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Defense & Security
Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence during a two-day meeting of the alliance's Defence Ministers at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on February 14, 2023.

Where is the transatlantic relationship heading?

by Florentino Portero

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The social dimension of the Alliance The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the organization created by the signatory states of the Washington Treaty to achieve the goals set by the Alliance, is an institution characteristic of the democratic realm, where governments depend on their respective public opinions when trying to establish a security policy. The people matter – and this is something we must keep in mind – when reflecting on their future. The simplest and most logical answer to the question posed in the title of this conference, the one that responds to common sense, is wherever its member states want. And this is the core of the problem. Do the allies have a common vision? Do they share interests as they did in 1949? Do they still believe they are a community united by their commitment to democracy? Is it reasonable to consider that they form a “collective defense system”? Without clearly answering these questions, it becomes very difficult to move forward with this analysis. We would be venturing into speculative territory. On the other hand, we cannot ignore reality, and this leads us to acknowledge that it is unlikely we will receive clear answers due to a set of considerations characteristic of the present time. The first refers to the lack of reliability of the State because of the high fragmentation of public opinion. Globalization and the Digital Revolution are causing social and economic changes that have led the population to distrust their political elites. Traditional parties are disappearing or losing seats, while new political forces emerge, questioning many of the paradigms we have been working with for years. The societies of the member states no longer have as clear a sense of the purpose of the Alliance as they did a decade ago, because there is confusion about what the actual risks, challenges, and threats they face are. The second is the absence of prominent figures with the authority to exercise leadership at the heads of the allied governments. We cannot ignore that in times of uncertainty, leadership is more necessary than ever, because in its absence, it becomes extremely difficult to shape a sufficiently common position among the citizens. The third is the empirical realization that the Alliance has not been able to manage the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine in a competent and professional manner. In the first case, the European allies decided to activate Article 5 of the Washington Treaty even though it wasn’t necessary, but wanting to show their solidarity with the state that had guaranteed their security for decades. However, on the battlefield, the vast majority shield themselves behind their ‘rules of engagement’ to avoid complicated situations. The goal was to comply with the United States more than to commit to victory. For its part, the United States was unable to maintain consistent objectives and strategy over time, which led to a humiliating defeat. What was the point of the waste of lives and money if, in the end, the same people returned to power? What was the point of the Alliance's technological superiority if it was defeated by poorly armed militias? In the second case, we have observed that despite the obvious incompetence of its armed forces, its limited capabilities, and its dire economic situation, Russia has managed to consolidate its control over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and continues to advance. For the average citizen, it is incomprehensible that, having committed ourselves to reclaim all Ukrainian sovereign territory and being much wealthier, our strategy has led Ukraine to the unfortunate situation it finds itself in. Why didn’t we offer them the weapons they needed from the very beginning? Why have we deprived them of the victory we formally committed to? The fourth is a derivative of the previous one. In this context, does it make sense for the citizen to trust the Alliance? Isn’t it understandable that they try to seek refuge within the national framework and fear that the Alliance, in the hands of unqualified people, will drag them into scenarios that are not critical to their lives? Whether we like it or not, the citizen's distrust in NATO is as justified as their intuition that only NATO can guarantee their security, which includes both their freedom and their well-being. What is the Alliance today? In circumstances as complex as those we are currently experiencing, it is virtually impossible for an organization composed of thirty-two member states to be a community committed to the defense and promotion of democracy. The mere reference to Turkey, Hungary, or Spain is proof of how far there are nations within it that are heading in a different direction. The evolution of European political systems points to a worsening of the situation rather than the exceptional nature of the mentioned cases. The community, as well as the idea that it constitutes a "collective defense system," falls within the realm of aspirations. The Alliance has been a “collective defense system,” and I have no doubt that there are allies who continue to act consistently with this idea. However, putting aside formalities, I believe that when assessing the transatlantic relationship, we must focus on its strict condition as an alliance. NATO is an asset that no one wants to lose, even though in its current state, it leaves much to be desired. Its strength does not lie in the common perception of the threat, the solidarity of its members, the available capabilities, or in sharing a strategy, which is clearly nonexistent. What makes its members want to keep it alive is the accumulated legacy after 75 years of shared experiences and the deep sense of insecurity in the face of the dual realization of a world undergoing profound change and poorly prepared national defenses from any point of view. Outside the Alliance, it’s even colder. NATO provides us with a starting point to try to react collectively, knowing that, in reality, except for the United States, no member state has the critical size to act as a "strategic actor." We have a history, an institutional framework, civilian and military bodies, doctrines, resources... that allow us to try to adapt without having to start from scratch. The European Perspective In recent years, the European states that are members of the Alliance have experienced the contrast between the claim that the European Union should assume the role of a "strategic actor" and the harsh, relentless reality of its impotence to effectively and competently address the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. In parallel, they have shifted from contempt for the United States, due to its erratic foreign policy and its inability to successfully complete its foreign initiatives, to seeking shelter once again under its military strength, considering the evidence of their own inability to understand international politics and act accordingly. It seems beyond doubt that the dynamics of the European integration process are heading towards the establishment of a federation. The transfer of sovereignty represented by the single currency was a milestone, marking the creation of "political Europe" through the Maastricht Treaty. Gradually, we are moving toward a single fiscal policy, with banking union, European monetary fund... ultimately towards the consolidation of an economic and monetary policy. Such significant common economic interests demand both a shared legal framework and a unified foreign policy. However, the factor of time plays a fundamental role. The passing of generations has allowed us to make progress, overcoming nationalist prejudices. Despite the formidable progress made, which is easily reflected in the recognition by young people that we live in a common cultural environment, the reality is that we are still far from forming what Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón referred to decades ago as a "European people." One thing is to delegate certain public policies to European institutions, and another, undoubtedly very different, is the exercise of actions that are characteristically sovereign. History and geography matter, and we must acknowledge that we have not yet formed that continental identity that would allow us to credibly face the formidable challenge of establishing a common foreign policy. The advantages of planning together and having the same capabilities are obvious, but above all, what matters is its viability. The Union is still not in a position to replace American leadership. This humbling realization transforms into a flow of energy in favor of the Alliance, assuming as inevitable the implementation of changes that allow it to adapt to a new international environment. For years, we have been aware that the Washington Treaty, and especially its Article 5, are anachronistic. The emergence of new domains – space, cyber, and cognitive – and the development of hybrid strategies challenge some of its foundations. Even so, we try to adapt without facing a reform of the treaty, in an exercise of understandable but risky caution. We are aware that the European theater is no longer the same as it was in 1949, that globalization and the "competition among great powers" in the race to win the "Digital Revolution" have shaped a considerably different scenario that we must integrate into, but we feel dizzy at the thought of leaving our own geographic zone, when we are not even in a position to effectively address our own problems. The American Perspective Since the creation of the United States, American society has lived with the contradiction between its isolationist vocation and its dependence on foreign trade. It fears becoming involved in the affairs of others at a high cost. However, the commercial dimension of its economy demands freedom of navigation, legal security, access to raw materials, and the ability to penetrate other markets, conditions that lead to an international role. From the First and Second World Wars, they learned that it was impossible to turn their back on what was happening in other countries, that they had to commit to international security, trying to establish an order that would guarantee their national interests. After years of involvement in international conflicts that seemed to have no end, isolationist and nationalist sentiment has grown, as a classic pendulum effect. In this context, it is understandable that the public debate openly questions its presence in the Atlantic Alliance. Is NATO a guarantee of the security of the United States? In the years immediately preceding the Madrid Summit, it was evident that the Alliance lacked a threat to unite it, a strategy to guide its steps, and capabilities that would allow it to carry out combined activities. It should therefore come as no surprise that since the second term of the Bush Administration, statements from senior officials have been warning of the dangerous drift of the Organization or threatening its withdrawal. There has been much talk about the low defense spending by many of the European allies. It is evident that without investment, there is no modernization, and without it, there is a technological disconnect that prevents the joint action of the armed forces of the different member states. However, what is truly concerning is what this implies in terms of abuse and disregard towards the United States. Hence, the heated reactions we receive from the other side. It is indecent that we spend on welfare, reaching levels that are unattainable for the average American, while we let them bear the cost of our security, both in economic terms and in human lives. As grave as, or even more than, the lack of investment is the absence of a shared vision and strategy, but it is understandable that the debate has focused on investment, an instrumental element. For European allies, increasing defense spending under the current economic circumstances will be as difficult as it is painful, but it will not be any less difficult or painful to reach an agreement that gives meaning to NATO's existence in the coming years. One of the few consensuses in the Capitol is to consider China as its main rival, around which all its economic, foreign, and defense policies revolve. In the Strategic Concept approved in Madrid, we can read that China is a “systemic challenge” for all of us. What policy have we derived from this categorical statement? Is there an Atlantic vision on this? It is hard to imagine that the Alliance can have a future if the states on both sides of the Atlantic do not reach a common position on how to engage with the great Asian power. In the same document, we find the statement that Russia is a “threat,” which does not align with statements from American leaders of both parties, though more from the Republican side than the Democratic one. It is neither acceptable nor responsible that, after the approval of such an important document, just two and a half years later, the United States acts as if the problem is not theirs. Putting formal aspects aside, is Russia a threat to the United States? To what extent does the behavior of the Moscow government in Eastern Europe affect U.S. national interests? Does it make sense for the United States to get involved in the war in Ukraine? Was Biden's behavior a reflection of a Cold War veteran, detached from the international circumstances of today? The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance was not the result of U.S. leaders in the early postwar years being convinced that the Soviet Union posed a threat to their national interests. On the contrary, they were fully aware that it did not. What concerned them was the extreme weakness of the European states, ravaged by a brutal war, the absence of a democratic culture, the high risk of totalitarian currents feeding off misery and uncertainty, and leading the Old Continent to a Third World War. European governments felt Soviet pressure. The area occupied by the Red Army was experiencing the extermination of representative institutions, Germany was torn between neutrality and partition, communist parties were gaining parliamentary positions in significant countries like France and Italy, supported by the prestige earned in the Resistance. For U.S. analysts, the European perception of the Soviet threat was exaggerated, but its effects could be concerning. The United States chose to engage in European reconstruction to prevent its drift towards fragmentation and totalitarianism, as the consequences of this drift could directly affect their national interests. They established a comprehensive strategy based on two pillars, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO has been and continues to be an instrument to guarantee cohesion and democracy on the Old Continent. The second Trump administration must resolve the tension between the isolationist demand of the citizenry, the need to create jobs on domestic soil through the erection of tariff barriers, the necessity of securing supply and distribution chains, and the consolidation of alliances or understandings between different regional blocs in response to Chinese initiatives. It is a set of contradictory actions wrapped in the populist demagoguery characteristic of our time, but which will require decisions in times marked by a succession of crises. Time for decisions An organization inhabited by officials does not need meaning to continue functioning. From 9 AM to 5 PM, qualified staff will move papers from one office to another, showcasing their professionalism and operational efficiency. However, it is important not to confuse NATO with the Alliance. The latter does need meaning, which is now in question. Whether we like it or not, the coming years will be crucial for its future. We will witness how the decisions made regarding a set of circumstances and debates will ultimately determine it, as well as the link between the two shores of the Atlantic. As happened at its origin, that link will go far beyond security, which is instrumental in consolidating that community which was the original aspiration and is now marked by its absence. The war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the central issue in the transatlantic relationship, as it brings to the negotiation table many of the fundamental issues that question its very existence. We are facing a continental conflict that arises after a Russian diplomatic attempt to reach an agreement on a new balance of power. Moscow's proposal demanded the withdrawal of U.S. units from areas bordering its territory and the removal of its nuclear weapons stationed in the Old Continent. Putin’s government felt threatened by NATO and the European Union's eastward expansion and demanded compensation. When it was not granted, it launched its third campaign on Ukraine and its fifth on territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. This is not a campaign that can be understood in a bilateral Russia-Ukraine logic, but rather as part of an effort by a revived Russian imperialism to reconstitute its historical sphere of influence. This invasion is not the first, and unless the Alliance acts wisely, it will not be the last. The role played by the Europeans has been disappointing. Their response to previous aggressions – Moldova, Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas – was the perfect example of how supposedly educated elites learn nothing from history. The French, Germans, and Italians collectively made the same mistakes as Chamberlain in Munich, thinking that the aggressor would be satisfied by acknowledging their right to aggression, when, in reality, they were encouraging them to proceed and prepare for new expansionist ventures. This attitude provoked the logical irritation and distrust in the Slavic-Scandinavian space, which was never deceived by the ongoing process under the Russian government. These powers refused to believe U.S. intelligence warnings about Russia's willingness to invade and reacted too late and poorly. All this, combined with the old problem of lack of investment in defense, made European armed forces ineffective and their industry powerless in responding to a demand for military capabilities in a short period of time. If the Europeans do not take their defense seriously, if they have become accustomed to parasitizing U.S. leadership, the frustration of their elites with their European allies is understandable. The Biden administration tried to use the Ukraine War to reconstitute the Alliance, but the strategy of attrition applied, renouncing victory out of fear of its political and military consequences, has led to a very high number of Ukrainian casualties and to public fatigue, which, following the Russian plan, is pushing through new political formations from both the right and the left to reach an unfeasible understanding with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. In the new international scenario, characterized by competition among great powers to achieve technological hegemony within the framework of the Digital Revolution, the United States needs Europe as much as Europe needs the United States. Russia does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, but it has become a vassal of China and an instrument of Beijing to weaken the cohesion of the Western bloc. The Trump administration must not fall into the temptation of turning its back on its allies, no matter how irresponsible and incompetent they may be, as this would cede ground to the rival. An even more protectionist policy could push European states, if not the Union itself, to seek alternative markets in China. A policy of greater withdrawal would encourage both division among continental powers and the pursuit of a middle ground between the two superpowers. What is at stake is much more than tariffs or investment in defense. What we will decide soon is whether we are a community or not, whether we face the challenges of a new era together, or if we choose separation. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States has valuable allies, particularly the United Kingdom and the Slavic and Scandinavian blocs. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine War could mean a victory for Russia by recognizing its right to alter Europe's borders by force, and the loss of trust from these allies, who are aware that even Trump would have fallen into the Munich trap, and despite his brash rhetoric, he would have ended up playing Chamberlain’s role. This would be a grave mistake for the United States, which, on the contrary, should rely on these countries to contain Russian expansionism and send a very clear message to Beijing about its commitment to updating and maintaining the cohesion of the Western community. Such an update would require allies, this time for real, to commit to defense investment and be prepared to use their capabilities when necessary. The Alliance needs a strategy. The concept approved in Madrid was merely the political framework to develop it. It is up to the Trump administration to lead its development in order to ultimately agree on what to do about the "Russian threat" and the "systemic challenge" posed by China. The Middle East crisis is unfolding in a scenario defined by two fronts established after years of diplomatic work: the "Abraham Accords" and the Axis of Resistance. Hamas’ aggression towards Israel has materialized in a harsh military campaign in the Gaza Strip, which has severely damaged the political and military capabilities of the Islamist group, and has extended to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is also suffering a heavy blow. In addition, Iran has seen its defense industry, anti-aircraft artillery systems, and, more limitedly, its nuclear network has suffered significant damage, while its intelligence system has been humiliated and degraded. In this context, despite the damage suffered by the Gazan population, the block formed by the Abraham Accords has remained cohesive, aware of Hamas' blackmail and the cost of yielding to it. On the other hand, Europe has presented itself as divided, lacking a strategic vision, not understanding that this was not a problem between Israelis and Palestinians, but an instrumental conflict aimed at undermining the regimes of Arab countries not aligned with the Axis of Resistance. Its criticism of Israel for the effects of its military campaign on the Gazan population consciously ignored both Hamas’ responsibility in turning them into human shields and the cost that accepting Hamas' blackmail would have had for all of us — Arabs, Israelis, and Europeans — if the campaign had not continued. How is it possible that we have so easily forgotten how the Axis powers were defeated? What would have happened in Europe during WWII if we had followed the European Union's demands during the Gaza War? The Middle East is a critical space for the Atlantic Alliance. It is understandable that the United States is frustrated with many of its European allies who, once again, have acted in a frivolous and irresponsible manner, unable to think in strategic terms. Israel has long chosen to turn its back on Europe, in response to a behavior it associates with a new form of anti-Semitism. The Arab bloc appreciates the European sensitivity to the suffering of the Gazan or Lebanese people, but it seeks security under the umbrella of the United States and Israel in the face of the Axis of Resistance, which poses a challenge of internal subversion, asymmetric warfare, and nuclear threat. A renewed Alliance needs to establish a strategy for the MENA region focused on containing Islamism and consolidating moderate regimes. China and Russia are taking advantage of the instability to infiltrate and hinder our missions. For them, instability on our southern front is a strategic objective, one that would fuel migration and insecurity, and with them, division within the Alliance and the Union. The Arab-Israeli bloc distrusts the United States due to its inability to maintain a strategy over time and does not rely on the Europeans. Only a firm stance from the Alliance in favor of this group of countries and against the Axis of Resistance could overcome this situation and guarantee both the cohesion of the Alliance and its authority in the region. The circumstances that led to the creation of the Alliance are behind us. They are history. However, today the Alliance is more necessary than ever. The circumstances have changed, but the community of values and interests remains the same, even though not everyone may understand this. Dissolving this community would be a grave mistake that would only benefit those powers whose goal is nothing more than to "revise" our legacy. Reviving it will not be easy. It will require political awareness and high-level diplomacy. Challenges that are impossible to achieve without leadership that matches the times. 

Defense & Security
Greenland for sale? asks a Donald Trump doll, Denmark, January 10, 2025

4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland – if it were for sale, which it isn’t

by Scott L. Montgomery

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of “national security” and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, “is not for sale,” said Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action. Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president’s repeated statements and invocation of national security, it’s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.’s geopolitical priorities. As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland’s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory’s potential independence. A matter of minerals Greenland’s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals – zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium – and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet. Greenland’s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld – or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic – uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide. During the 2010s, Greenland’s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd). When China’s Shenghe Resources took a major share in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe’s own potential supply. The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland’s parliament banned all uranium mining, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions. Fears of China abroad China’s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade. In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat. Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk. None of this sat well with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland’s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects. The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China’s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies. Long-standing US interest The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying he didn’t feel “we owe them the whole island.” In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023.   The northernmost military facility of the U.S., Pituffik has updated radar and tracking capabilities to provide missile warning, defense and space surveillance, and satellite command missions. While it also supports scientific research focused on the Arctic, the base is intended to increase military capabilities in the Arctic region for both the U.S. and its allies. The base has the ability to track shipping as well as air and satellite positions, giving it both real and symbolic importance to American strategic interests in the Arctic. As a result, much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, not just those in Trump’s orbit, view any notable Chinese presence in Greenland, whether temporary or permanent, with concern. Geopolitics of the Arctic Greenland is geographically situated between the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, two Arctic shipping routes whose importance is growing as sea ice shrinks. By around 2050, a Transpolar Sea Route is likely to open through the central Arctic Ocean, passing Greenland’s eastern shores. Furthermore, the island is the basis of Denmark’s sovereignty claim to the North Pole – rivaled by claims by Russia and Canada. While international law recognizes no national sovereignty in international waters, that has done little to end the diplomatic tug-of-war over the pole. The matter is far from trivial: Sovereignty would give a country access to potentially significant oil, gas and rare earth resources, as well as superior scientific and military access to the future Transpolar Sea Route. Yet, this dispute over ownership of the North Pole is only one part of the geopolitical struggle for offshore territory in the region. Russia’s growing militarization of its enormous coastal area has been countered by NATO military exercises in northern Scandinavia, while China’s own moves into the Arctic, aided by Moscow, has seen the launch of several research stations supported by icebreakers and agreements for research and commercial projects. China’s government has also asserted it has rights in the region, for navigation, fishing, overflight, investment in oil and gas projects, and more. Greenland for Greenlanders? All of these factors help decipher the realities involved in the U.S.-Denmark-Greenland relationship. Despite Trump’s words, I believe it is extremely unlikely he would actually use U.S. military force to take Greenland, and it’s an open question whether he would use coercive economic policies in the form of tariffs against Denmark to give him leverage in negotiating a purchase of Greenland. Yet while Trump and other foreign policy outsiders view Greenland through an external strategic and economic lens, the island is home to nearly 60,000 people – 90% of them indigenous Inuit – many of whom treat the designs of foreign nations on their territory with skepticism. Indeed, in 2008, Greenland voted to pursue nationhood. The island receives an annual subsidy of 500 million euros ($513 million) from Denmark, and to further economic independence, it has sought foreign investment. Interest from China has accompanied Greenland’s moves toward independence, backed by Beijing’s strategy to be an Arctic player. The thinking in Beijing may be that an independent Greenland will be less shackled to NATO and the European Union, and as such, more open to investment from further afield. Ironically, Trump’s recent comments have the potential of achieving something very different than their aim by encouraging Greenland’s prime minister, Mute Egede, to propose a referendum in 2025 on full independence. “It is now time for our country to take the next step,” he said. “We must work to remove … the shackles of colonialism.”

Energy & Economics
Selective focus of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP 21 or CMP 11 logo on a mobile screen stock image: Dhaka, BD- Feb 27, 2024

Ten Years After the Paris Agreement: The Tragedy of the Overshoot Generation

by Marcelo de Araujo , Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Paris Agreement will be ten years old in 2025. It is a good opportunity, then, to reassess the feasibility of its long-term goals and understand what they mean for the current and for the next generations. In a very optimistic scenario, if the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved, the climate crisis will have been solved by the end of the 21st century. In the meantime, though, the crisis will worsen, as temperature overshoot is very likely to occur by the middle of the century. During the overshoot period, our planet’s average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, which is the threshold proposed by the Paris Agreement. At the end of the overshoot period, which could last from one to several decades, the temperature will begin to fall until it eventually stabilises at 1.5°C at the turn of the century (IPCC 2023, 1810). Expectedly, the success of the Paris Agreement would greatly benefit the “post-overshoot generation”, namely the generation that will live in the first half of the 22nd century. But to ensure the success of the Paris Agreement, the generation that will live in the overshoot period – the “overshoot generation” – will have to remove an enormous amount of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) from the atmosphere. For now, though, it is unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies will be available at a scale that might enable the overshoot generation to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. To aggravate the problem, the overshoot generation will also probably have to rely on as-yet untested geoengineering technologies to promote their own survival. As we can see, conflicting interests of three different generations are at stake here, namely: (1) the interests of the current generation, (2) those of the overshoot generation, and (3) the interests of the post-overshoot generation. Given the unequal distribution of power across generations (Gardiner 2011, 36), it is likely that the current generation will tend to further their own interest to the detriment of the overshoot generation, even if, in the end, the climate policies enforced by the current generation do indeed fulfil the interests of the post-overshoot generation. The best possible world is one in which the goals of the Paris Agreement are achieved. Yet, depending on the choices that we make today, the best possible world could also mean the worst possible world that human beings will ever have met on our planet. That will be the fate of the overshoot generation, squeezed between the self-serving policies of the current generation and the climate hopes of the post-overshoot generation. The implications for international relations are momentous, as we intend to show in this article. Possible pathways The Paris Agreement did not establish a concrete deadline for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 2, namely: Maintain the increase in the global average temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and make efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. The scientific community generally understands that the Paris Agreement aims at climate stabilization at the end of the 21st century. There are two main reasons for this. The first is a constraint imposed by our planet’s climate system. The second is a constraint imposed by agreed upon principles of justice. As for the first reason, we have to bear in mind that an immediate reduction of GHG emissions would not be followed by an immediate decline of global temperature (Dessler 2016, 91). Even if all countries decided to eliminate their respective emissions today, the global temperature would continue to rise for several decades, until it begins to recede and stabilises at the turn of the century. As for the second reason, the Paris Agreement assumed that developing countries could not immediately reduce their own emissions without compromising their own development and the prospect of eradicating poverty. Thus, the Paris Agreement also established in Article 4 that each country could continue to emit GHG until their respective emissions peaked as soon as possible. After peaking, emissions should be rapidly reduced. Thus, the attempt to achieve the goals set out in Article 2 well before the end of the 21st century might turn out to prove inconsistent with the reality of our planet’s climate system and unfair towards developing countries. The problem, however, is that the Paris Agreement did not establish a specific pathway for the achievement of its long-term goals (Figure 1). There is, indeed, a multitude of pathways, but many (if not most) of them involve an overshoot period (Geden and Löschel 2017, 881; Schleussner et al. 2016). And as there are “different interpretations for limiting global warming to 1.5°C”, there emerges the question, then, as to which interpretation could do justice to the conflicting claims of the three different generations considered as a whole, namely the claims of the current generation, those of the overshoot generation, and the claims of the post-overshoot generation (Figure 2). There has been much discussion now on the concept of a “just transition”. But this debate has focused entirely on the claims that the members of the current generation can raise against each other, and not on claims that could be raised – or presumed – across the three generations referred to above. The IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Glossary from 2023, for instance, contains a specific entry on this topic: “Just transitions. A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no people, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind in the transition from a high-carbon to a low carbon economy” (IPCC 2023, 1806). The IPCC entry ends with some considerations regarding past generations: “Just transitions may embody the redressing of past harms and perceived injustices”. Interestingly, though, the entry says nothing about the normative implications of a just transition for future generations. A 2023 United Nations document defines the concept of just transition along similar lines (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 3, 12–13). But, again, it understands “just transition” in terms of claims that stakeholders within the current generation, whether at national or international level, can raise against each other. As for the international level, the United Nations document makes the following statement concerning the concept of just transition as applied to international relations: “As countries pick up the pace of their climate change mitigation strategies, it is critical that developed countries do not transfer the burden of the transition onto developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2023, 8). The problem, however, is that, as a matter of justice, it is equally critical that the current generation does not transfer the burden of the transition onto the overshoot generation, even if that burden, in the end, turns out to benefit the post-overshoot generation. Such an unequal distribution of burdens across three generations would certainly conflict with the requirements of intergenerational justice (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70; Meyer 2021). Overshoot generation and retroactive mitigation One might perhaps argue that no extra burden is being imposed on the overshoot generation, for the current generation is already having to face challenges that the overshoot generation, supposedly, will not have to face. The overshoot generation, one might suggest, will inherit from the current generation all the benefits resulting from the energy transition, but without having to bear the costs that the transition imposes on the current generation. The idea here is that by the middle of this century global emissions will have already peaked and will be declining at an accelerated pace, towards stabilisation at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level at the end of this century. Thus, the overshoot generation can arguably reap the benefits of green energy, as long as the current generation remains free, at least for the time being, to emit GHG further, which is necessary to finance the human and technological development that the overshoot generation will need later. This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the climate crisis – a fact that has not been given due attention in the public debate on climate policies. In a very optimistic scenario, the overshoot generation will not have the burden of reducing their own emissions because they will be able to rely on carbon-free energy. The problem, however, is that the overshoot generation will still have to retroactively mitigate the emissions of previous generations – including, of course, the emissions of the current generation. We call this process “retroactive mitigation”, for what is at stake here is not reduction and phasing out of one’s own emissions, but the removal of massive amounts of GHG, which previous generations failed to mitigate in the past. In a 2014 report, the IPCC realised that simply reducing GHG emissions would no longer be enough to preclude irreversible climate change. Removal of GHG would also be necessary (IPCC 2014, 12). The IPCC called attention to yet another problem: it was unclear whether CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technologies, including DAC (Direct Air Capture), could be deployed on a global scale in time to avoid a climate disaster. In a 2018 report, the IPCC was even less confident about the future development and scaling-up of CCS technologies (IPCC 2018, 136). To make matters worse, two further factors must be taken into consideration. (1) Recent studies show that there are practically no pathways left for the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals without the massive deployment of CCS (Smith et al. 2023). And (2) it has become increasingly probable that the overshoot generation will also have to deploy geoengineering technologies to cope with ever more frequent heatwaves (Moellendorf 2022, 161–70). It could perhaps be argued that afforestation and preservation of existing forests could be used instead of CCS technologies. However, the amount of land and water that would be necessary for the creation of new forests is probably larger than the amount of land and water available. Moreover, the attempt to create new forests on such a large scale might compromise the water and food security that the overshoot generation will need to promote their own climate adaptation (Shue 2017, 205). It is also necessary to take into account the amount of time new forests need to grow, not to mention the risk of fire. In this case, forests stop absorbing GHG and become GHG emitters themselves (Gatti et al. 2021). Implications for international relations In the aftermath of the Second World War, human being’s capacity to trigger catastrophic events at a global scale became increasingly apparent. As Garrett Hardin aptly put the problem in 1974: “No generation has viewed the problem of the survival of the human species as seriously as we have” (Hardin 1974b, 561). But while even realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and John Herz argued for international cooperation in the face of global threats, Hardin himself advanced what he called the “lifeboat ethics”. According to Hardin, instead of engaging in international cooperation, richer states should behave like lifeboats and resist the temptation to help individuals from poorer states to cope with environmental disasters or famines. This, he argued, might undermine richer states’ capacity to secure their own survival (Hardin 1974a; 1974b). In his The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival from 1977, Hardin resumes his criticism of international cooperation to alleviate the plight of poorer states: We will do little good in the international sphere until we recognize that the greatest need of a poor country is not material: call it psychological, moral, spiritual, or what you will. The basic issue is starkly raised in a story of personal heroism that unfolded in South America a few years ago (Hardin 1977, 64). Hardin goes on to recall the 1972 Andes plane crash, turned into a feature film in 2023. Hardin suggests that the passengers who had survived the crash would not have taken the initiative to save their own lives had they not heard on the radio that the search efforts to rescue them had been called off. Hardin’s conclusion is this: “This true story, I submit, bears a close resemblance to the moral situation of poor countries. The greatest gift we can give them is the knowledge that they are on their own” (Hardin 1977, 65). Hardin, of course, does not take into consideration the extent to which richer states themselves may be responsible for the plight of poorer states. Hardin’s self-help approach to international relations is in line with political realism. But when major realist thinkers themselves addressed the question of human survival, around the same time Hardin advocated his lifeboat ethics, they came to entirely different conclusions. Authors such as Morgenthau and Herz realized that nation-states had become unable to protect their own citizens in the face of global catastrophes triggered by the depletion of the environment or the outbreak of a nuclear war. As Morgenthau put the problem in 1966: “No nation state is capable of protecting its citizens and their way of life against an all-out atomic attack. Its safety rests solely in preventing such an attack from taking place” (Morgenthau 1966, 9). In a 1976 article on the emergence of the atomic age, Herz made a similar point: “Nuclear penetrability had rendered the traditional nation-state obsolete because it could no longer fulfill its primary function, that of protection” (Herz 1976a, 101). Both Morgenthau and Herz argued for international cooperation – or perhaps even the dissolution of the system of states (Morgenthau 1978, 539) – as the better strategy to avert global catastrophic risks (Herz 1976a, 110; 1976b, 47). Herz later also theorized about the concept of “ecological threat” and argued for the development of a new interdisciplinary field, which he aptly named “survival studies” (Herz 2003; Seidel 2003; Laszlo and Seidel 2006, 2–3; Graham 2008; Stevens 2020). During the overshoot period, as heatwaves and other climate-related extreme events become more severe and frequent, people in poorer countries are likely to suffer the most. Mass migrations are likely to occur on an unprecedented scale (Vince 2022). Given the current popularity of anti-migration measures both in the United States and Europe, it is imaginable, then, that the lifeboat ethics will strike a chord with future conservative governments. That would be an error, for the assumption that governments will be protecting their own citizens by way of making their borders impenetrable to climate migrants is misleading. The “ecological threat” cannot be held back by higher walls. Lifeboat ethics will make everyone worse-off. Back in the 1960s, Martin Luther King may not have had climate change or mass migration in mind, but his words strike us as even more poignant now: “We may have all come on different ships, but we’re in the same boat now” (as quoted by former American President Barack Obama). There is only one boat, carrying three generations of hopeful passengers with equal legitimate claims to a better climate. It is a long journey. Let us not allow our only boat to go down. Final remarks The scenario in which the overshoot generation will have to live is not an encouraging one, but it is even less inhospitable than the scenario that the post-overshoot generation will have to face if the goals of the Paris Agreement are not met. It is up to the current generation to make sure that the overshoot period is as short as possible, and that the overshoot generation will not only be in a position to adapt to unprecedented climate scenarios in the history of human civilization, but also fulfil hopes of the post-overshoot generation. Figures Figure 1: Pathways compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018, 62). FIGURE01  Figure 2: Pathways that would limit global warming to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018, 160).   Acknowledgements Marcelo de Araujo thanks Prof. Darrel Moellendorf for the invitation and the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for the financial support. Support for this research has also been provided by the CNPq (The National Council for Scientific and Technological Development) and FAPERJ (Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation). An earlier draft of this article was presented at the University of Graz, Austria, Section for Moral and Political Philosophy, in 2024, with thanks to Prof. Lukas Meyer for the invitation. Pedro Fior Mota de Andrade benefited from financial supported provided by CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development). References Dessler, Andrew Emory. 2016. Introduction to Modern Climate Change. Second edition. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Gardiner, Stephen. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gatti, Luciana V., Luana S. Basso, John B. Miller, Manuel Gloor, Lucas Gatti Domingues, Henrique L. G. Cassol, Graciela Tejada, et al. 2021. ‘Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change’. Nature 595 (7867): 388–93. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03629-6. Geden, Oliver, and Andreas Löschel. 2017. ‘Define Limits for Temperature Overshoot Targets’. Nature Geoscience 10 (12): 881–82. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-017-0026-z. Graham, Kennedy. 2008. ‘“Survival Research” and the “Planetary Interest”: Carrying Forward the Thoughts of John Herz’. International Relations 22 (4): 457–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808097311. Hardin, Garrett James. 1974a. ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor’ 8 (September):38–43. ———. 1974b. ‘Living on a Lifeboat’. BioScience 24 (10): 561–68. ———. 1977. The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Herz, John. 1976a. ‘Technology, Ethics, and International Relations’. Social Research 43 (1): 98–113. ———. 1976b. The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century. New York: D. McKay. ———. 2003. ‘On Human Survival: Reflections on Survival Research and Survival Policies’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 135–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310123. IPCC, ed. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. New York: Cambridge university press. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf. ———. 2018. ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’. Edited by V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, HO Pörtner, D Roberts, J Skea, PR Shukla, A Pirani, et al. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. ———, ed. 2023. ‘Annex I: Glossary’. In Climate Change 2022 – Mitigation of Climate Change, 1st ed., 1793–1820. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.020. Laszlo, Ervin, and Peter Seidel, eds. 2006. Global Survival: The Challenge and Its Implications for Thinking and Acting. 1st ed. Change the World. New York: SelectBooks. Meyer, Lukas. 2021. ‘Intergenerational Justice’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2021. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/justice-intergenerational/. Moellendorf, Darrel. 2022. Mobilizing Hope: Climate Change and Global Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Morgenthau, Hans. 1966. ‘Introduction’. In A Working Peace System, D. Mitrany, 7–11. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. ———. 1978. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf (Fifth Edition, Revised, 1978). Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Joeri Rogelj, Michiel Schaeffer, Tabea Lissner, Rachel Licker, Erich M. Fischer, Reto Knutti, Anders Levermann, Katja Frieler, and William Hare. 2016. ‘Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goal’. Nature Climate Change 6 (9): 827–35. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3096. Seidel, Peter. 2003. ‘“Survival Research:” A New Discipline Needed Now’. World Futures 59 (3–4): 129–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020310134. Shue, Henry. 2017. ‘Climate Dreaming: Negative Emissions, Risk Transfer, and Irreversibility’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8 (2): 203–16. https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2017.02.02. Smith, Stephen, Oliver Geden, Gregory Nemet, Matthew Gidden, William Lamb, Carter Powis, Rob Bellamy, et al. 2023. ‘State of Carbon Dioxide Removal – 1st Edition’, January. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W3B4Z. Stevens, Tim. 2020. ‘Productive Pessimism: Rehabilitating John Herz’s Survival Research for the Anthropocene’. In Pessimism in International Relations: Provocations, Possibilities, Politics, edited by Tim Stevens and Nicholas Michelsen, 83–98. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. United Nations Economic and Social Council. 2023. ‘Committee for Development Policy Report on the Twenty-Fifth Session (20–24 February 2023)’. Supplement No. 13 E/2023/33. Official Records. New York: United Nations. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/088/80/pdf/n2308880.pdf. Vince, Gaia. 2022. Nomad Century: How Climate Migration Will Reshape Our World. First U.S. edition. New York: Flatiron Books. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-N

Energy & Economics
Mexican exports to the United States. Mexican goods

Faced with Trump’s tariffs − and crackdowns on migration and narcotrafficking − Mexico is weighing retaliatory options

by Scott Morgenstern

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Donald Trump has made clear his intent to supercharge his “America First” approach to foreign policy in his second term – and Mexico looks set to be at the tip of the spear. While many of Trump’s predecessors have also followed a “realist” strategy – that is, one where relative power is at the forefront of international relations, while diplomatic success is viewed through how it benefits one’s own nation – the incoming president has displayed an apparent unwillingness to consider the pain that his plans would inflict on targeted countries or the responses this will engender. Trump’s proposed policies threaten Mexico in three key ways: First, his goal of deporting millions of migrants would put tremendous pressure on Mexico’s economy and society as the country tried to absorb the influx. This would be exacerbated by his second threat, a sharp increase in tariffs, which could devastate the critical export sector of Mexico’s economy. And third, Trump has floated the idea of using U.S. military power to confront narcotraffickers within Mexico, which would directly impinge on Mexico’s sovereignty and could generate more violence on both sides of the border. But as a scholar of Latin American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations, I see several options that Mexico could use to push back on Trump by imposing high costs on U.S. interests. Indeed, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has already signaled how she may counter Trump’s policies. The most obvious tools are ending cooperation on drugs and immigration and imposing tariffs of her own. She could also revoke some of the decades-old tax and labor privileges that have benefited U.S. businesses operating within Mexico. And finally, she could play the “China card” – that is, in the face of worsening U.S.-Mexico ties, Mexico could turn to Washington’s biggest economic rival at a time when Beijing is seeking to assert more influence across Latin America. From conciliation to confrontration Of course, a worsening relationship is not inevitable. During Trump’s first term, Mexico’s then-president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, maintained a constructive relationship with the U.S. administration. In fact, Lopez Obrador was surprisingly cooperative given Trump’s at times hostile rhetoric toward Mexico. For example, he helped facilitate the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico” program for those seeking asylum in the U.S. and also accepted Trump’s demands to renegotiate NAFTA and give it a title reflecting U.S. leadership: the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. Sheinbaum, who took office on Oct. 1, 2024, started with a cautious approach to her relationship with Trump. She congratulated Trump on his victory and urged dialogue with the incoming U.S. president. “There will be good relations with the United States. I’m convinced of that,” she told reporters on Nov. 7, 2024. But Trump hasn’t been conciliatory. In addition to talk about dumping millions of immigrants across the border, he announced on social media on Nov. 24 that he would impose a 25% tariff on Mexican and Canadian goods – a move that would effectively abrogate the USMCA. That post seemingly ended Sheinbaum’s cautious approach. In a strongly worded response, the Mexican president cautioned that she would respond in kind. A trade war, she noted, would harm the economies of both countries; progress on immigration and drug trafficking required cooperation, not threats, she added. The impact of tariffs Sheinbaum has said she wants to avoid a trade war, but Trump’s threats have led her nonetheless to talk about how a trade war would begin. This trade war, plus other costs Sheinbaum could impose on U.S. investors, would also likely foment a coalition of opposition within the U.S. business community – a group that has been a key ally of Trump. Trump’s stated goal of putting high tariffs on goods coming from Mexico is to encourage businesses that currently exploit lower employment costs in Mexico to relocate to the northern side of the border. But that approach ignores the impact that retaliatory tariffs and investment controls would have on U.S.-based companies that rely on the Mexican market. It would have several negative effects. First, a tit-for-tat tariff war would generate inflation for U.S. and Mexican consumers. Second, it would disrupt the integration of markets across North America. As a result of the elimination of tariffs – a key component of both NAFTA and the Trump-era USMCA – markets and the production of goods across North America have become highly interconnected. The trade treaties severely reduced barriers to investment in Mexico, allowing significant American investment in sectors such as agriculture and energy – where U.S. companies were formerly prohibited. Further, manufacturers now rely on processes in which, for example, the average car crosses the border multiple times during production. Similarly, agribusiness has developed symbiotic practices, such that grains, apples and pears are predominantly grown in the United States, while tomatoes, strawberries and avocados are grown in Mexico. Given these processes, the U.S. now exports over US$300 billion of goods and services per year to Mexico, and the stock of U.S. investments in Mexico reached $144 billion in 2023. If Trump abrogates the trade deals and imposes tariffs, he might convince investors to spend their next dollars in the U.S. But if Mexico imposes tariffs, business taxes or investment restrictions, what would happen to investors’ farms and factories already in Mexico? Past experience suggests that any disruption to supply chains or U.S. export markets would awaken strong business opposition, as analysts and business groups have already recognized. Trump is not immune to pressure from U.S. businesses. During his first administration, companies successfully opposed Trump’s attempt to close the border, arguing that slowing the flow of immigrants also meant slowing trucks full of goods. Security and immigration On the issue of the border and immigration, while Trump has issued threats, Sheinbaum has stressed the importance of cooperation. Currently, the Mexican government expends significant resources to patrol its own southern border, not to mention dealing with the many potential migrants who gather in its northern cities. Mexico could demand more support from the U.S. in exchange for this work, plus the costs associated with welcoming back the estimated 4 million Mexicans who are currently in the U.S. without proper documentation. The deportation of undocumented immigrants that Trump has repeatedly promised will require other types of cooperation, such as processing border crossings, and Mexico could slow-walk this process. Mexico has already signaled that it will withhold processing of non-Mexicans. The two countries have a history of collaboration in addressing the illegal drugs trade – but here too there have also been tensions. Toward the end of Trump’s first term, for example, a Mexican general was arrested in the U.S. on drug charges. After a diplomatic uproar, he was returned to Mexico and released. In late November, Sheinbaum noted that she and Trump had discussed security cooperation “within the framework of our sovereignty.” But Trump’s campaign rheotric seemed less concerned with Mexico’s sovereignty, floating the idea of sending troops to the border or even deploying them within Mexico to counter narcotraffickers. That would clearly enrage Mexico, with consequences that would extend far beyond a willingness to cooperate on the issues of drug trafficking. A chance for China? One country that stands to benefit should U.S.-Mexican relations deteriorate is China – an issue that Mexico could exploit. China is now the first or second trading partner with nearly every country in Latin America, including Mexico. The value of U.S.-Mexico trade is over $100 billion a year, but the growth of Chinese imports into Mexico has been limited somewhat by rules-of-origin provisions in NAFTA and the USMCA. A U.S.-Mexican trade war could weaken or end any incentive to keep Chinese goods out. Further, if the doors to the United States are narrowed through tariffs and hostile rhetoric, China’s car parts and financial services would clearly become even more attractive to Mexican businesses. A U.S.-Mexican trade war, in short, would augment Beijing’s access to a market on the U.S. border. A coalition of the concerned? In sum, if Trump goes through with his threats, the result will be costs to consumers and businesses, plus a new opportunity for China. This is likely to foment a coalition of industries, investors, consumers and foreign policy experts concerned with China – many parts of which supported Trump’s campaign.

Diplomacy
New Zealand parliament

New Zealand Strengthens Relations with Australia

by Vladimir Terekhov

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The meeting held on 6 December in Auckland, the second session of the “2+2 Format” established earlier this year, involving the foreign and defence ministers of both Australia and New Zealand, marked an important milestone in the rapidly advancing development of all aspects of bilateral relations. The Foreign Policy of New Zealand’s Conservative Government This process has become particularly evident since the conservative National Party government assumed power in New Zealand at the beginning of 2023. A few clarifications are warranted in this context. Firstly, the current government, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and representing the NPNZ (New Zealand National Party), officially took office in January 2023. However, it initially functioned as a caretaker government, succeeding the Labour administration under Jacinda Ardern, who had resigned prematurely. This interim status lasted until November 2023, when it shed the “caretaker” label following the general election held the previous month. It is worth noting that the NPNZ-led coalition’s victory was far from decisive, necessitating complex negotiations with a minor party to retain power. Secondly, it would be inaccurate to suggest that New Zealand entirely disregarded the foreign policy concerns of other Anglophone nations in past decades, including under Labour governments. For instance, Wellington has consistently remained a member of the Five Eyes alliance, an intelligence-sharing cooperative among five Anglo-Saxon countries. However, until the conservative government came to power, New Zealand appeared to make every effort to ensure that the significant deterioration in international relations, which began at the end of the previous decade, had no adverse effect on its relations with China. Nevertheless, the global restructuring process initiated in the second half of 2019 (notably marked by the Skripal affair) inevitably impacted New Zealand, particularly given its location in the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the focal point of the current phase of the “Great Game”. Bilateral Engagements in Relations with Australia New Zealand’s involvement in the aforementioned global restructuring is primarily occurring within the surrounding region of the vast Indo-Pacific area. Naturally, the country’s leadership has prioritised its relations with Australia, its closest partner in every respect. Within two months of shedding its “caretaker” status, New Zealand’s government, alongside its Australian counterparts, inaugurated the “2+2 Format” platform for foreign and defence ministers. The first session of this format took place on 1 February of this year in Melbourne. The mere existence of such a platform underscores the particularly close and trusting relationship between the two nations. However, the intention for closer bilateral cooperation on a broad range of issues was signalled six months earlier, during the first session of a separate “2+2 Format” involving finance and environment ministers, held in Wellington on 8 June 2023. This platform was subsequently convened for the second time on 30 July 2024 in Brisbane, Australia. Both sessions concluded with a “Joint Statement”. From the perspective of the evolving Indo-Pacific situation, special attention should be given to the second session of the defence and foreign policy “2+2 Format”, held on 6 December in Auckland. The key points of the document adopted at the session can be reviewed here. Notably, the title of the first chapter, “The Australia-New Zealand Alliance”, stands out. This chapter opens with an acknowledgment of the “natural, neighbourly, and formalised” bond between the two nations. The final element of this statement is confirmed by a significant reference to the ANZUS trilateral military-political treaty (involving the United States), which was adopted back in 1951, during the height of the Cold War. It is worth noting that until the signing of the document under discussion in Auckland, the very existence of ANZUS was likely remembered by few. This is not surprising, as for decades, international treaty reference guides consistently noted that, although ANZUS had not been formally dissolved, the United States and New Zealand had long ceased to maintain an alliance in practice. This situation stems from New Zealand’s 1984 declaration as a nuclear-free country, which resulted in the closure of its ports to American vessels with nuclear propulsion systems, even if they did not necessarily carry nuclear weapons at the time. By contrast, Japan, despite a similar “three non-nuclear principles” policy, has never taken such a step. Following the 1984 decision, which effectively marked the withdrawal of one participant from this tripartite alliance, the remaining two members restructured it to suit new conditions. However, with the end of the Cold War, even its bilateral format barely showed signs of activity. This continued until the latter half of the previous decade, a period when the world seemingly turned upside down. During this time, the Australian government, led by the conservative coalition under Scott Morrison, adopted a policy of sharply intensifying military-political ties with allies. This course has been largely upheld by the current Labour government under Anthony Albanese, which has also accelerated the development of comprehensive relations with its new ally, Japan. Canberra is also closely monitoring another key regional player: India. In summary, a particularly noteworthy development occurred on 6 December of this year in Auckland, New Zealand, when viewed from the perspective of assessing the evolving situation in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). New Zealand Increases Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region The meeting held on that day fits into the broader trend of New Zealand’s comprehensive engagement in the region, following Australia’s example. Indeed, the main aspects of this trend are mentioned in the final document adopted in Auckland. During his visit to Australia in August of this year, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his country’s intention to join the AUKUS pact (Australia-United Kingdom-United States), specifically its “Pillar II,” which focuses on the development of cutting-edge military technologies. The “Pillar I” of AUKUS, by contrast, deals with the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Japan and the Republic of Korea are also potential candidates to join AUKUS Pillar II. However, due to internal turmoil in South Korea, Japan currently remains the more likely candidate. Incidentally, in June of this year, Christopher Luxon made a three-day visit to Japan. A government communiqué regarding the trip and his discussions with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida noted the shared intention to develop various aspects of bilateral relations. This clearly signals a shift in New Zealand’s trajectory away from the popular (and to some extent accurate) stereotype of the country as a sleepy geopolitical backwater that also enjoys economic prosperity. This image has seemingly been satisfactory for New Zealanders until now. However, the geopolitical storms raging worldwide have inevitably reached even this distant nation. As New Zealand becomes increasingly involved in global disputes, it faces the prospect of previously unfamiliar challenges arriving on its shores. Finally, it is essential to note that the above developments weigh heavily on the negative side of the scale when assessing the current situation in the IPR. This does not mean, however, that there are no positive counterweights, albeit fewer in number. These positive elements suggest that the main players (at least for now) maintain control over the unfolding dynamics in the region. This is no small achievement in a world order that appears to be in upheaval.

Diplomacy
Paper ship with flags of the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Japan, the EU and China Concept of state relations, free trade agreement

China's Role in the Gaza Conflict: Global South Leadership and U.S. Rivalry

by Nadia Helmy

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском  Through its recent official and popular position towards the Gaza war, China seeks to define its position as a leader and defender of the so-called “global south” to pass the policy of transformation towards a multipolar international world in the face of the United States of America and its allies in the West. China seizes the opportunity to express the urgent need to reshape the global system led by the West under the leadership of Washington. Here, both Moscow and Beijing see Israel's war on the Gaza Strip as having led to directing Western military support efforts from Ukraine in the face of Russia, Beijing's close ally, to Israel, while China views the war from the perspective of its confrontation with America. As China attempts to express global and popular public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as part of a much broader Chinese strategy aimed at winning the support of the countries of the Global South to its side.    Both Russia and China are working to benefit from the war in Gaza, by strengthening their roles as supporters of the countries of the Global South, and demonstrating the failure and bias of the United States and the international system led by Washington in dealing with the grievances of that large bloc of countries in the world in the South. This also serves to realize Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision of Chinese leadership of the Global South, which includes the majority of Arab countries and Palestine, which enhances Beijing’s efforts to confront Washington and its Western allies and reshape the international system in its favor. China has exploited anti-Israel sentiments globally and at home, in an attempt to strengthen its position within the framework of the Global South.  In its strenuous efforts to express world public opinion and the feelings of peoples, China is pursuing many and varied plans to support the issues of the developing global south, most notably the Palestinian cause, and to expose what China considers to be American double standards in dealing with the Palestinians compared to Israel.    China's assumption of the presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2023 comes immediately after Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” or the Gaza War in October 2023, succeeding Brazil, coinciding with the escalation of brutal Israeli military operations in Gaza. For this reason, China has risked angering Israel, as it sees broader stakes in the current conflict that go beyond the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Beijing sees the crisis as an opportunity to distinguish its position from the pro-Israel West and to enhance its reputation in the global south, many of whose countries strongly sympathize with the Palestinian cause, which serves China's image.  To this end, China has used a tough diplomatic rhetoric against Israeli crimes in the Gaza Strip, and has condemned the US position, especially the obstacles created by the US by voting against a series of Chinese and Russian ceasefire resolutions in the UN Security Council. In addition, China has supported various decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to condemn Israel and arrest its Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu”.  China used its veto power against a draft resolution proposed by the United States of America on October 15, 2023, which did not include a call for an immediate ceasefire, or a permanent humanitarian truce for the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, "Chang Jun”  justified his country's opposition to the American draft resolution, because it includes many elements that divide rather than unite, and goes beyond the humanitarian dimension, and is unbalanced and mixes right and wrong, and does not reflect a strong call for a ceasefire and an end to the violence. The Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations “Jun” considered that the ceasefire is not just a diplomatic phrase, but means life and death for many civilians, which Washington did not understand, according to him. China also participated in the (Cairo Peace Summit 2023), which was held on October 21, 2023 in the New Administrative Capital, with China's call during the summit to stop the war in Gaza.  China's motivation for taking an interest in the Palestinian issue after the recent Gaza war may be more related to its competition with the United States and the image that China wants to project domestically and even internationally in light of its new position as a major global power. China wants to be seen as a wise and responsible superpower interested in mediation and peacebuilding. It is also likely that Beijing seeks to present an alternative viewpoint to the United States' perspective on peace to the world order, especially in the global South, where most countries in the region support the Palestinians.   Beijing has already come a long way in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from its active support for Palestinian factions recently to their invitation to China after the recent Gaza war to complete the Palestinian reconciliation process between all the warring Palestinian factions with Chinese support.  Since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip, Chinese positions and statements by officials in Beijing have carried a degree of escalation in tone towards Israel’s behavior. Beijing criticized the comprehensive Israeli bombing of civilians, condemned violations of international law, called for the implementation of the two-state solution, and called for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor to allow aid to enter the besieged Gaza Strip. Chinese Foreign Minister “Wang Yi” went further, describing the Israeli bombing of civilians in Gaza as actions that go beyond the scope of self-defense.  Chinese state media have also been highly critical of Israel, and in most of their reports have cited Iranian media, with the Chinese emphasis that: “the illegal use of white phosphorus bombs by the Israeli army against Palestinian civilians exposes it to international accountability”. Chinese state media have also blamed the United States, Israel’s strongest supporter, and have been explicitly accused in Beijing, for fueling tensions in the region. China has also angered Israel by refusing to join the United States and other countries in designating Hamas as a terrorist organization, describing it instead as a Palestinian resistance movement.    In late October 2024, immediately after the Gaza war, the China Daily, a Chinese propaganda outlet, declared that: “the United States is on the wrong side of history in Gaza”. Elsewhere, Chinese state television reported that Jews represent 3 percent of the United States’ population but control more than 70 percent of its wealth. With all official and popular Chinese media keen to repeat the narratives that dominate the popular discourse in the Global South. This repetition is in line with the majority opinion in some countries of the South, and it allows China to present itself as an alternative to the image of the United States of America as a warmonger, hegemonic, hypocritical and unjust.         In July 2024, Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian factions signed a preliminary agreement in the Chinese capital, Beijing, to form a transitional government for national reconciliation, with the aim of managing Gaza after the end of the war. The same group met in the Russian capital, Moscow, in February 2024, seeking to reach a similar agreement. At the same time, China was able to bring the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas movements together at the negotiating table in Beijing in two sessions of the National Dialogue during the months of April and June 2024, in a move that reflects China’s desire to interact with the Palestinian issue in a positive way.        Chinese official media is trying to support its position before Chinese public opinion at home and their sympathy for the people of Gaza, by emphasizing China's official discourse, which seeks to confirm that Beijing has made proposals to stop the war on Gaza, brought together the Palestinian movements Hamas and Fatah inside China, and called on the UN Security Council to calm the conflict. China also seized the opportunity of its meetings with Arab and Gulf foreign ministers to reaffirm the multiple peace plans it had previously proposed in favor of resolving the Palestinian issue. With the Chinese envoy to the Middle East “Zhai Jun” , confirming, with Palestinian and Arab officials, China's immediate call for an immediate ceasefire and providing humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.   As for the most prominent Chinese academic and research analyses of the Gaza war, Chinese Professor “Yan Shutong”, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at China's Xinhua University, described the matter as: “The Israel-Gaza war will reduce the global political influence of the United States. This has become very clear, because even its allies will have to distance themselves from it on this issue, and with the undermining of the United States' strategic relations with other major powers, the strategic balance between China and the United States will shift in China's favor”. Professor “Wang Yiwei”, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, also said: “China is now in a better position than the United States to help resolve conflicts, whether between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Russia and Ukraine, or Israel and the Palestinians”.  In this context, Professor Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, asserts that: “Beijing’s policy in the Middle East has been paralyzed by the conflict, given that the United States, which strongly supports Israel, is involved in this crisis, whether directly or indirectly. Who would listen to China?”. A report by the (international human rights organization Freedom House) described a wave of anti-Semitic sentiments on the Chinese Internet and Chinese media, especially popular ones related to Chinese social media, such as: the widely-used Chinese WeChat program, Weibo, QQ, and others. The Freedom House report confirmed that: “With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Chinese government has long promoted a narrative that places the blame squarely on Israel”. In light of the growing global and internal Chinese popular sympathy for the Palestinians, and the unprecedented spread of its manifestations within Chinese society via Chinese social media, and the holding of limited demonstrations in light of China’s sensitive internal policy towards popular demonstrations, decision-makers in Beijing find themselves facing a challenge to maintain a balanced position between the crimes committed by Israel against civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the position of the Palestinians in the Strip.   As an expert in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party in China, and constantly informed of all reports of Chinese think tanks and research centers, especially those related to the Middle East, it is noted that a number of Chinese analyses adopt a trend, vision, and perhaps another theory or school for the war in Gaza, namely the “theory of war between wars”, which later became clear to a large extent to be correct, meaning: that the war that was limited to the Palestinian Hamas movement and Israel, and Israel's practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will expand to include a conflict between Israel and Iran, but through its agents in the region, which means waging wars on different fronts at the same time, namely the war of Israel against Hamas, targeting Palestinian resistance elements in the West Bank, confronting Hezbollah on the southern Lebanese front, confronting the threats of the Houthi militia in Yemen, fighting the Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and waging confrontations against Iran, which leads the axis of resistance.    To this end, China seized the opportunity of the 10th China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to be held on May 30, 2024, with the participation of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” and a number of Arab leaders, most notably Egyptian President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”, to reflect the common desire to discuss aspects of China-Arab relations and ways to enhance them, deepen consensus between China and Arab countries, raise questions about the position of Gaza in China-Arab discussions, the limits of China's role in helping to stop the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and support the return to the path of political settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, leading to the two-state solution supported by major powers, most notably China.  Here, the Arab Summit, which was held in the Bahraini capital, Manama, on May 16, 2024, adopted the necessity of calling for an international peace conference that would contribute to restoring the negotiating track. This call intersects with the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call to hold an international peace conference during the Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum, where he stressed in his speech before the forum on May 30, 2024, that Beijing wants to strengthen its relations with Arab countries to be a model for global stability, calling for an international peace conference aimed at ending the war between Israel and Hamas, noting that Beijing is ready to work with Arab countries to resolve issues related to hot spots in ways that support the principles of fairness and justice and achieve peace and stability in the long term. Xi Jinping stressed that war cannot continue indefinitely, justice cannot remain absent forever, and the two-state solution cannot be arbitrarily overthrown.     Based on the previous analysis, we reach the conclusion that the Chinese trend towards interacting with the Middle East issues and the recent Gaza war represents one of the pillars of the escalation of the Chinese role at the global level and among the developing countries of the Global South led by China. This trend coincided with the vision of the United States of America to limit its ties to the interactions of the Middle East, due to its high cost and to move eastward to confront the growing Chinese influence in Asia.

Energy & Economics
The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi in a bilateral meeting with the Chinese Communist Party general secretary & president of China, Mr. Xi Jinping, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on June 23, 2016.

India-China Economic Interdependence: Collaboration Amid Rivalry in Global Supply Chains

by Seema Khan

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Despite escalating geopolitical tensions, India and China maintain a paradoxical relationship of economic interdependence. This dynamic reveals a delicate balance where strategic competition coexists with pragmatic cooperation, driving global supply chains and sustaining mutual economic benefits. The India-China relationship is characterised by both cooperation and competition, with economic ties often at odds with geopolitical tensions. In recent years, the relationship has been marked by increasing rivalry and mistrust, particularly following the 2020 border clashes in the Galwan Valley. This incident led to a significant deterioration in bilateral relations, resulting in India implementing economic measures against China, including banning numerous Chinese mobile applications and imposing stricter scrutiny on Chinese investments. However, in a recent development, India and China have agreed to resolve the Line of Actual Control (LAC) issue and move forward, signalling a potential thaw in tensions. While this thaw is good news, economic interdependence has persisted even with tensions running high, as evidenced by the continued high levels of bilateral trade. This paradoxical situation, where economic necessity coexists with strategic competition, underscores the multifaceted and often contradictory nature of India-China relations in the contemporary global context. Often described as “cooperation amid competition,” the relationship has important implications for both countries and the wider global economy. Their mutual interdependence plays a crucial role in global supply chains and consumer markets. India and China have robust trade relations, with China being one of India’s largest trading partners. Bilateral trade reached US$114.2 billion in 2021-22; and in 2022-23, China remained India’s largest source of imports, with its share increasing to 30 percent from 21 percent over the past 15 years. This relationship is characterised by Chinese imports of manufactured goods and electronic components, which are essential for India’s consumer market. India’s imports from China include machinery, telecom equipment, and electronic products, which are integral to its growing consumer electronics sector. The trade dynamics between the two countries ensure that Indian markets have access to affordable and diverse consumer goods, while China benefits from a large export market. This economic relationship encompasses various sectors, including manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, and technology, and has become particularly evident during global supply chain disruptions, such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the technology sector, Indian and Chinese companies have formed several alliances. Many Indian companies rely on Chinese components and raw materials for their production processes. For instance, India’s electronics and automotive industries heavily depend on imports from China for semiconductors, display panels, and other critical components. Chinese technology firms like Xiaomi, Oppo, and Huawei have significant operations in India, contributing to the smartphone and electronics market. These companies not only import finished products but have also established manufacturing units in India, creating jobs and contributing to the local economy. Additionally, collaboration in the tech sector extends to software and app development, with Chinese investments in Indian startups fostering innovation and growth. Chinese investments have played a crucial role in India’s startup ecosystem, with companies like Alibaba and Tencent holding significant stakes in Indian unicorns. While recent policy changes have led to a decline in Chinese investments, existing collaborations continue to influence India’s digital economy. The pharmaceutical industry represents another area of significant cooperation. India, known as the “pharmacy of the world,” relies heavily on Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) imported from China. Approximately 70 percent of India’s API requirements are met through Chinese imports. This collaboration is essential for maintaining the global supply of affordable generic medicines, particularly for developing countries. Both India and China have maintained a cooperative stance despite their political rivalries in the renewable energy sector. This collaboration is crucial for India’s ambitious renewable energy targets and global climate change mitigation efforts. China, as the world’s largest producer of solar panels and components, plays a vital role in India’s rapidly expanding solar market. In 2022, China exported solar cells and modules worth $3.89 billion to India, accounting for approximately 62.6 percent of India’s total solar imports. This interdependence is critical for India’s solar energy growth, with the country’s installed solar capacity reaching 66 GW by the end of 2022. Conversely, India’s burgeoning renewable energy market provides significant opportunities for Chinese manufacturers and investors. The collaboration extends beyond mere trade; Chinese companies have also invested in Indian solar projects and manufacturing facilities. For instance, LONGi Solar, a leading Chinese solar technology company, has established a solar module manufacturing plant in India with a capacity of Two GW. This interdependence in the renewable energy sector underscores the complex nature of India-China economic relations, where mutual benefits coexist with competitive dynamics. As both countries strive to meet their climate commitments and energy needs, their cooperation in this sector remains a critical factor in the global transition to clean energy. Last, the India-China economic relationship is integral to global supply chains, particularly in consumer markets. Their collaboration ensures cost-effective production, with Chinese components allowing Indian manufacturers to produce goods at competitive prices. The Indian electronics industry depends on Chinese semiconductors and circuit boards to assemble smartphones and other consumer electronics, ensuring they remain competitively priced. Quick market access due to large consumer bases in both countries further provides significant opportunities for businesses in both countries and beyond. Despite a competitive and conflictual relationship, trade between the two countries is a common factor that keeps them connected and facilitates the flow of technological know-how. In Asia, where the two countries have a combined population of more than 2.4 billion, their manufacturing capabilities play a crucial role in maintaining competitive global supply chains. This symbiotic relationship ensures the smooth functioning of supply chains, keeping costs low and availability high for consumer goods worldwide. Despite persistent geopolitical tensions and competitive dynamics, the India-China economic relationship underscores a paradox of interdependence. Much like the US-China dynamic, their collaboration in trade, technology, manufacturing, and renewable energy reveals a complex but mutually beneficial relationship. This interdependence sustains global supply chains, ensuring cost-effective production, technological innovation, and affordable consumer goods. By leveraging their manufacturing strengths and large consumer bases, India and China remain critical to global economic stability and growth. Even amid strategic competition, their economic ties highlight the pragmatic necessity of cooperation in an interconnected world. This article was published under a Creative Commons Licence. For proper attribution, please refer to the original source.

Energy & Economics
With Interim President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traore. Photo: Alexander Ryumin, TASS

Russian and waiting

by William Decourt , Spenser Warren

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Western missteps in Africa are creating an opening for Russia to deepen its influence. Recent protests against International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed austerity measures have rocked several African states. Kenya, a long-time partner of the United States and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti, experienced violent clashes between government security forces and anti-austerity protestors over tax hikes in a controversial finance bill. Simultaneously, many protesters saw Kenyan engagement in Haiti as footing the bill for American security interests while ordinary Kenyans struggled to make ends meet. Soon after, similar protests against IMF measures spread to Nigeria. Analysts and locals are concerned that spreading protests may threaten stability across Africa. Citizens of other countries continue to voice their displeasure with the political and economic status quo through protest (in Mozambique) and at the ballot box (in Botswana). IMF loans come with significant stipulations, including reforms to financial systems and governance. Critics of these conditions frequently malign the IMF as a violator of sovereignty. Changes to economic and governing models, combined with high debts and economic stress, increase the costs of everyday products and diminish purchasing power across the continent. To many ordinary citizens, the West is benefiting from the fruit of African resources while hindering Africans’ access to the global economy. Publics in these countries demand alternatives to IMF funding, protesting governments to oppose IMF-imposed austerity. Youth, an increasingly important demographic, are especially active. Many of these young people are college-educated but fail to secure adequately paid employment in skilled industries. The informal economy is growing but increasingly separated from formal and international economies. IMF austerity measures are driving the continent to economic crisis and protest that may have lasting effects anathema to US foreign policy and the liberal international order. Some already see China as a viable alternative, although public opinion of Chinese influence is mixed. Elsewhere, faded Cold War memories make Russia a relatively unknown economic and political alternative. So, while recent Western actions in Africa have put long term relationships at risk, Russia is slowly increasing its influence on the continent. In fact, the Kremlin has already taken action and is engaged in the politics surrounding the various debt crises in African nations. African countries owe debts to multiple international actors, including Russia. However, Moscow has forgiven debts owed by many of these countries, coupling debt relief with additional economic benefits, including an influx of grains and energy resources. It has also deepened defense cooperation with several African countries. This cooperation often includes contracts for weapons sales and the deployment of irregular military units, including the Wagner Group. Diplomatic actions such as the above have led some protestors to see Russia as a viable alternative to IMF funding and partnerships with the US and Europe. In a visual representation of this phenomenon, protestors have been seen waving Russian flags at mass gatherings across Africa. Russia appears to receive the greatest support in the Sahel, where governments have failed to curb political instability and deliver on economic development promises. Publics in the region were already angry with the continued postcolonial military presence of France, and Russia took advantage. Mass publics are not the only actors seeking alternatives, ruling elites also see Russia as an attractive partner. Russian defense cooperation and the presence of irregular forces bolster these regimes in the face of increasing civilian protests over poor governance or human rights. Still, Russia has not yet made the gains it could. The war in Ukraine is hurting Africans and contributing to economic stress as global grain prices have skyrocketed. Some perceive Russia as exacerbating the problems of failed governance through its use of Wagner Group formations to back corrupt officials, protect corporate interests, and bolster unpopular governments. Russian interest in the region is also less significant than in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or the Arctic, where Russia has more proximate strategic, economic, and political goals. Rather than rushing in, Russia’s economic presence in Africa is slowly advancing Moscow’s goals on the international stage. When Russia sought to undermine financial, technological, and energy sanctions from the West as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, it turned to Africa to find new consumers for food products, energy, and arms. Already, in the wake of the invasion, only half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. Such voting patterns at the UN indicate greater support for Russia in Africa than in other regions around the world, even if distrust of Russia remains high in some parts of the continent. Forecasted crises could increase Russian influence on the continent as well. Shocks generated by the African debt crisis could become a proximate cause for geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Rapid demographic changes and disastrous climate events (e.g., droughts and floods) exacerbate existing economic and migratory challenges. Since the tentacles of Russian economic and security influence, as well as misinformation, are already present in Africa, such future crises could pull multiple African states further into Russian orbit, and away from Western countries and institutions. Further alignment of African states with Russia would have several drawbacks. Russia would discourage democratization and use security assistance to bolster dictators across the continent. Environmentally sustainable development is also likely to be hampered. Russia may increase the extraction of natural resources in environmentally damaging ways. Additionally, Russian energy exports will be oil and gas, eroding the already significant investment and progress in green energy development many African political economies have made. As Western missteps create openings for Russia to gain a foothold in Africa, they also set the stage for other global powers to capitalize on the vacuum. Chinese-built infrastructure in Africa also contributed to debt burdens, but unlike Western approaches tied to IMF austerity measures, China is recalibrating its strategy. By shifting to smaller projects with lower debt exposure and promoting green energy development overseas, China positions itself as a more appealing partner. This strategy not only bolsters China’s domestic solar and EV industries but also enhances its soft power by responding to local economic needs. Moreover, as Western policy blunders alienate African publics and governments, both Russia’s and China’s influence may grow. Russia’s gains in the region could indirectly strengthen China’s position by fostering broader skepticism of Western-led systems, aligning African leaders more closely with Beijing’s geopolitical goals, including its stance on Taiwan. Africa is a burgeoning continent. One in four humans will be African by 2050. If the US and Europe pass on opportunities to engage with a continent of emerging green development powers and an increasingly educated demographic bulge, Western policies will undermine their own power and influence in the international order. Russia’s quiet increase in trade and security assistance offers an established alternative. Meaning ultimately, both Russia and China, may play the long game, gaining incremental support from a region of one billion people at a time. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) [add link: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/]

Diplomacy
Dotted world map illustration made of USA flag colors as concept for United States global dominance. Power and leadership symbol. Politics, military and economic influence.

Is the United States Still the Sole Superpower of the World?

by Taut Bataut

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском With the rise of Russia and China, the world is shifting dramatically from a unipolar US-dominated order to a multipolar one. Russia’s strategic alliances, along with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and economic growth, are reshaping global power dynamics. On the other hand, the United States’ military interventions and isolationist moves have raised a critical question: can it adapt to this new global reality, or will it continue to lose influence on these emerging powers? The Decline of U.S. Global Dominance The global order is witnessing a transformative period, from a unipolar order under US dominance to a multipolar one. The latter provides other major powers an extensive opportunity to challenge the US-led global system. China, Russia, and even the middle powers use this waning US influence to expand their global political clout. The rise of these powers is altering the global balance of power. Numerous US policy decisions have weakened its position in the global sphere. The militarization approach of the United States and the successive unpopular government policies have made its fall inevitable. The realist theorists attempt to attribute these changes in global power distribution as a result of the anarchic world system. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its growing economic might present the strongest challenge to the US economic and military hegemony in the world. The BRI has posed it as an indispensable economic partner of the countries across the three continents including Africa, Asia, and Latin America due to the investment of trillions of dollars in infrastructural projects. Moreover, its trade volume reached $6 trillion in 2022 surpassing the US trade volume of $4.9 trillion. This economic might has enabled it to entice states that became weary of the US’s harsh approach towards the developing and underdeveloped world. The Emergence of a Multipolar World Order Furthermore, globalization has also prompted the Third World countries to partake in knowledge and economic competitions with the Western world.   The liberal theorists hold that the leveling effect of globalization enables it to redistribute power. The emergence of this new multipolar world order has made it difficult for the US to establish and maintain its influence over the globe and remain relevant in global governance. The rise of BRICS, with its share of 37.4 percent in the global GDP in 2023, and its decision to introduce its currency for mutual trade have challenged the US financial system, hastening the decline of the US-led economic and political order. Moreover, the US policies under a few former presidents have also contributed to the rapid decline of the country’s hegemony. United States military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, its covert involvement behind sparking the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its compliance in Israel’s war crimes in Gaza have all damaged Washington’s global standing. Its deadliest invasion of Iraq, under the pretext of unverified reports of WMDs, undermined its credibility and destabilized the whole Middle Eastern region. In addition, the United States failed invasion of Afghanistan also contributed to its malignity around the globe. Russia and China were emboldened by such US failures and challenged it economically, militarily, and ideologically. Leadership crises in the United States have also undermined its international standing. President-elect Donald Trump’s previous government damaged America’s reputation to a great extent. His decision to withdraw from the Paris Accord and his criticism of NATO also inculcated distrust among the country’s allies. The US also holds a reputation for betraying its allies after achieving its ambitions. Pakistan is one of the best examples of this. The United States had always had a transactional relationship with Islamabad. After achieving its regional ambitions, it has always imposed sanctions on the country. Therefore, the US allies have started thinking of it as an unreliable ally. President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election has once again inculcated frustration among the US allies. His stance on Ukraine has already been criticized by its allies. President-elect Donald Trump seeks an immediate and peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Recently, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine after meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He advocates a non-interventionist policy. Therefore, it is believed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would come to an end after his final selection as the US President. Moreover, his presidency might also affect the unity of NATO, as he has always been critical of funding it. His “America First” approach also contributes to decreasing US influence and dominance over the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s crackdown against immigrants has also contributed to the United States’ isolation in the American region and beyond. In addition, Russia and China’s rise and BRICS expansion have also provided the middle powers and third-world countries a novel opportunity to form new alliances. The election of President-elect Donald Trump’s re-election, de-dollarization by BRICS, and the swift rise of Russia and China, along with other middle powers, all are contributing to the rapid decline of the US influence and dominance over the world.

Diplomacy
NATIONAL HARBOR, MD, USA- February 24, 2024: Donald Trump speaks at an event about his plan for defeating current President Joe Biden in November.

The Trump Effect

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This analysis focuses on possible short and medium-term effects of Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States. This paper starts with a brief account of Trump’s first presidency and then continues to account for major challenges that Trump’s administration will have to face domestically,The central part of the analysis focuses on the geopolitical consequences of Trump’s election. In particular, the author looks at Europe (the ongoing war in Ukraine): Middle East and Far East – especially China.The paper concludes with the author's conviction that the next few years will bring decisive changes likely to usher in the new world order.Keywords: Trump, US, Europe, Security, Geopolitics Introduction Donald Trump's election as the 45th President of the United States in 2017 had significant and far-reaching effects on world politics, marking a departure from previous administrations' approaches to foreign policy and international relations. Trump's presidency shifted from globalization to isolationism, protectionism, and nationalism (Kawashima, 2017). His "America First" strategy emphasized unilateral action and challenged the liberal international order the United States had led and protected since World War II (Mansbach, 2021). This approach has strained relationships with traditional allies, particularly in Europe, while simultaneously raising authoritarian leaders (Mansbach, 2021). Interestingly, Trump's election immediately negatively impacted trust in the U.S. government in Latin America, as demonstrated by a regression discontinuity design study (Carreras et al., 2021). Additionally, his controversial policies, such as the trade war with China, have had significant impacts on the global economy (Sahide et al., 2024). The Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Islamic World was notably less friendly compared to the Obama era, causing tensions in US-Islamic World relations (Bahari & Sahide, 2022). There seems to be a consensus that Trump's presidency accelerated societal processes, undermined democratic institutions, and encouraged hyperpartisanship within political institutions (James, 2021). While he did not always succeed in implementing major policy changes or fulfilling campaign promises, his leadership style and policy decisions significantly altered the global perception of the United States and its role in world politics, creating what some scholars describe as " a more dangerous world" (Mansbach, 2021).  Admittedly, Trump does not seem to be exceptionally hawkish when it comes to using military tools in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Let us remember that Barak Obama (Democratic Party), who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, ordered airstrikes in seven different countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria) (Liptak, 2014). During first Trump’s presidency, no new campaigns were started, although the intensification of the existing ones allegedly increased. Ultimately, it was Trump who was mainly behind the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Trump 2.0 November 2024 Presidential elections brought sweeping changes to the American political kaleidoscope. Donald Trump took a decisive victory over the Democratic candidate, Vice-President Kamala Harris, securing 312 electoral votes (with 270 being a victory threshold). Republicans also won the Senate with 52 seats against 47 and the House with 218 seats against 212. (Election Centre 2024).  This is arguably one of the most important political events in the world in 2024. Already Trump’s declarations regarding the first decisions to be taken once sworn in office on the 20th of January next year, plus his appointments for top offices in the U.S. administration, have caused a furore – a phenomenon referred to by many as the so-called ‘Trump Effect’. As much as political scientists, cognitive anthropologists or psychologists usually use this term to refer to racially inflammatory Elite Communication (Newman et al., 2020), this short analysis will look at the tectonic shifts in international relations, international security system and geopolitics that have already happened or are likely to occur after the 20th of January 2025. U.S. – politics Undoubtedly, the U.S. economy, society, and political system are in deep crisis. Economically, the Americans have been doing worse than ever since the Second World War. Inflation is rampant; economic inequality is very high; unemployment is on the rise; the state of infrastructure is relatively poor, and the level of public services is far from desirable, whereas taxation is reaching new heights amidst a slowing economy and diminishing number of small and medium enterprises (USA FACTS). Societywise, the problems are equally severe. According to Pew Research, the top issues facing the U.S. in this category are in the order of importance from top to bottom: the affordability of healthcare, drug addiction, illegal immigration, gun violence, violent crime, the state of moral values, the quality of public k-12 schools, Climate change, international terrorism, infrastructure condition, domestic terrorism and racism (Pew Research Centre, 2024). One should also add here the rising “wokeness’ of the American educational system, which poses a great challenge to the cohesion of the society and its future in terms of military power.  Politically, the picture is not better. According to the same research institution (Pew), the biggest problems that the U.S. political system faces are: political leaders do not face the consequences if they act unethically, it is difficult to find unbiased information about what is happening in politics, Congress accomplishes less than people give it credit for, the Federal Government does less for ordinary Americans than people give it credit for. Other problems include the role of special interest groups and lobbyists in policymaking, the cost of political campaigns and the animosity between the Republicans and the Democrats, which, in consequence, causes the inability of the political system to solve critical societal problems (Pew Research Centre, 2023). The first and foremost task ahead of Trump is to rectify problems at home. His Agenda47 (Republican Platform) declares 20 core promises: seal the border and stop the migrant invasion, carry out the largest deportation operation in american history, end inflation, and make america affordable again, make america the dominant energy producer in the world, by far, stop outsourcing, and turn the United States into a manufacturing superpower, large tax cuts for workers, and no tax on tips, defend the constitution, the bill of rights, and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to keep and bear arms, prevent world war three, restore peace in europe and in the middle east, and build a great iron dome missile defense shield over our entire country -- all made in america, end the weaponization of government against the american people, stop the migrant crime epidemic, demolish the foreign drug cartels, crush gang violence, and lock up violent offenders, rebuild cities, including washington dc, making them safe, clean, and beautiful again, strengthen and modernize the military, making it, without question, the strongest and most powerful in the world, keep the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, fight for and protect social security and medicare with no cuts, including no changes to the retirement age, cancel the electric vehicle mandate and cut costly and burdensome regulations, cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory, radical gender ideology, and other inappropriate racial, sexual, or political content on children, keep men out of women's sports, deport pro-hamas radicals and make college campuses safe and patriotic again, secure our elections, including same day voting, voter identification, paper ballots, and proof of citizenship and lastly unite the country by bringing it to new and record levels of success (Agenda 47).  International Politics Internationally, Trump faces many challenges. His presidency will have to address three primary regions defined geographically: Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. - Europe As far as Europe is concerned, the most pressing issue is the war in Ukraine. During his campaign, Trump repeatedly declared that his administration's support for the continuation of the U.S. support for the war effort against Russia would be terminated during the first 24 hours of his presidency (Hansler, 2024). As a consequence, shortly after Trump’s winning the White House race, the outgoing administration under POTUS Joe Biden finally allowed the Ukrainians to attack Russian territory with American long-range ballistic missiles (ATACMS), which allegedly came in as a response to the North Korean decision to send its troops to support Russian soldiers against Ukraine (Entous, Schmitt and Barnes, 2024). Next, in counter-response, President Putin of the Russian Federation signed a new nuclear Doctrine into power. Chillingly, it declares that Russia may use its nuclear weapons against any nuclear state, even in case of a conventional attack (Associated Press, 2024). As of the beginning of December 2024, the media are full of reports of an alleged concentration of Russian troops near the Ukrainian border, fueling speculation about an imminent mass invasion, this time with cities such as Kyiv being targeted in a conventional terrain operation (Bodner, De Luce and Smith, 2024).  One can only speculate what all this means and how far we are from the outbreak of the III World War (Sky News, 2024). Some things are, however, more or less evident. Firstly, the current escalation of war in Ukraine is likely a direct effect of Trump's winning and his declaration to end the war as soon as possible. The more the Russian troops advance in the field, the higher they can bid once the peace talks begin. Similarly, the more complex the situation in the field (Biden’s decision regarding the use of ATACMS), the more challenging it will be for Trump and his administration to achieve peace. Knowing the radically different approach to conflict with Russia of President Trump, the outgoing administration and national security advisors most likely wanted to achieve militarily as much as possible before they were ousted from their jobs. Secondly, Trump declared on numerous occasions that if European members of NATO want to continue their support for Ukraine, they should take the whole responsibility. He singled Germany, France, and Poland out. Poland, for that matter, enthusiastically agreed to carry on the baton and declared that it was ready to bear the heavy burden. In the words of Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, when participating in a radio broadcast, “We [Poland] are ready to take over the large part of the costs of supporting Ukraine” (Nczas Info, 2024). At the same time on the 3rd of December, the new Secretary General of NATO – Mark Rutte, during his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, openly declared: “The immediate priority must be to provide more arms to the country's forces as Russia gains territory along the battlefront in eastern Ukraine.The [Ukrainian] front is not moving eastwards. It is slowly moving westwards. So, we have to make sure that Ukraine gets into a position of strength, and then it should be for the Ukrainian government to decide on the next steps in terms of opening peace talks and how to conduct them." (VoA, 2024). To sum up, it looks like the current escalation, according to theoretical models such as those proposed by Herman Kahn in 1965 – a Cold War physicist - we are at stage 12 of 44 steps on the escalation ladder. As comforting as one might think it is, let us remember that according to Kahn’s theory, a local nuclear war takes place as early as at step 21 (Tinline, 2023). As history has proved many times, it is difficult, if impossible, to wage a systemic war on two fronts at the same time. Given the economic and military challenges perceived by Trump during his first tenure as U.S. President (See: A New National Security Strategy for a New Era, 2017), China is the challenger number one for the position of the United States in the international system and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, China wants to reorder the area in its favour. Would it be too much of a stretch of the imagination to claim that most likely, given the context above, Trump will probably arrange for peaceful talks with Russia over Ukrainian political and military leadership heads’? What will he want? Probably Russia’s neutrality in the face of the coming escalation of the conflict between the U.S. and China. What can he offer? Probably a big part of Ukrainian territory and the amendment to the Ukrainian constitution, according to which the country should forever be neutral militarily and politically. At the same time, the American withdrawal from Europe will most probably create a void that is most likely to be filled by Germans. The vision of the current German cabinet was elaborated on August 24, 2022, by Chancellor Olaf Scholz at Charles University in Prague. It paints a broad picture of the future of the EU at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four ‘revolutionary’ ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the further enlargement of the European Union for up to 36 states, a transition is urged to majority voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the German Chancellor asserts that Europeans grow more autonomous in all fields, assume greater responsibility for their security, work more closely together, and stand yet more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts (The Federal Government, 2022).  The leadership is not always openly claimed, at least verbally. Instead, the German National Security Strategy of 2023 mentions Germany's ‘special responsibility’ for peace, security, prosperity, and stability and the Federal Government’s ‘special responsibility’ for establishing the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity. (German National Security Strategy, 2023). In the same vein, German leadership posits their country as a leader in European Security, declaring the importance of becoming the ‘best equipped armed force’ in Europe (Euronews, 2022). Let us also remember that Berlin vigorously supported the latest proposal for a European army, which presumably might serve as a vehicle for further European integration towards the federalization of Europe.  At the same time, the prospect of federalization will face two major challenges: firstly, the future of transatlantic relations is less than certain, especially the economic competition between the EU and the U.S. European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen signalled the possibility of an economic war with the U.S. as a response to Trump declared protectionism of the American economy (Berg, Meyers, 2024). Secondly, the EU is highly inefficient in energy, so the question of future energy security becomes a priority. The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the redirection of Russian gas to China will profoundly affect the future of European economic development amid the so-called ‘Fit-for-55’ -  a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation to achieve a target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (Fit for 55, 2024). - Middle East As of the writing of this paper, one sees the escalation of the war in Syria. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “ongoing hostilities in northern Syria continue to expand to other parts of the country, endangering civilians and humanitarian workers, causing severe damage to critical infrastructure and disrupting humanitarian operations. As of 5 December, at least 178,000 people have been displaced due to the recent escalations in northern Syria, including 128,000 newly displaced and 39,000 displaced at least twice. Figures are still being reconciled, noting that UNHR and NGOs operating in the northeastern part of Syria estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people have been newly displaced there, including more than 25,000 currently hosted in collective centers”. (OCHA, 2024). According to international media (CBC News, 2024): ”Syria's long-running civil war came to a head Sunday when opposition forces entered the capital city of Damascus and the government of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. Russian state media later reported that Assad and his family had fled to Moscow. Crowds gathered in Damascus to celebrate the fall of Assad's government with chants, prayers and occasional gunfire, marking the end of a regime that, between the ousted President and his father, had ruled over Syria for half of a century.” […] "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen," President Biden said Sunday afternoon at the White House after convening his national security team to discuss the developments. He said the fall of Assad presented a "historic moment of opportunity" and pledged support for Syria and its neighbours against any threats” (Ott, 2024). Syria seems to be just another litmus test of the so-called regional security complex in the Middle East. As such, the war in Syria is obviously but a puzzle in a much bigger jigsaw that includes all major powers that operate in the region: the U.S.A, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran to name the most obvious ones. All of the above are deeply engaged in Middle East politics for the sake of their national interests and international security strategies. All of the above deserve separate analyses. For the sake of this paper, however, the author will focus only on the U.S. According to Douglas Macgregor and Dave Ramaswamy, “The fear in many nations’ capitals is that President Donald Trump’s return to Washington might make Israel feel more confident in attacking Iran. According to Mike Evans, founder of the Friends of Zion Museum in Jerusalem, “There is no world leader Trump respects more than Netanyahu.”  The evangelical leader also confides that President Trump would support an Israeli attack before his inauguration on the assumption that the destruction of Iran’s oil production facilities would devastate Iran’s economy, inducing Iran to end the war with Israel before President Trump assumes his office. This thinking by no means excludes an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear development sites as well.” (Macgregor & Ramaswamy, 2024). In their article, they state that “If America joins Israel in its war against Iran, the outcome will be a geopolitical showdown that could dramatically alter the world as we know it. It is the storm of the 21st century and, for the moment, the American ship of state is sailing right into it. “ They consequently pose four fundamental questions:  1. What is the American purpose in waging war against Iran? Is Washington’s purpose to destroy the Iranian state? To destroy its capability to wage war against Israel? To eliminate Iran’s developing nuclear capability? Or to decapitate the Iranian state in the hope that the Iranian people will overthrow their national government? 2. How will U.S. military power achieve the objectives? 3. What is the desired end state? What does the President want Iran and the region that surrounds it to look like when the fighting ends? 4. What is the strategic cost to the American people if Washington declines to participate in a regional war begun by Israel?  They conclude by asking yet another, perhaps the most crucial question: what do Netanyahu’s goals mean for the health of the American economy and the stability of the international system? Can Israel survive without attacking its numerous enemies?  The next couple of months are likely to bring at least some answers to some of these questions. Importantly, expert voices concerning the future of Israel seem to be abounding more and more (Teller, 2024). - China and the Far East Finally, there is a question of China. As mentioned before, Trump sees China as a major challenger to the role and position of the U.S. in the international system. The Republicans and the Democrats may be divided by numerous issues, but there is at least one regarding which they stay united. The true bipartisanship revolves around the Chinese challenge. Both parties, therefore, claim that the possibility of a systemic conflict with China is not a science fiction scenario. On November 20, 2024, a bipartisan group of lawmakers in the U.S. Congress heard that the U.S. had to prepare for a potential conflict with China by raising its defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP. (South China Morning Post, 2024). The recommendation came during an interactive exercise for members of the House Select Committee on China, based on a scenario predicted for 2026 and hosted by Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The report titled: The First Battle of the Next War Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, authored by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham opens with a chilling question: “What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is, therefore, not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.” (The First Battle of the Next War, 2023). They go on to claim that: “China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 Senior U.S. officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict. Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore justly become a focus of U.S. national security discourse.” China has grown increasingly assertive over the last decades and sees no reason to continue accepting a dominated world that facilitates the benefits of Western powers, especially the U.S.A. At a recent G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (November 2024), the President of China openly called for a multipolar world (Xinhua, 2024). In his words: “China and Brazil stay committed to peace, development, fairness and justice. We have similar or identical views on many international and regional issues. Both are staunch defenders of the basic norms of international relations and multilateralism, coordinating closely and consistently within the United Nations, G20, BRICS and other international organizations and multilateral mechanisms on crucial issues, including global governance and climate change. Not long ago, China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Our initiative has received a positive response from the international community. China and Brazil, embracing our roles and responsibilities as major countries, have contributed to a multipolar world, conduced to greater democracy in international relations and injected positive energy into global peace and stability.” (Xinhua, 2024 b).  Conclusion Taiwan has long been a global security issue and a point of concern on the geopolitical maps of the national security planners of great powers. It is not the only one, though. The war between the Koreas is formally not over (recently, North Korea allegedly sent soldiers to back Russia in its Special Military Operation in Ukraine); the American military presence in the Far East and South East Asia is likely to remain an issue, especially from the point of view of Beijing. Central Asia, with its geopolitical environment, religious activism and economic challenges, is likely to rise in importance as a chessboard for great powers. As the weight and focus of International Relations is relocating back to Asia (Euroasia rather than the North Atlantic Area), China and Russia are more likely to hold the keys to international peace and security than the United States. On top of that, one needs to look out for North Africa as a source of continuing instability and massive migration, especially to Europe. 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