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An ongoing power struggle for the position of ambassador at the Afghan embassy in New Delhi underlines India’s diplomatic quandary about the nature of its engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has not issued any public statement regarding the dispute between representatives of the previous Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan over who should occupy the post, but reports suggest India has conveyed to both sides that they need to settle their internal issue on their own. However, the fact that the visa of Qadir Shah, the person appointed by the Afghan Taliban as chargé d’affaires in New Delhi, has reportedly expired further complicates the power struggle. If the Indian government decides to extend Shah’s visa, it would interpreted as India’s willingness to accept a Taliban-appointed diplomat in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi. Following its seizure of power in August 2021 after overthrowing the U.S.-backed Ashraf Ghani government, the Taliban regime has been seeking international diplomatic recognition along with Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. The Taliban regime has so far taken control of more than a dozen missions abroad, but India is yet to have a Taliban-appointed ambassador. In March, the Taliban regime’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, revealed that “efforts are underway to take charge of other diplomatic missions abroad. [...] Diplomats of the former government are continuing their activities in coordination with the [Taliban] Foreign Ministry.” Afghan embassies in Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and some other Arab and African countries are now working under Taliban-appointed diplomats. India’s involvement in Afghanistan The security, economic, and humanitarian vacuum left by the withdrawal of American troops has significant implications for India’s interests in Afghanistan. India has always required and worked for a relatively stable Afghanistan free from threats by terrorist groups. Without formally recognizing the Taliban regime, in its many recent official statements India has made clear that it recognizes the reality on the ground. While India has also underscored the need for the Taliban regime to reform its governance in terms of gender and ethnic inclusivity, such normative considerations are unlikely to influence the substance of the India-Taliban relationship insofar as they do not essentially affect regional stability. India has no history of military intervention or political interference in Afghanistan and New Delhi has focused on forging people-to-people connections and projecting soft power. That is why, despite setbacks due to the hasty exit of U.S. forces, India continues to maintain goodwill among ordinary Afghans and perhaps even a section of the Taliban leadership (such as Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban’s deputy foreign minister, who is believed to have a soft spot for India). Next to the U.S., India was Afghanistan’s principal regional source of development assistance since the Taliban’s ouster in 2001. In fact, India’s engagement with Afghanistan offers a compelling example of the use of soft power. Beyond its geostrategic motives, New Delhi was determined to bolster Kabul to ensure that a radical Islamist regime beholden to Pakistan’s security establishment did not gain a foothold in the region. That India and the Taliban-led Afghanistan have gradually drawn together to the extent that they have is an example of pragmatism in foreign policy making at its best. For India, it makes sense to try to give some reason, in the form of diplomatic exchanges and developmental assistance, for the Taliban not to permit the export of terrorism from Afghan soil. For the Taliban, notwithstanding their ideological rigidity domestically, the dire need for development assistance means maintaining silence on India’s policies on the Kashmir Valley, which is predominantly Muslim.  The Taliban have sought India’s assistance in rebuilding their country. For a regime that has been diplomatically and financially isolated, its normal relationship with India also holds much pragmatic appeal, given New Delhi’s growing geopolitical influence and longstanding interest in accessing Central Asian markets via Afghanistan. New Delhi expands its presence and engagement In June last year, New Delhi decided to deploy a “technical team” at the Indian embassy in Kabul to re-establish its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan for the first time since the Taliban takeover. And soon after, when India delivered a consignment of medical supplies to Afghanistan as part of its humanitarian assistance, India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, characterized India as “a true first responder” in Afghanistan. India’s move to expand its diplomatic presence is also driven by a desire to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts. In order to avert a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, India supplied 40,000 metric tons (MT) of wheat overland via Pakistan in February 2022 and an additional 20,000 MT via Iran’s Chabahar port in March 2023 to be distributed through the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), along with 45 tons of medical assistance in October 2022, including essential life-saving medicines, anti-TB medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines, winter clothing, and tons of disaster relief material, among other supplies. In addition, India’s union budget for 2023-24 also made a special provision for a $25 million development aid package for Afghanistan, which has been welcomed by the Taliban. The Taliban have reportedly requested that India finish about 20 incomplete infrastructure development projects across the country. In April, during the signing of a memorandum of understanding with India for the dispatch of an additional 10,000 MT of wheat, the WFP assured India that it has the necessary infrastructure on the ground to quickly deliver the wheat to the most needy sections of the Afghan population. Recently, the MEA, under the aegis of the India Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC), invited Afghan government officials to attend a four-day virtual course on Indian legislation and business climate. In principle, India’s outreach to the Taliban is also conducive to achieving its counterterrorism objectives. However, there is a risk of over-expectation on the part of New Delhi that the Taliban would crack down on anti-India terrorists, as well as indications that the Taliban regime continues to maintain its deep links with Pakistan’s security establishment. It has been suggested by National Defense University Professor Hassan Abbas in his recently published book, The Return of the Taliban, that the Taliban regime consulted the Pakistani military before allowing India to reestablish its diplomatic presence in Kabul in June 2022. The Taliban’s ideological constraints India-Taliban relations could be hampered by the Taliban’s internal ideological positions, which the group has clung to rigidly even at the expense of its efforts to secure international recognition. The Taliban regime banned girls from educational institutions and prevented women from working in most fields of employment, including at non-governmental organizations. Women have also been ordered to cover themselves in public and are barred from many entertainment and sports venues. External pressure, including the imposition of sanctions, has not done much to convince the rigid hardliners within the Taliban regime to change their direction on human rights, gender equality, or ethnic representation in governance. This suggests that there are limits to what India can achieve through its interactions with the Taliban. The risks for India are heightened because some Pakistan-based terrorist groups would likely criticize the Taliban regime for seeking closer ties with India. Moreover, were Kabul’s cooperation with New Delhi to pose a threat to the Taliban’s own internal ideological legitimacy, this would also serve as a check on efforts to normalize relations. Regional dynamics and prospects for cooperation The Taliban regime is enthusiastically courting other regional powers as well, such as China, Russia, and Iran, each of which has its own regional interests. For instance, in contrast to India’s passive role and limited footprint in Afghanistan, China has been expanding its diplomatic and economic presence in the country. Recently, China discussed with the Taliban regime how to bring Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to boost investment in the crisis-hit country, while also pressing Kabul to deliver on its regional and international commitments to counter terror. In January of this year, Beijing signed a 25-year contract to extract oil from the Afghan Amu Darya Basin and is also negotiating other lucrative commercial deals with the Taliban regime. Central Asia has often been seen as a test case for Indian leadership. It is in Afghanistan that India has taken a notably more proactive approach to driving regional cooperation through connectivity initiatives. India has also used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) platform for this purpose. With inclusion of Iran this year, membership in the Eurasian political, economic, and security organization now includes all of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors with the exception of Turkmenistan. Early this month in Goa, India, the foreign ministers of SCO countries called for the establishment of a representative government in Afghanistan as well as the protection of women’s rights. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar remarked, “Our immediate priorities include providing humanitarian assistance, ensuring a truly inclusive and representative government, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and preserving the rights of women, children, and minorities.” While the SCO might appear a viable platform for regional cooperation, there are certain limits to its effectiveness in dealing with Afghanistan due to the divergent political and security interests of some SCO members, particularly India and Pakistan. Moreover, given Russia’s reduced international stature and Beijing’s growing leverage over Moscow due to its brutal war against Ukraine, the SCO is now a China-led organization. China is a key participant in many important regional forums where Afghanistan remains a core security concern. Since India has a very uneasy relationship with China and supports U.S.-led geopolitical initiatives, primarily the Quadrilateral Security Initiative or Quad (comprising India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia), to counter China, there are practical constraints to what India can achieve through the SCO.   While the Taliban have not yet shown the traits required for recognition as a legitimate political organization responsible for governing Afghanistan, the non-recognition of their regime should not worsen the suffering of the Afghan people. India has a clear interest in a stable and well-governed Afghanistan, not least to prevent spillover into Kashmir. For now, India’s policy toward Afghanistan remains focused on building pragmatic, if not cooperative, relations with the Taliban. India is engaging the regime on its own terms and continues to highlight its commitment to Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and women. India is equally careful that its interactions should not be viewed as a diplomatic embrace of the Taliban or its acceptance of their repugnant governance model.

In the last two years, China's leader, Xi Jinping, has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). What exactly are they, how do they differ from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and what do they imply for the State of Israel?  In the last two years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced three global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These new initiatives are a means of bolstering the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, with Xi at its head. More importantly, they reflect how China’s foreign policy has evolved and the lessons learned from its global engagement in the ten years since

Recep Tayyib Erdogan will remain president of Turkey for another five years after winning Sunday’s run-off election over his long-time rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. If he serves the full five-year term, he will have held power for 26 years – almost the entire history of Turkey in the 21st century. What is astonishing is how the majority of Turkish people elected Erdogan despite a worsening economy and now chronic hyperinflation that would likely bring down any government in a democratic country. So, how did Erdogan win the election and, more significantly, what is likely to happen in the country in the foreseeable future?Free but far from fairThe election was free in that political parties could put forth nominees on their own and carry out campaigns. Parties also had the right to have representatives in every polling station to ensure the votes were counted correctly. And voters were free to vote. However, the election was far from fair. First, a potential leading rival in the race, Ekrem Imamoglu, was sentenced in December to more than two years in prison on a charge of “insulting public figures”. Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, dealt Erdogan’s party a rare defeat in the 2019 Istanbul elections. Polls had shown he could win against Erdogan in the presidential election by a comfortable margin. Some argue the court ruling was politically motivated. With Imamoglu out of the picture, the opposition had to coalesce behind Kilicdaroglu, the weakest of all possible high-profile candidates. Erdogan also has an almost ubiquitous grip over the Turkish media, engineered through Fahrettin Altun, the head of media and communication at the presidential palace. Turkish media are either directly owned by Erdogan’s relatives, such as the popular Sabah newspaper managed by Sedat Albayrak, or controlled through managing editors appointed and monitored by Altun. Some independent internet news sites such as T24 practice self-censorship in order to remain operational. With this massive media control, Erdogan and his men ensured he had the most television airtime. Erdogan was depicted in the media as a world leader advancing Turkey by building airports, roads and bridges. He was put in front of dozens of journalists on TV, but all the questions were prepared in advance and Erdogan read his answers through a prompter. Altun also orchestrated a massive smear campaign against Kilicdaroglu. The opposition leader received minimal airtime, and when he was in the media, he was depicted as an inept leader unfit to rule the country. Altun not only controlled the conventional TV channels and print media, but also social media. On Twitter, a very influential platform in Turkey, Altun used bots and an army of paid trolls and influencers to seek to control the dialogue. And it worked. Sufficient number of voters were swayed through confusion and fear that the country would be far worse if Kilicdaroglu was elected. Lastly, there was the potential for fraud due to the non-transparent way the election results are processed. Once each ballot box is counted, the ballot and result sheet are transported by police in cities and the military in regional areas to the electoral commission. Both the police and military are under Erdogan’s tight control. The results are then reported only through the state-owned Anadolu Agency, while in the past they were reported by multiple independent agencies. Even if no evidence of fraud emerges in this election, the spectre could put in doubt the integrity of the entire electoral process.Staunch support from religious votersThere are two other factors that were decisive in the elections. The first is the support Erdogan received from Sinan Ogan, who was third in the first round of the presidential election two weeks ago, with 5.2% of the votes. Erdogan persuaded Ogan to throw his support to him. The second and most important factor was the way Erdogan was viewed in an almost mythical fashion by conservative and religious voters. For them, Erdogan is a religious hero and saviour. The religious population in Turkey has long suffered persecution in the name of secularism. For them, Kilicdaroglu and his Republican People’s Party symbolised that persecution. Although Kilicdaroglu abandoned the party’s previous strict secular policies, these voters never forgave it for preventing Muslim women from wearing the head scarf in educational and state institutions and keeping religion out of public life and politics for decades. The conservative and religious right in Turkey sees Erdogan as a world leader and a hero who struggled against ill-intentioned forces, both internally and externally, to make Turkey great again.What is likely to happen in Turkey post-election?Turkey desperately needed a change of government and a breath of fresh air. Now the social, political and economic suffocation is likely to get worse. Erdogan had promised a Turkish revival by 2023, which is the 100th anniversary of the republic’s founding. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world by then. However, Turkey barely sits in the top 20, at 19th. The economy has experienced a significant downturn in the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value, leading to a dollar-based economy. But dollars are hard to come by. The Turkish Central Bank kept the economy afloat by emptying its reserves in the last few months for the elections. The Central Bank has been running a current account deficit of US$8-10 billion dollars every month, and its reserves last week fell into the negative for the first time since 2002. Now Erdogan has to find money. He will resort to high interest foreign loans and embark on a diplomatic spree of the oil-rich Muslim countries to draw some of their funds to Turkey. The uncertainty around how successful these endeavours will be and their likely short-term gain may throw the Turkish economy into recession. For the people of Turkey, this could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living. The inflation rate had reached a 24-year high of 85.5% last year, and may go even higher, as the cash-strapped government continues to print digital money to pay for its large bureaucratic workforce. On foreign policy, Erdogan will continue to try to become a regional power independent of NATO, the European Union and the US. He will likely continue to strengthen Turkey’s ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has been a worry for Turkey’s Western allies.What does the future hold?This will be Erdogan’s absolute last term in office, according to the Turkish constitution, and it could possibly be cut short. The 69-year-old president has many health problems. He is becoming increasingly physically frail, finding it hard to walk, and his speech often slurs. In coming years, his health may get worse and he may have to hand over his presidency to a trusted deputy. The other possibility is that potential leaders in his party could decide to carry out a party coup to topple Erdogan before his term is up, so they can garner public support ahead of the 2028 presidential election. While there may be some political stability in post-election Turkey for now, the country will be in economic, social and political turmoil for the foreseeable future. Correction: This piece has been amended to say that if the Turkish economy slips into recession, it could mean massive unemployment and a reduced standard of living, instead of reduced cost of living.

The future of the region is still up for grabs. It will be up to those who believe in democracy and progress to seize it.The carpet rolled out to Bashar al-Assad by the Arab League in Jeddah this week opens a grim new chapter in a darkening world. Hundreds of thousands have been killed and millions displaced by the Assad regime’s horrific war crimes, yet here he is being welcomed with open arms. More than a decade after the Arab Spring, the promise of bringing new and more accountable political forces into power to sweep away long-serving and corrupt despots appears lost. Authoritarian regimes across the region have reasserted their control and sent a clear message: no change will be brooked and the existing political orders will endure come what may. What is most striking now is the solidarity of these regimes and their willingness to put aside past differences in favour of realpolitik. They no longer see benefit in proxy conflicts, and instead are willing to prioritize cooperation against efforts for reform in the region.Arab League ineffective against authoritarian regimesA byzantine institution, the Arab League – which welcomed Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky as he attempts to rally the world’s support against a rampant Russia – is filled with elderly men who talk for hours but do little. Syria’s seat was handed to the opposition in 2013 as regional states backed armed rebels attempting to overthrow the Assad regime. However, recent diplomatic exchanges between Syria and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Oman send a collective message from the authoritarian regimes that hold sway over the public body and never fully supported the idea of political transitions: ‘Even if we opposed you before, as long as you maintain your grip on power, you will be welcomed back into the fold’. By throwing open the door to Assad’s return, years of diplomatic isolation have fallen away in an instant. Is this the way the world bends? The Arab Spring, which swept across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, was a historic moment of political awakening for the region’s people. Some, such as Qatar and Turkey, sought to use the movement to consolidate power and support groups such as political Islamists and more radical militant groups. The UAE took a similarly aggressive approach, actively opposing political Islam and supporting militias and military forces opposing the Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements. Saudi Arabia attempted to both stop and contain the movement, backing the problematic Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered political transition in Yemen while sending troops to the Gulf monarchy Bahrain to preserve the regime there. In Syria, Iran helped Assad crush the opposition and flooded the country with militias and revolutionary guards. Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have recently supported Turkey and its president Recep Tayyip Erdogan with billions of dollars to help the flailing Turkish economy. Qatar, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt before its removal from power in 2013, recently deposited a billion dollars at the Egyptian central bank, helping bolster the position of the man who led the Islamist group’s ousting: President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Turkey has given clear instructions to Egyptian opposition TV channels based in Istanbul to ‘tone down’ coverage critical of the Egyptian government. As Iran contends with a wave of public protests calling for major changes and remains isolated under Western sanctions, Riyadh has moved to rebuild diplomatic ties with its long-time foe. The consequences of this authoritarian resurgence are devastating for the region’s people and the future of democracy. Sudan has descended into renewed violence that threatens a wider civil war. Meanwhile, Tunisia is slipping back into dictatorship under President Kais Saied. A military intervention and more than eight years of conflict in Yemen has left millions dependent on international aid for survival and the country fragmented under the control of multiple armed groups. Libya has been torn apart by proxy conflict. Egypt faces increasing economic hardship despite its grandiose mega-projects. Exhausted by conflict and repression There is hope. These regimes hope their populaces are exhausted by conflict and repression and no longer have the will to prioritize calls for change. But that is not to say the Arab Spring was in vain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the latest reminder of how authoritarian regimes hold back progress in their countries and threaten global peace and stability. While the Arab Spring battles have been won by authoritarian regimes and their supporters, a generation has experienced a political awakening and seen first-hand the fragility of these repressive orders. The forces of change must regroup and find new approaches and tools for the struggle ahead. Efforts for peaceful democratic reform should be supported by the international community and not sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Worryingly, the authoritarian Arab regimes have become more united, not less. This unity is a threat to democratic progress in the region. Yet while the Arab Spring gambit may have been countered, the future of the region is still up for grabs. It will be up to those who believe in democracy and progress to seize it.

Last weekend, Turkey held a historic election that will be crucial in deciding in the way the country is heading. Although almost all pre-election polls were predicting a narrow win for the main opposition candidate, the results are inconclusive, and the country will go to a runoff election in two weeks’ time. The new constitution voted in 2017 stipulates the parliament and presidential elections must be held at the same time. To win the presidential component of the election, a candidate must garner more than 50% of the votes. If none of the candidates receives greater than 50% of the votes, the election goes to a runoff election between the two candidates with the highest votes. This is precisely the situation Turkey faces now. Incumbent President Recep Tayyib Erdogan and his closest rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, will face each other in a runoff election on May 28.Who is Erdogan’s opposition and what were their arguments?There are two main blocks that fought to win in a bitter and ruthless campaign. The broad opposition National Alliance is made up of six political parties, spearheaded by the Kilicdaroglu-led Republican People’s Party (CHP) party. CHP is known for its pro-secularist policies, and for this reason have been fiercely opposed by the religious segment of Turkish voters. To turn this image around, Kilicdaroglu promised a broad reconciliation policy to unite the country and heal the wounds of the past. He also followed an appeasement strategy by drawing under the National Alliance the national and conservative leaning Good Party (IP) and three minor religious parties, the conservative Happiness Party (SP), Future Party (GP) and Solution Party (DEVA). The last two parties’ inclusion in the alliance are significant, as they are respectively led by Ahmet Davudoglu, a former prime minister and Erdogan’s former foreign minister, and Ali Babacan, who served as the minister of economy until 2019 under successive Erdogan governments. Holding the alliance together was important, as a key criticism against the opposition was its fragmented nature, which some argued would make it impossible to form a concerted front against Erdogan. The National Alliance successfully overcame this hurdle. The next problem was who would be the collective candidate of the National Alliance. The polls consistently showed mayors of Ankara and Istanbul ahead of Kilicdaroglu as candidates. Turkish voters tend to prefer politicians with proven public office track record – two of the mayors had this but Kilicdaroglu did not. In a decision some argue was politically motivated, Imamoglu was charged and sentenced to three years for insulting the Electoral Council (YSK). This took him out of contention. Another spanner in the works for the National Alliance was the self-nomination of Muharrem Ince for the presidential election. Ince was CHP’s nominee in the 2018 election where he lost to Erdogan. The National Alliance was fearful Ince’s candidacy would split opposition votes, which would in turn take the election to a second round that would advantage Erdogan. Ince announced his withdrawal from the race two days before the election, after several images were circulated on internet alleging him having an affair. Battered and bruised, Kilicdaroglu remained as the main opposition candidate in the last stretch. He had three main arguments in his campaign. The first was the failure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s 2023 goals and objectives. Turkey was supposed to enter the top 10 economies in the world. Turkey barely stays within the top 20, at 19th. What is worse, the economy has been on a downturn for the past three years. The Turkish lira has plummeted in value and inflation has reached as high as 85.5%. Kilicdaroglu has pointed to the high price of onion and potatoes as a symbol of economic crisis and worsening cost of living for many Turks. The second is the increasing reputation of nepotism, corruption and wasteful government spending, which has been long criticised by many segments of Turkish society. Mismanagement of the government were widely criticised immediately after the February 2023 earthquake, delivering further a blow to Erdogan and his government. Finally, Kilictaroglu tried to present a new vision for the electorate. He announced a four-step reform program that would make Turkey ● more democratic● more productive, with investment in agriculture and industry● a social state with services● able to sustain these reforms. What was Erdogan’s election strategy?Unfortunately for Kilicdaroglu, his message could not be heard by all voters, especially those in small towns and rural areas who primarily rely on conventional media of TV and newspapers. As a result, he won the majority vote in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, but Erdogan was in front in inland areas and smaller cities. A key strategy for Erdogan is controlling the Turkish media. Turkey has one of the highest rates of detained and jailed journalists in the world – in fact, it is second only to China. During April, Erdogan received more than 33 hours of airtime on the state-run TRT channel. Kilicdaroglu had just 32 minutes. The incumbent government’s job was relatively easier. Erdogan was the natural candidate for the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led People’s Alliance. Ultra nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) has been supporting the AKP government since 2015. The alliance also included several minor religious and nationalist parties. The ruling block had three main arguments against the opposition. First was the secular history of CHP, established by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and now led by Kilicdaroglu. In the 1990’s, CHP was the leading defender of the headscarf (hijab) ban for women. Erdogan argued if Kilicdaroglu became president, religious Muslims in Turkey would lose their freedoms gained in the past two decades under his rule. Second was Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi religious identity. Alevism is a branch of Shi’a Islam followed by about 5-10% of Turks within a largely Sunni nation. The Erdogan camp was hoping the Sunni majority would not relate to Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi orientation. Third was the accusation that Kilicdaroglu would collude with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK, the Kurdish separatist organisation that was responsible for many terrorist activities in Turkey. The extreme implication was that Kilicdaroglu would divide the country along Turkish and Kurdish lines, a charge vehemently denied by Kilicdaroglu. It seems the fear mongering strategy against Kilicdaroglu worked, and Erdogan will go to the runoff election ahead of his rival. What is likely to happen next? Erdogan, nevertheless, has been wounded. If 50+% gives political legitimacy, and Erdogan is the incumbent president, he lost some legitimacy by receiving less than 50% of the votes last weekend. The Turkish media will play a key role in the next two weeks. They are in a conundrum. They cannot be too critical of Erdogan and support Kilicdaroglu for fear of a post-election crackdown if Erdogan wins. But they would also not want to be seen as too supportive of the Erdogan government in case Kilicdaroglu wins the election. Erdogan will have no qualms about putting excessive pressure on the media, and that may be sufficient to tip the election in his favour. Kilicdaroglu will have a chance to face Erdogan, with no other opposition candidate, in an electoral duel. If he is able to appeal to people who did not vote for Erdogan, he may pull off a narrow win. His strategy will be to call for all voters to turn up and vote if they do not want another five year’s of Erdogan rule and economic hardship.

In China-brokered talks, the two oil-rich and rival states of Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to restore diplomatic relations after a seven-year split. Although the two sides need much confidence-building, their rapprochement carries the potential to change the regional geopolitical landscape at the cost of concerns for policy hawks in the US and Israel. The longstanding Iranian–Saudi sectarian and geopolitical rivalry has been a major source of tension and conflict in the Persian Gulf region. Traditionally, whereas Iran has sought to project itself as the guardian of Shia Islam, Saudi Arabia has claimed the leadership of Sunni Islam. Both have also competed for regional geopolitical supremacy. They have been involved, in opposition to one another, in some of the conflict-ridden flashpoints in the region, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Fearing Iran’s nuclear program and regarding the country as a regional threat, the traditionally US-backed Saudi Arabia has opened backdoor diplomatic channels with Iran’s other US-allied regional foe, Israel, and supported the normalisation of relations between some of its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, in particular) with the Jewish state in an anti-Iran front. In response, Iran has forged close ties with Russia and China. The Saudi execution of a prominent Shia cleric and Iranians’ storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran resulted in Riyadh cutting ties with Tehran in early 2016. However, the regional picture has lately changed for the two protagonists. Despite being under severe American sanctions and beset by public protests since September 2022, the Iranian Islamic regime has managed to maintain its regional influence in the Levant—the area stretching from Iraq to Lebanon—as well as Yemen and has made a show of its military strength by supplying Russia with deadly drones in the Ukraine conflict. Saudi Arabia hasn’t been able either to rebuff the Iranian influence or to maintain its historical trust of the US as a very reliable ally, especially in the wake of America’s inability to rein in Iran and to avoid defeat in Afghanistan. It has increasingly found it in its interest to diversify its foreign relations, forging closer relations with the very powers with which Iran has established camaraderie, most importantly China. The kingdom’s young de facto ruler Mohammad bin Salman has viewed this diversification as not only signalling his dissatisfaction with Washington’s criticism of his alleged human rights violations, but also aiding him with realising his vision to make Saudi Arabia a regional superpower by 2030. For this, he wants to reduce the country’s dependence on hydrocarbon as a source of wealth; expand its economy, trade and inflow of investment and high-tech industry; and change its social and cultural landscape, though not its authoritarian politics. He has found the Chinese model more appealing in this respect. Beijing could not be more pleased with the Iranian–Saudi rapprochement under its diplomatic auspices. It constitutes a major step, along with the recent peace proposal for Ukraine, in Beijing’s global diplomatic offensives to raise China’s credentials as a peacemaker through a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states on the world stage. The underlying message is to present the US as an interventionist ‘warmonger’ power. In addition, it paves the way for China’s deeper and wider economic and trade ties in a region from which it imports some 40% of its annual oil needs. These developments can only be unsettling for the US and Israel, both of which regard any regional easing on Iran, especially with China’s support, as contrary to their interests. The US wants to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program, regional influence and handling of recent domestic unrest, headed by Iranian women against theocratic restrictions and declining standards of living. It is also not keen to see Saudi Arabia tilt towards the very powers that the US seeks to contain. Israel regards Iran’s Islamic regime as an existential threat and has vowed to do whatever it takes to prevent it from becoming a military nuclear power. The two sides have been locked in a shadow war for some time. Israel has frequently attacked Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, assassinated several of the country’s nuclear scientists and raided its ships. In a more daring act, recently it directly attacked defence installations in Isfahan where Iranian nuclear facilities are located. In turn, Iran has targeted Israeli ships, intelligence and diplomatic personnel, and has promised to retaliate against any hostile Israeli action. Israel and Iran have at times come very close to serious blows. Any direct confrontation between them could have devastating consequences for the region and beyond. Having said that, it’s also important to be reminded that China has good cooperative diplomatic, security and intelligence relations with Israel. Can we expect Beijing to step in there as well to bring about a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, where the US has failed? Most likely not, given Israel’s intransigence not to give up its occupation and America’s unwavering strategic backing of it.

Countries across the Middle East have engaged in an unprecedented pattern of reconciliation to protect their interests amid fluctuations in the international order. But without deliberate international support, these new ties can easily unravel. On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced their intention to restore diplomatic relations over a two-month period, in a deal brokered by China. Riyadh’s reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad in Syria is also underway, and its behind-the-scenes engagement with Israel has increased. This rapprochement with Iran and other regional efforts matter because they shed light on a significant region-wide trend of de-escalation that has been underway since the resumption of high-level UAE–Iran relations in 2019. In the wake of geopolitical tensions and distraction, it also marks a shift towards direct Middle East regional conflict management which – should it last – is a first for countries in the region. Driven by a combination of conflict fatigue, COVID-19, a focus on economic security, continued concern over declining US engagement, and increased geopolitical competition, states across the Middle East have engaged in an unprecedented pattern of reconciliation to protect their interests amid fluctuations in the international order. New US priorities on regional security A key driver of this new approach is certainly connected to regional perceptions of inconsistent US security support. This sentiment is not new but has been mounting since the Obama administration articulated new US priorities directed towards China and Russia. The Trump and Biden administrations both continued this policy and demonstrated similar signs of distraction when the US withdrew from Afghanistan while calling on its partners in the Middle East to share the burden of regional security. The outpouring of Western support for Ukraine while little is being done to stem threats from Iran has further confirmed a perception across the Middle East that US support is declining, despite continued assurances by US policymakers. Countries in the region have also realised that confrontation with Iran has not only failed to deliver the desired results but has also exposed them to economic vulnerabilities. For the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular, the June 2019 attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the September 2019 attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure caused a change in thinking. Moreover, multiple rounds of domestic protests and maximum pressure international sanctions have also failed to get Iran to adjust its regional posture or reduce support for regional proxy groups. Reaching out to Iran was an opportunity to hedge against further attacks and directly manage, rather than outsource, their security. Five rounds of bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, organized by Iraq, sought to stabilize tensions. While these discussions stalled due to the stalemate over the JCPOA and ongoing protests in Iran, they paved the way for Beijing’s intervention. This has led to an unprecedented wave of diplomatic contact and subsequent outreach across the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been particularly involved in efforts to put out regional fires. Abu Dhabi has taken the lead in engaging with Tehran, Ankara and Damascus, with Riyadh following closely behind. Notably, the UAE’s National Security Adviser Tahnoun bin Zayed – the country’s brightest spark – has led the way and proven to be an adept tactician by dousing, if not completely extinguishing, the flames. Abu Dhabi also made a bold move in signing the Abraham Accords with Israel in September 2020. Although the two countries had long-established relations behind the scenes, formalizing its relationship with Israel allowed Abu Dhabi to rapidly advance its goals in finance, technology, healthcare, education and defence. Although Abu Dhabi signing the accords was conditional on Israel not annexing parts of the West Bank, it managed to bypass the centrality of Palestine as the region’s most pressing challenge. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia will continue to backchannel with Israel, but will only normalize under the right conditions and with the right incentives. The normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran marks the formal end of seven years of heightened tensions and could have important consequences for the war in Yemen, Iran’s role in the region and regional stability more broadly. While the move is unlikely to lead to a major reset in regional relations – and Beijing’s capacity to remain involved is unclear – it has given rise to a pause in which some advances could be made. Although Yemen is a difficult nut to crack, a significant step toward a longer-term truce is being negotiated. Underpinning the ceasefire and dampening down cross-border activity would provide Saudi Arabia with some respite and lessen Iran’s frustration with Iran International and other Saudi-funded broadcasters hostile to the Iranian regime. Bahrain is expected to follow Riyadh’s lead and resume dialogue with Tehran. More productive examples include the end of the Qatar crisis. The 2021 Saudi-led Al-Ula agreement led to a significant reset of GCC ties following the 2017 blockade of Qatar. In this instance, Riyadh demonstrated its appetite for fresh foreign policy interventions and, with the backing of Kuwait, rode a little roughshod over UAE and Bahrain sensibilities – all in the name of lowering regional temperatures. A knock-on effect of warming Saudi-Qatar ties has been the strengthening of ties between Egypt and Qatar, which hit an all-time low following Sisi’s seizure of power in 2013. Relations between Qatar and Bahrain have also been restored. In other words, the change in regional environment has allowed states locked in combat – both literally and metaphorically – to lay down their arms and start a dialogue. Restoring ties with Syria and ending long rivalries Elsewhere, the UAE has taken the lead in restoring Arab state ties with the Assad regime in Syria, with Jordan in lockstep. Although this is a step-by-step process, news that Saudi Arabia will soon open its consulate in Damascus suggests that normalization – despite US and EU sanctions – is well underway. In fact, states including Egypt are showing willingness to restore Syria to the Arab League and are expected to invite Assad to attend the 2023 Arab League summit. Although it is unlikely that Gulf Arab states will bankroll Syria’s reconstruction – they are much too canny for that – they will support early recovery, on the condition that Assad curtails the Captagon trade to the Gulf. Meanwhile, the March 2022 reconciliation between Turkey and the UAE, followed by a similar rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, has formally ended a decade-long rivalry. This has been followed by a restoration of Turkey-Israel relations, while a reconciliation between Turkey and Egypt is also underway. This pattern of de-escalation is indeed a significant shift away from the confrontation that has dominated Middle East politics since the Arab Spring. For the time being though, the range and diversity of new alignments should not be seen as anything more than a pattern of hedging to manage the geopolitical juggling between the US, Russia and China. Moreover, these shifts cannot solve entrenched mistrust or dust off the tensions built up during the past decade of regional competition. Rather, they should be seen as deliberate recalibrations aimed at conflict management and reducing economic vulnerability. Only with time and sustained political investment can this de-escalation turn into meaningful change and a true regional reset. But without deliberate international support, these new ties can easily unravel.

Chinese mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran potentially signals paradigm shifts in Middle Eastern diplomacy and alliances.  The mediation suggests a more productive approach than that of the United States by seeking to manage rather than resolve conflicts based on principles enunciated by China in 2021. The successful mediation between the Middle East’s foremost archrivals also indicates it could lead to a broader regional détente. Sources in Bahrain said the Shiite-majority Gulf state ruled by a Sunni Muslim minority might be on the verge of restoring diplomatic relations with Iran. The sources said Bahrain and Iran were already exchanging messages. Long at the forefront of disputes between Iran and various Gulf states, Bahrain would be the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member without formal relations with the Islamic republic when Riyadh and Tehran exchange ambassadors in accordance with the agreement negotiated by China. The GCC groups Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. In what looks like a possible second wave of détente in the Middle East, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan could be next in line. In the first wave, Saudi Arabia and the UAE buried their hatchets with Qatar and Turkey; the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco established diplomatic relations with Israel; and Israel and Turkey patched up their differences. To be sure, the dialing down of tensions without parties making major political concessions and the revival of economic ties meant countries were no longer showing their fangs. Instead, they put their differences on ice. Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to be travelling down the same road. The two countries agreed to no longer show their fangs, with the kingdom allegedly promising to stop funding media and groups opposed to the regime in Tehran. In return, Iran  reportedly pledged to help end the eight-year-long war in Yemen and prevent Houthi rebels from striking at targets in Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denied that Yemen had been discussed in Beijing. At the same time, the agreement appears to have potentially put a monkey wrench in geopolitical maneuvering by Israel and various Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. It also may spark new cleavages and exasperate existing ones. The agreement has dampened Israeli and US hopes of a united Saudi-Emirati-Israeli front against Iran that could risk a military confrontation. Moreover, Saudi Arabia will likely have been fortified in its resolve to establish formal relations with the Jewish state only when there is a solution to the Palestinian problem. In a sign of the times, Saudi Arabia this week prevented Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen from attending a UN World Tourism Organisation conference in the kingdom by refusing to discuss security arrangements for the visit. Mr. Cohen’s attendance would have been a Cabinet-level Israeli official’s first public visit to the kingdom. While the timing may have been coincidental, the agreement put a reported Emirati decision to stop purchasing Israeli military equipment in a larger context. Israeli media reports said the decision had been prompted by Israel’s domestic political crisis, which raised doubts about Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s ability to control his far-right, ultra-nationalist, and ultra-religious coalition partners. The UAE has forged close economic and security ties with Israel since establishing diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, together with Bahrain and Morocco. Last month, Israel and the UAE unveiled a jointly developed unmanned surveillance, reconnaissance, and mine-detecting vessel. Ali Shamkani, the Iranian national security official who negotiated the deal with Saudi Arabia in Beijing, was in the UAE this week to meet President Mohammed bin Zayed. The Emirates has been out front in reaching out to Iran in recent years. The Saudi and Emirati moves prompted Efraim Halevy, the former head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency and a long-time dove, to wonder aloud whether Israel, too, should reach out to Iran. “This should be the moment for Israel to analyze the situation and, inter alia, to determine whether this is an opportune moment to launch a very careful positive probe in the direction of Tehran,” Mr. Halevy opined in an article in Haaretz, Israel’s foremost liberal newspaper. In a twist of irony, the UAE halt to Israeli arms acquisitions makes a Saudi recognition of Israel any time soon even less likely. Even so, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement appears to have energized an emerging cleavage between the kingdom and the UAE, onetime allies who increasingly are becoming economic and political competitors. The cleavage has prompted the UAE to suddenly speed up the gradual normalisation of relations with Qatar, two years after the lifting in 2021 of the Emirati-Saudi-led diplomatic and economic boycott of the Gulf state because of its alleged ties to Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Together with Bahrain, the UAE has, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, been slow in injecting warmth into the normalisation. That appears to have changed. In the last week, the UAE reportedly withdrew its bid to host the 2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting and said it would support Qatar as a potential host instead. The UAE also unblocked Qatari news websites it had blocked during the boycott. These include the Al Jazeera television network, the London-based  The New Arab newspaper, and the state-run Qatar News Agency. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, which like the UAE, has designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, appears to be cautiously reviving ties to figures allegedly associated with the Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has long been more ambivalent towards the Brotherhood, a particular bete noir of the UAE. Prominent British Muslims, whom conservative members of the Muslim community and other conservative groups accuse of having links to Islamist organisations, including the Brotherhood, earlier this month were invited to a two-day conference in London hosted by Mohammed al-Issa, the secretary general of the Muslim World League. The conservative critics took exception to an allegedly prominent role given at the conference for British and European Muslim leaders to the Muslim Council of Britain, an organisation that has been blacklisted for much of the past 14 years by successive British governments. The government refuses to engage with the Council because its then deputy director-general called in 2009 for violence against Israel and condoned attacks on the Royal Navy if it tried to intercept arms for Hamas, the Islamist group controlling Gaza, from being smuggled into the Strip. A widely respected British academic described the blacklisting as “a political decision from the rightwing” that lacked evidence. He said the allegations of Islamist connections were “off the mark” and that “the current Secretary General is a wholly different generation than that of the past.” The intellectual further noted that the government had reengaged with the Council for a period before again blackballing the group. “The current secretary-general was basically a child when all of this happened but is still being clobbered over the head with it. It’s a double standard, no such rigour of past connections exists around other representative groups,” the academic said. Since coming to office, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has converted the Muslim World League into the propagator of his autocratic form of Islam that is socially more liberal, politically repressive, and demands absolute obedience to the ruler. Once a Brotherhood stronghold, the League was a major global funder of erstwhile Saudi religious ultra-conservatism for more than 60 years since its founding in 1962. Notwithstanding Mr. Bin Salman’s repositioning, sources privy to the League’s inner workings suggest members of the Brotherhood remain influential and on the organisation’s payroll. “The old guard is still very much present,” one source said. “There is a bit of a schism in Saudi, and some of the younger anti-Brotherhood guard can’t believe how the Muslim World League is operating,” added another who follows the group closely. Saudi Arabia’s state-aligned Al Arabiya television network reported from Cairo days before the London conference that exiled offspring of prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers were restructuring the group in Europe and the United States. An article on the network’s website critical of the Brotherhood warned the activists were recruiting among Arabs in the West. It asserted that they also sought to “infiltrate’ human rights groups. A third source with close ties to the kingdom argued that “the question is whether the Muslim World League only restructured to meet the new Muslim Brotherhood generation in the West. They seem to say one thing to some people and something different to others.”

Last week’s surprise two-and-a-half-hour visit to Amman by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, where he met King Abdullah for the first time in almost five years, is a significant diplomatic victory for the kingdom. The visit happened due to the United States’ pressure on Netanyahu and a few days after White House National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, was in Israel and the West Bank.  Sources say that CIA Director William Burns was also in the region before Israel’s raid into the Jenin refugee camp on Thursday and played a crucial role in facilitating the Netanyahu-Abdullah meeting. A day before Netanyahu arrived in Amman, accompanied by the chief of Israeli intelligence, sources confirmed that the heads of intelligence bodies of several Arab and Gulf countries were also in Amman.  According to Israeli sources, Netanyahu reiterated his commitment to honoring the historical and legal status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque. This came after weeks of rising tensions between the Netanyahu-led newly-formed far-right government and Jordan. A day after the new Israeli government was sworn in early January, Israel’s new Minister of National Security, the ultra-nationalist Itamar Ben Gvir, made a short tour of the Aqsa compound, eliciting  Jordanian, Arab, and international denunciation.  Jordan has been bracing for a confrontation with the new Israeli government since Netanyahu won the elections last October and began negotiating with far-right politicians to form a coalition. King Abdullah and Netanyahu had sparred over Israeli breaches of Aqsa for years, and it is no secret that the Jordanian monarch does not trust the veteran Israeli premier. A few days before Netanyahu’s government took office, King Abdullah told CNN that he was prepared for conflict should the status of Jerusalem’s holy sites change. He expressed concern that “Israel is trying to push for changes to his custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in occupied East Jerusalem, warning that he has “red lines” and that “if people want to push those red lines, then we will deal with that.” The most dangerous escalation occurred on January 17 when Israeli police blocked a routine visit by Jordan’s ambassador to Tel Aviv to the Aqsa. He was later allowed but not before a diplomatic crisis got out of hand. While Israel claimed it was a misunderstanding, Jordan viewed the incident as setting a dangerous precedent. Here, the king called for the support of Jordan’s allies in the Gulf, Europe, and the United States. It is believed that Jordan was certain that the next provocation, which would be the most critical, needed to be pre-empted. This was when the US stepped in, putting pressure on Netanyahu to visit Amman and pledge to honor the status quo. Brinkmanship For King Abdullah, further escalation at the Aqsa would push both sides to adopt a policy of brinkmanship whose outcome would be disastrous. Facing mounting economic challenges at home, a crisis at Aqsa would force the king to take drastic measures. His “red lines” could go as far as suspending the peace treaty with Israel. However, that would open a political Pandora’s Box. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a signatory to the Abraham Accords, has stood firmly by King Abdullah during the recent crisis. The UAE stands with Jordan on two basic premises – its support for the two-state solution and status quo for Aqsa. Several analysts had noticed that the royal court statement, released following the meeting, did not mention the Hashemite custodianship. However, it underlined the need to observe Aqsa’s historical status quo. Some argue that the legal and historical status quo, which goes back to the late 19th century and has been observed by the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and later by Israel, makes it legally impossible for Israel to disregard. The Hashemite custodianship, referred to as “a special role” in the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty, is less precise. According to another view, Jordan wants to ensure that responsibility for maintaining the status quo at Aqsa is not restricted to Jordan alone but is an international commitment. While Ben Gvir vowed to repeat his Aqsa breaches a day after the Amman meeting – saying only Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Temple Mount – it is believed that Netanyahu, at least for now, will avoid further provocations with Jordan. All eyes will be on the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s ongoing visit to the region. He is expected to underline support for Jordan’s custodianship and the status quo understanding at Aqsa.

On November 26, 2022, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, approved a parliamentary resolution of November 18 to open an embassy in Israel. This decision corrects the existing asymmetry: notwithstanding the close relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, and in spite of the existence of an Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan since 1993, Baku had no embassy in Israel. Azerbaijan’s decision to open an embassy in Israel was accompanied by a decision to open a representative office in Ramallah. There are three reasons for the Baku decision. The first is Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenia in 2020. During the war and according to the agreements that concluded it, Azerbaijan liberated seven regions adjoining Nagorno-Karabakh that had been under Armenian control since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also gained control over parts of the region. In the past, Baku was concerned that opening an embassy in Israel would arouse criticism among Arabs and Muslims, leading to anti-Azerbaijan votes in international forums, but in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War Baku achieved a decisive victory and is therefore less in need of support in the political arena. For its part, Armenia opened an embassy in Israel in 2020. Another important catalyst for the decision was the signing of the Abraham Accords and normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel last August. These developments make full diplomatic relations between Israel and a Muslim country far more acceptable than previously. Today, more than a dozen Muslim countries have full diplomatic relations with Israel, some with a high public profile. In the context of Arab Gulf states, Azerbaijan also has close relations with the United Arab Emirates. Baku’s decision also comes against the background of the growing tension between Azerbaijan and Iran. Over the last three decades, because of the large Azeri population in Iran (around 15-20 percent of the population, according to various estimates), and concerns in Iran over separatist ambitions among the Azeri minority, Tehran supported Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, although it officially declared neutrality. Moreover, Iran also covertly supports the Hussainiyoun Brigades, an organization that is opposed to the regime in Baku, although it is also careful about maintaining close ties with the Azerbaijani authorities. Tehran for its part takes a negative view of Baku’s cooperation with Jerusalem and with Washington, and has expressed this openly and explicitly.  As Iran sees it, closer relations between Israel and Azerbaijan give Israel an opportunity to expand its presence and influence in the spheres of security and intelligence, including the use of territory in Azerbaijan for Israeli activity against targets in Iran. Indeed, the outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War increased tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan because it extended their common border. Baku also has reservations about Iranian policy, particularly following the opening in October this year of the Iranian consulate in Kapan, a town located in the southernmost district of Armenia. The location of the new consulate is perceived as problematic since Azerbaijan hopes to reach an agreement with Armenia and Russia to establish the Zangezur Corridor transport route, which will enable unimpeded access from Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave, which is part of Azerbaijan. In addition, Iran’s recent military exercise along the border with Azerbaijan was deemed a threatening message to Baku. This exercise follows the exercise held last year, which was the first time since Azerbaijan’s independence that Iran carried out a military exercise along their shared border. Moreover, an Iranian spy network was captured in Azerbaijan in November. In the past there were similar cases of Iranian subversion in Azerbaijan, as well as attempts to strike at Israeli and Jewish targets in the country. Yet despite all these subversive activities, Tehran did not manage to obstruct the defense cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan or the opening of the Azerbaijan embassy in Israel.  Over the years, the leading components of the relations between Israel and Azerbaijan were the import of oil from Azerbaijan (about 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports) and the export from Israeli defense industries to Azerbaijan, as well as their cooperation on intelligence matters. Recently, with the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan began exporting grain to Israel, while an Israeli company is involved in the desalination facility in the Caspian Sea. In addition, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, some 50,000 Israeli tourists travelled to Azerbaijan each year, and Baku hopes that this number will increase. As a preliminary step to opening the embassy in Israel, in 2021 Baku opened a trade office in Israel, indicating its intention to broaden the economic cooperation between the countries. In 2020 the volume of civilian trade between Israel and Azerbaijan (excluding oil) was about $200 million. Azerbaijan is also proud that it has one of the largest Jewish communities in a Muslim country (estimates range from 15,000-30,000) and boasts of many years of religious tolerance. The Azeri community in Israel, numbering 50,000-70,000 people, is also an important bridge between the two countries.  Relations with Azerbaijan are likewise important in the context of Israel-Turkey relations. Over the years, the United States has encouraged the three countries to cooperate, and inter alia, Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel run through Turkey. The fact that both Ankara and Jerusalem are perceived as important allies of Baku and that Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War is attributed in part to the assistance received from these two countries were among the factors that contributed to the warmer relations between Turkey and Israel over the past year. Azerbaijan President Aliyev tried to mediate between Jerusalem and Ankara to normalize their relations after the crisis in 2018. Significantly, in spite of the tensions between Israel and Turkey over the past decade, Baku’s relations with Israel have not cooled – on the contrary, they have grown stronger. However, the Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle also embodies the potential for competition: Israeli and Turkish defense industries compete with each other, and this competition is likely to become more intense as Turkey’s defense industry develops more advanced products.  Support for relations between Israel and Azerbaijan crosses party lines in Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, expected to become the next prime minister, visited Azerbaijan twice as Israel’s Prime Minister – in 1997 and 2016. His visit in 2016 is particularly memorable, since at that time President Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had so far purchased military systems from Israel worth $5 billion. During the visit Netanyahu said that changes were evident in many parts of the Muslim world, and particularly in Arab states, “But I think if they want to see what the future could be, come to Azerbaijan and see the friendship and the partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan.” These words can take on added significance with the opening of Azerbaijan’s embassy in Israel, which can be interpreted as an outgrowth of the Abraham Accords.  Azerbaijan has been an important partner for Israel in recent decades as a reliable supplier of energy and in terms of security. The opening of the embassy in Israel is a welcome step from Jerusalem’s perspective, reflecting the potential to expand relations to additional fields as well. At the same time, Azerbaijan, like other countries with a Muslim majority, is sensitive to the Palestinian issue, and it is therefore not surprising that the move toward Jerusalem is accompanied by a move toward Ramallah. Turkey is also important in the context of relations between Jerusalem and Baku, and developments in relations between Ankara and Jerusalem could impact on decision making in Baku, although as the past decade has shown, they do not have decisive impact. For that reason, although relations between Jerusalem and Baku have strengths of their own, and in spite of the secular nature of Azerbaijan, they should not be considered as disconnected from Israel’s relations with the rest of the Muslim world.