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Diplomacy
India vs Pakistan conflict concept background with flags and map in the backdrop. Political, war, trade, India pakistan sports

Comparative analysis of India and Pakistan's foreign policy through a postcolonial lens

by Sana Mumtaz

The 1947 partition of British India gave rise to two sovereign states, India and Pakistan, that inherited similar colonial legacies but developed starkly divergent foreign policy paths. These differences were not purely strategic but were rooted in how each state interpreted its postcolonial condition. While India adopted a policy of non-alignment to protect its sovereignty in a bipolar world, Pakistan aligned itself early with Western powers, prioritizing security over autonomy. These choices, driven by internal insecurities, historical trauma, and leadership visions, shaped their global engagements for decades. This paper argues that the postcolonial experiences of both countries profoundly influenced their foreign policies, with India pursuing strategic autonomy and soft power projection, while Pakistan adopted dependency-based alignments driven by survival instincts and regional insecurity. Post-colonialism and Foreign Policy Identity Post colonialism refers to the condition of states that have emerged from the yoke of colonial rule and are navigating their way toward independent identity formation, both domestically and globally. It is a political, cultural, and psychological process that involves reasserting autonomy after years of subjugation (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). For India, postcolonial diplomacy was a tool to construct an independent identity distinct from the former colonizers and the Cold War superpowers. Nehru's advocacy for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s was deeply rooted in India’s postcolonial ethos of resisting domination, militarism, and Western dependency (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan’s postcolonial trajectory was markedly different. The trauma of partition, including widespread violence and the loss of territory, fostered an intense sense of vulnerability. Lacking economic strength and surrounded by perceived hostilities particularly India Pakistan's leadership quickly sought external patrons, viewing alignment as essential for its survival. In 1954, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), receiving substantial U.S. aid in return (Ahmar, 2024). This early dependence on Western powers shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy as one centered on external security guarantees rather than autonomous diplomacy. India’s Evolving Foreign Policy India's foreign policy evolved in three broad phases: 1. Idealist non-alignment (1947–1971)2. Pragmatic balancing (1971–1991)3. Multi-alignment with strategic autonomy (1991–present). In its early years, India sought to play a moral leadership role among decolonized nations, promoting peace, non-intervention, and South-South cooperation. Nehru’s role in establishing the NAM in 1961 underscored India's desire to remain outside Cold War binaries and carve a distinct place for itself on the world stage (Taneja, 2019). However, India’s 1962 border war with China revealed the limitations of idealism. This military defeat prompted a rethinking of foreign policy, leading to closer ties with the Soviet Union. By 1971, India had signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signaling a partial alignment to protect regional interests, especially as it supported Bangladesh’s liberation (Ahmar, 2024). India’s economic liberalization in 1991 was a turning point. With its economy opening to global markets, foreign policy began prioritizing trade, investment, and strategic partnerships. India launched the “Look East” policy, now rebranded “Act East,” to deepen ties with ASEAN and East Asian powers. Simultaneously, India cultivated strong relations with the United States, particularly in defense, nuclear cooperation, and technology transfer (IRJSSH, 2024). Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has expanded its global footprint further by participating in multilateral platforms like the QUAD, BRICS, G20, and the SCO. It has also invested in soft power diplomacy, promoting yoga, Bollywood, and higher education as cultural exports. India’s campaign for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its 2023 G20 presidency signal its aspiration to emerge as a major global player. Pakistan’s Security-Oriented Diplomacy Unlike India’s autonomy-focused policy, Pakistan’s foreign policy has remained anchored in strategic partnerships, primarily driven by regional security anxieties. Its early Cold War alliances with the U.S. brought military and economic support, including weapons, aid, and development funding. However, these benefits came at the cost of diplomatic flexibility. Pakistan became part of the American containment strategy rather than a voice for postcolonial solidarity (Ahmar, 2024). During the 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted to diversify foreign ties by engaging China and Islamic states. Yet, Pakistan remained entangled in great-power politics. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another watershed moment: Pakistan became a frontline state in the U.S.-backed resistance, supplying weapons and training to the mujahideen. While this brought short-term geopolitical relevance and aid, it also sowed the seeds of extremist militancy that later destabilized the region (The Guardian, 2025). In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan again aligned with the U.S. as a key ally in the War on Terror, receiving billions in aid. However, mistrust over counterterrorism commitments led to strained relations. More recently, Pakistan has deepened ties with China through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multi-billion-dollar initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative. CPEC has transformed infrastructure and energy access but raised concerns about rising debt and reduced strategic independence (Financial Times, 2025). Simultaneously, Pakistan has relied heavily on Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE for financial bailouts. However, the country’s emphasis on Islamic solidarity has not always translated into diplomatic support—especially on the Kashmir issue—where economic interests increasingly override religious or ideological ties (Economic Times, 2025). Comparative Analysis Although born from the same colonial womb, India and Pakistan followed radically different paths in foreign relations. India’s strategic approach has evolved from Nehruvian idealism to Modi’s pragmatic multi-alignment, allowing it to maintain relationships with the U.S., Russia, and China simultaneously. It has strengthened its global standing through economic diplomacy and soft power, investing in trade, culture, and multilateralism (IRJSSH, 2024). Pakistan, meanwhile, has remained stuck in a pattern of dependency, cycling through major power patrons to meet its security and economic needs. Its alliances have often been transactional and security-driven, resulting in short-term gains but long-term vulnerabilities. This reliance on external support has constrained Pakistan’s ability to assert an independent foreign policy agenda (Cvetanovska et al., 2016). India’s soft power and diaspora networks have significantly enhanced its global image, while Pakistan’s foreign relations have been more narrowly focused and reactive. Moreover, India’s diversified diplomatic strategy has helped it gain global influence despite regional tensions. Pakistan’s narrower diplomatic focus has limited its ability to pivot globally beyond its traditional allies. Conclusion India and Pakistan’s foreign policies reflect not just their immediate strategic calculations but also how each internalized its postcolonial legacy. India transformed its colonial trauma into a quest for autonomy and leadership among the Global South. Its foreign policy matured from idealism to realism, culminating in strategic flexibility and global engagement. Pakistan’s path, however, was shaped by existential insecurity, leading to a foreign policy centered on alliances for survival. This comparative lens reveals the long-term consequences of early postcolonial choices. India’s foreign policy has grown more self-reliant and global, while Pakistan remains vulnerable to dependency, volatility, and limited diplomatic bandwidth. Understanding these divergent trajectories is crucial for comprehending the subcontinent’s enduring tensions and each state’s future on the global stage. Bibliography Ahmar, M. (2024). Post-Independence Compulsions and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. Pakistan Horizon.Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2016). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (2nd ed.). Taylor & Francis.Cvetanovska, D., Nurgaliyeva, L., & Saidov, A. (2016). India–Pakistan Relations from Foreign Policy Perspective. Journal of Political Studies, 23(1), 45–59.Economic Times. (2025). Why countries still support Pakistan despite terrorFinancial Times. (2025). Pakistan’s strongman courts the US while drawing closer to China.IRJSSH. (2024). Comparison of foreign policy of Pakistan and India during 1947 to 2023. International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3(1), 861–871.Taneja, K. (2019). India’s Grand Strategy: From Nonalignment to Multi-Alignment. Oxford University Press.The Guardian. (2025). Thawing of relations between Pakistan and the US.

Diplomacy
2025 SCO Summit - Tianjin Meijiang International Convention and Exhibition Center

SCO Summit 2025: an illusion of smiles and handshakes

by Hammad Gillani

Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization with significant Chinese influence and spans over the vast Eurasian region. Considered to be among the world’s largest regional organizations, SCO has gained immense attraction and a boost in its mission, particularly in 21st-century geopolitics.(SCO 2017) Since its very inception in 2001, the SCO has been promoting three main objectives, including regional stability (terrorism, extremism and separatism), multilateral cooperation (politics, trade, economy and culture), and a multipolar global order.(Calderonio 2025) The fundamental geopolitical dynamics have been further elucidated by the SCO summit in 2025. Held in Tianjin province of China, the SCO 2025 was a notable diplomatic event where friends and foes were brought under a common framework. By extraordinary meet-and-greets, the summit sends a clear message to the Western bloc that accepting the realities is the key to success in the current international structure. While, on the stage, the summit depicted a united multipolar world, but the internal differences between the member states reveal the illusion behind the optics. Tianjin Summit: Strategic Signaling to the West The CCP selected Tianjin city for the summit, primarily due to the following reasons: · Historically, Tianjin had been under the control of European powers. China signals the West of its supremacy by holding a summit in the same city.· Located very close to Beijing, Tianjin is a port city that represents China’s economic might.· Tianjin is a technological and industrial hub of China. It represents China's readiness to advance its vision of peaceful development.· Tianjin is also a critical junction of China’s BRI project, which further glorifies China’s growing economic significance in the international arena. No doubt, China tried its best to project its economic superiority to the west by selecting Tianjin for the summit. But this selection can be considered as China centrism by the member states. It will give rise to the feelings of Chinese brand promotion rather than collective ownership. Summit Significance The current geopolitical dynamics make the 2025 SCO summit unique. This year witnessed the revival of President Trump in the Oval Office, which altered the political and economic status quo of the international arena in a very short period of time.(Jonathan Swan 2023) The Russia-Ukraine war is still there. The Trump administration has tried its best to somehow resolve the Ukraine war, but it has miserably failed to do so. The previous Biden administration, along with the European allies, had frozen the Russian assets. In addition, the ongoing Israel-Gaza tensions have further added fuel. This year witnessed the combined US-Israel efforts to denuclearize Iran through military means. Israel has put an iron hand on the axis of resistance. Last but not least, 2025 once again witnessed a military standoff between Pakistan and India, where China provided immense support to Pakistan.(Clary 2025) Similarly, the situation in the Middle East has completely deteriorated. The 2025 SCO summit gathers half of the world’s states on a single platform with a prime motto of multi-polarity to be the sole solution to increasing crises in the international arena. In spite of all this, this summit didn’t result in any new development. As usual, the initiatives were taken but remain merely declaratory. The consensus-driven decision-making has caused serious hurdles for the SCO to deduce some fruitful results. The difference of opinion of the member states belonging to different parts and blocs of the world creates a mess that at the end cannot produce any concrete decision. Dead Economies: Response to Trump After the recent tensions between the US and India due to the tariff issue, President Trump titled both Russia and India as dead economies. In a broad context, Trump slammed the eastern powers, saying that without US assistance, their economies are considered as fatal.(Kay 2025) However, President Trump's bold claims were shattered by the attendance of 26 world leaders at the SCO summit in 2025. To foster regional and global cooperation, nations from opposing ideologies came together under the SCO banner. Furthermore, the idea that China, Russia, and India were isolated nations that the West ignored was destroyed. Instead, the three major regional titans teamed up to strengthen their connections even more. Yet, one can say that this collective response to the West is just for a stage show. It is due to the fact that SCO is surrounded by internal rivalries and differences of opinion in driving the international structure. Concerns of Central Asian states are its best manifestation. According to them, SCO is becoming more a China-centric platform rather than a multi-vocal stage. Moreover, Chinese debt trap diplomacy and Uyghur issues are also a cause of divide. Similarly, Indian strategic rivalry with China and its close ties with the West, i.e., QUAD, will always be a major loophole in the SCO. The member states know the reality that the world is heading towards Multipolarity, but the US dominance and hold in the international arena can’t be neglected. UN Chief Participation The participation of the United Nations Chief, Antonio Guterres, in the SCO meeting at this juncture also gives more strength to the multipolar manifestation of the international system. This visit is of huge importance, as Trump's political and pro-Israeli actions have caused the allies, particularly the UN and European allies, to lose their confidence. By attending the SCO summit, Guterres positively sent the message that only the new international order dominated by China could provide a practical solution to global regional peace and security. Xi, in response, showed his willingness to work with the UN.(Fisayo 2025) But his statement is more like just a symbolic gesture. This is due to the fact that SCO, up till now, can’t meet the institutional level of the UN, NATO or the EU. With weak institutional structure, including consensus-based decision-making, absence of supranational authority, no permanent parliament or court, etc., the SCO is still very far away from that of the Western security and economic bloc. Thus, the participation of the UN Chief was no doubt of much significance, but the participation has to go beyond declaring statements and symbolic gestures. East Meets West: NATO Boots in SCO NATO’s prominent member state, Turkey, participated in the SCO summit 2025.(Xinhua 2025) In view of recent geopolitical dynamics, the revival of Turkey has increased its vitality. The role of Turkey in post-Assad Syria and its continuous support to Gaza has emboldened its footprints in the region. The strained relations between Turkey and Israel further added to the duel. Moreover, in the recent Indo-Pak conflict of May 2025, Turkey played its vital part assisting Pakistan alongside China against India. President Erdogan’s participation signals to the West that nations have many balls in the air to play with. Not only Turkey, but also the Slovakian Prime Minister also participated in the summit. Note that Slovakia is a member of both NATO and the European Union. Fico has a pro-Russian view, maintaining neutrality in the foreign policies. His government also denies President Trump’s proposal of raising NATO defense spending up to 5%. Similarly, the ideological rift with the EU has further broadened the gap. While meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit 2025, President Putin praised Robert Fico’s policies, saying, “We are very grateful that you and your government are following an independent foreign policy and are not contributing to the widespread anti-Russo sentiment that is engulfing most of Europe. Right now, there are constant attempts to spread fear about Russia's alleged plan to attack Europe.”(Reuters 2025) In addition, many non-NATO US allies participated in the SCO summit 2025. These include Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia unquestionably belongs to the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). But the latest peace brokered by the Trump administration between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has reduced the Russian influence in the region. Their participation in the summit at such a critical time suggests that the eastern flank, especially the PRC and China, can’t be ignored.(Yerevan 2025) Now, it seems like there is a clear divide in the western blocs i.e. NATO or the EU, and the SCO is going to attract these divided western members. But, that’s not the only case. There is also another side of the coin. No doubt, Turkey is taking interest in eastern initiatives, but still it is not given any permanent member status by China and Russia. It is still under the observer status. This is because Turkey has been an essential member of NATO for a very long period of time. As of now, Turkey is trying to balance its relationship with east and west. It can’t simply ignore the Western dominance and, at the same time, can’t leave the rising multipolar world alone. Similarly, several EU states, including Hungary and Slovakia, have some differences with the European Union, but it does not mean that they will be completely switching their blocs. Moreover, these EU states have a very low status in the Eastern Bloc, while on the other hand, they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the EU. Sino-Indian Convergence The participation of Indian Prime Minister Modi in the SCO summit 2025 after a five-year gap was an immediate shift. India emerged as a key ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States recognized India as the region's “Net Security Provider.”(Hassan and Ali 2025) But the recent clash between the Trump administration and India over the tariff issue and Trump’s supportive statements for Pakistan have created a political divide between the two allies. Participation of the Indian prime minister in the SCO summit explicitly signals to the US that they have an independent foreign policy, and if not the US, then the eastern flank is ready to cooperate with them. And the world witnessed that both Xi and Putin welcomed PM Modi warmly, signaling to the US that they have been successful in destroying the Indo-Pacific struggle of the US against China. President Xi stated while meeting with PM Modi, “Let the dragon and elephant dance together.”(Simone McCarthy 2025) Now, this statement by the Chinese leader is just like a symbolic gesture. The realities can’t be ignored. China is continuously increasing its military arsenals and building a new military city, but where? In the backyard of India. In addition, there are border disputes between both the states. For this, the Indian strategic thinking cannot compromise its security over diplomatic relations with China. Here, the long-term vital ally of India is only the US in the Indo-Pacific. The dragon and elephant will not dance together until and unless historical grievances, security dilemma and public perception are all addressed. Institutional Limitations of SCO   US Foreign Policy Failure From the very first day of his second tenure, President Trump has been trying to create a divide between China and Russia. During his election campaign, he used to propagate a pro-Putin stance, stating that he will be going to end the Ukraine war in just 24 hours.(Hagstrom 2023) Similarly, he has given multiple times this statement that Russia is a very big power, and the US doesn’t want to strain its relation with Russia. Trump also accepted Putin’s demands of expelling NATO from its eastern borders. At the same time, Trump started a tariff war against China. He tried to get the favor of the Russian president while creating tensions with China. This policy is not new. President Richard Nixon had done this before. But the current geopolitical dynamics have completely changed as compared to the past, and this is the reason that Trump’s Nixonian version has miserably failed.(Wright 2025) In doing so, it seems that the Trump administration has lost the trust of its historical allies, including the European states and India. Despite the fact that the ongoing situation is going against the US, we can’t ignore the strategic hold of the US in the international arena. Whether it is trade, security or technology, the US is still considered to be the dominant player. The rising multipolarity has no doubt created dents in the Western system, but the dollar monopoly in the international markets is still playing its part, with many nations, whether by choice or not, conducting their financial transactions in the US dollar. Cooperation and Caution in SCO The SCO member states are somehow caught in between balancing and hedging. They not only try to balance between East and West but also between China and Russia. The Central Asian republics can’t ignore Russia, which is sitting in their backyard. Similarly, they want Chinese to invest but simultaneously restrain from overdependence on China. Then comes the case of Iran, which tends to be active in eastern diplomatic and security initiatives. The western sanctions and isolation forced it to join the eastern camp. But, due to its economic constraints, Iran does not have much say in the decision-making process. Last but not least, Pakistan and India. Both rivals try to improve their image by projecting their different stances in the Eastern Bloc. Pakistan plays its part in the SCO to gain regional popularity, but its fragile economy is again the main hurdle. On the other hand, India does a to-and-fro motion by maintaining close strategic relations with the West, especially the US and on the sidelines, not ignoring Russia completely. This creates a fractured picture, which demonstrates that the outer layer is hard, but the inner one is soft enough to be broken by just a small shock. Conclusion The 2025 SCO summit has become a landmark event where friends and foes were seen under a common banner. It can be considered a political power show where China and Russia conveyed a clear message to the West that capitalist behavior is no longer a viable option for anyone. The world is moving towards a multipolar region where there are multiple options for states to collaborate with. But, simultaneously, the internal contradictions, fractured structure and geopolitical hedging have surrounded the SCO stage. Thus, we can conclude that the SCO is more a symbolic platform where cohesion and coherence is still absent. Only the illusion of photo shoots, smiles and handshakes are apparent. References Calderonio, Vincenzo. 2025. “A Basis for Human Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence Computation.” ArXiv, 1–14. http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12498.Clary, Christopher. 2025. “Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/.Fisayo, Jeremiah. 2025. “China’s Support for Multilateralism Is Essential, Says UN Chief Antonio Guterres at Key Summit.” Euro News. 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/30/chinas-support-for-multilateralism-is-essential-says-uns-antonio-guterres-at-key-summit.Hagstrom, Anders. 2023. “Trump Describes How He Could Solve Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 24 Hours.” Fox News. 2023. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-describes-how-he-could-solve-russia-ukraine-conflict-24-hours?msockid=3238bbf1abda66eb085dadedaada6754.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.Jonathan Swan, Maggie Haberman & Charlie Savage. 2023. “How Trump Plans to Wield Power in 2025: What We Know - The New York Times.” New York Times. 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html.Kay, John Reed & Chris. 2025. “Donald Trump Slams India and Russia as ‘Dead Economies’ after Tariff Stand-Off.” 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/390be64a-1527-4f71-a322-59af41133914.Reuters. 2025. “Slovak Prime Minister Fico to Meet Xi, Putin, Zelenskiy This Week.” Reuters. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/slovak-prime-minister-fico-meet-xi-putin-zelenskiy-this-week-2025-09-01/.SCO. 2025. “General Information | External Communication | The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” Accessed September 6, 2025. https://eng.sectsco.org/20170109/192193.html.Simone McCarthy, Nectar Gan & Rhea Mogul. 2025. “India’s Modi Meets Xi on His First China Trip in Seven Years as Trump’s Tariffs Bite.” CNN. 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/31/china/india-china-xi-modi-meeting-intl-hnk.Wright, Mark Antonio. 2025. “Why a ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Won’t Split Xi and Putin.” National Review. 2025. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-prospects-of-a-reverse-nixon-to-split-russia-and-china-grow-dimmer/.Xinhua. 2025. “Xi Meets Turkish President.” Xinhua News. 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202508/31/content_WS68b44ea4c6d0868f4e8f5365.html.Yerevan. 2025. “Armenia Intends to Join SCO in Line with Its Balanced Policy - Pashinyan.” Arka News Agency. 2025. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia-intends-to-join-sco-in-line-with-its-balanced-policy-pashinyan/. 

Diplomacy
NEW YORK, USA - JUNE 21 2013 - United Nations security council hall headquartered in New York City, in a complex designed by architect Niemeyer open to public.

The UN in crisis: Justice without power, power without justice

by Francisco Edinson Bolvaran Dalleto

Abstract The United Nations (UN), eighty years after its creation, faces a structural crisis that reveals the tension between justice and power. This essay examines how the design of the Security Council, with its veto power, perpetuates an unequal order inherited from 1945 and limits the effectiveness of the collective security system. Through theoretical perspectives — Morgenthau, Schmitt, Habermas, Falk, and Strange — it is shown that international law remains subordinated to power interests, that proclaimed universality masks hegemonies, and that global economic dynamics lie beyond institutional reach. Cases such as Kosovo, Libya, Gaza, and Myanmar illustrate the paralysis and delegitimization of the Responsibility to Protect. Considering this scenario, two paths emerge: reforming multilateralism with limits on the veto and greater representativeness or resigning to a fragmented order. The conclusion is clear: without adaptation, the UN will become a symbolic forum, making chronic its inability to respond to current challenges. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, warned: “The United Nations was not created to take us to heaven, but to save us from hell.” [1] Eighty years after its founding, that promise seems to falter in the face of multiple wars, such as those in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, or Myanmar, among many others, with a sense of ineffectiveness, loss of prestige, and collective impotence being perceived: does the UN no longer fulfill the role it once assumed? At first glance, blame falls solely on the nature of the institution itself. But the root of the problem seems to lie not only in New York, but also in the main capitals of the world. The UN is nothing more than what States allow it to be. Its effectiveness depends on the will of those who comprise it; and the uncomfortable truth is that the great powers prefer to limit its scope rather than cede parcels of sovereignty. As John Rawls pointed out, a just international system requires that peoples accept common principles of justice. [2] Today, by contrast, it is a constant that collective interest systematically gives way to particular interest. The Security Council is the most evident symbol of this contradiction. It remains anchored in post-war logic, with five permanent members clinging to the privilege of the veto. That power, already met with skepticism in San Francisco in 1945, turned into a tool of paralysis. As Canada denounced in 2022, the veto is “as anachronistic as it is undemocratic” and has prevented responses to atrocities. [3] Aristotle said that “justice is equality, but only for equals.” [4] In the UN, the Assembly proclaims sovereign equality, while the Council denies it in practice: some States remain “more equal” than others. The UN Charter articulates its backbone in a few luminous rules: the prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2.4), non-intervention in internal affairs (Art. 2.7), and, as a counterbalance, the collective security system of Chapter VII (Arts. 39–42), which grants the Security Council the authority to determine threats to peace and authorize coercive measures. In parallel, Art. 51 preserves the right of self-defense against an “armed attack.” [5] This normative triangle — prohibition, collective security, defense — is the promise of a world governed by law and not by force, but it must be put into practice. In the 1990s, a dilemma arose: what to do when a State massacres its own population or is unable to prevent it? The political-legal response was the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), affirmed at the 2005 World Summit (paras. 138–139). [6] Its architecture is sequential: (I) each State has the primary responsibility to protect its population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (II) the international community must help States fulfill that responsibility; and (III) if a State manifestly fails, the international community, through the Security Council, may adopt collective measures — preferably peaceful ones; as a last resort, coercive — case by case and in accordance with the Charter. Properly understood, R2P is not a license to intervene; it is a duty to protect framed within International Law. The historical record shows both its necessity and its perverse effects. Kosovo (1999) inaugurated, without authorization from the Council, the narrative of “humanitarian intervention,” based on a supposed “legitimate illegality.” [7] The precedent left a dangerous standard: humanitarian purposes invoked to circumvent the hard core of the Charter. Libya (2011) seemed to be the “ideal case” of R2P: the Council authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. [8] However, the shift toward regime change eroded the trust of Russia and China, which since then have blocked robust resolutions on Syria, hollowing out the effectiveness of R2P. [9] The lesson is bitter: when protection is perceived as a vehicle of hegemony, the norm is delegitimized, and the veto becomes reflexive. Gaza and Myanmar display the other face of paralysis. In Gaza, the Council’s inability to impose sustainable ceasefires — despite patterns of hostilities that massively impact the civilian population — has shifted the debate to the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice through interstate actions and provisional measures. [10] In Myanmar, the genocide of the Rohingya mobilized condemnations, sanctions, and proceedings before the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ), [11] but did not trigger a coercive response from the Council. R2P exists on paper; its implementation is captive to the veto. Thus, the “right to have rights” that Arendt spoke of still depends on geopolitics. [12] History teaches that international law has always been strained by force. Rousseau warned that the strong seek to transform their power into law. [13] That is what the winners of 1945 did by crystallizing their hegemony in the Charter. And so, what Kant dreamed of as perpetual peace remains chained to an unequal order. [14] The UN, more than a republic of law, still seems a field of power. That fragility has opened space for alternatives. The BRICS, for example, have emerged as a heterogeneous bloc that combines the cohesion of historically homogeneous powers such as China and Russia with the diversity of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Paradoxically, their strength lies in articulating that heterogeneity against a common enemy: the concentration of power in the Security Council. [15] In a multipolar world, heterogeneity ceases to be a weakness and becomes a driver of plurality and resistance. The UN crisis is not only about security; it is also economic and distributive. The universalist promise of the Charter (Arts. 1.3 and 55–56, on cooperation for development) coexists with a global financial architecture whose heart beats outside the UN: the IMF and World Bank, designed in Bretton Woods, project a structural power — in Susan Strange’s terms — that conditions public policies, access to liquidity, and investment capacity. [16] The sovereign equality proclaimed in New York becomes blurred when the asymmetry of weighted voting in financial institutions (and the conditionality of credit) makes some States more “equal” than others. This is not a recent claim. Since the 1960s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and, later, the Declaration on a New International Economic Order (1974), sought to correct structural problems such as the deterioration of terms of trade and the dependence between “center” and “periphery” countries, as Prebisch had pointed out. [17] However, the results were limited: ECOSOC lacks teeth, UNDP mobilizes cooperation but fails to change the rules of the system, and the 2030 Agenda sets important goals but without mandatory enforcement mechanisms. [18] The pandemic and the climate crisis have further worsened these inequalities, highlighting problems such as over-indebtedness, the insufficiency in the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and climate financing that often arrives late and under unsuitable conditions. In this scenario, the New Development Bank of the BRICS emerges, seeking to open a path toward greater financial autonomy for developing countries. [19] International economic justice is the reverse side of collective security. Without fiscal space or technological transfer, the Global South remains trapped between development promises and adjustment demands. The UN has political legitimacy to outline a Global Economic Council (as proposed by the Stiglitz Commission in 2009) [20] to coordinate debt, international taxation, and global public goods, but it currently lacks normative muscle. The result is fragmentation: fiscal minilateralism, climate clubs, and value chains that distribute risks to the South and rents to the North. The solution does not lie simply in “more aid,” but in prudent rules such as: (I) a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism under UN auspices; [21] (II) effective international taxation on intangibles and the digital economy; [22] (III) binding compliance with the loss and damage fund in climate matters; [23] and (IV) a reform of quotas in IFIs that reflects the real weight of emerging economies. [24] Without constitutionalizing — even gradually — this economic agenda, sovereign equality will remain an empty liturgy and the discontent of the Global South a political fuel that erodes the UN from within. The truth is that the United Nations of 1945 no longer responds to the challenges of 2025. As the president of Brazil recently said: “The UN of 1945 is worth nothing in 2023.” [25] If States do not recover the founding spirit — placing collective interest above particular ones — the organization will remain prisoner of the veto and the will of a few. The question, then, is not whether the UN works, but whether States really want it to work. Taking the above into account, this essay will analyze the UN crisis from three complementary dimensions. First, the theoretical and philosophical framework that allows us to understand the tension between power and law will be addressed, showing how different authors highlight the structural roots of this contradiction. Second, historical episodes and current examples will be reviewed to illustrate the paralysis and democratic deficit of the organization. Finally, possible scenarios for the future will be projected, engaging in the exercise of evaluating the minimum reforms that could revitalize multilateralism in contrast to the alternative of critical global fragmentation. Considering all together, the argument is that the UN finds itself trapped between justice without power and power without justice, and that its survival depends on its ability to adapt to an international order radically different from that of 1945. I. The contradiction between power and law: Hans Morgenthau and political realism To understand the paralysis of the UN, it is useful to turn to Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer of realism in international relations. In his work “Politics Among Nations” (1948), he warned that the international order is always mediated by the balance of power and that legal norms only survive to the extent that they coincide with the interests of powerful States. [26] His idea is provocative: international law is not an autonomous order, but a language that powers use so long as it does not contradict their strategic objectives. Applied to the UN, this analysis is clear: the institution reflects less universal ethical commitment and more correlation of historical forces. The Security Council is not a neutral body, but the mirror of the hegemony of 1945, crystallized in Article 27 of the Charter, which enshrines the right of veto. The supposed universality of the UN is subordinated to a mechanism designed precisely to ensure that no action contrary to the superpowers could be imposed. Contemporary critiques confirm Morgenthau’s intuition. When Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine, [27] or the United States does the same regarding Gaza, [28] it becomes evident that international justice is suspended in the name of geopolitics. The legal is subordinated to the political. In this sense, the UN crisis is not an accident, but the logical consequence of its design, and what Morgenthau pointed out seventy years ago remains valid: as long as there is no coincidence between law and power, international norms will remain fragile. Political realism helps explain why the UN fails when it is most needed. States continue to act according to their national interests, even when this contradicts the international norms they themselves have subscribed to. The Security Council has become a space where powers project their strategies of influence, blocking collective actions whenever these affect their geopolitical priorities. The war in Ukraine, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide show that international law is applied selectively, reinforcing the idea that rules are valid only when they do not interfere with the power of the strongest. This pattern evidently erodes the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of societies, because it generates the perception that the organization is incapable of representing the collective interest and, instead, merely reflects the correlation of forces of each historical moment. II. Carl Schmitt and the Myth of Universal Order Another voice that resonates is that of Carl Schmitt, who in “The Nomos of the Earth” (1950) argued that every international legal order arises from a founding political decision, that is, an act of power. [29] For Schmitt, there is no “universal law” that imposes itself; what is presented as universal is, in reality, the crystallization of a particular domain. The UN perfectly embodies this diagnosis. The founding discourse of San Francisco in 1945 spoke of “we the peoples of the United Nations,” [30] but in reality the Charter was written under the predominance of the winners of the Second World War. What was presented as a universal order of peace and security was, in fact, the codification of the Allied hegemony. Schmitt helps explain why the UN has never escaped that original logic. Although the General Assembly proclaims sovereign equality in Article 2 of the Charter, the structure of the Council reproduces the privilege of a few. [31] The international law of the UN appears, in Schmittian terms, as a “nomos” imposed by the winners, not as a true universal community. The consequence is a legitimate deficit that has persisted until today and explains much of the perception of ineffectiveness. The original structure of the UN perpetuates an unequal design that remains in force. The veto privilege is not only a defensive mechanism for the winners of the Second World War, but it has also functioned as a lock — one without keys — that prevents any real evolution of the system. Over eight decades, demands for reform have clashed with the resistance of those who benefit from keeping the rules intact. The contradiction is evident: developing States, which today represent the majority in the General Assembly, lack effective power in the most important decisions on international security. The gap between the universalist discourse of sovereign equality and the hierarchical practice of the Council undermines the credibility of the multilateral order. As long as this tension persists, the UN will hardly be able to become the space of global governance that the world requires more urgently than ever in the 21st century. III. Habermas and the Need for a Deliberative Community In contrast to this pessimism, Jürgen Habermas offers a different perspective. In “The Inclusion of the Other” (1996) and in later essays, he proposed moving toward a “constitutionalization of international law,” understood as the creation of a global normative space in which decisions are not based on force, but on rational deliberation. [32] From this perspective, the UN would be an imperfect embryo of a community of world citizens. The impact of this idea is enormous: it suggests that, beyond current deadlocks, the UN embodies the possibility of transforming power relations into processes of public deliberation. Article 1 of the Charter, which speaks of “maintaining international peace and security” and of “promoting friendly relations among nations,” can be read not only as a political mandate but also as a normative ideal of cosmopolitan coexistence. [33] Criticism of Habermas is evident: his proposal errs on the side of idealism in a world where national security interests remain paramount. However, his contribution is valuable because it allows us to think of the UN not only as a paralyzed body but also as a field of normative struggle. The problem is not only the strength of the vetoes but also the lack of will to transform that space into a true deliberative forum. [34] Thinking of the UN as a deliberative community requires recognizing that its current procedures do not guarantee authentic dialogue. Debate in the General Assembly is often reduced to formal statements, while crucial decisions, as everyone knows, are taken in restricted circles. The lack of effective mechanisms for the participation of non-state actors, such as regional organizations or civil society, further limits the inclusive character of the institution. Genuine deliberation should open spaces where multiple voices can influence decision-making processes, not only through speeches but by building binding consensus. However, the most powerful States fear losing control over the international agenda, which generates a vicious circle: an elitist governance system is maintained that protects privileges, but at the cost of sacrificing legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, the promise of a deliberative order is reduced to a normative horizon that has not yet been realized. IV. Richard Falk and the Global Democratic Deficit A more recent contribution comes from Richard Falk, jurist and former UN rapporteur, who has insisted on the “democratic deficit” of the international order. In his view, the UN suffers from a structural contradiction: while the Charter proclaims the sovereignty of peoples, in practice it concentrates power in a small club of States. [35] This not only limits its effectiveness but also erodes its legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of the world. The case of Palestine is emblematic. The General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but the veto in the Council blocks any effective measure. [36] Falk interprets this as evidence that the UN operates under a “democracy of States” but not under a “democracy of peoples.” The impact is devastating: millions of people perceive the organization not as a guarantor of rights, but as an accomplice to inequality. This leads us to a brief analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC), born from the Rome Statute (1998), which promised a civilizational breakthrough: that the most serious crimes (“which affect the international community as a whole”) would not go unpunished. [37] Its design is cautious: complementarity (it acts only if the State is unwilling or unable), restricted jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and — with limits — aggression), and jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or referral by the Security Council. The two major milestones of the Council — referrals of Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011) —demonstrated both the potential and the limits. There were procedural advances and arrest warrants, but also contested operative clauses and very little cooperation for arrests. [38] The implicit message to the Global South was ambiguous: justice is universal, but its activation depends on the map of alliances in the Council. At the same time, key powers are not parties to the Statute (United States, China, Russia) and yet influence when the Court acts. The result fuels the argument of “winners’ justice” that several African foreign ministries have raised. The Court has tried to rebalance its map: investigations in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Ukraine, as well as arrest warrants against high-ranking authorities in cases of aggression or serious international crimes, have partly disproved the idea of a one-sided persecution. But the Achilles’ heel persists: without State cooperation, there are no executions of warrants; without the Council, there is no activation in key contexts; with the Council, there is a veto. In addition, Article 16 of the Statute allows the Council to suspend investigations for 12 renewable months, a political valve that subordinates the judicial to the geopolitical. [39] Integrating Falk’s critique into this essay makes it possible to highlight that the UN crisis is not only institutional but also democratic. Article 1.2 of the Charter proclaims respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, but this ideal becomes empty when the veto power systematically contradicts it. [40] The democratic deficit of the UN is not limited to the Security Council but runs through the entirety of its institutional architecture. Developing countries have little influence on global economic governance, despite being the most affected by decisions on debt, trade, or climate financing. Unequal representation in bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, together with dependence on international cooperation, reproduces relations of subordination that contradict the principles of equality and self-determination. Moreover, world citizenship lacks a real channel of influence: peoples see their demands diluted in state structures that do not always — or almost never — reflect their needs. This divorce between peoples and States turns the UN into an incomplete democracy, where the most vulnerable collective subjects fail to make their voices heard. Overcoming this limitation is essential to restoring the legitimacy of multilateralism. V. Susan Strange and the Geopolitics of the Economy Finally, Susan Strange adds another dimension: the economic one. In “The Retreat of the State” (1996), she argued that power in the contemporary world does not reside only in States, but also in transnational forces — financial markets, corporations, technologies — that escape institutional control. [41] The UN, designed in 1945 under the logic of sovereign States, lacks instruments to govern this new scenario. The impact is evident. While the Security Council is paralyzed in debates over traditional wars, global crises such as climate change, pandemics, or the regulation of artificial intelligence show that real power has shifted toward non-state actors. [42] Strange warns that if international institutions do not adapt to this reality, they risk becoming irrelevant. In this sense, the UN faces not only a problem of veto or representativeness, but also a historical mismatch: it was designed for a world of States and conventional wars, but today we live in a world of transnational interdependencies. The Charter, in its Article 2.7, continues to emphasize non-interference in the internal affairs of States, but this clause seems insufficient to govern global threats that transcend borders. [43] And it is vitally important to note that the global threats of the 21st century do not fit the traditional paradigm of interstate wars that has been preconceived. Challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and technological revolutions pose risks that no State can face alone. However, the UN lacks effective mechanisms to coordinate global responses in these areas. The fragmentation of climate governance, competition for vaccines during the pandemic, and the absence of clear rules to regulate large digital corporations illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. In this context, state sovereignty proves insufficient, and the principle of non-interference becomes obsolete. If the UN does not develop innovative instruments that integrate transnational actors and strengthen multilateral cooperation, it risks becoming a merely declarative forum, incapable of offering concrete solutions to the problems that most affect contemporary humanity — and it is important that these critiques be heard before it is too late. VI. Current Scenarios All the above opens up a momentous dilemma of our time: either we reform multilateralism so that law contains “force,” or we normalize “exception” forever. [44]Scenario A: A minimal but sufficient cosmopolitan reform. A critical group of States —supported by civil society and epistemic communities — agrees to self-limit the veto in situations of mass atrocities (ACT-type codes of conduct), promotes the expansion of the Council with some permanent presence of the Global South (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and one African seat, probably South Africa), and strengthens “Uniting for Peace” mechanisms to circumvent blockages. [45] The ICJ gains centrality with advisory opinions politically bound by prior compliance commitments, the ICC ensures interstate cooperation through regional agreements, and the UN creates a rapid civil deployment capacity for the protection of civilians, minimal cybersecurity, and climate response. [46] In the economic sphere, a Global Economic Council emerges within the orbit of the UN to coordinate debt, climate, and international taxation with common standards. [47] Scenario B: Ordered fragmentation of anarchy. Blockages become chronic. Security shifts to ad hoc coalitions and minilateralisms (NATO Plus, QUAD, expanded BRICS), economic governance is decided in restricted membership forums, and the UN remains a symbolic forum without decision-making capacity. [48] Exception becomes the rule: “preventive interventions,” widespread unilateral sanctions, proliferation of private military companies, opaque cyber-operations, and a data ecology controlled by a few platforms. [49] International law endures as a language, but its social force dissipates; incentives push toward strategic autonomy and legal security by blocs. In other words, the future of the UN will depend on its ability to balance justice and force in an international environment marked by multipolarity. I insist that one possible path is to advance toward gradual reforms that strengthen transparency, broaden the representativeness of the Council, and grant greater autonomy to the General Assembly and judicial bodies. Another, far more radical, is the consolidation of parallel mechanisms that de facto replace the role of the UN through regional alliances, ad hoc coalitions, and alternative economic forums. Both paths involve risks: reform may stagnate in the lowest common denominator, while fragmentation may deepen inequalities and conflicts. However, what seems clear is that maintaining the status quo will only prolong paralysis and further weaken the legitimacy of the multilateral system. The choice between reform or irrelevance will, ultimately, be the decisive dilemma of the 21st century. I believe that three milestones will indicate where we are headed: (1) effective adoption of commitments to abstain from vetoes in the face of mass atrocities; (2) funded and operational implementation of the climate loss and damage mechanism; (3) cooperation with the ICC in politically sensitive cases, without ad hoc exceptions. [50] VII. Conclusion: Between Disillusionment and Hope The UN marks eighty years caught in Pascal’s dilemma: “force without justice is tyranny, justice without force is mockery.” [51] The diagnosis is clear: the Security Council has turned justice into a mockery, while the great powers have exercised force without legitimacy. [52] The result is a weakened organization, incapable of responding to the most urgent tragedies of our time. However, it would be a mistake to fall into absolute cynicism. Despite its evident limitations and alongside all that has been mentioned, the UN remains the only forum where 193 States engage in dialogue, the only space where there exists even a minimal notion of common international law. [53] Its crisis should not lead us to abandon it, but rather to radically rethink it. Perhaps the path lies in what Habermas calls a “constitutionalization of international law,” as previously proposed, or in a profound reform of the Security Council that democratizes the use of force. [54] History teaches that institutions survive if they manage to adapt. [55] If the UN does not, it will be relegated to the status of a giant that humanity needs but that is paralyzed, a symbol of a past that no longer responds to the challenges of the present. [56] But if States recover something of the founding spirit of 1945, perhaps it can still save us from hell, even if it never takes us to heaven. [57] VIII. References [1] Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld. Citado en Brian Urquhart. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[2] John Rawls. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.[3] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[4] Aristóteles. Política. Traducido por Antonio Gómez Robledo. México: UNAM, 2000.[5] Naciones Unidas. Carta de las Naciones Unidas. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 26 de junio de 1945.[6] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin, 1968.[8] Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003.[9] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[10] Susan Strange. States and Markets. London: Pinter, 1988. 11. Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.[12] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.[13] Martha Finnemore. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.[14] Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.[15] Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.[16] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[17] Joseph Nye. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.[18] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[19] Robert Keohane y Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.[20] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[21] Stephen Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.[22] Robert Cox. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.[23] Robert Cox. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.[24] Charles Kindleberger. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.[25] John Ikenberry. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.[26] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[27] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[28] Michael Doyle. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.[29] Charles Beitz. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.[30] Andrew Moravcsik. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53[31] Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.[32] Friedrich Kratochwil. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.[33] Nicholas Onuf. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.[34] Christian Reus-Smit. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.[35] Martha Finnemore y Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.[36] Michael Barnett y Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.[37] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[38] Allen Buchanan y Robert Keohane. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405–37.[39] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[40] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.[41] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[42] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[43] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[44] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[45] Corte Internacional de Justicia. Advisory Opinions. La Haya: CIJ, varios años.[46] Naciones Unidas. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A/59/565, 2 December 2004.[47] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[48] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[49] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[50] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[51] Blaise Pascal. Pensées. París: Éditions Garnier, 1976.[52] Brian Urquhart. Hammarskjöld. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[53] Naciones Unidas. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 1945.[54] Jürgen Habermas. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.[55] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[56] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[57] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Diplomacy
President of Russia Vladimir Putin meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2025)

Why Xi, Putin and Kim on One Stage Matters

by Roie Yellinek

Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

Diplomacy
President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping together at SCO Summit

India’s strategic reset in Tianjin

by Harsh V. Pant , Atul Kumar

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin turned out to be the largest gathering in the institution’s history, convening 20 foreign leaders and 10 heads of international organisations, including United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. More than a display of institutional breadth, the summit served as a stage for geopolitical signalling, most visibly through the joint presence of the leaders of China, India, and Russia. Their highly choreographed meetings were designed for maximum optics and deployed as deliberate instruments of international messaging, reflecting the emergence of a multipolar world. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the summit provided an opportunity to engage closely with both India and China while demonstrating that Moscow is not bereft of partners. Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed to use the occasion to burnish his credentials as the architect of an emergent political and economic order. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, conveyed a distinct and calculated message — that Indian foreign policy is rebalancing its strategic relations with the world’s major powers and restoring its posture to the centre. In doing so, New Delhi is translating its long-proclaimed doctrine of multi-alignment into practice, positioning itself as a pivotal actor in an increasingly multipolar system. Strategic Leverage  Since the end of the Cold War, Indian foreign policy has been adjusting by building its ties with the West in general and the US in particular. To illustrate in just one domain, New Delhi has purchased an array of advanced US systems, including C-17 and C-130 strategic airlift aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol planes, Chinook, Apache, and MH-60R helicopters, F404/414 engines, and MQ-9 drones, transactions that together totalled $24 billion between 2000 and 2024. This surge in US acquisitions has coincided with a marked decline in Russian influence: Moscow’s share of India’s arms imports fell from 76 per cent during 2009–2013 to just 36 per cent over the past five years. India’s pivot toward the US, and its rapid defence and economic diversification have kept Beijing on edge. During the Cold War, China extracted substantial strategic and economic benefits while playing a swing-state role between Washington and Moscow. Today, Chinese observers worry that India may play a similar role as its vaunted strategic autonomy has given way to a de facto US alignment, visible in defence procurement, economic cooperation, and a network of mini-laterals aimed at constraining Beijing. However, this narrative has softened somewhat after President Trump imposed a 50 per cent tariff on Indian exports, introducing a note of friction into the US-India equation. Against this backdrop, New Delhi and Beijing, cautiously engaging since the 2024 Kazan Summit, have stepped up their rapprochement efforts. At their bilateral meeting in Tianjin, both sides signalled a clear desire to restore stability and predictability: The focus on peace along the border and rebuilding mutual trust was unmistakable. Mr Xi emphasised strengthened communication, expanded exchanges, and multilateral cooperation, all aimed at returning bilateral relations to a pre-2020 baseline. Mr Modi, visiting China after seven years, framed a peaceful border as essential to the smooth development of the broader relationship. He also ensured that counterterrorism remained front and centre at the SCO, with the final Tianjin Declaration explicitly and emphatically condemning the Pahalgam terror attack in India. Structural Tension Vs Strategic Triangulation Beneath the polished optics, the India-China standoff remains unresolved. Around 60,000 troops on each side still face off along the Line of Actual Control, and Tianjin offered no concrete road map for demobilisation or border delimitation. Disputes over Pakistan, Tibet, and Taiwan persist, a reminder that diplomacy cannot paper over deep strategic fissures. Strategic triangulation adds another layer of complexity. Both capitals have long leveraged ties with third powers to boost bargaining power and extract economic or diplomatic advantage. Beijing seeks a show of unity with India against Washington’s tariffs but remains wary: If New Delhi secures a better deal, alignment with the US is always on the table. Institutionally, the SCO continues to lag behind Brics in global visibility, yet its operational significance is rising. China’s trade with SCO members hit $512.4 billion in 2024, doubling the 2018 level. Therefore, Mr Xi’s advocacy for a “new type of international relations”, coupled with initiatives such as the SCO Development Bank and multilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy, reflects a strategic calculus: to insulate Beijing from the volatility of Washington while steering the engines of future economic growth. Ultimately, the India-China meeting in Tianjin exemplified a nuanced balancing act: cooperation where feasible, vigilance where imperative, and a stark reminder that even as optics improve, the underlying geopolitical chessboard remains fiercely contested. Conclusion Mr Modi’s Tianjin visit and his meeting with Mr Xi signalled New Delhi’s growing international leverage. The summit remains low on concrete agreements, but it revitalised efforts to normalise ties and restart Chinese investment in India. Therefore, visa restrictions are loosening, direct flights are set to resume, and barriers to Chinese exports of fertiliser, machinery, and rare earths are gradually falling. Beneath the diplomatic optics, however, structural competition between India and China persists. Nevertheless, New Delhi is carefully striving to avoid overreliance on Washington, resisting a return to single-nation dependency. The India-China-Russia camaraderie on display in Tianjin sends a deliberate signal: Indian foreign policy will not be shy to reclaim its centrist, multi-aligned stance, leveraging strategic autonomy to navigate a complex, multipolar world. This commentary originally appeared in Business Standard.

Diplomacy
Kim and Trump shaking hands at the red carpet during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit 2018

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Trump 2.0: Another cycle with new attributes?

by Jesús de los Ángeles Aise Sotolongo

Abstract Never before had a sitting U.S. president managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, nor had any leader from Pyongyang sat face-to-face with a sitting U.S. president during their term as Kim Jong Un did. With Trump’s potential return, could there be another cycle of rapprochement? This paper seeks to address this question. The failure of the previous negotiating cycle, the DPRK’s advances in deterrence, and shifts in peninsular, regional, and global circumstances suggest that both leaders might bring new attributes to their interactions, potentially yielding surprising outcomes Introduction Except for a few moments of rapprochement, since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), U.S. administrations have maneuvered with various forms and methods to destabilize its political and economic system. And since Pyongyang decided to develop nuclear weapons, Washington has labeled them illegal, demanding that they be abandoned, sponsoring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, and implementing strict unilateral penalties. Meanwhile, successive DPRK leaders have persevered in a military doctrine based on the development of nuclear deterrence to guarantee national defense and security. Nevertheless, an unprecedented moment that broke with that persistent circumstance took place during Donald Trump’s previous term, when the relationship shifted from “fire and fury” to successive summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019, in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. The exchange of insults — Trump calling Kim “little rocket man” and Kim referring to Trump as a “dotard” — mutated into their approaching one another as “pen pals.” This surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK temporarily, though without the expected results, loosened the “Korean Gordian knot.” No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, and in history, no North Korean leader had ever stood face-to-face, on equal footing, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did. Former President Barack Obama delivered several appealing speeches, but he seemed weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea, calling it “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its weapons and nuclear programs (Kausikan, 2025). For his part, at the beginning of his term, Joe Biden announced a “new strategy” toward the DPRK that never materialized; he pleaded for dialogue with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously increasing war threats; he grouped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into an ideological category that resurrected the Bush-era notion of the “axis of evil.” Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored the differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of integration into the global economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea (Kausikan, 2025). The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances, obstacles, and expectations for a new cycle of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Development This second term of President Donald Trump, more transactional and less predictable, seems to be raising expectations of reducing confrontational stress on the Korean Peninsula, and everything indicates that it brings with it a modification of Washington’s policy toward the DPRK. This is conditioned by the following radical changes in strategic circumstances compared to his previous term: DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have undergone new and sophisticated advances. The DPRK has broken all ties and symbols of its relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as its “principal and unchanging enemy.” Declaring that it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the Korean People’s Army to accelerate preparations to “occupy, subdue, and completely reclaim” South Korea. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two Kim Jong Un–Vladimir Putin summits, and Kim’s reference to Putin as his “closest comrade,” have shown the very high level of understanding and commitment between the parties. This is reflected in the DPRK’s unrestricted support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures, which includes a “mutual military assistance” clause. Meanwhile, Russia supports the DPRK diplomatically and economically, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports — essentially oil, raw materials, and food — as well as providing assistance in various fields. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis has been taking shape among China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies describe it as a “new axis.” Within this interconnection, the DPRK holds important advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. The removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his irresponsible Martial Law is reinforcing the possibility of a new government led by the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae Myung as the clear favorite and, as of today, more likely to win. [1] This would open the door to a revival of North–South détente reminiscent of the Moon Jae In era. Trump’s foreign policy objectives are based on his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) vision — now reinforced — which prioritizes U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments (e.g., South Korea and Japan). At least these six factors seem to be significantly influencing Donald Trump’s decision to return to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. While the DPRK occupies a relatively lower position on Trump’s list of priorities (with China and the Russia–Ukraine conflict taking precedence), and dialogue does not appear imminent, he has made it clear that he would like to reconnect with Kim Jong Un, seems willing to reopen negotiations, and is evaluating and discussing possible avenues of interaction that could lay the groundwork for a potential summit. It is said that Washington has been holding discreet conversations with Pyongyang, consulting external experts, and considering options to potentially restart dialogue. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un — clearly more assertive and militarily more powerful in Washington’s eyes — has not publicly shown any willingness to renew his earlier offers related to denuclearization. In his own words: “the DPRK’s nuclearization is non-negotiable,” and he continues to exert pressure by showcasing the country’s missile–nuclear power. This has been illustrated unequivocally and consistently when Kim Jong Un visited nuclear material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and January 2025. For the DPRK, survival is an existential matter, and Pyongyang considers its nuclear–missile programs absolutely indispensable to secure it; there is nothing we can see that would persuade or force it to renounce them, as that would imply regime change. Everything indicates that the U.S. president is aware that his counterpart has not yet overcome the discouragement caused by the failure of the previous negotiation process, and for that reason, he is sending increasingly precise messages about the possibility of renewed talks, while boasting of his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. At the same time, however, Pyongyang continues to issue contradictory signals of distrust toward Washington, in response to the confrontational attitude and the increasingly close military and intelligence ties with the DPRK’s immediate neighbors. It is worth noting that, this past February, the U.S. sent a nuclear submarine and several B-1B bombers to South Korea; U.S. military forces carried out multiple war exercises, including live-fire drills along the Demilitarized Zone, as well as heavy bombing maneuvers and even space force operations. In March, a large-scale scheduled exercise took place—70 percent larger than the one held the previous year. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of 2024 the DPRK leadership decided to create a certain margin of diplomatic maneuver in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration. The coverage given to Trump’s inauguration on January 22 marked a shift from Pyongyang’s initial decision to remain silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections in November. Moreover, this information was published in media outlets aimed at both domestic and international audiences, suggesting that North Korea has begun preparing its people for a new approach to Trump, when appropriate. Despite the steady flow of official statements and media commentary criticizing the United States, anti-American rhetoric has become somewhat less intense. Notably, the use of the expression “U.S. imperialists” has significantly decreased since then. This is also true of Kim’s public statements, which are considered the most authoritative in North Korea. For example, Kim’s speech at the Ministry of Defence on February 8 was the harshest and most detailed on the United States since his speech at a national defence exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in many of his previous speeches at defence-related venues or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “U.S. imperialists.” In fact, the last reported use by Kim of the term “U.S. imperialists” was in his defence exhibition speech last November. While there has been a rise in criticism of the United States since early February, as demonstrated by a series of “KCNA commentaries,” the broader trend since December still holds. The media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when criticizing U.S. statements or actions. When issuing criticism, they have only referred to “the new U.S. administration,” “the current administration,” or the “U.S. ruler.” KCNA’s commentary on February 12 regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “current U.S. administration” for the plan to take control of Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. All these articles were published in outlets aimed at domestic audiences, likely because they addressed foreign policy issues not directly relevant to North Korea. In contrast, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of Rubio’s statement about the “rogue state” was only published on external websites and not disseminated to the domestic audience. This allowed Pyongyang to register its rejection of the statement to external audiences while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home. Pyongyang also appears to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking while it awaits the new Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. Its Ministry of Defence stated that the United States was “openly ignoring the DPRK’s security concerns” in reference to a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that entered a South Korean port — an unusually direct accusation that the United States “ignores” its security concerns. If we consider the reverse side of this message (do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns), it is in fact a call from Pyongyang to the new administration to take its “security concerns” into account in its policy toward North Korea (Minyoung Lee, 2025). We can therefore see some Trumpist signals that could prove attractive to Pyongyang’s leadership: Repeated references by the U.S. president, describing the DPRK as a “nuclear power,” a concept recently reinforced when he qualified it as a “great nuclear power.” It is noteworthy that very recently U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the expression “nuclear-armed state” to refer to the DPRK, implicitly admitting Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. This comment suggests that the U.S. is unofficially considering the DPRK as a nuclear-armed nation, just as it does with India, Pakistan, and Israel. There are signs of a strategic shift aimed at overcoming deadlock and building trust by moving from denuclearization as the priority toward nuclear security. In other words, instead of demanding denuclearization, the focus would be on improving the safety of nuclear facilities — such as preventing accidents, leaks, or proliferation risks to third countries — through active bilateral technical cooperation that aligns reciprocal interests. The decisions that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, when the U.S. classified South Korea as a “sensitive country,” as well as the so-called “strategic flexibility” that “modifies the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” It is true that many officials in the Trump administration continue to officially reiterate their commitment to the DPRK’s denuclearization. However, statements by the U.S. president and his Secretary of State suggest that they recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, generating a dual reaction: on one hand, surprise at an abrupt shift in policy toward the DPRK’s nuclearization, and on the other, uncertainty about what would happen to the security concerns of its allies — South Korea and Japan — as well as those of the U.S. itself. It should be noted that Trump stated — no less than in front of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — that he intended to re-establish relations with Kim Jong Un, that “he would do it,” that he has “…an excellent relationship with Kim Jong Un and we’ll see what happens.” And he declared: “But without a doubt, it is a nuclear power.” In that same setting, Trump also mentioned that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, effectively recognizing them as de facto nuclear-armed states, adding that Kim Jong Un “possesses numerous nuclear weapons” and that “others possess them as well.” Therefore, the statements by Trump and Rubio that tacitly recognize the DPRK as a “nuclear power” indicate a shift in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang. It seems that interactions between the DPRK and the U.S. are moving toward a turning point: from denuclearization as the priority to nuclear security — a strategic change in U.S. policy aimed at overcoming deadlock and establishing trust, as a preliminary step toward a possible peace treaty. The repeated reference by U.S. President Donald Trump to the DPRK as a nuclear power could be an effort to draw Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, since North Korea seeks de facto recognition by the U.S. as a nuclear-armed state. Trump seems to be maintaining the perspective that the next negotiation should focus on reducing threats rather than denuclearization, despite his stated pursuit of “complete denuclearization.” Everything suggests that Trump is emphasizing the evident reality of Pyongyang’s progress in its nuclear program. It can also be considered that Trump’s remarks may imply that, as a result of the failure of his summit efforts to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, he may now be encouraging the consideration of an alternative strategy. However, Pyongyang is publicly and incessantly rejecting Trump’s attempts to restart dialogue; this stance has much to do with the recent history of U.S. negotiations and the president’s insufficient reciprocity to the concrete measures proposed by Kim Jong Un. In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting the latest developments that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, which could, to some extent, influence a shift in Pyongyang’s perception and lead it to accept talks with Washington. We refer to the classification of South Korea as a “sensitive country” and the idea of “modifying the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” a classification that significantly restricts collaboration in areas of advanced technology, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, quantum science, and advanced computing. This measure, which took effect on April 15, subjects South Korean researchers to stricter controls for collaborating or participating in research at DOE facilities or research centers and marks the first time South Korea has received such a designation from the U.S. government. In this regard, the “sensitive country” classification is based on unilateral criteria such as national security, nuclear non-proliferation, regional instability, threats to economic security, and alleged support for terrorism. This list, maintained by the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) along with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), already included countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Additionally, North Korea and Iran are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” while China and Russia are considered “countries of concern.” Such a designation suggests that the U.S. has growing concerns about the increasing voices among South Korean academics, politicians, and citizens who support the development of domestic nuclear weapons. Recent surveys reveal that popular support for nuclear armament has reached between 60% and 70%, apparently stemming from the belief that South Korea must take a bold defensive measure against North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Although some who favor this idea believe that President Donald Trump’s skeptical view of alliances — focused on reducing the financial burden of protecting U.S. allies — might allow Seoul to develop nuclear weapons and thus reduce Washington’s responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of this happening remains slim. However, the debate will not disappear in the short term due to growing skepticism about the so-called U.S. “extended deterrence,” which relies only on the deployment of strategic assets in the South of the peninsula. In the meantime, the DPRK is very likely to feel satisfied, as it sees its long-standing desire fulfilled: to witness cracks in the Washington–Seoul alliance. Another decision that would benefit the DPRK under the so-called “strategic flexibility” is the projection that the Trump administration may deploy U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, following the circulation of a purported Pentagon memorandum detailing its objective of deterring China from occupying Taiwan. As is well known, the primary mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter threats from the DPRK. Should this decision materialize, their mission would then shift to countering China, considered a key component of the current administration’s foreign policy. This would create a security vacuum for Seoul and further strain its relations with Beijing. In such a circumstance, the Trump administration could pressure South Korea to handle conventional military actions from the DPRK independently, with the U.S. intervening only in the case of nuclear threats. Therefore, the best option for Seoul is to significantly strengthen its defensive capabilities, preparing for a scenario in which U.S. troops are not involved in a conventional war with the DPRK. The notion of “strategic flexibility” for the USFK reflects a shift in the main mission of U.S. forces abroad, moving from the defense of nations through their permanent presence to rapid deployment in other parts of the world where conflicts arise. As expected, unease is growing in Seoul in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing assertiveness, while the latter shows greater defiance. First, due to the possibility that Trump’s second administration may divert part of the USFK’s resources to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would leave South Korea more vulnerable. Second, because South Korea is currently in open political turmoil over the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, and everything seems to indicate that the so-called South Korean democracy has failed to demonstrate itself as reliable in the eyes of Trump and his team. It is worth mentioning what Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University, stated in his most recent book, titled “Why American Diplomacy Fails”. The expert describes North Korea’s nuclear problem as an illustrative failure of U.S. diplomacy. His remarks are eloquent when he says: “In my conversations with members of the Trump administration during my trip to America, I had the impression that they firmly feel that Korea [South Korea] has been getting a free ride [on U.S. security] for far too long. South Korea’s excessive dependence on the United States could have serious consequences. The Korean government needs to develop autonomous strategic thinking. It needs to explore creative contingency plans for the worst-case scenario of a U.S. absence from the Korean peninsula.” We can see that Trump’s return is testing diplomatic limits and fueling a key question: Will Trump’s return to the White House open another cycle of engagement with Kim Jong Un, but with new attributes? The U.S. president always highlights his good personal relationship with the DPRK leader, something that, undoubtedly, could have a positive effect. But, as of today, Pyongyang seems to lack incentives to negotiate with Washington for four essential reasons: Military, it has achieved significant advances in its conventional weapons programs, strategic missiles, and nuclear arms, which provide it with a high deterrent capability. Economically, even under heavy sanctions, it is experiencing moments of economic expansion, it has made progress in import substitution, its local industry is reviving, and infrastructure construction is in full development. This makes negotiating the lifting of sanctions, in general and with Washington in particular, less urgent for Pyongyang. Its willingness to take political risks in exchange for economic benefits has clearly diminished. Geostrategically, its military alliance with Russia may generate new revenues, transfers of military technology, practical experience in modern warfare, and weaken the international sanctions regime. Geopolitically, the world is entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that could eventually result in a multipolar order. The DPRK seems well positioned due to its ties with two key actors in the multipolarization process: Russia and China. At the same time, it observes the disruption of the traditional alliance structure with the United States and sees Washington distancing itself from its main allies, who are also DPRK’s adversaries in East Asia. Therefore, it appears willing to watch the evolution of events and their outcome. Donald Trump has stated that his administration has opened a line of communication with the DPRK and considered that, at some point, “something will probably happen,” emphasizing: “There is communication. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un… I get along wonderfully with him… I think it is very important. It is a ‘great nuclear nation,’ and he is a ‘very smart guy.’ I got to know him very well… We will probably do something at some point.” It cannot be ruled out in this analysis that the DPRK is doubly leveraged. On one hand, with stable trade with China; on the other, with Russia’s reciprocity for its declared and materially sustained support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Therefore, additional incentives directly linked to DPRK’s comprehensive security must emerge. If the U.S. were to formally recognize the DPRK as a “de facto nuclear power,” which would represent a radical change in U.S. strategy, the prospect of future negotiations focused on threat reduction rather than denuclearization would open up. Despite Trump’s flattering words and the expectations they raise, it is not clear whether the U.S. president would be able to secure internal consensus within his administration to make such a decision without major obstacles, and, at the same time, manage to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership around him. Conclusions The viability of negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK under Trump’s new government remains uncertain, but it is possible that Trump will pursue a new “diplomatic victory” — similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un — through an alternative strategy that bilaterally satisfies Pyongyang’s aspiration to be recognized as a de facto nuclear state. However, it is unlikely that the international community would accept the U.S. unilaterally recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a vote by the UN Security Council would be required, where the United Kingdom and France would surely veto it; and if it were brought to the General Assembly as a resolution, the number of opposing votes would probably be a majority. It is worth noting that the DPRK is doubly leveraged: it has stable trade with China and reciprocity from Russia for its material support, in addition to enjoying the diplomatic backing of both powers. Given its persistent distrust of Washington, it is to be expected that Pyongyang will maintain its close coordination with Beijing and Moscow and use it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, for the time being, it is not clear whether the U.S. president will be able to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership surrounding him. Notes[1] Lee Jae Myung was elected as president of the Republic of Korea after the June 3rd, 2025 elections. References Aise Sotolongo, J. (2025). Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or change with the DPRK? World and New World Journal. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4082Chan-kyong, P. (2025, 12 de marzo). Kim Jong Un seeks negotiating leverage over Trump's new nuclear demands, analysts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3296722/kim-jong-un-seeks-negotiating-leverage-over-trump-new-nuclear-demands-analystsChung-in, M. (2025, 15 de febrero). It's time Korea prepares itself for a peninsula without the US, expert advises. The Korea Herald. https://m.koreaherald.com/article/10455463Depetris, D. R. (2025, 9 de abril). Kim Jong Un is watching Trump's Ukraine diplomacy with interest. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2025/04/kim-jong-un-iswatching-trump-ukranie-diplomacy-with-interestEFE. (2025a, 10 de enero). Pionyang dice que sus armas nucleares no son moneda de cambio para negociar. Swissinfo. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/pionyangdice-que-sus-armas-nucleares-no-son-moneda-decambio-para-negociar/88844909EFE. (2025b, 22 de marzo). Washington, Seúl y Tokio reafirman su compromiso para desnuclearizar a Corea del Norte. Swissinfo. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/washington%2C-se%C3%BAl-y-tokio-reafirman-su-compromiso-para-desnuclearizar-a-corea-del-norte/88881832EM Redacción. (2025, 12 de marzo). Estados Unidos califica a Corea del Sur como un "país sensible", limitando la cooperación en tecnología avanzada. Escenario Mundial. https://www.escenariomundial.com/2025/03/12/estados-unidos-califica-a-corea-del-sur-como-un-pais-sensible-limitando-la-cooperacion-en-tecnologia-avanzada/KBS WORLD. (2025, 5 de febrero). Seúl y Washington acuerdan limitar el término "desnuclearización" a Corea del Norte y no a toda la península. http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=s&Seq_Code=92262Kipiahov, O. (2025, 9 de febrero). Rossiian vstrechaiut s ulybkami posol RF v KNDR rasskazal kak zhivet severnaia koreia. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. https://rg.ru/2025/02/09/rossiian-vstrechaiut-s-ulybkami-posol-rf-v-kndr-rasskazal-kak-zhivet-severnaia-koreia.htmlKYODO NEWS. (2025, 18 de marzo). China eyes teaming up with Japan, South Korea to denuclearize N. Korea. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/03/c5e26b7d5347-htmlLankov, A. (2025, 9 de febrero). Trump’s North Korea nuclear diplomacy: Between bad and worse. Asialink Diplomacy. https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/article/trump-north-korea-diplomacy-between-bab-and-worse/McCartney, M. (2025, 17 de abril). Trump plans to disarm North Korea, but Kim wants more nuclear weapons. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/us-north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-2022678Minyoung Lee, R. (2025, 25 de abril). North Korea leaving maneuvering room with the US while preparing for long-term confrontation. 38 North. https://www.38north.org/2025/04/noth-koreas-acknowledgement-of-war-participation/Reddy, S. (2025, 9 de febrero). Russian envoy to DPRK says Moscow welcomes talks between US and North Korea. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/russian-envoy-to-dprk-says-moscow-welcomestalks-between-us-and-north-korea/Sneider, D. (2025, 3 de abril). Is North Korea the next target of Trump’s search for a deal? Keia. https://wwwkeia.org/2025/04/north-korea-the-netx-target-oftrmps-search-for-a-deal/Sputnik. (2025, 31 de marzo). Trump valora su relación con líder norcoreano Kim Jong Un y planea un eventual contacto. El País CR. https://www.elpais.cr/2025/03/31/trump-valora-su-relacion-con-lidernorcoreano-kim-jong-un-y-planea-un-eventual-contacto/YONHAP. (2025, 8 de marzo). Trump appears to use 'nuclear power' label to lure N. Korea to dialogue: US expert. The Korea Times. https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=394200

Diplomacy
Indian Arctic Himadri station

Leveraging India’s Arctic Observer Status: Scientific Diplomacy as a Lever for Climate, Resource and Security Advancement

by Sneh Kotak

Introduction The Arctic region, located above 66.5° N latitude and spanning approximately 14.5 million square kilometers, includes the Arctic Ocean, surrounding seas, and the northern territories of eight Arctic states -Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.1 With melting ice opening critical maritime routes like the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and unlocking access to vital resources, global interest in the region has intensified. Governance remains limited to Arctic states within the Arctic Council, while non-Arctic countries like India hold observer status without voting rights. India, despite its geographical distance, holds a strategic interest in the Arctic for scientific collaboration, climate research, and access to critical minerals. As a permanent observer since 2013, it has established the Himadri Research Station in Svalbard (78°55′N, 11°56′E) and the IndARC observatory in the Kongsfjorden fjord. Yet its influence is constrained by structural limitations and increasing competition from China, which actively seeks Arctic access through its Polar Silk Road. This paper argues that scientific diplomacy can serve as a key lever for India to deepen engagement, enhance its strategic presence, and align Arctic access with its broader energy and climate security goals. Strategic Importance The Arctic is no longer a distant, frozen periphery of global landmass, it has become a contention of resource politics, climate urgency and military escalation. Once defined by remoteness, the region today hosts an intensifying convergence of climate disruption, mineral access and geostrategic rivalry. As Arctic ice recedes at unprecedented rates, the region is unlocking new navigational routes and exposing valuable reserves of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements and copper2 which are resources crucial to the global green energy transition. Indian Involvement and Presence India’s official interest in the Arctic began with its first expedition in 2007 and has since matured with the establishment of the Himadri research station (2008),3 IndARC Observatory (2014)4  and a series of bilateral research collaborations. India’s Arctic Policy, released in 2022, formalized its intent to participate in scientific, economic and environmental cooperation across six thematic pillars: research, environmental protection, resource exploration, logistics, governance and capacity building. Despite these efforts, India’s observer status in the Arctic Council grants no voting rights and limited influence over policy formation. This structural limitation is exacerbated by the growing strategic assertiveness of China and Russia. Both nations have expanded dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic, including China’s self-declared “Near- Arctic State”5 status and Russia’s militarization of its northern flank. For India, this presents both challenges and opportunities. The Arctic’s emerging importance intersects with India’s national priorities in vital areas, such as:a) Securing climate-relevant data to understand and mitigate monsoon and GLOF (Glacial Lake Outburst Floods) patterns.b) Accessing critical minerals for its 2070 net-zero emissions goal and green industrialization.6 Strategic Importance of the Arctic for India The Arctic’s geo-environmental dynamics have profound consequences for India. The increased melting of the Greenland and Arctic ice sheets contributes to the rise in sea levels and fluctuations in monsoon variability through changing planetary wave patterns.7 The Himadri station in Ny-Alesund and IndArc mooring offer India unique insight into these processes, feeding long-range weather forecasting models via NCPOR-ISRO pipelines. On the diplomatic front, as the only Global South climate observer, India’s data-sharing from Arctic observatories strengthens its credibility within forums such as the Arctic Council’s Environment Protection Working Group and the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON). Unlocking shipping corridors like NSR and CVMC could reduce Europe’s shipping time from Asia by approx. 40-50%, generating economic dividends. India’s Navy and Merchant Marine benefit from Arctic route familiarity, while India’s global positioning is enhanced through maritime cooperation. This demonstrates the importance of the Arctic for climate, economy and diplomacy. Navigating the shifting maritime architecture may redefine global trade through corridors like NSR and the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor (CVMC).8 Indian Policy and Strategic Gaps India’s Arctic engagement is still relatively nascent in terms of international literature but is growing in strategic significance. The most foundational contributions include policy reviews by India’s Ministry of Earth Sciences (2022), Arctic Council science reports and multilateral white papers by think tanks and scholars. a) Scientific Infrastructure and Diplomacy – India’s Arctic science program, anchored by Himadri and IndARC, has contributed valuable data on atmospheric variability, Arctic monsoon linkages and glacial melting. According to Krishnan et al (2021)9 India’s participation in the Ny-Alesund Science Managers Committee has facilitated cross-national collaboration with Norway, Germany and the UK. The use of ISRO satellites to monitor climate interactions also reflects a techno-diplomatic layer of soft power. b) Policy and Strategic Gaps – India’s 2022 Arctic Policy was a milestone, but scholars critique its technocratic tone and lack of geopolitical urgency. Verma (2023)10 notes that the policy’s six pillars are too operational and overlook the need for a dedicated strategic or security component. With rising militarization of the Arctic by Russia and China, and NATO’s increased surveillance operations, India risks being a passive observer if strategy remains science-focused only. c) Moreover, India’s Arctic policy has yet to align with its Act East or Indo-Pacific strategies, thereby missing synergies in maritime infrastructure and regional partnerships Chaudhury (2025)11  d) Critical Minerals and Strategic Supply Chains – India’s net-zero targets by 2070 and the Green Hydrogen Mission depend on sustainable access to lithium, cobalt and REEs. However, nearly 90% of India’s lithium and cobalt are sourced via Chinese refineries (ICWA 2024).12 The Arctic, particularly Greenland, Canada and Russia holds untapped reserves. India’s MoUs with Chile and Australia represent important steps, but lack continuity in Arctic-focused supply diplomacy. e) Rising Security Competition – Russia’s reactivation of Soviet-era bases, introduction of hypersonic missile systems and increasing joint exercises with China in Arctic waters have altered the balance of power. According to the CSIS (2023), this militarization, while defensive in tone, is designed to deter NATO and non-Arctic encroachments. China, on the other hand, has institutionalized its Arctic ambitions via the Polar Silk Road, icebreaker fleets and joint resource ventures with Russia. Since India lacks comparable Arctic military presence or deep water capacity, a militarized response is not deemed appropriate.13 Instead, turning to diplomacy offers a non-threatening influential strategy, especially among neutral Arctic actors like Norway and Iceland. f) Moreover, India’s GLOF technology can be showcased in forums such as the Arctic Climate Change Forum and NATO’s emerging climate nodes, blending humanitarian outreach with scientific cooperation. This positions India as an active partner in Arctic climate resilience. Mineral Diplomacy and Green-Energy Autonomy India’s green energy ambitions hinge on reliable supplies of lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare-earth elements critical to battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) and renewable storage solutions. The 2023 National Critical Mineral Mission diagnoses India’s near total dependence on Chinese supply chains. To break this dependency, strategic focus has shifted to geologically stable Arctic reserves in Greenland, Canada and Siberia. However, access to these mineral reserves demands more than diplomatic prowess, it requires project level cooperation built on scientific triads. India-Greenland MoUs should exist to propose joint surveys for these minerals with the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources.14 SWOT Analysis An integrated SWOT analysis allows for a realistic assessment of India’s Arctic trajectory:   Recommendations Based on the preceding analysis, the following recommendations integrate scientific diplomacy, climate technology and strategic logistics to boost India’s Arctic influence. 1. Establish an Indian Arctic-Earth Diplomacy Corps: Hosted jointly by the MEA and the MoES, IAEDC should comprise scientists, diplomats, oceanographers and military linguists specialized in Arctic affairs. They will lead institutional relations and field missions. 2. Expand Scientific Infrastructure: Upgrade Himadri Station into a multilateral research hub by inviting partner scientists and enabling joint projects. Additionally, post a mobile Arctic-Himalaya GLOF Expedition Team, designed by IIT Roorkee-NCPOR, 16 to Arctic communities for pilot data assimilation. India could also launch open-access Arctic climate data portal harmonized with ISRO satellites to promote transparency and scientific collaboration. 3. Launch the Green Minerals Research Alliance: With NITI Aayog approval, form an R&D network with Greenland Institute of Natural Resources and Norwegian or Canadian universities to explore joint technology solutions for sustainable mineral extraction. 4. Develop Maritime-Climate Corridors: Repurpose CVMC agreements to include climate-monitoring science hubs and shared logistics facilities across Arctic ports during summer navigation seasons. 5. Engage in Climate Security Exercises: Participate in or lead Arctic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercises, deploying India’s unique Himalayan HADR expertise to Arctic conditions. 6. Strengthen institutional capacity: Add an Arctic Mandate Cell to NITI Aayog/DMEO for integrated policy planning across relevant ministries. Additionally, begin an Annual India-Arctic Science Summit, facilitating policy dialogue, mineral-science collaboration, sharing climate technology and youth and student fellowships based mostly on Arctic research and education.  Conclusion and Scope for Further Research India’s Arctic observer status offers a unique but limited opening. By wielding scientific diplomacy as a central instrument, India can convert passive Arctic presence into strategic influence without seeking voting rights or military buildup. The science-driven strategy empowers India to: 1. Conduct climate resilient modeling and synchronization for both Himalayan and Arctic regions.2. Secure mineral access gradually through transparent and partner-driven resource diplomacy.3. Enrich maritime connectivity via CVMC/NSR corridors supported by joint data sharing.4. Preserve strategic autonomy while aligning climate and development objectives with global governance standards. Through case studies of GLOF modeling, joint mineral exploration and maritime climate corridors, India can operationalize sustainable soft power influence. These initiatives reinforce India’s green ambitions and help disconnect critical and military-driven inputs from dominant actors like China.Future research could examine legal frameworks underpinning India’s non-Arctic science based rights, economic evaluations of Indian-built ice class vessels and evaluation systems for policy success metrics in Arctic diplomacy. Overall, by framing Arctic engagement as an extension of climate-resilient and demilitarized diplomacy, India emerges as a critical stakeholder in polar governance which is determined by climate science, research, data exchange, transparency as well as mutually beneficial diplomatic relations with Arctic council members and observer members. References 1.    Arctic Portal. “Arctic Circle.” Arctic Portal Maps. https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions/2418-arctic-circle 2.    Ollila, Mirkka Elisa. “The Triangle of Extraction in the Kola Peninsula.” The Arctic Institute, October 1, 2024. Accessed June 18, 2025. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/triangle-extraction-kola-peninsula/ 3.    National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research. “Himadri Station.” NCPOR – Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. Accessed June 18, 2025. https://ncpor.res.in/app/webroot/pages/view/340-himadri-station 4.    National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research. “IndARC.” NCPOR – Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India. https://ncpor.res.in/arctics/display/398-indarc 5.    Merkle, David. “The Self‑Proclaimed Near‑Arctic State.” International Reports (Auslandsinformationen),Konrad‑Adenauer‑Stiftung. https://www.kas.de/en/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/der‑selbsternannte‑fast‑arktisstaa 6.    Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India. “India Is Committed to Achieve the Net Zero Emissions Target by 2070 as Announced by PM Modi, Says Dr. Jitendra Singh.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, September 28, 2023.  https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1961797 7.    Association of American Universities. “Ice Sheet Surface Melt Is Accelerating in Greenland and Slowing in Antarctica.” Featured Research Topics, Association of American Universities, May 26,  2025. https://www.aau.edu/research-scholarship/featured-research-topics/ice-sheet-surface-melt-accelerating-greenland-and 8. Korea Centre (Mahatma Gandhi University). “The Arctic and Northern Sea Route: A New Frontier for India–South Korea Cooperation.” Korea Centre, April 7, 2025. https://koreacentre.org/2025/04/07/the-arctic-and-northern-sea-route-a-new-frontier-for-india-south-korea-cooperation/ 9.    Krishnan, K.P., and S. Venkatachalam. “Chapter 2 – India’s Scientific Endeavors in the Arctic with Special Reference to Climate Change: The Past Decade and Future Perspectives.” In Understanding Present and Past Arctic Environments: An Integrated Approach from Climate Change Perspectives, 15–29. 2021. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/B9780128228692000062 10. Kumar, Ashish, and Sudheer Singh Verma. “The Arctic Region: National Interests and Policies of India and China.” January 2023. PDF. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ashish-Kumar-591/publication/388222280_The_Arctic_Region_National_Interests_and_Policies  of_India_and_China/links/678fca07ec3ae3435a733a47/The-Arctic-Region-National-Interests-and-Policies-of-India-and-China.pdf 11. Observatory of Regional Transformations (ORF). “From Look East to Act East: Mapping India’s Southeast Asia Engagement.” Observer Research Foundation, 2025. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-look-east-to-act-east-mapping-india-s-southeast-asian-engagement 12. Indian Council of World Affairs. “From Look East to Act East: Mapping India’s Southeast Asia Engagement.” ICWA. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10458&lid=6669 13. Osho, Zerin, and Eoin Jackson. “The Polar Tiger: Why India Must Be Included in the New U.S. Arctic Defense Strategy.” High North News, November 28, 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/polar-tiger-why-india-must-be-included-new-us-arctic-defense-strategy 14. Greenland Institute of Natural Resources. Frontpage. Nuuk, Greenland. https://natur.gl/ 15. ThePrint, What Are Indian Researchers Doing in the Arctic Circle? YouTube video, 2:26, published https://youtu.be/WsZO0ZCTSyI?si=ysLbBnkAiqYzIlMp 16. Centre of Excellence in Disaster Mitigation & Management, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee. Home. https://iitr.ac.in/Centres/Centre%20of%20Excellence%20in%20Disaster%20Mitigation%20and%20Management/Home.html 

Diplomacy
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Leadership, Thought, and Succession in the CCP

by Jonathan Ping , Anna Hayes

As Xi Jinping tightens his grip on power amid economic headwinds and political uncertainty, questions of succession loom large. The path beyond Xi, marked by purges, rivalries, and competing visions for China’s future, remains shrouded in secrecy but carries global consequences. In October, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is scheduled to hold its annual plenary session where the Central Committee will meet to determine policy and the country’s general direction, including leadership. In China, the CCP and the leader hold immense, omnipotent power. The single-party state controls its population through SkyNet, a real-time urban surveillance system enforcing compliance; through the Great Firewall and Great Canon, which restrict information, encourage self-censorship, and spread disinformation; and through brutal oppression, particularly in remote regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. At the top of the Party, the General Secretary imposes a narrative—leadership thought—often expressed as an aphorism. The leader’s thought guides behaviour and justifies sacrifices made for socialism. Mao Zedong’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and recasting of Marxism-Leninism devolved into a leadership cult, which ultimately resulted in the chaos of disrupted education and the madness of the Cultural Revolution. Subsequently, the Party attempted to limit the power of leaders by setting two-term limits. As leader, Deng Xiaoping prioritised economic reforms, famously asserting that the colour of a cat—its ideology—was irrelevant, so long as it could catch mice and function effectively in economic terms. While urging caution abroad under his “Hide and Bide” strategy (hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead), he promoted bravery in domestic reform. His approach, expressed through the Chinese metaphor, “Cross the river by feeling for the stones,” was pragmatic, experimental, and gradualist. Jiang Zemin added his “Theory of Three Represents” to expand the Party’s base, while Hu Jintao emphasised a “Scientific Outlook for Development,” which aimed to reduce the widening inequalities within China to build a “Harmonious Socialist Society,” thereby lessening the chance for social conflicts to emerge. Within the leadership pantheon, the most consequential since Mao is Xi Jinping. Now 72 years old, Xi has enshrined his leadership role by removing the two-term limit and embedding his own thought— “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”—into the constitution. Xi’s thought is expansive and multifaceted, earning him the nickname “Chairman-of-Everything.” It is reinforced by the promise of fulfilling the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation: a long-held desire that China would reemerge as the global leader under a Sino-centric world order. Xi also side-stepped Deng’s “hide and bide” strategy, adopting a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy, believing China’s time had arrived. China’s economy is increasingly unstable, particularly in the property sector. Youth unemployment remains high, the Zero-Covid policy ended in failure, and the country is facing a demographic decline earlier than expected. More significantly, the leadership has retreated from consumption-led growth—a path that poses political risks Xi Jinping appears unwilling to confront. This shift has forced bankrupt provincial governments to sustain both real and superficial growth through the shadow economy and opaque financial instruments that merely circulate debt. These economic pressures are not just technical—they reflect deeper leadership challenges, raising questions about the resilience of Xi’s governance model, the fraying social contract between the Party and the people, and the viability of a fourth term for Xi amid growing internal and external scrutiny. At some point, China will have a new leader, but the path to that inevitable change is obscured and speculative. While Xi has not appointed a clear successor, discussions of potential replacements typically include Ding Xuexiang, Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Liu Jie, and, more recently, Wang Yang. Wang was Party Secretary of Guangdong and served as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee between 2017 and 2022. At 70 years old, he isn’t a young leader but has a reputation as a liberal reformer. Succession and the path to leadership in China can be difficult, if not horrific. Liu Shaoqi, who headed the PRC from 1959, was purged in 1968, publicly denounced, and beaten by Mao’s Red Guards before dying alone on a concrete floor. Xi was a member of the sent-down youth, experiencing the hardships of that time, and Deng was purged many times before his final rehabilitation, before becoming leader. Purge and renewal remain a Party tool for self-purification. For example, Bo Xilai was put on trial in 2011 shortly before his rival for power, Xi, took the leadership. Xi’s decades-long anti-corruption campaigns are widely viewed as purges of his political rivals, allowing him to cement his power. Of the more than 100 recently, Wang Renhua, Secretary of the Central Military Commission, Wang Chunning, Commander of the People’s Armed Police, and Zhang Jianchun, from the Central Propaganda Department, were caught up in Xi’s military purges. However, Xi’s Stalinist approach to purging, targeting allies and appointees alike, now leaves him in a precarious position. While the CCP leadership succession process has several negative elements, it does enable abrupt change and has built a leadership group with useful skill sets. China altered immensely from Mao to Deng and, subsequently, the world around it. Forty percent of new Politburo members since 2022 have a military-industrial background. These engineering skills and CCP dominance have shaped the Chinese domestic market, leading to global development prowess as the lead supplier of electric cars (70 percent of global production) and solar panels (exceeding 80 percent of global production). In comparison, most Ministers and Cabinet Members in the US and Australia have Law and Arts degrees. The question of what comes after Xi will have wide ranging implications. Given the trade war with the US, economic de-linking, and domestic turmoil, a Xi successor would attempt to quell and consolidate. The Party may seek short-term stability to consolidate Xi’s gains in the US conflict, awaiting the next US president, and focus on regional influence through soft power initiatives and structural power around the Nine-Dash Line and Taiwan. The new leader might echo the aphorism 固守阵地 (gù shǒu zhèn dì): “hold the fort” or “defend the position” as a basis for policy positions. Wang appears as likely a candidate as any. He holds a master’s in engineering, attended the Central Party School, and isn’t seen as a “rising star” but more of a seasoned politician.This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.

Diplomacy
5th August 2024. Dhaka, Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh celebrate the resign of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and people honor the Bangladesh Army.

How Far Has Bangladesh Come One Year After Its 'Second Independence'?

by Tamanna Ashraf

Dr. Mohmmad Yunus, the Chief Advisor (CA) of Bangladesh’s interim government revealed the “July Declaration” on August 5th, 2025, to commemorate the 1-year anniversary of the student-led revolution that toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year Awami League (AL) regime. The essence of the July Declaration is to reflect the ambitions and goals of the Bangladeshi citizens for its future. The July Declaration highlights Bangladesh’s political struggles since its independence in 1971 and emphasizes how that struggle has culminated in the July Revolution and its vision for the future. More specifically, the Declaration outlines the suppression of Bangladeshi people’s political and human rights by Hasina’s regime, after 3 rigged elections, implicating the loss of the people’s mandate. The past year encapsulates a critical period in Bangladesh’s history and a stress-test of the Yunus administration. Although the July Declaration expresses the aspiration to build a country based on rule-of law, upholding human rights, and erasing corruption, the one-year tenure of Dr. Yunus reveals mixed levels of achievements. Since taking power, the interim government faced four crucial goals: to establish domestic security and stability, bring justice for the injured and deceased of the July Revolution, hold the corrupt members of the AL regime accountable, and to create a different economic and political vision for Bangladesh in the 21st century, especially for the young population. It is important to recall that the students, facing bleak job prospects, protested against the Hasina’s regime’s policy that allotted a disproportionate number of coveted government jobs to the descendants of freedom fighters of the 1971 war for independence. After more than a decade of corruption, mismanagement of government funds and bank reserves, Bangladesh was facing a dollar reserve crisis during the last years of the Hasina administration. From the beginning, the interim government’s challenge was to reverse the downward economic trajectory as part of new economic vision for Bangladesh. After Hasina’s fall, the former Governor of Bangladesh Bank also fled the country. The current governor’s policies, combined with increased remittance, have improved dollar reserves. External debts decreased in the fourth quarter of December 2024, compared to the third quarter as a result of the interim government’s cautious approach to foreign loans. The revival of the Chittagong Port and leasing part of the Port to a UAE-based company is intended to make Chittagong the economic heart of a new Bangladesh. The interim government’s initiatives to expand Bangladesh’s semiconductor industry also indicate an economic vision that is technology and youth centric. The underlying theme of the July Revolution was to reinvent the country and its engagement with global partners. There have been significant changes Bangladesh’s foreign policy since the 2024 revolution. One notable change is relationship with Western countries. The Biden administration , the European Union (EU), China, Pakistan, and India were prompt to congratulate Dr. Yunus. Such messages gave legitimacy to the interim government, the student’s revolution, while recognizing Hasina’s removal from power. UN Secretary General António Guterres’s visit during March 2025, brought renewed focus on the Rohingya refugee crisis, giving Bangladesh more agency on the issue. However, the UN (and therefore the U.S.) backed plan to establish a “humanitarian corridor” require tactful balancing between Chinese, American and Indian interests in the region. Admittedly, disagreements within the interim government, among the major political parties, and with the Bangladesh armed forces poses questions on whether the Yunus team can effectively carry out such a plan. Dr. Yunus’s engagement with Western and Asian partners centers on establishing Bangladesh’s autonomy. Meeting with 19 EU delegates, he pushed for moving the visa centers from New Delhi to Dhaka or another neighboring country. Signing a Memorandum of Understanding with China on the Teesta River crisis (after a 13-year stalemate with India) and creating medical facilities in China to treat Bangladeshi patients (after India curtailed medical visas) point to a deepening ties with China and to showcase a more assertive engagement with global partners. The previous examples also signal Bangladesh’s pivot away from India. The flood in August 2024 immediately after the revolution reinvigorated anti-India rhetoric and resurfaced frustration with perceived longstanding asymmetric hydro-diplomacy with India.  But, most importantly, Hasina’s continued presence in India remains a point of contention. Even after one year, India declines requests for Hasina’s extradition citing  safety concerns and whether she will receive a fair trial in Bangladesh. The current India-Bangladesh relationship presents a strategic challenge for India. Over the last few decades, India’s diplomatic relationship with Bangladesh has been limited to cooperative relationship with AL, neglecting maintaining diplomatic overtures with other political parties in Bangladesh. Consequently, significant portion of the Bangladeshi public perceived the AL party being overly friendly with India. Naturally, people’s dissatisfaction with Hasina’s policies were also transferred to grievances against India. The geographic reality implies that to address the persisting security concerns in the northeast Indian states (which includes Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, and Sikkim), the Indian government should pursue cooperative relationship with Bangladesh. In fact, Dr. Yunus connected the revival of the Chittagong Port and its significance for Indian northeastern states. Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India stance had allowed India to address security challenges in the northeastern states, without facing obstacles from Bangladesh. Political changes in Bangladesh necessitates the Indian government to realign its foreign policy and strive to form partnership with the people, instead of a singular political party. Domestic politics is one of the areas where the Yunus administration has shown weak progress. Since the onset, the administration faced frequent protests from garment workers, bureaucrats, and security forces. Even politically, reaching consensus on pressing issues is also becoming increasingly challenging. On the question of elections and electoral reforms, the divergence among the political parties and even splinters within the parties is becoming more visible. Pressure from leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) for earlier election raises doubts whether the interim government could accomplish its reform goals before the February 2026 general elections. Fifteen years of AL’s one-party rule has left BNP organizationally weak and divided. The newly created National Citizens Party (NCP) by the student leaders of the revolution is still consolidating its political base. Disagreements between the Chief of Army Staff General Waker-Uz-Zaman and the interim government point to a lack of partnership. General Waker’s insistence of the role of the Bangladesh Riffles (BDR) in the 2009 Pilkhana Massacre stands at odds with the families of the victims who demand justice and answering lingering questions about Awami League regime’s role. Such sentiments from families erode faith in the justice system. The interim government has taken steps to provide financial and medical support for the survivors of the July Revolution suffering from various injuries and permanent disabilities. Unfortunately, the July Declaration does not mention the continuing suffering of the survivors. The role of female students in the July Revolution is also not mentioned in the Declaration, despite being on the frontlines of the revolution. Such omissions do weaken the position of the domestic political reform agenda of the interim government and prevent it from giving these groups of people a sense of justice and inclusion in the new Bangladesh. Ensuring a safe and stable environment, while establishing the rule of law is the biggest shortcoming of the Yunus administration. Awami League has not expressed any remorse in its role in the violence of the revolution despite mounting evidence. The activities of Awami League and its student wing have been banned. Nonetheless, the disgraced political party continues to cast a large shadow. Hasina continues to make inflammatory statements from her exile in India that fuels new violence in Bangladesh. The arrest of Major Sadikul’s wife over allegations of plans to train AL ‘activists’ to destabilize the capital creates bleak prospects of the country’s security and the realization of the July Declaration. Furthermore, the alleged involvement of the spouse of an army major in such nefarious plans creates more questions about whether the armed forces are reliable partners to fulfill the promise of the 2024 revolution. At the one-year anniversary, the dream of the July Revolution remains unrealized. Dr. Yunus and his interim government have shown competence in addressing the economic challenges. Furthermore, changed engagement with Western and regional powers points to the desire to gain more agency over global and regional matters. Nonetheless, on the domestic political and security fronts, the interim government has shown problems with internal coordination and with other political stakeholders. Dr. Yunus has not proven himself to be a savvy politician. The utter corrosion of all institutions after 15-year corruption of Hasina’s regime requires mini revolutions within all political stakeholders. Political rhetoric must go beyond political disagreements for its own sake and making abstract ideological statements to rile up supporters. The political parties must discuss tangible problems faced by the people and offer feasible solutions. Otherwise, the promise of the July Revolution will remain unfulfilled.

Diplomacy
24.01.2023 - Foto oficial da VII Cúpula da CELAC (52647149569)

Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean Nations as a strategy for integration with Asia and Africa

by Isaac Elías González Matute

Abstract This article analyzes the challenges and threats to global peace and stability, derived from the unipolar geopolitical vision of the United States and the application of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine”, promoted during the Trump administration and characterized by the “Maximum Pressure” strategy promoted by the America First Policy Institute. Through a methodology of documentary review of primary and secondary sources, together with a prospective analysis of risk trends, the strategic and leading role of CELAC in the defense of the interests of Latin America and the Caribbean is dimensioned, highlighting how this organization opens opportunities to strengthen trade relations with Asia and Africa, contributing to the construction of a multipolar world order by promoting initiatives such as China's Belt and Road as an alternative mechanism to the global economic war of the United States and its “US-CUM” project, framed in its foreign policy based on national security interests. Introduction 21st-century geopolitics has undoubtedly been characterized by strong pragmatism in the exercise of states’ foreign policy, balancing between two visions — specifically between the Unipolar Geopolitical Vision and the Multipolar Geopolitical Vision — which have categorized the praxis of international relations of the so-called Global North and Global South, respectively; a context that clearly shows a fervent struggle for political control of resources and for hegemony, where the United States competes for global supremacy with emerging poles of power such as Russia and China. Given the current international scenario, it becomes increasingly imperative to identify and understand both the needs and the challenges for the planet’s sustainable development, from a global perspective in all areas (economic, political, social, geographic, cultural, environmental, and military). In this regard, the present research prospectively analyzes the administration of President Donald Trump as part of the multidimensional threats that the U.S. represents not only for Latin America and the Caribbean but also for Africa and Asia, considering the impact of current U.S. foreign policy both on the American continent and for Africa and Asia. All of this is with a view to highlighting, through debate, the importance of rethinking CELAC as an international organization that systematically advances in a transition process from “Community” to “Confederation,” as an intergovernmental entity with the capacity to confront the threats of a unipolar geopolitical vision foreign policy, and in line with the goals established as development projects under the so-called “CELAC 360 Vision” [1], aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda, adopted by the United Nations (UN). Regarding the referred geopolitical transition, it is worth noting, as Guendel (2024) states: “The rising multipolarity will provoke, starting from this first decade of the 21st century, the emergence of historical events that mark the reaction to the expansion of Western geopolitical power to those old regions that were under another geopolitical influence. Among the most notable events, we must consider the processes of de-dollarization of the world economy, the war in Ukraine, the tension in the Taiwan Strait, and, of course, the war in Palestine. Under this reference, it is possible to characterize the current international geopolitical scenario as a moment of transition between the previous form of unipolar power and the new multipolar relations (123) [2]. Building on the above, the current geopolitical transition is a systemic process sustained by the multipolarity of international relations, driven by the struggle for power and the quest for economic dominance in both domestic and international markets. This has given rise to a growing trend in states’ foreign policy toward the construction of a multipolar world, where territorial governance over strategic resources forms part of the necessary geopolitical counterweight in regional dialogue, cooperation, and integration to face the challenges of the present century. The changes in the world order require Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia to promote an idea of continental unity, framed within an anti-imperialist mindset, allowing progress toward Latin American, African, and Asian continentalism, compatible with the multipolar geopolitical vision, under the sustainable development approach put forward through the BRICS. Regarding this last international actor, Guendel (2024) notes: “In the development of a new phase of the globalization process after the end of the Cold War — what was geopolitically a new scenario for consolidating unipolar power relations — new lateral actors emerged, the so-called BRICS, which, by proposing alternative ways of thinking and economic relations favorable to Third World countries, would foster the emergence of a new global geopolitical scenario of multipolar relations (123). According to this scenario, the trend toward multipolarity in international relations —strengthened by globalization and technological advancements — will allow for the consolidation of a multipolar world, though not without first becoming a causal factor of various conflicts and challenges on a global scale, specifically in all spheres of power (economic, political, social, geographic, cultural, environmental, and military). Hence the importance of formulating a strategy for regional integration of Latin America, Asia, and Africa that aligns with global sustainable development plans — such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative — which, combined with the BRICS, constitute two fundamental pillars in strengthening the multipolar world. However, this will also accentuate the differences in geopolitical interests between the strategic agenda of the Global North (led by the U.S. through the G7) and that of the Global South (BRICS countries) regarding the projected economic growth of each. Having this in mind, the present research aims to analyze the challenges and threats to global peace and stability as a consequence of the U.S. unipolar geopolitical vision and the application of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” promoted by President Donald Trump and the policies advanced by his main think tank, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), characterized by the “Maximum Pressure.” Development U.S.: Foreign policy oriented toward a new global fundamentalism The new White House administration, under the presidency of Donald Trump, challenges the so-called conservative Establishment [3] in the U.S., and according to Myriam Corte (2018), in her article on “Analysis of the U.S. ‘Establishment’” [4], the following statement is mentioned: “The residence of the current president is the site that houses political power, but at the same time reflects migratory power, since it is a construction built in the 18th century by African slaves, based on Irish architecture. As for the cabinet, it is made up of wealthy white men, who are responsible for administering power, but in the current administration some members have been accused of domestic abuse and misogynistic practices; therefore, it is important to identify whether Trump represents that old, conservative, and rigid establishment, or if there is any change” (1). According to what has been stated, there is undoubtedly a perception of a different stance associated with the “Deep State” Establishment in the U.S., with relevant structural changes that have a strong impact on both domestic and foreign policy. An example of this, according to Myriam Corte (2018), is represented in the very fact that: “Another variant is the Bible study group that was formed in the White House, as well as the group of fellows made up of 147 young people between the ages of 21 and 29, with a characteristic profile: all are wealthy individuals, among them the son of the president of the World Bank, who represent the new generation that will inherit power…” (1). In this context, the U.S.’s status as a major power revolves around a scenario of geopolitical conflict, even prioritizing its national interests over those of its main strategic allies, as a consequence of the systemic deterioration of its hegemony vis-à-vis Russia and China. This has generated hostile political actions as strategies to justify its territorial ambitions, in an attempt to counter the exponential growth of the BRIC and the crisis this represents for the global dollar system. A clear example of some hostile political actions is reflected in what happened with its European (NATO) partners recently, as well as with Canada, Mexico, and Greenland, becoming part of the geopolitical pragmatism promoted by the Donald Trump administration. Now, in direct relation to the unipolar geopolitical vision that characterizes U.S. foreign policy, it oscillates between defending the interests of the conservative Establishment and the postulates and ideals promoted by the AFPI [5], which maintain a clear influence in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, acting as a think tank. Regarding this matter related to the influence of AFPI in the Donald Trump administration, it is worth mentioning some aspects associated with the practice of U.S. foreign policy for a better understanding of its current dynamics, which revolve around a new global fundamentalism with a marked unipolar geopolitical vision. Among them, we have the following: New global fundamentalism against the conservative national security establishment The AFPI serves as the main think tank for the Trump administration, according to Seibt (2024), who in his article “The America First Policy Institute, a discreet ‘combat’ machine for Donald Trump” [6], states the following: “America First” is often associated solely with Donald Trump’s isolationism. But behind the scenes, it is also linked to an ultra-conservative think tank with growing influence, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI)” (1); a fact that justifies the appointments made before and after Donald Trump’s swearing-in as President of the U.S., as he has been using an increasingly influential group in high-level decisions, subtly and systematically modifying changes in strategic agendas from the so-called “Deep State,” starting from what Seibt (2024) also refers to: “…the election of Brooke Rollins marks the consecration of AFPI’s influence, of which she is president, and which has been described by the New York Times as ‘a group as influential as it is little known’ in the orbit of Trumpism… Brooke Rollins is not the only person from AFPI that Donald Trump has chosen for his future government. Linda McMahon, chosen to be Secretary of Education, is the director of this think tank. And let us not forget Pam Bondi, who has been called to replace the too-controversial Matt Gaetz as Attorney General, and who oversees all the legal matters of the America First Policy Institute” (para. 5). In this context, there is clear evidence of AFPI’s influence within the Trump administration; therefore, to understand where the unipolar geopolitical vision recently adopted by the U.S. is headed — together with its prospective analysis — it is necessary to understand, from the very foundations of AFPI, how this organization envisions the path of what it calls, from a supremacist perspective, “America First.” To this end, it is enough to review the main AFPI website [7], where both its vision and analysis of what the U.S. should be, as well as how it should approach the exercise of foreign policy, are broken down and organized — with a curious detail that sets it apart: placing the interests of the American people above the interests of the conservative National Security establishment, stimulating the need to create a nation different from what they consider a “theoretical United States.” As AFPI (2025) states and describes: The Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute defends Americans rather than a “theoretical United States” imagined by Washington’s national security establishment. The exercise of American power requires a clear justification, and an “America First” approach ensures that such power is used for the benefit of Americans. To promote this objective, the Center seeks to ensure the rigorous advancement of policies that constitute an authentically American alternative to the increasingly obsolete orthodoxy of Washington’s foreign and defense policy… (para. 2). As outlined, AFPI both promotes and warns about the exercise of power, prioritizing U.S. interests, as long as these remain distant from what it considers the “obsolete orthodoxy of foreign policy” that has characterized the U.S. for decades and centuries. In this sense, the likelihood increases of perceiving the presence or formation of a different establishment in the U.S., one that rivals the Anglo-Saxon conservatism rooted since the nation’s very founding. Domestically, the perception of a new global fundamentalism in U.S. foreign policy grows — one with an even more marked unipolar geopolitical vision of an imperialist nature — based on what AFPI (2025) doctrinally dictates in terms of foreign policy: The phrase “America First” refers to an approach rooted in the awareness of the United States’ unique role in the world and its unparalleled ability to do the most for others when its people are strong, secure, and prosperous. It means that any commitment of American lives or dollars abroad must bring concrete benefits to the American people. Every investment of U.S. resources must generate a substantial security benefit (para. 3). From this, it is possible to infer the direction of the U.S. strategic agenda under the current administration and doctrinally supported by AFPI as its main think tank. However, the deep changes that are occurring — both inside and outside the U.S. — and how the global economic and financial situation fluctuates because of these changes, in a certain way, compel major economies to reconsider new mechanisms for economic and financial coordination and cooperation. This includes strengthening regional integration frameworks that allow them to navigate the ongoing process of reconfiguring the current world order, laying the groundwork for the construction of a multipolar world. Proxy Control of Global Territorial Governance, Backed by the “Donroe Doctrine” The exercise of current U.S. foreign policy, characterized by a unipolar geopolitical vision under the new Trump administration, is the result of the application of a doctrine carefully designed and reformulated from its dogmas, supported by a strong religious fundamentalism and associated with racial supremacism; wherein the U.S. seeks to perpetuate its global hegemony by returning to its original imperialist character. All of this turns the exercise of U.S. power toward National Security, but with a practical approach different from the so-called “obsolete orthodoxy of conservative foreign policy.” As AFPI (2021) has emphasized since its founding: Religious freedom is a fundamental human right guaranteed not only in the Constitution of the United States but also in Article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is a natural right inherent to all of humanity (para. 3). With the above, at first glance, AFPI appears to delineate its religious fundamentalism, oriented toward the promotion of a new global fundamentalism through the exercise of foreign policy that justifies its actions in favor of U.S. supremacist interests, in line with what AFPI (2021) reiterates as its mission on its platform: AFPI exists to promote policies that prioritize the American people. Our guiding principles are freedom, free enterprise, national greatness, U.S. military superiority, foreign policy engagement in the interest of the United States, and the primacy of American workers, families, and communities in all we do (para. 1). To this, we must add the disposition — regarding national security — of driving U.S. supremacism through the application of Hard Power [8], economic warfare, and the increased implementation of Unilateral Coercive Measures (UCMs) against any country that contravenes U.S. interests, by perpetuating interventionist policy in all spheres of power (economic, political, social, geographic, cultural, environmental, and military). An example of the above is referred to by AFPI (2025) on its website [9], as follows: The American victories in World War II and the Cold War established our country as “the last best hope for man on Earth.” The cause of freedom everywhere in the world depends on a strong United States. With our country secure, we can, with greater confidence, promote American security abroad. U.S. security is exemplified by a strong military, fair trade agreements, alliances that are equitable, aggressors who are isolated, and those who harm us, destroyed. The AFPI views American security abroad as a prerequisite for peace at home: always putting American interests first. This includes moving away from endless and unnecessary wars to rebuild the homeland, while also understanding our indispensable role in maintaining a peaceful world… (para. 4). With a brief reading of the above, it is possible to see at first glance the practical description of current U.S. foreign policy, starting from the fact of recent attempts to end the Ukrainian conflict; however, skepticism when addressing both the geopolitical feasibility and the reliability of the proposals made by the Trump administration reveals a hidden objective, particularly associated with proxy control of global territorial governance through hostile policies and the use of the government itself as a weapon. An example of this is the stimulation of a trade war by the U.S. against Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (NATO allies), all with the aim of establishing as a rule the use of Hard Power for political persuasion over strategic resources — an example of this being the recent (and forcibly) signed rare earths agreement by Ukraine — in favor of the United States. U.S.-CUM, a New Nation-State and Persuasive Technology: Utopia or Global Geopolitical Threat? Geopolitical changes in the 21st century are advancing in parallel with technology, the economy, and global energy interdependence. For this reason, the use of Persuasive Technologies [10], through various media and information channels, plays a fundamental role in creating opinion frameworks and the mass manipulation of perceptions on a global scale. In other words, in the Era of Disinformation, technology is the primary tool, stemming from the communication needs of modern society. In this regard, Tusa et al. (2019) state the following: “…fake news has always existed. What is happening now is a greater emergence on open and free access platforms, which causes this type of information to grow exponentially in a matter of seconds. Therefore, fake news creates a wave of disinformation, a fact that motivates academia and civil society to counter it, to achieve the return of good journalism and truthful information” (20). [11] In this context, current disinformation processes respond to pre-established objectives by power poles linked to fluctuating geoeconomic interests in the world order, in which the Global North with a unipolar geopolitical vision and the Global South with a multipolar geopolitical vision are in open confrontation. In relation to this, Valton (2022) points out: “…economic globalization, finance, and the development of new technologies have opened spaces for the new geoeconomy. Thus, geoeconomy as part of the process of change plays an essential role that affects international relations, with an impact on international trade, global markets, and conflicts in the quest for capital accumulation. Geopolitical interests are closely linked to the economic gains of major capitalist powers and transnational corporations in their eagerness to increase their revenues, maintain and expand their area of influence in other regions, at the expense of the indiscriminate exploitation of the natural resources of underdeveloped countries, with high poverty rates and environmental damage” (2). [12] Now, considering the unipolar geopolitical vision of U.S. foreign policy and the doctrinal influence of the AFPI in the new Trump administration, there is a curious growing communication campaign on different digital platforms, specifically associated with persuasive technologies, that fosters the perception of the creation of a new State called U.S.-CUM. While this corresponds to a very subtle disinformation campaign and somewhat utopian in nature, it is nonetheless surprising that, in the facts and actions of the new White House administration, they have not stopped flirting with certain ideas related to the mentioned State in question.   To be more specific, the U.S.-CUM is a utopian idea of a territorial expansion of the current United States, adding the territorial spaces of Canada and Mexico with the goal of increasing the economic, political, financial, and military capacities of the U.S., to counter emerging powers and prevent the consolidation of a multipolar world. An example of this can be found in some posts made on the Reddit platform, a social network popular among the U.S. population, similar to Instagram, X, TikTok, and Facebook, among others. The U.S.-CUM utopia has now moved from a mere concept to a possible threat to global geopolitics, the moment the foreign policy of the Trump administration suggests the possibility of territorially adding Canada, turning it into the 51st state of the United States. Colvin (2025), in his AP article titled “Trump says he is serious about making Canada the 51st U.S. state,” refers to the following: President Donald Trump said he was serious about wanting Canada to become the 51st state of the United States in an interview aired Sunday during the Super Bowl pregame show… The United States is not subsidizing Canada. Americans purchase products from the resource-rich nation, including raw materials such as oil. Although the goods trade deficit has grown in recent years to $72 billion in 2023, it largely reflects U.S. imports of Canadian energy… (paras. 1-4). [13] In relation to the same policy undertaken with Canada, the Trump administration began a very dangerous strategy against its territorial neighbors, with the following actions: declaring Mexican drug cartels as terrorist groups (knowing how the U.S. has manipulated the concept of terrorism to justify military interventions), implementing migrant deportation policies, waging a fight against fentanyl, and additionally launching a tariff war with both Mexico and Canada. It has also reiterated its intention to annex Greenland, accompanied by threats of tariffs and a trade war against Denmark and other EU countries, including undermining the existence of NATO. All the above is carried out under the close advice and influence of the AFPI, clearly reflected in its supremacist doctrinal positions and aspirations to create a large imperialist nation. An example of these ambitions has been openly published by various international media outlets, including the news channel FRANCE24. In this outlet, Blandón (2025) refers to the following: During a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated that control of Greenland is necessary to improve international security, while once again confirming his interest in annexing this territory… Outgoing Greenland Prime Minister Mute Egede responded on the social network Facebook: “The U.S. president has once again raised the idea of annexing us. Enough is enough!”, and added that he will call on the leaders of all parties to convince them to prevent it… (paras. 1, 2).   In other words, it is appropriate to infer that the direction and intentionality of the foreign policy of the new Trump administration is aimed at territorial expansionism and the promotion of proxy control of global territorial governance, supported by the “Donroe Doctrine” and enhanced through the use and development of Persuasive Technology, aligned with a global strategic agenda (influenced by the AFPI), which seeks to counter the strengthening of a multipolar world and perpetuate U.S. imperialist hegemony under a global supremacy fundamentalism. CELAC as a Geopolitical Counterweight to the Real Threat of the U.S. and Its New Imperialist Format for Hegemonic Survival The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), as an intergovernmental organization, currently acquires strategic value for the entire continent and its sustainable development, within the framework of creating new mechanisms for coordination, cooperation, and regional integration with Africa and Asia — especially China — through the Belt and Road Initiative, considering the entire current geopolitical context where markets play a predominant role in defining internal policies and in directly influencing the strategic agendas of each nation's foreign policy, according to constantly changing global challenges, heightened by the stance adopted by the Global North, led by the U.S., against the Global South, led by BRICS countries. Once the real threat posed by the U.S. has been identified — based on the unipolar geopolitical vision that has characterized the exercise of its foreign policy — this is compounded by the supremacist trend in implementing Unilateral Coercive Measures (UCMs) [14] against free and independent nations that, upholding the principle of self-determination, do not submit to or share the interests of the Anglo-Saxon establishment, promoted by the new U.S. administration. Now then, conducting a prospective analysis of how and on what grounds the U.S. sustains and describes its current hegemonic behavior, it is possible to predict, with certain elements and data, what its courses of action will be — courses that Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Africa and Asia (especially China), should consider. Among these, the following stand out: Territorial Expansion of the U.S. Trade War The current trade war declared between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico — initially through the reciprocal imposition of tariffs — considering the influence of the AFPI as a U.S. Think Tank, is clearly perceived as territorial expansion, in search of proxy control over territorial governance previously mentioned, of all strategic resources in Latin America and the Caribbean. This comes because of the fiscal, economic, and financial weakening the U.S. is experiencing through the increase of public debt, which is practically unsustainable. In this sense, the actions taken by the Trump administration in appointing certain cabinet positions can be understood to some extent. However, it is curious and at the same time causal that many appointments obey and are related — directly and indirectly — to the training of officials associated with and linked to the AFPI, as part of its strategic objective. An example of this are the words of Colonel Robert Wilkie, co-chair of the Center for American Security, member of the AFPI, quoted by King (2025) in his press article titled “AFPI Welcomes President Trump’s Renewal of the American Dream”, where the following was stated, making direct reference to peace through strength: President Trump proclaimed that America is back, which means our Armed Forces are back: the greatest force for peace in the history of the world. He has restored the highest combat standards so that our soldiers fight, win, and return home to their loved ones as soon as possible. President Trump has restored the place of honor our warriors hold in the hearts and minds of the American people. He has restored America’s deterrent power and told the world that the most powerful words in the language are: “I am an American citizen.” Our borders are stronger, our seas safer, and every wrongdoer knows that the eagle is watching them. (para. 6) The above statement does not set aside its imperialist and supremacist character, denoting the philosophical and doctrinal thinking deeply rooted in the officials who hold government functions at all decision-making levels, promoting pro-U.S. policies that disrespect international law and encourage the establishment of a rules-based world order, with full disregard for the international rule of law. This is, in fact, a very complex and dangerous geopolitical situation, which threatens not only the self-determination of peoples, but also the ability to advance in areas of coordination, cooperation, and integration to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in the United Nations 2030 Agenda, to which CELAC countries adhere through the implementation of development plans seeking mutual benefit. Now then, the world order is in permanent change, with a tendency toward the consolidation of a multipolar world because of the crisis of capitalism and the Anglo-Saxon economic model represented in the Bretton Woods System. This situation favors the opening of new mechanisms supported by the multipolarity of international relations, depending on the behavior of the world economy, as a result of the policies of both the U.S. and emerging powers—especially the BRICS countries. However, it is precisely the economic pulse that will redefine the hostile actions of the U.S. in defense of its global hegemonic power, equally and in parallel influenced by the energy capacities of the world powers in conflict — an element that is preponderant in geopolitical influence. An example in this chapter is Russia’s advantage in gas and oil during the Ukrainian conflict. The exponential economic growth of the BRICS compared to the G7 is the clearest expression of the multilateral influence trend of member countries, in line with the multipolarity of international relations, where the geopolitical positioning of both the Global North (G7) and the Global South (BRICS) can be clearly observed. This economic and financial disparity accelerates the weakening of the Bretton Woods System and, consequently, the collapse of the dollar system within the Anglo-Saxon economic model, leading to the loss of hegemonic influence of the Global North countries — especially the U.S. as its main exponent. Other data are relevant when conducting a prospective analysis, with the aim of identifying growth and sustainable development opportunities, as well as understanding the challenges to achieving strategic objectives for comprehensive development by nations. Among the data to consider in the prospective analysis, we have the following chart, associated with excessive global consumption in the 21st century compared to the 20th century:   According to the chart on excessive global consumption, in only six years of progress into the 21st century, modern society has exceeded more than half of what it consumed in the 20th century, with a 75% increase above the average recorded over the last 100 years — a truly alarming percentage with a tendency to increase, as a consequence of economic activity, technological advancement, and the increase of armed conflicts worldwide. Within this context, the U.S. will increasingly seek to influence countries that significantly represent an economic interest in terms of territory, population density, manufacturing and industrial capacity, and geographic position. Through proxy control of territorial governance, it will aim to increase its hegemonic capacity in the economic and financial spheres against its main geopolitical rivals in the struggle for global supremacy — namely Russia and China — whose multipolar geopolitical vision entirely rivals the unipolar geopolitical vision of U.S. foreign policy. Given this scenario, CELAC presents a fundamental characteristic that allows it to move forward as a geopolitical counterweight to the U.S., broken down as follows:Territorial extension: all member countries together cover an enormous territorial space rich in strategic resources, with common areas of influence and mutual interest for sustainable development. Shared future, based on history, language, customs, and other cultural expressions that strengthen Latin American and Caribbean identity, which can be leveraged in the processes of regional consultation, cooperation, and integration with Africa and Asia. The increase in the hostile trend of U.S. foreign policy worldwide will require greater effort from CELAC to advance in consolidating full regional integration. However, the current progress of the intergovernmental organization has been limited to certain and specific areas, namely the economic, cultural, social, and political spheres of its members. Transition toward the Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean States as a strategy for geopolitical counterbalance and sustainable development For CELAC to consolidate itself as a geopolitical counterweight to U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region, it must be grounded in the exercise of a foreign policy with a multipolar geopolitical vision, compatible with the mutual sustainable development interests of the Global South. In this regard, Palacio de Oteyza (2004), in his essay "The Imperial Image of the New International Order: Is This Political Realism?" states the following: “The second realistic image of the international order, partially compatible with the geoeconomic image, consists of a return to a traditional multipolar system of balance of power, but with a decisive weight given to the military factor. The multipolar system is characterized by the absence of a hegemon and a flexibility of alliances among the great powers, aimed at restraining any potential challenger” [13]. In this context, the geopolitical counterweight that CELAC needs to confront the U.S.’s hegemonic ambitions in the region — and even globally — is regional integration in other areas not currently contemplated by the Community of Nations due to its nature. That is, increasing integration in the military, geographic, and social spheres through the transition toward a confederation of nations would enhance international relations capabilities, contributing to the adoption of deterrent measures for the prevention of armed conflicts and even facilitating its integration into other centers of power with a multipolar geopolitical vision, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to further strengthen relations with both Russia and China and their respective sustainable development plans. Economic opening and new formulas for regional integration with Africa and Asia An economic opening is the result of the globalization process, the advancement of new technologies, and the effects of the exercise of states’ foreign policies in accordance with their interests and the geopolitical vision they adopt, for geopolitical analysis that enables the identification of risks, threats, and opportunities in the international arena. That said, within the framework of regional integration, CELAC must also prioritize investment sectors for the establishment of common development interests among CELAC, Africa, and Asia. One of the most notable current realities is the fact that the Global South’s economy began systematically, setting challenges and then experiencing growth in less time compared to the growth of the G20, led by the U.S., with China taking the lead according to the percentage value recorded in 2024. In this scenario, CELAC, by reconsidering its transition toward a Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean States, would allow for greater autonomy in its integration into the global architecture implied by the strengthening and consolidation of the BRICS at the global level as an alternative system to the Bretton Woods System. In doing so, advances toward strengthening regional integration — embedded within a new multipolar world, with the combined capabilities of the Global South — can become, more than a reality, a necessity to confront the real threats posed by the U.S., serving as a geopolitical counterweight and a tool for insertion into the multipolar world through continental alliances between Latin America and the Caribbean, with Africa and Asia. Conclusions It was possible to assess the leading role of CELAC and its strategic nature in defending the regional interests of Latin America and the Caribbean, opening a world of opportunities in trade relations with Asia and Africa for the construction of a multipolar world through the promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an alternative mechanism to confront the U.S. economic war on a global scale and its project to create the so-called “U.S.-CUM”, as part of its foreign policy based on its national security interests. In this regard, in an environment of geopolitical changes and international crisis, as part of the transition process toward the consolidation of a multipolar world, CELAC can promote or drive significant advances aimed at the creation of a Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CONLAC) as part of a strategy for integration with Asia and Africa, considering the multipolar geopolitical vision shared by the Global South, where the concept of shared development represents a key point for international dialogue and cooperation — specifically in the economic, social, political, geographic, cultural, environmental, and military spheres. All of this would serve to act as a geopolitical counterweight to the threats and global challenges promoted by the U.S., in the exercise of its unipolar geopolitical vision in foreign policy, of an imperialist, hegemonic, and supremacist nature. Notes [1] Fuente: https://celacinternational.org/projects/[2] Revista Comunicación. Año 45, vol. 33, núm. 1, enero-junio 2024 (pp. 120-133). Fuente: https:// www.scielo.sa.cr/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1659-38202024000100120[3] Conjunto de personas, instituciones y entidades influyentes en la sociedad o en un campo determinado, que procuran mantener y controlar el orden establecido. Fuente: https://dpej.rae. es/lema/establishment[4] https://gaceta.politicas.unam.mx/index.php/poder-estadounidense/[5] https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/security/national-security-defense[6] https://www.france24.com/es/ee-uu-y-canad%C3%A1/20241126-el-america-first-policy-institute-una-discreta-m%C3%A1quina-de-combate-de-donald-trump[7] https://americafirstpolicy.com/centers/center-for-american-security[8] El poder duro se da cuando un país utiliza medios militares y económicos para influir en el comportamiento o los intereses de otras entidades políticas. Es una forma de poder político a menudo agresiva, es decir, que utiliza la coerción. Su eficacia es máxima cuando una entidad política la impone a otra de menor poder militar o económico. Fuente: https://www. jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/what-isthe-difference-between-hard-power-and-softpower-1608095574-1[9] https://americafirstpolicy.com/centers/center-for-american-security[10] La tecnología persuasiva está concebida para permitir que los usuarios voluntariamente cambien sus actitudes o comportamientos por medio de la persuasión y la influencia social. Al igual que la tecnología de control, utiliza actuadores y un algoritmo de influencia para ofrecerle información eficaz al usuario. Fuente: https://osha.europa.eu/es/tools-and-resources/eu-osha-thesaurus/term/70213i#:~:text=Context:,ofrecerle%20informaci%C3%B3n%20eficaz%20al%20usuario[11] https://revistas.usfq.edu.ec/index.php/perdebate/article/view/1550/2661[12] Fuente: https://www.cipi.cu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/1-elaynevalton.pdf[13] https://apnews.com/article/trump-canadagolfo-america-super-bowl-bret-baier-musk-cc8848639493d44770e60e4d125e5a62[14] Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales.[15] Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, núm. 64, p. 7-28 References Colvin, J. (2025, 9 de febrero). Trump dice que habla en serio al afirmar que Canadá sea el estado 51 de EEUU. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/trump-canada-golfo-america-super-bowl-bret-baier-musk-cc8848639493d44770e60e4d125e5a62Corte, M. (2018, 7 de mayo). Análisis del ‘establishment’ estadounidense. Gaceta UNAM. https://gaceta.politicas.unam.mx/index.php/poder-estadounidense/Guendel Angulo, H. (2024). 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