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Diplomacy
WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 20: President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House on January 20, 2025 in Washington, DC. Trump takes office for his second term as the 47

Donald Trump: Reconfiguring Global Order

by Jeffrey Sommers , Zoltán Vörös , István Tarrósy

Chaos seems to mark US policy under President Donald Trump at first blush. But behind what appears (and sometimes is) capricious Trump Administration decision making are policymakers with serious plans. They intend to engage perceived threats to the United States power, while transforming its economy in ways making it less dependent on global supply chains and “reserve assets.” Recognizing festering wounds to the US economy while seeing areas of strength, Trump policymakers look to cauterize the former while pivoting more fully to the latter. Trump’s presidency has openly engaged in criticizing past US liberal interventionist and neoconservative foreign policy. Branded as “America First” Trump’s US does not seek isolationist withdrawal from the globe, but rather a dismantling of institutional structures and alliances that no longer benefit Washington. The United States can and should continue projecting power far but, not wide, according to America Firsters. Under America First, the national interest does not always align with the “international community,” a term America Firsters would regardless see, borrowing a line from Benedict Anderson, as a fictitious “imagined community.” America First means dismantling the liberal hegemonic world order, or at minimum the US offloading the bill for it. The cost of that liberal order, with some 750 US military bases abroad, combined with growing power of the BRICS (China chiefly, but not only), signals to America Firsters America’s need to retreat from some parts of the world, while continuing to exercise dominance in others. Related to national security is the fallout from a generation of globalization in labor markets. US offshoring manufacturing in the post-Bretton Woods period lowered production costs. Cheap goods produced abroad were then purchased by Americans even more cheaply courtesy of the overvalued dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This worked greatly for US consumers, albeit with the intention of also pushing down US labor costs. Globalization enabled the United States to vacuum up global manufactures, while also running up massive government fiscal deficits. As former Vice-President Dick Cheney described it during globalization’s heyday, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.” What was once, however, a massive advantage for the United States later became its “twin deficits” problem. In short, the best fit for the US is a realist spheres of influence model, according to the Trump Administration. The criticism of the liberal world order, of course, circles back to the aforementioned economic challenges: on the one hand, the negative economic processes related to global labor organization and America’s indebtedness, and on the other hand, the strengthening of emerging international actors. Amongst these entities, the People’s Republic of China has long been high on the agenda. During the first Trump administration the president escalated tariffs on goods imported from Asia’s giant, which then led to a trade war. According to a Pew Research Center survey from mid-April 2025, although Americans believe that this bilateral trade relationship benefits China more than the US, they are “skeptical that increased tariffs on Chinese imports will have a positive effect on the country or on their own lives.” The Trump Administration thinks otherwise. America’s economy entering Trump’s presidency looked strong. On the cusp of the great 2008 financial shock, the European Union’s dollar GDP was $16.4 trillion, the US’ was $14.8 trillion. But by 2024, EU GDP was $18.7 trillion, while the United States posted a GDP of $28 trillion. Thus, in the span of less than a generation, the US went from having a GDP 9.8% short of the EU’s in 2008 to leaping ahead with a GDP 32% larger by 2024. These impressive US GDP gains were built on the foundations of financial services, corporate high-value added HQ (headquarters) functions, intellectual property, higher education, and information technology. Yet, there were problems: Maintaining world order, or empire, was, as we asserted above, expensive. In 2024 the US military budget was $824 billion. This figure does not even count huge “off (or black) budget” items related to security, etc., for which costs are not precisely known. Besides these numbers, we should not forget about the military’s global presence: The US paid for global security costs, protecting important maritime trade routes, chokepoints – not just supporting the American interest, but for instance chiefly helping China trade with the world. These costs were covered, in part, through US borrowing, much of it from abroad. In 2024, the US government deficit stood at $1.8 trillion, or 6.4% of GDP. While the total US debt reached $38 trillion. The last time the US federal budget was in surplus was in the last term of President Bill Clinton, when there were both reduced military expenditures (post-Cold War “peace dividend”) and top marginal income tax rates of 39.6%. And before Clinton’s second term, US budgets were only in surplus in 1969 and before that only for several years in the 1950s. Decelerating US decline also requires addressing these areas. First is the area of domestic costs. US public pension costs (Social Security and Medicare) face a fiscal crisis. The dedicated taxes (Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or “FICA”) will soon be insufficient to pay for pension costs. FICA taxes in the late 20th century, under President Ronald Reagan, were raised above pension costs. The surplus (a de facto tax on labor) was to finance costs of a future changed 21st century demographic mix creating lower ratios of workers to pensioners. This funding forward model could only work if surplus revenues were invested in productivity enhancing infrastructure creating larger future economic growth and productivity. Instead, the FICA tax surpluses levied on labor were largely used to reduce budget deficits resulting from tax cuts to the wealthy and corporate sectors. In short, to be blunt, the money was taken from labor, with continued borrowing now to pay pension costs running up against the limits of the US to borrow. Second, reserve assets. Lack of ground rents, given the US had no centuries long accumulation of land ownership from feudalism, meant low land prices and reduced inequality generally in the United States. Additionally, the United States applied tariffs to protect domestic markets and promote industrialization generally starting with their first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures” in 1791 that gave the US high tariffs, only later rivaled by Russia under the economic leadership of Sergei Witte and Pytor Stolypin in Russia’s late Czarist Russia period. Third, after the 2008 US financial shock it became clear that China was not limited to being merely a supplier of lower-tier consumer goods to the world, but risked becoming a power that could challenge the United States (an idea encapsulated in the Thucydides trap). Rather than markets paving the path toward liberal democracy, as many US policymakers previously assumed, the ascendancy of Xi Jinping signaled China’s fealty to an autonomous route to development. However, China still depends on the global system, the institutions, and structures that have ensured and continue to ensure its participation in global trade, for example. China does not yet possess the global capabilities that would allow it to defend its interests beyond its borders. Therefore, taking action against Beijing as a rival could cause difficulties in time for a country that is dependent on numerous structures maintained by Washington. The Trump administration’s goals and responses to the US crises are to:• Offload costs of US “empire” to other states currently benefiting from it• Recovery through fall in commodity prices (energy, food, metals, etc.)• Move from globalization to regional spheres of influence• Postpone “Armageddon” of global exit from US dollar• Widen leads in AI, thus requiring cheap energy• Reduce US government debt levels• Widen US lead in space• Reshore US industry To achieve these goals, a tariff policy was established that fundamentally shapes American economic and foreign policy, to which Washington has put forward the following proposals: First, other countries can accept tariffs on their exports to the United States without retaliation, providing revenue to the U.S. Treasury to finance public goods provision. Critically, retaliation will exacerbate rather than improve the distribution of burdens and make it even more difficult for us to finance global public goods; Second, others can stop unfair and harmful trading practices by opening their markets and buying more from America; Third, they can boost defense spending and procurement from the U.S., buying more U.S.-made goods, and taking strain off our service-members and creating jobs here; Fourth, they can invest in and install factories in America. They won’t face tariffs if they make their stuff in this country; Fifth, they could simply write checks to the Treasury that help us finance global public goods. Or more passively, accept conversion of their Treasury Bills into century-long non-interest bearing bonds. American foreign policy actions can generate results that are drastically different from expectations, and in certain cases can accelerate and amplify problems Washington faces. Although it is evident classic free trade agreements have not formed the basis of American foreign and economic policy for some time, the tariffs introduced and then implemented (and periodically suspended) by the Trump administration, imposed challenges to the United States on several fronts: First, tariffs have severely affected or even targeted states that have traditionally been in partnership with the United States (e.g. EU, Japan, South Korea), which Washington could rely on for support, for example during its international interventions. Such steps can, on the one hand, harm and jeopardize American global and economic interests, and on the other hand, push actors towards a multipolarity that Washington fears. Similarly questionable are trade actions against states that could be pillars of a coalition against China (e.g. Vietnam and the Philippines). American weaponization of trade and unilateral military expectations make Washington an unattractive, if not unreliable, partner, thus encouraging multilateralism. Second, Washington’s demands that states sever trade relations with China, or even with Russia, as Trump asked India to do, is accelerating states decoupling from the United States not on ideological grounds but primarily based on realistic economic policy considerations. Third, these steps could also threaten the dominance of the US dollar, and even accelerate decline in confidence of the dollar – further complicating the financing of the deficit. The Trump Administration (Treasury Department) are aware of the dangers (the “Triffin” reserve currency dilemma) but think the crisis is so acute that they must do something even if they risk accelerating the dollar’s collapse. However, it is also true that a drastic decline in confidence in the US currency would require an alternative reliable currency, and currently, the currency of no potential player can be considered perfectly reliable or transparent. Finally, on a global scale, the America First slogan is not necessarily guaranteed to win partners for Washington. It is evident that in the short term, several actors will not be able to free themselves from the security architecture guaranteed by the Americans (see: NATO), but most actors will strive to advance by developing and building their own capacities. In conclusion, Washington under Trump looks to downsize and rightsize. American economic and military power, while strong, has declined from its post-Cold War unipolar moment. Reduced power has diluted American confidence, thus resulting in the US taking at times a more aggressive posture in an increasingly multipolar world. Meanwhile, the rest of the world grows wary at how the Trump Administration reacts to these changed global ‘‘adjustments” that are creating confusion over where spheres of influence begin and end. The days of America acting to, in the phrasing of Joseph Nye Jr., “winning the hearts and minds” of the world, seems off the table. The United States now retreats from soft power with dramatic cuts to foreign aid and international exchanges, such as its Fulbright program. Rather than winning the world over, under Trump, demands for deference to US authority and power now mark its preferred relations with the world, while it disengages from other parts of the globe.

Diplomacy
WASHINGTON, DC - JANUARY 20: President Donald Trump signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House on January 20, 2025 in Washington, DC. Trump takes office for his second term as the 47

Donald Trump: Reconfiguring Global Order

by Jeffrey Sommers , Zoltán Vörös , István Tarrósy

Chaos seems to mark US policy under President Donald Trump at first blush. But behind what appears (and sometimes is) capricious Trump Administration decision making are policymakers with serious plans. They intend to engage perceived threats to the United States power, while transforming its economy in ways making it less dependent on global supply chains and “reserve assets.” Recognizing festering wounds to the US economy while seeing areas of strength, Trump policymakers look to cauterize the former while pivoting more fully to the latter. Trump’s presidency has openly engaged in criticizing past US liberal interventionist and neoconservative foreign policy. Branded as “America First” Trump’s US does not seek isolationist  withdrawal from the globe, but rather a dismantling of institutional structures and alliances that no longer benefit Washington. The United States can and should continue projecting power far but, not wide, according to America Firsters. Under America First, the national interest does not always align with the “international community,” a term America Firsters would regardless see, borrowing a line from Benedict Anderson, as a fictitious “imagined community.” America First means dismantling the liberal hegemonic world order, or at minimum the US offloading the bill for it. The cost of that liberal order, with some 750 US military bases abroad, combined with growing power of the BRICS (China chiefly, but not only), signals to America Firsters America’s need to retreat from some parts of the world, while continuing to exercise dominance in others. Related to national security is the fallout from a generation of globalization in labor markets. US offshoring of manufacturing in the post-Bretton Woods period lowered production costs. Cheap goods produced abroad were then purchased by Americans even more cheaply courtesy of the overvalued dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This worked great for US consumers, albeit with the intention of also pushing down US labor costs. Globalization enabled the United States to vacuum up global manufactures, while also running up massive government fiscal deficits. As former Vice-President Dick Cheney described it during globalization’s heyday, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.” What was once, however, a massive advantage for the United States later became its “twin deficits” problem.   In short, the best fit for the US is a realist spheres of influence model, according to the Trump Administration. The criticism of the liberal world order, of course, circles back to the aforementioned economic challenges: on the one hand, the negative economic processes related to global labor organization and America’s indebtedness, and on the other hand, the strengthening of emerging international actors. Amongst these entities, the People’s Republic of China has long been high on the agenda. During the first Trump administration the president escalated tariffs on goods imported from Asia’s giant, which then led to a trade war. According to a Pew Research Center survey from mid-April 2025, although Americans believe that this bilateral trade relationship benefits China more than the US, they are “skeptical that increased tariffs on Chinese imports will have a positive effect on the country or on their own lives.” The Trump Administration thinks otherwise. America’s economy entering Trump’s presidency looked strong. On the cusp of the great 2008 financial shock, the European Union’s dollar GDP was $16.4 trillion, the US’ was $14.8 trillion. But by 2024, EU GDP was $18.7 trillion, while the United States posted a GDP of $28 trillion. Thus, in the span of less than a generation, the US went from having a GDP 9.8% short of the EU’s in 2008 to leaping ahead with a GDP 32% larger by 2024. These impressive US GDP gains were built on the foundations of financial services, corporate high-value added HQ (headquarters) functions, intellectual property, higher education, and information technology. Yet, there were problems: Maintaining world order, or empire, was, as we asserted above, expensive. In 2024 the US military budget was $824 billion. This figure does not even count huge “off (or black) budget” items related to security, etc., for which costs are not precisely known. Besides these numbers, we should not forget about the military’s global presence: The US paid for global security costs, protecting important maritime trade routes, chokepoints – not just supporting the American interest, but for instance chiefly helping China trade with the world. These costs were covered, in part, through US borrowing, much of it from abroad. In 2024, the US government deficit stood at $1.8 trillion, or 6.4% of GDP. While the total US debt reached $38 trillion. The last time the US federal budget was in surplus was in the last term of President Bill Clinton, when there were both reduced military expenditures (post-Cold War “peace dividend”) and top marginal income tax rates of 39.6%. And before Clinton’s second term, US budgets were only in surplus in 1969 and before that only for several years in the 1950s. Decelerating US decline also requires addressing these areas. First is the area of domestic costs. US public pension costs (Social Security and Medicare) face a fiscal crisis. The dedicated taxes (Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or “FICA”) will soon be insufficient to pay for pension costs. FICA taxes in the late 20th century, under President Ronald Reagan, were raised above pension costs. The surplus (a de facto tax on labor) was to finance costs of a future changed 21st century demographic mix creating lower ratios of workers to pensioners. This funding forward model could only work if surplus revenues were invested in productivity enhancing infrastructure creating larger future economic growth and productivity. Instead, the FICA tax surpluses levied on labor were largely used to reduce budget deficits resulting from tax cuts to the wealthy and corporate sectors. In short, to be blunt, the money was taken from labor, with continued borrowing now to pay pension costs running up against the limits of the US to borrow. Second, reserve assets. Lack of ground rents, given the US had no centuries long accumulation of land ownership from feudalism, meant low land prices and reduced inequality generally in the United States. Additionally, the United States applied tariffs to protect domestic markets and promote industrialization generally starting with their first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures in 1791 that gave the US high tariffs, only later rivaled by Russia under the economic leadership of Sergei Witte and Pytor Stolypin in Russia’s late Czarist Russia period. Third, after the 2008 US financial shock it became clear that China was not limited to being merely a supplier of lower-tier consumer goods to the world, but risked becoming a power that could challenge the United States (an idea encapsulated in the Thucydides trap). Rather than markets paving the path toward liberal democracy, as many US policymakers previously assumed, the ascendancy of Xi Jinping signaled China’s fealty to an autonomous route to development. However, China still depends on the global system, the institutions, and structures that have ensured and continue to ensure its participation in global trade, for example. China does not yet possess the global capabilities that would allow it to defend its interests beyond its borders. Therefore, taking action against Beijing as a rival could cause difficulties in time for a country that is dependent on numerous structures maintained by Washington. The Trump administration’s goals and responses to the US crises are to: • Offload costs of US “empire” to other states currently benefiting from it• Recovery through fall in commodity prices (energy, food, metals, etc.)• Move from globalization to regional spheres of influence• Postpone “Armageddon” of global exit from US dollar• Widen leads in AI, thus requiring cheap energy• Reduce US government debt levels• Widen US lead in space• Reshore US industry To achieve these goals, a tariff policy was established that fundamentally shapes American economic and foreign policy, to which Washington has put forward the following proposals: First, other countries can accept tariffs on their exports to the United States without retaliation, providing revenue to the U.S. Treasury to finance public goods provision. Critically, retaliation will exacerbate rather than improve the distribution of burdens and make it even more difficult for us to finance global public goods; Second, others can stop unfair and harmful trading practices by opening their markets and buying more from America; Third, they can boost defense spending and procurement from the U.S., buying more U.S.-made goods, and taking strain off our service-members and creating jobs here; Fourth, they can invest in and install factories in America. They won’t face tariffs if they make their stuff in this country; Fifth, they could simply write checks to the Treasury that help us finance global public goods. Or more passively, accept conversion of their Treasury Bills into century-long non-interest bearing bonds. American foreign policy actions can generate results that are drastically different from expectations, and in certain cases can accelerate and amplify problems Washington faces. Although it is evident classic free trade agreements have not formed the basis of American foreign and economic policy for some time, the tariffs introduced and then implemented (and periodically suspended) by the Trump administration, imposed challenges to the United States on several fronts: First, tariffs have severely affected or even targeted states that have traditionally been in partnership with the United States (e.g. EU, Japan, South Korea), which Washington could rely on for support, for example during its international interventions. Such steps can, on the one hand, harm and jeopardize American global and economic interests, and on the other hand, push actors towards a multipolarity that Washington fears. Similarly questionable are trade actions against states that could be pillars of a coalition against China (e.g. Vietnam and the Philippines). American weaponization of trade and unilateral military expectations make Washington an unattractive, if not unreliable, partner, thus encouraging multilateralism. Second, Washington’s demands that states sever trade relations with China, or even with Russia, as Trump asked India to do, is accelerating states decoupling from the United States not on ideological grounds but primarily based on realistic economic policy considerations. Third, these steps could also threaten the dominance of the US dollar, and even accelerate decline in confidence of the dollar – further complicating the financing of the deficit. The Trump Administration (Treasury Department) are aware of the dangers (the “Triffin” reserve currency dilemma) but think the crisis is so acute that they must do something even if they risk accelerating the dollar’s collapse. However, it is also true that a drastic decline in confidence in the US currency would require an alternative reliable currency, and currently, the currency of no potential player can be considered perfectly reliable or transparent. Finally, on a global scale, the America First slogan is not necessarily guaranteed to win partners for Washington. It is evident that in the short term, several actors will not be able to free themselves from the security architecture guaranteed by the Americans (see: NATO), but most actors will strive to advance by developing and building their own capacities. In conclusion, Washington under Trump looks to downsize and rightsize. American economic and military power, while strong, has declined from its post-Cold War unipolar moment. Reduced power has diluted American confidence, thus resulting in the US taking at times a more aggressive posture in an increasingly multipolar world. Meanwhile, the rest of the world grows wary at how the Trump Administration reacts to these changed global ‘‘adjustments” that are creating confusion over where spheres of influence begin and end. The days of America acting to, in the phrasing of Joseph Nye Jr., “winning the hearts and minds” of the world, seems off the table. The United States now retreats from soft power with dramatic cuts to foreign aid and international exchanges, such as its Fulbright program. Rather than winning the world over, under Trump, demands for deference to US authority and power now mark its preferred relations with the world, while it disengages from other parts of the globe.

Defense & Security
AI US China Technology War as Chinese and American Technology competition for technological dominance and artificial intelligence trade war or national security risk as a 3D illustration.

The high-Tech Cold War: US-China Rivalry and the Battle for Global Innovation

by Eraj Farooqui

Since the 1970s, the US-China relationship has been defined by a combination of cooperative and competitive objectives. Competitive interests, however, have prevailed, resulting in a rising competition between the two countries. (Pillsbury, 2015) Candidates in the 2016 presidential election treated China as an adversary, with Donald Trump's China-bashing becoming a trademark of his campaign. Rivalry with China has become the organising premise of American foreign policy under Trump's administration. Republicans and Democrats differ on most issues, but they agree on the need to change America's approach towards China. This has sparked speculation about whether the US-China relationship has devolved into a possibly violent clash or a new Cold War. The Trump administration has openly announced a shift in US policy towards China, with Matt Pottinger claiming that the US has modified its China policy to emphasise competition. Former Vice President of Trump Pence stated that the United States will combat China aggressively on all fronts, including economic, military, diplomatic, political, and ideological. This statement is regarded as "the declaration of a new Cold War." (Pence’s, 2018) Former Trump advisor Stephen K. Bannon has declared economic war on China, blaming its exports on the American working and middle classes. Many people agree that China is economically dominating America, and the US government and industry have done little to solve the situation. Globalists such as Madeline Albright, Tom Friedman, and Fareed Zakaria have grown increasingly concerned about China's lack of reciprocity in economic dealings with the United States. David Lampton, a pro-engagement advocate, has criticised China's WTO membership for increasing bilateral trade surpluses. (Staff R. , 2017) The second stage began when Donald Trump determined to halt Chinese commercial and technological advancements, renouncing liberal internationalism in favor of a new grand strategy against China. (Drezner D. R., 2021) The growing view of Xi Jinping as a harsh leader with an aggressive foreign policy contributes to the sense of an ideological clash. China and the United States have initiated an unconstrained war for bilateral, regional, and global dominance, ushering in a new age of strategic conflict that has yet to be fully defined. (Rudd, 2020) The US-China conflict appears to be a Cold War, and any return to a pre-2017 environment of "strategic engagement" with Beijing is no longer politically viable. (Rudd, 2020)However, (Zakaria, 2019) does not feel that the liberal international order has deteriorated as much as is widely assumed, and China is far from a grave threat to the liberal international system. Despite the best intentions of both countries, the US-China relationship is more likely to devolve into economic and military competition. (Lake, 2018) China's strategy aims to modernize its industrial capacity and secure its position as a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. The strategy aims to reduce reliance on foreign technology imports, increase Chinese-domestic content of core materials, and upgrade its dominant position in major strategic industries, such as pharmaceutical, automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, and most importantly, IT and robotics. The 14th Five-Year Plan of China (2021-2025) emphasizes high-quality growth driven by green and high-tech industries, service sectors, and domestic consumption. The US judged China's old growth model as generating a somewhat balanced win-win relationship between the two economies, based on "comparative advantage" and "cost-benefit" evaluations. However, Beijing's new growth model, particularly the "Made in China 2025" aspiration, is perceived as competition with the US service and knowledge economy, resulting in trade and high-tech warfare between the two countries since 2018. (Bernal-Meza L. X., China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition?, 2021) The US business community, once a staunch supporter of engagement, has complained that China has hacked American industrial secrets, created barriers to American firms investing in China, enforced regulations that discriminate against foreigners, maintained high tariffs that should have been reduced decades ago, and blocked American Internet businesses. In a rare joint statement by the allies, the intelligence chiefs of the Five Eyes countries convened on Tuesday to charge China with stealing intellectual property and using artificial intelligence to hack and spy on the countries. (Bing, 2023) The officials from the United States,Britain,Canada,Australia and Huawei,for example,has tight relations with the Party and has been accused of stealing intellectual property as well as spying on Western countries. The United States is concerned about Huwaie's 5G supremacy, which is why it’s CEO, Meng Wan Zhou, was arrested in Canada. Indeed, its importance was highlighted when the United States imposed restrictions restricting, and in some cases prohibiting, Chinese telecoms operations in the American market, and launched a global effort to persuade friends, partners, and others to follow suit. Thus, while President Trump allowed one company (ZTE) a respite from what appeared to be a ban that would put it out of business, later American limitations on Huawei threatened to destroy China's premier international technology company's global viability. (Goldstein, 2020) When it comes to both green technology and chips, it is now at the center of American politics. The CHIPS Act, approved by Congress last year, included $52 billion in grants, tax credits, and other subsidies to stimulate American chip production. That's the kind of industrial policy that would make Hamilton gape and clap. Over the next few years and decades, China will pour vast sums of money into its own industrial strategy programmes, spanning a wide spectrum of cutting-edge technology. According to one Centre for Strategic and International Studies researcher, China already spends more than 12 times as much of its GDP on industrial programmes as the United States. (BROOKS, 2023) Certain social media sites, such as Facebook and Google, are prohibited in China.In the United States, there is a restriction on TIKTOK and WECHAT. To counter China, the United States has implemented a number of statutes, including the: 1.COMPETES Act 2020.: The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee decided to advance the America Competes Act of 2022, which intends to improve America's scientific and technology efforts in the twenty-first century in order to compete with China in vital fields. The bipartisan Act is divided into eleven sections, with Division K headed "Matters Related to Trade." Trade Adjustment Assistance, Import Security and Fairness Act, National Critical Capabilities Review, Modification and Extension of Generalized System of Preferences, Reauthorization of the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016 and Other Matters, and Temporary Duty Suspensions and Reductions are the seven sections of the Act. President Joe Biden has indicated his support for the Act, arguing that it will strengthen America's supply chains and reenergize the economy's innovation engine, allowing it to compete with China and the rest of the globe for decades to come. 2.Chips and Science Act 2022: President Joe Biden signed the Chips and Science (or CHIPS) Act into law, promising local semiconductor producers more than $50 billion to expand home output and "counter China." (Cosgrove, 2023) 3.The United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act 2022: Although China now dominates clean technology manufacturing, the Inflation Reduction Act contains provisions geared primarily at strengthening the United States' clean energy supply chain. Furthermore, the global transition to clean technology such as solar panels and electric vehicles is unavoidable and ongoing as they become more affordable than fossil-fueled alternatives and countries take action to achieve their Paris climate obligations. (NUCCITELLI, 2023) CHIP War After failing to achieve an agreement with Chinese regulators, Intel cancelled a $5.4 billion takeover deal with Israel-based Tower Semiconductor. China is one of Intel's most important markets, and on July 3, Beijing announced a license requirement for exporters of gallium and germanium, rare-earth metals used in semiconductor manufacturing. The chip war is mostly motivated by the United States' concerns about China's military exploitation of semiconductor technology. However, China's military sector has a key weakness: most of its cutting-edge applications rely on foreign technological inputs, particularly microprocessor exports. China will be the world's largest buyer of semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2021, accounting for 26% of worldwide demand. Biden established an export license requirement in October 2022, limiting China's access to semiconductor innovations manufactured by US corporations. In July 2023, Japan officially prohibited the sale of 23 types of semiconductor equipment to China, which is significantly more widespread than the US restriction, impeding China's development of advanced chips and basic chips used in technology such as automobiles and smartphones. The Netherlands Standing Committee on Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation said in September that it will begin limiting its semiconductor technology exports to China. According to Nikkie Asia, this new legislation would prohibit the Dutch ASML from exporting innovative chip manufacturing methods without first getting government-approved licenses. (CHENG TING-FANG, 2023) These export limitations have pushed Beijing to retaliate, with China's most recent regulation on gallium and germanium shipments serving as a direct retaliation to the US' global allies. According to the New York Times Magazine, Taiwan manufactures more than 90% of the world's most advanced microchips and could risk armed confrontation if China goes on the offensive in the future. (Palmer, 2023) Former national security advisor Robert O'Brien, on the other hand, believes that in the case of an impending invasion,the US would destroy Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturers rather than allow them to fall into the hands of China. The chip battle has further pushed Taiwan into an awkward position in the changing geopolitical landscape. (Carr, 2023) The Biden administration intends to restrict shipments of advanced artificial intelligence chips designed by Nvidia to China as part of a broader set of actions aimed at preventing Beijing from gaining advanced US technologies to enhance its military. The action is intended to address regulatory gaps and limit China's access to advanced semiconductors, which might feed AI advances and sophisticated computers crucial to Chinese military purposes. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, emphasised that the administration's goal is not to harm Beijing economically. (Alexandra Alper, 2023) In the words of Lampton, "There was a widespread public perception that the Sino-American economic playing field had been unfair to Americans, with the assertion that the American economy was hollowed out, in part due to overt and covert technology transfer to China" (Lampton, 2015) . China's new growth strategy is leading to more rivalry than complementarity in the China-US economic partnership. The fact that "China's achievement in moving up in the global supply and value chains has led to Beijing's larger share of global surplus and the reduction of the profit margin for traditional core states" has disturbed the United States. (Li X. , 2020) As Lenin would have argued, the dynamics of the US-China rivalry are an inter-imperial rivalry driven by inter-capitalist struggle. Competition for the global market could quickly escalate into escalating confrontations of zones of influence, if not war. Conclusion The US-China rivalry is characterised by a complex interplay of economic, technological, and ideological issues. Although the relationship resembles a new Cold War, some argue that it is best understood as a capitalist intra-core competition driven by inter-imperial rivalry. As Lenin foresaw, competition for global markets may escalate into conflicts over areas of control. The contest is likely to last and have an impact on the global order for many years to come since both nations have made large investments in industrial strategy and technology. Advanced semi-conductors and AI chips are necessary for the next race for technological supremacy. 6G telecom and quantum computing. The globe was forced to protect the supply chain for rare earth materials due to this high-tech rivalry. Since they are currently the epicentre of the world's military and economic might. For many years to come, its influence will shape international politics, trade disputes, and technological advancements. Global struggle for these minerals is anticipated in the twenty-first century, much like the wars for oil and gas in the twentieth. Rare earths will be the focus of the twenty-first century. Mineral-rich nations like Brazil, India, Australia, and Vitenam will also become strategically significant for other reasons. As competition for these resources intensifies, international relations will shift and geopolitical alignment will result. 5Gs is no longer the focus of this new technical cold war. It now comes down to controlling the basic materials that enable technology. For this reason, JD Vance adds, "Give us your financial resources, and we'll take care of you." In the trade and technology conflict that has intensified since the Biden Administration increased the restrictions on sales of cutting-edge American technology to China, the Pentagon has designated rare earth as a strategic mineral that is essential for US defence.In response to US technology sanctions, China restricted the export of rare earth materials.It has nothing to do with economics, but rather with military supremacy on a worldwide scale. This is how the US sees the discovery of these rare earth minerals. Donald Trump is threatening Canada, Greenland, and Ukraine for this reason. Due to their large stockpiles of rare earth materials, they are able to protect the global supply chain in this way.Interestingly, however, China produces 63% of rare earth minerals and refines 83% of them. It can store 44 million metric tonnes of reserves in this manner. The US would still have 4-5 million tonnes of metric reserves if it were to seize the deposits of Greenland, Canada, and Ukraine.Thus, they are negligible compared to 44 million metric tonnes in China. If China wisely controls its rare earth export strategy, it will be powerful enough to remind the world of its might without being overly harsh. Then it can demonstrate that Beijing is just as adept at using resources as Washington is at using dollars or sanctions. However, if the world manages to get past it or if China's grip wanes, its greatest advantage may begin to diminish. The next few months are critical because tanks and missiles are not being used in the largest power fight this time. Minerals and magnets will be used to combat it. Bibliography Alexandra Alper, K. F. (2023, October 18). Biden cuts China off from more Nvidia chips, expands curbs to other countries. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/technology/biden-cut-china-off-more-nvidia-chips-expand-curbs-more-countries-2023-10-17/Bernal-Meza, L. X. (2021, May 1). China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 64, no. 1. Retrieved from https://www.redalyc.org/journal/358/35866229009/html/#B39Bing, Z. S. (2023, May 23). Chinese hackers spying on US critical infrastructure, Western intelligence says. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/technology/microsoft-says-china-backed-hacker-targeted-critical-us-infrastructure-2023-05-24/BROOKS, D. (2023, March 23). The Cold War With China Is Changing Everything. Retrieved from The NewYork Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/23/opinion/cold-war-china-chips.htmlCarr, E. (2023, August 22). The 2023 US–China Chip War: The Nexus Of High Tech And Geopolitics. Retrieved from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/earlcarr/2023/08/22/uschina-chip-war-the-nexus-of-high-tech-and-international-relations/?sh=618bc5ed1bd3CHENG TING-FANG, L. L.-B. (2023, June 30). Netherlands unveils chip tool export curbs in fresh blow to China. Retrieved from Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Netherlands-unveils-chip-tool-export-curbs-in-fresh-blow-to-ChinaCosgrove, L. (2023, May 5). Lawmakers Tout Effect of CHIPs Act in US Competition with China. Retrieved from THE EPOCH TIMES: https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/lawmakers-tout-effect-of-chips-act-in-us-competition-with-china-5243151Drezner, D. R. (2021, May/June 13). The end of grand strategy. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs,: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/end-grand-strategyGoldstein, A. (2020). US–China Rivalry in the twenty-first century: Déjà vu and Cold War II. China International Strategy Review volume 2,, 48-62.Kautsky, K. (1914, September 11). Ultra-imperialism. Der Imperialismus," Die Neue Zeit, 32 (1914), Vol. 2, 908-922. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htmLake, D. A. (2018). Economic openness and great power competition: lessons for China and the United States. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3, 237-70.Lake, D. A. (2018). Economic openness and great power competition: lessons for China and the United States. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3, 237-270.Lampton, D. (2015, June 2). David Lampton on “A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations”. Retrieved from COUNCIL PACIFIC AFFAIRS: https://www.councilpacificaffairs.org/news-media/security-defense/dr-david-lampton-on-a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations/Li, X. (2020). The rise of China and its impact on world economic stratification and re-stratification. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 34, no. 4 , 530-50.NUCCITELLI, D. (2023, September 20). The Inflation Reduction Act is reducing U.S. reliance on China. Retrieved from The YALE Climate Connection: https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/09/the-inflation-reduction-act-is-reducing-u-s-reliance-on-china/Palmer, A. W. (2023, August 11). An Act of War’: Inside America’s Silicon Blockade Against China. Retrieved from The NewYork Times Magazine : https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/12/magazine/semiconductor-chips-us-china.htmlPence’s, P. J. (2018, October 5). China Speech Seen as Portent of ‘New Cold War’. Retrieved from New York Times. : https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/world/asia/pence-china-speech-cold-war.htmlPillsbury, M. (2015). The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower . Henry Holt and Co.Rudd, K. (2020, May 6). The coming post-COVID anarchy. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-05-06/coming-post-covid-anarchyStaff, R. (2017, August 17). Trump adviser Bannon says U.S. in economic war with China: media. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-bannon-idUSKCN1AX0DEZakaria, F. (2019, December 6). The new China Scare: why America shouldn’t panic about its latest challenger. Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare 

Defense & Security
Missiles in front EU flag. Air defense systems European Union. Cruise missiles in Europe. Concept weapons development in Europe. Stockpiles strategic missiles. Concrete wall in foreground. 3d image

Nuclear Sharing Between the U.S. and the EU. Benefits and Challenges.

by Krzysztof Śliwiński

Abstract This paper examines the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, focusing on its benefits and challenges within the U.S.-EU security framework. Nuclear sharing involves the U.S. deploying B61 nuclear bombs in select European NATO countries, with host nations providing delivery systems and infrastructure while the U.S. retains full control, ensuring compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The arrangement strengthens NATO's deterrence posture, promotes alliance cohesion, and supports non-proliferation by dissuading the development of independent nuclear arsenals. Recent geopolitical tensions, especially Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have intensified calls for expanding sharing to countries like Poland, enhancing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. Exercises such as Steadfast Noon validate operational readiness and signal resolve. Critics, however, highlight legal and escalation risks, potential NPT violations, and domestic opposition in host countries. Despite these issues, nuclear sharing remains a crucial component of Euro-Atlantic security, adapting to evolving threats while balancing deterrence, alliance unity, and non-proliferation goals.  Key Words: International Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Sharing, Alliances Introduction Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's deterrence strategy, designed to distribute the benefits, responsibilities, and risks of nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. Under these arrangements, the United States deploys a limited number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs at bases in several European NATO member states. At the same time, those host countries provide the necessary infrastructure, security, and dual-capable aircraft (DCAs) to deliver weapons in a crisis. The weapons remain under full U.S. custody and control at all times, in compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A nuclear mission can only be authorised after explicit political approval from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all NATO members, and the U.S. President (and potentially the UK Prime Minister). This setup ensures collective decision-making and underscores the U.S.'s extended deterrence commitments to its allies, helping prevent nuclear proliferation by giving non-nuclear states a stake in the Alliance's nuclear posture without independent arsenals.[1] The arrangements originated in the Cold War era, with the first U.S. atomic weapons arriving in Europe in 1954. By the 1960s, they were formalised through the NPG to allow non-nuclear allies input on nuclear policy. Today, approximately 100 B61 bombs are forward-deployed in Europe, hosted by five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Seven NATO allies contribute DCA, including F-16s and F-35s, which serve dual roles in conventional operations and as potential nuclear delivery platforms. France and the UK maintain independent nuclear forces that complement the US-led sharing but operate outside the formal NATO structure. While the question references the EU, nuclear sharing is strictly a NATO framework; all host countries are EU members except Turkey, creating significant overlap but no direct EU-level involvement.[2] These arrangements serve multiple purposes: they enhance Alliance cohesion, provide tools for managing escalations in conflicts, and signal resolve to adversaries, such as Russia. Recent geopolitical tensions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have prompted discussions about expanding sharing to strengthen deterrence on NATO's eastern flank.[3] Poland, a NATO member since 1999, has long advocated for a stronger role in the Alliance's nuclear mission amid heightened Russian threats, particularly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In June 2023, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki first publicly expressed interest in hosting U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO's sharing policy, arguing it would bolster deterrence without violating the NPT. This push intensified in early 2025, driven by concerns over U.S. reliability under the second Trump administration and Russia's aggressive posture.[4]   On March 13, 2025, President Andrzej Duda explicitly urged the U.S. to deploy nuclear warheads on Polish territory, stating in interviews that NATO infrastructure—including nuclear assets — should "shift east" to match the eastward expansion of the Alliance's borders since 1999. He emphasised that such a move would enhance security guarantees and deter future Russian aggression, while also praising France's potential extension of its "atomic umbrella" as a complementary option. Duda's proposal carried domestic political weight, positioning Poland's conservative opposition as pro-U.S. ahead of the May 2025 presidential election, where candidates debated transatlantic ties versus European autonomy.[5] Proponents argue Poland is an ideal candidate: it spends 4.7% of GDP on defence (exceeding NATO's 2% target), has built one of Europe's strongest militaries, and hosts significant U.S. rotational forces. Analysts suggest that deployment could involve adapting Polish F-35s for DCA roles or constructing secure storage facilities. However, logistical and political hurdles remain, including a potential Russian backlash and the need for NPG consensus.[6] As of October 2025, however, no U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed to Poland, and the proposal remains under discussion without a formal U.S. commitment. Instead, Poland has deepened integration through participation in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, which began on October 13, 2025, across Belgium, the Netherlands, and the North Sea — testing procedures for credibility and safety. Poland joined as a full participant alongside Finland, Germany, and the U.S., signalling growing involvement in nuclear planning but stopping short of hosting assets. Alternatives like a dedicated U.S. "nuclear umbrella" declaration for Poland have been floated to avoid escalation without physical deployment.[7] What academics say Academic experts agree that Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's defence strategy. This arrangement refers to an agreement according to which the United States deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons on allied territory while maintaining ownership and peacetime custody.[8]This allows selected NATO members to participate in nuclear planning and provide delivery systems, creating a framework that extends American nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. The operational structure of nuclear sharing involves dual-key arrangements in which both U.S. and host-nation authorisation are required for weapon employment. The United States maintains absolute control and custody of its nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe, while Allies provide military support for the DCA mission with conventional forces and capabilities. Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the Alliance's interconnection and remain a key component of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.[9] These arrangements are coordinated through NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, ensuring multilateral consultation on nuclear policy and targeting decisions. Currently, only five European NATO members have signed bilateral nuclear-sharing agreements with the U.S. These are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, under which the U.S. stores B61 nuclear gravity bombs at their airbases and their dual-capable aircraft can deliver them in a NATO context. These arrangements, dating back to the Cold War and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties, involve approximately 100 U.S. warheads as of 2025.[10] Nuclear sharing serves multiple strategic purposes within the alliance framework. It strengthens extended deterrence by visibly integrating allied forces into NATO's nuclear posture, thereby reassuring front-line states of American commitment.[11] Experts claim that these arrangements helped prevent nuclear proliferation by reducing incentives for European allies to develop independent arsenals during the Cold War.[12] Additionally, nuclear sharing distributes the political and operational burdens of nuclear responsibility across participating members rather than concentrating them solely with the United States. However, nuclear sharing faces significant criticisms. Legal scholars argue that forward-deploying U.S. weapons on non-nuclear states potentially contravenes the Non-Proliferation Treaty's spirit, creating ongoing diplomatic tensions with Russia and other nations.[13] Domestic opposition within host countries and concerns about the escalation of crises further complicate these arrangements.[14] Despite these challenges, nuclear sharing remains integral to NATO's deterrence strategy, particularly as renewed great-power competition has reinforced alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defence in the contemporary security environment. Benefits of Nuclear Sharing Firstly, official sources from NATO and the U.S. government consistently highlight the benefits of their efforts in preserving peace, deterring aggression, fostering unity, and aligning with global non-proliferation norms. The primary official argument for nuclear sharing is its role in bolstering NATO's deterrence posture against evolving threats, particularly from nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and related documents emphasise that the Alliance's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons, serve to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression". [15] The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration reaffirms this, stating that "nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security" and that NATO's capabilities provide the "supreme guarantee" for all members.[16] By integrating U.S. nuclear assets with European contributions, such as DCA from seven Allies, these arrangements complicate adversaries' planning and enhance crisis management. As noted in NATO's factsheet, "nuclear sharing provides military and political tools for deterrence and can be used to manage escalation in a crisis," with DCA serving as a "visible and valuable instrument for strategic communications" to signal resolve.[17] Accordingly, in a security environment marked by Russia's integration of nuclear forces into its military strategy and threats against Allies, nuclear sharing ensures credible deterrence without provoking conflict. NATO’s former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that "the purpose of NATO's nuclear weapons is not to provoke a conflict but to preserve peace, deter aggression and prevent coercion," underscoring that arrangements like those involving Germany are vital for the "security of the whole alliance".[18] The U.S. State Department echoes this rationale, claiming that with NATO "numerically outgunned on the central front," nuclear sharing maintains a "nuclear deterrent posture sufficient to deter the Soviet aggression," a logic that persists against modern threats.[19] Against this backdrop, exercises like Steadfast Noon[1] Further strengthen this by simulating nuclear scenarios, ensuring "the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission".[20] Overall, according to official sources, these mechanisms help preserve stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and adapt to challenges posed by actors such as China and North Korea. Secondly, nuclear sharing fosters unity and shared responsibility among NATO members, distributing the benefits, risks, and political burdens of deterrence more evenly among them. NATO's publications explicitly state that these arrangements "ensure that the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared across the Alliance," demonstrating "unity and cohesion amongst all Allies" through joint decision-making in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).[21] This shared approach, as NATO sources claim, reinforces the indivisibility of security, as outlined in NATO's nuclear policy: "Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the interconnection of the Alliance and remain one of the main components of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area".[22] The 2024 Summit Declaration commits to "modernising its nuclear capabilities" and "strengthening its nuclear planning capability," ensuring broader participation to "demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve".[23] By involving European Allies in Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions and infrastructure, nuclear sharing is intended to help mitigate disparities in capabilities, promote equitable burden-sharing, and prevent fragmentation within the Alliance. Thirdly, NATO posits that nuclear sharing supports non-proliferation efforts. Contrary to criticisms, official sources argue that nuclear sharing advances non-proliferation by reducing incentives for Allies to pursue independent nuclear programs. NATO's review of the NPT at 50 years notes that these arrangements "have contributed to security in Europe and non-proliferation as Allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella have not felt pressure to develop their own weapons".[24] Codified during the 1960s negotiations, they comply fully with the Treaty, as both the U.S. and the USSR ensured that no prohibitions were placed on such setups.[25] The U.S. State Department details this compromise, which allowed for "wartime nuclear sharing" without requiring peacetime transfer, thereby reassuring allies like West Germany and dissuading proliferation.[26] Post-Cold War reductions — over 90% in NATO's nuclear stockpile — align with NPT Article VI disarmament goals while maintaining deterrence.[27] This balance facilitates peaceful nuclear cooperation under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, thereby strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.[28] Finally, according to the U.S. State Department, nuclear sharing underscores the U.S. commitment to European security, countering fears of "decoupling" where allies doubt American resolve. The State Department describes it as addressing whether the U.S. would "sacrifice Chicago to save Hamburg," by making nuclear weapons available for Europe's defence.[29] NATO's policy affirms that U.S. strategic forces, supplemented by forward-deployed assets, provide the "supreme guarantee," with Allies contributing to ensure integration across domains.[30] To sum up, official arguments portray nuclear sharing as indispensable for deterrence, cohesion, non-proliferation, and transatlantic solidarity. These arrangements, according to Western policy-makers and experts, have sustained European stability for decades, with ongoing modernisation ensuring their relevance in an unpredictable world. Nuclear Sharing in the Face of an Ongoing War in Ukraine Nuclear sharing has allegedly bolstered NATO's overall deterrence posture, helping to prevent Russian escalation in Ukraine, including potential nuclear use. NATO's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons in Europe, are described as essential to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression" in the face of Russia's nuclear threats and integration of nuclear forces into its strategy.[31] This has indirectly supported Ukraine by signalling to Russia that any significant escalation — such as nuclear strikes or attacks on NATO territory — would invoke a collective response, thereby limiting Russia's options in the conflict. Russia's invasion has been accompanied by nuclear sabre-rattling to deter Western intervention, but nuclear sharing has helped counter this by maintaining credible deterrence without direct NATO involvement in Ukraine.[32] In that sense, the already mentioned exercises like Steadfast Noon simulate nuclear scenarios, reinforcing the "credibility, effectiveness, safety and security" of the deterrent, which has been crucial amid threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. Analysts note that this has made Russian nuclear signalling less credible over time, allowing the West to provide advanced weapons to Ukraine that were initially considered taboo.[33] However, Russia's threats have still delayed and limited the scale of Western aid, such as restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia, due to fears of crossing "red lines".[34] As mentioned before, nuclear sharing agreements have arguably fostered greater unity among NATO allies, enabling sustained military and economic support for Ukraine. By sharing the "benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence," nuclear sharing demonstrates Alliance solidarity and the "indivisibility of security" in the Euro-Atlantic area.[35] This has reassured European allies, particularly those near Russia, allowing them to commit resources to Ukraine without fearing abandonment. For example, Poland's push to join nuclear sharing reflects heightened threat perceptions from the war, aiming to strengthen deterrence and defence in a hostile environment. NATO's support, including intelligence sharing and strategic communications, has, at least in the eyes of Western policy-makers, deterred Russian use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[36] Without reassurance from nuclear sharing of U.S. commitment — countering fears of "decoupling" — it might have been harder for Europe to maintain this level of involvement.[37] From Russia's perspective, nuclear sharing exacerbates tensions, viewing it as part of NATO's eastward expansion that provoked the invasion.[38] Putin has used this to support claims behind "Russia's Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, framing Ukraine's potential NATO integration as a threat that could place U.S. nuclear weapons near Russia's borders, similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. This rationale has fueled Russian nuclear threats, which aim to limit Western aid and prolong the conflict by raising escalation fears.[39] The war has heightened nuclear risks, with some analysts arguing it presents greater dangers than the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the potential for miscalculation.[40] Russia's deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a counter to NATO's sharing arrangements has further escalated postures.[41] Recent decisions by the U.S., UK, and France to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russian targets have prompted Putin to warn of a direct NATO-Russia war, indirectly tying into nuclear sharing's role in deterrence dynamics.[42] This has possibly complicated peace efforts, as Russia perceives Western escalation as existential, making negotiations harder. As mentioned earlier, nuclear sharing has arguably helped mitigate proliferation risks during the war. By providing a shared nuclear umbrella, it reduces the incentives for allies like Poland and Germany to pursue independent nuclear programs, thereby supporting the NPT.[43] Possibly then, the invasion has not sparked widespread proliferation, partly because NATO's deterrent reassures members. Interestingly, however, the debates over a "European nuclear deterrent" independent of the U.S. — spurred by uncertainties such as potential shifts in U.S. policy under Trump — could undermine this if not managed effectively.[44] The war has also renewed focus on modernising nuclear sharing, with NATO committing to enhancing capabilities at the 2024 Washington Summit.[45] This has indirectly affected Ukraine by diverting Russian resources and attention, though some argue it prolongs the stalemate without a decisive victory. In summary, nuclear sharing has possibly acted as a stabilising force for NATO, enabling robust support for Ukraine and deterring Russian nuclear escalation. However, it has also contributed to heightened tensions and Russian intransigence, complicating pathways to peace. As the war persists into 2025, proposals to expand sharing (e.g., to Poland) reflect its evolving role in countering ongoing threats. Conclusion The "Steadfast Noon" exercises are arguably a clear signal to any potential adversary, including Russia, that NATO is prepared to defend all its members against any threats, including nuclear ones. Such exercises involve the use of American non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, although no real combat weapons are used during the drills. The exercises serve not only to practice deterrence against possible nuclear attacks but also to prepare for the potential use of nuclear weapons by NATO if necessary. The fact that these exercises involve nuclear deterrence indicates that NATO's defence strategy includes readiness to escalate to a nuclear response if provoked by a nuclear attack. The locations of these nuclear weapons are not publicly disclosed. Still, there is speculation about their presence in countries like Poland, particularly in light of recent secret agreements that allow foreign troops to enter Polish territory. On the other hand, one should also consider potential downsides, especially for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Nuclear sharing for potential allied use in wartime poses significant risks despite its deterrence aims. One major downside is its incompatibility with the NPT, which violates Articles I and II.[2] Enabling the indirect transfer of control to non-nuclear states undermines global non-proliferation efforts and draws criticism from states such as China. This arrangement also heightens proliferation risks, as peacetime training and exercises normalise nuclear readiness, potentially inspiring similar setups in Asia-Pacific regions like Japan and South Korea, escalating regional tensions.[46] Security concerns include increased escalation dangers, where limited nuclear use could spiral into full-scale war, especially amid vulnerabilities at host bases like Incirlik in Türkiye during political instability. Expanding sharing, such as to Poland, fuels arms races with Russia and exposes more European sites to attacks, without adding credible deterrence given NATO's conventional superiority. Politically, it breeds divisiveness within NATO, fostering resentment among allies and diverting resources from conventional forces, while eroding U.S. control and complicating disarmament. Domestically, host nations face public backlash and moral burdens from anti-nuclear norms, straining alliance cohesion. Russia's objections in NPT forums further highlight how sharing provokes international backlash, risking broader conflicts. Notes [1] On Monday (October 13 2025), NATO began its annual nuclear deterrence exercise Steadfast Noon. The exercise is a long-planned, routine training activity and part of NATO’s broader efforts to maintain readiness and ensure transparency around its nuclear posture. It is not linked to any current world events, and no live weapons are used.[2] Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. See more at: https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html References [1] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[2] Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight-Boyle, M. (2023, November 8). Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-11/nuclear-weapons-sharing-2023/[3] Johns, E. (2025, October 10). Incomplete Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath Raise Questions About Suspected US Nuclear Deployment. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[4] Johns, E. (n.d.). Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing. IISS. Retrieved October 14, 2025, from https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[5] Poland’s president urges U.S. to move nuclear warheads to Polish territory, FT reports. (2025, March 13). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/polands-president-urges-us-move-nuclear-warheads-polish-territory-ft-reports-2025-03-13/[6] Poland’s president vows to spend 4.7% of GDP on defence this year. (2025, February 5). Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/05/polands-president-vows-to-spend-47-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year[7] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[8] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[9] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_50068.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=Nuclear%20consultation,are%20members%20of%20the%20NPG[10] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[11] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[12] Khalessi, D. (2015). Strategic ambiguity: Nuclear sharing and the secret strategy for drafting articles I and II of the nonproliferation treaty. The Nonproliferation Review, 23(1-2), 81-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1155865 [13] Park, K. C., & Choo, J. (2022). NATO's nuclear sharing strategy and its implications for establishing a new strategy for strengthening extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. International Area Studies Review, 26(1), 51-78. https://doi.org/10.18327/jias.2022.1.26.1.51 [14] Smith, M. A. (2004). To neither use them nor lose them: NATO and nuclear weapons since the cold war. Contemporary Security Policy, 25(3), 485-514. https://doi.org/10.1080/1352326042000330637[15] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[16] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[17] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[18] Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom. (2020, May 11). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm[19] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[20] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[21] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[22] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[23] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[24] Durkalec, J. (2018, June 29). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis. NATO. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/06/29/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/index.html[25] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[26] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[27] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf[28] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/[29] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[30]NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[31] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm [32] Nuclear Stability and Escalation Risks in Europe. (2023, September 1). Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/09/nuclear-stability-and-escalation-risks-in-europe/[33] Ibidem.[34] Kimball, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine[35] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[36] Dickinson, P., Arick, R., & Lander Finch, N. (2025, October 15). How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/how-the-us-and-europe-can-deter-and-respond-to-russias-chemical-biological-and-nuclear-threats/[37] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[38] Magnier, E. J. POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/ejmalrai/status/1796511588465201374[39] Ukraine: how nuclear weapons continue to increase the risks, two years on. (n.d.). ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons). Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://www.icanw.org/ukraine_two_years_how_nuclear_weapons_increase_the_risks[40] Kimballl, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine [41] Kayali, L., Jungholt, T., & Fritz, P. (2024, July 4). Europe Is Quietly Debating a Nuclear Future Without the US. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/04/europe-us-nuclear-weapons-00166070[42] Katchanovski, I. (n.d.). POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/I_Katchanovski/status/1858244090909127000[43] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[44] Samuelki, O. (2025, March 11). Europe going nuclear would be a catastrophic mistake. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/3/11/europe-going-nuclear-would-be-a-catastrophic-mistake[45] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[46] Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (2024). China Arms Control and Disarmament Association China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy. https://www.cinis.com.cn/zhzlghyjzy/yjbg/1446912/2024072914514738359.pdf 

Defense & Security
USA and China competing in AI supremacy, represented by chess pieces on a world map highlighting technological rivalry. AI wars between USA and china concept.

Emerging global AI order: a comparative analysis of US and China's AI strategic vision

by Hammad Gillani

Introduction   The 21st century global politics has now taken a new shape with the advent of artificial intelligence (AI). The traditional nature of great power rivalry revolves around military maneuvers, defensive-offensive moves, and weapons deployment to challenge each other, maintaining their respective hegemony over the international arena. The revival of artificial intelligence has reshaped the conventional great power game.(Feijóo et al. 2020) From now onwards, whenever the strategic circles discuss the security paradigm, AI has to be its part and parcel. The emergence of AI has altered the status quo, where major powers are now shifting towards AI-based technology. As the most basic function of AI is to create such machines and platforms that can perform tasks more proficiently than humans, it has the ability to enhance decision-making, increase efficiency, and reduce the likely risk of human errors. But at the same time, risks are also lingering.   The United States (US) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are considered to be the main players of great power politics. Their rivalry has long been centered around territorial conflicts and maritime contests. With the PRC claiming most of the territories in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the US, under its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022), has challenged the Chinese assertion.(Hassan and Ali 2025) But what the world has witnessed is that both economic hegemons have been avoiding any direct military conflict with each other. The most prominent area where both the US and the PRC are now in a continuous competition is the technological domain. China has always maintained an edge over the US in the respective field due to the fact that it holds most of the world’s known rare earth minerals—a key to technological superiority. Through trade barriers, i.e., tariffs, quotas, etc., and restricting trade with prominent Chinese companies, the US has always tried to contain technological developments in China.(Wang and Chen 2018)   “The reality is that both China and the United States are focused on getting the infrastructure necessary to win the so-called AI race. Now, whether it’s actually a race is a separate question, but data, energy, and human capital are all critical inputs to this. The massive investment infrastructure is top of mind for leaders in both countries as they seek to do it. China’s access to the advanced technology and semiconductors is going to be a key cornerstone in this regard.”(Sacks, 2025) US and China have placed AI at the center of their national policies and global strategies. Both have been introducing various policy papers, strategies, and action plans for the advancements in the field of artificial intelligence and how to counter the side. Now, the international arena is witnessing two parallel AI setups: one created by the US and the other by China. As both are tremendously investing in research, development, and innovation in artificial intelligence, their national narratives and global plans are competing with each other, further exacerbating the international AI landscape.   This paper aims to critically analyze key policies highlighted under the national action plans and strategies launched by the US and the PRC, respectively. Applying the theoretical lens of constructivism, which deals with the role of ideas, norms, and values in shaping the international system, the paper will demonstrate key differences between the AI strategies of the US and China and how their ideological beliefs shape their respective AI policies. Moreover, the analysis will provide expert views on the future landscape of the AI race, its relation to the Great Game, and its political, economic, and military repercussions for the rest of the world. Furthermore, the analysis will mostly rely on expert interviews, key excerpts from official administrative documents, and research findings. This study will also provide insights into the Trump 2.0 administration’s policy outlooks vis-à-vis Beijing’s National AI policy.   America’s AI Action Plan 2025   President Trump unveiled his administration’s national strategy on artificial intelligence on 23rd July 2025. Entitled as “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan”, this strategy is a long-term road map to counter and contain China’s growing profile in the tech world, in particular the AI.(White House, 2025) The title of the strategy explicitly announces that the US has entered into the global AI race. Under this strategy, the United States does not want to eliminate China, rather the US desires to lead the AI world as a core nation, while the PRC should operate as a periphery nation. On July 15 2025, while addressing the AI Summit in Pittsburgh, President Donald Trump stated, “The PRC is coming at par with us and we would not let it happen. We have the great chips and we have everything great. And, we will be fighting them in a friendly fashion. I have a great relationship with President Xi and we smile at the back and forth, but we are leading…...”(AFP, 2025)   America’s AI Action Plan: Key Pillars   A. Accelerate AI Innovation   This first pillar of the AI national strategy by the US deals with the fact that AI should be integrated into every sector of American lives. From the grassroots level to the national or international level, the US should be a leading AI power. AI innovation states that any type of barrier, i.e., legal, regulatory, or domestic constraints, must be eradicated at first to promote, enhance, and boost AI innovation in the US. The strategy clearly states the innovation in artificial intelligence to be the fundamental step towards AI global dominance. The American beliefs, values and norms hold much significance in this regard. This strategy laid down the framework where AI platforms and models should have to align with the US democratic principles, including free speech, equality, transparency, and recognition. This means that the US AI action plan will operate under the umbrella of capitalist ideology.(White House, 2025)   Another most important feature in the field of AI innovation is the conglomeration of public-private ventures. Both the governmental authorities and public institutions are provided with such policies and frameworks to integrate AI platforms into their day-to-day operations. Creating an AI ecosystem is the cornerstone of this strategy.(White House, 2025) It aims to build an American workforce mastered in AI capabilities, defense forces and their key platforms integrated with AI, and provide a secure and safe environment to national and international investors, thus encouraging them to increase their investments in the US. Last but not least, the development of various departments countering the unethical use of AI, i.e., deep fakes, thus securing the national sovereignty and integrity of the homeland.   Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Lynne Parker, while highlighting the significance of the US 2025 AI Action Plan, stated, “The Trump Administration is committed to ensuring the United States is the undeniable leader in AI technology. This plan of action is our first move to enhance and preserve the US AI interest, and we are eager to receive our public perception and viewpoints in this regard.”(House, 2025) The AI innovation drive is indicative of the US being a liberal-democratic and entrepreneurial society. It has an innovation culture that focuses on open research, leadership in the private sector, and ethics based on its national myth of freedom, individualism and technological optimism.   B. Building the AI Infrastructure   This is the most crucial pillar of the US AI Action Plan 2025. From propagating the idea of AI innovation, the next step is to build a strong, secure, and renowned infrastructure to streamline the policy guidelines highlighted in the national AI strategy. This includes the development of indigenous AI factories, companies, data facilities, and their integration into the American energy infrastructure. The most significant step highlighted in this pillar is the construction of indigenous American semiconductor manufacturing units.(White House, 2025) Now what does it mean? As of today, China is considered to be the center of semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductors are the basic units of any technology, i.e., weapons, aircraft, smartphones, etc. The US has long been importing semiconductor chips from China. Integration of the US energy infrastructure with that of the AI facilities is the ultimate objective of this strategy. Immense energy-producing units, i.e., electricity, under the ‘National Energy Emergency Act’ would be established to provide a continuous supply of electricity to AI data centers and facilities without any hindrance.(House, 2025)   But the Trump 2.0 administration, under its protectionist policies, aspires to restrict imports from China and build a domestic semiconductor processing unit. Highlighting the American dependence on Chinese chips, the American chemist and politician John Moolenaar stated, “The Trump administration has made one thing abundantly clear: we must reassert control over our own economic destiny. That’s not isolationism; that’s common sense. The Chip Security Act, outbound investment restrictions, and stronger export controls—those aren’t closing ourselves off. They are about ensuring America isn’t subsidizing or facilitating our own decline. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using American capital to fund aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and AI systems that target our allies and threaten our freedoms.”(Moolenaar, 2025)   The norm of decentralized innovation is applied in developing the infrastructure, and it empowers universities, startups, and private corporations. This is an expression of confidence in market mechanisms and civil liberties, which is in line with its social values of open innovation and competition.   C. AI Diplomacy and Security   The last pillar of the US AI national action plan is to collaborate with international partners and allies. This simply means to export American AI technology to strategic partners and those with common interests. This will, as a result, give rise to new types of groupings known as ‘AI Alliances.”(White House, 2025) The Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), QUAI AI Mechanism, and US-EU Trade and Technology Council are some of its best manifestations. Like the security and defense partnerships, the AI alliances will enable the US and the West to encircle the PRC in the tech world, where strong western collaborations and partnerships would hinder the PRC from becoming the tech giant or from excelling in AI production. It Encourages responsible AI governance and a democratic form of AI standards of the US, which are based on its self-perception as a global governor of the liberal values.   Thus, in order to enhance AI-related exports to allies, the US has established various institutions, including the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The US AI diplomacy aims to counter China’s growing footprints in the international bodies and institutions.(State 2023) As these global bodies are a key to spreading particular norms and values, shaping the public perception, and framing the global order, the US wants to challenge Chinese entrenchments in these organizations through political and diplomatic coalitions and groupings. Doing this, the West will be able to propagate their version of the global AI order. This means capitalism vs. communism will now be clearly visible in the global AI race between the economic hegemons.   The US Vice President J.D. Vance, while addressing the European Union (EU) leaders in Paris explicitly stated, “The US really wants to work with its European allies. And we wish to start the AI revolution with an attitude of cooperation and transparency. However, international regulatory frameworks that encourage rather than stifle the development of AI technology are necessary to establish that kind of trust. In particular, we need our European allies to view this new frontier with hope rather than fear.”(Sanger 2025) In case of security, the strategy aims to establish various AI Safety Institutes (AISIs) to reduce or eliminate the risk of AI-related accidents, which include errors in AI platforms, most specifically in the AI-operated weapon systems, and the unethical use of AI programs, i.e., generative AI or LLMs. Similarly, the strategy emphasized the danger posed by the non-state actors. These violent actors must be restrained from acquiring such advanced yet sophisticated technology.(White House, 2025)   China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan   For the first time in July 2017, the PRC launched its long-term national AI vision 2030, entitled “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” which is comprised of all the policies, guidelines, and measures to be taken by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to foster its AI developments.(Council 2017) China’s AI 2030 vision is none other than the extension of the idea that President Xi Jinping circulated in 2012 regarding China’s future role in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This strategy aims to strengthen China’s AI footprints in the international arena. Ranging from investments to infrastructure, this plan of action explicitly declared to develop the PRC into the hub of AI innovation and investment by 2030. This plan of action is determined to bring about a profit of $160 billion by 2030.(O’Meara 2024) While addressing the Politburo Study Session on 25th April 2025, the Chinese President Xi Jinping noted, “To gain a head start and secure a competitive edge in AI, it is a must to achieve breakthroughs in basic theories, methodologies, and tools. By leveraging AI to drive the transformation of scientific research paradigms, we can speed up achieving breakthroughs in scientific and technological innovation in all sectors.”(Agency 2025)   China’s AI Vision 2030: Key Objectives   A. AI Leadership (2020)   The PRC has successfully accomplished this objective. Under this pillar, China has established significant AI infrastructure, including key facilities and data centers, coming at par with the US. Within this, the CCP urged the academic institutions to promote, enhance, and foster research in the AI domain, which resulted in the major developments in the sectors of big data, swarm intelligence, and super artificial intelligence.(Council 2017) China has successfully established its domestic AI industrial complex worth $22 billion. Various educational institutions, i.e., Tsinghua, Peking, etc., and major companies, i.e., Baidu, iFlyTek, etc., have now completely transformed into AI hubs where research, innovation, and practices are conducted through highly advanced AI platforms.   Commenting on the US-China AI leadership contest, Dr. Yasar Ayaz, the Chairman and Central Project Director of the National Center for AI at NUST, Islamabad, explicitly remarked, “Efficiency is the new name of the game now. Chinese AI inventions and developments clarify the fact that even with the smaller number of parameters, you could achieve the same kind of efficiency that others with an economic edge are achieving.”(Ayaz 2025) The AI leadership symbolically builds the socially constructed narrative of the Chinese Dream and national rejuvenation into the need to overcome the century of humiliation and take its place in the world order. Here, AI leadership is not just a technical objective but a discursive portrayal of the Chinese self-concept of being a technologically independent and morally oriented civilization.   B. AI Technology (2025)   The second most important objective of China’s AI Vision 2030 is to reach a level of tech supremacy in the international arena by 2025. Major work areas include localization of chip industries, advancements in semiconductors and robot manufacturing, etc. The first phase of 2020 basically laid the infrastructural foundation of the plan, while this phase deals with the development and innovation of key AI-operated platforms, including robots, health equipment, and quantum technology.(Council 2017) Another most crucial feature of the 2025 phase is to establish various AI labs throughout mainland China. This would result in the integration of AI into different public-private sectors, i.e., finance, medical, politics, agriculture, etc. Last but not least, a civil-military collaboration is described to be a cornerstone in this regard.   The AI-operated platforms would be utilized by both civil and military institutions, thus preserving the PRC’s national security and safety. Giving remarks over China’s technological edge, Syed Mustafa Bilal, a technology enthusiast and research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), added, “China, which for the longest time has been criticized for having a technologically closed-off ecosystem, is now opting for an open-source approach. That was evident by the speeches of Chinese officials at the Global AI Action Summit, in which they tried to frame China’s AI strategy as being much more inclusive as compared to the West. And one illustration of that is the ironic way in which deep search is currently furthering OpenAI's initial selfless objective of increasing AI adoption worldwide.”(Bilal 2025) Thus, the AI vision of China reflects ideational promises of social order, central coordination, and a moral government, ideals that are based on its political culture and civilization background.   C. AI Innovation Hub (2030)   By 2030, China aims to be at the epicenter of global AI innovations, development, and investments. The PRC’s political, economic, and defense institutions will be governed under AI overhang. The most significant feature of this phase is to counter the US-led AI order by challenging the US and the West in various international bodies like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The main tenet of China’s 2030 vision is to transform it into a completely AI-driven economy—an AI economic giant.(Council 2017) As the PRC is ruled by the communist regime of President Xi Jinping, China aspires to counter the Western-led AI order through instigating its communist values, including high surveillance, strict national policies, and population control. By avoiding a completely liberal, free speech AI environment in mainland China, the CCP aims to come on par with the US by having authoritative control over its people, thus maintaining its doctrine of ‘techno self-reliance.’   Giving his insights on the new global AI order and the ideological rift between the US and China, Dr. Wajahat Mehmood Qazi, advisor on AI and digital transformation to the private tech companies and faculty member at the COMSATS University, Lahore, explicated, “Yes, there is a digital divide, but the interesting part over here is this: the world is evolving, so this big divide is no more about the decentralization or the centralization. If we look at how China is promoting openness by releasing its foundation models, at the same time the ecosystem of their LM models or AI is still in close proximity. Whereas, the western world is having a different narrative. They are talking about the openness of the models, but at the same time it’s more market-driven. In my view, we are entering into a world where innovation requires openness and closed methods simultaneously.”(Qazi 2025)   The concept of innovation with Chinese features is used to describe a socially constructed attempt to exemplify another approach to technological modernity, which combines dictatorial rule and developmental prosperity. It is a mirror image of self-concept in China as a norm entrepreneur that wants to legitimize its system of governance and impact the moral and technological discourse of AI at the global scale.   Conclusion   The constructivist perspective informs us that the competition between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined; it is being conditioned by the perceptions, suspicion, and competing versions that can be rebuilt through dialogue and mutual rules. The ideological divide can be overcome by creating inclusive tools of AI governance, with transparency, ethical principles, and shared responsibility in their focus. The common ground created through the establishment of a mutual conception of the threats and the ethical aspects of AI will enable the United States and China to leave the zero-sum game on AI and enter into a model of normative convergence and accountable innovation. Constructivism thereby teaches us that cooperation in AI is not just a strategic requirement but also a social option, which is constructed on shifting identities and the recognition of global interdependence with each other.   The great power competition is now in its transformative phase, bypassing the traditional arms race for a more nascent yet powerful AI race. In the context of the US-China contest, administrations on both sides are trying their utmost to launch, implement, and conclude critical national strategies and formulations in the field of artificial intelligence. Both are moving forward at a much greater pace, thus developing advanced technologies in the political, economic, and military domains. Be it China’s Deep Seek or the Western Chat GPT, be it Trump’s Stargate project or Xi’s AgiBot, both are investing heavily into the tech-AI sector. Despite this contest, both economic giants also need joint efforts and collaborations in various matters of concern. Until now, it’s been very difficult to declare which will lead the global AI order. The chances of a global AI standoff are there.ReferencesAFP. 2025. “Trump Vows to Keep US Ahead in AI Race with China.” The News International. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1328672-trump-vows-to-keep-us-ahead-in-ai-race-with-china.Agency, Xinhua News. 2025. “20th Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo.” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 1–3.Ayaz, Dr. Yasar. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t.Bilal, Syed Mustafa. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t.Council, State. 2017. “Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/.Feijóo, Claudio, Youngsun Kwon, Johannes M. Bauer, Erik Bohlin, Bronwyn Howell, Rekha Jain, Petrus Potgieter, Khuong Vu, Jason Whalley, and Jun Xia. 2020. “Harnessing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Increase Wellbeing for All: The Case for a New Technology Diplomacy.” Telecommunications Policy 44 (6). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101988.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.House, White. 2025. “Declaring a National Energy Emergency – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/.House, White. 2025. “Public Comment Invited on Artificial Intelligence Action Plan – The White House.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/02/public-comment-invited-on-artificial-intelligence-action-plan/.Moolenaar, John. 2025. “The 2025 B.C. Lee Lecture Featuring Congressman John Moolenaar.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIIUZlaKofU.O’Meara, Sean. 2024. “China Ramps Up AI Push, Eyes $1.4tn Industry By 2030.” Asia Financial. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-ramps-up-ai-push-eyes-1-4tn-industry-by-2030-xinhua.Qazi, Dr. Wajahat Mehmood. 2025. “Global AI Rivalry: U.S vs China.” PTV. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_82MMzI_g2c&t=.Sacks, Samm. 2025. “China’s Race for AI Supremacy - YouTube.” Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaccSxP8pOQ&t=8s.Sanger, David E. 2025. “Vance, in First Foreign Speech, Tells Europe That U.S. Will Dominate A.I.” THe NewYork Times. Accessed July 24, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/11/world/europe/vance-speech-paris-ai-summit.html.State, US Department of. 2023. “Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” no. October, 103–13. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Department-of-State-Enterprise-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy.pdfWang, You, and Dingding Chen. 2018. “Rising Sino-U.S. Competition in Artificial Intelligence.” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 4 (2): 241–58. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740018500148.White House. 2025. “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf

Defense & Security
Soldier, CPU computer (central processing unit) US and Chinese flag on white background. US vs China chip war or tech war, semiconductor industry concept. US restrict and control chip export to China.

Superpowers Without Soldiers: Can Technology Replace Traditional Hegemony?

by Syeda Farani Fatima

Introduction Hegemony is the core principle in International Relations. It has been conceptualized through military strength, economic influence, and ideological control. The theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci is based on assuming control but not necessarily through force, whereas realist theorists such as John Mearsheimer stress the relevance of military strength for ensuring global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The 21st century, though, brought into being a different era of transformation and technological breakthroughs that turned the existing arrangements on their head. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber war, and space technology, great powers are transforming from traditional soldiers to cyberspace warriors. AI and other cyber tools are altering the strategic equation between major powers, providing avenues for countries like China and Russia to undermine US hegemony (Rooney et al. 2022). Hegemony in the past had been founded on military superiority, but at present, academics have discovered that technological hegemony is leading the way. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and AI have captivated researchers because they can transform war. Cyberspace has become the new battleground of power. The US and China are competing for cyber hegemony (Akdaǧ 2025). Space is increasingly regarded as a new battleground in geopolitics. The US Space Force and China’s BeiDou system illustrate how nations weave surveillance and communication in their strategic decision-making (O’Hanlon 2020). Thus, new technologies are reshaping the China-US rivalry. To counter this, countries are investing in tech-based industries, which will change the way human thinks. The analysis will explore whether emerging technologies can efficiently replace traditional tools of hegemony or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power provides a critical framework in this modern era, where influence may flow from military boots to silicon chips. Global powers are moving towards influence and deterrence-based tech models, supplementing hard power. However, this transition has its risks, such as overdependence and ethical concerns. The paper argues that a complete transformation is not happening, but there will be dual-track hegemony where military and technology will coordinate to dominate. Policy implications of this shift are profound. Global powers must collaborate to draft international norms for AI and cyberwarfare, developing nations must develop their technology rather than dependency on global powers, as it will be easier for them to surveil and dominate, and international institutions must proactively govern the techno-political landscape to prevent destabilization. This study will use a qualitative approach, and it will be a case-based methodology combining theoretical perspectives of philosophers. This analysis is important as it delves into the transformation of the mechanics of global power from military hegemony to technology-oriented hegemony. It uses secondary sources like policy briefs, think tank reports, books, etc. Finally, this analysis concludes that soldiers may never be the first line of every fight, but the battle for global supremacy is firmly human-hinged in decisions on technology, ethics, and governance. Hegemony is a core concept in International Relations, grounded in military capacity, economic influence, and institutional influence. Historically, great civilizations like the Roman and British empires attained hegemony by dominating in naval power, making alliances and expanding their territories. In the post-World War II era, the US built dominance through overseas military bases and nuclear deterrence. Historical Foundations of Traditional Hegemony The Roman Empire, a classic example of past hegemony, attained this power by constructing roads, forts, and legions in the world's islands. Later, the British Empire sustained its dominance by modernizing the Royal Navy and the global trade network. The post-World War II era saw the hegemony of the United States with overseas military bases and security alliances. John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that according to great powers, hegemony is the best way to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001). Limitations of Traditional Hegemony The primary limitation of the traditional hegemonic model is the risk of overreach, entering into too many overseas agreements that become economically and politically unsustainable. Imperial overstretch, a model proposed by Paul Kennedy, explains the collapse of empires when they are unable to maintain their economy due to huge global aims (Kennedy 1988). Concurrently, we can see that after so many years have passed in the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the US is spending trillions. Approximately $3.68 trillion was spent on Iraq and Afghanistan (Costs of War | Brown University 2025). This highlights that military dominance can be costly and unsustainable. Mearsheimer, in an interview at the New York Times, claimed that ‘the United States is responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis’. Lack of legitimacy and local resistance is another great flaw in the traditional hegemonic pattern. For example, in Vietnam, soldiers used their knowledge of geography to push back against America's advanced weapons. Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign-led missions struggled with local insurgents. The New Tools of Technological Hegemony Cyber Power Cyber power has rapidly become a strategic field where states project their influence far beyond the geographic borders, often without soldiers. Cyber operations are dominating in this digital age, and the SolarWinds hack shows how states can achieve global influence through an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure breach. In March 2020, Russian hackers placed a secret backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion software. This infected around 18000 users, including US major government departments (Cybersecurity 2021). The cyberattacks went undetected for several months, revealing vulnerabilities in the digital network. It was the worst cyber-espionage attack ever, an analyst described. Iran's 2019 cyberattack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia shows that the acquisition of digital superiority can help influence norms, command the critical infrastructure, and set global political narratives without foreign boots on the ground. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to know cyber deterrence theory. It discusses capability, attribution, and resolution. States should advance digital tools, modify their tracking system and enhance communication and transparency. The most lethal weapon today may not fire a projectile-it fires packets. This metaphor illustrates that state actors can erode adversary national infrastructure, banks and election systems without traditional warfare. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III described the integrated Deterrence that integrates cyber with land, sea, and space under a unified strategy (Masitoh, Perwita, and Rudy 2025). Cybersecurity experts say that cyberpower is now a geopolitical power. And cyber warfare is not a sideshow; it’s a frontline strategy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data AI’s strategic significance for national security has been emphasized by leaders like Jason Matheny, CEO of RAND Corporation. He warns that AI could make it easier to make harmful weapons and dangerous technologies (Matheny 2024). The 2023 report of RAND on AI and Geopolitics argues that AI may be the next frontier in US-China rivalry (Pavel et al. 2023). ChatGPT and Bard, like generative AI models, have humanitarian strategic applications, which makes fake news so believable that it feels like fact. This capability of AI can transform propaganda into scalable digital warfare. Beyond surveillance, AI has transformed military operations tactics. Military applications like drone swarming, algorithmic targeting, and predictive ISR create scenarios where the frontline shifts from kinetic zones to data centers. AI diplomacy is becoming the new foreign aid. Financial Times article notes that tech giants are deploying AI mechanisms in Africa not only for development but for their advantage as an influence tool. Thus, AI and big data are a new form of informational hegemony. Space Militarization and Satellite Dominance Space militarization emerged during the Cold War. States like the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan have developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (Samson and Cesari 2025). General John Jay Raymond at the US Space Command Launch said that, “Outer space is now recognized as a domain of military operations” (Raymond 2021). China’s 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite, is still a thorn in the eyes of major powers. Russia has also launched missions like Kosmos-2553. Evolution from GPS to GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) reflects strategic change. The US has GPS, China has BeiDou, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite constellation, and Europe has Galileo; each system highlights the sovereignty in digital positioning. China’s counterpart doctrine states in its 2021 Space White Paper that space-based assets are not crucial for renaissance only but for strategic deterrence without deploying soldiers or causing deaths of your military men (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2022). Undersea Cables and Digital Infrastructure Control Undersea cables carry over 95% of global data transmission (Sherman 2021). Disruption or surveillance of these cables can impact the worldwide flow of data and diplomatic communications. In developing countries like Pakistan, Kenya, and Ecuador, Huawei-funded infrastructure provides smart city services. Cable route is not just wiring undersea, it is influenced by encryption. The US and EU have Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, like surveillance platforms. Cable-Landing zones (CLZs) are the chokepoints used for manipulation, Cloud interconnection policies allow control of traffic flow, and Surveillance software and firmware installed at data centers can be remotely controlled, bypassing local safeguards. Blocking connections can slow or disrupt foreign economic leverage. Digital infrastructure has become a domain for hegemony that is more insidious in strategic potential. This map exposes the physical foundations of digital power. Nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control. Disruption or surveillance of these cables can cripple economies or governance. Regional chokepoints also reflect strategic leverage in geo-economics and cyber diplomacy, making this infrastructure as consequential as traditional military bases. Figure 1: This map shows the physical foundations of digital power, nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control.Superpowers’ Technological Footprint United States Silicon Valley is the heart of US technological hegemony, and some other government agencies, like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are contributing to maintaining US technological hegemony. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), drones, and defense-grade AI-powered decision-support systems are a tech-military hybrid force. Furthermore, the US controls major pillars of technology like operating systems (Microsoft, Apple, Google dominate desktops and mobile devices), and Satellites. Advanced technologies have enabled remote force projection like drone strikes, executing surgical operations, Cyber Command operations from SolarWinds retaliation, deployment of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA), enhancing deterrence. China Made in China 2025 vision aims to displace US techno-hegemony. China’s centralized Social Credit System reflects a template of techno-surveillance hegemony. Beijing is now selling surveillance systems to developing countries, highlighting its tech supremacy. China is controlling telecommunications architecture by promoting Huawei’s 5G worldwide. China’s cyber army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), specializes in offensive and defensive cybertech warfare (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s Digital Silk Road links infrastructure investments in Asia and Africa with national encryption systems and cloud data centers. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a bilateral dialogue, said that ‘our fiber networks and data exchanges are now integrated with Beijing’s national infrastructure policy’. Thus, acquiring such a position in technology will prove China’s hegemony and can make it a superpower, making the world again a bipolar one. China’s strategic doctrine focuses on autonomous systems and digital authoritarian export over occupancy and geopolitical projection, respectively. Russia Russia’s global strategy remains rooted in a hybrid doctrine that combines cyber tools, space capabilities and disinformation operations. The Gerasimov Doctrine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, emphasizes the blend of political, cyber, and economic tools to achieve strategic goals without casualties. The Ukraine conflict is a great example of cyber dominance. Russia has cyber units such as APT28 (Fancy Bears), Satellite Spoofing and Jamming, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which have executed targeted hacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), disrupted Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and led disinformation campaigns. Russia’s power formula centers on dense cyber capacity, economic coercion, and unpredictability (making deterrence harder). Risks and Criticism of Tech-Based Hegemony Technology provides tools for security and influence, but overdependence causes strategic vulnerability, which leads to ethical dilemmas and raises questions about digital sovereignty. Overdependence and System Vulnerability A fundamental flaw of technological hegemony is its fragility. Systems are dependent on infrastructure (cloud servers, AI control nodes, etc.). The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) says that lethal autonomous weapons are the cause of escalation in conflicts (CCW 2022). Take the SolarWinds breach of 2020, in which an update exposed thousands of sensitive pieces of information. Ethical Concerns China, Ethiopia, and some other states have AI-powered surveillance regimes. China exports networked camera systems and facial recognition tools to states that use them to suppress dissent. A senior researcher at Amnesty noted that, ‘delegating life and death decisions to software is ethically unjustifiable’. Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism Due to technological influence, digital dependency has increased in the Global South. Digital dependency without regulatory safeguards leads to digital colonialism. Countries lacking advanced technology are reliant on digital ecosystems developed by superpowers. It is said by Dr Ruha Benjamin that ‘when code becomes law, and pipelines become policy enforcers, sovereignty is outsourced’. Hegemony Without Consent Soldiers are a visible force, but technology imposes itself quietly via platforms, which results in domination without democracy. Tech-enabled coercion doesn’t need tanks; it needs standards embedded in devices, laws baked into algorithms. This contradicts liberal norms of International Relations (IR), where hegemony should rest on consent for international legitimacy (Sakumar, Broeders, and Kello 2024). Future Power Projections: Domain-wise Breakdown There are five interconnected domains of future power projections: land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Land Domain In traditional combat, troops were used to counter enemy force, but now in the third digital era, surveillance grids, AI-powered motion detection systems, and autonomous land robots are replacing soldiers. The Israeli military is testing unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which they have named Jaguar, to patrol borders, and this will reduce human casualties. The diagram illustrates the interaction or the coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS), and the target within a given environment. At first, the operator gives a high-level command which activates the controller, and the system provides feedback to the operator, such as mission success or failure. The controller is the brain of this system. It monitors the environment, processes data and controls the weapons. It operates in loops, evaluating the environment and updating the decision. Once the target is detected autonomously, the gun acts, which includes missile launch or gunfire. This entire process takes place in a dynamic environment. Figure 2: The coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS) Air Domain Traditional manned fighter jets were dominating in aerial combat. Now, aerial dominance is shifted towards hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled drone swarms. Russia’s Zircon and China’s DF-ZF are hypersonic missiles that can travel at Mach 5+ speeds. AI drone swarms are rendering conventional missile defense systems obsolete. The US Air Force’s “Golden Horde” project and China’s GJ-11 stealth drone exemplifies this shift. Sea Domain Sea powers used to refer to blue-water navies and submarine fleets. They remain the core of maritime protection, but unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are quickly supplanting aircraft carriers. UUVs are being used to surveil for months on their own, and they will not be detected. Subsea data cables, which transport 95% of internet traffic, are a strategic resource; such cables are undersea digital arteries. Securing the sea in the 21st century means controlling what is beneath it. The diagram illustrates major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). It is an important element in current naval battles and marine monitoring. The GPS/RF module is situated at the top of the AUV, through which the vehicle can position itself beneath the water. The propeller motor is the mobility unit of an AUV, driven by lithium-ion batteries. It provides thrust and directional movements. An electronic aid container serves as a housing store; it includes an onboard computer, a mission processor, a power distribution unit, and communication interfaces. AUVs have sensors which detect how deep the AUV is in the water column by measuring hydrostatic pressure. Acoustic Doppler Current Profile (ADCP), is a sonar device that uses Doppler shift in acoustic signals to measure the speed of water currents. An AUV manage its vertical position with a buoyancy tank. AUVs use an inertial navigation system; they determine the position of the AUV based on prior data. AUVs also contain forward-looking (Sound Navigation and Ranging) SONARs and Altimeters that scan and detect any obstacles in front of them and maintain a safe height from the seabed, respectively. Transducers are the mouth and ears of AUVs; they transmit and receive acoustic signals. They are crucial for clandestine communication and sensing of the environment. These AUVs are extremely crucial in contested sea areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic. Therefore, AUVs are revolutionizing maritime operations by enlarging surveillance, exploration, and undersea warfighting capabilities. As technology evolves, AUVs will define the future of naval strategy and oceanographic study. Figure 3: Major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Cyber Domain Cyberspace has no borders. Global powers like the US, China and Russia have developed cyber command units to disrupt the power grids of the opposite side. Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, China’s alleged breach of U.S. personnel databases (OPM hack), and the Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program exemplify how software has become a strategic weapon. According to NATO’s 2025 Cyber Doctrine, ‘A cyberattack triggering Article 5 [mutual defense] is not just theoretical—it’s a matter of time.’ Space Domain Traditionally, space power was limited to spy satellites, but now anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), Starlink and military satellite systems have transformed into a combat zone. The US created its Space Force in 2019 to dominate in space militarization. In the Ukraine war, SpaceX’s Starlink became crucial for Ukrainian battlefield communication, prompting Elon Musk to limit military use to avoid escalation. Table 1 (figure 4): Old model versus new model comparison in each domain of future power projection. Done by the author. Domain Old Model New Model Land Troop deployment - Armored divisions - Occupation warfare AI-enabled surveillance grids - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) - Real-time satellite + sensor networks Air Fighter jets - Airbases - Strategic bombers Hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-ZF, Zircon) - Drone swarms with AI autonomy - Human-out-of-loop air dominance Sea Naval fleets - Aircraft carriers Submarines Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (ORCA UUV) - Seafloor cable warfare - Autonomous maritime surveillance Cyber (No traditional equivalent) State-sponsored hacking - Data theft & disinformation ops - Cyber jamming, spoofing in kinetic war Space Reconnaissance satellites Missile early-warning systems ASAT weapons (China, Russia tests) - Satellite internet constellations (Starlink) - Real-time warfighting integration (JADC2) Can Technology Fully Replace Military Power? The emergence of advanced technologies like AI, autonomous weapons and space militarization has sparked the debate about whether technology can replace military power, wholly or not? Strategic autonomy, in which a nation’s ability to defend its interests independently requires both technology and military. Technology acts as a critical enabler but not a substitute. AI can analyze satellite data in seconds, but only trained personnel can conduct peacekeeping missions in fragile regions. Modern warfare is shifting towards grey zone conflicts that fall below the threshold of open combat. Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 blended cyberattacks and physical deployments of troops, due to which the line between technology and military became blurry. This incident shows that technology without boots is of no advantage. In addition, technology needs regular upgrades and educated users, and excessive reliance upon these systems may cause interruptions such as electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. In a time of humanitarian crisis, disaster response, and counterinsurgency, forces are indispensable. To defeat an enemy or to dominate, one must employ both technology and an educated military. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have altered the character of air war. Great powers are investing heavily in military AI and quantum communication to improve battlefield awareness, minimize human loss of life, and enhance decision-making, but note that international decisions do not depend on a machine. They don't aim to replace the military, but they want to develop their technology. Thus, the emerging model of global power is not soldiering versus technology, but it is soldiers plus technology. It is known as dual-track hegemony, and a nation that acquires it will dominate shortly. A tech-savvy soldier, supported by AI and robotics, is the face of tomorrow’s war. Conclusion The United States, China and the EU are global powers of the modern era. These states possess the technological capital and military infrastructure that shape the regulation of engagement in cyberspace and AI. Firstly, they must strengthen international norms for cyber operations and AI governance. UNGGE has made some progress relevant to this, but this needs a broader enforcement mechanism like the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, global powers must invest in ethical and auditable technology. As AI is dangerous due to biased surveillance systems, facial recognition abuses, and it is also used in predicting policies, which is a major ethical concern. Algorithmic transparency, data protection, and privacy rights must be enforced as soon as possible. Lastly, multilateralism must extend to outer space. As space is becoming a battlefield, complicating geopolitical rivalry, to counter it, multilateralism must be encouraged. For developing countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria, the emergence of technological hegemony is both a threat and an opportunity. These countries should enforce digital sovereignty policies. These nations should avoid digital dependency, as it will be easier for global powers to surveil and dominate. Emerging powers should build defensive cyber infrastructure instead of offensive. They should build secure networks and legal protection against espionage on their own. Defensive strategy will serve as a strategic safeguard and can be used as a pawn in great power rivalries. Emerging powers should pursue a multilateral coalition among Muslim majority states to enhance their connectivity and ties. South-south cooperation must be promoted. The UN, G20 and other international bodies must move towards digital governance mechanisms instead of vague declarations. UN should form a Global Charter on Tech Governance, similar to a Digital Magna Carta. The charter should have ethical limits on the establishment and use of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapons. They should increase their coordination with the G20 to amplify these efforts. G20 should create a Tech and Ethics working Group, which can bridge the trust gap between Developed and developing countries in the digital arena. Global order continues to evolve in the 21st century, and the foundations of power projection are rewritten. There is a paradigm shift from boots to bots. This research demonstrates that while technology has transformed, it cannot entirely replace traditional modes of combat. Technology can only help the military to dominate in a region or conflict, but cannot fully replace it. There will be dual track hegemony, and the one who will acquire this hegemony will control world islands, and controlling world islands means ruling the world. However, this transformation comes with serious risks like AI miscalculations, vulnerabilities of digital infrastructure and ethical concerns. But we should keep in mind that military power is no longer sufficient, nor is technology alone a guarantee of dominance, in post-silo, where military, technological, and normative tools must function together to sustain leadership.ReferencesAkdaǧ, Yavuz. 2025. “Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony.” Perspectives on Politics. doi:10.1017/S1537592725000040.CCW. 2022. “Document Viewer.” : 16. https://docs.un.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2021/3 (October 18, 2025).“Costs of War | Brown University.” https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/ (October 18, 2025).Cybersecurity, Centre for. 2021. 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Does the U.S. Economy Benefit from U.S. Alliances and Forward Military Presence? RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-5/RAND_RRA739-5.pdf.Sakumar, Arun, Dennis Broeders, and Monica Kello. 2024. “Full Article: The Pervasive Informality of the International Cybersecurity Regime: Geopolitics, Non-State Actors and Diplomacy.” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2023.2296739 (October 18, 2025).Samson, Victoria, and Laetitia Cesari. 2025. “Secure World Foundation: 2025 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report.” https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/2025-global-counterspace-capabilities-report (October 18, 2025).Sherman, Justin. 2021. Cyber Defense across the Ocean Floor : The Geopolitics of Submarine Cable Security. Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2019. China’s National Defense in the New Era. Foreign Languages Press. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2022. “Full Text: China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective.” https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202201/28/content_WS61f35b3dc6d09c94e48a467a.html (October 18, 2025)

Diplomacy
Aerial view Panama Canal, third set of locks, water shortages, maritime traffic, water reuse vats, summer drought.

What CK Hutchison told us in the Panama Case?

by Wallace Loo

The attempted sale of CK Hutchison’s Panama Canal operations to the US-based company BlackRock and Terminal Investment Limited was more than a commercial transaction. When Beijing publicly opposed the deal, branding it a betrayal of national interests, it transformed into a case study in how global business is being reshaped by strategic rivalry. The controversy illustrates a deeper question: Can Hong Kong’s leading conglomerates still operate on commercial logic alone, or are they inevitably drawn into the geopolitical contest between the United States and China? For Hutchison, the Panama case shows that the room for neutrality is shrinking. Why does it matter? Beijing’s intervention signals to Hong Kong businesses and foreign investors alike that commercial neutrality is no longer assured. Loyalty, alignment, and political sacrifice are emerging as expectations alongside profit and efficiency. For global decision-makers, this raises two critical issues: Why did Hutchison seek to exit its Panama Canal holdings in the first place? Why did Beijing judge it necessary to intervene in a transaction that, on the surface, was driven by corporate strategy? Why Hutchison sold its Panama Canal operations? 1. Strategic Realignment Toward Core Businesses CK Hutchison has steadily repositioned itself around two “twin engines”, i.e. real estate in Asia and infrastructure in Europe. While ports in Latin America once fit into its global footprint, they were never central to this model. By selling its Panama Canal operations, Hutchison freed resources to consolidate strengths where it sees long-term stability and growth. This is part of a deliberate shift visible over the past decade: acquiring the German infrastructure firm ISTA in 2017 and securing UK regulatory approval in 2024 for the £11 billion merger of Vodafone UK and Hutchison’s subsidiary Three. These moves point to a concentration of capital in Europe’s regulated infrastructure and Asia’s high-demand property markets, underscoring a deliberate pivot toward strengthening European operations and ensuring cash flow visibility. This implies that Hutchison is reducing its exposure and a systematic exit to regions marked by political uncertainty and doubling down on reinvesting into higher-yielding and strategically aligned assets, particularly in European infrastructure platform while deepening its Asian real estate footprint. For governments and investors, this suggests that Hong Kong conglomerates are not retreating from globalization but are planning to recalibrate toward safer, higher-visibility assets. 2. Capitalizing on Market Timing and Asset Valuation The divestment also reflected classic Hutchison discipline: Buying early and exiting when valuations reach the peak. With global demand for strategic infrastructure rising, the Panama Canal assets commanded a premium. The resulting HK$19 billion in proceeds and a sharp rise in share price underlined investor confidence. Such timing underscores Hutchison’s longstanding strategy of opportunistic repositioning. This divestment was both value-accretive and strategically well-timed. By crystallizing gains now, the group strengthens its balance sheet and cash-reserve, maintaining its flexibility to reinvest or return capital to shareholders. For policymakers, this implies that global infrastructure assets are increasingly financialized. Strategic nodes like the Panama Canal are no longer just trade arteries but high-value commodities in global capital markets. Governments must therefore view divestments not only as corporate decisions but as moves that can shift control of strategic assets between geopolitical actors. 3. Geopolitical Considerations and Risk Mitigation The Panama Canal is a corridor of strategic significance and what US-President Donald Trump calls Chinese ownership on the potential dual-use nature of port terminals there inevitably drew scrutiny in Washington. U.S. allies have already tightened the screening of Chinese-linked infrastructure deals and the EU’s 2019 FDI framework explicitly flagged ports as areas requiring “special oversight”. Against this backdrop, Hutchison sought to avoid being cast as a “Chinese state-backed actor”, an extension of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Hutchison has taken deliberate steps to present itself as a neutral and commercially driven multinational investor, rather than an extension of Chinese state policy. The company restructured in 2015 to a Cayman Islands base carefully positioning itself apart from state-linked Chinese enterprises, which creates an international legal identity rather than retaining a mainland Chinese or Hong Kong corporate domicile. By exiting Panama, Hutchison not only monetized assets but also reduced exposure to the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry in one of the world’s most contested trade chokepoints. For European and U.S. decision-makers, this implies that Hutchison’s move signals how Hong Kong firms navigate geopolitical pressure. It shows that even Chinese-origin conglomerates may prefer retreat to avoid being entangled in state rivalries. Hutchison pre-emptively mitigated the risk of being labelled a “Chinese state proxy” in a critical geopolitical theatre. This move not only alleviated Western concerns about Hutchison’s control of Panama’s ports but also demonstrated the group’s ability to act with commercial neutrality and flexibility, preserving its ability to operate, finance, and expand in Western markets without being constrained by the “Chinese capital” label. For Beijing, however, this retreat risks weakening China’s global port footprint. This highlights a potential divergence between the commercial logic of Hong Kong firms and China’s strategic ambitions. Why did Beijing intervened? 1. Loss of Chinese Strategic Assets and Diplomatic Advantage The Panama Canal is among the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and control of its ports carries weight far beyond commerce. For China, investment in Latin American terminals has been part of a wider strategy to shape global shipping routes and enhance strategic reach. From Beijing’s perspective, CK Hutchison’s divestment was more than a business transaction. This was a strategic setback. The transfer of control to U.S.-linked interests was seen as a symbolic “recapture” of the terminals, which weakens China’s presence at a vital corridor. Within the Chinese leadership, the ports had been regarded as potential bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with Washington. But this loss reduced Beijing’s diplomatic toolkit at a time of rising frictions. The episode illustrates how Chinese policymakers increasingly view overseas ports as instruments of geopolitical positioning, not just commercial assets. Hutchison’s decision to sell underscored a broader reality: not all Chinese-affiliated enterprises act in alignment with state objectives. For Beijing, this implies that the Panama case highlighted the limits of relying on Hong Kong conglomerates to advance strategic interests abroad. For foreign governments and firms, it signalled both China’s heightened sensitivity to divestments in contested regions and the growing tension between corporate autonomy and state geopolitical expectations. 2. Absence of Beijing’s Prior Approval Sparked Political Backlash In the Panama Canal divestment, Beijing’s leadership reacted strongly against CK Hutchison’s “transaction first, then approval” approach. Beijing expressed dissatisfaction and even instructed state-owned enterprises to suspend new collaborations with the Li family, who serve as the controlling shareholders and principal decision-makers of Hutchison. Hutchison defended this sale as a “purely commercial and competitive process” by emphasizing Mediterranean Shipping Company as the principal buyer. Yet, in the context of intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, this stance was no longer acceptable. Regulatory pressure and political intervention from Beijing slowed negotiations, preventing the transaction from proceeding as planned. The broader precedent is clear: in strategically sensitive areas, Beijing now expects Hong Kong firms to align commercial decisions with state priorities. Neutrality is no longer an option. This marks a fundamental shift in the operating environment, binding the leading Hong Kong conglomerates more closely to state interests and constraining their room for independent strategic choices. For policymakers and investors, this implies that the Panama case shows how Beijing is extending political oversight into commercial domains once seen as autonomous. Hong Kong enterprises face increasing limits on their ability to separate business logic from state loyalty, particularly where Sino-U.S. rivalry is at stake. 3. Public Opinion as Strategic Pressure: Shaping a New Regional Order Beijing’s response to Hutchison’s Panama sale was not confined to official channels. Pro-Beijing media denounced the deal as disloyal and profit-driven, framing it as a matter of national honour. When the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, which is the Beijing central body responsible for overseeing Hong Kong and Macao affairs, amplified these narratives, they gained quasi-official status and exerted pressure on both Hutchison and other Hong Kong firms. This discourse resonated beyond China. The Panama Canal Authority warned that excessive concentration of terminal assets could undermine neutrality and competitiveness. This wording strikingly complies with Beijing’s “anti-hegemony” rhetoric. By shaping the terms of debate, Beijing positioned itself to argue for greater balance and competition in Panama’s port operations. Looking ahead, China advocates to leverage new concession tenders to advance its tactical objectives: strengthening the role of China Ocean Shipping Company, counterbalancing U.S. and European dominance and embedding Chinese capital in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure. More broadly, the case illustrates how Beijing integrates public opinion, regulatory narratives, and commercial strategy to shape a regional order more favourable to its interests. For policymakers, this implies that Panama demonstrates how Beijing transforms domestic media pressure into a tool of international influence. What begins as reputational discipline at home can translate into bargaining leverage abroad, particularly in contested regions where infrastructure and influence are intertwined. Points of Special Relevance: Beijing’s Strategic Signal Beijing’s intervention in the Panama Canal case should be read not as a single act but as a strategic signal. Its aims to prevent U.S. and European firms from consolidating control at a vital chokepoint and to avoid the appearance of “losing” strategic assets. At the same time, Beijing used this episode to remind Hong Kong conglomerates that in sensitive geopolitical contexts, commercial logic alone is no longer sufficient. The Panama case demonstrates how Beijing leverages commercial disputes as instruments of statecraft. The more plausible outcome is a conditional arrangement to encourage Panama to introduce mechanisms that limit Western influence in Latin America. China seeks structural adjustments that preserve its influence and reshape the regional order to its advantage. From Neutrality to National Loyalty As U.S. China tensions intensify, many multinational firms pursue de-risking strategies: not full decoupling as it is economically unviable, but carefully calibrated ambiguity that allows them to operate in both markets without explicit political commitments. This balancing act is becoming harder in Hong Kong. Since 1997, the influx of mainland state-linked enterprises has blurred the line between state and market. Benefiting from the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, these firms embedded political expectations into business norms. Ties to the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference are increasingly relevant in Hong Kong. By 2019, Beijing moved further, promoting patriotism in the business sector such as the Greater Bay Area Business Support Scheme, which channels funding toward firms demonstrating “patriotic entrepreneurship” or contributions to “national rejuvenation”. The result is a growing convergence of economic and political expectations. Commercial autonomy is increasingly contingent on political alignment, eroding the distinction between business logic and ideological loyalty. For investors and firms, this raises strategic concerns: - Will political loyalty requirements constrain the free flow of capital? - Could companies risk state intervention or even nationalization if perceived as acting against China’s interests? These questions remain unresolved, but Hutchison’s Panama case shows how quickly a commercial decision can be redefined as a matter of national loyalty. The broader uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong’s business environment will shape the city’s role as a financial hub in the decade ahead. This is my view on things: An Outlook on Hong Kong Looking ahead, the space for Hong Kong conglomerates to maintain commercial neutrality is narrowing. The rise of a nationalist business paradigm means companies must increasingly balance political conformity with economic self-interest. Two scenarios are emerging: 1. “Hong Kong, then China”: firms retain some operational autonomy and global credibility by prioritizing commercial logic, while carefully managing political sensitivities. 2. “China, then Hong Kong”: political loyalty takes precedence, with business priorities subordinated to national strategic goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Which path prevails will determine Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub. The tension between economic liberalism and political loyalty is no longer abstract. It is becoming the defining fault line for Hong Kong’s business landscape in the decade ahead.

Diplomacy
Sharm El Sheikh Summit for Peace: Agreement to End the War in Gaza, 13 October 2025. Photo by Roman Ismayilov. President.az, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Gaza Peace Plan: End of war, or A beginning of occupation?

by Muhammad Abdullah

On 29 September 2025, President Trump held a press conference along with his counterpart, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and issued 20 Points detailed peace plan for the war-torn Gaza, though he claims that the plan was backed by prominent Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and some other’s. By and large these Muslim states also welcomed the Plan, most importantly Palestinian political body which is Palestinian Liberation Organization also called the plan an opportunity to end the war on Gaza. Some significant points of the peace plan. Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. (Gjevori, 2025)Role of ArabsSince the start of Trump’s tenure  and the new American administration Arabs were making efforts to stop the long running Gaza War, they propose alternatives to Trump’s Gaza Rivera plan and so on. (Jazeera, 2025) Now, when eventually Gaza Peace Plan announced by Trump, they (Arabs ) not only endorsed the Plan but also Nations like Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye take part in negotiations with Hamas and Israel, along with envoy to Middle East Steve Witkoff, and finally brought some relief for Gazans like (ceasefire and immediate supplies of aid) which is very crucial for the starving people Gaza. (Irish, 2025)Proposed Governance ModelGaza would be governed by technocrats, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day public services and municipal functions in Palestine. The committee would be composed of qualified Palestinian and International experts. They will be overseen by a body called the Board of Peace. There would be a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF). To oversee security in Gaza during transition. (Walsh, 2025)Parties response to the plan.Hamas, which is the military body of Gaza has also issued a response to Trump’s Plan, in which they accepted the demands like hostage release, and to hand over the administration of Gaza to independent Technocrats, but they clearly stated that they want to negotiate over some points through mediators.PLO which is Political body of Palestine, welcomed the ceasefire but they are opposed to hand over Gaza’s governance to foreign actors, as Nasser al- Qudwa, a prominent Palestinian and Nephew of Yasser Arafat, has warned against foreign governance of Gaza post-Hamas, (Newspaper, 2025) stressing that leadership must be rooted locally rather than imposed from abroad. The statement highlights the potential opposition and undermines the credibility of the plan.The Israeli Prime Minister called the plan as their victory and fulfillment of their objectives, as they want to decommission Hamas, they will achieve this once the plan is implemented. The tunnels which were in Gaza and which caused Israel unbearable damage, especially in early days of war. (Bronner l., 2025) They are also going to get rid of them by Hamas exclusion and their deradicalization and development of infrastructure by independent actors. The most favorable point for Israel is Trump's statement that “if Hamas does not accept the plan then you [Netanyahu] are allowed to finish the job in Gaza and destroy Hamas completely”. (Griner, 2025) Which I think is a very provocative statement and can cause more bloodshed of innocent civilians. which may end up in complete occupation of the Strip.  Since the day Trump’s plan for Gaza was announced, the Israeli military did not slow down their advancement in the strip, instead they continued with their actions against civilians which reflect their intentions clearly.But for the implementation of the so-called peace plan and to further discuss over its terms both parties take part in negotiations in Egypt. With the mediation of Qatar and Egypt, these negotiations continued for days and then concluded with the statement made by Donald Trump that Israel and Hamas have agreed to his peace plan for Gaza. The Israeli military says that a ceasefire in Palestinian territory took effect on Friday 10th. And that it has begun to withdraw from parts of the Strip as per plan. The first phase of Trump's plan is expected to see the release of all 20 living Israeli hostages in exchange for around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza. Increased amounts of aid will also enter the Strip. (BBC, 2025). On October 13th, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. (BBC, 2025) The same day, in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt, an international peace summit was held, attended by representatives from various nations, - including Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, among others – but notably excluding Hamas and Israel representatives. The summit focused on humanitarian access to Gaza and mechanisms to monitor the proposed ceasefire, aiming to end the two-year war. The outcome was the signing of a joint declaration by Egypt, US, Qatar and Türkiye. Despite these recent developments, the Plan gave the UN only a minimal role, limited to the supply of aid. Although the UN was created to maintain world peace and to resolve conflicts peacefully, when we see the plan, Trump did not assign any role to the peace keeping body, instead he appointed Tony Blair [former British PM, who invaded Iraq in 2003] as head of the Board of peace, which is an international Transitional body whose responsibility is to supervise the apolitical Palestinian committee (responsible for day to day running activities in Gaza). AnalysesThe future of the 20 Points Plan is quite uncertain because it neither has a security guarantee for Palestinian nor any durable provisions about the existence of Palestinian state. The plan calls for an ISF (International stabilization Force) which will be deployed in Gaza immediately for ensuring peace, but the fact is the world does not have a pool of experienced peacekeeping force for this purpose that can handle the situation.  Furthermore, the Israeli PM made it clear that there is no meaningful withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza anytime soon.Moreover, the Plan prohibits Israeli annexation of Gaza, but it does not address the issue of the West Bank. Annexation there is opposed by present and potential Abraham Accord States. But I think soft annexation there would be continued through expansion and establishment of settlement. (weller, 2025)ConclusionWhile the world is admiring Trump’s 20 Points Peace Plan, how can we think of peace anywhere, without an army, and most importantly without recognizing the place as a sovereign State with demarcated borders? Although the Plan has some appealing aspects like immediate ceasefire, entry of aid, development of infrastructure in Gaza and exchange of prisoners, it lacks in terms of security from future Israeli aggression, and it also has no provision about the Palestinian state with borders of before 1967 with East Jerusalem as its Capital. Furthermore, if the plan is implemented Palestinians will be governed by the people of other countries, who will govern them as per the policy devised by the committee, (whose members probably belong to West and other States) not according to the needs and opinion of Palestinians. Which may add more to their misery. So, for a short span of time the Plan may seem like the end of war, but in the long run if more reforms like the recognition of Palestinian statehood and its existence will not be made, then this is just a start of a new occupation. References BBC. (2025, october 9).  BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgqx7ygq41o.ampBBC. (2025, october 14). BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c740jx07vz0oBronner, L. (2025, september 30). Le Monde.  https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/30/netanyahu-accepts-trump-s-gaza-peace-plan-under-pressure-but-sets-conditions_6745930_4.html?utmGjevori, E. (2025, sep 29). al jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/9/29/heres-the-full-text-of-trumps-20-point-plan-to-end-israels-war-on-gazaGriner, A. (2025, oct 3). AL Jazeera. from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/trump-issues-sunday-deadline-for-hamas-to-accept-gaza-peace-proposal?utm_sourceIrish, J. (2025, october 8). Reuters. from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/europeans-arabs-meet-flesh-out-next-phase-trump-gaza-plan-2025-10-09/?utm_sourceJazeera, A. (2025, feb 21). Al Jazeera. Arab leaders hold a meeting and discuss alternatives to GazaNewspaper, T. T. (2025, october). the times.  https://www.thetimes.com/world/middle-east/article/nasser-al-qudwa-gaza-hamas-palestine-israel-news-vl7xmgct9?utm_sourceWeller, M. (2025, oct 2). Cathom house. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/can-trump-peace-plan-gaza-succeed?utm

Diplomacy
canada between Israel and Palestine.  Israel canada Palestine

Israel/Palestine and Canada’s Empty Support for International law

by Alex Neve

Abstract Canada has long maintained that international law must be central to resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. But has there been appropriate follow-through when international law has been violated? This policy brief examines Canada's positions and, importantly, actions, in the face of violations of international law by the Israeli government during its military offensive on Gaza following the 7 October 2023 attacks in southern Israel by Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups. The analysis makes it clear that Canada has rarely condemned those violations, let alone imposed sanctions or other consequences for them.Keywordshuman rights, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, Canada, Canadian foreign policy, international law, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, international humanitarian law Professed respect for international law “Israel has a right under international law to take the necessary measures, in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law, to protect the security of its citizens from attacks by terrorist groups.” In many respects, this statement—taken from the section detailing “Support for Israel and its Security” in Global Affairs Canada's overview of “Canadian policy on key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”1—captures what is right in principle, but so terribly wrong in practice, when it comes to Canada's foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine. As it should be, international law is lifted up and given a spotlight. Canada's position is grounded in an expectation that international human rights and international humanitarian law will be respected. But what the statement does not convey is that there is rarely an appropriate response by the Canadian government when it becomes clear that actions taken by Israel—particularly the Israel Defense Forces—to protect the security of its citizens consistently amount to grave, widespread, and systematic violations of both international human rights and international humanitarian law. International law and human rights also feature prominently in other key elements of Canada's policy regarding the conflict. Canada recognizes the “Palestinian right to self-determination.” The rights of Palestinian refugees are to be respected, “in accordance with international law.” Canada notes that the “Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the occupied territories” and consequently that Israeli settlements are in violation of that convention, as is the Israeli government's construction of the barrier inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Failure to uphold international law This is all good, in principle. But how does Canada react to the fact that the Palestinian right to self-determination and the rights of Palestinian refugees have undeniably been abrogated for decades? And what is Canada's response to the defiant expansion of the Geneva Convention–violating settlements throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem? Rather than mount a robust defence (or any defence, for that matter) of the international legal principles at stake, Canada's policy more or less goes quiet at this point. There is no condemnation of the breaches of international law, and consideration of the possible implications under Canadian law is reluctant at best, with a bare minimum of legal, trade, or other consequences for these blatantly unlawful actions. The disconnect between rhetorical flourishes of support for the professed importance of international law but the failure and unwillingness to champion it when it is breached has, unfortunately but perhaps not surprisingly, dominated the key aspects of Canada's response to Israel's unrelenting assault on Gaza following the brutal attacks launched by Hamas and other armed Palestinian groups in southern Israel on 7 October 2023. It was evident from the outset. October 7th, Gaza, and Canada's empty resort to international law Reacting to the horror of the October 7th attack, Canada, like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and many of its allies in Western Europe, almost immediately referenced the fact that Israel had a right to defend itself. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's first statement, on October 8th, noted that Canada “reaffirm[ed] its support for Israel's right to defend itself.”2 But what, as a matter of international law, did that actually mean? The question as to whether Israel as a nation has the right to defend itself from attack is dictated by Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence, and other public international law sources. As Marko Milanovic, professor of public international law at the University of Reading School of Law notes, “[M]any who think there is a single, clearly correct answer to the question whether Israel has a right to self-defence do so simply because the answer fits their prior narratives and worldviews.” Milanovic lays out the complexity and uncertainty in considerable detail and concludes that “the jus ad bellum is indeterminate on the question of whether non-state actors, whose conduct is not attributable to a state, can commit armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 of the Charter.”3 With the threshold question of whether an attack carried out by an armed group such as Hamas constitutes an armed attack of the nature that would trigger application of Article 51 being at best indeterminate, so too is the question as to whether a right of self-defence arises. As such, the Canadian government's simple assertion, without any further expansion or discussion, is clearly not without debate. Offering no qualification or explanation alongside that assertion, on a matter that is unsettled and complex within international law, is problematic. Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations[.]”4 What emerges from a review of applicable international law, however, are differing views as to whether, and to what extent, a nation's right under Article 51 to resort to armed force in response to an attack—in other words, to go to war as a means of self-defence—arises when the attack is carried out by another state, not when the perpetrator is a non-state actor or armed group such as Hamas or the other Palestinian armed groups responsible for the October 7th attacks, operating within territory that is controlled by the state concerned. That is reflected in the conclusion of the ICJ in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (200 l), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.5 Having determined that Article 51 was not relevant, the Court also went on to consider whether Israel could more broadly rely on the customary international legal principle of a “state of necessity” to justify construction of the wall. The Court agreed that Israel had “the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens” but noted that “measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law.”6 This is essentially where Canada's stated policy lands as well. For example, the now former prime minister's October 8th statement, referenced above, goes on to qualify that Israel's right to defend itself must be exercised “in accordance with international law.” This, in turn, echoes the numerous references to the need to respect international law noted above, which are scattered throughout Canada's overall Israel/Palestine policy—established long before October 7th. The phrase “in accordance with international law” has been repeated consistently in written statements, social media posts, and press comments by the prime minister,7 the minister of foreign affairs,8 and other ministers9 at various stages of the current conflict. But we do not find any further explanation as to what that entails-for instance, that regardless of whether or not a right of self-defence to an armed attack exists in these circumstances and legally justifies Israel launching a war against Hamas, fundamental principles from international humanitarian law, such as the requirements of necessity and proportionality, nevertheless always apply. That failure to have clearly acknowledged the applicable international humanitarian law framework is particularly problematic, because the evidence that those legal obligations have been systematically and gravely violated, to the extent of undeniably constituting war crimes, has become incontrovertible. Yet as Israel's full-scale assault on Gaza was launched and expanded—and as reports from the UN,10 humanitarian agencies,11 international12 and national13 human rights organizations, local human rights monitors,14and journalists15 made it clear that massive human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law were occurring—nothing more was said. Canada did not move from stating that international law must be respected to stating the obvious—that it was well-established that this was not happening. The Canadian government refused to criticize Israel for breaches of international law, let alone press for accountability and consequences for the violations. Canada and the ICJ's Genocide Convention case Nowhere has this been more apparent, or more consequential, than in Canada's response to announcements and rulings from the two international courts that have a key role in upholding international law in situations such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Canada is often regarded as one of the world's most reliable champions of international courts. As such, its failure to show the expected support at this time has been widely noted with concern. The ICJ is actively engaged with the conflict through two separate cases. On 29 December 2023 South Africa launched proceedings16 against Israel, alleging violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) with respect to Israel's actions in Gaza. Given the gravity and urgency of the situation on the ground in Gaza, South Africa has applied to the Court on four separate occasions,17 seeking orders for interim provisional measures while the case proceeds. The Court consequently indicated a range of provisional measures in various orders18 issued between January and May 2024. The Court's provisional measures have been grounded in a finding that “at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa under the Genocide Convention and for which it was seeking protection were plausible, namely the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts mentioned in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel's compliance with the latter's obligations under that Convention.”19 The legal semantics of that ruling are nuanced, but nonetheless significant and with very real consequences. The Court has not reached any conclusion as to whether genocide has occurred in Gaza—or even whether it has possibly or potentially occurred—nor would it be expected to at this early stage of the case. But it is a clear statement that the Court considers the rights protected under the Genocide Convention to be plausibly pertinent to Israel's military operations in Gaza. Drawing on the Court's conclusion, many commentators,20 including legal experts and human rights organizations, now regularly reference plausible, potential, or prima facie genocide in Gaza. The Court's final ruling on whether Israel has in fact breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention is still some way off—likely late 2025, at the earliest. Among the provisional measures indicated by the Court to date are orders that Israel prevent the commission of all acts of genocide, prevent and punish incitement to genocide, enact immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza, and immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in Rafah that may inflict on Palestinians in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about their physical destruction as a group, in whole or in part. Canada's response to the ICJ rulings has been, at worst, tepid and incoherent, and at best, only supportive when consistent with Canada's already established positions. Following the first provisional measures indicated by the Court in January, Canada's foreign affairs minister, Mélanie Joly, issued a statement expressing support for the ICJ's “critical role … in upholding the international rules-based order,” but stressed that this support did “not mean that [Canada accepted] the premise of the case brought by South Africa.”21 There was not a word from the Canadian government calling on Israel to comply with the Court's order, which is what would have been expected from a self-declared champion of the Court. The response four months later to the Court's provisional measures concerning Rafah was stronger. Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated what was by then Canada's established position, calling for “no more military operations in Rafah by Israel, and certainly no escalation of military operations in Rafah.” The prime minister also underscored that the “ICJ's proposals are binding and we expect everyone to follow them as a matter of international law.”22 However, as is well established, Israel did not comply with the Court's ruling with respect to Rafah, and Canada has issued no express condemnation, let alone imposed any consequences, for that disregard of international law. Canada and the ICJ's advisory opinion The second ICJ case dealing with Israel-Palestine is an advisory opinion requested in January 2023,23 following a December 2022 UN General Assembly resolution seeking the Court's views on the legal consequences of Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), including East Jerusalem. The Court's Advisory Opinion24 was issued on 19 July 2024. The Court was unequivocal in concluding that “the sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel's presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.”25 Notably, the ICJ specifically addresses the question of the legal consequences of Israel's unlawful presence in the OPT for third states, which would obviously include Canada, and concludes that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”26 This leads to a consideration of Canada's stance before and after the ICJ Advisory Opinion. Canada filed a written submission27 seven months in advance of the hearing, arguing that the Court should use its discretion and decline the General Assembly's request to issue an advisory opinion. Canada also initially requested an opportunity to make oral submissions during the hearing, and was one of fifty-four states and multilateral organizations slated to do so.28 However, as the hearing got underway on 19 February 2024, Canada withdrew its request to make an oral presentation29 and chose to rely solely on the earlier written submission—namely, that the Court should decline to issue an advisory opinion. The explanation offered for withdrawing from the oral hearing was that the government's position had not changed from the time of making its written submission. Apparently, that position was unchanged even though external circumstances had changed dramatically. After all, Canada's position had been formulated seven months earlier—before the October 7th attack in Israel, the subsequent Israeli offensive in Gaza, and the 26 January 2024 ICJ ruling on provisional measures in the case brought by South Africa under the Genocide Convention. Canada's response after the Advisory Opinion was issued was certainly lacking. The immediate reaction was limited to a statement that the government had “taken note” of the Advisory Opinion, stressing that it was “nonbinding.”30 Two weeks later, a passing reference to the Advisory Opinion appeared in a joint statement from Prime Minister Trudeau and the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand reiterating their call for a ceasefire and expressing concern about the mounting hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. The statement generically called on Israel “to respond substantively to the ICJ's advisory opinion,”31 but offered no examples as to what that substantive response should entail. Canada's response to the advisory opinion A resolution came before the UN General Assembly on 18 September 2024, following up on the ICJ Advisory Opinion, which had, after all. initially been sought by the General Assembly. Among other provisions, the resolution “[w]elcomes the Advisory opinion … [and] [d]emands that Israel comply without delay with all its legal obligations under international law, including as stipulated by the International Court of Justice.”32 The resolution passed with 124 votes in favour, 14 against, and 43 abstentions.33 Canada was one of the countries to abstain. Many of Canada's close allies, such as France, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand, supported the resolution, while many others, including Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, joined Canada in abstaining. Israel and the United States were among the fourteen states that opposed the resolution. In a statement, the government explained its decision to abstain rather than support the resolution, citing that it did not reference the “need to end terrorism, for which Israel has serious and legitimate security concerns” and that it contained “language that aligns with Boycott Divestment Sanctions, which Canada firmly opposes.”34 To a certain extent, the decision to abstain rather than oppose (which has tended to be Canada's voting record with UN General Assembly resolutions related to Israel/Palestine)35 the resolution may be seen as a small step forward. It was, however, sharply criticized by Canadian groups supportive of Israel.36 There has yet to be any acknowledgement of the steps that Canada is obliged to take—and therefore that it intends to take—in response to the ICJ's identification of a responsibility incumbent on third states not to “render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel's illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” What implications might there be, for instance, for Canadian trade policy, the charitable status of Canadian organizations, the involvement of Canadians in real estate deals in the OPT, or the possibility that the actions of some Canadians with respect to settlements in the OPT might even be tantamount to criminal liability for war crimes? Canada designated Hamas a “terrorist entity” under Canadian law in 2002.37 Numerous other Palestinian armed groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, have similarly been designated. Since the October 7th attack, there have been four rounds of sanctions, targeting thirty-nine individuals, including Hamas leadership.38 Canada has been slower to take action against individuals and groups responsible for violence and human rights abuses against Palestinians. After considerable pressure, in May, June, and September of 2024, the government imposed three rounds of sanctions against a total of fifteen individuals and seven groups deemed responsible for “extremist settler violence against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.”39 These are the first ever sanctions of that nature. However, no sanctions have been imposed against Israeli political leaders who have been widely condemned for supporting, facilitating, and inciting that extremist settler violence—notably Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.40 There have been repeated calls for Canada to impose a comprehensive arms embargo on any weapons, including parts and components, transferred either directly to Israel or indirectly through third countries, most notably the United States. While the government announced in January that no new export permits would be authorized, and later cancelled thirty existing permits, the ban is still far from comprehensive.41 For instance, Canadian-made parts are sold to companies in the United States, where they are used in the assembly of F-35 fighter jets destined for Israel. The Canadian Commercial Corporation, a Canadian Crown Corporation acting on behalf of General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems—Canada, also remains under contract to provide the US Department of Defense with artillery propellants that will be supplied to Israel.42 Reports indicate that C$95 million worth of military goods could be exported from Canada to Israel through to the end of 2025.43 It is also worth noting that the Canada–Israel Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in 1997 and was updated in 2019, extends its coverage to the “territory where [Israel's] customs laws are applied.”44 This means the trade deal includes Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which Canada considers to be unlawful. There was a concerted push by legal experts and human rights groups to exclude those unlawful settlements45—which, after all, constitute war crimes under international law—from the gamut of the trade deal when it was updated, but the government refused to make that change. Canada and the International Criminal Court Meanwhile, an announcement from Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, on 29 May 2024, raised further concerns about Canadian double standards regarding international law and institutions when it comes to Israel. Khan indicated that, as part of an ongoing investigation launched over three years ago, he was seeking arrest warrants for five key Israeli and Hamas leaders, including Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and its then minister of defence, Yoav Gallant, on war crimes and crimes against humanity charges in connection with the October 7th attacks in southern Israel and the aftermath in Gaza.46 Canada, famously, was an ardent champion of the establishment of the ICC in 1998.47 Canada's foreign affairs minister at the time, Lloyd Axworthy, played a key leadership role, and a Canadian, Philippe Kirsch, served as the first ICC president. However, rather than express support and offer a commitment to cooperate with Khan and the Court as the case proceeds, Prime Minister Trudeau, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, and Foreign Affairs Minister Joly all pilloried the prosecutor for having sought the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, decrying what they called an unhelpful “equivalence” between Hamas and the Israeli government.48 The government's position was criticized in an open letter to the prime minister from over 375 Canadian law professors, lawyers, legal scholars, academics, civil society, faith and labour movement leaders, and former diplomats and parliamentarians, including Axworthy and two former ambassadors to the United Nations, Allan Rock and Rosemary McCarney. The letter notes: The principles of equal treatment and access to justice in the field of international criminal justice do not, by any measure, amount to an equivalence of the nature you have decried. No country, no armed group, no corporation and no individual can be allowed to stand above or apart from the law. Nothing undermines justice more—at a national or international level—than double standards and exceptionalism. This commitment must be at the core of Canada's ICC position and foreign policy.49 Canada was among ninety-three states to subsequently endorse a joint statement on 14 June 2024 reaffirming that ICC officials and staff must be able to carry out their work “without intimidation.”50 While the statement does not explicitly mention the Israel/Palestine case, it is widely understood to be a response to threats that had been levelled at the Court by supporters of Israel, including the US House of Representatives.51 Beyond that, Canada's position regarding the application for the arrest warrants remained the same. On 21 November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, more commonly known as Deif, commander-in-chief of the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas (known as the Al-Qassam Brigades). Warrants had initially been sought as well for Yahya Sinwar, then head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and Ismail Haniyeh, former head of the Hamas political bureau, but those applications were later withdrawn following evidence confirming their deaths.52 The arrest warrant issued for Deif was cancelled on 26 February 2025 after his death was also confirmed.53 In reaction to the news of the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant being issued, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that Canada “will abide by all the regulations and rulings of the international courts.”54 Minister Joly, while declining to answer the “speculative” question about executing the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants if circumstances arose, confirmed that Canada must “abide by its treaty obligations.”55 While there is no explicit commitment to execute the warrants, the generic affirmations that Canada will abide by all rulings of the international courts, and by its treaty obligations, point in that direction. It is not as clear a statement of support as was made by many other governments, but at least it moves away from criticizing the prosecutor. Disregarding international law in Israel/Palestine weakens it everywhere And in the current volatile global context, with the United States, Russia, and China now regularly and flagrantly violating international law and disregarding—often contemptuously—international courts and human rights bodies, the need to vigorously and scrupulously reinforce international law has become imperative. The bottom line is that it is not enough, and is, in fact, dangerous hypocrisy, for the Canadian government to laud the important role of international law and international legal institutions in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if those legal standards and bodies are ignored, abandoned, or, at best, given lukewarm support by Canada when breached or disrespected. It is appropriate and necessary for international law to be at the heart of Canada's foreign policy with respect to the conflict. But that requires demonstrating, with decisive words and concrete measures, both internationally and nationally, that Canada means what it says in standing up for the rules-based international order that it has helped to shape since the 1940s. To do otherwise weakens the international legal framework at a time when it needs to be stronger than ever. Those consequences reverberate far beyond Israel and Palestine alone. Declaration of conflicting interestsThe author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.FundingThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.Notes1. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), “Canadian policy on key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/mena-moan/israeli-palestinian_policy-politique_israelo-palestinien.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).2. Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister on attacks against Israel,” 8 October 2023, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2023/10/08/statement-prime-minister-trudeau-attacks-against-israel (accessed 10 April 2025).3. Marko Milanovic, “Does Israel have the right to defend itself?,” EJIL: Talk!, 14 November 2023, https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-israel-have-the-right-to-defend-itself/ (accessed 22 April 2025).4. United Nations (UN), Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Article 51, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (accessed 10 April 2025).5. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, paragraph 139, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 20 April 2025).6. Ibid., paragraph 141.7. Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau speaks with Israel War Cabinet member Minister Benny Gantz, 16 November 2023,” https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2023/11/16/prime-minister-justin-trudeau-speaks-israel-war-cabinet-member-minister (accessed 10 April 2025).8. GAC, “Statement by Minister Joly on the International Court of Justice's decision on South Africa's request for provisional measures in its case against Israel,” 26 January 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/01/statement-by-minister-joly-on-the-international-court-of-justices-decision-on-south-africas-request-for-provisional-measures-in-its-case-against-is.html (accessed 10 April 2025).9. Bill Blair (@BillBlair), “Canada continues to support Israel's right to defend itself in accordance with international law, following the brutal terror attack by Hamas on October 7. Hamas must immediately release those being held hostage,” X, 4 November 2023, https://x.com/BillBlair/status/1720983221398069565 (accessed 10 April 2025).10. UN Human Rights Council, The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/index (accessed 10 April 2025).11. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “ICRC president tells Gaza forum: civilians must be protected, hostages must be released unharmed,” 9 November 2023, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-president-tells-paris-conference-gaza-immediate-imperative-is-to-save-lives (accessed 10 April 2025).12. Amnesty International, “Damning evidence of war crimes as Israeli attacks wipe out entire families in Gaza,” 20 October 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/damning-evidence-of-war-crimes-as-israeli-attacks-wipe-out-entire-families-in-gaza/ (accessed 10 April 2025).13. B’Tselem—The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Manufacturing famine: Israel is committing the war crime of starvation in the Gaza Strip,” April 2024, https://www.btselem.org/publications/202404_manufacturing_famine (accessed 10 April 2025).14. Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, “About 10 percent of the Gaza Strip's population killed, injured, or missing due to the Israeli genocide,” 25 July 2024, https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/6420/About-10-percent-of-the-Gaza-Strip%E2%80%99s-population-killed,-injured,-or-missing-due-to-the-Israeli-genocide (accessed 10 April 2025).15. Bethan McKernan et al., “Palestinian prisoners describe systemic abuse in Israel's jails,” The Guardian, 5 August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/05/palestinian-prisoners-describe-widespread-abuse-in-israels-jails (accessed 10 April 2025).16. ICJ, Application Instituting Proceedings Containing a Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), 29 December 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).17. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Provisional Measures, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/provisional-measures (accessed 10 April 2025).18. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Orders, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192/orders (accessed 10 April 2025).19. ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) – Order, 24 May 2024, paragraph 32, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).20. Alexandre Skander Galand and Wim Muller, “The ICJ's findings on plausible genocide in Gaza and its implications for the International Criminal Court, Opinio Juris,” 5 April 2024, https://opiniojuris.org/2024/04/05/the-icjs-findings-on-plausible-genocide-in-gaza-and-its-implications-for-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed 10 April 2025).21. GAC, “Statement by Minister Joly,” 26 January 2024.22. Darren Major, “Trudeau says Israel needs to follow ICJ ruling and halt operations in Rafah,” CBC News, 24 May 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-icj-decision-rafah-1.7214231 (accessed 10 April 2025).23. ICJ, Request for Advisory Opinion pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 77/247 of 30 December 2022: Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 17 January 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20230117-REQ-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).24. ICJ, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 19 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).25. Ibid., paragraph 261.26. Ibid., paragraph 279.27. ICJ, Request by the United Nations General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the “Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,” Written Statement of the Government of Canada, 14 July 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20230724-wri-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).28. ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (Request for Advisory Opinion), Public hearings to be held from Monday 19 to Monday 26 February 2024, Press Release, 9 February 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240209-pre-01-00-en.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).29. Justice for All Canada, “Canada's absence from ICJ hearings is a blow to Palestinian justice,” 20 February 2024, https://www.justiceforallcanada.org/icj-canada-withdrawal-feb20-2024.html (accessed 10 April 2025).30. The Canadian Press, “Ottawa says it has ‘taken note’ of UN court call for end to Israeli settlements,” The Globe and Mail, 19 July 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ottawa-says-it-has-taken-note-of-un-court-call-for-end-to-israeli/ (accessed 10 April 2025).31. Prime Minister of Canada, “Joint statement by the prime ministers of Australia, Canada and New Zealand,” 26 July 2024, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2024/07/26/joint-statement-prime-ministers-australia-canada-and-new (accessed 10 April 2025).32. UN General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/24: Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel's policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN Document A/RES/ES-10/24, 9 September 2024, paragraphs 1 and 3, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/272/75/pdf/n2427275.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).33. UN, “UN General Assembly demands Israel end ‘unlawful presence’ in Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 18 September 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154496 (accessed 10 April 2025).34. GAC, “Canada abstains from United Nations General Assembly resolution on the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel's policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 18 September 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/09/canada-abstains-from-united-nations-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-advisory-opinion-of-the-international-court-of-justice-on-the-legal-conseque.html (accessed 10 April 2025).35. Jeremy Wildeman, “Assessing Canada's foreign policy approach to the Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, 1979–2019,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 27 no. 1 (2021): 62–80.36. Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, “Canadian government breaks UN promise,” 18 September 2024, https://www.cija.ca/canadian_government_breaks_un_promise (accessed 10 April 2025).37. Public Safety Canada, “Currently listed entities,” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#25 (accessed 10 April 2025).38. GAC, “Canadian sanctions related to terrorist entities,” https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/terrorists-terroristes.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).39. GAC, “Canada imposes third round of sanctions on perpetrators of extremist settler violence against Palestinian civilians in West Bank,” 18 September 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/09/canada-imposes-third-round-of-sanctions-on-perpetrators-of-extremist-settler-violence-against-palestinian-civilians-in-west-bank.html (accessed 10 April 2025).40. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, “Canada's sanctions on illegal settlers in the OPT,” August 2024, https://www.cjpme.org/fs_248 (accessed 10 April 2025).41. Steven Chase, “Mélanie Joly says Canada will block U.S.-bound ammunition sale destined for Israel,” The Globe and Mail, 10 September 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-suspends-arm-sales-israel-through-united-states/ (accessed 10 April 2025).42. Kelsey Gallagher, “Canada under contract to supply the IDF with artillery propellant,” Project Ploughshares, 26 March 2025, https://www.ploughshares.ca/publications/canada-under-contract-to-supply-the-idf-with-artillery-propellant (accessed 22 April 2025).43. Emma Paling, “$95 million in new Canadian military goods could flow To Israel By 2025,” The Maple, 1 August 2024, https://www.readthemaple.com/95-million-in-new-canadian-military-goods-could-flow-to-israel-by-2025/ (accessed 10 April 2025).44. GAC, Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement, 13 September 2019, article 1.7, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/israel/fta-ale/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 10 April 2025).45. Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, “Annexing Palestine through trade: The Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” September 2023, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/cjpme/pages/7341/attachments/original/1695662785/EN_-_Annexing_Palestine_Through_Trade_-_2023-010_-_FINAL.pdf?1695662785 (accessed 10 April 2025).46. International Criminal Court (ICC), “Statement of ICC prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine,” 20 May 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state (accessed 10 April 2025).47. Valerie Oosterveld, Canada and the Development of International Criminal Law: What Role for the Future?, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Paper no. 16, March 2018, https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/documents/Reflections%20Series%20Paper%20no.16web.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).48. Marie Woolf, “Ottawa weighs in on ICC's warrant requests for Israeli, Hamas leaders,” The Globe and Mail, 21 May 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-says-canada-respects-independence-of-icc-but-rejects-comparing/ (accessed 10 April 2025).49. Open Letter, “A call for Canadian support for the ICC's work with respect to Palestine/Israel,” 29 May 2024, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc01c8f405d5340f3254abf/t/6657cdbfeebac657b722e956/1717030335790/Open+Letter+to+PM+Trudeau%2C+29.05.24+EN.pdf (accessed 10 April 2025).50. GAC, “Joint Statement in support of the International Criminal Court,” 14 June 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/06/joint-statement-in-support-of-the-international-criminal-court.html (accessed 10 April 2025).51. Harry Davies, “ICC must be allowed to carry out work ‘without intimidation,’ say 93 member states,” The Guardian, 15 June 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/law/article/2024/jun/15/icc-must-be-allowed-to-carry-out-work-without-intimidation-say-93-member-states (accessed 10 April 2025); Caitlin Yilek, “House votes to sanction International Criminal Court over potential warrants for Israeli officials,” CBS News, 4 June 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/house-vote-international-criminal-court-sanctions-netanyahu/?intcid=CNM-00-10abd1h (accessed 10 April 2025).52. ICC, “Statement of ICC prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine,” 21 November 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-situation-state-palestine (accessed 10 April 2025).53. ICC, Decision terminating proceedings against Mr Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al Masri (Deif), 25 February 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-01/18-417 (accessed 10 April 2025).54. Robert Fife, “Trudeau says Canada would abide by ICC arrest warrants for Netanyahu, former defence minister,” The Globe and Mail, 21 November 2024, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-trudeau-says-canada-would-abide-by-icc-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu/ (accessed 10 April 2025).55. CBC News, “Canada needs to follow ICC obligations, Joly says,” 21 November 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.6571268 (accessed 10 April 2025).

Diplomacy
Kim and Trump shaking hands at the red carpet during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit 2018

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Trump 2.0: Another cycle with new attributes?

by Jesús de los Ángeles Aise Sotolongo

Abstract Never before had a sitting U.S. president managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, nor had any leader from Pyongyang sat face-to-face with a sitting U.S. president during their term as Kim Jong Un did. With Trump’s potential return, could there be another cycle of rapprochement? This paper seeks to address this question. The failure of the previous negotiating cycle, the DPRK’s advances in deterrence, and shifts in peninsular, regional, and global circumstances suggest that both leaders might bring new attributes to their interactions, potentially yielding surprising outcomes Introduction Except for a few moments of rapprochement, since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), U.S. administrations have maneuvered with various forms and methods to destabilize its political and economic system. And since Pyongyang decided to develop nuclear weapons, Washington has labeled them illegal, demanding that they be abandoned, sponsoring United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, and implementing strict unilateral penalties. Meanwhile, successive DPRK leaders have persevered in a military doctrine based on the development of nuclear deterrence to guarantee national defense and security. Nevertheless, an unprecedented moment that broke with that persistent circumstance took place during Donald Trump’s previous term, when the relationship shifted from “fire and fury” to successive summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019, in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. The exchange of insults — Trump calling Kim “little rocket man” and Kim referring to Trump as a “dotard” — mutated into their approaching one another as “pen pals.” This surprising shift in U.S. policy toward the DPRK temporarily, though without the expected results, loosened the “Korean Gordian knot.” No U.S. president has managed relations with the DPRK as Donald Trump did, and in history, no North Korean leader had ever stood face-to-face, on equal footing, with a sitting U.S. president as Kim Jong Un did. Former President Barack Obama delivered several appealing speeches, but he seemed weak to many countries in East Asia, including U.S. allies and partners. For eight years, he did nothing about North Korea, calling it “strategic patience.” This eroded deterrence and allowed Pyongyang to advance its weapons and nuclear programs (Kausikan, 2025). For his part, at the beginning of his term, Joe Biden announced a “new strategy” toward the DPRK that never materialized; he pleaded for dialogue with Kim Jong Un while simultaneously increasing war threats; he grouped China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea into an ideological category that resurrected the Bush-era notion of the “axis of evil.” Biden’s simplistic binary categorization was not a policy. It ignored the differences in how these four countries define their interests, the degree of integration into the global economy, and the scope of their ambitions. These differences should be the starting point for U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea (Kausikan, 2025). The purpose of this article is to examine the circumstances, obstacles, and expectations for a new cycle of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang with Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Development This second term of President Donald Trump, more transactional and less predictable, seems to be raising expectations of reducing confrontational stress on the Korean Peninsula, and everything indicates that it brings with it a modification of Washington’s policy toward the DPRK. This is conditioned by the following radical changes in strategic circumstances compared to his previous term: DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have undergone new and sophisticated advances. The DPRK has broken all ties and symbols of its relations with the Republic of Korea, which it classifies as its “principal and unchanging enemy.” Declaring that it has no intention of avoiding war, it has instructed the Korean People’s Army to accelerate preparations to “occupy, subdue, and completely reclaim” South Korea. There has been a tightening of ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The two Kim Jong Un–Vladimir Putin summits, and Kim’s reference to Putin as his “closest comrade,” have shown the very high level of understanding and commitment between the parties. This is reflected in the DPRK’s unrestricted support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, ratified by both legislatures, which includes a “mutual military assistance” clause. Meanwhile, Russia supports the DPRK diplomatically and economically, opposing multilateral and unilateral sanctions, and expanding its exports — essentially oil, raw materials, and food — as well as providing assistance in various fields. An emerging anti-U.S. and anti-Western axis has been taking shape among China, Russia, the DPRK, and Iran, which has become so significant that Washington and its allies describe it as a “new axis.” Within this interconnection, the DPRK holds important advantages in three strategic dimensions: economic, military, and diplomatic. The removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his irresponsible Martial Law is reinforcing the possibility of a new government led by the Democratic Party, with Lee Jae Myung as the clear favorite and, as of today, more likely to win. [1] This would open the door to a revival of North–South détente reminiscent of the Moon Jae In era. Trump’s foreign policy objectives are based on his “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) vision — now reinforced — which prioritizes U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments (e.g., South Korea and Japan). At least these six factors seem to be significantly influencing Donald Trump’s decision to return to diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. While the DPRK occupies a relatively lower position on Trump’s list of priorities (with China and the Russia–Ukraine conflict taking precedence), and dialogue does not appear imminent, he has made it clear that he would like to reconnect with Kim Jong Un, seems willing to reopen negotiations, and is evaluating and discussing possible avenues of interaction that could lay the groundwork for a potential summit. It is said that Washington has been holding discreet conversations with Pyongyang, consulting external experts, and considering options to potentially restart dialogue. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un — clearly more assertive and militarily more powerful in Washington’s eyes — has not publicly shown any willingness to renew his earlier offers related to denuclearization. In his own words: “the DPRK’s nuclearization is non-negotiable,” and he continues to exert pressure by showcasing the country’s missile–nuclear power. This has been illustrated unequivocally and consistently when Kim Jong Un visited nuclear material production facilities and the Nuclear Weapons Institute (NWI) in September 2024 and January 2025. For the DPRK, survival is an existential matter, and Pyongyang considers its nuclear–missile programs absolutely indispensable to secure it; there is nothing we can see that would persuade or force it to renounce them, as that would imply regime change. Everything indicates that the U.S. president is aware that his counterpart has not yet overcome the discouragement caused by the failure of the previous negotiation process, and for that reason, he is sending increasingly precise messages about the possibility of renewed talks, while boasting of his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. At the same time, however, Pyongyang continues to issue contradictory signals of distrust toward Washington, in response to the confrontational attitude and the increasingly close military and intelligence ties with the DPRK’s immediate neighbors. It is worth noting that, this past February, the U.S. sent a nuclear submarine and several B-1B bombers to South Korea; U.S. military forces carried out multiple war exercises, including live-fire drills along the Demilitarized Zone, as well as heavy bombing maneuvers and even space force operations. In March, a large-scale scheduled exercise took place—70 percent larger than the one held the previous year. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of 2024 the DPRK leadership decided to create a certain margin of diplomatic maneuver in anticipation of the incoming Trump administration. The coverage given to Trump’s inauguration on January 22 marked a shift from Pyongyang’s initial decision to remain silent on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections in November. Moreover, this information was published in media outlets aimed at both domestic and international audiences, suggesting that North Korea has begun preparing its people for a new approach to Trump, when appropriate. Despite the steady flow of official statements and media commentary criticizing the United States, anti-American rhetoric has become somewhat less intense. Notably, the use of the expression “U.S. imperialists” has significantly decreased since then. This is also true of Kim’s public statements, which are considered the most authoritative in North Korea. For example, Kim’s speech at the Ministry of Defence on February 8 was the harshest and most detailed on the United States since his speech at a national defence exhibition in November 2024. However, unlike in many of his previous speeches at defence-related venues or events, he did not use derogatory terms such as “U.S. imperialists.” In fact, the last reported use by Kim of the term “U.S. imperialists” was in his defence exhibition speech last November. While there has been a rise in criticism of the United States since early February, as demonstrated by a series of “KCNA commentaries,” the broader trend since December still holds. The media have refrained from mentioning Trump by name, even when criticizing U.S. statements or actions. When issuing criticism, they have only referred to “the new U.S. administration,” “the current administration,” or the “U.S. ruler.” KCNA’s commentary on February 12 regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, blamed the “current U.S. administration” for the plan to take control of Gaza, omitting Trump’s name. All these articles were published in outlets aimed at domestic audiences, likely because they addressed foreign policy issues not directly relevant to North Korea. In contrast, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of Rubio’s statement about the “rogue state” was only published on external websites and not disseminated to the domestic audience. This allowed Pyongyang to register its rejection of the statement to external audiences while controlling the narrative about the Trump administration at home. Pyongyang also appears to be creating diplomatic space by attempting to influence Washington’s thinking while it awaits the new Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea. Its Ministry of Defence stated that the United States was “openly ignoring the DPRK’s security concerns” in reference to a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that entered a South Korean port — an unusually direct accusation that the United States “ignores” its security concerns. If we consider the reverse side of this message (do not ignore North Korea’s security concerns), it is in fact a call from Pyongyang to the new administration to take its “security concerns” into account in its policy toward North Korea (Minyoung Lee, 2025). We can therefore see some Trumpist signals that could prove attractive to Pyongyang’s leadership: Repeated references by the U.S. president, describing the DPRK as a “nuclear power,” a concept recently reinforced when he qualified it as a “great nuclear power.” It is noteworthy that very recently U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the expression “nuclear-armed state” to refer to the DPRK, implicitly admitting Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. This comment suggests that the U.S. is unofficially considering the DPRK as a nuclear-armed nation, just as it does with India, Pakistan, and Israel. There are signs of a strategic shift aimed at overcoming deadlock and building trust by moving from denuclearization as the priority toward nuclear security. In other words, instead of demanding denuclearization, the focus would be on improving the safety of nuclear facilities — such as preventing accidents, leaks, or proliferation risks to third countries — through active bilateral technical cooperation that aligns reciprocal interests. The decisions that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, when the U.S. classified South Korea as a “sensitive country,” as well as the so-called “strategic flexibility” that “modifies the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” It is true that many officials in the Trump administration continue to officially reiterate their commitment to the DPRK’s denuclearization. However, statements by the U.S. president and his Secretary of State suggest that they recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, generating a dual reaction: on one hand, surprise at an abrupt shift in policy toward the DPRK’s nuclearization, and on the other, uncertainty about what would happen to the security concerns of its allies — South Korea and Japan — as well as those of the U.S. itself. It should be noted that Trump stated — no less than in front of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — that he intended to re-establish relations with Kim Jong Un, that “he would do it,” that he has “…an excellent relationship with Kim Jong Un and we’ll see what happens.” And he declared: “But without a doubt, it is a nuclear power.” In that same setting, Trump also mentioned that India and Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons, effectively recognizing them as de facto nuclear-armed states, adding that Kim Jong Un “possesses numerous nuclear weapons” and that “others possess them as well.” Therefore, the statements by Trump and Rubio that tacitly recognize the DPRK as a “nuclear power” indicate a shift in Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang. It seems that interactions between the DPRK and the U.S. are moving toward a turning point: from denuclearization as the priority to nuclear security — a strategic change in U.S. policy aimed at overcoming deadlock and establishing trust, as a preliminary step toward a possible peace treaty. The repeated reference by U.S. President Donald Trump to the DPRK as a nuclear power could be an effort to draw Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, since North Korea seeks de facto recognition by the U.S. as a nuclear-armed state. Trump seems to be maintaining the perspective that the next negotiation should focus on reducing threats rather than denuclearization, despite his stated pursuit of “complete denuclearization.” Everything suggests that Trump is emphasizing the evident reality of Pyongyang’s progress in its nuclear program. It can also be considered that Trump’s remarks may imply that, as a result of the failure of his summit efforts to reach an agreement with Kim Jong Un to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, he may now be encouraging the consideration of an alternative strategy. However, Pyongyang is publicly and incessantly rejecting Trump’s attempts to restart dialogue; this stance has much to do with the recent history of U.S. negotiations and the president’s insufficient reciprocity to the concrete measures proposed by Kim Jong Un. In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting the latest developments that have shaken the peninsular geopolitical context and the Washington–Seoul alliance, which could, to some extent, influence a shift in Pyongyang’s perception and lead it to accept talks with Washington. We refer to the classification of South Korea as a “sensitive country” and the idea of “modifying the mission of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).” The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) designated South Korea as a “sensitive country,” a classification that significantly restricts collaboration in areas of advanced technology, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, quantum science, and advanced computing. This measure, which took effect on April 15, subjects South Korean researchers to stricter controls for collaborating or participating in research at DOE facilities or research centers and marks the first time South Korea has received such a designation from the U.S. government. In this regard, the “sensitive country” classification is based on unilateral criteria such as national security, nuclear non-proliferation, regional instability, threats to economic security, and alleged support for terrorism. This list, maintained by the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) along with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), already included countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Additionally, North Korea and Iran are designated as “state sponsors of terrorism,” while China and Russia are considered “countries of concern.” Such a designation suggests that the U.S. has growing concerns about the increasing voices among South Korean academics, politicians, and citizens who support the development of domestic nuclear weapons. Recent surveys reveal that popular support for nuclear armament has reached between 60% and 70%, apparently stemming from the belief that South Korea must take a bold defensive measure against North Korea’s growing nuclear threats. Although some who favor this idea believe that President Donald Trump’s skeptical view of alliances — focused on reducing the financial burden of protecting U.S. allies — might allow Seoul to develop nuclear weapons and thus reduce Washington’s responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula, the likelihood of this happening remains slim. However, the debate will not disappear in the short term due to growing skepticism about the so-called U.S. “extended deterrence,” which relies only on the deployment of strategic assets in the South of the peninsula. In the meantime, the DPRK is very likely to feel satisfied, as it sees its long-standing desire fulfilled: to witness cracks in the Washington–Seoul alliance. Another decision that would benefit the DPRK under the so-called “strategic flexibility” is the projection that the Trump administration may deploy U.S. troops stationed in South Korea in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, following the circulation of a purported Pentagon memorandum detailing its objective of deterring China from occupying Taiwan. As is well known, the primary mission of the 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea is to deter threats from the DPRK. Should this decision materialize, their mission would then shift to countering China, considered a key component of the current administration’s foreign policy. This would create a security vacuum for Seoul and further strain its relations with Beijing. In such a circumstance, the Trump administration could pressure South Korea to handle conventional military actions from the DPRK independently, with the U.S. intervening only in the case of nuclear threats. Therefore, the best option for Seoul is to significantly strengthen its defensive capabilities, preparing for a scenario in which U.S. troops are not involved in a conventional war with the DPRK. The notion of “strategic flexibility” for the USFK reflects a shift in the main mission of U.S. forces abroad, moving from the defense of nations through their permanent presence to rapid deployment in other parts of the world where conflicts arise. As expected, unease is growing in Seoul in the face of Pyongyang’s increasing assertiveness, while the latter shows greater defiance. First, due to the possibility that Trump’s second administration may divert part of the USFK’s resources to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which would leave South Korea more vulnerable. Second, because South Korea is currently in open political turmoil over the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol, and everything seems to indicate that the so-called South Korean democracy has failed to demonstrate itself as reliable in the eyes of Trump and his team. It is worth mentioning what Moon Chung In, emeritus professor at Yonsei University, stated in his most recent book, titled “Why American Diplomacy Fails”. The expert describes North Korea’s nuclear problem as an illustrative failure of U.S. diplomacy. His remarks are eloquent when he says: “In my conversations with members of the Trump administration during my trip to America, I had the impression that they firmly feel that Korea [South Korea] has been getting a free ride [on U.S. security] for far too long. South Korea’s excessive dependence on the United States could have serious consequences. The Korean government needs to develop autonomous strategic thinking. It needs to explore creative contingency plans for the worst-case scenario of a U.S. absence from the Korean peninsula.” We can see that Trump’s return is testing diplomatic limits and fueling a key question: Will Trump’s return to the White House open another cycle of engagement with Kim Jong Un, but with new attributes? The U.S. president always highlights his good personal relationship with the DPRK leader, something that, undoubtedly, could have a positive effect. But, as of today, Pyongyang seems to lack incentives to negotiate with Washington for four essential reasons: Military, it has achieved significant advances in its conventional weapons programs, strategic missiles, and nuclear arms, which provide it with a high deterrent capability. Economically, even under heavy sanctions, it is experiencing moments of economic expansion, it has made progress in import substitution, its local industry is reviving, and infrastructure construction is in full development. This makes negotiating the lifting of sanctions, in general and with Washington in particular, less urgent for Pyongyang. Its willingness to take political risks in exchange for economic benefits has clearly diminished. Geostrategically, its military alliance with Russia may generate new revenues, transfers of military technology, practical experience in modern warfare, and weaken the international sanctions regime. Geopolitically, the world is entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that could eventually result in a multipolar order. The DPRK seems well positioned due to its ties with two key actors in the multipolarization process: Russia and China. At the same time, it observes the disruption of the traditional alliance structure with the United States and sees Washington distancing itself from its main allies, who are also DPRK’s adversaries in East Asia. Therefore, it appears willing to watch the evolution of events and their outcome. Donald Trump has stated that his administration has opened a line of communication with the DPRK and considered that, at some point, “something will probably happen,” emphasizing: “There is communication. I have a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un… I get along wonderfully with him… I think it is very important. It is a ‘great nuclear nation,’ and he is a ‘very smart guy.’ I got to know him very well… We will probably do something at some point.” It cannot be ruled out in this analysis that the DPRK is doubly leveraged. On one hand, with stable trade with China; on the other, with Russia’s reciprocity for its declared and materially sustained support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine. Therefore, additional incentives directly linked to DPRK’s comprehensive security must emerge. If the U.S. were to formally recognize the DPRK as a “de facto nuclear power,” which would represent a radical change in U.S. strategy, the prospect of future negotiations focused on threat reduction rather than denuclearization would open up. Despite Trump’s flattering words and the expectations they raise, it is not clear whether the U.S. president would be able to secure internal consensus within his administration to make such a decision without major obstacles, and, at the same time, manage to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership around him. Conclusions The viability of negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK under Trump’s new government remains uncertain, but it is possible that Trump will pursue a new “diplomatic victory” — similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un — through an alternative strategy that bilaterally satisfies Pyongyang’s aspiration to be recognized as a de facto nuclear state. However, it is unlikely that the international community would accept the U.S. unilaterally recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a vote by the UN Security Council would be required, where the United Kingdom and France would surely veto it; and if it were brought to the General Assembly as a resolution, the number of opposing votes would probably be a majority. It is worth noting that the DPRK is doubly leveraged: it has stable trade with China and reciprocity from Russia for its material support, in addition to enjoying the diplomatic backing of both powers. Given its persistent distrust of Washington, it is to be expected that Pyongyang will maintain its close coordination with Beijing and Moscow and use it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, for the time being, it is not clear whether the U.S. president will be able to mitigate the suspicion and animosity of Kim Jong Un and the leadership surrounding him. Notes[1] Lee Jae Myung was elected as president of the Republic of Korea after the June 3rd, 2025 elections. References Aise Sotolongo, J. (2025). Return of Donald Trump: Continuity or change with the DPRK? World and New World Journal. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4082Chan-kyong, P. (2025, 12 de marzo). Kim Jong Un seeks negotiating leverage over Trump's new nuclear demands, analysts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3296722/kim-jong-un-seeks-negotiating-leverage-over-trump-new-nuclear-demands-analystsChung-in, M. (2025, 15 de febrero). 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