Provider of in-depth & balanced analysis on hot issues around the world

Successful North and South Korean satellite launches underscore both countries’ ambitions to possess an independent space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to support their respective deterrence postures. Paradoxically, better ISR capabilities may also improve stability on the Korean Peninsula. Within two weeks, North and South Korea have each successfully launched their first military geospatial imaging satellites. Although the information-gathering capabilities of North Korea’s satellite are probably inferior to South Korea’s, Pyongyang will likely improve this over time, possibly with Russian assistance. Space-based systems will increase Pyongyang and Seoul’s capability to hold each other’s territory at risk, but paradoxically may also improve stability. Targeting tactics Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems play an important role in the so-called ‘kill-chain’ through which militaries detect, track and engage targets with precision-strike systems. Pyongyang and Seoul possess large arsenals of precision-guided ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles, but their respective ISR capabilities to inform targeting decisions are less mature by comparison. North Korea has developed several types of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) for ISR purposes, but sensor, endurance and communications constraints limit their utility, and they are vulnerable to South Korean and United States air defences. South Korea has more advanced ISR capabilities, but it has historically relied on United States space-based assets for its geospatial imagery needs.    North Korea said that it developed a space-based ISR capability to provide its armed forces with ‘real-time information’ to improve its ‘war deterrent’. Following the successful launch of the Malligyong-1 satellite on 21 November, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said that it provided North Korea with ‘eyes’ to complement its ‘fist’. To underline this point, North Korean state media claimed the satellite imaged Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and other ‘ major targets in the enemy region’ that North Korea could target in a conflict, without releasing imagery. Similarly, South Korea said that it is developing its space-based ISR capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of its so-called 3K deterrence architecture. It envisages South Korean forces detecting and targeting North Korean missile launchers and command-and-control in the event of an imminent or unforeseen North Korean missile launch. Both countries have made clear their recent launches are merely a first step to building out a space-based ISR layer. North Korea has said that it will launch an unspecified number of satellites in the future. Seoul plans to follow the 1 December launch of a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket with the deployment of four synthetic-aperture radar satellites by 2025, giving it an all-weather capability. Launch implications Although North Korea’s launch is an achievement for Pyongyang after earlier launch failures, the satellite’s likely poor image quality might provide limited initial returns. After a prior North Korean launch of a military-satellite similar to the Malligyong-1 failed, South Korean and US investigators judged, based on recovered parts, that the payload had ‘no military use’, suggesting its sensors and communication equipment were of poor quality. Even so, the successful launch on 21 November provides Pyongyang with an independent capability that will likely mature through domestic refinement, illicit acquisitions and potentially foreign assistance. South Korea claims that Russia provided unspecified input on the Chollima-1 satellite-launch vehicle (SLV) following two failed launch attempts earlier this year. Russian President Vladimir Putin also apparently pledged to provide support for North Korea’s space programme during a September meeting with Kim at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, possibly as repayment for much-needed ammunition to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Because SLVs incorporate dual-use components and technologies that can also be used in ballistic missiles, Pyongyang’s satellite launch was condemned by France, the United Kingdom and the US as destabilising and a violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to North Korea’s sanctioned ballistic missile programme. The Chollima-1 SLV’s first-stage rocket motor, for instance, is derived from the Soviet-designed RD-250 engine that has powered several different North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17. An advancement in North Korea’s SLV capabilities will undoubtedly have some benefits for its ballistic missile programme. Although Pyongyang regularly tests ballistic missiles, it is unlikely to have used this launch to disguise testing military capabilities related to its missile programme. South Korea’s military space programme also has received some external assistance. The country launched its satellite on a SpaceX Falcon 9 SLV from the US government’s Vandenberg Space Force Base. Future satellite launches might continue to use US technology alongside South Korea’s burgeoning SLV capability. Supporting stability Perhaps paradoxically, Pyongyang and Seoul’s new space-based ISR capabilities may have some unexpected stability benefits by reducing mutual fears of pre-emption. In a crisis, a lack of information may exacerbate pre-emption fears and could trigger escalation. South Korea’s deterrence doctrine is based on Seoul’s fear that North Korea may pre-emptively use conventional or nuclear weapons against it. North Korea is arguably concerned about South Korea’s analogous precision-strike capabilities, evidenced by recent changes to its nuclear doctrine to delegate launch authority if Kim were killed. Although space-based ISR will allow North and South Korea to target each other more effectively in a conflict, their new capabilities might also be useful in a crisis by providing Pyongyang and Seoul with greater situational awareness that could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

The killing of a Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon on Jan. 8, 2024, has raised concern that the conflict between Israel and Hamas could escalate into a regional war. Wissam al-Tawil, the head of a unit that operates on Lebanon’s southern border, was killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike just days after a senior Hamas leader was assassinated in Beirut and amid sporadic attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli targets. But how likely is a full-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah? The Conversation turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert on Lebanon-Israel relations at the University of Notre Dame, to assess what could happen next. What do we know about the latest strike? We know that it was an Israeli drone that killed al-Tawil. Hezbollah has since released picture of him with Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s secretary general, and Qassem Soleiman, the former head of Quds Force – one of Iran’s main military branches – who was assassinated by the U.S. in 2020. This suggests that al-Tawil was a major target for Israel, as he clearly had connections with top figures in Lebanon and Iran. The fact that it was a drone attack is also important. This suggests that the operation was based on good Israeli intelligence on al-Tawil’s whereabouts. This wasn’t a chance encounter. This was clearly a calculated and precise attack. After the operation, Israel said al-Tawil was responsible for a recent missile attack on Israel’s Mount Meron intelligence base in northern Israel. That attack was in response to the earlier assassination of a Hamas leader in Beirut. So what we are seeing is a pattern of tit-for-tat strikes. So this doesn’t mark an escalation? I don’t see the killing of al-Tawil as an escalation, as such. Rather, it is a targeted retaliation by Israel to the earlier Hezbollah strike on one of their facilities. There are some important things to note in that regard. It was just 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. This is still within the geographical area where the two sides have been exchanging fire since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas in Israel. So this is still within the realm of border skirmishes, to my mind, and falls short of full war. Is it in the interests of Israel to escalate conflict? I don’t think either side is interested in full-blown war, for different reasons. For Israel, the pressure is from outside the country. There is immense international pressure on Israel not to start a full-blown war with Hezbollah. Indeed, U.S. Secrtary of State Antony Blinken is currently in the region and visiting Israel with that message: Do not start a war with Hezbollah. I think there is a realization, certainly in the international community, that a full-blown war between Hezbollah and Israel will decimate Lebanon and also lead to major destruction in Israel. What about pressure within Israel? Certainly within Israel there is a strong lobby for war with Hezbollah. The thinking among Israeli military hawks here is a powerful military blow against Hezbollah would allow people living in the north of Israel to return to homes they evacuated when it looked like war might be in the cards. Indeed, the Israeli Ministry of Defense wanted preemptive war with Hezbollah after the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. But U.S. President Joe Biden stopped that from happening for the same reason that Blinken is currently trying to dissuade Israel from further escalating the conflict. And what about Hezbollah? How might it respond? Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, is between a rock and a hard place. The majority of Lebanese people clearly do not want a war. But any attack resulting in the deaths of high-ranking Hezbollah figures will be met by internal demands for action. But there is a tipping point for Hezbollah, as there is for the Israelis too – which is why this tit-for-tat pattern is such a risky matter. On the Lebanese side, if Israel hits strategic Hezbollah assets deep in Lebanon – that is, outside the border areas – or launch an attack that leads to mass civilian deaths then it might lead to full-blown conflict. But so far that has not been the case. The attacks by Israel have been surgical and precise. In the case of the Hamas leader killed in Beirut, it was only Palestinians killed. It was a humiliation for Hezbollah for sure – it happened in Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut. But it wasn’t on Hezbollah assets, such as personnel, strategic sites or command centers. Israel has limited its attacks largely to the border area. Public sentiment is still very strongly against war in Lebanon. Certainly there is strong sympathy for Gazans. But the prevailing sentiment in Lebanon is that support cannot come at the price of Lebanese lives. And that suits the Hezbollah hierarchy at present. They know that the threat of war is their most important card. Once played, they can’t use it again. Is there a diplomatic way forward? Both parties are looking at diplomacy. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has said that his country’s preferred path is “an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement.” Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the goal of returning Israeli citizens to their homes in the north would be done “diplomatically” if possible. But added, “If not, we will work in other ways.” Similarly in Lebanon, the talk is of a diplomatic solution – notably by enforcing United Nations Resolution 1701, which calls for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and for Israel to withdraw to the international border. So it isn’t that there isn’t a credible diplomatic path. And the fact that both sides use the language of diplomacy suggests there is no appetite for full-blown war. Indeed, the U.S. has long been trying to get Israel and Lebanon to resolve disputes over their shared borders. Both sides signed a U.S.-brokered maritime agreement in 2022, and there have been attempts at a similar deal in regards to the land boundary. There remained disagreement over 13 spots along the border. But since Oct. 7, the U.S. has tried to use the prospect of a negotiated land solution based on U.N. Resolution 1701 to diffuse tension between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese government has said it welcomes U.S. efforts to resolve the disputes. On the Israeli side, too, they are going along with U.S. attempts to keep U.N. Resolution 1701 on the table – I think, mainly to keep America on side. Does Iran have any role in influencing Hezbollah’s response? Iran has immense influence over Hezbollah – it pays for military operations and equipment. But Hezbollah is not only an Iranian proxy; it has domestic considerations, and its interests lie with the Lebanese political scene. For that reason, Hezbollah is attuned to the domestic popular pressure in Lebanon against a war. Also, I don’t think Iran wants to see an escalation. Like Hezbollah, Iranian leaders know that threat of war – through their proxies in the region – is their most valuable asset. And I don’t think Iran is ready to use it. Iran might also be concerned that if fighting escalates, then it will be drawn into war. Iran has so far played a smart game since the Oct. 7 attacks – it has stayed away from the battlefield, while supporting the sporadic attacks on Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria. But a full war between Israel and Hezbollah may draw Iran into direct confrontation with Israel and the U.S. And that is something that leaders in Tehran will most likely not want, especially after a terror attack in Iran on Jan. 3 exposed how vulnerable Iran is internally.

Why is Pyongyang ringing in the new year with warmongering? North Korea’s official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, is predicting a year of living dangerously, marked by the “highest risk of confrontation.” Addressing an end-of-year party plenum, Kim Jong Un cautioned that “war can break out at any time.” He added, however, that foreign military confrontation would be met by “a deadly blow to thoroughly annihilate” the enemy and subjugate “the whole territory of South Korea.”  Kim’s dire forecast is a matter of concern, but not because deterrence is likely to fail. The North Korean leader wants others to fear the prospect of war, which is why he (once again) threatened that the Korean peninsula is “on the precipice of nuclear war.” But Kim wants to sharpen his “treasured sword,” not fall on it.  North Korea may be viewed as preternaturally bellicose, but menacing discourse is not harmless prattle. The sharp rhetoric emanating from the Kim regime masks serious internal and external goals that impinge on vital U.S. national interests and regional security. For starters, Kim needs to justify his fixation on military spending. Clearly, three military parades, 44 missiles, and 64 flights a year are difficult to sustain. The notion that U.S. and allied military exercises are making the thought of war on the peninsula “realistic” is propaganda. Even so, Kim’s pledge to launch three more military spy satellites in the coming months is realistic, if also suggestive of one of the concrete benefits of adopting Russia as North Korea’s primary defense partner. North Korea’s anemic economy cannot support additional military spending. The ambitious five-year defense modernization plan Kim unveiled three years ago is perpetuating the country’s impoverishment. Pyongyang’s boast of a 40% increase in the country’s gross domestic product last year masks a fragile and sanctioned economy, overly dependent on China, which accounts for 90% of North Korean exports. While North Korean exports to China rebounded to about $300 million in 2023, a shocking 57% of that total came from exports of wigs, false beards, eyebrows and eyelashes. A weak and vulnerable economy is precisely why the North Korean regime places a higher priority on cyber theft than it does on legal trade. When you can raise more than $2 billion from hacking, who needs to maintain so many foreign diplomatic outposts in Africa? So, U.S. and South Korean authorities must step up their game if they are to prevent cyber heists like the one on Orbit Chain on New Year’s Eve that probably netted North Koreans $81.5 million in cryptocurrency.  Kim Jong Un also is relying on cooperation with like-minded partners to compensate for his diplomatic failures with South Korea and the United States. Having strengthened ties with Russia by providing additional ammunition for Moscow’s war of aggression — and North Korean mortar and rocket shells are increasingly visible on the Ukrainian battlefield — Kim is in a position to leverage relations with Beijing.  China’s Xi Jinping, locked in a fierce competition with the United States, appears eager to lend an extra hand to help North Korea. Xi’s New Year’s Day greeting to Kim said that “the new situation in the new era” further underscores the need to take “a strategic and long-term perspective” on China-North Korea relations. North Korea’s diplomatic outreach to Russia and China not only is a counterpoise to growing trilateral relations among the United States, Japan and South Korea but also a useful means of undermining Seoul as it begins a two-year stint as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council.  Setting a belligerent tone to commence the year is also Pyongyang’s way of trying to subvert South Korea’s democratic government. There was no subtlety in labeling South Korea “a hemiplegic malformation and colonial subordinate state.” Furthermore, as South Koreans mark the centennial of the birth of former president Kim Dae-jung, the Kim regime might be engaging in wishful thinking that progressives will rise in protest against the conservative administration of Yoon Suk-yeol. Politics is as polarized as ever and South Korean police are reinforcing security after the stabbing of the leader of the main opposition political party and an online threat to kill the head of the ruling People Power Party. But Kim Jong Un must have an even greater fear of losing his totalitarian power than is suggested by state-controlled media. Burnishing Kim’s credentials as a benevolent father figure and feigning more democratic elections shows a need to appeal to popular support. Even more telling was the Jan. 1 airing on North Korea’s KCTV of the movie A Day and A Night, which highlights the real story of how a nurse uncovered a counter-revolutionary plot to overthrow the Kim Il Sung government. The point of the Pyongyang-produced movie is to ensure North Korean people are sufficiently motivated to protect their leader.  Finally, threatening conflict is a cost-effective way for the Kim regime to amplify America’s trending theme of dread about the fate of American democracy. The West has a rich supply of smart pessimists who regularly churn out frightening warnings. No doubt Kim also would like for us to unburden ourselves by accommodating a nuclear North Korea and removing U.S. troops from the peninsula.  Oh, to recall the “beautiful letters” that Kim Jong Un penned to then-President Donald Trump after their brief flirtation with peace in the summer of 2018. 

From the start of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli calls to crush Hamas have escalated, joined by major Western powers calling for the end of Hamas’ rule in Gaza Strip (GS) and its exclusion from the Palestinian decision-making circle. This has coincided with a global campaign vilifying Hamas, accusing it of terrorism, and seeing it as an obstacle to achieving peace and stability in the Middle East. Arab and regional forces have also actively worked against Hamas, affecting their external relations and its security and developmental strategies. Arab leaders and officials have openly discussed this in closed rooms with Western leaders or with figures who later revealed it in the media, such as Dennis Ross and Thomas Friedman.A World Without Hamas:So, these powers believe that Hamas is the problem, and that its leadership is now sought after, with the solution to regional stability being the exclusion of Hamas. Let’s deal with the hypothesis of getting rid of Hamas calmly and objectively. We should ask those who have filled the world and the media against Hamas some simple questions. Hamas emerged as a movement in 1987, nearly forty years after the decision to partition Palestine and the 1948 war and the establishment of the Israel. What have peace-loving powers done during these forty years to grant Palestinians their rights, end Israeli occupation, and implement United Nations (UN) resolutions?! Was Hamas the obstacle and the problem?! After more than thirty years of the Oslo Accords signed in 1993, which the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership hoped would establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank (WB) and GS within five years. Who disrupted the implementation of the agreement? Who destroyed the peace process? Who destroyed the two-state solution? Who turned the Oslo experience and the peace process into a catastrophe for the Palestinian people? Wasn’t it the Israeli side who doubled the number of settlers, seized land, Judaized holy sites, and turned the Palestinian Authority (PA) into a functional security entity serving the occupation? After more than twenty years of the (Saudi) Arab Peace Initiative launched in 2002, wasn’t it the Israeli occupation that ignored and thwarted it, leaving it on the shelf, if not in the trash bin?! And, assuming there was no Hamas throughout this period, would the Israelis have granted Palestinians full sovereignty to the WB and GS? Or is the problem deeply rooted in the essence of Zionist ideology and the dominant Israeli mindset that rejects this?! For example, during the period 25/2–3/3/1996, after several operations carried out by Hamas in retaliation for the assassination of Yahya ‘Ayyash that shook Israel, major Western powers, Israel, the PA, and several Arab and world countries rushed to hold an international conference titled the Summit of Peacemakers, on 13/3/1996, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, to support the peace process and combat “terrorism.” The PA, in collaboration with the Israeli occupation and the United States, using all means of suppression and brutality, launched a smear campaign against Hamas in an attempt to eradicate anything related to the Islamic resistance movement. Practically, the PA spared no effort and succeeded, to a large extent, in dismantling most, if not all, of the resistance cells, and largely managed to strike the organizational structure of Hamas and stifle its popular base. Then what?! In the following four years, the situation stabilized for the PA, and its nine Security Forces met all Israeli demands and achieved the targeted “quality standards.” However, Israel, on the other hand, did nothing but continue its plans of Judaization and settlement, using the settlement process as a cover to penetrate the Arab and Muslim region and normalize relations with it. The matter culminated in the failure of the Camp David II negotiations in July 2000. And the question that arises is, during that period, practically a “world without Hamas,”’ why was the promised peace settlement not achieved? Therefore, Yasir ‘Arafat lost any hope of realizing the dream of the Palestinian state he aspired to. This frustration played a fundamental role in pushing ‘Arafat to support the Al-Aqsa Intifadah that erupted in September 2000, with the participation of Fatah elements, both popularly and militarily. As for the second result, it is that Hamas, in a very short time, regained its strength, advanced to lead armed resistance, and gained unprecedented popular support, culminating in its overwhelming victory in the 2006 Legislative Council elections. Attempts to create a “world without Hamas” by the PA have been repeated since 2007 for many years in WB. Hamas has suffered (and still suffers) from the PA’s repression (along with Israeli repression and US expertise), its pursuit, closure of its institutions, and the targeting of its organizational structure. So, what was the result after 16 years?! The result is that Hamas is the most popular faction in WB, or at least the fundamental competitor to Fatah!! Otherwise, why did the Fatah leadership shy away from the election obligations and the putting the Palestinian house in order, in the spring of 2021, and continues to evade them until now?! Even in GS, the suffocating blockade and participation in five destructive wars over 16 years have only increased Hamas’s strength and popularity!! Therefore, the question directed at Israel is: If WB is under your direct and indirect occupation, and you have failed over 36 years to uproot Hamas, even with a Palestinian partner, and it still maintains its popularity; what do you expect even if you manage to reoccupy GS? Why insist on “trying the tested” and “reinventing the wheel”?Will of the Occupation… or the Will of the People?!There is a fundamental question that arises: Does a “world without Hamas” reflect the will of the occupation and its allies, or the will of the Palestinian people?! Therefore, does Israel and its allies have the right to guardianship over the Palestinian people? Is it their right to impose their standards on the Palestinian people in choosing their representatives and leaders? What audacity and arrogance is it that the enemy decides the form and specifications of the leadership of a people who are victims of occupation?! The second fundamental question is, why do the Western world, Arab normalizers and their allies seek to adapt the situation in Palestine according to the desires and standards of the occupation and in a way that pleases Israel? Instead of working according to hundreds of international resolutions and the inherent rights of peoples to self-determination, to adapt the situation in favor of ending the occupation and exerting all pressures on it to force it to do so?! Therefore, the persistence of Israel as a “state above the law,” securing its occupation, and ensuring its continued subjugation of another people is the abnormal situation that must be eliminated. Hence, if the Palestinian people choose Hamas as an expression of their free will, the correct approach is to respect the will of the people, not the will of the occupation. Hamas governed GS according to the majority elected by the Palestinian people, and it did not come with an Israeli or US permission or approval. Thus, it remains whether they are satisfied or unsatisfied; this is not their business.Realistic Indicators:Indicators show that after more than 75 days of the brutal Israeli aggression on GS, Hamas’s popularity remains high and continues to rise, and the Palestinian environment still rallies around it inside and outside Palestine. The methods of massacres and atrocities have deepened the desire of the Palestinian people for revenge and for making more sacrifices to end the occupation. Thus, Israel’s mad desire to reach a “world without Hamas” has only strengthened Hamas and elevated its status among Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims and the world as a movement of resistance and liberation. This happened at a time when the ugly face of the occupation was increasingly exposed. The latest opinion polls released by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Research on 13/12/2023 show a rise in Hamas’s popularity and more support for the resistance line, with an overwhelming majority demanding the resignation of ‘Abbas. Moreover, if there were a referendum on the most popular factions or parties in the Arab and Muslim world, Hamas might win by a comfortable majority, gaining a position that no other Palestinian faction, party, or Arab or Muslim leader could dream of. Perhaps Abu ‘Ubaidah, whose name and face we do not know, would receive far more votes than many leaders and presidents whose names echo in the media day and night!!Hamas and the International Community:If the world were without Hamas, would it be better for the international community to support the Palestine issue? In fact, the objective study of the course of the world’s interaction with the Palestine issue, its prominence on the international agenda, and the increasing percentage of votes for it since the emergence of Hamas until now (1987–2023), indicates that whenever there is resistance, an atmosphere of uprising, confrontation with the occupation and an ascendance of Hamas’s role, this voting percentage increases in the UN and its institutions, as well as in the official and popular global interaction. Conversely, whenever the trend of peace settlement and the imposition of a state of “calm” prevails, international interest and support, as well as voting percentages in the UN, decrease. Israel exploits this to further its settlement and Judaization, moving towards closing the Palestinian file and imposing its visions that erase the rights of the Palestinian people in their land and holy sites. Researchers, such as Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, have written about this phenomenon.Hamas and “Terrorism”:Several Western countries accuse Hamas of “terrorism” and killing civilians, seeing the need to delegitimize it internationally. However, for the Palestinian people, Arabs, Muslims and everyone who believes in the right of the Palestinian people to liberate their land, Hamas is seen as a moderate, open Islamic movement, a national liberation movement whose existence is linked to confronting Zionist terrorism and ending the occupation. Crushing and sidelining Hamas will not eliminate the essence of the liberation idea; it is an inherent and sacred right for any people with dignity seeking to determine their destiny on their own. Accusing Hamas of terrorism is merely a tool to prevent any legitimate resistance against the occupation. Regarding the issue of targeting civilians, perhaps there is no room for discussion here, but historically, it suffices to note that since its inception, Hamas has sought to focus on military objectives. After the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre carried out by a Zionist called Baruch Goldstein in 1994, Hamas offered to avoid killing civilians from both sides, but the Israeli occupation ignored it and continued its massacres. Documented statistics indicate that Israel has killed more than 11 thousand Palestinian, the overwhelming majority being civilians, from 2000 until just before the recent Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7th. The whole world has witnessed the Israeli massacres in GS… Let’s first talk about the “Zionist terrorism.” The moderate Islamic civilizational ideology is the most powerful, deep and widespread school of thought in Palestine, the Arab world and the Muslim world. Palestine, with its great religious significance and heritage, occupies a central place in the hearts of every Arab and Muslim. This school of thought, even if Hamas were hit, has the potential to reproduce a stronger and wider movement. It is associated with a just battle worth sacrificing and dying for, linked to the status of Palestine and not necessarily to the existence of Hamas. It is an entrenched ideology in Palestinian society and the Ummah (Muslim nation). It is foolish to ignore it and insist on going against the tide of history after thirty years of British colonialism and seventy-five years of Zionist colonization, using the same mechanisms that have proven their failure. *** The clear result of this discussion is that those who talk about a world without Hamas do not mean Hamas alone, but they aim to target the resistance of the Palestinian people and their vibrant and free forces. They want a world conducive to the continuation of occupation, injustice and the subjugation of the Palestinian people… They want Palestinian people without will, a people dancing to the tunes of the occupation, a people without claws and teeth, which will never happen!! Instead, global efforts should focus on creating a world without colonization… without occupation… without a Zionist settler-colonial expansionist project. It should be a world that respects the free will of peoples and pressures Israel, not those fighters for their freedom. It should be a world that stops evading the obligation that will happen sooner or later, which is the liberation of Palestine and ending the occupation.

The Israel/Hamas war poses some issues for International Relations scholars which we perhaps tend to downplay. For example, the desire to act or demonstrate solidarity, to fulfil the imperative to ‘decolonise’ or ‘to call out the oppressors’, can often clash with the desire to deconstruct or oppose claims to political or moral authority. Today many people are becoming increasingly aware of our shared imbrications and entanglements, where all ‘our livelihoods are underwritten by colonial violence and unsustainability’. If coloniality is not something that can just be wished away but is at the heart of the international system, the best of intentions can often result in reducing decolonising to a metaphor or taking shortcuts – ‘decolonial washing’ via publishing appeals, petitions and statements – rather than initiating transformative change. For example, one minute we’re reading or writing critical studies of the ways that international institutions gain moral authority through international humanitarianism, but the next minute, when something dreadful happens in the world, it seems that there is no alternative but to demand that our governments act ‘progressively’ in the world. This problem perhaps is most acute when it comes to the demand that ‘something must be done’ about international outrages, such as war crimes and genocide. In these cases, it appears that our ethical and political desires to decolonise have no avenue of expression without reinforcing the existing domestic and international hierarchies. The danger is magnified in the cases of international policy discourses that assert their humanitarian and universal underpinnings, seeking legitimacy for interventions to protect victims of violence. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins writes: ‘…race and racism need to be taken seriously as features within the structures of humanitarian thought and practice. Alongside this, it is necessary, for scholars and practitioners alike, to acknowledge that humanitarianism, with its universalist claims, acts as a salve for sustained racial discrimination and violence, working if not to entirely invisibilize racial hierarchies within suffering, then to make the racial underpinnings of such suffering acceptable through supposedly universal practices of care.’ In such cases, the moral imperative to ‘decolonise’ can be particularly paradoxical. If ‘decolonising’ is to be more than a managerial buzzword, the global structures of power and domination, built on colonial exploitation, indigenous dispossession, and chattel slavery, would need to be dismantled. This would seem to rub up against the desire that dominant world powers and international and domestic institutions demonstrate their ‘decolonial’ credentials. Perhaps it could be argued that we have already rehearsed this problem of international institutions garnering moral and political credibility on the back of wars and atrocities. Most recently in the international attention to the Ukraine/Russia conflict, making some (white, European) lives more grievable than others. It seems particularly difficult to take colonial legacies and continuing international hierarchies of power out of international calls for humanitarian action in the Israel/Hamas conflict. For example, many University schools and departments are drawing up their own petitions on the conflict. Staff are not merely left to sign one of the many petitions already in existence, calling for peace and justice in Gaza, but are encouraged to organise their own workplace petitions. The reason for this bypassing of existing demands for the British government to act as a force for peace has little to do with Britain’s key colonial role in the establishment of Israel as a settler-colonial state. The need for a separate petition arises in order for colleagues to make solidarity demands upon their university employers and to “show that our stated commitment to progressive values and decolonising education actually means something”. It becomes a problem when the desire to demonstrate ‘decolonial’ or ‘progressive’ credentials takes the form of petitioning the British government and University and other employers to involve themselves in international conflicts as a way of demonstrating that they somehow share or can lead political and ethical work in this area. This is particularly the case when many leading states and educational institutions would find it much more difficult to discuss their own financial dependency on endowments from the profits of coloniality and chattel slavery. As leading authorities on ‘decolonial washing’ write, ‘we contend that engaging in complicated conversations is a necessary condition for decolonising university curricula’. It is doubtful that conversations about these institutions own colonial complicities can be short-cut through petitioning them to become decolonial actors elsewhere in the world. As Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang argued, not taking decolonising seriously ends up in settler ‘moves to innocence’ and ‘settler futures’ where leading colonial institutions and beneficiaries are reimagined in non-oppressive terms. As the editors of Decolonising the University state: ‘the foundations of universities remain unshakably colonial’. Therefore, focusing on the British government and leading employers and institutional benefactors in ways that problematise assumptions of their moral authority would presumably be more useful than calling upon these institutions to demonstrate their commitment to decolonising. As Vanessa de Oliveira Andreotti powerfully argues – ‘Potholes in the Road toward Decolonization (For People in Low-Intensity Struggle)’ – coloniality is so baked into Western state powers and institutions that attempts to take ‘short cuts’ through making ‘decolonial’ claims and statements can easily feed into existing hierarchies, reproducing ‘colonial entitlements’ rather than challenging them.

The attacks on shipping in the Red Sea is a test for the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy to deal with China In a House Armed Services Committee hearing in March 2023 on the US posture and security challenges in the Middle East and Africa, it was acknowledged that “…President Biden’s decision to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all US forces from Afghanistan has undermined our national security.” The developments of the past few weeks in the Red Sea have made this assertion seem prophetic. Yemen’s Houthi rebels have strategically positioned themselves to exploit less monitored zones in the Red Sea and the broader Arabian Sea. With numerous naval vessels navigating this critical route linking the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, countering the Houthi rebels and their assaults on global shipping has become exceedingly challenging for the US. The Houthi rebels have connected these attacks to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, tying the halt in hostilities along shipping lanes to a ceasefire negotiation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Their strategy involves increasing attacks on ships and holding them as leverage to prompt the US to pressure Israel for a ceasefire. The timing of the Houthi actions aligns with Israel’s focused operations in southern Gaza and a waning Congressional backing in the US for continuous financial support for overseas conflicts. Tactically, the Houthis see an opportunity to open a third front in the maritime domain, even as the Israeli air defence systems are overwhelmed by combined rocket attacks of Hamas and Hezbollah in the north and south. In an offensive barrage last week, the Hezbollah carried out six attacks in eight hours. In the maritime domain, the Houthis have carried out multiple UAV, rocket and missile attacks targeting a dozen merchant ships in the larger Indian Ocean. Iran has conducted attacks on US and Israeli vessels in the region as well. A recent attack on an Israeli vessel off the west cost of India near Veraval is a red flag for safety and security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the Indo-Pacific. With unmanned aerial vehicles and use of other technological capabilities, the attacks on ships could be rapid, discreet, damaging and, most of all, with little or no accountability. Often, the vulnerabilities associated with international strategic choke points have always been assessed from the perspective of State complicity, resting States’ conviction on limited capacities of non-State actors to exact huge costs. If anything, the Red Sea crisis shows that even with little but calculated external support, non-State actors could indeed significantly disturb the predictability of global supply chains and bring merchandise flow to a halt. The economic impact of increased attacks in the Red Sea is already being felt, as many ships have begun to avoid the route through the Red Sea and prefer the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. This has caused worries of delay in the global freight markets and pricing concerns in energy dependent countries beside the security concerns for shipping companies such as Maersk. Since the Israel-Hamas war began, the US Central Command has been active in preventing a slew of UAV attacks by the Houthi rebels. For the US, the situation developing in the Red Sea presents a combination of political, economic and strategic challenges. The ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza has politically isolated the US at the global level as the only country to oppose a UNSC ceasefire resolution. The political heat from the Israel-Hamas war is being felt at home with dwindling youth support for President Biden as presidential elections near. The economic costs of the two wars – one in the Middle East and the other in Ukraine – is already tearing the US Congress apart. At the strategic level, coordinated attacks on international shipping threatens to force a rebalancing of the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific. The US currently has two aircraft carriers positioned in the Middle East since the Israel-Hamas war began. While a strong US military presence in the region may have prevented the war from spreading through the region, any additional and long-time concentration of force posture in the Gulf may be detrimental to Washington’s Indo-Pacific intent. Indeed, America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is being tested in the Middle East through five core ideas. Firstly, the recentring of US forces in the Middle East contradicts the intended pivot towards Asia. Secondly, the attacks orchestrated by the Houthis and Iran highlight the unpredictable threats that can disrupt supply chains in the region. Thirdly, the US faces challenges in executing counterterrorism and counterpiracy efforts in the Indo-Pacific, especially while collaborating with allies. Moreover, integrating the Middle East into an Indo-Pacific connectivity project appears increasingly challenging. Lastly, China’s refusal to join the US in protecting the Red Sea shipping lanes reveals Beijing’s divergent strategy for engaging with the Middle East from that of the US.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, issued the following statements at the start of the expanded meeting with the members of the War Cabinet: Prime Minister Netanyahu: “Mr. Secretary, it's good to welcome you and your delegation again. We're fighting a war of civilization against barbarism. I can say that when we spoke, I expressed again our commitment, Israel's commitment, to achieve total victory against Hamas. And we think this is not only our war but in many ways your war because you are leading the forces of civilization in the world. This is a battle against the Iranian axis, the Iranian axis of terror, which is now threatening to close the maritime strait of Bab el-Mandeb. This threatens the freedom of navigation of the entire world. I appreciate the fact that you're taking action to open that strait. It's not only our interest, it is the interest I think of the entire civilized community. I want to thank you for the support that you have shown consistently, and I welcome the opportunity to talk about what else we're doing to have our common interests served." US Secretary of Defense Austin: "Prime Minister Netanyahu, thanks for hosting us again. This is my fourth visit to Israel as Secretary of Defense and my second since the terrible day of October 7th. I'm here to underscore what President Biden has said again and again: our commitment to Israel is unshakeable. I know that Israel is a small, tightknit country and I know that all Israelis were touched by the vast evil committed by Hamas. So I'm here to mourn with you for the innocent souls taken from you on October 7th and I'm also here to stand alongside the families of those still missing in Gaza, including US citizens. America's commitment to Israel is unwavering and no individual, group or state should test our resolve. So in the Red Sea, we're leading a multinational maritime taskforce to uphold the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation. Iran's support for Houthi attacks on commercial vessels must stop. Now, we'll continue to provide Israel with the equipment that you need to defend your country, Mr. Prime Minister, including critical munitions, tactical vehicles and air defense systems. We'll continue to support Israel's mission to find and free all of the hostages. I'm also here to discuss how we can best support Israel on a path to lasting security and that means tackling urgent needs first. We must get more humanitarian assistance in to the nearly two million displaced people in Gaza and we must distribute that aid better. We want to thank you for the recent initiatives that you've taken, Mr. Prime Minister. We applaud that and hopefully that will enable us to move even more in. Thanks for again being a great host and I look forward to a great discussion, Mr. Prime Minister." Also participating in the meeting are: For the Israeli side – Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Minister Benny Gantz, Minister Gadi Eisenkot, MK Aryeh Deri, National Security Council Director Tzachi Hanegbi, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff Tzachi Braverman, Government Secretary Yossi Fuchs, IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, the Prime Minister's Military Secretary Maj.-Gen. Avi Gil, and the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Adviser Ophir Falk. For the American side – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown, Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs David Satterfield, Secretary Austin's Chief of Staff Kelly Magsamen and Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Israel Stephanie Hallett. *** The views and opinions expressed in this article solely belong to the author and do not represent the perspectives or stance of World and New World Journal, nor do they reflect the opinions of any of our employees. World and New World Journal does not endorse or take responsibility for the content, opinions, or information presented in this article. Readers are encouraged to consider multiple sources and viewpoints for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. Thank you for your understanding.

Originally published by Hlib Parfonov at The Jamestown Foundation on 13. December 2023 Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 190 Over the past month, as many as ten forced landings of civilian aircraft have taken place in Russia. The most serious of these happened over the past week. On December 7, a fire on board an Aeroflot Airlines Boeing 777 forced the aircraft to make an emergency landing. The plane was flying from Kamchatka to Moscow when a passenger noticed smoke coming from under his seat. The preliminary investigation attributed the fire to a short circuit of wiring in the main cabin (T.me/aviatorshina, December 7). That same day, a Tu-204S cargo plane of Aviastar-Tu Airlines with registration number RA-64024 was returning from Zhengzhou airport in China. After takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic controllers that the left engine had stalled and requested an emergency landing at Ulan-Ude airport (Ruavia.su, December 7). And on December 8, a Siberian Airlines Boeing 737 traveling from Novosibirsk to Moscow made an emergency landing in Tolmachevo. Immediately after takeoff, both of the aircraft’s engines caught fire (T.me/aviatorshina, December 8). These incidents highlight growing problems for Russia’s civilian and commercial aviation. Many of the technical difficulties are tied to Western sanctions prohibiting the import of critical components for the proper maintenance of aircraft. The recent forced landings represent another example of the war in Ukraine increasingly being brought home to Russia. Western sanctions and a critical shortage of technical personnel have hampered Russian civilian aviation since the beginning of the war (see EDM, July 3, September 8). Due to a lack of specialists and necessary spare parts, negligence of management, and Moscow’s fundamental departure from the rules for servicing foreign-made aircraft, much of the Russian civilian fleet could be grounded over the next year, with few prospects for reversing that trend. This is evidenced by the fact that, compared to 2022, the number of flight delays for the Urals MTU of the Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) increased by 44 percent this year (880 in 2023 compared to 490 in 2022). At the same time, there have been 739 cases of flights being unable to depart on time due to technical malfunctions (Insightnews.media, December 7). The lack of access to software updates and proper technical advice, as well as skipping regular maintenance intervals, have led many of Russia’s civilian aircraft to gradually break down. Most often, engines, landing gear, and brakes are the first to fail. Problems with flaps, air conditioning and de-icing systems, or internal wiring are less common but have been seen increasingly in recent weeks. Thanks to the Kremlin’s orders not to record any defects in pilots’ logbooks, all civilian aircraft appear to be perfectly serviceable on paper (Insightnews.media, December 7). Moscow’s problems with domestic aviation extend beyond civilian flights to the commercial sector. Russia’s air freight industry is stagnating fast, as it is dominated by the outdated Soviet Ilyushin Il-76 and Ukrainian Antonov AN-24 and AN-26 cargo aircraft. On November 8, the Federation Council held a roundtable discussion on the state of the country’s air transit capabilities (Gazeta.ru, November 9). Some participants expressed fear that up to 25 percent of the commercial fleet will be inoperable in less than five years. The average age of Russian commercial cargo aircraft is 50 years old. These aircraft have not been properly upgraded and maintained due to the mass transfer of foreign aircraft to Russia before the war; the lack of economic feasibility in completing such an overhaul, with costs estimated at billions of rubles; and the inability to gain access to necessary parts to upgrade the Ukrainian cargo planes. The repercussions of Moscow’s war against Ukraine have forced Russian operators to pay minimal attention to the maintenance of civilian and commercial aircraft. While companies can still source some spare parts for the 50-year-old aircraft, they have run into problems tracking down components for more modern equipment, such as parts for Motor Sich engines. In another example, the aircraft of Abakan Air, which operates international flights for Russian entities and provides transportation services for clients from other countries, are constantly out of order. According to internal documents, engines, air conditioning systems, and even radios often fail, and the company has been unable to bring in the necessary parts and technical expertise to solve these issues (24tv.ua, December 5) Similar problems also extend to helicopter aviation. The main bottleneck involves flagging production of modern engines. For example, in April, Russian Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov announced that a shortage of VK-2500 engines was slowing down the production of Mi-8 transport helicopters. For VK-2500 engines, only a single production center was created in St. Petersburg, with a maximum volume of 200 engines annually. Manturov pointed out that Russian officials had tried increasing the volume to 300, though production has struggled to keep up. Today, demand sits at over 500 for these engines (Interfax, April 11). In addition, extending the service life of transport helicopters has further hurt the industry. As early as 2022, Russian airline Utair asked Rosaviatsia to extend the maximum allowable service life of engines for the Mi-8 and Mi-172 helicopters. The airline asked to increase the period from 7,500 to 9,000 hours, arguing that “the resource condition of TV3-117 engines” is already close to the maximum permissible level. According to aviation experts, such a request is madness and will likely lead to more serious technical issues in the near future (RBC, August 16, 2022) All this points to Moscow’s war against Ukraine increasingly coming home to the Russian public, disrupting their everyday lives. The current trend in Russian civilian and commercial aviation points to the possibility that these two sectors cannot adequately support the country’s transit demands. This will result in a redistribution to the already overloaded Russian railways. That reality will have severe economic consequences and further limit the effectiveness of military logistics in resupplying the frontlines with manpower and munitions in a timely fashion.

In recent days, three Israeli-linked commercial vessels were targeted by ballistic missiles and drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, marking a clear escalation in maritime attacks in the critical Bab el Mandab strait between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for two of the attacks, as well as an earlier hijacking of a Japanese-operated cargo ship by helicopter last month. On Sunday, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree reemphasised that all Israeli-affiliated vessels travelling along the Yemeni coast would be fair game if Israel does not cease its attacks on Gaza, which have claimed the lives of at least 15,500 Palestinians since October 7. Who are the Houthis? The Iranian-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, are insurgents that control most of Yemen’s north, including the nation’s capital, Sana'a. The group emerged in the 1980s as a political-religious revivalist movement out of the Zaydi sect from Yemen’s northern highlands, namely the ancient city of Saada. The movement’s broad motivations emerged from longstanding grievances that left many Zaydis feeling like second-class citizens within the wider Yemeni social and political order. Many in the Houthi leadership received religious education in Iran before returning to Yemen in the early 2000s and becoming more politically active. The Houthis are not mere Iranian “proxies”, however. Attempts to portray them as such tend to overemphasise this connection and ignore the indigenous nature and causes of the movement and its ideology. The group engaged in ongoing struggles against the Ali Abdullah Saleh-led Yemeni government throughout the 2000s, ultimately contributing to its collapse following the 2011 Arab revolts. Following the Arab Spring and increasing chaos in Yemen, the Houthis gained significant momentum. In 2014, they were able to oust the Saudi-backed transitional government and seize power over much of Yemen, rapidly blitzing into the country’s south – a move that shocked international onlookers in its brazenness and efficacy. In response, a Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition launched a military intervention, which they believed would rapidly overwhelm the insurgents with their technological superiority. The operation went awry, however. Thanks to their own tenacity, along with increasing support from Iran, the Houthis were able to bog down the coalition forces into a bloody stalemate. This brought untold misery to the wider Yemeni population, but allowed the Houthis to hold onto power over much of the country’s north. A series of backchannel negotiations led to a halt in the fighting in 2022. Although peace talks officially commenced in April, Yemen remains in a state of precarious peace. Because this is such a critical time for the Houthis, it begs the question: why are they risking their hard-won gains over a conflict thousands of kilometres away that doesn’t directly involve them? Why Israel? The Houthis are part of the so-called “axis of resistance”, an alliance of proxy militant and insurgent groups that Iran has built throughout the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Within this wider context, Israel has attempted to implicate Iran in Red Sea attacks, but Tehran denies it. To interpret the Houthi attacks on Israel as solely an extension of Iran’s wider geopolitical manoeuvring would be overlooking a crucial Houthi political strategy. The group’s support of the Palestinians is also a way of garnering domestic and regional support for its own position in Yemen. While many countries in the region have sought a detente with Israel in recent years, it’s clear that support for the Palestinians remains high among the wider Arab population. As such, the Houthis clearly see an opportunity to step into the vacuum and generate positive public opinion for their cause. This not only strengthens the Houthis’ authority at home, but is also critical to reinforcing the legitimacy of the Houthis as Yemen’s governing authority in the eyes of the international community. Why is the Bab el Mandab Strait important? Yemen has always been at the centre of regional geopolitics due to its strategic location on the Bab el Mandab Strait, also known as the “Gate of Tears,” which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean beyond. Because vessels need to traverse the 30-kilometre-wide strait to travel between Europe and Asia (via the Suez Canal), it serves a pivotal role in global trade and energy security. Oil and natural gas shipments pass through the strait from the Middle East to Europe and North America. Historically, the strait is no stranger to conflict. In 1973, for instance, Egypt blockaded the strait to prevent ships from reaching Israel during the October war. The Houthis are aware of how critical this waterway is. And its attacks on the vessels, which may seem to be a nuisance for now, could potentially cause larger problems for Israel and its allies. For Israel, diverting its shipments to Asia around the southern tip of Africa – instead of through the Red Sea – would significantly increase shipping costs and transit times. Any disruption to this trading route would have serious global economic costs, as well. Global maritime insurance companies are already hiking their prices and limiting their coverage of high-risk shipping as a direct result of the Houthi attacks. The Houthi threat also serves to ratchet up the wider tensions in the region, potentially changing the calculus of the US and Israel, who might become more cautious in their actions as a result. For the Houthis, these provocations are ultimately low cost and high return. Given the insurgent, battle-hardened and dispersed nature of the group, for example, it would be difficult for Israel or its allies to try to respond to the attacks. So, as long as the war in Gaza drags on, the Houthis will likely continue to play a disruptive role and look for new ways to create uncertainty and risk in the region.

Pyongyang successfully launched its first military reconnaissance satellite after two previous failures. North Korea has developed a robust missile arsenal but, until now, lacked a remote reconnaissance capability to identify, track, and attack U.S., South Korean, and Japanese military targets. The satellite’s capabilities, as well as whether it incorporated Russian technology, remain unknown. North Korea announced the satellite surveilled U.S. military bases in Guam and vowed to launch several additional reconnaissance satellites “in a short span of time.” South Korea responded by suspending portions of an inter-Korean military agreement meant to prevent military clashes along the DMZ, raising tensions on the peninsula even further. On November 21, Pyongyang conducted its third attempt at launching its Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite onboard a Chollima-1 rocket. Previous launches in August 2023 failed to achieve orbit, but clearly, North Korea learned some valuable lessons. The South Korean navy salvaged some of the rocket and satellite debris from the ocean floor, enabling technical analysis, though the results have not been disclosed. Kim Jong-un declared the regime’s intention to develop a military reconnaissance satellite in his January 2021 directive to the regime’s defense industry. Other delineated military projects included a solid-fuel ICBM, tactical nuclear warheads, hypersonic gliding flight warheads, and a nuclear-powered submarine. >>> North Korea and Russia: How Far Could Their Partnership Go? North Korea reported an “important final-stage test” in December 2022 involving a mock satellite and subsequently released two poor-quality images of the Korean Peninsula. Experts denigrated the grainy, low-resolution images as being of far worse capability than commercially available imagery. Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korea’s leader, responded angrily that the test was to show the feasibility of the system rather than the eventual quality of the imagery. In April 2023, Kim underscored the importance of having “several reconnaissance satellites on different orbits [for] securing real-time information about the hostile forces’ military scenario and moves.” Ironically, North Korea’s most recent satellite launch occurred the same day the regime criticized South Korea and the United States for “recklessly” militarizing space, describing Seoul’s upcoming launch of its own reconnaissance satellite as an “extremely dangerous military provocation.” It is possible that Russia provided technology to improve North Korea’s satellite launch capabilities in return for Pyongyang’s shipments of massive amounts of artillery ammunition to Moscow. During Kim’s September 2023 trip to Vladivostok, President Vladimir Putin hinted at providing military and technological support to North Korea. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Russia was providing “technology and support” for North Korea’s military programs, though without elaborating on details. A South Korean military official told reporters that an 80-ton liquid fuel engine was transferred from Russia to North Korea even before the September summit. Russian engineers traveled to North Korea after the summit. More likely, however, North Korea’s long-planned launch occurred too quickly after the Kim-Putin summit to have incorporated new Russian technology. Pyongyang announced it had developed the satellite and launcher “by its own efforts and technologies.” Pyongyang has frequently failed initial tests of new missile systems before eventually succeeding. South Korea responded to the launch by partially suspending the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, which then-President Moon Jae-in hailed as a major step in improving relations with Pyongyang. The accord established mutual risk reduction and confidence-building measures to reduce the potential for inadvertent military escalation. However, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration declared that North Korea repeatedly violated the agreement and criticized provisions of the deal, which curtailed allied reconnaissance and military training activities. The Yoon administration announced it would suspend Article 1, Clause 3 of the agreement and restore airborne reconnaissance operations along the DMZ. >>> Next-Generation Interceptor Needed in Greater Quantities to Stay Ahead of the North Korean Missile Threat Any North Korean launch using “ballistic missile technology” is a violation of numerous U.N. resolutions, regardless of whether it is depicted as a civilian space launch. While China and Russia will veto approval of any new U.N. resolutions, the United States should step up its enforcement of U.S. and U.N. sanctions and work systematically with the international community to target North Korean violators, as well as entities in Russia, China, and elsewhere that facilitate Pyongyang’s transgressions. The U.S. should also counter the growing North Korean military threat by strengthening security cooperation with allies South Korea and Japan, while encouraging these two allies to improve their bilateral cooperation. Last year, the U.S. resumed large-scale military exercises with South Korea and restarted rotational deployments of strategic assets, both after a four-year hiatus. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo also restarted trilateral military exercises. These measures have augmented allied deterrence and defense capabilities. The three nations should consider a return to pre-2018 training levels as a minimum requirement for future training schedules. Given the escalating growth in North Korean nuclear and missile forces, Washington should confer with Seoul and Tokyo on a training regimen that includes all military services and goes beyond ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine exercises to include air and ground forces. The historic trilateral Camp David Summit in August paved the way for greater American-led military, economic, and technological cooperation against common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. The three leaders, however, will need to operationalize the extensive security agreements they reached as well as commit greater resources to offset advancing Chinese and North Korean military capabilities represented by this launch. This piece originally appeared in The National Interest https://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas-spy-satellite-launch-one-giant-and-dangerous-question-mark-207448