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The recent conflict between Iran and Israel, irrespective of its military and security ramifications, marks the genesis of a new phase in Iran’s engagement with the world. This has the potential not only to alter the regional balance but also to redefine the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program, its sanctions regime, and its diplomatic capacities. While many anticipated that this confrontation would escalate political and economic pressures on Iran, certain strategic realities and diplomatic indicators suggest that, conversely, this crisis might initiate a recalibration in international policy concerning Iran. Ostensibly, the Western alliance continues to voice concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. However, at deeper levels, the question arises: if Iran’s key nuclear facilities have been targeted and completely obliterated, what justification remains for continuing “maximum pressure“? Does this situation, despite its inherent difficulties, not present an opportunity for Iran to enter a new phase of diplomatic play without explicitly signaling retreat? A phase where novel tools, such as collaboration with third countries, the strategic use of silence, and intelligent avoidance of direct negotiation, could supersede the exhaustive path of the past. This analysis endeavors to present a clear and comprehensive picture of the sanctions landscape, the outlook for a potential agreement, and innovative diplomatic avenues for Iran post-conflict. The central question is whether Iran can leverage this crisis into an opportunity to restore its economic and strategic standing, or if the post-conflict environment will merely exacerbate the challenges in its engagement with the world. To begin with, the logic of sanctions has always rested on a simple principle: to generate pressure for behavioral change. However, this logic is deemed effective only when the sanctioned entity retains maneuverability or the motivation to resist. Now, following an attack that the U.S. claims to have inflicted on sensitive parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a clear contradiction has emerged in Western sanctions policy: if Iran is no longer capable of quickly returning to a high level of nuclear activity, what is the meaning and justification for continuing a policy of maximum pressure? From the perspective of independent observers, this juncture could represent a strategic rupture. Maximum pressure is justifiable when Iran is on an escalating trajectory with its nuclear program and the technical balance of power is shifting in Tehran’s favor. However, if, as claimed by the opposing side, Iran’s nuclear capability has been set back, then maintaining the sanctions structure would be less an instrument of foreign policy and more an indication of the aimlessness and inertia within the U.S. policymaking apparatus. Under such circumstances, some circles in Tehran speak of the necessity of adopting “intelligent silence.” This approach, instead of sharp reactions or widespread propaganda, relies on leveraging strategic ambiguity and granting itself time. This is particularly relevant if conditions arise where the West, to maintain the appearance of their operation’s success, is compelled to temporarily halt or alleviate pressures. In this scenario, Iran, without abandoning its principled positions, could create space for a recalibration of international actors’ behavior. The critical point is that sanctions are effective only when dynamically linked to a specific objective. If the goal was to alter nuclear behavior, and that behavior is now contained, then the continuation of sanctions is not a tool of statecraft but a sign of the absence of an alternative strategy. Iran can exploit this contradiction, provided it accurately comprehends the changing strategic landscape and avoids falling into the trap of hasty reactions. Building on this evolving dynamic, the recent conflict not only disrupted strategic calculations in Tehran and Tel Aviv but also palpably darkened the political and diplomatic atmosphere between Iran and the West. Prior to this conflict, although indirect nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. were proceeding in a fragile silence, avenues for reviving the 2015 agreement (JCPOA) were still conceivable. Now, however, following explicit military threats from the U.S. and its overt role alongside Israel, even this fragile path has been severely questioned. In Tehran, many analysts believe that the strategy of appeasement and cautious engagement with the West regarding the nuclear dossier requires reconsideration. The recent military threats posed by Washington and its allies, more than being psychological pressure, carried an operational message—a message that effectively put those political elites in Iran who had always dismissed Western threats as mere rhetoric into a position of weakness. It is now acknowledged that complete disregard for threats can be costly for the country. Consequently, the decision-making discourse in Tehran has undergone a new realism: neither complete appeasement nor hasty confrontation; rather, the management of the balance between threat and opportunity. Nevertheless, direct negotiation with the U.S. remains a red line that is rooted not only in domestic politics but also intrinsically linked to Iran’s strategic prestige. On the other hand, the Trump administration faces domestic challenges and electoral constraints and does not wish to enter a process, on the eve of elections, that could be interpreted by its domestic opponents as “conceding to Tehran.” This is particularly true given that the recent conflict has created a more aggressive image of Iran in Western public opinion, an image that significantly complicates the space for flexible diplomacy. Given this diplomatic deadlock, traditional options are practically defunct. Neither the Vienna path is effective, nor do the Omani or Qatari channels operate with the same ease as before. Therefore, either innovative models must be considered—or it must be accepted that the agreement, in its previous form, has reached a historical dead end, and the time has come for a new architectural approach to engagement. One such idea is the adoption of a “third-party commitment” model, which could resolve part of the nuclear and sanctions crisis without requiring a direct agreement with the U.S. In this model, Iran could entrust a portion of its nuclear technical and supervisory commitments, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, to regional third countries such as Qatar, Oman, or Saudi Arabia. These countries, which maintain more balanced relations with Washington, could act as guarantors of these commitments and, simultaneously, negotiate with the U.S. government for specific sanctions waivers to facilitate economic and banking cooperation with Iran. For instance, Tehran could agree with Saudi Arabia or Qatar that part of the oversight process for enrichment or peaceful nuclear activities would be pursued through structures supervised by these countries or joint regional bodies. In return, these countries could receive licenses from the U.S. Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to participate in energy, banking, or transportation projects with Iran. This model, while circumventing the political sensitivities of direct negotiation, could provide a limited breathing space for Iran’s economy at the technical and executive levels. Another advantage of this approach is the strengthening of Iran’s regional position through the institutionalization of cooperation with its neighbors. Such a model transforms Iran’s image from a threatening actor to a cooperative partner, and effectively, contrary to Israel’s narrative, leaves the path open for regional dialogue. Evidently, this model is not without challenges, including Iran’s need to gain the trust of these countries, provide sufficient technical and legal guarantees, and prevent Israeli maneuvering aimed at disrupting this process. However, in the current circumstances, “third-party commitment” is one of the few options that can overcome the current impasse without imposing the heavy costs of a direct agreement. To fully grasp the broader diplomatic calculus, one must look beyond regional conflicts and into the structural shifts within global geopolitics. For a precise analysis of U.S. sanctions and diplomatic behavior towards Iran, it is insufficient to focus solely on military skirmishes or rhetorical threats. Official and semi-official U.S. foreign policy documents in recent years clearly indicate that Washington’s strategic priority is not Iran, nor even the Middle East, but rather containing China in global competition. This prioritization has created a divergence between verbal threats and the actual U.S. willingness for military engagement or even sustained maximum pressure. Although Washington symbolically and periodically sided with Tel Aviv in the recent Iran-Israel conflict, it was never eager for direct military involvement. In fact, many American analysts warned that drawing the U.S. into a new war in the Middle East would divert the country’s strategic focus from containing China, controlling Taiwan, and technological-economic competition with East Asia. In this vein, the Trump administration—contrary to the traditional perception of its aggressive policy—is disinclined towards costly and protracted wars in the Middle East. Even during his first term as president, he emphasized the withdrawal of troops from the region, reducing foreign expenditures, and focusing on the domestic economy. Therefore, although his policy towards Iran appears more hostile on the surface, in practice, he might prefer an option for managing tension without war; a model that could include maximum economic pressure, occasional threats, and perhaps even a show negotiation, but not direct engagement. Taken together, these factors—shifting U.S. priorities, regional recalibrations, and tactical innovation—suggest that the recent Iran-Israel conflict was a turning point that not only impacted the regional security balance but also provided an opportunity to revisit the path of sanctions, diplomacy, and nuclear policies. Contrary to popular belief, this war may have transformed into a saturation point in the West’s sanctions logic, rather than merely an excuse to intensify pressure—a point where continued pressure, without a clear objective, amounts to strategic self-sabotage. On the other hand, Trump’s return to power, with all its sharp and symbolic implications, conceals a contradictory reality: this president might be less inclined than any of his predecessors to engage in a costly war in the Middle East. The prioritization of China, domestic economy, and Trump’s transactional approach all indicate that Iran can utilize the existing environment to design a new path, one that does not necessarily lead to a classic agreement, but rather to smart tension management through informal and regionally focused tools. In this context, initiatives such as third-party commitments, leveraging neighbors’ capacities to reduce pressure, and pursuing a policy of strategic silence and ambiguity can enable Iran to redefine its economic and diplomatic trajectory – and to do so without retreat, without costly negotiations, and without falling into the trap of zero-sum games. However, success on this path requires several fundamental preconditions: (1) a precise understanding of strategic changes in the US; (2) realism in confronting new threats without succumbing to emotional reactions; (3) intelligent coordination among domestic decision-making bodies; and finally (4) revival of Iran’s economic and regional diplomatic capacity with the aim of exploiting limited but important opportunities. Ultimately, the fundamental question is not whether a grand agreement is imminent or if sanctions will be lifted overnight. The question is whether Iran, at this historical juncture, can calmly, precisely, and with an integrated view of security, economy, and diplomacy, transform the crisis into a platform for recalibrating its role in the regional and global order. The answer to this question depends not merely on external developments, but on the will and initiative within Iran. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

Sara Duterte’s visit to Australia marks a bold attempt to internationalise her father’s legal battle with the ICC, using diaspora diplomacy to challenge human rights mechanisms. Her campaign raises serious questions about how states like Australia should respond when populist leaders seek to undermine international legal norms from foreign soil. In a near two-hour speech before a crowd of supporters in Melbourne, embattled Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte (herein Sara) called on the Filipino community to “convince” the Australian government to “look into the case” of her father, former President Rodrigo Duterte, before the International Criminal Court (ICC). During the rally, Sara publicly urged supporters to lobby the Australian government—a party to the Rome Statute. Mr Duterte is currently detained at The Hague for alleged crimes against humanity, perpetrated in the context of his bloody “War on Drugs.” Sara has seemingly embarked on a “global sympathy tour,” albeit tagged as a personal trip, to muster support for her father. At home, she fights off an impeachment trial, one which may plunge the Philippines into a constitutional crisis. The Duterte family is mobilising political resources and capital amid a crisis, with a strategy focused on building transnational support networks among loyal supporters to defend their violent legacy and deflect legal accountability. Australia is a critical stop in Sara’s roadshow. It was the first country explicitly named in news reports as a potential host for Mr Duterte as his defence team requests an interim release. Australia was her first stop after the defence made its request, prompting her to publicly deny that any formal approach had been made. Since Mr Duterte’s arrest in March, Sara has addressed overseas Filipinos in Qatar, Malaysia, and the Netherlands. There are key stakes that lie beyond Philippine domestic politics in every overseas trip she makes. In every visit, she stokes deeply emotional—and often inflammatory—appeals that challenge attitudes towards the rule of law. These may cause concern for public order, as Duterte supporters are known to be fiercely loyal, even engaging in politically trolling the ICC. Public assemblies organised around the trips have caused issues in other countries, resulting in investigations being made by host countries or the refusal of local institutions to associate with the pro-Duterte activities. Sara alluded to attempts at reaching out to Foreign Minister Penny Wong. She appealed for the fair application of rules to her father. These statements fit a pattern of invoking due process rhetoric when convenient, yet lacking genuine attempt at engaging official channels. For example, she called ICC lawyers “stupid” in attempts to undermine the investigation’s credibility, mirroring her father’s hostile attitude when he was in power. Filipino human rights defenders based in Australia have publicly condemned her visit as polarising. Domestic politics have deeply divided Filipinos back home. The visit drew prominent attention given Australia’s active role in the multilateral human rights system and adoption of a sanctions regime targeting rights violators. In urging migrant Filipinos to support her family, Sara’s speech brings to focus to an autocratic tendency in challenging human rights mechanisms. It also raises the question of whether states like Australia will be willing to act on political rhetoric from high-profile figures who undermine international norms and human rights. Observers also noted that Mr Duterte previously provoked tensions with Australia. He threatened to cut diplomatic ties in 2016 after criticism of his remarks about the rape and murder of an Australian missionary, and later ordered the deportation of Australian citizen Patricia Fox for opposing the War on Drugs. Australian officials have declined to engage Sara’s speech. Even so, her visit has roped Australia into the Dutertes’ impunity saga. The Dutertes’ recorded backlash against international legal norms—such as the former president’s withdrawal from the ICC, threatens to do the same with the UN Human Rights Council. Now, Sara’s public hostility towards the ICC prosecutor confronts the rules-based order that the Philippines and Australia commit to. Uncertainty in the international order affects Australia’s strategy on security, diplomacy, and international law, especially in light of recent strengthening of ties with the Philippines on security cooperation. Days after the visit, the ICC publicised the OTP’s opposition to Mr Duterte’s request for interim release. The OTP opposed the interim release due to flight risk. Sara’s political influence and vast network exacerbates the risk, and may help facilitate Mr Duterte’s evasion of justice. So far, Sara Duterte has made risky political moves: violent election rhetoric, assassination plots, attacking her impeachment, and evasion of congressional hearings. If she emerges unscathed, she could remain the frontrunner for the 2028 presidential race. The presidency would give her control over foreign policy. For states like Australia, ostensibly committed to the integrity of a rules-based international order, this raises questions about how they will respond to those who challenge international norms through provocative foreign engagements. This is not just about the ICC’s legitimacy or the Philippines’ politics—it is about whether international norms can withstand pressure from leaders who openly defy them.

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has been suspended following the leaking of a recording of a conversation she had with former Cambodian leader Hun Sen. The conversation was seen as a serious breach of ethics, even an act of treason, against a backdrop of tensions with Phnom Penh. The affair rekindled border tensions and exacerbated clan rivalries within the Thai government. On 2 June 2025, Thailand's Constitutional Court voted unanimously (9-0) to examine a petition filed by thirty-six senators calling for the impeachment of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. On 1 July, the court ordered her immediate suspension by seven votes to two, pending a final verdict. The leader now has 15 days to prepare her defence. Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai is now acting Prime Minister, while Paetongtarn herself has been given the portfolio of Culture, following an express reshuffle of the government. Paradoxically, this reshuffle, approved by the King, leaves the country without a Defence Minister, in the midst of a diplomatic crisis with Cambodia. The official reason for Paetongtarn's suspension? A ‘serious breach of ethics,’ following the leak of an audio recording of a private conversation between Paetongtarn and Hun Sen, Cambodia's former strongman. This diplomatic scandal is exacerbating Thailand's political crisis. It reveals the underlying tensions of a fragile system, marked by dynastic alliances, the judicialization of politics, military rivalries, and a polarized society. A leaked audio recording at the heart of the scandal Since May 2025, tensions between Thailand and Cambodia have been rising steadily, fueled by ancient border disputes inherited from the French colonial period. On 18 June, a 17-minute audio recording was made public; its broadcast appears to have been orchestrated from Phnom Penh, although it is not clear by whom. It shows the Prime Minister talking to Hun Sen, President of the Cambodian Senate and father of the current Prime Minister Hun Manet. The subject of the discussion is the sovereignty of three temples on the Thai-Cambodian border, which has been a theatre of tension for decades. Paetongtarn adopts an informal and conciliatory tone. At one point she says: ‘Uncle, please be lenient with your niece’. A little later, she adds: ‘Your Excellency Hun Sen, whatever you want, I will take care of it.’ In the call, she also criticizes the commander of Thailand's second military region, Lieutenant-General Boonsin Padklang, who is in charge of the border sector, describing him as a member of the ‘opposing camp.’ This is a worrying sign of institutional cohesion, in the context of historic mistrust between the Shinawatra clan and the military establishment. Since the recording was leaked, Paetongtarn has apologized to General Boonsin and publicly expressed her regrets to the Thai people - not for her remarks to Hun Sen, but for the leak itself, which she describes as regrettable. She justified the tone of the conversation by referring to a negotiating technique on her part. Hun Sen claims that he only shared the recording with around eighty colleagues to ‘inform’ them, without being able to identify the person who orchestrated the leak. Not a very convincing line of defence, especially as he then threatened to divulge further compromising information about Paetongtarn and his father Thaksin (former prime minister of Thailand from 2001 to 2006). The effect was immediate: a national outcry, accusations of treason and a government in crisis. The People's Party, the main opposition party and offshoot of the Move Forward Party, which was dissolved in 2024, demanded the dissolution of parliament and an early general election. The Bhumjaithai, a conservative party with its base in the Buriram region (Isan), and the second largest force in the government coalition behind the Prime Minister's Pheu Thai, announced its withdrawal from the government on 19 June - officially, in the name of national sovereignty in the face of a head of government judged incapable of responding to threats from Cambodia; unofficially, it is seeking to dissociate itself from a weakened government, in a context of rivalry over control of the strategic Ministry of the Interior. It was against this backdrop that a group of senators close to the Bhumjaithai party - nicknamed the ‘dark blues’ (the color of the Bhumjaithai party) because of their partisan allegiance - appealed to the Constitutional Court, accusing Paetongtarn of a ‘serious breach of ethics.’ In their petition, they formally called for her dismissal, arguing that her behaviour had breached the standards of probity expected of a head of government. A risky response and a threatened majority In this climate of hostility, Paetongtarn has a way out: to resign before the Constitutional Court's decision, as many politicians and analysts have urged her to do. This strategy would enable her to preserve her political future and stand for re-election at a later date. This choice is not without precedent in the Shinawatra dynasty. In 2006, her father Thaksin dissolved parliament in an attempt to defuse a political crisis but was overthrown shortly afterwards in a military coup. In 2014, her aunt Yingluck, prime minister from 2011 to 2014, adopted the same strategy: she dissolved the National Assembly before being impeached by the Constitutional Court, then overthrown in her turn by the army. These precedents partly explain why Paetongtarn seems to have ruled out this option: in the Thai political system, dissolving Parliament offers no guarantee of survival. She therefore prefers to face the verdict of a Constitutional Court perceived to be close to the royalist and military establishment, which has historically been hostile to the Shinawatras, despite the risk of political banishment. Politically, her position has become untenable. The Pheu Thai party, which she leads, has just 141 seats out of 495. Her new majority is based on a fragile coalition of around 260 seats, threatened at any time by internal divisions and power struggles. Around twenty MPs originally elected in opposition - nicknamed the ‘Cobra MPs’ for having switched sides in return for financial compensation - could provide occasional support to the government, but without guaranteeing its stability. In this context, the cabinet reshuffle is a tactical maneuver: it aims not only to reassure public opinion, but also to broaden the parliamentary base by integrating or rewarding small parties likely to join or support the coalition. And yet, neither the dissolution of the Assembly nor the holding of early elections are on the agenda. Pheu Thai hopes to have its budget adopted before October, and to avoid an electoral confrontation with the opposition represented by the People's Party, credited with 46% of voting intentions according to a NIDA poll on 29 June, compared with just 11.5% for Pheu Thai. In addition, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) is investigating several cases involving Paetongtarn: her alleged illegal ownership of shares in a luxury resort; a 2016 family transaction in which she allegedly used undated promissory notes to ‘pay’ 4.4 billion baht (around $135 million) in shares, thereby avoiding nearly 218 million baht in taxes; and her controversial handling of the 28 May border crisis, which resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier. Added to this are the court cases against his father, which could weaken the whole family, at a time when the compromises made between Pheu Thai and its former conservative adversaries seem increasingly fragile. Thaksin is on trial for the crime of lèse-majesté, following an interview he gave to a South Korean media outlet nine years ago. He is also on trial for his controversial return to Thailand in 2023: although officially sentenced to one year in prison after a royal pardon, he did not spend a single day behind bars, having been transferred to the police hospital on the first night for health reasons. This prolonged stay in a VIP room provoked considerable controversy, which was rekindled in June 2025 when a judicial enquiry was opened and several doctors were suspended by the Medical Council, against a backdrop of political pressure. History repeats itself: a court at the heart of power games Paetongtarn's suspension is one in a long series of politically biased judicial decisions. In 2024, his predecessor Srettha Thavisin, a member of Pheu Thai, was dismissed for ethical breaches after appointing a minister who had served time in prison. At the same time, as we mentioned earlier, the Move Forward Party was dissolved and its leaders banned political life for campaigning in favor of reforming the lèse-majesté law. In 2022, the Court suspended Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha for exceeding his legal term of office, before concluding in a controversial decision that his term of office had only really begun with the adoption of the new Constitution in 2017, even though he had already been leading the military government since 2014. This trend is not neutral. Judicial institutions, in particular the Constitutional Court, are regularly mobilized to neutralize figures perceived as hostile to the established order (monarchy, army, high bureaucracy). Once again, the procedure follows a well-worn pattern: acceptance of the complaint, investigation against the accused, then removal from office. It should be noted that the Bhumjaithai party was also the subject of a complaint for its alleged involvement in fraud during the 2024 senatorial elections. It was accused of having illegally financed certain candidates. The Constitutional Court unanimously rejected the application, ruling that there were no grounds for prosecution. This decision contrasts with the acceptance of the complaint against Paetongtarn, and fuels suspicions of differential treatment. Bhumjaithai is increasingly establishing itself as the new political pillar of the conservative forces. Regional maneuvers, national protests The current crisis goes well beyond the parliamentary framework. On 28 June, thousands of demonstrators gathered in Bangkok under the banner of the ‘United Front for the Defence of Thai Sovereignty’. They were led by Sondhi Limthongkul, a central figure in the Yellow Shirts movement, a royalist and ultranationalist group opposed to Shinawatra governments and one of the architects of Thaksin's overthrow in 2006. Alongside the traditional figures of the conservative right wing, there were also former allies of Thaksin who have now broken away, including Jatuporn Prompan, one of the leaders of the Red Shirts, a popular movement born in reaction to the 2006 coup. Another demonstration is scheduled for mid-August when the Constitutional Court is due to deliver its verdict. The speeches vary, but all converge on a moral formal accusation: the Prime Minister is said to have traded national interests for family benefits. While the majority are calling for change through parliamentary channels, some zealous conservatives are raising the spectre of a coup d'état. The patriotic music, the protest scarves, the whistles: everything was reminiscent of the mobilizations that preceded the most recent coup, in 2014. In the background, relations between Thailand and Cambodia are worsening, against a backdrop of territorial rivalries and political reshuffling. Officially, Phnom Penh is considering taking a border dispute over Kood Island, potentially rich in oil and gas resources, to the International Court of Justice. But many analysts see this move as part of a wider strategy to weaken the Thai government by fueling controversy over the parallel diplomacy between Thaksin Shinawatra and Hun Sen. The joint development project in this area, long discussed between the two men, now symbolizes an informal alignment that is disturbing Bangkok. It is in this context that the audio leak is a deliberate maneuver: Hun Sen is seeking to expose these links publicly, to divert attention from the internal tensions in Cambodia, and to influence the Thai political balance. This offensive can also be explained by more immediate economic interests: the legalization of casinos, promoted by Paetongtarn, and her policy of fighting cross-border criminal networks, directly threaten the Cambodian casino industry and the income of Cambodian elites based along the border. These attacks are reigniting old suspicions about the links between the Shinawatra family and Cambodia. Thaksin and Hun Sen have enjoyed a close relationship for decades, based on shared economic interests and a form of political pragmatism. When Thaksin and former prime minister Yingluck fled Thailand after the coups of 2006 and 2014, it was Hun Sen who offered them asylum. In 2008 and 2011, border tensions - particularly around the Preah Vihear temple - had already been used to portray the Shinawatras as traitors to the nation. Now, with Paetongtarn in power and Thaksin back in the fold, these accusations are resurfacing. Chronic instability and a locked political scene Paetongtarn's removal from office seems increasing but the succession options remain unclear. Her designated replacement within Pheu Thai, Chaikasem Nitisiri, is attracting reservations due to his state of health and his past stance in favor of reforming the crime of lèse-majesté. Within the coalition, other leading figures such as Pirapan and Jurin lack political clout or have been weakened by the controversy. At present, the only candidate with sufficient parliamentary clout and a degree of legitimacy seems to be Anutin Charnvirakul. But in the event of a parliamentary deadlock, former prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha could emerge as a ‘wild card’ candidate, although he would only be able to hold the post for two more years before reaching the maximum number of years allowed by the Constitution. Paetongtarn's downfall, if confirmed, will be part of a familiar cycle: leaders emerging from the ballot box are discredited by institutional mechanisms, conservative elites reorganize, the streets fill up, and the army prepares in the background. Behind the image of a generational or female revival, Paetongtarn's power rested on an architecture inherited from her father that she neither reformed nor challenged. But by seeking to navigate this system while re-imposing the influence of her family, she has rekindled tensions with the conservative elites who had done everything to exclude the Shinawatras. The challenge is less institutional than political, but she may have underestimated the resilience of the existing system. In the short term, everything depends on the decision of the Constitutional Court, expected in one- or two-months’ time. But as always in Thailand, the real negotiations do not take place in Parliament or in the public square; they take place behind the scenes, between families, factions, and interlocking interests, with the King at the head of state.

Abstract The right to freedom of expression is currently facing a global crisis unleashed by the conflict in Gaza. The conflict has led to a high polarisation of public opinion, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is facing systematic suppression worldwide. In this column, I shed light on how state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause and I consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context. The column concludes that the failure to protect the right of Palestinians to have their voices heard contributes to the erosion of our collective right to freedom of expression and has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. KeywordsFreedom of expression, Gaza, peaceful protests, media freedom, academic freedom‌, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland 1. INTRODUCTION Since 7 October 2023, the right to freedom of expression has been severely restricted worldwide. Irene Khan, current UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, has depicted the current situation as ‘a global crisis of freedom of expression’ unleashed by the conflict in Gaza.1 The threats to the exercise of this fundamental human right have been so extensive and granular that, for instance, in early October 2024, a beekeeper was fined in Italy for merely having exposed a banner at his market stall reading ‘Stop bombing Gaza – stop genocide’.2 Despite the fact that the International Court of Justice has confirmed that what we see on our screens and read about in the newspapers (which cannot even fully reflect the reality that Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank face every day) may amount to a real and imminent risk of genocide already in January 2024,3 the right to freedom of expression of Palestinian activists and their supporters is severely restricted, especially in North America and Europe. It has been commented that ‘rarely has a conflict challenged freedom of opinion and expression so broadly and so far beyond its borders’.4 As a result, in this column I shed light on how both state and non-state actors have been active vehicles for the restriction of the right to freedom of expression in the context of the conflict in Gaza by targeting voices in support of the Palestinian cause in different ways. I then consider the application and scope of the right to freedom of expression in this context and I draw some conclusions on the wider implications that restrictions imposed on freedom of expression bear for the protection and promotion of human rights more generally. 2. SILENCING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE: THE ROLE OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS Since the beginning of the conflict in Gaza, public opinion has become highly polarised, with opposing factions supporting either Israel's actions or the Palestinian cause. Yet, Palestinian voices and their supporters have faced systematic suppression, with both states and non-state actors actively taking measures to silence their positions. Protests in support of the Palestinian cause have been severely restricted in many countries across the world, often on the grounds that these measures are necessary to protect public order and security, to counter “support of terrorism”, and/or to “prevent antisemitism”. Governments, and Western ones in particular, have imposed specific restrictions, blanket bans or pre-emptive bans on demonstrations in support of Palestine.5 Additionally, law enforcement officials have often resorted to excessive use of force and arbitrary detention to disrupt the protests.6 Although in some instances these protests have seen incidents of violence or vandalism, oftentimes the imposed restrictions have been disproportionate. In Germany, for instance, public authorities have imposed pre-emptive bans on several solidarity gatherings in support of Palestinians, based on concerns for ‘public security’, a need to prevent the ‘public celebration of the Hamas terrorist attacks’ of 7 October 2023, and ‘the increase in antisemitic attacks’ in the country.7 These decisions, however, were often grounded on ‘unspecified risks of “inciting, antisemitic exclamations, glorification of and incitement to violence, and acts of violence”’.8 In Italy, protests have been met with excessive use of force by police. For instance, during a protest organised in Pisa in February 2024, riot police and police vehicles were deployed against protesters to block the route to the university square, where participants were directed. In an effort to prevent the participants to reach the square, police charged forward and hit students with batons.9 The disproportionate response by law enforcement led to an unprecedented statement by Italian President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella, who criticised the policing of the protest.10 These restrictions have not been limited to public demonstrations. Academic freedom, in fact, has also faced severe challenges. In many university campuses across the world, students have set up encampments, in solidarity with the Palestinian people, to call for a ceasefire as well as to demand that their universities divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation of the Palestinian territories.11 However, these initiatives have also been met with restrictions: university administrations and local authorities have forcibly removed the encampments, often employing excessive use of force and arbitrarily arresting protestors.12 Students who have participated in the protests have even faced disciplinary measures: as underscored by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, these have included ‘suspension, possible expulsion, eviction from campus housing and the threat of deportation of some foreign students, which could jeopardize their scholarships and future careers’.13 Universities have also increasingly cancelled and even prohibited the holding of events on Israel and Palestine. The recent suspension of a planned event with Francesca Albanese, current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 by the University of Munich14 and by the Free University of Berlin15 are only the latest example in a long list of events on Palestine canceled by universities across the globe.16 Journalists, and the media more generally, have been subjected to an unprecedented level of attacks. Israel has not only denied access to Gaza to foreign press,17 thereby preventing proper reporting from the ground, but those journalists with access to Gaza have been deliberately killed or arbitrarily detained: according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, as of 3 February 2025, 167 journalists and media workers were confirmed killed (159 Palestinian, 2 Israeli, and 6 Lebanese), 49 journalists were reported injured, 2 journalists were reported missing, and 75 journalists were reported arrested.18 Under international humanitarian law, the deliberate killing of journalists is prohibited and the killing of civilians is a war crime.19 Israel has also banned Al-Jazeera20 and raided its offices.21 Recently, the Israeli government has additionally sanctioned the newspaper Haaretz and banned government funding bodies from communicating or placing advertisements with the newspaper on the grounds that Hareetz published ‘many articles that have hurt the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its right to self-defence, and particularly the remarks made in London by Haaretz publisher Amos Schocken that support terrorism and call for imposing sanctions on the government.’22 Additionally, the Israeli government relies on a military censor, which is empowered to fully or partially redact any article dealing with “security issues”: in 2023, 613 articles were barred from publication, and 2,703 articles were redacted.23 Traditional and social media have also played a huge role in censoring pro-Palestinian content. While journalists reporting from Gaza and the West Bank have been silenced by Israel, a worrying majority of media outlets from North America and Europe have consistently failed to perform their watchdog role and speak truth to power: newspaper headlines and TV shows have regularly dehumanised Palestinians,24 and their coverage of the situation in Gaza has consistently employed wording that contributes to the creation a “normality” where, as also underscored by Fuad Zarbiyev, Palestinian lives are not as grievable as Israeli ones.25 Social media platforms have played a crucial role in providing real-time information about the situation in Gaza. This is especially so given that, as mentioned, Israel has severely restricted foreign media access. Nonetheless, despite their crucial role for providing access to information on the situation in Gaza, social media platforms have also significantly contributed to censoring Palestinian content, either because of their inadequate and biased content moderation systems, or following governmental requests for content removal. A human rights due diligence exercise reviewing the impact of Meta's policies and activities during the May 2021 crisis in Israel and Palestine confirms that Meta's policies and practices have resulted in biased outcomes which have specifically impacted Palestinian and Arabic speaking users.26 For instance, the report revealed that Arabic content had greater over-enforcement, meaning that platforms were erroneously removing Palestinian voices.27 While platforms’ content moderation systems already disproportionately restrict Palestinian voices, governmental requests for content removal further exacerbate the issue. As reported by Human Rights Watch, between 7 October and 14 November 2023 alone, Israel's Cyber Unit sent social media platforms 9,500 content takedown requests, 60% of which went to Meta, and platforms overwhelmingly complied with these requests in 94% of cases.28 Content that was shared in support of the Palestinian cause was frequently removed by social media platforms, including the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free”. Although this slogan has been meant and interpreted by many as a peaceful call for the right to self-determination of Palestinians,29 it has been removed by the platforms.30 The slogan has even been criminalised or sanctioned in some countries.31 Taken together, this range of measures represent a substantial and highly problematic attack on the right to freedom of expression and access to information and, in turn, to the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. I will now set out the application and relevance of the contours of this right in this context. 3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The right to freedom of opinion and expression is protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),32 as well as under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).33 Additionally, article 20 of the ICCPR prohibits ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’.34 The right to freedom of expression also includes the ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’.35 Freedom of expression is integral to the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly and association,36 protected under article 20 of the UDHR, article 21 of the ICCPR37 and article 11 of the ECHR.38 Crucially, for the right to freedom of expression to be restricted, such restriction must meet three cumulative criteria: (1) it must be provided by law; (2) it must pursue a legitimate aim (the respect of the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals); and (3) the restriction must be necessary and proportionate for pursuing such aim.39 Because the right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler for the exercise of other fundamental rights,40 any restriction must be construed narrowly so as not to impair its exercise. Restrictions to freedom of expression, even when pursuing the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others (for example, the right to non-discrimination of Jewish people and the fight against antisemitism) or public order, need to be proportionate. The rise of antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism requires all states to take the necessary measures to protect Jews, Muslims, Palestinians and Arabs from discrimination and hate speech. However, oftentimes restrictions to freedom of expression have relied upon a definition of “antisemitism” which is, in itself, contrary to international human rights law. Many governments rely, in fact, on the working definition of antisemitism provided by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.41 This definition is overly broad, does not contain the element of “incitement”, and conflates criticism of the state of Israel with antisemitism, therefore contravening the right to freedom of expression since international human rights law allows for criticism of all states.42 The reliance by many governments on this working definition has been considered as a ‘politically motivated instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism’,43 primarily harming Palestinians and human rights defenders advocating on their behalf.44 As also underscored by Irene Khan, ‘[t]he central conceptual flaw of the “working definition” is the inherent conflation of Zionism, a political ideology, with antisemitism’, which results in “the suppression of legitimate criticism of Israel, not the enhancement of protection of Jews from racial and religious hatred and intolerance”.45 The disruption or prohibition of peaceful protests through the means of excessive use of force, the forcible removal of peaceful student encampments, or even the prohibition of events addressing the topic of Palestine or criticising the state of Israel's actions without it being necessary and proportionate for pursuing a legitimate aim cannot be considered measures in compliance with international human rights law. As also underscored by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association, isolated instances of violent conduct are not sufficient to taint an entire assembly as non-peaceful46 and ‘[w]here isolated instances of violence take place in the context of a protest, law enforcement personnel must make all efforts to locate and remove the violent individuals, to allow other protesters to exercise their rights to assemble peacefully and express themselves’.47 Likewise, the attacks on journalists and on media freedom violate everyone's right to freedom of expression and to access to information and, in some instances, they also contravene international humanitarian law. These violations become even more troublesome given the ‘allegations of targeted attacks on media as part of a strategy to cover up evidence of war crimes’.48 At the same time as governments are violating their own obligations under international human rights law, corporate entities such as traditional media and social media are acting in contravention of their own responsibility to respect human rights. By virtue of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, ‘[b]usiness enterprises should respect human rights’, meaning that “they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.49 As such, both traditional media and social media platforms should ensure that their business activities do not infringe on the rights to freedom of expression and access to information. This would include ensuring that reporting does not perpetuate double standards and that content moderation systems do not disproportionately censor Palestinian content. Precisely because the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and access to information acts as a catalyst for the exercise of other fundamental rights, its restriction has wider repercussion on the promotion and protection of human rights more generally. Not only the right to freedom to peaceful assembly is also heavily impacted, but, more crucially, the right to self-determination of Palestinian people is also affected. The blanket ban on the use of Palestinian symbols is but one example of the impact that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression have on the Palestinian right to self-determination. The lack of proper protection of the right to freedom of expression also results in the failure to shed light on a variety of human rights violations that Palestinians are subjected to everyday in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the right to life and the right to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.50 4. CONCLUSION That a beekeeper is fined for exposing a banner calling for the end of a genocide, that students lose their scholarship or visas for calling on their government to demand a ceasefire and on their university to divest from corporations profiting from the conflict and occupation, that a professor is prevented from giving a lecture about Gaza in a university premise, that our governments respond to student peaceful protests with violence – these are issues that should concern each of us. Each of these restrictions, when failing to comply with the standards of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality (as set out in international human rights law), violates our fundamental right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom of expression is considered to be an enabler to the exercise of other fundamental rights. As reiterated by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, ‘the genocide in Gaza, the violation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian Territory and the failure of Israel to respect its international legal obligations, including the occupation of Palestinian territory, are matters of global public interest’.51 By failing to stand up for the exercise of our right to freedom of expression in support of the Palestinian cause, and by failing to demand accountability from those actors who consistently violate it, we contribute to its erosion. And by failing to stand up for the rights of Palestinians, including their right to have their voices heard, we fail to stand up for human rights. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Notes1. Irene Khan, Global threats to freedom of expression arising from the conflict in Gaza - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2024 [A/79/319] para 1.2. Federico Berni, ‘Striscione pro Palestina al mercato di Desio, arrivano i carabinieri: multa di 430 euro all’apicoltore’ Corriere della Sera (16 October 2024) <https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/lombardia/24_ottobre_16/striscione-pro-palestina-al-mercato-di-desio-arrivano-i-carabinieri-multa-di-430-euro-all-apicoltore-7c08956e-a16b-4070-a1e7-93b3c5b31xlk.shtml> accessed 3 February 2025.3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (International Court of Justice). See also, Francesca Albanese, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 - Anatomy of a genocide 2024 [A/HRC/55/73].4. Khan (n 1) para 1.5. ibid 34.6. ‘Europe: Under Protected and Over Restricted: The State of the Right to Protest in 21 European Countries’ (Amnesty International, 2024) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/8199/2024/en/> accessed 3 February 2025.7. ibid 97.8. ibid, emphasis added.9. ibid 98.10. ibid.11. Khan (n 1) para 40; Michael Williams, ‘Pro-Palestinian Student Protests around the World – in Pictures’ the Guardian (7 May 2024) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2024/may/07/pro-palestinian-student-protests-around-the-world-in-pictures> accessed 3 February 2025.12. Khan (n 1) para 41.13. ibid 42.14. Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur oPt [@FranceskAlbs], ‘The University of Munich Has Canceled My Talk, a Decision I Hope They Will Reconsider. If Not, I Look Forward to Seeing You Elsewhere, German Friends. May Freedom of Expression and Your Right to Be Informed Prevail. @LMU_Muenchen’ <https://x.com/FranceskAlbs/status/1885703501516267743> accessed 4 February 2025. On how anti-Palestinian racializing processes and repression operate within a framework of liberal freedom in German education, see Anna Younes and Hanna Al-Taher, ‘Erasing Palestine in Germany's Educational System: The Racial Frontiers of Liberal Freedom’ (2024) 33 Middle East Critique 397.15. ‘Statement Regarding the Planned Public Lecture and Discussion with Francesca Albanese and Eyal Weizman on February 19, 2025’, Freie Universität Berlin (12 February 2025) <https://www.fu-berlin.de/en/presse/informationen/fup/faq/nahost/wissenschaftliche-veranstaltung/index.html> accessed 24 February 2025. On the gravity of these actions for academic freedom, see Isabel Feichtner, ‘Where Is Our Outcry?' (Verfassungsblog, 19 February 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/where-is-our-outcry/> accessed 24 February 2025; Khaled El Mahmoud, ‘Special Editorial: A Nation in Crisis: The Suppression of Academic Freedom and the Rise of Ideological Conformity’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 21 February 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/special-editorial-a-nation-in-crisis/> accessed 24 February 2025.16. See, for example, Vimal Patel and Anna Betts, ‘Campus Crackdowns Have Chilling Effect on Pro-Palestinian Speech’ The New York Times (17 December 2023) <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/17/us/campus-crackdowns-have-chilling-effect-on-pro-palestinian-speech.html> accessed 4 February 2025; ‘Harvard Medical School Cancels Class Session With Gazan Patients, Calling It One-Sided’ The Harvard Crimson (22 January 2025) <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2025/1/23/hms-cancels-gaza-patient-panel/> accessed 4 February 2025.17. ‘Open up Access to Gaza and Protect Journalists’ Le Monde (29 October 2023) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/29/open-up-access-to-gaza-and-protect-journalists_6212695_23.html> accessed 4 February 2025.18. ‘Journalist Casualties in the Israel-Gaza War’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 3 February 2025) <https://cpj.org/2025/02/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/> accessed 4 February 2025.19. Under art. 79 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (signed on 12 December 1977, entered into force on 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3. “Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1”; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 8(2).20. Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Israel Bans Al Jazeera: What Does It Mean and What Happens Next?’ Al Jazeera (6 May 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/6/israel-bans-al-jazeera-what-does-it-mean-and-what-happens-next> accessed 4 February 2025.21. ‘Israel Raids and Shuts down Al Jazeera's Bureau in Ramallah in the West Bank’ AP News (22 September 2024) <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-al-jazeera-gaza-war-hamas-4abdb2969e39e7ad99dfbf9caa7bb32c> accessed 4 February 2025.22. ‘Israel Sanctions Haaretz Due to Articles That “Hurt” Israeli State’ Al Jazeera (24 November 2024) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/24/israel-sanctions-haaretz-due-to-articles-that-hurt-israeli-state> accessed 4 February 2025.23. Amjad Iraqi, ‘Israeli Military Censor Bans Highest Number of Articles in over a Decade’ +972 Magazine (20 May 2024) <https://www.972mag.com/israeli-military-censor-media-2023/> accessed 4 February 2025.24. The dehumanisation of Palestinians in traditional media is a longstanding phenomenon. See, for example, Laura Albast and Cat Knarr, ‘Opinion | How Media Coverage Whitewashes Israeli State Violence against Palestinians’ Washington Post (28 April 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/28/jerusalem-al-aqsa-media-coverage-israeli-violence-palestinians/> accessed 4 February 2025.25. Fuad Zarbiyev, ‘“What about October 8? What about October 9? What about October 10? What about October 11?” On the Grievability of Palestinian Lives’, Geneva Graduate Institute (14 October 2024) <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/the-grievability-of-palestinian-lives> accessed 4 February 2025.26. ‘Human Rights Due Diligence of Meta's Impacts in Israel and Palestine | Reports | Sustainable Business Network and Consultancy’, BSR (22 September 2022) <https://www.bsr.org/en/reports/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine> accessed 4 February 2025.27. ibid 5.28. Rasha Younes, ‘Meta's Broken Promises’, Human Rights Watch (21 December 2023) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and> accessed 4 February 2025.29. Ellen Ioanes, ‘“From the River to Sea,” the Phrase Used amid the Israel-Hamas War, Explained’ Vox (24 November 2023) <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/23972967/river-to-sea-palestine-israel-hamas> accessed 17 February 2025.30. Human Rights Watch has found that “[i]In hundreds of cases, th[e] slogan [“From the River to the Sea”], as well as comments such as “Free Palestine,” “Ceasefire Now,” and “Stop the Genocide,” were repeatedly removed by Instagram and Facebook under “spam” Community Guidelines or Standards without appearing to take into account the context of these comments.”, ibid 27.31. See, for example, Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Announcement of a ban on associations in accordance with Section 3 of the Association Act Ban on the association ‘HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya)” in German), 2 November 2023, available at <https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/pub/publication/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/content/M0JVrk5Qop55DhqscjE/BAnz%20AT%2002.11.2023%20B10.pdf?inline>32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 19.33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 10.34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 20.35. ibid 19(2).36. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34 para 4.37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 21.38. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (n 33), art 11.39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 32), art 19(3).40. Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 2011 [A/HRC/17/27] para 22.41. Khan (n 1) para 79.42. ibid, para 80.43. Tendayi Achiume, Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance - Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume 2022 [A/77/512] para 71.44. ibid 76.45. Khan (n 1) para 81.46. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 37, (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21)’ (2020) CCPR/C/GC/37 para 19; Clément Voule, Protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests during crisis situations - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule 2022 [A/HRC/50/42] para 40.47. Voule, (n 46), para 40.48. Khan (n 1) paras 17 & 89.49. OHCHR, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2011) HR/PUB/11/04 Principle 11.50. OHCHR, ‘Israel's Escalating Use of Torture against Palestinians in Custody a Preventable Crime against Humanity: UN Experts’ (5 August 2024) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/08/israels-escalating-use-torture-against-palestinians-custody-preventable> accessed 18 February 2025; Amnesty International, ‘Israel/OPT: Horrifying Cases of Torture and Degrading Treatment of Palestinian Detainees amid Spike in Arbitrary Arrests’ (8 November 2023) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/israel-opt-horrifying-cases-of-torture-and-degrading-treatment-of-palestinian-detainees-amid-spike-in-arbitrary-arrests/> accessed 18 February 2025.51. Khan (n 1) para 88.*This column is based and expands upon a short article previously published on the Geneva Graduate Institute website, available here https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/silenced-voices-freedom-expression-gazaCorresponding author(s):Stefania Di Stefano, International Law Department, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland. Email: stefania.distefano@graduateinstitute.ch

Abstract The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order moving towards multipolarity. The return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine raises serious questions about US involvement in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect both that his administration is unwilling to engage productively with the EU and that it distrusts multilateral forums, preferring bilateral, nation-to-nation contacts. This article seeks to bring clarity to the future US–EU relationship by identifying some of the points of contention and offering a perspective on how the transatlantic partnership can move forward constructively. KeywordsTransatlantic relations, EU–US relations, Trump administration, EU, Bilateral relations, Multipolar world order Introduction Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a new axis of power is taking form, led by Russia and China and supported by North Korea, Iran and Belarus. This shift brings a profound transformation within the global balance of power and is a direct threat to the liberal international world order. In the midst of this geopolitical recalibration, the return of Donald Trump to the helm of the White House with an ‘America First’ doctrine poses serious questions about US engagement with the transatlantic alliance. There are growing worries about the US’s willingness to continue to honour its Article 5 commitments within NATO and maintain an active role in the collective defence of Europe, but also about the role of the US as a supporter of Ukraine and the liberal multilateral rule-based system. State of play in the EU–US partnership During the first Trump administration, at the state funeral of former US president George H. W. Bush, the EU’s ambassador to the US, David O’Sullivan, was asked to stand at the back of the line-up to pay his respects, breaking diplomatic protocol (Knigge 2019). He politely acquiesced, but in the days that followed it came to light that during the first Trump administration, the US Department of State had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU in the second half of 2018 without informing the EU Delegation in Washington (Smith 2019). Beyond the failure to communicate this important diplomatic status change, which was not well received in Brussels, and in addition to the protocol issue of having a long-serving foreign ambassador downgraded on the spot at a state funeral, this sent a clear message: the Trump administration does not respect the EU, and nor does it view the Union as an interlocutor. On many occasions during his first administration, Trump’s officials clashed with the EU. In a major foreign policy speech in Brussels, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly questioned the continued value of the EU and urged European countries to reassert their national sovereignty (Pompeo 2018). As the second Trump administration begins its work with unprecedented vigour, so far the EU has hardly featured as a consideration for the president or his top officials. At the time of writing, the nominated US ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, has not yet testified (Singh and Jones 2025). In his early remarks as secretary of state, Marco Rubio has hardly mentioned the EU at all. On 29 January, the first call between High Representative Kaja Kallas and Rubio took place, alleviating some concerns about the distinct lack of US–EU dialogue taking place due to the change in administration (Liboreiro 2025). However, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, the new US administration went beyond the usual call for European allies to spend more on defence. Vice-President JD Vance drove home the seismic shift underway in the US commitment to European defence and upended decades of policy (Quinville 2025). Moreover, on the European side, the attempts by some members of the Trump administration to support far-right candidates in Europe (as done by Elon Musk and Vance in Germany and Romania) bring a new level of discomfort and mistrust, as it looks like parts of the administration and Trump’s brand of conservatism, colloquially known as ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA), want to export their domestic cultural wars to Europe, thus attacking the core shared value of the transatlantic partnership: liberal democracy. A divorce or just a rough patch in transatlantic relations? Over the past seven decades, successful cooperation between the US and European institutions has helped to build the liberal multilateral world order and to uphold the UN Charter by promoting global stability and prosperity. With a combined population of nearly 800 million people, the US and the EU have the most integrated economic cooperation in the world, accounting for 43% of global GDP and 30% of global trade in goods and services (European Council 2025). President Trump’s repeated claims that the EU was set up to ‘screw’ the US reflect the Trump administration’s unwillingness to engage productively with the EU and its distrust of multilateral forums, and hence its preference for bilateral, nation-to-nation contact. The administration’s growing distrust of the EU also reflects the changing public perception of the EU among segments of the American public, such that 29% of Republicans view the EU as ‘unfriendly’ or ‘hostile’, up from 17% last year, and negative perceptions of Europe among Democrats are also slowly rising (The Economist 2025). This represents an inward turn in American society as politics becomes increasingly polarised. On the other hand, favourable attitudes among Europeans towards the US have fallen below 50%, with only around a third of Germans (32%) and the French (34%) having a positive view of the current American administration, with the least favourable views being held in Denmark, where only 20% approve (Britton 2025). Less than 100 days into his second term, at the time of writing, Trump has already broken long-standing norms and practices in US–European relations. Vance’s critical discourse at the Munich Security Conference, which harshly attacked European values, brought a major departure from traditional diplomatic language. The US vote alongside Russia and North Korea, and against traditional allies, on a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for the return of occupied territory to Kyiv further deepened concerns (Landale and Jackson 2025). Additional actions, such as the controversial Oval Office meeting between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the temporary suspension of intelligence and military assistance to Ukraine, the exclusion of Europeans from Ukrainian peace negotiations, and the disproportionate and unjustified tariffs on the EU have heightened European anxiety. These moves have raised fears of a possible end to the transatlantic partnership and a wider US retreat from global leadership. For most Europeans, the second Trump administration appears to be strategically prepared, driven not only by revenge in domestic politics, but also by a sense of retribution in foreign policy. But while distrust has never been higher, it would be a mistake to take the path of severing the relations between the US and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic partnership has suffered similar lows in the past, from vastly different perspectives on the US invasion of Iraq, the Obama administration’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Points of tension and contentionTech On tech regulation, storm clouds are already gathering as Trump has lashed out at the EU for regulating big tech companies (Doan and Stolton 2025). During the transition, the new Trump administration has been noted for the active participation of several tech CEOs. This was most evidently on display during Trump’s inauguration, which saw the likes of Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Elon Musk (Tesla), as well as other billionaires from around the world (including TikTok’s CEO) gather to welcome in the new administration (Kelly 2025). These tech CEO supporters, not usually as prominently on display in American politics, are flocking to the new administration, which has pledged massive tax cuts for billionaires, the promotion and deregulation of cryptocurrencies, and the removal of restrictions on free speech and fact-checking (Samuel 2025). The EU’s attempts to regulate big tech companies under this new administration will be even more difficult, given their close proximity to and influence on the second Trump presidency. Energy Another likely area of divergence between the US and the EU is in their approaches to energy policy and climate policy. Trump has pledged to ‘drill baby drill’, promising to fund more fossil fuel extraction and curbing green and renewable projects. He has openly called climate change a hoax and ended US participation in the Paris Climate Agreement. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states continue to invest heavily in renewables, with clean energy sources accounting for 70% of the bloc’s electricity demand in 2024 (Vetter 2025). The US, already trailing in wind power and investment in renewables, now risks falling irrevocably behind most of the developing world in clean energy production. Trump might find less of a market for fossil fuels in the EU as a result of its heavy investment in renewables, instead having to turn to other markets. Trade and tariffs On the campaign trail, Trump vowed that as president he would impose tariffs on everyone from China to neighbours, Mexico and Canada, to allies such as the EU. Although the initial tariffs placed on Mexico and Canada were swiftly lifted, a new wave of tariffs of 25% on foreign steel and aluminium was announced on 11 February. This move mirrors that of his first administration (Wiseman 2025). The EU was swift to respond, announcing a slew of counter-measures targeting iconic US products such as jeans, bourbon, peanut butter, whiskey and motorcycles. European steel companies could see as much as 3.7 million tons of steel exports lost as a result of US-imposed tariffs. Together, as noted above, the US and the EU account for about 30% of global trade, with deeply intertwined production and supply chains. However, this does not appear to be part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its decision to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs of 20% on almost all other EU products as part of its Liberation Day plan. The proposed tariffs could affect around 70% of EU exports to the US, worth around €532 billion ($585 billion) in 2024, with potential tariffs on copper, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and timber still on the cards (Blenkinsop 2025). As the trade wars begin again, US–EU trade and economic relations will undoubtedly face difficult times over the next four years and risk undermining or limiting cooperation in other areas as a result. Responding to Trump’s announcement, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, astutely summed up: ‘The global economy will massively suffer. Uncertainty will spiral and trigger the rise of further protectionism. The consequences will be dire for millions of people around the globe’ (European Commission 2025). The EU, in addition to planning and implementing counter-measures to Trump’s tariffs, has to walk a difficult tightrope to maintain its investment ties (Casert 2025). The Arctic Trump’s approach to the Arctic in the days leading up to the transition and in his first three months, most notably his refusal to promise not to invade Greenland by force, if deemed necessary (Kayali 2025), sparked widespread condemnation from European leaders. Trump raised the idea of purchasing Greenland from Denmark in 2019 during his first term, and reasserted his intention to acquire the vast island, rich with rare earth minerals, on a fiery phone call with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. In response, the Danish premier garnered support among European heads of state. However, Trump’s focus on Greenland could have profound implications for the balance of power in the Arctic region. Although the Arctic is increasingly discussed in geopolitical terms, in part due to Russia’s and China’s interests in new shipping routes, it remains a zone of peace. The implications of potential NATO infighting over Greenland, and the possibility that this could accelerate Greenland’s independence, could work to China’s or Russia’s advantage and risk disrupting the balance of power in the Arctic region that has allowed peace to prevail. Defence spending The Trump administration’s renewed push for European NATO allies to spend at least 5% of their GDP on defence has reignited tensions over transatlantic burden-sharing. During his first visit to a NATO defence ministers’ meeting, US Secretary of Defense Hegseth made it clear that the US no longer sees an indefinite American presence in Europe as guaranteed (Erling 2025). While these pressures reflect Washington’s frustration over decades of unequal defence spending, they also risk undermining alliance cohesion by demanding an unrealistic increase in European defence budgets. Most European states have already significantly increased their military spending, jointly spending €326 billion on defence in 2024, an increase of 30% since 2021 (European Defence Agency 2024). And the European Commission’s recently launched ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 initiative proposes an additional €800 billion to help EU member states fill their defence gaps and increase their military production and capacity (Gomez 2025). However, calling for a sudden escalation to 5% of GDP overlooks the political, economic and social constraints within Europe and could provoke backlash rather than cooperation. A more realistic target of 3% to 3.5% of GDP offers a more balanced and politically realistic path, consistent with strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and could be discussed as a new NATO defence commitment at the upcoming Hague Summit this summer. EU defence market The EU is developing its European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in response to the challenging new security and geopolitical reality. A key focus within the plan is strengthening the European internal market for defence, which remains heavily underdeveloped and dependent on non-EU suppliers, notably the US, which accounts for more than half of the EU’s defence procurement. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, launched in 2024 by the European Commission, proposes some ambitious objectives: by 2030, at least 50% of member states’ defence acquisitions should go to the European defence industry, rising to 60% by 2035, and 40% of these procurements should be through collaborative projects (European Commission 2024). Nevertheless, this strategy is not without challenges, as some EU member states, particularly the Eastern European countries, still favour US suppliers and see buying American defence systems as a way to foster security ties with Washington. The return of Trump, along with signs of US disengagement from Europe, has led to a renewed debate within the EU about reducing reliance on American defence capabilities and investing more in equipment ‘Made in Europe’. At the same time, the evolving US position has complicated transatlantic defence industrial cooperation. While Rubio has recently stressed the importance of continued American participation in European defence procurement, the latest EU proposals to prioritise the European defence industry have raised concern in Washington (Cook and Croucher 2025). Any move to limit access for American defence companies might provoke a political backlash, even as European leaders become increasingly worried about the credibility of the US defence commitments. Recent events such as the politicisation of US military aid to Ukraine and the unpredictability of future armament deliverables have further shaken European confidence. But despite the growing uncertainty, EU countries should remain interested in cooperation with the US, not exclusion. The challenge now is to strike a balance: to build a more autonomous and resilient European defence market while maintaining a constructive and cooperative relationship with the US. Ukraine peace negotiations The peace negotiations for Ukraine are becoming a major point of divergence between the US administration under Trump and its European allies. Trump’s main goal is to quickly end the conflict in Ukraine and position himself as a successful deal maker on the global stage. So far, his administration has shown a willingness to make significant concessions to Russia, often unilaterally and without securing reciprocal commitments from Moscow. This approach might be part of a broader strategy that includes weakening Russia’s alliance with China, securing American access to Ukrainian rare earth resources and continuing a larger US strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific (Mills 2025). So far, this conciliatory ‘deal making’ has caused anxiety among European leaders, who fear that a hasty or unbalanced peace agreement might lead to a forced Ukrainian capitulation and would undermine long-term European security and stability. Therefore, European countries are insisting on being part of the discussions on defining what a just, long-standing and sustainable peace should look like, a peace that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty and deters further Russian aggression on the country or continent. In parallel, European countries are formulating their own vision for a lasting peace, independent of American leadership. Recent discussions and meetings led by the UK and France are proposing a ‘coalition of the willing’ that would send 10,000 to 30,000 troops to Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire (O’Sullivan and Khatsenkova 2025). But current plans face significant obstacles: disagreements among European states over troop commitments and mandate, fears of escalation in a direct conflict with Russia and a lack of critical defence enablers that only the US can provide. While countries such as the UK, France and Sweden are considering ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, Eastern European states, notably Poland, remain reluctant, preferring to commit to logistical roles rather than direct engagement. Moreover, European allies are seeking explicit US backstop support (logistical, intelligence and political) to enhance the credibility of the deterrence of these peacekeeping forces against future Russian aggression. The way in which the Ukraine peace negotiations unfold could be a source of further tension between the US and European partners in the months and years to come. A way forward The transatlantic relationship is undergoing a period of critical recalibration, marked by the return of a more transactional US administration and a world order migrating towards multipolarity. A possible way forward in Euro-Atlantic relations is to adopt a pragmatic approach that preserves cooperation where possible while accepting a more interest-based partnership. Paradoxically, as the US pivots towards the Indo-Pacific to counterbalance China’s global rise, this may offer a new avenue for transatlantic rapprochement. Both the US and the EU increasingly recognise the need to address China’s more assertive economic and geopolitical behaviour, and both see the growing socio-political and security threats from the rise of this axis of upheaval formed of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. For Europeans, navigating this increasingly unstable geopolitical landscape will require clarity, political maturity and a greater sense of strategic responsibility. The EU must continue to invest in its strategic autonomy—not to disengage from the US, but to become a more equal and reliable transatlantic partner. The coming months will be vital in charting a new course for transatlantic cooperation, one that emphasises increased European defence investment, a coordinated approach to the Russian and Chinese threats, the need for a deeper EU–NATO cooperation, a responsible resolution to the war in Ukraine, and a more balanced EU–US partnership. As such, European leaders will need to make a concerted effort to build bridges with the Trump administration by focusing on areas of convergence and mutual strategic interest. What lies ahead is a period of repositioning, a reordering of the transatlantic relationship from one rooted primarily in shared norms, values and principles towards a more pragmatic and transactional partnership based on common interests and careful management of differences. While challenging, this transformation could lead to a more resilient and mature transatlantic alliance, shaped by partners on an equal footing, capable of adapting to the demands of an unstable and unpredictable multipolar world order. ReferencesBlenkinsop P. (2025). EU seeks unity in first strike back at Trump tariffs. Reuters, 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-seeks-unity-first-strike-back-trump-tariffs-2025-04-06/. Accessed 7 April 2025.Britton H. (2025). European favourability of the USA falls following the return of Donald Trump. YouGov, 4 March. https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/51719-european-favourability-of-the-usa-falls-following-the-return-of-donald-trump. Accessed 8 March 2025.Casert R. (2025). EU vows countermeasures to US tariffs. Bourbon, jeans, peanut butter, motorcycles are easy targets. The Associated Press, 11 February. https://apnews.com/article/eu-us-tariffs-trump-trade-war-leyen-0b23d25d30428eb288b79bfda4fa25e9. Accessed 16 February 2025.Cook E., Croucher S. (2025). Europe’s plan to ditch US weapons spooks Trump administration: Report. Newsweek, 2 April. https://www.newsweek.com/europes-plan-ditch-us-weapons-spooks-pentagon-report-2054087. Accessed 2 April 2025.Doan L., Stolton S. (2025). Trump blasts EU regulators for targeting Apple, Google, Meta. Bloomberg, 23 January. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-23/trump-blasts-eu-regulators-for-targeting-apple-google-meta. Accessed 5 February 2025.Erling B. (2025). Hegseth tells Europe to spend on defence as US presence may not last forever. Reuters, 14 February. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hegseth-tells-europe-spend-defence-us-presence-continent-may-not-be-forever-2025-02-14/. Accessed 17 February 2025.European Commission. (2024). The European Defence Industrial Strategy at a glance. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en. Accessed 5 March 2025.European Commission. (2025). Statement by President von der Leyen on the announcement of universal tariffs by the US. 3 April. https://ec.europa.Eu/commission/presscorner/detail/mt/statement_25_964. Accessed 7 April 2025.European Council. (2025). EU relations with the United States. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/united-states/. Accessed 25 March 2025.European Defence Agency. (2024). 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Euronews, 27 March. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/27/coalition-of-the-willing-meets-in-paris-to-strengthen-support-for-ukraine. Accessed 27 March 2025.Pompeo M. R. (2018). ‘Restoring the role of the nation-state in the liberal international order’. Speech made to the members of the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, 4 December 2018. U.S. Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/restoring-the-role-of-the-nation-state-in-the-liberal-international-order-2/. Accessed 20 January 2025.Quinville R. S. (2025). Making sense of the Munich Security Conference. Wilson Center, 18 February. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/making-sense-munich-security-conference. Accessed 22 February 2025.Samuel S. (2025). The broligarchs have a vision for the new Trump term. It’s darker than you think. Vox, 20 January. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/395646/trump-inauguration-broligarchs-musk-zuckerberg-bezos-thiel. Accessed 7 February 2025.Singh K., Jones R. P. (2025). Trump nominates former CKE Restaurants CEO Puzder as US ambassador to EU. Reuters, 23 January. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-nominates-former-cke-restaurants-ceo-puzder-us-ambassador-eu-2025-01-23/. Accessed 1 February 2025.Smith K. E. (2019). The Trump administration downgraded the E.U.’s diplomatic status in Washington. That’s going to hurt. The Washington Post, 8 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/08/the-trump-administration-is-downgrading-the-e-u-s-diplomatic-status-in-washington-thats-going-to-hurt/. Accessed 17 January 2025.The Economist. (2025). Schooled by Trump, Americans are learning to dislike their allies. 31 March. https://www.economist.Com/graphic-detail/2025/03/31/schooled-by-trump-americans-are-learning-to-dislike-their-allies. Accessed 1 April 2025.Vetter D. (2025). As Trump dumps clean energy, fossil fuels lose their grip on Europe. 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Brazil's BRICS+ presidency ahead of the summit in Rio de Janeiro Brazil is using its BRICS+ presidency in 2025 to promote a more inclusive and sustainable world order as a pragmatic mediator for developing and emerging countries and to preserve its independence in foreign policy. For Europe, this presents both challenges due to the growing heterogeneity and independence of the BRICS+ group, as well as opportunities for a strategic partnership with Brazil, for example through the EU-Mercosur agreement and joint projects in the areas of climate, health, and technology. It is crucial that Europe recognizes Brazil as an equal partner in order to jointly set global standards and actively shape the international order. The Brazilian BRICS+ presidency With the assumption of the BRICS+ presidency in January 2025, the first following the expansion of the alliance, Brazil is once again assuming a vital role on the international stage after the G20 presidency in the previous year. Under the motto "Strengthening cooperation in the Global South for more inclusive and sustainable governance", Brazil is setting clear priorities: global health cooperation, trade and finance, climate change, regulation of artificial intelligence, multilateral peace architecture and institutional development of the BRICS+ bloc. Brazil is advancing the latter, for example, through events such as the 11th Parliamentary Forum in Brasília in June 2025, which aims to deepen political dialog and parliamentary cooperation and promote the democratic legitimacy of the bloc. Between February and July, the Brazilian Presidency set a broad agenda with over one hundred ministerial and technical meetings. The selected topics reflect the interests of many emerging and developing countries and illustrate Brazil's claim to function as a bridge builder between the so-called "Global South" (a controversial term due to its vagueness and homogenization) and the established industrialized countries. Foreign policy pragmatism as a leitmotif Brazil's foreign policy has historically been characterized by pragmatism and a clear focus on national interests. For decades, the country has pursued a strategy aimed at preserving the greatest possible autonomy and not subordinating itself to the priorities of the major powers. This attitude is currently particularly evident: Brazil has not joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and voted against the inclusion of Nicaragua and Venezuela in the BRICS. Brazil's great dependence on its most important trading partner China is now also being viewed critically in parts of Brazilian politics and diplomacy. However, the government in Brasília continues to strictly refuse to be pigeonholed or categorized into a fixed camp, instead opting for flexibility and openness - a strategy that ensures maximum freedom of action. In contrast to countries such as Mexico, which is more closely tied to the USA due to its geographical location and economic ties, Brazil can balance its foreign policy between different centers of power and represent its interests with confidence. Heterogeneity and dynamics of the BRICS+ The BRICS+ group is anything but homogeneous. The member states are democracies, autocracies and dictatorships and disagree on a variety of issues. For example, whether BRICS+ should function as an anti-Western force or serve as a platform for a reformed, more inclusive world order. The refusal of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin to attend the BRICS+ summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7 highlights the internal tensions and heterogeneity of the alliance of states. If Putin could take part in the summit virtually, there is speculation in Brasília about the reasons for Xi's refusal. Is the Chinese partner annoyed by Brazil's rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative or are they bothered by India's prominent participation in Rio de Janeiro? Chinese voices justify Xi's absence with the fact that he has already met President Lula twice in less than a year, once at the G20 summit in Brazil in 2024 and most recently at the China-CELAC summit in Beijing in May. The Egyptian government also recently announced that President Al-Sisi will not be traveling to the summit due to the situation in the Middle East. Other high-ranking guests such as Mexican President Sheinbaum and Turkish President Erdoğan have also announced that they will not be traveling to Rio. An Iranian delegation has not yet been confirmed. On the one hand, the absence of the two heavyweights, Xi and Putin, could weaken the international appeal and political weight of the meeting, as the media attention and the signal effect of such a summit depend on the presence of the heads of state. On the other hand, this constellation opens up new scope for action, especially for those countries that are not clearly anti-Western - above all Brazil, India, and South Africa. These countries could use the opportunity to set their own priorities and campaign for a more pragmatic, more open orientation of the BRICS+. Brazil in particular, which traditionally pursues an interest-oriented and pragmatic foreign policy, sees itself in the role of a mediator who does not want to commit the bloc to a confrontation with the West. Rather, Brazilian diplomacy is concerned with using BRICS+ as a platform for reforming the international order without submitting to the priorities of individual major powers. The fact that Brazil has neither joined China's Belt and Road Initiative nor supported Venezuela's admission to the BRICS underlines this independent and active course of non-alignment. Within Brazilian politics, academia and diplomacy, the increasing heterogeneity of the BRICS+ group is being increasingly criticized. Although the expansion to include new members such as Indonesia and Ethiopia has increased the global reach, it has also exacerbated internal conflicts of interest. There are voices in Brasília who fear that the bloc's coherence and ability to act could suffer as a result of this diversity. At the same time, however, diversity also offers opportunities for Brazil: it enables Brazil to distinguish itself as a constructive force and promote dialog between different political and economic systems. However, it is questionable whether the current government under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) will be able to take advantage of this opportunity. Multipolarity, geography and new zones of influence The multipolar world order that is currently emerging following the end of US unipolar dominance is tending towards instability. Several centers of power are competing for influence, the complexity of international relations is increasing, and the risk of conflict is rising. In the course of these developments, the BRICS+ are also gaining relevance. We are experiencing a time in which zones of influence such as those actively pursued by the USA and Russia are once again gaining in importance - be it in Eastern Europe, the Middle East or in North and South America. In this environment, Brazil is pursuing a "hedging" strategy: it is skillfully balancing between the major powers without committing itself, thus preserving its foreign policy autonomy. A balancing act that is becoming increasingly difficult, as demonstrated by the recurring critical questions from Europe about Brazil's BRICS+ membership. Brazilian diplomatic pragmatism is difficult to reconcile with the European idea of a value-based multilateral world order and is therefore difficult for Europeans to understand. Brazil's geographical location - as the largest nation in South America, with access to the Atlantic and as a bridge between North and South - also has a major influence on its foreign policy stance. Geography plays a key role in understanding certain political actions. Its distance from the global centers of conflict allows Brazil to take on a moderate, mediating role. While many conflicts in other parts of the world are dominated by geopolitical tensions, Brazil can often act more neutrally and constructively. Brazil's wealth of raw materials and the associated potential, as well as its special geographical and strategic position, make it an important player in international diplomacy and a key player for Europe. Resources, narratives, and soft power In the 21st century, power is no longer measured exclusively in terms of military superiority. Rather, access to natural resources - especially rare earths -, economic innovation and the ability to shape global narratives are at the heart of the modern exercise of power. Soft power, i.e., influence through diplomacy, cultural exchange, and the targeted shaping of narratives, has become a central instrument of international politics. A striking example of the importance of soft power was demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic: China and Russia made targeted use of vaccine diplomacy to expand their influence in Latin America. The BRICS alliance also gained in importance and stood for cooperation in the so-called "Global South". Europe, but also the USA, on the other hand, was initially perceived in the region as cautious and concerned with its own advantage. The EU's so-called "vaccine nationalism" at the beginning of the pandemic had a lasting impact on the trust of many countries in European solidarity. This experience is still present in Latin American memory today. Brazil has made great progress in its own vaccine production in recent years and has established itself as a regional player in the healthcare sector. Nevertheless, the country is still dependent on international supply chains, particularly for the procurement of precursors and technologies. The opening up to China and Russia in the healthcare sector as a result of vaccine diplomacy has created additional opportunities for these players to strengthen their presence and influence in Brazil and the region. Opportunities for a strategic partnership with Europe It is precisely against this backdrop that Europe must seek new opportunities to put its relationship with Brazil on a future-oriented and partnership-based footing. The EU has considerable strengths: economic and technological innovation, diplomatic experience, and the ability to set international standards. With the "Strategic Compass", the EU has further developed its foreign policy instruments and focuses on the four guiding principles of "Acting, Securing, Investing, Partnering". However, in order to be successful in global competition, Europe must act faster and be prepared to meet Brazil on an equal footing and take it seriously as an equal partner. The EU should make targeted use of its economic, technological, and diplomatic strengths for sustainable and strategic cooperation. This includes the promotion of joint research projects, technology and science transfer and support for the development of local production capacities - particularly in the healthcare sector, but also in areas such as sustainable raw material extraction, digitalization, and green transformation. Especially at a time when the reliability of the USA as a partner is being questioned for good reasons, Europe and Germany can score points with reliability, transparency, and long-term commitment. In addition to the EU-CELAC summit in November 2025, another important instrument in this context would be to hold renewed German-Brazilian government consultations before the Brazilian presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2026. The conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement, cooperation on renewable energies, the promotion of sustainable agriculture, the deepening of cooperation in the defense industry and the co-design of global health standards are fields in which Europe and Brazil can jointly set standards. At the same time, it is essential for the EU to strengthen its own raw material security and secure access to key technologies and rare earths in order to maintain its own ability to act. In the long term, a close partnership with Brazil offers the EU and Germany the opportunity not only to pursue economic interests, but also to jointly develop global standards and actively help shape, reform and strengthen the rules-based international order. However, this requires Europe to respect Brazil as an independent, equal player and to recognize and consider the country's specific interests and experiences. The latter also applies equally to the other side. Symbolic gestures such as Brazilian President Lula's participation in the military parade in Moscow on May 9 to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the war are detrimental to cooperation with Europe. They hinder trusting, forward-looking cooperation between Europe and Brazil, which could bring great benefits to both sides and contribute to stabilizing the multilateral world order. Outlook: COP30 and Brazil's global agenda In November 2025, Brazil will host the UN Climate Change Conference COP30 in the Amazon region in Belém in the final phase of its two-year leadership role - a further step towards positioning itself as a global player in climate and environmental policy and acting as a mediator between the so-called "Global South" and the industrialized nations. The Brazilian agenda focuses on sustainable development, the protection of biodiversity and the promotion of renewable energies. This underlines Brazil's claim to assume not only regional but also global responsibility. The COP30 offers Europe and Brazil a further opportunity to intensify their cooperation on climate protection and related issues and to provide joint impetus for a more sustainable world order. Conclusion The emerging multipolar world order is more unstable and prone to conflict than the unipolar phase before. Brazil acts skillfully in the field of tension between the great powers and uses its resources and diplomatic flexibility to secure national interests. Europe should recognize this reality and actively shape its partnership with Brazil to its own advantage. The influence of the BRICS+ alliance should be viewed soberly - neither overestimated nor underestimated, but with a realistic assessment of its importance and potential. Only through strategic engagement and a little more pragmatism can the EU and Germany safeguard their interests and contribute to stabilizing an increasingly fragmented world. The BRICS+ summit and the upcoming COP30 are touchstones for Brazil's and Europe's ability to help shape a new, complex world order and act on an

Despite growing defence and economic ties, the Iran-Israel conflict reveals the limits of Russia-Iran relations and Moscow’s regional balancing act. The 12-day war between Israel and Iran, exacerbated by the air strikes conducted by the United States (US) on Iranian nuclear sites, has significantly escalated tensions in the Middle East. Russia has condemned both Israel and the US for ‘violating international law and the United Nations Charter’. However, beyond rhetoric, Russia could not do much in this conflict. Given its own involvement in the war with Ukraine, ongoing talks to normalise relations with the US, and close economic and people-to-people ties with Israel, Russia has been compelled to restrict its support for Iran to the diplomatic realm. Even on this level, Moscow’s proposal to mediate between Iran and Israel was rejected by US President Donald Trump. The Israel-Iran conflict has exposed limitations in the Moscow-Tehran strategic partnership and jeopardised Russia’s efforts to maintain regional equilibrium. Understanding the historical complexities of Russia-Iran ties The Middle East has always been a focal point in Moscow’s foreign policy, transcending its energy interests and the need to access the Western Indian Ocean. The region’s proximity to Russia, combined with its great power competition with the US, has driven Moscow to vie for regional influence. Iran and the erstwhile Soviet Union’s relations were complex, marked by instances of cooperation, yet peppered with deep distrust. This hindered Moscow from fully solidifying its ties with Tehran. Although the Soviet Union was the first major power to establish diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, its invasion of Afghanistan was perceived as an intervention in Tehran’s sphere of influence. This provoked a negative view of the USSR among the Iranian leadership and undermined the scope for cooperation. The death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the dissolution of the USSR created an opening in the relationship. Even though Moscow was largely looking to the US in its decision-making, Russia started assisting Tehran with its civil nuclear programme. Despite US proliferation concerns, Russia entered into a contract in 1995 to build a light-water reactor for the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP). The agreement also included training Iranian engineers and scientists at Russian nuclear research centres. That July, however, under US pressure and in a significant policy reversal, Moscow agreed to halt sales of conventional weapons to Iran. Throughout the 2000s, Tehran blamed Russia for adopting a transactional approach, often acting according to its own convenience and at times using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the US. During the same period, Moscow did not veto additional United Nations (UN)-sponsored restrictions imposed against Iran and limited the nuclear partnership by delaying the construction of the Bushehr NPP reactors. In the 2010s, Russia suspended the deal to supply Iran with S-300 air defence systems, following the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which was supported by all the E3+3 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US). The resolution banned Tehran from receiving any heavy conventional weapons, including missiles or missile systems. During the Syrian civil war, Russia worked in tandem with pro-Assad forces and Iran-backed ground forces in an attempt to eliminate the Islamic State. Even though this improved the bilateral relations with Iran, the lack of trustpersisted. A vivid example was the decision to revoke the permission for Russian fighter jets to use the Hamadan airbase for conducting raids over Syria, a week after granting the access—a move forced by a wave of protests in Iranian parliament and media. Russia has consistently upheld a non-proliferation stance on Iran, playing a crucial role in establishing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, which imposed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Only after the JCPOA was signed did Moscow unlock the S-300 contract with Tehran. Russia was critical of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Three years later, when Joseph Biden came to power in the US, Moscow supported an updated version of the JCPOA and expressed frustration with Iran’s obduracy. Russia-Iran engagement post-Ukraine Cooperation has gained momentum since the Ukraine conflict began in early 2022. Iran did not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine but reiterated that war was not a solution. Defence relations strengthened as Iran exported Shahed-136 and the Mohajer drones to Russia and has reportedly exported ammunition, mortars, and other military equipment. In return, Iran has purportedly secured a deal to acquire Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. Although the contract’s details are obscure, as is the case with most Russia-Iran defence dealings, reports suggest Moscow supplied an unspecified number of jets to Tehran in late 2024. Even so, it is clear that whatever Iran obtained from Moscow did not help during the recent war with Israel, in which the latter established complete control of the Iranian airspace. Mutual economic interests span several sectors. Russia is the largest investor in the Iranian economy. In 2022–23, investments were estimated at US$2.76 billion. Although both countries compete with each other in the oil and gas sector, Moscow has pursued several projects with Tehran, planning to invest around US$8 billion in this sphere. The two sides have promoted a proposal to supply gas to Iran via Azerbaijan, with the first phase expected to start by the end of 2025. Both countries are eager to improve connectivity through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Russia has pledged a state loan of 1.3 billion euros for constructing the Astara-Rasht railway link that could bridge the remaining gap in the Iranian section of the INSTC. The two countries are working closely to integrate their payment systems. The Russian Mir App is already operational at Iranian point-of-sale terminals, and the full interoperability between the Mir and Shetab payment networks is anticipated soon. Although Tehran concluded a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2023, its impact has been marginal, with bilateral trade hovering around US$5 billion over the past three years. Facing mounting international pressure, Russia and Iran have been compelled to align more closely. In January 2025, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty covering a wide range of cooperation areas. Putin described it as a “real breakthrough, creating conditions for the stable and sustainable development of Russia, Iran and the entire region,” while Pezeshkian called it “a new chapter of strategic relations.” While the treaty obliges the sides “not to offer any military or any other aid to an aggressor attacking another party,” it stops short of a mutual security guarantee clause, such as the one Russia signed with North Korea. Tehran was reportedly reluctant to commit to military obligations, likely to avoid entanglement in Russia’s war with Ukraine. For Russia, maintaining equidistance between Middle Eastern powers without firmly siding with Iran is consistent with its traditional regional policy. The view that Russia was unable to support Tehran due to being bogged down in Ukraine is arguably reductive and not the primary reason for Russia’s fence-sitting in the Israel-Iran war. It would be unwise for Russia to antagonise Tel Aviv, which has adopted a restrained position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite political tensions, Moscow appreciates that Israel has not joined Western sanctions against the Russian economy or sent any defence equipment to Kyiv. Additionally, the gradual reset of diplomatic contacts with Washington—furthered by the Trump administration's conciliatory stance towards Russia’s interests in Ukraine—has narrowed Russia’s regional manoeuvring space. Escalatory rhetoric or military involvement could cost Russia its hard-earned diplomatic positioning and risk renewed US support for Ukraine. In 2023–24, Iran formally joined non-Western multilateral organisations and groups such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which is expected to bring Russia and Iran closer together in their interaction on Eurasian affairs and in their visions on ‘an emerging world order’. However, there are nuances to Moscow’s and Tehran’s approaches, which are not immediately apparent. While both capitals are seemingly sharing the anti-US sentiments, a significant section of their elites still seeks to restore ties with the West. This means that the Russia-Iran connection hangs on the external factor of their respective dialogues with the West. The more isolated they are, the more likely they are to gravitate towards each other; alternatively, both Moscow and Tehran would see little incentive in investing much political and financial capital in the bilateral relationship. This suggests that Russia and Iran are unlikely to become allies, and that their future partnership will factor in the US calculations.

Abstract The international system is currently undergoing a process of reconfiguration that is having an impact on all areas of global development. In this process of reordering power relations, there is a tendency to move towards multipolarity, leaving behind the unipolar coalition established after the Second World War. In this context, several emerging powers are gaining increasing international power, which has led to changes in the hierarchy of power on the international geopolitical chessboard. Such is the case of the People's Republic of China, which has established itself not only as a power of great impact and relevance in the Asian region, but also in the entire international system. Namely, the management of the government and the Party in terms of innovation, industrialization, informatization, productivity, expansion and internationalization of its economic model, positions this country as the most dynamic center of the international economy. Evidencing that alternative models to the capitalist system are possible and viable, which strengthens the trend towards a systemic transition and multipolarity in the International System Introduction In the last two decades, a set of geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and conflicts have become evident, with significant implications extending throughout the International System. As a result, we are currently experiencing a convulsion of the established order, giving way to a process of new global reconfigurations. In this context, several researchers and academics such as Jorge Casals, Leyde Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián Schulz, among others, have noted that these conditions have led to a crisis and hegemonic transition process, with a trend toward multipolarity in which the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing relevance. This article, titled "The International Reconfiguration’s Process Towards Multipolarity: The Role of China as an Emerging Power," is dedicated to analyzing the position of this country within the current international reconfiguration of power. Accordingly, the first section will systematize some essential guidelines to understand the current crisis and the decline of the hegemonic order established in the post-World War II period. The second section will address China's positioning amid the international reconfiguration of power. In this regard, it is important to note that China's rapid rise highlights how development management aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals can lead to a shift in the paradigm of international relations, as well as power reconfigurations that challenge the current balance of forces. Thus, it can be affirmed that China's rise constitutes a decisive element within the current trend toward multipolarity. DevelopmentNew International Order: Approaches to the Multipolar Reconfiguration of the International System The current international context is marked by a process of crisis. This crisis reflects the fact that the world order no longer aligns with the correlation of forces that gave rise to it during the post-World War II period. It is not a circumstantial crisis, but rather the interlinking of various interconnected crises that span across all sectors of life. That is to say, the effects of one crisis often become the causes of another, involving economic, political, social, cultural, ethical, moral, technological, commercial, and environmental components. In other words, it is a structural and systemic crisis—one that cannot be resolved unless a similarly systemic transformation occurs. To gain greater clarity, it is important to consider that the consolidation of the capitalist system brought about the process of globalization. This, in turn, introduced large-scale production and technological development capable of increasing output. This process, along with other characteristics of the system, has exponentially accelerated social inequalities between developed and developing countries. It has also led to strategic tensions over the control of resources, raw materials, and inputs, resulting in geopolitical conflicts. Furthermore, the capitalist system has imposed an extremely high environmental cost, demonstrating that it is exceeding both its own limits and those of the planet. Specifically, in its constant pursuit of profit and maximization of gains, negative environmental impacts are not factored into cost-benefit analyses, leading to widespread environmental degradation. Among other harms caused by the system, we observe a decline in investment rates, an increase in public debt, loss of autonomy in monetary policy, rising unemployment levels, reductions in real wages, and growing inequality, among others. In short, capitalism has become an unsustainable system whose primary concern is profit generation—something that is currently entirely incompatible with environmental preservation and the responsible use of natural resources. Therefore, it can be affirmed that some of its most alarming effects include: vast amounts of currency without backing, increasingly concentrated in fewer hands; acceleration of capital concentration in the West; rising military expenditures; and environmental pollution and destruction (Casals, J., 2023). On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify that, for a particular state to be considered hegemonic, it must not only exert its influence predominantly within the system of international relations; its hegemonic role must also be linked to the founding and establishment of a universally accepted concept of world order. That is, the majority of other states must recognize it as such and identify with the model promoted by the hegemon. Therefore, it is not merely a matter of a hierarchical order among states, but rather the adoption of a dominant model of production that involves those states. As a result, certain mechanisms or general rules of conduct are established for the participating states. For this reason, a hegemonic crisis involving the dominant actor in the system of international relations leads to a crisis in the social, economic, political, and institutional structures upon which that actor’s dominance was built. In light of these elements, we currently observe a set of powers within the International System that are vying to establish a new distribution of power—one that moves away from the unipolar coalition led by the United States following World War II. From this perspective, Juan Sebastián Schulz asserts: “A hegemonic crisis occurs when the existing hegemonic state lacks either the means or the will to continue steering the interstate system in a direction broadly perceived as favorable—not only for its own power, but also for the collective power of the dominant groups within the system.” (Schulz, J. S., 2022) As a result, strategic alliances have been formed and new power groups have emerged that influence international relations.These blocs are precisely what the new polarity is forming around, increasingly reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity. This is a system in which hegemonic influence is not determined by a single power, but by two, three, or more. In this regard, Juan Sebastián Schulz further notes that a process of insubordination is becoming evident, particularly in the Western peripheries. As a consequence, several countries have begun to criticize the configuration of the contemporary world order, initiating efforts to organize and propose alternative models (Schulz, J. S., 2022). This reveals the emergence of a new kind of power hierarchy, generating a global order in which a diversity of forces and actors prevails. In this context, China has experienced rapid growth, thereby contributing to the trend toward multipolarity. While this does not imply that the United States will cease to be one of the central powers in the system of international relations—given its considerable global influence—it is evident that there is a noticeable decline in the dominance it held during the unipolar era that emerged after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This process of intersystemic transition unfolds in various phases. First, there is an observable economic transition marked by a shift in the center of gravity of the global economy toward emerging and developing economies. This shift is accompanied by a necessary technological transition, characterized by a new struggle—this time to lead the technological revolution. These changes, in turn, must be supported by a political transition. Currently, countries from the Global South have gained increasing prominence on the international stage [1]. From this foundation, a geopolitical transition is also underway, where the center of gravity and decision-making—once concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon West—is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, a cultural or civilizational transition is taking place, wherein the previously dominant value system is giving way to the rise of a new worldview. Based on this, the phases of the transition process can be outlined as follows: Existence of a stable order that brings together the majority of nation-states in the International System. - A crisis of legitimacy begins to affect the established global order. - A deconcentration and delegitimization of power emerges, impacting the hegemonic power. - An arms race and formation of alliances ensue in an attempt to preserve the hierarchical order by any means. This leads to a widespread crisis and the rise and emergence of new actors. - A necessary resolution of the international crisis. - Renewal of the system. (Schulz, J. S., 2022) In light of the above, it can be stated that a “new international order” is taking shape. Its manifestations are multifaceted, such as: - The rise of movements and associations of states that serve as alternatives to the neoliberal order. - Emerging powers like China and Russia are gaining strength in various sectors of the international geopolitical arena. - Russia's confrontation with NATO in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. - Sanctions imposed by the United States on various NATO and European Union countries have strengthened the BRICS nations. - The incorporation of new members into BRICS can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance the economic and political dominance of the United States and the European Union. - The expansion of anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal integration mechanisms that promote South-South cooperation, such as the G-77 + China group. - The financial sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in the context of the Ukraine conflict have sparked a debate about the viability of the international monetary system and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. - China and Russia conduct transactions in yuan and sell oil in this currency to Iran, Venezuela, and Gulf countries. China has increased its economic and political influence in the world, which can be seen as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. Its leadership within BRICS and its growing role in the global economy may be indicators of a shift in the balance of power. All these developments reflect a growing awareness within the International System of States regarding the importance of international cooperation to address global challenges such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and food security. They also serve as indicators that a transformation is underway in the way countries interact with each other, resulting in a shift in the economic, political, and strategic center of gravity. In this context, the United States has unleashed a global hybrid war as a desperate attempt to defend and maintain its hegemonic position, which once appeared unshakable in the postwar world. To this end, it has targeted China, as the latter represents its main threat in the economic and scientific-technological order. From this perspective, tensions between the United States and China have significantly deteriorated since the Republican administration of President Donald Trump. Beginning in 2017, his policy took on an aggressive stance toward China, manifesting through a trade war and economic attacks aimed at preserving U.S. global hegemony. This demonstrates that, in response to a process of decline already underway, nationalist and protectionist efforts intensified in the U.S., with policies targeting some of the emerging pillars of the crisis-ridden world order—China being a primary example. Under the administration of Joseph Biden, the focus shifted toward competition, emphasizing the commitment to protect U.S. sovereignty from potential Chinese threats. A significant shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan became evident with the approval of arms sales to Taiwan in August 2023, which escalated tensions in the region (Collective of Authors). Furthermore, in recent years, the United States has increasingly worked to generate geopolitical and geoeconomic motivations aimed at fostering tensions between China and Russia, potentially sparking conflict between the two. It has strengthened alliances with neighboring countries of these powers—most notably Taiwan and Ukraine—which has triggered concerns and tensions in both nations. A containment policy has also been deployed, including the imposition of trade barriers and tariffs on Chinese products; restricting Chinese companies’ access to U.S. technology and markets; and promoting the diversification of supply chains to reduce dependence on China. Nevertheless, the ongoing sanctions and restrictions have only served to reaffirm the shared survival interests of both powers, strengthening corporate ties and relations between them. These actions also reflect the growing concern among U.S. power groups over the decline of their hegemonic dominance. The Emergence of China and Its Role in the Transition Toward Multipolarity In a previous article titled "The Synergy Between Economy and Environment in China Through the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals," (‘La sinergia entre economía y medio ambiente en China mediante la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible’) the process of socioeconomic transformations experienced in the People's Republic of China over the past decade was discussed. These transformations have been primarily aimed at revitalizing the nation in preparation for its centenary in 2049. This strategy is rooted in aligning the Centenary Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set for 2030, under the leadership of the Communist Party and the momentum driven by President Xi Jinping. The results of this strategy have had an impact not only on the Asian Giant itself—now a decisive actor in the Asian region—but also on the international order as a whole. As a result, China has emerged as a powerful rising power, with promising prospects for further elevating its development standards. This is backed by sustained GDP growth, averaging between 6% and 8% annually, indicating a robust economy. In addition, China holds vast foreign exchange reserves, granting it economic stability and the capacity to withstand potential external shocks. It also invests heavily in modern infrastructure and cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and renewable energy—all of which enhance its competitiveness and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainable growth (Lagarde, CH). Nonetheless, China has also had to confront significant challenges in its gradual and progressive approach to the desired development model. Among these is the environmental cost associated with its rapid economic growth. For instance, China still experiences high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, along with air, water, and soil pollution. In response, measures have been implemented such as the establishment of a national monitoring network and the replacement of coal heating systems in Beijing. Efforts have also been made to purify water resources polluted by industrial processes, and imports of solid waste have been reduced to help decontaminate soils affected by industrial and agricultural activities (González, R., 2023). In general, the development of renewable energy and a circular economy model is being promoted to enable a gradual transition toward a green economy, grounded in the concept of an ecological civilization. For this reason, China’s new era is committed to scientific and technological innovation as a means of driving economic growth that is both sustainable and capable of ensuring a higher quality of life for its population. This, in turn, leads gradually toward a new model of political leadership and economic management. In this regard, Jin Keyu, Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), has stated that “trillions of dollars of investment are needed for the global green transition, and China is going to play an essential role in that transformation” (Feingold, S., 2024). Based on the aforementioned elements, various authors such as Dr. C. Charles Pennaforte, Dr. C. Juan Sebastián Schulz, Dr. C. Eduardo Regalado Florido, among others, have indicated that the millenary nation represents a threat to the hegemony held by the United States since World War II. Consequently, it is recognized that a process of hegemonic crisis and transition is currently underway, with the Asia-Pacific region emerging as the center of gravity of the global power, thereby contributing to the multipolar transformation of the International System. The authors of “Is China Changing the World?” argue that “market socialism with “Chinese characteristics” must gradually and more clearly diverge from capitalism if it is to embody a genuinely alternative path for all of humanity.” In pursuit of this goal, China bases its policy of peaceful coexistence on five fundamental principles:Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, regardless of a country's size, power, or wealth. Mutual non-aggression Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, acknowledging that each nation has the right to freely choose its own social system and path of development. Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful coexistence. (Herrera, R.; Long, Z.; and Andréani, T., 2023) The rise of China as a major international power under these principles has been consolidating since 2012 under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China (CPC), gaining particular momentum from 2020 to the present. Thus, China has not only become the leading power within the Asian regional balance but has also expanded its presence across Europe, Africa, and Latin America—primarily through loans, investments, and multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America. In addition, China has positioned itself as a leader in several sectors, and it is projected that its economy may surpass that of the United States, increasing its Gross Domestic Product (Rodríguez, L., 2022). It has also undergone a process of opening up, energizing both its international trade and its overall foreign relations, all under the control of the Government and the Party. This, combined with its rise and development initiatives, has made China a focal point of interest for many countries within the International System seeking to jointly advance projects based on cooperation, the principle of shared advantage, and multilateralism. In this regard, the white paper "China and the World in the New Era," published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2019, states: “The world is moving rapidly toward multipolarity, diverse models of modern development, and collaboration in global governance. It is now impossible for a single country or bloc of countries to dominate world affairs. Stability, peace, and development have become the common aspirations of the international community.” (People’s Republic of China, 2019. Quoted in Schulz, J. S., 2022) Undoubtedly, this rise has become a source of concern for U.S. power groups, which have increasingly applied geostrategic pressure. Notably, the United States has strengthened military alliances with India, Japan, and Australia in an effort to encircle China and attempt to control or obstruct its maritime routes—this also being a manifestation of the intensification of the imperialist arms race. Nonetheless, China has maintained its development strategy and, as part of it, has strengthened its diplomatic network and its relations with multiple countries across all world regions. For all these reasons, China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. Notably, it went from representing 4% of global GDP in 1960 to 16% in 2020—undeniable evidence of rapid economic growth. Moreover, it has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and also the leading importer, establishing itself as a major industrial power. In this regard, United Nations data reveal that China leads global industrial production, accounting for 30% of the total. This figure surpasses other industrial powers such as the United States (16%), Japan (7%), Germany (5.7%), and South Korea (3.2%) (Schulz, J. S., 2022). In addition, China has remained the world’s leading manufacturing power for approximately 15 consecutive years, according to statements from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology at the beginning of this year. This sector alone has contributed over 40% to overall growth. Likewise, in 2024, China experienced a significant increase in foreign investment, reflecting its interest in strengthening international cooperation for development. Efforts are also underway for urban renewal in 2024, with around 60,000 projects being implemented across various cities. These initiatives are primarily aimed at transforming underdeveloped neighborhoods and creating smarter urban areas (Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in the People's Republic of China, 2025). In this regard, the following graphs illustrate the value of China’s international trade during the 2016–2024 period, highlighting a strong presence of exports compared to imports. A second chart shows China's global export share, where it holds a dominant position.   Thus, China has risen as a center of power in the international system, with leadership not only in the economic domain but also in science and technology. At the same time, it has promoted a series of investments and a process of internationalizing its national currency. Accordingly, the Asian Giant offers an alternative model of development—one that is more comprehensive and sustainable—allowing it to propel the new phase of Chinese development. This phase aims not only to fulfill the dream of national rejuvenation but also to ensure the survival of its unique political, economic, and social model. Nevertheless, the significant challenges of sustaining growth cannot be overlooked. From this perspective, experts believe that new avenues of growth will be necessary for China to maintain the trajectory it has been experiencing. Specifically, the country must continue expanding its industrial sector while strengthening areas such as artificial intelligence, digital financial services, and green technologies (Feingold, S., 2024). It is also important to highlight the projected continuity and leadership of the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping identified as a key figure in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in China, in conjunction with the socioeconomic transformation strategy toward the 2049 centenary. This has been pursued through the defense of multilateralism, economic openness, and international integration and cooperation in support of global development. Conclusions In light of the above, a decline in U.S. hegemony can be observed, even though this process is not linear—nor is it certain whether any single power or coalition has come to occupy a hegemonic position. What is clear, however, is the existence of a trend toward multipolarity, driven by emerging powers and the strategic ties they are establishing. This is giving rise to a non-hegemonic reconfiguration of power blocs, which are building a multilateral and multipolar institutional framework. It can also be affirmed that China has become the most dynamic center of the global economy. This has been supported by its growth strategy focused on industrialization, digitalization, innovation, productivity, expansion, and internationalization of its development model—while maintaining a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. A range of key initiatives and development projects have been implemented to support the country's rise, consolidating its role in the multipolar reconfiguration of the International System. All of this has been essential in driving China’s new phase of development and contributing to the broader process of multipolar transformation. Undoubtedly, China’s rapid ascent represents a significant challenge to the International System, as it reflects a shift in international relations and a transformation in the distribution and hierarchy of global power. Notes [1] It is important to clarify that the so-called Global South should not be equated with the Third World, as the distinction between the First and Third Worlds is primarily based on economic and technological differences, which do not align with the current circumstances of the International System of States. In contrast, the term Global South emerges from a new geopolitical perspective that arose in the post–Cold War context, driven by the need to promote South-South cooperation. 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"La Planificación y Recomendaciones del XIII Plan Quinquenal". Recuperado de: https:// politica-china.org/wp- content/uploads/6sei-yangweimin-ES.pdf .

Recent news from Ukraine has generally been bad. Since the end of May, ever larger Russian air strikes have been documented against Ukrainian cities with devastating consequences for civilians, including in the country’s capital, Kyiv. Amid small and costly but steady gains along the almost 1,000km long frontline, Russia reportedly took full control of the Ukrainian region of Luhansk, part of which it had already occupied before the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And according to Dutch and German intelligence reports, some of Russia’s gains on the battlefield are enabled by the widespread use of chemical weapons. It was therefore something of a relief that Nato’s summit in The Hague produced a short joint declaration on June 25 in which Russia was clearly named as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security”. Member states restated “their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine”. While the summit declaration made no mention of future Nato membership for Ukraine, the fact that US president Donald Trump agreed to these two statements was widely seen as a success. Yet, within a week of the summit, Washington paused the delivery of critical weapons to Ukraine, including Patriot air defence missiles and long-range precision-strike rockets. The move was ostensibly in response to depleting US stockpiles. This despite the Pentagon’s own analysis, which suggested that the shipment – authorised by the former US president Joe Biden last year – posed no risk to US ammunition supplies. This was bad news for Ukraine. The halt in supplies weakens Kyiv’s ability to protect its large population centres and critical infrastructure against intensifying Russian airstrikes. It also puts limits on Ukraine’s ability to target Russian supply lines and logistics hubs behind the frontlines that have been enabling ground advances. Despite protests from Ukraine and an offer from Germany to buy Patriot missiles from the US for Ukraine, Trump has been in no rush to reverse the decision by the Pentagon.   Another phone call with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on July 3, failed to change Trump’s mind, even though he acknowledged his disappointment with the clear lack of willingness by the Kremlin to stop the fighting. What’s more, within hours of the call between the two presidents, Moscow launched the largest drone attack of the war against Kyiv. A day later, Trump spoke with Zelensky. And while the call between them was apparently productive, neither side gave any indication that US weapons shipments to Ukraine would resume quickly. Trump previously paused arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in March, 2025 after his acrimonious encounter with Zelensky in the Oval Office. But the US president reversed course after certain concessions had been agreed – whether that was an agreement by Ukraine to an unconditional ceasefire or a deal on the country’s minerals. It is not clear with the current disruption whether Trump is after yet more concessions from Ukraine. The timing is ominous, coming after what had appeared to be a productive Nato summit with a unified stance on Russia’s war of aggression. And it preceded Trump’s call with Putin. This could be read as a signal that Trump was still keen to accommodate at least some of the Russian president’s demands in exchange for the necessary concessions from the Kremlin to agree, finally, the ceasefire that Trump had once envisaged he could achieve in 24 hours. If this is indeed the case, the fact that Trump continues to misread the Russian position is deeply worrying. The Kremlin has clearly drawn its red lines on what it is after in any peace deal with Ukraine. These demands – virtually unchanged since the beginning of the war – include a lifting of sanctions against Russia and no Nato membership for Ukraine, while also insisting that Kyiv must accept limits on its future military forces and recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the Ukrainian mainland. This will not change as a result of US concessions to Russia but only through pressure on Putin. And Trump has so far been unwilling to apply pressure in a concrete and meaningful way beyond the occasional hints to the press or on social media. Coalition of the willing It is equally clear that Russia’s maximalist demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and its European allies. With little doubt that the US can no longer be relied upon to back the European and Ukrainian position, Kyiv and Europe need to accelerate their own defence efforts. A European coalition of the willing to do just that is slowly taking shape. It straddles the once more rigid boundaries of EU and Nato membership and non-membership, involving countries such as Moldova, Norway and the UK. and including non-European allies including Canada, Japan and South Korea. The European commission’s white paper on European defence is an obvious indication that the threat from Russia and the needs of Ukraine are being taken seriously and, crucially, acted upon. It mobilises some €800 billion (£690 billion) in defence spending and will enable deeper integration of the Ukrainian defence sector with that of the European Union. At the national level, key European allies, in particular Germany, have also committed to increased defence spending and stepped up their forward deployment of forces closer to the borders with Russia. US equivocation will not mean that Ukraine is now on the brink of losing the war against Russia. Nor will Europe discovering its spine on defence put Kyiv immediately in a position to defeat Moscow’s aggression. After decades of relying on the US and neglecting their own defence capabilities, these recent European efforts are a first step in the right direction. They will not turn Europe into a military heavyweight overnight. But they will buy time to do so.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Brexit has had numerous consequences, many of which were scarcely discussed in the lead-up to the 2016 referendum. The British Overseas Territories (BOTs) were not exempt from the repercussions following the decision to leave the European Union (EU). All BOTs maintained a formal relationship with the EU through the 2013 Overseas Association Decision, which provided a range of benefits—including economic and environmental cooperation, development assistance, policy dialogue, and the free movement of goods, services, and people. For Gibraltar, the end of free movement raised concerns about the future of its open border with Spain. Interim measures were introduced to maintain a ‘fluid’ border when the UK formally exited the EU in 2020. However, without a comprehensive agreement, there remained a real risk that the border would become much harder—especially with the EU’s upcoming implementation of the new Entry/Exit System (EES). Indeed, there were signs that managing the border was becoming increasingly difficult. For instance, Spanish authorities began to intensify checks on people crossing the border, resulting in long delays and queues. Approximately 15,000 people commute daily from Spain to Gibraltar for work, comprising over half of Gibraltar’s workforce. Additionally, waste disposal in Gibraltar was becoming more problematic, as much of it is transported across the border. Many older Gibraltarians recall the border closure between 1969 and 1982, a decision made by General Franco. Although Gibraltarians demonstrated flexibility and resilience in adapting to the closure, it caused significant short- to medium-term economic hardship and separated families and friends. Spanish workers also suffered during this period. The desire to protect the economies of both Gibraltar and Spain was therefore a key factor in the push to secure a post-Brexit agreement. Negotiations that began under the UK Conservative Government were protracted, with key obstacles including the precise role of Spanish officials conducting Schengen checks in Gibraltar and the status of Gibraltar Airport, which also serves as an RAF base. However, on 11 June 2025, an agreement was reached on the core aspects of a future treaty. The overarching goal is to enhance prosperity across the Gibraltar–Spain region by removing physical barriers and checks on people and goods, while safeguarding the Schengen Area, the EU Single Market, and the Customs Union. The hope is that the deal will provide legal certainty, stimulate economic growth, and strengthen cooperation between Gibraltar and Spain. More specifically, the agreement includes the following commitments: First, joint border checks at Gibraltar’s port and airport will replace controls at the Gibraltar–La Línea crossing, easing daily travel. Spain will conduct Schengen checks, while Gibraltar will maintain UK checks. One outcome of this will be that UK nationals visiting Gibraltar will be counted as part of the time-limited allowance (90 days) for short stays in the Schengen area. Second, a customs union between Gibraltar and the EU will eliminate goods checks and ensure tax alignment—particularly on tobacco—to prevent market distortions and support regional development. Third, guarantees on fair competition in areas such as labour, the environment, anti-money laundering, transport, and social security. The agreement also establishes a financial mechanism to support training, employment, and regional cohesion. On announcing the agreement, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said: “Alongside the Government of Gibraltar, we have a reached an agreement which protects British sovereignty, supports Gibraltar’s economy and allows businesses to plan for the long-term once again”. He also took a swipe at the previous Conservative government: “This government inherited a situation from the last government which put Gibraltar’s economy and way of life under threat. Today’s breakthrough delivers a practical solution after years of uncertainty”. Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, Fabio Picardo, who played a central role in the negotiations, also welcomed the deal. While José Manuel Albares, the Spanish foreign affairs minister, said it would bring down “the last wall” on the continent. To her credit, Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, Priti Patel, did not dismiss the deal, but reserved judgement until full details were available. However, others on the right went to their usual default position. Former Tory Home Secretary Suella Braverman said: “We are absolutely furious about this deal. It’s another unbelievable and unimaginable betrayal”. Reform UK described the agreement as a “total surrender”, while Conservative Armed Forces spokesperson Mark Francois declared: “First Chagos, now Gibraltar—and next, probably the Falklands. Labour used to sing The Red Flag—now they just wave a big white one instead”. Previously, I have argued that this narrative—linking decisions about one BOT to others—is misleading and overlooks the important differences between them. Many Brexiteers’ opposition to this deal is a classic case of wanting to ‘have their cake and eat it.’ They voted for Brexit (which Gibraltar strongly opposed), demanded a hard Brexit, yet seem either unable or unwilling to acknowledge and address the problems it has caused. Without a pragmatic border deal, Gibraltar’s political and economic position—which the right claims to staunchly defend—would almost certainly have been hurt longer term. Right-wing voices in Spain are also opposed to the agreement, but they feel it concedes too much to the UK and Gibraltar. Interestingly, this is not the first instance in which a complex border issue has been successfully addressed between the UK and an EU member state. The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, located on the southern coast of Cyprus, form a single BOT. These areas were retained by the UK following Cyprus’ independence and are home to a non-permanent British population as well as a permanent Cypriot community. Prior to Brexit, the border between the SBAs and the Republic of Cyprus was entirely open. Given the unique characteristics of the territory, it was essential to maintain this openness. To preserve the status quo, a specific Protocol was included in the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated under Prime Minister Boris Johnson. This Protocol ensures the continued application of EU law in key areas such as taxation, goods, agriculture, and fisheries within the SBAs, with enforcement carried out by the Republic of Cyprus. Although Gibraltar has been described as “the last piece of the EU exit jigsaw,” several Brexit-related issues concerning the BOTs remain unresolved and, hopefully, will soon be addressed. Perhaps the most pressing of these involves the Falkland Islands and its fisheries exports to the EU. At the time of Brexit, none of the BOTs were included in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While only a few BOTs engage in trade with the EU, the Falklands is a notable exception—particularly in its trade with Spain. Over the years, the Falklands has developed strong ties with Spanish fishing fleets and importers. As a result, more than 90% of the fish caught in its waters—primarily Loligo squid and various finfish—are exported to Spain. This industry is vital to the Falklands’ economy, contributing around 40% of the government’s annual revenue. It is also significant for Spain, which sources over 30% of its imported calamari from the Falklands. Before Brexit, Falklands fisheries exports entered the EU tariff-free. Now, they are subject to the EU’s common external tariff, which ranges from 6 to 18%, amounting to approximately €15 million annually—a substantial burden for a small economy. There is hope that, as part of a broader reset in UK-EU relations, the trade status of the BOTs can be improved. In a recent parliamentary response, David Lammy stated, “we are always seeking to reduce tariff burdens for our overseas territories, and we are in ongoing discussions with the European Union in particular”. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.