected Vehicles, Armoured Vehicles, PINAKA Rockets & Launchers, Ammunitions, Thermal Imagers, Body Armours, besides Systems, Line Replaceable Units and Parts & components of Avionics and Small Arms.” Challenges Even though India has made noticeable progress, challenges still persist. According to SIPRI, in 2011 India was responsible for 14% of global arms imports — making it the largest importer. Fast forward to 2024, it still accounts for 8.3% of global arms imports — the second largest, just behind war-torn Ukraine. While this decline in share indicates progress, the absolute value of imports remains high due to India’s expanding defence budget and modernisation drive. Even though the industry has grown, it hasn't fully absorbed the appetite for equipment required by the armed forces. On the export front, despite registering a noticeable increase in international arms sales, the industry is far from the target set by the government. The biggest challenge in meeting the government’s export target comes from the DPSUs, which have been rising slowly to the expectations. Some recent attempts to export major systems have not met with success. It faces tough competition from countries like Turkey (~$7.2 billion in defence exports for 2024), South Korea (~$20 billion in defence exports for 2024) and Israel(~$14.8 billion in 2024). The Indian defence industry, despite having a large production and R&D base, lacks the technological depth to design/manufacture major systems and critical parts, components, and raw materials, which are eventually imported. Moreover, the reforms announced by the Modi Government haven't been implemented fully. Given India’s bureaucratic system, overcoming the delays in implementation will remain a key challenge in the foreseeable future. Global Parallels in Defence Industrialisation India's transition from a state-dominated, import-reliant defence ecosystem to a more hybrid, self-reliant model invites comparisons with other emerging powers that have successfully navigated similar paths. South Korea offers a stark contrast through its aggressive export-oriented strategy: starting in the 1970s amid threats from North Korea, Seoul invested heavily in R&D (allocating over 4% of GDP annually in recent years) and leveraged chaebol conglomerates like Hyundai and Hanwha to build integrated supply chains, transforming from an importer to a top-10 global exporter with $20 billion in annual sales by 2024, including K9 howitzers and T-50 trainers. Turkey, facing NATO dependencies and regional instabilities, adopted agile policies under its Defence Industry Agency (SSB), mandating high domestic content (up to 70% in major programs) and integrating SMEs via incentives and technology transfers, propelling exports to $7.2 billion in 2024 through platforms like Bayraktar drones. Israel, constrained by size and hostile neighbors, pioneered a niche innovation ecosystem via public-private partnerships, mandatory military service feeding talent into firms like Rafael and IAI, and venture capital-driven R&D, yielding $14.8 billion in exports focused on high-tech systems such as Iron Dome. Unlike India's historically centralized DPSUs and gradual private inclusion, these models emphasize export discipline, rapid policy iteration, and SME/startup ecosystems—lessons India could adapt by accelerating iDEX funding, enforcing stricter local content in DAP procurements, and fostering chaebol-like consortia to bridge technological gaps and compete globally. Conclusion The Narendra Modi government has sought to break the inertia of snail-like defence reforms that were going on since India's Independence. Under the banner of Atmanirbhar Bharat, it has pushed to cut imports and boost local production. Defence exports have begun to grow. More importantly, private companies and start-ups have entered what was once a tightly guarded public sector preserve. A more competitive ecosystem is slowly taking shape. Yet the road to self-reliance remains long. If India can integrate private innovation with public manufacturing and reduce bureaucratic delays, it could transform from being the world’s largest importer to a key global supplier in the multipolar era. Sourceshttps://www.orfonline.org/research/india-s-defence-industry-achievements-and-challengeshttps://www.orfonline.org/research/a-decade-of-defence-reforms-under-modihttps://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2116612https://indiasworld.in/reforming-defence-production-faster-and-deeper/https://theprint.in/defence/india-second-largest-arms-importer-after-ukraine-reliance-on-russia-declines-says-sipri-report/2541373/https://www.pib.gov.in/PressNoteDetails.aspx?NoteId=154617&ModuleId=3https://www.cnbc.com/2024/12/04/as-global-defense-spending-surges-south-korean-arms-makers-look-like-a-clear-winnerhttps://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/02/04/turkeys-defense-exports-hit-record-high-of-7.1-billion-in-2024/https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2025/06/05/israel-announces-defense-export-record-15-billion-in-2024/https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php