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Diplomacy
No Corruption, Stop Corruption Image by Zelandia

Structural corruption and fragile democracies: the Latin American vicious circle

by Hugo Borsani

In Latin America, corruption is not an anomaly of the democratic system, but rather a structural cog that weakens it, fuels populism, and perpetuates inequality. Corruption is a constant in most Latin American countries. Regardless of ideology and party alternation, corruption has remained persistent across much of the region and, in many cases, has even increased. Between 2014 and 2024, only five countries in the region—Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic—registered an improvement in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In Paraguay the index shows no variation, while in the remaining 14 countries the perception of corruption increased. Large-scale abuse of power by senior government officials, the public bureaucracy, and major private corporations contributes to undermining citizens’ trust in their representatives and in democratic institutions as a whole. How corruption is expressed Corruption in Latin America takes multiple forms and manifests itself at different levels of political, economic, and social life. In its most visible and highest-impact expression are large corruption schemes involving top state authorities and major private companies. Cases such as that of the construction firm Odebrecht, whose illicit practices spread to several countries in the region and came to light between 2014 and 2016, revealed the existence of transnational networks of bribery and illegal political financing. Similarly, scandals such as the “Mensalão” and Operation “Lava Jato” in Brazil exposed the depth of these schemes and their ability to cut across governments and political parties, seriously compromising the credibility of democratic institutions. One of the most sensitive areas in which this dynamic is expressed is the financing of electoral campaigns. The lack of clear regulations, transparency, and effective oversight has turned political financing into a privileged gateway for corruption. As a result, electoral processes tend to produce governments constrained by private interests that, once in power, seek to recoup their investment through legislative favors, budgetary allocations, or regulatory decisions, thereby weakening democratic representation. However, corruption is not limited to these major scandals. It also manifests itself in everyday practices that directly affect the relationship between citizens and the state. The payment of bribes to access public services, expedite procedures, or exercise rights that should be universally guaranteed contributes to normalizing illegality and steadily erodes trust in public institutions. At the same time, corruption in Latin America transcends the state sphere and extends into the private sector. Tax evasion, consumer fraud, and other fraudulent practices are frequent and generate serious social costs. In addition, the advance of drug trafficking has deepened these dynamics, promoting corruption at different levels of the state and society and reinforcing a vicious circle that undermines legality and institutional legitimacy. Delegitimization of democracy Although corruption is not exclusive to the political sphere, when it involves politicians, members of governments, or public officials, its impact on the loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions among the population is greater. The persistence of high levels of corruption in the state is an indicator of significant failures in control mechanisms among state institutions—that is, in so-called inter-institutional accountability, a fundamental dimension for the proper functioning of liberal representative democracy. Without oversight bodies and institutions with effective capacity to investigate and punish corruption, the quality of democracy is seriously affected. The fragility or inefficiency of oversight institutions and bodies is also reflected in insufficient sanctions, delays in institutional timelines for applying the corresponding penalties, and, in many cases, their complete absence. This undoubtedly contributes to a sense of impunity and serves as an incentive for the repetition of corrupt practices. The persistence of corruption, and the difficulties in imposing exemplary and effective punishment on those responsible, has influenced the loss of citizens’ trust in traditional political parties and leaderships, and even in the democratic system itself, boosting electoral support for populist parties and leaders. At the beginning of the century these had a left-wing profile (the so-called twenty-first-century socialism), but today they assume a clear far-right profile. These are movements and leaders critical not only of traditional political elites but also, to varying degrees, of traditional democratic institutions—especially institutions of political oversight and accountability, such as the judiciary, prosecutors’ offices, and audit bodies, among others. These populist parties and leaders come to power, in most cases, with promises to put an end to the corruption inherited from “traditional politics.” Nevertheless, once in government they tend to dismantle or co-opt oversight bodies and institutions. Examples of this were the governments of Morales in Bolivia, or the government of former president Bolsonaro in Brazil. The latter dismantled the existing network of anti-corruption bodies because, according to him, there was no corruption in his government. With the co-optation or limitation of oversight institutions and bodies, populist governments face fewer obstacles to engaging in corrupt practices. And in the context of an eroded democratic regime, institutions find it more difficult to punish those responsible. The correlation between corruption and inequality Societies marked by social and economic inequality are more vulnerable to corruption, and at the same time corruption increases those very inequalities. It is no coincidence that Latin America is considered the most unequal region in the world: according to Oxfam’s report for Latin America and the Caribbean Wealth Unchecked, Democracy at Risk. Why Latin America and the Caribbean Need a New Fiscal Pact, the top 1% of the population concentrates around 45% of regional wealth, in a context of persistently high levels of corruption. Corruption deepens inequality because it gives the corrupt greater capacity to influence government decisions and changes in legislation for their own benefit. This leads to democracies captured by particular interests and with less efficient outcomes for the population as a whole, which in turn contributes to weakening trust in democracy as a system capable of meeting, at least in basic terms, citizens’ needs and expectations. The other side of this phenomenon is the case of Uruguay. The Latin American country with the lowest perception of corruption, according to Transparency International, is also the one with the lowest level of inequality in the region and the only full democracy in Latin America, according to The Economist index. It is also, together with Argentina, one of the two countries with the highest support for democracy in the region: 70% of Uruguayans express support for democracy, compared with a regional average of 52%, according to Latinobarómetro. The corollary seems clear, though undoubtedly difficult to implement: reducing corruption requires strengthening oversight institutions and bodies, accompanied by a reduction in social inequality.

Diplomacy
China, Nicaragua bilateral relations concept background

A family state at the service of Beijing

by Martin Brown

The democratic collapse of Nicaragua has created the ideal conditions for China to consolidate a model of cooperation based on political control, trade dependence, and resource extraction. Throughout 2025, Nicaragua’s co-presidency under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has accelerated the consolidation of an authoritarian family state. Constitutional reforms in January eliminated the separation of powers, subordinating the judicial, legislative, and electoral branches to the executive, while subsequent legislation extended political terms and enabled the regime to weaponize electoral institutions against political opponents. Since 2018, the Ortega-Murillo government has imprisoned, exiled, or stripped citizenship from hundreds of critics and dismantled thousands of civil society organizations, hollowing out independent checks on power. These legal and institutional changes have transformed Nicaragua from a weakened democracy into a closed authoritarian system, heightening the risk of systematic human rights abuses and creating permissive conditions for opaque foreign economic engagement — particularly China — in strategic commercial and mineral sectors. Starting December 2021, President Ortega broke ties with Taiwan, establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, marking this “new era” by opening a Chinese embassy in Managua the same month. This decision followed weeks of the Organization of American States (OAS), United States, and European Union (EU) condemning the 2021 elections as illegitimate due to the months of repression and incarceration of 39 people, including civil society leaders and presidential candidates by President Ortega. Beijing took the opportunity to enter Managua seeking to ease the sense of intensifying international isolation for Ortega’s regime. As of 2023, Managua’s total exports to Beijing were valued at an estimated $27.3 million yet increased by almost 300 percent in 2024 to $82.1 million. Also in 2024, Beijing was the second largest exporter to Nicaragua, making up 14 percent of total imports, at $1.65 billion. Recently Beijing and Nicaragua have held over $1 billion trade deficit, acting as a lifeline of the regime’s desperate survival strategy with China as a primary benefactor. As Western pressure builds, Beijing provides capital, infrastructure, trade, and opportunities for the Ortega-Murillo regime through the commercial and mineral sector. Nicaragua has directly aided in the expansion of China’s economic development in the region and passed multiple pieces of legislation to pave a simple road for Beijing. For example, on October 30th, 2025, Nicaragua’s National Assembly unanimously passed a Special Economic Zone (ZEE) directly tying China’s Belt and Road Initiative effectively boosting influence through infrastructure and trade. The ZEE includes many perks for Beijing operations in Nicaragua, such as full exemptions from income tax, dividends, import duties for up to a decade, targeted industrial sectors for manufacturing, agroindustry, tech, and exports. The head of the ZEEs will be President Ortega’s son, Laureano Ortega Murillo with a renewed promise of jobs, poverty alleviation, and technology transfers. The President’s son heading the ZEEs reflects Nicaragua’s foreign policy focus on becoming a Pacific-Caribbean trade bridge. Moreover, since 2021, the Ortega-Murillo regime has quietly granted an estimated 300,000 hectares of land, or almost 2.36 percent of Nicaragua’s national territory to four PRC affiliated mining companies: Zhon Fu Development, Nicaragua XinXin Linze Mineria Group, Thomas Metal, and Brother Metal. These companies do not contain a track record in Nicaragua, connected to a known Chinese entity, or even have a website. Yet, they are conveniently tailored by the Ortega-Murillo regime as Nicaragua allows opaque shell companies with no track record to operate in critical infrastructure sectors. To aid Beijing’s mineral campaign, the Ortega-Murillo regime has been revoking concession rights and granting those same stripped mining concessions to these opaque Chinese affiliated shell entities. In 2022, the Sandinista National Assembly reformed Law 387 to allow concession transfers without public bidding, weaken social oversight mechanisms, and concentrate decision-making for the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This “reform” allows Nicaragua exclusive control over flipping ownership on mining concessions without warning. Separate from mining, Beijing has been manipulating Nicaragua’s commercial sector reliant on Chinas exports to Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaraguan merchants claim to face “unfair competition” as their sales dwindle, due to the explosion of Chinese nationals operating in the region. Chinese businesses have frozen the Nicaraguan market through selling inexpensive products easily accessed by Chinese nationals under the low-tariff agreements between Ortega-Murillo and Beijing. Reports reflect that China’s strategy is to exploit import benefits provided by the Nicaraguan government, allowing Chinese nationals to sell goods at “rock-bottom prices”. This strategy has allowed Beijing to completely undermine Nicaraguan businesses and take over the market. In May 2024, the Confidential reported Chinese businesses have slashed 70 percent of local merchant sales. Moreover, this increase of Chinese businesses by Chinese nationals directly translates to the growth of imports from the PRC, influencing a further expansion of the already tremendous trade deficit. This inability to produce goods appealing to Beijing markets will perpetuate further trends of high imports and minimal exports by Nicaragua, granting the opportunity for Beijing to fully influence the export capacity under the Ortega-Murillo regime. Nicaragua has rapidly stepped forward to ban media by prohibiting Bibles, newspapers, magazines, books, drones, and cameras from entering the country. This came without an official decree by the government but has still been enforced by immigration and customs at border crossings. Since 2018, 61 media outlets have been closed or confiscated with over 2,300 recorded violations by journalists, forcing 300 journalists into exile from Nicaragua. Globally, the world must continue to investigate and report the egregious human rights violations conducted by this family dictatorship. Their goal of alienating their civil populace to generate wealth for themselves and Beijing through illicit and shadowy economic efforts must face legal hearings to benefit the people of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s corrupted government continuing to weaken the foundations of their democratic institutions to favor Chinese ownership of commercial and industrial zones will freeze Nicaraguan exports in favor of dependence on Chinese imports.

Diplomacy
Dhaka, Bangladesh -November 17, 2025: Student crowds are cheering outside the International Crimes Tribunal as Sheikh Hasina was sentenced to death in a crime against humanity case, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

The Hasina Extradition: A Test of South Asia’s Democratic Values

by Alesha Mushtaq

In August 2024, Bangladesh witnessed a seismic political upheaval when mass student-led protests forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country after 15 years in power. What began as demonstrations against a controversial government job quota system quickly evolved into a movement against authoritarianism, corruption and human rights abuses. As protests intensified and security forces responded with deadly force, killing hundreds of demonstrators, Hasina’s grip on power collapsed. Sheikh Hasina fled to India in August 2024 after mass protests toppled her government. While thousands of families in Bangladesh were still searching for their disappeared loved ones. The interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has since established the International Crimes Tribunal to investigate crimes committed during Hasina’s Tenure. In a landmark decision, the tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. Bangladesh has formally requested her extradition from India, setting the stage for a diplomatic standoff. The case has become a test of whether regional powers prioritize justice for victims or political convenience. India’s decision on Hasina’s extradition will determine whether the South Asia region moves towards accountability for state crimes or continues protecting fallen autocrats, and New Delhi must recognize that genuine regional stability comes not from shielding allies who have committed atrocities, but from supporting the democratic transitions their own people have fought for. South Asia has a long history of leaders escaping accountability by fleeing across borders, creating a culture of immunity and reinforcing a free pass to everyone. Whether it be Gotabaya Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, who fled during the economic crisis in 2022 or Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, who left in 2021 as the Taliban took control of Kabul. The pattern is recurrent, destabilizing regional stability of South Asian countries. Nonetheless, the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh has issued death sentences based on documented evidence against Sheikh Hasina. India could break this cycle without simply handing Hasina over. A conditional extradition can be sought out, one that ensures fair trial standards, and would address both countries’ concerns. India could request the assistance of international observers from the UN or the Commonwealth monitoring the proceedings, ensuring the trial meets global standards. New Delhi could also negotiate for the death penalty to be commuted to life imprisonment, a condition many European countries insist on before extradition. Political scientist Ali Riaz, who has extensively studied Bangladesh’s democratic transitions, argues that “accountability isn’t about revenge, it’s about building institutions strong enough to prevent future abuses.” His research on transitional justice shows that countries which address past crimes, even imperfectly, create more stable democracies than those that sweep them under the rug. Another point to note is that India positions itself as the world’s largest democracy and a champion of human rights, yet protecting Hasina undermines these claims. India has been vocal about human rights abuses in Pakistan and Myanmar. Yet when its ally commits similar crimes, India provides sanctuary. Many predict that India would not extradite Sheikh Hasina due to vested interests. Many Bangladeshis have gone on to adopt anti-India sentiments, creating resentment in many people's hearts. India could address this issue by allowing an independent judicial review of the extradition request rather than making it purely political. Currently, extradition cases in India go through the courts. However, the final decision rests with the executive, it could mean that the government blocks extradition for political reasons. In Hasina’s case, India could publicly commit to letting its own judiciary evaluate the evidence without political interference, then abide by whatever the courts decide. This approach has been seen recently. In January of 2025, the UK Supreme Court ruled on an extradition request involving former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s associates, allowing the judicial process to run its course rather than the government making a unilateral decision. Late Legal Counsel to the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, stated famously that this “Depoliticized what could have been a diplomatic crisis” between Britain and Pakistan. India could follow a similar path. Furthermore, another point of view is that refusing extradition undermines Bangladesh’s fragile democratic transition and could push the country toward instability. The new government needs to deliver justice to maintain legitimacy. If India protects Hasina, it could further fuel conspiracy theories about Indian interference. Creating an anti-India sentiment, potentially pushing Bangladesh towards China or Pakistan for a new regional alliance. Historically, when people feel that justice is denied, they lose faith in democratic institutions. Political Scientist Ali Riaz’s research shows that countries that failed to address past crimes, for instance, Pakistan after military rule or Sri Lanka post-civil war, continue to face cycles of authoritarianism within the nation. If extradition proves too complicated diplomatically, India could support an alternative that still delivers justice. It could push for a truth and accountability commission. This model has worked in countries emerging from authoritarian rule, such as South Africa used it after apartheid, and Peru established one after Alberto Fujimori’s dictatorship. The focus shifts from punishment to documentation, as well as acknowledgement and institutional reform. Under this arrangement, Hasina would provide testimony, either in person or through live transmission from India to Bangladesh’s commission. She would have to answer questions about disappearances, extrajudicial killings and other alleged abuses. Victims' families would finally get acknowledgement and answers to their losses. Priscilla Hayner, a Human rights activist, in her research shows that truth commissions can help societies move forward when criminal trials become politically impossible. It is a way for the Victims’ families to finally be heard and acknowledged. India’s strategic interests in Bangladesh, trade routes, security cooperation and connectivity projects depend on maintaining trust with whoever governs in Dhaka. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus has recently gained popular legitimacy and international credibility. Starting this relationship but dismissing their primary demand for accountability will have consequences that outlast any short-term benefit of sheltering Hasina. Real regional stability does not come from protecting fallen leaders; it comes from supporting the democratic processes that brought new governments to power and from promoting solidarity. India understood this principle when it brought new governments to power. India understood this principle when it supported democratic movements elsewhere. Bangladesh deserves the same consideration. The extradition question is ultimately about India's foreign policy and whether it's guided by consistent principles or convenient exceptions.

Diplomacy
Ulsan, South Korea - September 28th, 2024: View of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan Headquarters, South Korea. A key player in shipbuilding, this landmark facility.

South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam show that economic statecraft is not just the preserve of great powers

by Robyn Klingler-Vidra

Make American shipbuilding great again (Masga) may sound like an effort by the US to bolster its economic strength and project power internationally, but Masga is not an American policy. It is a South Korean initiative that emerged following trade talks with the US in June. Rather than responding to the Trump administration’s tariff threats solely through trade negotiations, Korean officials saw an opportunity to show their American counterparts that South Korea deserved better treatment. They suggested that South Korea bring its shipbuilding prowess to the US. South Korea is perhaps most famous as an exporter of K-pop, cars and semiconductors. But it is also a global powerhouse in shipbuilding. The shipyard in the south-eastern Korean city of Ulsan alone produces roughly ten times more ships annually than the entire US shipbuilding industry. And as the US tries to counter China’s rapidly growing naval fleet, Korean assistance is something that is clearly needed. The US navy secretary, John Phelan, declared earlier in 2025 that US shipbuilding programmes “are a mess”. He added: “I think our best one is six months late and 57% over budget … That is the best one.” Masga was launched in August, with South Korean conglomerates HD Hyundai and Samsung Heavy Industries signing a US$150 billion (£112 billion) deal to modernise US shipbuilding capabilities. It is a clear example of a middle power, a term for countries that lack the dominance of great powers but matter because they possess distinctive industrial, resource or diplomatic capabilities, using economic statecraft to punch above its weight. Economic statecraft has largely been used to describe actions taken by great powers like the US and China to enable and restrict access to their consumer markets, investment coffers and production capabilities. The aim is to achieve foreign policy goals or national security objectives by inflicting damage on or beating the capabilities of a rival power. One classic example is the US government’s use of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine and Iran over its nuclear programme. The overt linking of economic tools like sanctions and tariffs to defence objectives in Washington’s recent national security strategy is another striking illustration of this. Middle powers have traditionally not actively pursued economic statecraft to achieve their objectives. They have instead looked to secure a seat at key tables through cooperative participation in regional and multilateral forums. But some of these countries are now asserting their power more explicitly, through preemptive moves like Masga. Using economic statecraft Taiwan is perhaps the most obvious case of a middle power engaging in economic statecraft. The country has used its critical role in global semiconductor supply chains as leverage to protect itself against Chinese invasion. Former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen referred to international reliance on the island’s chip industry as a “silicon shield” in 2021. Taipei imposes strict controls on tech sales and screens investment, particularly from China, to protect its position. And Taiwan’s industry-leading firms, such as TSMC, also invest heavily to maintain their technological edge. Vietnam offers another example. Consistent with its “bamboo diplomacy” foreign policy model, Hanoi hosts leaders from China, Russia and the US, seeking flexibility rather than rigid alignment. The aim is clear: to maximise Vietnam’s national interests pragmatically and with autonomy. With the world’s sixth-largest reserves of rare earths, Vietnam is now looking to use critical minerals as a tool of economic statecraft. The government voted to ban rare-earth exports on December 11, citing the need to reorient the sector towards domestic processing and higher-value manufacturing rather than merely the export of basic raw materials. Rare earths are essential components in numerous products that are central to our daily lives, including smartphones, semiconductors and electric vehicles. By restricting foreign access to these essential inputs, Vietnam is striving to secure its long-term position in the supply chains of highly in-demand resources. Together, these cases show how economic statecraft is not only the preserve of great powers. Middle power states are selectively granting and restricting access to their economic strengths to reshape markets and security relationships. Korea’s shipbuilding, Taiwan’s chip production and Vietnam’s rare earths illustrate this more assertive approach. They are no longer confined to reactive measures or behind-the-scenes diplomacy in regional forums or multilateral negotiations. These states are proposing economic and military partnerships, as seen in initiatives such as Masga and Tsai’s assertion that everyone needs to care about Taiwan, given how essential chips are to the world economy. Great powers are taking notice. In October, HD Hyundai and US defence contractor Huntington Ingalls Industries announced they are together building next-generation navy vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean firm will build a US navy ship. And Washington has also reportedly been courting Hanoi with elevated diplomatic status and promises of mining support. For other middle powers, the lesson is clear: identify and leverage the strategic economic strengths that other countries depend on.

Diplomacy
Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Sessão de abertura do IV Fórum CELAC-China. China National Convention Center II, Pequim - China. Foto - Ricardo Stuckert / PR Lula Oficial, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>,

China and the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

by Tings Chak

China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. On December 10, 2025, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the coast of Venezuela, carrying over a million barrels of crude. “Well, we keep [the oil],” President Trump told reporters. Venezuela’s foreign ministry called it “blatant theft and an act of international piracy,” adding: “The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed. It has always been about our natural wealth, our oil.” That same day, on the other side of the world, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (the first since 2016) outlining a vision of partnership “without attaching any political conditions.” The timing captures the choice now facing Latin America. Two documents released within a week — Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 5 and China’s policy paper five days later — lay bare fundamentally different approaches to the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine returns Trump’s NSS makes no pretense of diplomatic subtlety. It declares a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US opposition to “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in the hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere is now America’s “highest priority”, with three threats requiring military response: migration, drugs, and China. Countries seeking US assistance must demonstrate they are “winding down adversarial outside influence” — a demand that Latin American nations cut ties with Beijing. The strategy promises “targeted deployments” and “the use of lethal force” against cartels. It states that Washington will “reward and encourage the region’s governments … aligned with our principles and strategies.” Unsurprisingly, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio rushed to congratulate Chile’s Trump-inspired extreme right wing candidate José Antonio Kast, who won the presidency with 58% of the vote (the most right-wing leader since Pinochet). The tanker seizure shows what this doctrine looks like in practice. Since September, US strikes on boats have killed 95 people. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group patrols the Caribbean. As Colombian President Gustavo Petro observed, Trump is “not thinking about the democratization of Venezuela, let alone the narco-trafficking” — only oil. After declaring that a new phase of attacks could include “land strikes on Venezuela”, Trump threatened the Colombian president that “he’ll be next” as well as invasion of Mexico. China’s alternative China’s policy paper operates from an entirely different premise. Opening by identifying China as “a developing country and member of the Global South,” it positions the relationship as South-South cooperation and solidarity rather than great power competition. The document proposes five programs: Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace, and People-to-People Connectivity. What distinguishes this paper from its 2008 and 2016 predecessors is its explicit call for “local currency pricing and settlement’ in energy trade to “reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks” — new language directly addressing the weaponization of the dollar. This trend has been underway, as highlighted by the R$157 billion (USD 28 billion) currency swap agreement between Brazil and China, signed during Brazilian president Lula’s visit to the Asian country in May this year. China’s policy paper supports the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace” — a pointed contrast to US twenty-first century gunboat diplomacy. And it contains a line clearly responding to Washington’s pressure: “The China-LAC relationship does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party.” The historical pattern Of course, the focus on the “China threat” to “US pre-eminence” in the region is not new. In August 1961, progressive Brazilian Vice President João Goulart visited China, the first high-ranking Latin American official to do so after the Chinese Revolution. At a mass rally in Beijing, he declared that China showed “how a people, looked down upon by others for past centuries, can emancipate themselves from the yoke of their exploiters.” The US response was swift. American media constructed a narrative linking Brazilian agrarian reform movements to a “communist threat from China.” On April 1, 1964 (less than three years after Goulart’s visit) a US-backed military coup overthrew him. Twenty-one years of dictatorship followed. The playbook remains the same. In the 1960s, the pretext was “communist threat”; today it’s “China threat.” And what’s at stake is Latin American sovereignty. What makes this moment different is economic weight. China-LAC trade reached a record US$518.47 billion in 2024, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. China’s share of trade with Mercosur countries has grown from 2% to 24% since 2000. At the May 2025 CELAC-China Forum, Xi Jinping announced a USD 9 billion investment credit line. In 1964, Latin America had few alternatives. Today, China presents another option. The question before the Latin American people The right-wing surge across the continent is undeniable — Kast in Chile, Milei in Argentina, the end of MAS rule in Bolivia. These victories reflect the limitations of progressive governments when addressing crime, migration, and economic stagnation. But they also reflect how US-generated crises become the terrain on which the right wins. The question is whether Latin American governments (including right-wing ones) want to be subordinates in what Trump’s strategy calls an “American-led world.” Even Western liberal analysts are alarmed. Brookings describes the NSS as “essentially assert[ing] a neo-imperialist presence in the region.” Chatham House notes that Trump uses “coercion instead of negotiation”, contrasted with China, “which has been providing investment and credit … without imposing conditions.” That being said, China’s presence in Latin America is not without contradictions. The structure of trade remains imbalanced — Latin America exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods. Meanwhile, labor and environmental concerns linked to specific Chinese private enterprises cannot be ignored. Whether the relationship enables development or reproduces dependency depends on what Latin American governments demand: technology transfer, local production, industrial policy. This agenda for a sovereign national project must be pushed forward by the Latin American people and popular forces. At present, the differences between the two visions being presented of the “US-led world” and a “community with a shared future” have never been starker. This article was produced by Globetrotter. The original article is under a CC BY-SA license

Diplomacy
USA and China trade relations, cooperation strategy. US America and China flags on chess pawns soldiers on a chessboard. 3d illustration

New World Order: China vs the United States

by Manuel Alejandro Nuñez Vilcabana

Abstract This research article seeks to analyze the current geopolitical landscape, specifically the strategic confrontation between China and the United States and its impact on the international context. In this regard, the concept of the “World Order” refers to the hegemony that the United States held in the West following the end of the Cold War. Over the years, a new concept emerged, the “New World Order,” which defines the relationships that develop after a historical stage of international hegemony. The research begins by defining the variable “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order.” It then focuses on post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy, which shaped the course of the West. This is followed by an analysis of China’s foreign policy in recent years, which has generated a shift in the international paradigm. Finally, the study aims to analyze the confrontation between both countries for global hegemony through various international policies and geopolitical strategies. In conclusion, the concept of the “New World Order” for the 21st century is based on the strategic rivalry between China and the United States within an increasingly multipolar system. Both countries have defined foreign policies: the United States seeks to maintain hegemony, while China aims to create an international environment in which all participants can benefit. The conflict itself defines the “New World Order.” Keywords: China, United States, New World Order, geopolitics, international economy. Introduction Currently, there is an ongoing struggle between two powerful states that influence the reality of other countries around the world: the United States and China. These economic and military powers are at an impasse. On one hand, the United States seeks to maintain its influence and hegemony in the West, setting the agenda in international organizations and resolving global conflicts according to its own rules. On the other hand, China, which has a historical rivalry with the U.S., has become the world’s second-largest economy due to its economic development and has joined powers such as Russia and India to counter the US ambitions. The old “World Order” is in decline, making it necessary to update this category of international relations and define what the “New World Order” is, what it consists of, why it emerges, and, above all, how it could be addressed. For this reason, this research article first defines what is understood by the “World Order.” It then analyzes the crisis of this “World Order” in the 21st century, which has led to the emergence of a “New World Order” spearheaded by China’s rise on the international stage. The study continues by examining the United States and the general actions it has taken to reach this critical point, followed by an analysis of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and finally, it explores how this confrontation impacts international reality. World Order To understand the concept of “World Order,” it is necessary to begin with a preliminary conceptual analysis of its underlying roots. “Hegemony” and “Power” are two key concepts for understanding the definition of “World Order.” “Hegemony” can be understood as the midpoint between the processes of influence and dominance in interstate relations, beyond its legal content in public or international law. The term has been used by Marxist and structuralist currents, but for general understanding, hegemony is predominantly the ability to lead or direct others. This can be understood from any perspective, whether international, social, or interpersonal. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981a) Hegemony cannot be understood without the exercise of power. In this context, power in the social sphere is the capacity of one person to influence another. A person becomes both agent and object simultaneously; the one who exercises power over another has the ability to influence decisions, activities, motivations, and more. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) The hegemonic process is explained through the exercise of power. “Power”, being the ability to influence an external agent, inherently requires being prepared to surpass this external agent in order to maintain a constant exercise of power and prevent, under any circumstances, the influenced agent from reacting and obstructing the full exercise of power. Consequently, it can be understood that the “World Order” is viewed from a hegemonic structural perspective, where the power exercised by one party — in this case, a country or countries — is largely consensual. This differs from a non-hegemonic order, where multiple actors coexist and compete for dominance over others. Even so, a notable distinction exists with respect to domination, which is the factual exercise of power. In other words, domination can exist without hegemony. (Cox, 2013) Naturally, under this definition, one might assume that the “World Order” follows a linear historical trajectory, with a clear beginning, middle, and end, along with defined actors and positions. This, however, is not the case. The “World Order” is a process marked by constant crises, emerging actors as they develop economically, socially, and militarily, specific interests seeking to influence others, and, above all, a continuous struggle for being the state at the top. (Schulz, 2023) Historically, the concept of “World Order” emerged after the Cold War. Another way to understand the term is through the hegemony of a political-economic model, materialized in the social and cultural expressions of countries. After the Cold War, a “neoliberal” model was established and adopted by most Western countries to perpetuate U.S. interests. Through “liberal” or “neoliberal” policies, a process of domination or hegemony is observed. (Duque-Vargas, 2021) Over the years, academia has reevaluated global events and defined categories through historical processes, which, due to circumstances, reemerge with new actors and in different geographic locations. Today, the concept of the “Cold War” is used as a framework to understand the struggle between powers. The so-called “New Cold War” refers to the confrontation between the U.S. and either Russia or China (Sanz Díaz & Sáenz-Rotko, 2022). It does not describe warfare in the same sense as from 1947 to 1991 but rather as a model of confrontation between powers, with the U.S. as a constant actor. From a political-philosophical perspective, liberalism has been and continues to be widely debated. To simplify — since defining this current is beyond the scope of this study — liberalism is politically expressed in liberal democracies and economically in the opening of markets to the international context and the development of capitalism as an economic model. (Bobbio & Matteucci, 1981b) Today, debate persists around the concept of “neoliberalism,” which emerges from liberalism, and no definitive canon has been established. Therefore, this term will not be defined to avoid straying from the focus of the study. Finally, the concept of “World Order” adopted for this study is a fusion of the concepts previously analyzed. The political-economic model in most Western countries over the past twenty-five years has been liberal democracy, imposed by the United States after the Cold War, expressed through culture, education, language, and other societal aspects, and continues to this day. (Dabat & Leal, 2019) In summary, the concept of “World Order” reflects the understanding that the United States maintained global hegemony over the past twenty-five years. This was due to its superior economic and military capacity, which shaped the political actions of other Western countries that adopted the pre-established model (liberal democracy). This allowed the U.S. to stimulate its market, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating its hegemony. Crisis of the 20th-Century “World Order” The World Order is affected by constant crises, as previously noted, but it is currently in a phase referred to as the “Interregnum.” This definition, noted by Gramsci, is understood as the midpoint where nothing is fully defined. It is a neutral moment, where there is neither progress nor regression, reached either because the dominant forces are unable to maintain their hegemony without detaching from coercive tools or, conversely, because the forces of change are insufficient to achieve their objectives. (Sanahuja Perales, 2022) This “stalemate” generates conflicts not only between countries but also within society itself. The post-capitalist economic model responds to this issue. Due to the technological rise of mass communication (social media) and the constant need to produce to sustain the model, problems of social identity emerge. As the identity of the “self” disappears, the identity of the “we” is eliminated; society itself disappears, leaving only a sum of undefined societies with shared problems such as anxiety and depression, which validate themselves through social media that consumes them. (Touraine & Guilpain Peuliard, 2016) The “World Order” after the Cold War established a globalizing mechanism that led to a paradigm of worldwide impoverishment, which is paradoxical to the intended outcome. This can be explained by the fact that the new production model adopted by large corporations sought to regress in social standards, promoting increased profits and reduced costs. This led major factories to relocate to countries where social policies were more easily circumvented, ignoring the regulations of their countries of origin, nullifying the consequences of their actions, and impoverishing the capacity of these populations to recover economically and socially. Consequently, this created not only a model of economic crisis but also a process of global social injustice with long-term consequences. (Chomsky, 2001) It is important to understand that the 20th-century “World Order” was not only afflicted by moral issues but also by global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In this context, international organizations demonstrated their inability to prevent the very problems they were originally established to address. It is essential for international organizations to promote new guidelines that cover sensitive issues such as global health. Within this framework, the “New World Order” is characterized by a human-centered approach and common development objectives. (Caldera Ynfante, 2020) To address the challenge of identifying problems affecting the international community, CEPLAN developed a series of nine “megatrends,” which are: population aging, increased global urbanization, a poly-nodal world, growing social inequalities and persistent social conflicts, crises of liberalism and globalization, changes in disease patterns and health systems, scarcity of natural resources, climate change and environmental degradation, and accelerated technological innovation and development. While these megatrends focus on the Peruvian context, they were formulated considering international agendas such as the 2030 Agenda and prospective analyses. (Observatorio Nacional de Prospectiva, n.d.) Emergence of the “New World Order” Under these circumstances, it becomes necessary to renew definitions and ask: are we still in the post–Cold War era? The answer is no, and it is necessary to present updated sociological and international relations categories. For this reason, the term “New World Order” is used when analyzing factors such as deindustrialization, failures in multilateralism, and the emergence of new powers capable of determining and imposing new positions. (Ramírez Montañez & Sarmiento Suárez, 2021) A large amount of studies presents a central point: the United States is losing its hegemonic control. This can be explained by the policies adopted by different governments, the economic decline due to historical recessions such as that of 2008, the absence of a political model to replace the failed attempt at liberal democracy in the region, internal social crises caused by various factors, and the emergence of China as an antagonist to its objectives. (Lechuga Cardozo & Leyva Cordero, 2020) United States and Hard Power The foreign policy of the United States has been widely studied by international relations scholars. It is often the focus of imaginative interpretations that sometimes verge on the absurd. Naturally, it is necessary to study such an important country with historical and economic significance with objectivity. After the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, U.S. foreign policy took on a singular purpose: to be the world’s foremost power. This entails determining the direction of global affairs, whether through diplomatic or coercive means — military or economic. The various tools used to achieve this purpose have included multilateralism (as seen during the Obama and Biden administrations) and the radical unilateralism presented by Trump. (Domínguez López, 2021) This doctrine, however, has a history that predates the Twin Towers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the creation of international organizations, learning from the failures of those established after World War I. These new international organizations were intended to preserve peace and develop new mechanisms for political and economic cooperation. Naturally, as the victorious power of both World Wars, and in the absence of a figure of comparable stature, the U.S. determined the future of these organizations, their purposes, and their rules. (Barbé, 1995) It is therefore necessary to understand that U.S. domestic policy effectively became its foreign policy. In other words, every state seeks to maintain order within its territory, continuously develop, and achieve a peak that can be consistently surpassed. This was how the United States viewed the world: as its canvas. (Lascano, Vedia & Colotta, 2020) Theoretically, the U.S. has a clear distinction from other states regarding hard power. Hard power is defined as a country’s military capability at strategic points around the world. The United States maintains military bases in various parts of the globe, on islands and specific territories, to impose its authority. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This military power is accompanied by economic power derived from arms development. War serves as a mean to develop the American industry, whose involvement — necessary from a business standpoint, though not necessarily military — has become central to debates due to the close relationship between political power, state structure, and the military-industrial complex. (Lorden Zeddies, 2023) The US model has been vigorously copied by various political figures. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, a member of Brazil’s right-wing party, positioned himself as a “Latin American Trump.” (Rodrigues, 2019) This demonstrates the influence of American doctrine on Western countries. Bolsonaro is not the only figure in the region; others include Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele, while in Europe, Giorgia Meloni serves as a counterpart. In the most recent U.S. elections held on November 5, 2024, Donald Trump won the presidency of the White House again. This would be his second term, and his positions, rather than moderating, became increasingly radical. His slogan, “Make America Great Again,” calls for a historical revision of what the United States represented in the world, from a colonialist perspective. Additionally, his various speeches against Mexican immigrants have been characterized as xenophobic. (Bussaja, 2024) It is evident, then, that the U.S. stance continues to be one of maintaining dominance and hegemony. The New Giant: China Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. His first objective was the creation of a “New Silk Road,” referencing the Silk Road of the 2nd century that connected Europe, Africa, and Asia. This new route was designed to connect China with the rest of the world, opening its markets and leaving behind its historically insular past. (Zhongguo, 2019) This initiative also reflects the early stages of Jinping’s domestic policy based on soft power. The theory of soft power defines a country’s influence through economic strategy. In other words, it involves intervening in international markets to the extent necessary — or even obligatory — for the countries involved in the global landscape. In most cases, this is manifested through the accumulation of ports in different countries, controlled or financed by a single nation, with priority given to these key points as essential for its development. (Peña Galindo, 2018) This strategy not only promotes the economic development of a state but also enables the formulation of new political relationships. In China’s case, we see outreach to Japan, India, and Russia. (Rosas, 2008) Naturally, China initially sought to engage with these countries due to geographic proximity, but over time, and with the growth of its industry, it sought relationships with more distant nations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, China has established various agreements on economic, political, and social cooperation. However, as can be inferred, these initiatives have limitations due to China’s cultural gaps; while China seeks to open its cultural world to Latin America — and vice versa — the result is not an intercultural process but rather a multicultural one. (Staiano, 2019) This approach poses a challenge for the United States. In Latin America, the U.S. has historically held strong influence, but its challenges in various areas have allowed China to enter Latin markets freely. Countries in the region are not indifferent to China’s initiatives. The Chinese market offers cheaper products, more technologically advanced goods, and cultural visibility for the general public. (Zapata & Martínez-Hernández, 2020) A clear example of China’s soft power in South America is the Chancay mega-port in Peru. This port opens multiple opportunities for the region and the world. Asian products cost less and take fewer days to arrive. It increases tariff revenue in Peru and promotes the development of economic corridors in the region. (Villagra, 2023) Finally, China’s strategy is historically grounded in the “Century of Humiliation,” a historical period that continues to affect the Chinese Communist Party’s self-perception. Since China’s opening to the international market, measures have been taken to achieve the overarching goal: to “cleanse” its history. Communication strategies such as the “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” Peripheral Diplomacy, and its new international relations model based on win-win principles have made Xi Jinping one of the most recognized and lauded leaders when evaluated objectively in historical context. (Mazuelos Chávez, 2022) China vs. the United States The power dynamic between the U.S. and China has persisted over time. During his presidency, Obama made decisions that marked a rapprochement with China, but this paradigm shifted under Trump’s administration, which adopted a protectionist and nationalist policy line, culminating in a tariff war in 2018. China, on the other hand, maintained its party ideals, and under Xi Jinping, distanced itself from any hegemonic ambitions, promoting economic engagement with peripheral countries, respect for international organizations, and goodwill in international politics. (Barrera G et al., 2021) China’s stance is evident in the increase of exports to various countries. In multiple conferences, President Xi Jinping consolidated China’s economic openness, generating investment confidence in other countries by presenting a strong economic ally that does not interfere in domestic politics. Furthermore, economic exchanges benefit both parties. (Xu, 2021) Thus, on one hand, the U.S. seeks to protect its economy by radicalizing protectionist measures, triggering a tariff war, disturbing the international context, and increasing tensions with the Asian continent. Meanwhile, China’s economic model functions effectively as long as it opens itself to other countries, proposing alliances that mutually benefit both sides. Consequently, in the years leading up to the coronavirus pandemic, a confrontation between China and the U.S. was anticipated. By 2021, all signs pointed to an inevitable economic clash. Beyond tariff measures, questions arose as to whether China might repeat the same mistakes the U.S. made in managing hegemony, which have been analyzed over time and through unfolding events. (Gerig, 2021) Under these tensions, the U.S. emphasized that its intentions revolved more around physical warfare than economic conflict. Unlike China, the U.S. has allies that are more strategically positioned militarily but weaker economically. This is why a military agenda is promoted: in a hypothetical conflict, U.S. military capacity, combined with access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, its military bases, and its industrial complex, would tilt the balance of war in its favor. Strategically, China has greater capacity to influence peripheral markets, making it difficult for the U.S. to initiate a conflict, as it would lack long-term trading partners, discouraging its production chain. (Gerig, 2021) Eventually, both countries need each other to maintain economic and technological development. China has independently developed innovative technologies but requires a large market to justify its multi-million-dollar investments, while the U.S. keeps many of its factories in China due to low labor costs. Trump’s first-term policies were later moderated by Biden, who adopted a more conciliatory approach, opening diplomatic channels while still emphasizing the importance of maintaining U.S. hegemony. (Fernández Tabío, 2022) So, where did this confrontation materialize? By 2023, Latin America became the preferred arena for both countries. Both sides recognized its importance, and peripheral economies were the center of attention. The notable difference between the two was, once again, their engagement strategy. The U.S. took a coercive approach toward Panama, whereas China approached Peru through port investments, creating new maritime routes that benefit the entire southern continent. (Carbajal-Glass, 2023) By 2024, with Trump’s second administration, the U.S. strongly opposed the rise of Asia, returning to isolationism. China maintained its perspective of mutual cooperation, while the U.S. pursued a militaristic stance, attempting to obstruct China’s cooperative development with Latin America and India. Even so, U.S. efforts were insufficient to prevent Asia’s engagement with other Western countries. Currently, China holds significant influence in Europe, Africa, and Latin America. (Nascimento, 2024) Discussion After conducting this comprehensive analysis of the “World Order” and its evolution into the “New World Order,” it becomes clear that the struggle for hegemony occurs between China and the United States. This confrontation is primarily economic, although it has cultural, military, social, and political dimensions. It is not comparable to the Cold War, but the term is used as a representation of a past that seems to echo in the present. (Crivelaro Neto, 2024) The “New World Order” for the 21st century represents a context of economic, political, military, cultural, and social crisis. The confrontation between these two major powers defines the current trajectory of the world. Countries that lack the capacity to participate in this confrontation (peripheral economies) nevertheless become geostrategic points of contention. This is evident in the case of Latin America. The diplomatic and cooperative relationships that China has built in recent years have strengthened its ability to confront the United States. (Rosas, 2008) The geopolitical landscape is fraught with uncertainty generated by the development of the conflict itself, making it difficult to establish definitive guidelines or perspectives in the analysis. The U.S., through its foreign policy, seeks to maintain its hegemony. Donald Trump exemplifies this approach. The American perspective is to prevent any other country from determining what should be done. This approach is not only aimed at countering China, which has become its primary adversary, but also applies to other countries, including the European Union, which remains its ally. China presents itself as the leader of this “New World Order” through its alliances in Asia and Latin America because it possesses the greatest capacity to confront the U.S., withstand policies directed against it, and develop new strategies through economic and technological development, preventing the U.S. from achieving international stability. The global reality (New World Order) is, in any case, a multipolar system. Finally, the United States faces multiple challenges. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, several events have contributed to its weakening. Moreover, the Biden administration has left a significant debt to the American people, and the crisis of liberal democracies continues to deepen. Trump represents the American mindset, while Xi Jinping is its most important adversary. This confrontation will ultimately be resolved with a single winner in a zero-sum equation. Conclusions Addressing the main objective of this research, the “New World Order” projected for the 21st century is the conflict between China and the United States. This impasse, as discussed, represents a deadlock in the international arena. It is necessary to allow more time for events to unfold. In due course, a winner will emerge in this economic contest. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the United States remains at the forefront, and figures such as Donald Trump clearly exemplify the country’s continued hegemonic perspective. In the case of China, Xi Jinping’s government has marked a decisive shift in foreign policy, achieving what the reform and opening period did not: transforming China into an international market. Only time will determine whether it can withstand U.S. measures. 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Diplomacy
Flag USA and China on Computer Chip . Global chip shortage crisis and China-United States trade war concept.

Leading States in the Race for Artificial Intelligence in the Current International System

by Danna Fernanda Mena Navarro

1. Introduction: AI as a Reconfiguration of the Global Order Artificial intelligence (AI) has become one of the most influential factors shaping the contemporary international system. Major powers are competing to lead the new technological revolution that impacts the economy, security, foreign policy, defense, communications, and scientific innovation. The development of AI depends on three strategic inputs: 1. Human talent (research, data engineering, mathematics, computer science). 2. Computational capacity and access to large volumes of data. 3. Robust innovation ecosystems, with companies, universities, and aligned industrial policies. Global spending on artificial intelligence is expected to exceed USD 52 billion over the next three years, consolidating AI as the central axis of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IDC, 2023; Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). 2. Talent as a Global Strategic Resource More than 60% of top AI researchers work in the United States, and about half of them are immigrants, primarily from China, India, Europe, and Iran (Stanford AI Index Report, 2024). The so-called brain drain is not merely an academic issue, but a geopolitical one: • States compete to attract talent through visas, high salaries, and access to frontier laboratories. • Innovation in AI depends on who concentrates the largest amount of specialized human capital. The United States dominates due to its ability to attract international researchers, while China compensates through massive investment and domestic talent production. 3. The United States Leads the AI Race for Three Main Structural Reasons 1. Innovation, talent, and industry: The United States leads in high-impact research publications and AI startups (more than 50% worldwide). Private investment exceeded USD 350 billion in 2023 alone. Key companies include Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, NVIDIA, Tesla, and IBM, among others. 2. Computational infrastructure and chips: The country concentrates the most advanced computational infrastructure and controls cutting-edge chips (such as the NVIDIA H100), a resource that China cannot yet produce at the same level. 3. AI and national security: The United States allocates more than 16 federal agencies and billions of dollars annually to AI development for defense, cybersecurity, and intelligence (White House AI Budget, 2024). 4. China: The Emerging Superpower on the AI Path China ranks second globally in the AI race but follows a more aggressive, centralized, and ambitious strategy. • Massive investment as state policy: China has pledged to invest more than USD 150 billion by 2030 in AI under its Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) (Government of China, 2017). • Domestic talent production: China trains more AI engineers than any other country. Annual graduates in science and engineering reach 4.7 million, compared to 600,000 in the United States (UNESCO, 2023). However, a significant portion migrates to the U.S. due to better research conditions. • China’s role in the global AI industry: China leads in AI-based facial recognition, with generative AI startups such as Baidu, SenseTime, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent AI Lab. It produces massive numbers of publications, although with lower scientific impact than those from the United States. AI is widely implemented in governance, security, and smart cities. • The chip dilemma: China depends on advanced semiconductors produced only by Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung), and the United States/Netherlands (ASML). • Export controls: Export restrictions imposed on China since 2022 limit its ability to train frontier models, although the country is making radical investments to achieve chip sovereignty. 5. Europe, India, Israel, Canada, and Other Relevant Actors • Europe: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the Netherlands generate a solid ecosystem in algorithmic ethics, digital regulation (AI Act), and applied research. • India: The world’s main hub of engineering talent and a global provider of technological services. • Israel: A powerhouse in cybersecurity and military AI, with per-capita innovation comparable to Silicon Valley. • Canada: The birthplace of deep learning (Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio) and a strong center for basic research. 6. Africa on the AI Chessboard: Intentions, Challenges, and Opportunities Although Africa does not lead the AI race, its geopolitical role is growing rapidly for four strategic reasons. Africa is a major producer of critical minerals. AI depends on lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, and Africa holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves (in the DRC), as well as other strategic minerals in Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique. This places the continent in a key position within the supply chains for batteries, computers, and data centers. There is also a rapid expansion of digital infrastructure. China, through Huawei and ZTE, has built around 70% of Africa’s 4G network, as well as Ethiopia’s first smart data center and technology innovation hubs in Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Africa is entering the AI space through fintech, digital health, smart agriculture, and biometric systems. In terms of AI policy, African countries with formal AI strategies include Egypt, Rwanda, Kenya, and South Africa. • Threats and challenges: limited computational infrastructure, a deep digital divide, the risk of dependence on external technological solutions, the use of AI for political surveillance (as seen in Ethiopia and Uganda), and a shortage of specialized talent. 7. China and Africa: The Intersection of AI, Data, and Geopolitics China combines its role in AI with its influence in Africa through investments in digital infrastructure, the sale of surveillance systems, the construction of data centers, and technical training programs. This creates interdependence but also raises concerns: Africa could become dependent on Chinese systems that are difficult to replace. Data may become centralized on foreign platforms, and the risk of a technological debt trap adds to existing financial dependence. 8. AI, Regulation, and Global Governance The rapid expansion of AI calls for international treaties on data use, security standards, limits on military automation, and ethical regulations to protect civil society. Governance will be decisive in determining not only who leads, but also how this technology will be used in the coming decades. In this context, global AI governance has become a new field of geopolitical competition. While the European Union promotes a regulatory approach based on human rights and risk prevention, the United States favors market self-regulation and innovation, and China advances a model of state control and technological sovereignty. Multilateral organizations such as the UN, the OECD, and the G20 have begun discussing common principles, but there is still no binding international regime. The absence of clear rules increases the risks of an algorithmic arms race, the use of AI for mass surveillance, and the deepening of global inequalities in access to and control over technology. 9. Conclusions The United States leads due to innovation, global talent attraction, and computational capacity. China follows closely with a comprehensive state-led strategy and dominance in global digital infrastructure. Europe, India, Israel, and Canada contribute key elements to the global ecosystem. Africa, while not a leader, occupies an increasingly strategic role due to its resources, data, markets, and alliances. The race for AI will define not only the global economy, but also the balance of power in the international system of the 21st century. References -Stanford University.(2024). AI Index Report 2024. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2024-ai-index-report?utm_source=chatgpt.com -International Data Corporation. (2023). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Spending Guide. IDC. https://www.idc.com/data-analytics/spending-guide/ -State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2017). Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. Government of China https://fi.china-embassy.gov -UNESCO. (2023). Global Education Monitoring Report: science, technology, engineering and mathematics. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. https://www.unesco.org/en -The White House. (2024). Federal AI Budget and National AI Strategy. Executive Office of the President of the United States. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/ -European Commission.(2023).Artificial Intelligence Act. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2023). OECD. Artificial Intelligence Policy Observatory. https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/artificial-intelligence.html

Diplomacy
Prime Minister's Office (GODL-India), GODL-India <https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/Gazette_Notification_OGDL.pdf>, via Wikimedia Commons

Media statements by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of India

by Vladimir Putin , Narendra Modi

Following Russian-Indian talks, Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi made statements for the media. The statements were preceded by a ceremony for the exchange of signed documents. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (retranslated): Your Excellency Vladimir Putin, my dear friend, Representatives of the two countries, and our friends from India, good afternoon. I am delighted to welcome President Putin to the 23rd Russia–India Annual Summit. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is taking place at a time marked by several historical dates in our relations. President Putin laid the groundwork for our strategic cooperation 25 years ago, and 15 years ago, in 2010, we upgraded our partnership to the level of a special privileged strategic partnership. Over the past 25 years, President Putin has been relentless in promoting these relations by demonstrating his wise leadership and vision. Regardless of the circumstances, it is his leadership that has reinforced our mutual relations and enabled us to achieve new heights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to President Putin for his friendship and for his unwavering commitment to working with India. Friends, The world has faced numerous ups and downs over the past 80 years, during which humankind has had to endure many crises and challenges. And throughout this time, the friendship between Russia and India has successfully weathered these storms. These relations are based on mutual respect and deep trust and have invariably stood the test of time. Today, we discussed our ties and cooperation in all their aspects with a view to creating an even more solid foundation. We want to reinforce our economic cooperation and elevate it to a new level. This is the objective we share and it is our shared priority. To make this a reality, we have agreed to implement a programme for economic cooperation until 2030. It will provide for diversifying our trade and investment, making them more balanced and sustainable. At the same time, it will help unlock new dimensions in our cooperation. Today, President Putin and I will be taking part in the Russia–India Business Forum. I am convinced that this platform will also help strengthen our business ties and open new doors for exports, joint manufacture and technical innovation. Both countries have been proactive in working on a free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and our country. Our cooperation in agriculture and fertilizers is extremely important for our food security and the prosperity of our farmers. I am happy that our countries will work together to promote our mutual production of urea. Friends, Promoting connectivity between our countries is another priority for us. We will redouble our efforts regarding the discussions on the North-South International Transport Corridor and the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor. I am confident that we will effectively cooperate in the interests of promoting polar trade via local trade routes. We have offered an opportunity to strengthen our cooperation in the Arctic, which will create new jobs for Indian young people. At the same time, our deep cooperation in shipbuilding will help us boost our joint initiatives. This is yet another important example of our mutually beneficial cooperation, which is increasing the number of jobs and skills while strengthening regional connectivity. Energy security is another important pillar of partnership between Russia and India. Our cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, which is rooted in our history, has helped us uphold our commitment to providing clean energy, which is extremely important for both countries. I have no doubt that our mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of critical minerals will also be important for a safe and diversified provision of resources to the world. We also maintain our cooperation in such areas as clean energy, high technologies and modern industries. Friends, Our cultural relations and ties between individual representatives of our countries are of special importance for relations between Russia and India. Over the past decades, our peoples have demonstrated respect and admiration for each other’s cultures, and we have coordinated various measures to further strengthen this cooperation. The recent opening of two Indian consulates in Russia is a significant step forward, facilitating contacts for all our citizens and bringing our nations even closer together. This October, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims received blessings at the sacred relics of Buddha Shakyamuni in Kalmykia. I am confident that we will soon implement a 30-day visa-free regime for tourist groups, which will greatly enhance travel between our countries. This measure will not only bring our peoples closer but also invigorate our societies and unlock new opportunities. I am therefore pleased that today we were able to sign two key agreements to advance this initiative. Our collaboration will also deepen in education and professional development, including through increased student and academic exchanges. Friends, Today, we discussed a range of pressing regional and global issues. On Ukraine, India’s position has been consistent from the outset: we stand for peace. We welcome all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful, long-term resolution of this conflict. India has always been ready to support such efforts, and we will continue to do so. India and Russia have always supported one another and worked shoulder to shoulder in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the cowardly atrocity at Crocus City Hall are connected by a common, hateful ideology. India firmly believes that terrorism constitutes a direct assault on universal human values. Our unity within the global community is the only effective way to combat this evil. We cooperate closely within the UN, the G20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral forums. We will continue this essential dialogue and cooperation across all these platforms. Your Excellency, I am confident that our enduring friendship will provide the strength needed to address global challenges. Together, we can help lead the way towards a more prosperous future. Once again, I thank you and all members of your delegation for your visit to India. Thank you very much. President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. Prime Minister, dear friend, Ladies and gentlemen, My sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of India, Droupadi Murmu, to you, Mr Prime Minister, and to all our Indian colleagues for the exceptionally warm and cordial welcome extended to the Russian delegation. The discussions we have just concluded with our Indian colleagues, along with our highly productive one-on-one conversation last night – for which I thank you again, Mr Modi, for your generous hospitality – were held in a constructive and friendly spirit, reflecting the privileged partnership between Russia and India. I would note that the Prime Minister and I have established a close working and personal rapport. We have met at the SCO summit in September, we maintain regular contact by telephone and personally oversee the development of our strategic cooperation across all key areas, as well as the progress of major bilateral projects. Today, with the participation of our delegations, we conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Russian-Indian cooperation. We also exchanged views on current international and regional issues. The joint statement we have adopted outlines clear priorities for advancing our ties in politics, security, trade, the economy, and cultural and humanitarian affairs. As you have seen, this was complemented by the signing of a substantial package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental, and corporate agreements. Many of these documents are aimed at expanding our economic partnership. This is only natural, as our nations are important partners in trade, investment, and technology. Last year, our bilateral trade grew by a further 12 percent, reaching a new record. While various estimates differ slightly, the consensus places the figure somewhere between US$64 and US$65 billion. We project trade will stand at a comparable level by year’s end. That said, we believe there is clear potential to increase this volume to US$100 billion. To realise this ambitious goal, we have now agreed upon a joint Programme for the Development of Russian-Indian Economic Cooperation until 2030. This comprehensive roadmap provides clear guidelines. Our intergovernmental commission and the relevant economic ministries and agencies are tasked with removing barriers to the flows of goods and capital, implementing joint industrial projects, and deepening our collaboration in technology and investment. Today, His Excellency the Prime Minister shared a comprehensive list of issues with us. It goes without saying that both Russia and India will be extremely diligent and responsive in reviewing them. Make no mistake, we will work on this matter. Of course, having India create a free trade zone with the Eurasian Economic Union would help boost Russia-India business ties. The effort to draft an agreement to this effect is already in progress. I must express my satisfaction with the fact that the two countries have been consistent in their commitment to switching to national currencies in mutual transactions. Their share in business deals has already reached 96 percent. Our two countries have developed resilient interbank channels for lending and financial transactions. Russian economic actors have been making wider use of the rupees they generate from export contracts. Major joint projects receive their funding in Russian rubles. There has been positive momentum in our energy partnership. Russia is a reliable supplier of energy resources and everything India needs for developing its energy sector. We are ready to continue ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies for the Indian economy to support its rapid expansion. Of course, our bilateral energy cooperation goes far beyond this horizon. The flagship project to build India’s biggest NPP, Kudankulam, is underway. Two out of six reactors have been connected to the power grid, while the other four are in the engineering and construction stages. Once this NPP reaches its full capacity, it will make a meaningful contribution to India’s energy mix, helping Indian companies and households access affordable and clean energy. We believe that building small modular reactors and floating NPPs could also be relevant, just as using nuclear technology for non-energy purposes, including in healthcare, agriculture and other sectors. We are also working with our Indian partners to create new effective international transport logistics routes. This includes a project to create the North-South corridor linking Russia and Belarus to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure development along the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, including the Northern Sea Route as its main artery, offers ample opportunities for expanding bilateral trade. There are many other economic sectors in which Russia and India have built a positive track record. We are working on joint initiatives in manufacturing, machine building, digital technology, space exploration and other research-intensive domains. For example, a business agreement that was signed as part of the visit provides for building a major Russian-Indian pharmaceutical plant in the Kaluga Region for producing high-quality anticancer medicine using cutting-edge Indian technology. At the same time, Russian companies will start producing their goods as part of the Make in India programme, which is Prime Minister Modi’s flagship project. Prospects for strengthening interaction between Russian and Indian entrepreneurs and business communities are being discussed in detail at the business forum that is currently underway in New Delhi. Mr Prime Minister and I will attend its plenary session later today. Russian-Indian humanitarian cooperation is ongoing in many spheres. Our peoples have been sincerely interested in each other’s traditions, history and spiritual values for centuries. Our scientific and educational contacts, as well as youth and public exchanges are actively developing. The regular cross festivals of Russian and Indian films invariably enjoy success. Mutual tourist flows grow every year. The Russian RT channel will begin broadcasting to India today. This will certainly help the Indian audience learn more about Russia and Russians and acquire objective information about current developments in our country. Our discussions on key global and regional issues have reaffirmed the similarity of our countries’ positions. Russia and India pursue an independent and sovereign foreign policy. We are working together with our allies in BRICS, the SCO and other countries of the Global Majority to promote the shaping of a more just and democratic multipolar world order, and to protect the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. These include the right of every country to its own path of development, the preservation of its own cultural and civilisational identity, respect for sovereignty and a delicate balance of interests of all members of the international community. Russia and India, as the founding nations of BRICS, have done and continue to do a great deal to enhance the prestige of that organisation. As you know, India will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. We will provide all-round assistance to our Indian friends in their work on the current BRICS agenda. Of course, I would also like to say that Russia and India have traditionally worked closely together in the military-technical sphere. Our country has been assisting the modernisation of the Indian army, including the air defence, air force and navy, for over 50 years. Overall, we are certainly satisfied with the results of our talks. Our plans include a meeting with President of India Droupadi Murmu. However, I can already express my confidence that this visit and the agreements reached will effectively promote the further strengthening of the Russian-Indian strategic partnership for the benefit of the people of India and Russia. Thank you.

Diplomacy
PM meets Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on December 05, 2025. Attribution: Prime Minister's Office (GODL-India), GODL-India <https://data.gov.in/sites/default/files/Gazette_Notification_OGDL.pdf>, via Wikimedia Comm

Russian and India: Key Areas of Cooperation

by Alexey Kupriyanov

President Vladimir Putin’s current visit to India is his first since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. This gives it a certain symbolic weight: over the past three years, Russia–India relations have not only withstood the impact of Western sanctions and political pressure but have also developed to a degree that would have seemed unimaginable just a decade ago. The President’s trip to India serves as a consolidation of the progress achieved and a signal that the special relationship between Moscow and New Delhi is here to stay, while trade between our countries will continue to grow. Politics The political foundation of the current stage of Russia–India relations was laid in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership. Since then, nothing has changed conceptually in the political relationship between Moscow and New Delhi: neither side seeks to transform the partnership into a formal alliance. The addition of the term “specially privileged” to the phrase “strategic partnership” in 2010 only underscored that relations with India are no less important for Russia than those with China. The vector set 25 years ago has shaped the development of bilateral relations ever since. Moscow supported New Delhi’s bid to join the SCO, where India was eventually admitted in 2017, and has consistently advocated for India’s inclusion among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. India, in turn, has steadily supported Russian initiatives in international organizations and, after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, declined to condemn Russia—much to the disappointment of European and American officials and politicians who had expected moral support from the “world’s largest democracy.” The reasons that allow this strategic partnership to endure and flourish have puzzled outside observers for decades. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet–Indian partnership, formalized by the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, was usually explained through a set of entirely practical considerations: the Soviet leadership’s desire to secure a valuable ally in Asia, to establish close ties with one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and to shield itself from a potential Chinese attack—something that was taken quite seriously in both New Delhi and Moscow at the time. Had clashes along the Line of Actual Control in the Himalayas or on the USSR’s Far Eastern frontiers escalated into a full-scale armed conflict, Beijing would have faced the prospect of waging a two-front war in two remote and inhospitable theaters, with complex logistics and harsh climatic conditions. After the end of the Cold War and the normalization of Russian-Chinese relations, this incentive for rapprochement disappeared, yet it had no effect on the relationship between Moscow and New Delhi. It appears that the underlying reason is that the political partnership between Russia and India represents a rare phenomenon in Russian foreign policy practice: it is not reactive, but proactive in nature. It is not a tactical response to an emerging problem, but a deliberately constructed and carefully maintained axis designed to yield mutually beneficial political dividends in the future. At every meeting, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi reaffirm their commitment to the concept of a multipolar world. In the context of a shifting international order moving toward natural polycentricity, any country seeking to preserve internal stability and independence in political decision-making in the new era can do so only by relying on a broad network of interactions with other centers of power—and Russia and India view each other precisely as such centers. No matter how turbulent global politics becomes in the coming decades, New Delhi remains convinced that Moscow will continue to be a reliable and valuable partner, while Moscow is confident that New Delhi will stay the course of strategic autonomy and will not join any anti-Russian alliances, including military ones. Such confidence is rare in relations between major powers, and it has allowed the partnership to withstand difficult moments in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Economy Economic relations between Russia and India are breaking records: the current fiscal year’s trade turnover is likely to exceed $75 billion, a level not seen since the dissolution of the USSR. This growth has been driven by Western sanctions and the subsequent rupture of Russian exporters’ commercial ties with their traditional partners in Europe, accelerating the long-declared “pivot to the East.” It soon became clear, however, that at least part of this pivot to the East amounted to a partial “turn back toward the West.” A significant share of Russian hydrocarbons sold to India and other Eastern states ends up in Europe after being refined. India thus plays the role of a transit hub, ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of the “oil pump.” In the end, Russia sells at a discount, Europe buys at a premium, and the margin is pocketed by Indian refineries as a reliability premium amid geopolitical turbulence. This model has two major problems. First, its growth has clear limits and is extremely dependent on the broader foreign-policy environment. The record figures were reached in record time—less than three years—but Russia is now selling to India, in value terms, roughly the same amount of oil it once sold to Europe before the conflict began. This does not mean that trade growth will stop in the next fiscal year; however, the pace will clearly slow, and the stated goal of reaching $100 billion by 2030 will have to be approached gradually rather than through a sharp surge. The second problem will become fully apparent if the West either abruptly lifts or, conversely, tightens sanctions. In the first scenario, India’s role as an intermediary would no longer be needed; in the second, there is a risk that Indian companies—deeply integrated into Western business networks—may choose not to take the risk and withdraw, leaving the intermediary role to firms from other countries. In either case, trade turnover could collapse just as rapidly as it grew. To avoid this situation, and at the same time address the enormous trade imbalance between India and Russia, the very model of economic interaction must change. At present, India exports mainly agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and light-industry goods to Russia. To prevent a collapse in trade should sanctions be lifted or tightened, India’s exports to Russia must expand. The focus should be on heavy machinery and high-tech products to which Russia has lost access due to sanctions. This would benefit both sides. India would gain a guaranteed market and an incentive to develop its own high-tech industries (spare parts, electronics, and so on), which has been declared a priority under the “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” programs. Russia, in turn, would be able to secure access to goods that it cannot produce domestically in the short term. Another important area of cooperation is the creation of new production chains. Against the backdrop of declining Western investment in its economy and a clear reduction in interest from Western companies, India is in need of capital and technology. Russia, living under sanctions, needs goods. This creates a situation that effectively pushes the two economies toward cooperation and the formation of production chains in which Russia can assume responsibility for research and development (R&D), while India serves as the manufacturing base. With sufficient flexibility, such arrangements would, on the one hand, make it possible to involve companies from third countries in production, and on the other, facilitate the entry of jointly produced Russian-Indian goods into global markets. Finally, India could play with respect to Western technologies and investment the same transit-hub role it already plays with oil—serving as an intermediary through which Western companies interested in maintaining or expanding their business in Russia could invest and export to the Russian market. If this mechanism has worked for oil, it may also work for capital and technology. The only question is political will, well-developed operational mechanisms, and a clearly organized logistical framework capable of reducing transaction costs. Experts & People One of the key factors that can, and should, shape the further rapprochement between Russia and India is raising the level of specialized expertise. An expert in and of himself—whether in the Russian or Indian economy, specific industries, or domestic politics—does not produce or sell a physical good. But as a specialist, he can identify in a timely manner which goods should be sold, to whom, and where. Expert services can save companies considerable resources. At the same time, there is a clear shortage of specialists in both Russia and India, though the deficit is far more pronounced in India. In Russia, in recent years, specialized universities, responding to the demands of the moment, have significantly expanded the training of professionals who work directly with India, primarily economists with knowledge of Hindi (although the training of specialists in Indian law remains seriously underdeveloped). In India, however, there are still no academic institutions that systematically train experts in the modern Russian economy or Russian law with knowledge of the Russian language. Most universities that teach Russian studies are oriented toward history and literature. As a result, the niche of specialists on contemporary Russian realities is often filled by individuals who, in many cases, enter the field by chance and derive all their information about Russia from the U.S. and British press. In this context, training specialists becomes a top priority. This task can be addressed through a comprehensive set of measures—opening branches of Russian universities and analytical centers in India, increasing quotas for Indian students in Russia (including in the social sciences), and intensifying exchange programs. The more highly qualified Russia specialists India has, and vice versa, the more significant the impact of this factor will be. Finally, an important issue is the development of tourism. It is no secret that the flow of tourists from Russia to India is far greater than the flow from India to Russia. Some travel to India for a couple of weeks of warm sea, sunny skies, and fresh fruit in the middle of winter; others come in search of ancient wisdom or just because it is interesting to them. The inbound flow from India, however, is far weaker. First, Indians on average have less disposable income, and those who do tend to prefer domestic tourism, neighboring countries, or Europe. Second, many Indians simply have no idea what there is to see in Russia beyond Red Square and the Hermitage. These problems can and should be addressed by reducing costs and removing barriers. An important step in this direction could be an agreement to waive visas for organized tour groups. However, corresponding measures are also required from Russia’s tourism industry, above all special offers tailored to Indian travelers, who may be interested not only in the classical destinations of Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in natural and industrial tourism. At the time of writing, neither the visit’s program nor the list of signed documents and agreements had been released. Nonetheless, the visit itself is the main event: it signals that the period when the public dimension of the partnership had to be downplayed so as not to ruffle Western feathers has now passed. TEXT

Diplomacy
The Japanese and Chinese flags are being pulled apart, with the Taiwanese flag in the middle. This suggests that Japan's stance is,

Why Japan’s support for Taiwan has gone down so badly in China

by Lewis Eves

Tensions are rising between China and Japan again over a dispute in the East China Sea. Such tensions are usually over the Senkaku Islands, an uninhabited chain administered by Japan but claimed by China. The current row, however, stems from international anxiety over a possible Chinese invasion of democratically ruled Taiwan. On November 17, in her first parliamentary address since taking office in October, Japan’s prime minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that her country could intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Takaichi’s comments sparked anger in China, with state media framing her rhetoric as reminiscent of Japanese acts of violence towards China during the second world war. Beijing has demanded that Takaichi retract her comments – a call she has rebuffed – and is advising Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan, claiming there has been a deterioration in public security there. China has also introduced a blanket ban on Japanese seafood imports as the row continues to escalate. The ruling communist party, which frames itself as the protector of the Chinese nation, has long sought to reunify China following the so-called “century of humiliation”. Starting with the first opium war in 1839 and concluding with the end of the second world war in 1945, this period saw China victimised and partitioned by various foreign powers. Taiwan is thus problematic for the party. The island state broke away from China in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war, and its autonomy from Beijing contradicts the goal of national unity that the party has promised. Some observers fear that China will seek reunification through force, with some predictions suggesting it will be ready to invade Taiwan as soon as 2027. There is no guarantee that an invasion will occur. But the international community, led by the US, is preparing for a confrontation over Taiwan regardless. On the same day Takaichi made her comments, the US government announced it had agreed to sell US$700 million (£535 million) of arms to Taiwan. In this context, Japan’s show of support for a strategic partner in the region is not surprising – yet Takaichi’s remarks about Japanese intervention are particularly provocative for China. One reason is that Japan occupied and colonised Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, contributing to China’s century of humiliation. This makes Japanese threats to intervene in Taiwan’s defence a contentious prospect for China to consider. Another reason is that anti-Japanese sentiment is a prominent characteristic of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese nationalists are vocal in condemning Japan for any provocation, pointing to historical atrocities committed against China as evidence of a need to stay vigilant against renewed Japanese aggression. The idea of Japan intervening to maintain the status quo in what China considers a breakaway province probably falls under their idea of an aggressive act. Will tensions escalate? Outright conflict between China and Japan remains unlikely. It is possible that Takaichi’s remarks were simply an effort to shore up domestic political support, rather than a genuine military threat. Her rightwing Liberal Democratic party (LDP) previously governed Japan in coalition with the centre-right Komeito party. This coalition broke down in October 2025, forcing the LDP to rely increasingly on its nationalist base for support – a group that is generally suspicious of China’s growing military and economic strength. Irrespective of Takaichi’s motive, China has responded assertively. It sent its coast guard to the Senkaku Islands in what it called a “rights enforcement patrol”. The Japanese government has also accused China of flying military drones near Japan’s most westerly territory, Yonaguni, which is close to Taiwan’s east coast. Any misfire risks open hostility between the two nations. The Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands. vadimmmus / Shutterstock Relations between Japan and China are tense, yet I see cause for optimism. Takaichi has positioned herself as a successor to the late Shinzo Abe, who served as Japan’s prime minister from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020.Like Takaichi, Abe promoted an assertive Japanese foreign policy. He oversaw reinterpretations of Article 9, the pacifist clause of Japan’s constitution, to lessen restrictions on his country’s use of military force. This included passing legislation in 2015 which allows Japan’s self-defence force to deploy to protect the country’s allies. This legislation has enabled Takaichi to consider military intervention in Taiwan’s favour. When Abe entered office in 2012, it was also a tense time for China and Japan. Japanese nationalist activists swam to the Senkaku Islands and raised their country’s flag, triggering massive anti-Japanese protests in China. Tensions remained high for several years, with both countries deploying ships and warplanes to the region. This resulted in several near-misses that could have escalated into outright conflict. In 2014, Chinese fighter jets flew extremely close to a Japanese surveillance plane and intelligence aircraft near the islands, passing about 30 metres from one plane and 50 metres from another. However, once tensions passed, Abe and China’s leader, Xi Jinping, oversaw several years of relative calm and cooperation between their two countries. In fact, this is usually linked to the familiarity Abe and Xi developed through their interactions while managing their countries’ mutual animosity over the disputed islands. So, if Takaichi can follow her mentor’s lead and successfully navigate the tensions to build an effective working relationship with Xi, a more stable relationship between China and Japan in the future is still possible.