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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Israel’s conflict with Iran represents far more than another Middle Eastern crisis – it marks the emergence of a dangerous new chapter in nuclear rivalries that has the potential to reshape global proliferation risks for decades to come. What began with Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and other targets on June 13, 2025 has now spiraled into the world’s first full-scale example of what I as an expert in nuclear security call a “threshold war” – a new and terrifying form of conflict where a nuclear weapons power seeks to use force to prevent an enemy on the verge of nuclearization from making that jump. As missiles continue to rain down on both Tehran and Tel Aviv – with hundreds dead in Iran and at least 24 killed in Israel – the international community is witnessing the collapse of traditional deterrence frameworks in real time. Unlike traditional nuclear rivalries where both sides possess declared arsenals – like India and Pakistan, who despite their tensions operate under mutual deterrence – this new threshold dynamic creates an inherently unstable escalation spiral. Iran increasingly believes it cannot deter Israeli aggression without nuclear weapons, yet every step toward acquiring them invites more aggressive Israeli strikes. Israel, for its part, cannot permanently eliminate Iran’s nuclear knowledge through military means – it can only delay it through means that would seemingly guarantee future Iranian determination to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Under this dynamic, neither side can step back without accepting an intolerable outcome: for Israel, an Iran more determined than even in becoming a nuclear weapons nation capable of deterring Israeli action and ending its regional military dominance; for Iran, the risk of regime change through devastating Israeli strikes. The consequences of this deadly logic extend far beyond the Middle East. The preventive strike precedent The stakes could not be higher, as Iranian officials have called the attack “a declaration of war” and vowed that destroyed nuclear facilities “would be rebuilt.” Israel, meanwhile has warned its campaign will continue “for as many days as it takes.” Most ominously, the scheduled nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran were called off, with Tehran dismissing any such dialogue as “meaningless.” This may suggest diplomacy’s window – which opened for just a few months under Trump’s second administration, after being closed during his first – was deliberately slammed shut. More broadly, the Israeli strikes mark a dangerous evolution in international norms around preventive warfare. While Israeli officials called this a “preemptive strike,” the legal and strategic reality is different. Preemptive strikes respond to imminent threats – like Israel’s 1967 Six-Day War against Arab armies preparing to attack. Preventive strikes, by contrast, target distant future threats when conditions seem favorable – like Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Israel justified its action by claiming Iran could rapidly assemble up to 15 nuclear bombs. Yet, as the International Atomic Energy Agency director, Rafael Grossi, warned beforehand, an Israeli strike could solidify rather than deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, potentially prompting withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. True to that warning, on June 16, Iran announced it was preparing a parliamentary bill that would see the country leave the 1968 treaty. Israel’s calculations in opting to strike build on the same erosion of international legal frameworks that has legitimized preemptive warfare since the United States’ military action in Afghanistan and Iraq after the Sept. 11, 2001 attack. America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged sovereignty norms through practices like drone strikes and preemptive attacks. More recently, operations in Gaza and elsewhere have demonstrated that violations of international humanitarian law carry limited consequences in practice. For Israel, this permissive environment has seemingly created both opportunity and justification regarding striking Iran – something that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pursuing for decades. Already, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant demonstrated nuclear facilities’ vulnerability in modern warfare. I believe Israel’s actions further risk normalizing attacks on nuclear infrastructure, potentially legitimizing similar preventive actions by India, China or the U.S. against emerging nuclear programs elsewhere. From strikes to regional conflagration Israel’s initial strike quickly triggered inevitable escalation. Iran’s retaliation came in waves: first hundreds of drones and missiles on June 13, then sustained barrages throughout the following days. By the morning of June 15, both countries were trading strikes on energy infrastructure, military bases and civilian areas, with no immediate end in sight. The Houthis in Yemen have since joined the fight, by launching ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv. Notably absent are Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Iraqi militias – all significantly damaged by recent action by Israel. This degradation of Iran’s “axis of resistance” – its traditional forward deterrent – fundamentally alters Tehran’s strategic calculations. Without strong proxies to threaten retaliation, Iran is more exposed to Israeli strikes, making nuclear weapons seem like the only reliable deterrent against future attacks. The escalation pattern illustrates what can happen when when a government casts aggression as prevention. Having initiated the recent escalation of hostilities, Israel now faces the consequences. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s vow that destroyed facilities “would be rebuilt” underscores that Israeli action designed to prevent nuclearization may instead result in Iran pursuing it with renewed determination. The commitment trap This creates what strategists call the “commitment trap” – a dynamic where both sides face escalating costs but cannot back down. Israel faces its own strategic dilemma. The strikes may ultimately accelerate rather than prevent Iranian nuclearization, yet backing down would mean accepting a nuclear Iran. Netanyahu’s promise that current strikes are “nothing compared to what they will feel in coming days” shows how quickly strikes sold as preventative escalate toward total war. Unlike established nuclear powers that can negotiate from positions of strength, threshold states, such as Iran, face a stark choice: remain vulnerable to preventive strikes and regime change or race toward the protection that nuclear deterrence provides. North Korea offers the clearest example of this dynamic. Despite decades of sanctions and military threats, Pyongyang’s nuclear program has made it essentially immune to preventive strikes. Iranian leaders understand this lesson well – the question is whether they can reach the same protected status before suffering decisive preventive action. Traditional nuclear deterrence theory assumes rational actors operating under mutual vulnerability. But threshold wars break these assumptions in fundamental ways. Iran cannot fully deter Israeli action because it lacks confirmed weapons, while Israel cannot rely on deterrence to prevent Iranian weaponization because Iran’s nuclear program continues advancing. This creates “use it or lose it” dynamics: Israel faces shrinking windows to act preventively as Iran approaches weaponization; Iran faces incentives to accelerate its program before suffering additional strikes. The absence of effective external mediation compounds these risks. U.S. President Donald Trump’s response to the strikes reveals this dynamic starkly. Initially opposing military action and preferring diplomacy to “bombing the hell out of” Iran, Trump pivoted dramatically after the strikes began, and warned that “there’s more to come. A lot more.” His post on Truth Social – “Two months ago I gave Iran a 60-day ultimatum to ‘make a deal.’ They should have done it!” – demonstrates how quickly diplomatic efforts can collapse once threshold wars begin. Global implication The international response reveals how thoroughly Israel’s Operation Rising Lion has normalized aggression against nuclear facilities. While European leaders called for “maximum restraint,” none condemned Israel’s initial attacks. Russia and China condemned the attacks but took no concrete action. The U.N. Security Council produced only statements of “concern” about “escalation.” This normalization sets what I believe to be a catastrophic precedent. The threshold war model threatens to unravel decades of nuclear governance based on deterrence rather than preemption. Indeed, the Iran-Israel threshold war sets dangerous precedents for other regional nuclear competitions. Successful preventive strikes could incentivize similar actions elsewhere, eroding diplomatic nonproliferation efforts. Conversely, rapid nuclearization by Iran could encourage other threshold states, like Saudi Arabia, to pursue nuclear capabilities swiftly and secretly. When preventive strikes become the enforcement mechanism for nonproliferation norms, the entire architecture of nuclear governance begins to crumble. Without these frameworks, the world faces an unstable future defined by cycles of preventive strikes and accelerated nuclear proliferation – far more dangerous than the Cold War-era standoffs that shaped nuclear governance.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском As Israel’s devastating war in Gaza has ground on, the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was thought to be “dead”. Now, it is showing signs of life again. French President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly pressing other European nations to jointly recognise a Palestinian state at a UN conference in mid-June, focused on achieving a two-state solution. Macron called such recognition a “political necessity”. Countries outside Europe are feeling the pressure, too. Australia has reaffirmed its view that recognition of Palestine should be a “way of building momentum towards a two-state solution”. During Macron’s visit to Indonesia in late May, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto made a surprising pledge to recognise Israel if it allowed for a Palestinian state. Indonesia is one of about 28 nations that don’t currently recognise Israel. France, Australia, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea are among the approximately 46 nations that don’t recognise a Palestinian state.   The UN conference on June 17–20, co-sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, wants to go “beyond reaffirming principles” and “achieve concrete results” towards a two-state solution. Most countries, including the US, have supported the two-state solution in principle for decades. However, the political will from all parties has faded in recent years. So, why is the policy gaining traction again now? And does it have a greater chance of success? What is the two-state solution? Put simply, the two-state solution is a proposed peace plan that would create a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state. There have been several failed attempts to enact the policy over recent decades, the most famous of which was the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. In recent years, the two-state solution was looking less likely by the day. The Trump administration’s decision in 2017 to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the US embassy there signalled the US was moving away from its role as mediator. Then, several Arab states agreed to normalise relations with Israel in the the Abraham Accords, without Israeli promises to move towards a two-state solution. The Hamas attacks on Israel – and subsequent Israeli war on Gaza – have had a somewhat contradictory effect on the overarching debate. On the one hand, the brutality of Hamas’ actions substantially set back the legitimacy of the Palestinian self-determination movement in some quarters on the world stage. On the other, it’s also become clear the status quo – the continued Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank following the end of a brutal war – is not tenable for either Israeli security or Palestinian human rights. And the breakdown of the most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the return of heavy Israeli ground operations in May and reports of mass Palestinian starvation have only served to further isolate the Israeli government in the eyes of its peers. Once-steadfast supporters of Israel’s actions have become increasingly frustrated by a lack of clear strategic goals in Gaza. And many now seem prepared to ignore Israeli wishes and pursue Palestinian recognition. For these governments, the hope is recognition of a Palestinian state would rebuild political will – both globally and in the Middle East – towards a two-state solution. Huge obstacles remain But how likely is this in reality? There is certainly more political will than there was before, but also several important roadblocks. First and foremost is the war in Gaza. It’s obvious this will need to end, with both sides agreeing to an enduring ceasefire. Beyond that, the political authority in both Gaza and Israel remains an issue. The countries now considering Palestinian recognition, such France and Australia, have expressly said Hamas cannot play any role in governing a future Palestinian state. Though anti-Hamas sentiment is becoming more vocal among residents in Gaza, Hamas has been violently cracking down on this dissent and is attempting to consolidate its power. However, polling shows the popularity of Fatah – the party leading the Palestinian National Authority – is even lower than Hamas at an average of 21%. Less than half of Gazans support the enclave returning to Palestinian Authority control. This means a future Palestinian state would likely require new leadership. There is almost no political will in Israel for a two-state solution, either. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not been shy about his opposition to a Palestinian state. His cabinet members have mostly been on the same page. This has also been reflected in policy action. In early May, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a plan for Israel to indefinitely occupy parts of Gaza. The government also just approved its largest expansion of settlements in the West Bank in decades. These settlements remain a major problem for a two-state solution. The total population of Israeli settlers is more than 700,000 in both East Jerusalem and the West Bank. And it’s been increasing at a faster rate since the election of the right-wing, pro-settler Netanyahu government in 2022. Settlement is enshrined in Israeli Basic Law, with the state defining it as “national value” and actively encouraging its “establishment and consolidation”. The more settlement that occurs, the more complicated the boundaries of a future Palestinian state become. Then there’s the problem of public support. Recent polling shows neither Israelis nor Palestinians view the two-state solution favourably. Just 40% of Palestinians support it, while only 26% of Israelis believe a Palestinian state can “coexist peacefully” alongside Israel. However, none of these challenges makes the policy impossible. The unpopularity of the two-state solution locally is more a reflection of previous failures than it is of future negotiations. A power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland was similarly unpopular in the 1990s, but peace was achieved through bold political leadership involving the US and European Union. In other words, we won’t know what’s possible until negotiations begin. Red lines will need to be drawn and compromises made. It’s not clear what effect growing external pressure will have, but the international community does appear to be reaching a political tipping point on the two-state solution. Momentum could start building again.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

I. Introduction Since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, the Gaza war has entered its third year. Palestinians continue to endure an unprecedented level of violence, trauma, economic hardship, and uncertainty. The war has resulted in a staggering number of casualties and widespread displacement, in addition to massive destruction of physical assets in Gaza, significant reduction of economic output, increased violence in the West Bank, and widespread collapse of basic service provision across the entire Palestinian territories.  As of May 7, 2025, according to Wikipedia and Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 55000 fatalities (53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) and more than 110,00 injuries have been reported in Gaza. More than half of the casualties are women, children, and the elderly. An estimated 1.9 million people, approximately 90 percent of Gaza’s population, are currently internally displaced. Seventy percent of Gaza’s Road network, more than 80 per cent of commercial facilities, and close to 90 percent of housing units in Gaza have either severely damaged or have been destroyed.  Since October 7, 2023, the UN has documented over 1,500 clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank, resulting in property damage, casualties, and displacement. Over 1,600 Palestinians, half of whom are children, have been displaced due to increased settlers’ violence and access restrictions. Additionally, existing fiscal constraints and growing security concerns have disrupted service provision in the West Bank.  On the macroeconomic front, the Gaza and West Bank face a collapse, which is unmatched in recent memory. The Palestine economy has faced significant contraction, evidenced by a reduced production, sharp decline in gross domestic product (GDP), and soaring unemployment rates. On the other hand, the Gaza war has had significant negative impacts on Israel. The economic and financial costs of war consist of the direct cost of military operations as well as the indirect losses that extend over the medium and long term. One of the most direct costs of the Gaza war was the recall of about 300,000 reservists in the early days, which meant that the Israeli government would bear the cost of conscription, and the Israeli economy would bear loss of output due to their absence from the workforce.Given these situations, this paper analyzes the economic effects of the Gaza war on Palestine and Israel. II. Literature on the Effects of Wars Wars have the potential to alter the parties and “transform the future” of belligerents (Ikle 1991) and they also bring about fundamental changes to the international system (Gilpin 1981).  Scholars in Economics have provided considerable analysis of the macroeconomic effects of a conflict across spatial levels: locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally. Some studies have examined the effects of specific wars such as the Syrian civil war (Kešeljević and Spruk, 2023) or the Iraq war (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). For example, an analysis estimated that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had an economic cost of 1% of global GDP in 2022 (Liadze et al. 2023) Others have examined the effects of war in general. For instance, Reuven Glick and Alan Taylor (2010) examine bilateral trade relations from 1870 to 1997 and find large and persistent negative impacts of wars on trade and hence on national and global economic welfare. Similarly, Vally Koubi (2005) investigates the effects of inter- and intrastate wars on a sample of countries and finds that the combined prewar, contemporaneous, and postwar effects on economic growth are negative.  A “war ruin” school emphasized that the destruction caused by wars is accompanied by higher inflation, unproductive resource spending on the military, and war debt (Chan 1985; Russett 1970). By contrast, a “war renewal” school argued that there can be longer-term positive economic effects from war because war can lead to increased efficiency in the economy by reducing the power of rent-seeking special interests, triggering technological innovation, and advancing human capital (Organski and Kugler 1980).  III. Economic Effects of the Gaza War1. Casualties  As Table 1 shows, since the Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, 55,000 people (as of May 7, 2025, 53,253 Palestinians and 1,706 Israelis) have been killed in the Gaza war according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Scholars have estimated that 80% of Palestinians killed are civilians. A study by OHCHR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) found that 70% of the Palestinians killed in residential buildings or similar housing were children and women.  The majority of casualties have been found in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Health Ministry’s total casualty count is the number of deaths directly caused by the war.  The 7 October attacks of the Hamas on Israel killed 1,195 people, including 815 civilians. A further 806 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem).  2. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Palestine  As Figure 1-1 shows, since October 7, 2023, Palestine’s economy has significantly contracted as a result of continued warfare. As Figure 1-2 shows, economic downturn started from the fourth quarter of 2023. In 2024, Palestine's GDP contracted by 27% compared to the previous year. The decline was driven by a 27% drop in industrial output in the Gaza Strip due to the ongoing Israeli occupation and attack. Especially, economic contractions were recorded in construction (-14.5%), services (-11.0%), financial and insurance activities (-5.3%), information and communication (-3.2%). However, Palestine’s economy began to recover in the fourth quarter of 2024, although it still marked a negative growth.   Figure 1-1: Palestine economic growth rate  Figure 1-2: Palestine economic growth (quarterly) As Figure 2 shows, industrial production in Palestine significantly decreased in 2024 as war has continued between Israel and Hamas. Industrial production in Palestine has been low, averaging -7.62 percent from 2012 until 2025. However, it reached a record low of -29.77 percent in June of 2024. Then industrial production in Palestine increased to 2.1 percent in March of 2025 over the same month in the previous year.   Figure 2: Industrial production in Palestine As Figure 3 shows, inflation rate in Palestine has significantly increased in 2023 and 2024, reaching all time high of 88.93 percent in November of 2024. High inflation resulted from resource shortages as a result of continued warfare and significant production decline. And then inflation rate in Palestine dropped to 1.88 percent in March and -2.51 percent in February of 2025. Inflation rate in Palestine averaged 4.95 percent from 1998 until 2025.   Figure 3: Inflation rate in Palestine As Figure 4-1 shows, unemployment rate in Palestine significantly increased after October 7, 2023, as economy continued to shrink and industrial production fell. Unemployment rate in Palestine increased to 35.20 percent in the first quarter of 2024 from 24.1 percent in the third quarter of 2023. It then dropped to 31.1 percent in the second quarter of 2024 and 28.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Unemployment Rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 24.07 percent from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 35.60 percent in the third quarter of 2002 and a record low of 8.80 percent in the second quarter of 2000.    Figure 4-1: Unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-2 shows, youth unemployment rate in Palestine increased from 38.40 percent in the first quarter of 2023 to 45.70 percent in the first quarter of 2024 and then slightly dropped to 42.60 percent in the third quarter of 2024 and 38.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. Youth unemployment rate in Palestine has been remarkably high, averaging 41.85 percent from 2009 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 49.90 percent in the second quarter of 2018 and a record low of 32.90 percent in the first quarter of 2011.   Figure 4-2: Youth unemployment rate in Palestine As Figure 4-3 shows, full-time employment in Palestine plunged to 628000 persons in the first quarter of 2024 from 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023. Then it increased to 705700 persons in the fourth quarter of 2024. Full-time employment in Palestine averaged 888133 persons from 2010 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 1143800 persons in the third quarter of 2023 and a record low of 67900 persons in the first quarter of 2010.   Figure 4-3: Full-time employment in Palestine Despite the continued warfare in Gaza, as Figure 5 shows, exports in Palestine did not significantly decrease. On the contrary, exports in Palestine increased from 148.3 USD Million in August 2023 to 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024. Exports in Palestine averaged 68.15 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 164.20 USD Million in December of 2024 and a record low of 15.92 USD Million in April of 2002. Exports in Palestine maintained pre-war level in 2025, recording 140.70 USD Million in January of 2025. Top exports of Palestine in 2023 were scrap iron ($68.6M), tropical fruits ($53.8M), pure olive oil ($10.9M), and building stone ($7.56M).  Figure 5: Exports in Palestine Figure 6 shows, imports in Palestine significantly dropped in 2024 as warfare continued in Gaza. Imports in Palestine decreased to 420.30 USD Million in April 2024 from 747.20 USD Million in August 2023. Imports in Palestine averaged 370.00 USD Million from 2001 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 750.60 USD Million in November of 2022 and a record low of 82.71 USD Million in April of 2002. According to media reports, there are severe food shortages in Gaza, but there is no information about the imports of food after 2023.   Figure 6: Imports in Palestine As Figure 7 shows, since October 7, 2023, government spending in Palestine has significantly declined in 2023 and early 2024, hitting a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024. And then government spending in Palestine increased to 666.70 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2024 from 616.50 USD million in the third quarter of 2024. Government spending in Palestine averaged 797.95 USD million from 2011 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 974.90 USD million in the fourth quarter of 2016 and a record low of 461.20 USD million in the first quarter of 2024.   Figure 7: Government spending in Palestine 3. Economic Effects of the Gaza War on Israel  As Figure 8 shows, since October 7, 2023, when the Hamas attacked Israel, government spending in Israel significantly increased as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas. Government spending in Israel increased from 84100 ILS (Israel new shekel) Million in the third quarter of 2023 to 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and 97018 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Government Spending in Israel averaged 58676 ILS Million from 1995 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 97973 ILS Million in the fourth quarter of 2023 and a record low of 39524 ILS Million in the third quarter of 1995.   Figure 8: Government spending in Israel As Figure 9 shows, as Israel government conducted massive military operations against the Hamas, military expenditure in Israel increased to 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 from 27498.50 USD Million in 2023. Military expenditure in Israel averaged 7742.87 USD Million from 1951 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 46505.30 USD Million in 2024 and a record low of 57.60 USD Million in 1954.   Figure 9: Military expenditure in Israel As Figure 10 shows, Israel recorded a government budget deficit of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023 from 14100 ILS Million in January 2023 because government spending, in particular military expenditure significantly increased. Government budget value in Israel averaged -3405.71 ILS Million from 2005 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 22839.00 ILS Million in January of 2025 and a record low of -33793.00 ILS Million in December of 2023.   Figure 10: Budget Balance in Israel As Figure 11-1 & 11-2 show, Israel's economic growth plunged to -4.32 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 from 3.44% in the third quarter of 2023. Israel experienced consecutive negative growth until the third quarter of 2024 as the ongoing conflict with the Hamas had taken a significant toll on economic activity. This marked the weakest growth since 2020, when the covid-19 pandemic severely impacted the economy. However, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Israel expanded 5.46 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 over the same quarter of the previous year. GDP annual growth rate in Israel averaged 3.73 percent from 1996 until 2024, reaching an all-time high of 16.27 percent in the second quarter of 2021 and a record low of -8.37 percent in the second quarter of 2020.  Figure 11-1: Israel's economic growth rate  Figure 11-2: Israel's GDP growth (quarterly) As Figure 12 shows, industrial production in Israel decreased 7.4 percent in December of 2023 and 9.8 percent in March 2024 and then increased 15.9 percent in December 2024. Industrial production in Israel averaged 5.66 percent from 1960 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 62.70 percent in June of 1968 and a record low of -29.20 percent in June of 1967.   Figure 12: Industrial production in Israel As Figure 13 shows, unemployment rate in Israel decreased from 4.30 percent in January 2023 to 2.80 percent in November 2023 and 2.60 percent in December 2024. This decline seems to result from the fact that Israeli government called up tens of thousands of reservists to replace conscripts and active-duty soldiers. And then unemployment rate in Israel slightly increased to 2.9% in March 2025. Unemployment rate in Israel averaged 5.89 percent from 1992 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 11.40 percent in March of 1992 and a record low of 2.60 percent in August & December of 2024.  Figure 13: Unemployment Rate in Israel As Figure 14 shows, the number of unemployed persons in Israel decreased to 119200 in December of 2024 from 184000 in January 2023. Unemployed persons in Israel averaged 192800 from 1991 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 305400 in September of 2003 and a record low of 119200 in December of 2024.  Figure 14: The number of unemployed persons in Israel As Figure 15 shows, after October 2023, exports in Israel fluctuated between 4470 USD Million in October 2023, 5330 USD Million in March 2024, 4320 USD Million June 2024 and 5250 USD million in December 2024. Exports in Israel averaged 1836.30 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 6276.70 USD Million in March of 2022 and a record low of 10.80 USD Million in July of 1959.   Figure 15: Exports in Israel As Figure 16 shows, imports in Israel fluctuated between 8090 USD Million in August 2023, 7590 USD Million in December 2023, 7010 USD Million in August 2024, and 8318.70 USD Million in March 2025. Imports in Israel averaged 2500.72 USD Million from 1959 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 10372.30 USD Million in May of 2022 and a record low of 33.10 USD Million in November of 1959.   Figure 16: Imports in Israel As Figure 17 shows, inflation rate in Israel decreased from 5.40 percent in January 2023 to 3.70 percent in October 2023 and 2.50 percent in February 2024. It then increased to 3.60 percent in August 2024 and 3.80 percent in January 2025. Inflation rate in Israel averaged 26.75 percent from 1952 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 486.20 percent in November of 1984 and a record low of -2.70 percent in March of 2004.   Figure 17: Inflation rate in Israel As Figure 18 shows, despite on-going warfare in Gaza, gasoline price in Israel did not rise significantly. It increased from 1.82 USD/Liter in September 2023 to 1.98 and 2.14 USD/Liter in January and May 2024, respectively and then dropped to 2.06 and 2.04 USD/Liter in August 2024 and February 2025, respectively. Gasoline prices in Israel averaged 1.78 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, reaching an all-time high of 2.30 USD/Liter in June of 2022 and a record low of 0.73 USD/Liter in December of 1995.   Figure 18: Gasoline price in Israel IV. Conclusion The Gaza war has had negative impacts on both Palestine and Israel, but the negative effects were much bigger in Palestine than in Israel. The number of casualties was much higher in Palestine. Especially the war brought down Palestine economy, lowering economic growth, reducing industrial productions, and increasing inflation & unemployment in Palestine. The Israeli economy has also slowed down, and budget deficit increased. However, unemployment went down, and inflation has been stable between 2 and 5 percent. Trade has maintained a pre-war level, although there have been some difficulties. References Bilmes, Linda, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2006. The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Chan, Steve. 1985. “The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems.” Orbis 29 (2): 403–434.CIA Factbook. 2024. “Ukraine.”Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  Glick, Rouven and Alan Taylor. 2010. “Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(1): 102-127.Iklé, Fred C. 1991. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press.Kešeljević, Aleksandar, and Rok Spruk. 2023. Estimating the Effects of Syrian Civil War. Empirical Economics.  Koumi, Valley. 2005. “War and Economic Performance.” Journal of Peace Research 42 (1): 67-82. Liadze, Iana, Corrado Macchiarelli, Paul Mortimer-Lee, and Patricia Sanchez Juanino. 2023. “Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine War.” The World Economy 46: 874–886.Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Russett, Bruce. 1970. What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. New Haven: Yale University Press.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском While Trump declared the truce agreement a US victory, Ansar Allah said that Washington contacted them in order to “avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen”. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement reached a ceasefire deal with the United States on Wednesday, May 7, according to Oman, which mediated the negotiations. The deal stipulates the halt of Ansar Allah’s attacks on US ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, and an end to US aggression on Yemen. However, it does not prevent the Yemeni movement from launching attacks on Israel.  “Following recent discussions and contacts conducted by the Sultanate of Oman with the United States and the relevant authorities in Sana’a, in the Republic of Yemen, with the aim of de-escalation, efforts have resulted in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides,” Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Albusaidi, wrote on X. “In the future, neither side will target the other, including American vessels, in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and the smooth flow of international commercial shipping,” the minister added. Peoples Dispatch spoke to a member of the Communist Party of Jordan, Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh, to discuss the ceasefire, which he described as a “sudden development in the war in the Red Sea.” Dr. Emad Al-Hatabeh indicated that “both the US and Oman didn’t comment on Ansar Allah’s missiles targeting Israel, especially that this agreement was reached shortly after a Yemeni missile reached Ben Gurion airport, near the occupied city of Lydda (also known as Lod).” As per Al-Hatabeh’s analysis, “important questions about this agreement are left without answers. Taking into consideration the Omani role in the American – Iranian negotiations, is the ceasefire in the Red Sea part of the deal? Another question will arise from this assumption, did America give up some of Israel’s interests in order to reach an agreement with Iran? Where does this agreement leave Netanyahu’s government, especially after Ansar Allah’s spokesman told Reuters that the agreement doesn’t include Israel.” Ansar Allah says the US contacted them seeking a truce One day before Oman announced that the deal was sealed, US President Donald Trump alluded that a ceasefire agreement was about to be reached, claiming that Ansar Allah agreed to stop the fight with the US because they “capitulated”.  “They just don’t want to fight, and we will honor that and we will stop the bombings, and they have capitulated,” Trump said from the White House on Tuesday, May 6. “They will not be blowing up ships anymore, and that’s what the purpose of what we were doing. So that’s just news. We just found out about that. So I think that’s very, very positive,” he added. Although Trump bragged about the deal, presenting it as a US victory, analysts suggest that it was Ansar Allah that forced the world’s greatest military superpower to the negotiating table, after paralyzing US naval traffic off the Yemeni coast.  Ansar Allah’s chief negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam, confirmed during an interview with Almasirah TV channel, that the movement “did not make any request to the Americans to hold ceasefire talks”. Abdulsalam asserted that, on the contrary, the movement recently received US requests and messages seeking a truce, via the Sultanate of Oman. The Yemeni official pointed out that US endeavors to reach a ceasefire with Ansar Allah were a great disappointment to Israel. “The Israelis have endured great disappointment after the stance of the US, which tried to walk away and avoid drowning in the mountains of Yemen,” he said. However, Abdulsalam clarified that Ansar Allah is still “assessing this US position so that the facts on the ground do not contradict its statements”. He further warned that in the event that the US “would not abide by the agreement in any way”, the movement “will respond”. Abdulsalam considered the deal “a success to be added to Yemen’s credit, as it enhances a situation that would leave the “usurper entity” [Israel] in a situation of loneliness, in confrontation with the great popular and military stance led by Yemen on behalf of the Arab and Islamic nation.” The ceasefire was announced two months after Trump ordered a large-scale aerial campaign against Yemen on the pretext of protecting US shipping, air, and naval assets and to restore “navigation freedom” from Ansar Allah’s attacks. Trump’s order followed Ansar Allah’s decision to resume a ban on Israeli ships due to Israel’s continuous blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yemen threatens Israel with a devastating and painful response for attacking Sana’a airport  While Ansar Allah agreed to a truce with the US, it vowed to escalate its operations against Israel as long as its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza is not lifted.  In response to Israel’s aggression on Sana’a International Airport on Tuesday, that destroyed terminal buildings and caused USD 500 million in damage, Yemen’s Supreme Political Council Chairman, Mahdi al-Mashat, threatened that “Sanaa’s response will be devastating, painful, and beyond what the Israeli enemy can endure.” “From this moment onward, stay in your shelters or leave for your homelands immediately. Your failed government will no longer be able to protect you,” Al-Mashat warned Israeli people.  Moreover, the Yemeni senior official reaffirmed that no aggression will deter Yemen from its “rightful decision” to support the people of Palestine “until the genocide ends and the siege on Gaza is lifted.” The Yemeni Armed Forces’ spokesman, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, also confirmed in a televised statement late Wednesday, that the movement will continue its ban on Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, alongside the comprehensive aerial blockade on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Text under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 (CC BY-SA) license

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском The Israeli army seeks to mobilize 30,000 reservists for a new expansion of its offensive on Gaza. UN-affiliated organizations warn of famine and disease in an enclave where clean drinking water is scarce. The Israeli security cabinet has approved a plan to intensify the operation in Gaza, which includes capturing or seizing additional areas across the Palestinian coastal territory and expanding the area controlled by the IDF. Government members, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, are already using the term “occupation” to clarify the plans for Gaza. Although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not specified which parts of the territory are involved in the new escalation, anonymous military sources have claimed that the goal is to occupy the entire Gaza Strip. The idea put forth by the Zionist regime, in any case, is to seize the territory and not return it in the future. Hamas has rejected this plan and continues to pursue “a comprehensive agreement that guarantees the safety and protection of our people,” according to one of its senior officials. The announcement includes the destruction of “all infrastructure above and underground,” according to Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir. The meeting followed IDF orders to mobilize 30,000 reservists last Saturday. Israel is thereby increasing pressure on Gaza during the same month that U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, where he will present his colonization plans aligned with the wishes of the Tel Aviv regime. The plan also entails a new forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to the south of Gaza, expected to last for months. The government of Netanyahu — who is considered a suspected war criminal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) — faces internal resistance from the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, which has protested what they see as prioritizing territorial conquest over the return of prisoners captured by Hamas on October 7. Fifty-nine people remain held by the Gaza government after Israel unilaterally broke the ceasefire on March 18. The Forum mentioned before, criticized the Gaza occupation plans, referring to them as the “Smotrich-Netanyahu Plan for the Sacrifice of Hostages,” according to a public statement. The main debate within the security cabinet focused on whether to open routes for humanitarian aid — routes that have been closed since early March, two weeks before the ceasefire collapsed. According to Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Itamar Ben Gvir — also subject to ICJ arrest warrants — argued for keeping all aid routes closed: “I don’t understand why we have to give them anything; they have enough food there. We should bomb Hamas’s food reserves,” the outlet quoted. The Chief of Staff called the idea “dangerous.” According to the same leaks, Ben Gvir also proposed “bombing food warehouses and generators.” The International Criminal Court has reminded that blocking humanitarian aid may constitute a war crime. The Israeli government has leaked to the press that under the new escalation, humanitarian aid would be allowed in only through “international organizations and private security contractors.” On Sunday, May 4, the Country Humanitarian Team (CHT), under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), reported that for nine weeks Israeli authorities had blocked all supplies from entering Gaza: “Bakeries and community kitchens have shut down. The warehouses are empty. Children are starving.” Two days earlier, UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell expanded on the critical situation in Gaza: “In the past month, more than 75% of households have reported increased difficulty accessing water. Families don’t have enough to drink, cannot wash their hands when needed, and often must choose between showering, cleaning, or cooking,” Russell said in a statement. UNICEF also warned of the prevalence of acute watery diarrhea, especially dangerous for children: “Over 9,000 boys and girls have received treatment for acute malnutrition,” the organization added. At the end of April, during ICJ hearings related to South Africa’s case against Israel, Claire Nicolet, Head of Emergencies at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), stated that “Israeli authorities are not only using aid as a bargaining chip but also as a weapon of war.” Since October 7, 2023, 52,567 Palestinians have been killed and 118,610 injured as a result of Israeli attacks, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Of those fatalities, 2,459 occurred after the March ceasefire was broken. 

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском From war threats to negotiations In the early months of 2025, Iran and the United States stood on the brink of open military conflict. The escalation was driven by several factors that coincided in time, heightening the effect of instability. It was one of the most dangerous periods in the history of their relations. Until very recently, Iran lived under a cloud of anxious expectation: would war erupt, or could the situation be contained? The first reason behind the sharp escalation is, without doubt, Donald Trump’s return to office. It is well known that during his first presidency in 2018, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), reinstated prior sanctions and introduced new, extremely severe ones against Tehran. Trump took a hardline stance toward the Islamic regime, viewing it as a threat to human rights and regional stability. By early February of this year, he had already issued strict demands to Iran: to drastically scale back—or possibly entirely dismantle—its nuclear program, relinquish nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cease support for allied groups in the region (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi Shiite militias). He threatened large-scale bombings if Tehran disagreed, but also left room for negotiations. It is worth recalling that Trump personally authorized the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), accusing Shiite militias under Soleimani’s leadership of alleged mass killings of civilians in Syria. In contrast, Iranians see Soleimani as a noble warrior and a professional soldier, who saved the peoples of Syria and Iraq from terrorist atrocities, and were outraged by his extrajudicial killing. From an economic perspective, it was during Trump’s first term that Iranian oil exports plummeted nearly tenfold, from over 2.5 million barrels per day in April 2018 to 300,000 barrels per day in June 2019. Although sanctions remained in place under President Joe Biden, their enforcement became more lenient. As a result, by 2024, Iran had begun rapidly rebuilding its oil exports, which rose to 1.9 million barrels per day by the summer of last year. This sparked hopes for a gradual economic recovery. However, Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 meant a new wave of threats. In his first month back in office, Trump gave Iran a two-month deadline to make concessions or face a firm response. The second reason is Israel’s aggressive and expansionist policy. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, long described Israel as a colonial-settler project created by the West, inherently driven to expand by seizing territory from neighboring Muslim countries and committing crimes against their Muslim populations, all with the ultimate goal of forcibly establishing “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. In reality, there have been some differences between Israeli governments: under left-wing leadership, Israel tends to act more peacefully and moderately, while right-wing administrations pursue more aggressive and harsh policies. In recent years, however, Israel’s actions toward its neighbors have become especially aggressive—exactly as Khomeini had described—after the rise to power of the most radical ultra-right forces. The devastation that this government has brought upon the Gaza Strip, razing it to the ground, speaks for itself. After the fall of Bashar Assad’s strong leadership in Syria, Israel immediately seized the opportunity to destroy all of Syria’s heavy weaponry, effectively disarming the country. Israel then moved to capture more Syrian land beyond the annexed Golan Heights and committed new violations there. The Iran policy of the current Israeli government is focused on overthrowing the regime and installing puppet authorities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, known for his uncompromising hostility toward the regime in Iran, has spoken openly of his desire to see its end. There were rumors in Iran’s media space suggesting that Israel might be considering Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son, as a symbolic leader for a future “secular Iran.” Within Iran, perceptions of the Pahlavi dynasty are overwhelmingly negative: it is seen as a pro-Western dynasty detached from traditional Islamic roots, which exploited national resources and oppressed Muslims and the Islamic clergy. Nonetheless, a portion of Iranian youth and some opposition commentators in the country hold radical views, harbor hostility toward Islam and Arabs, and support Trump, Netanyahu and the Pahlavi dynasty. This group would likely side with the enemy if hostilities broke out. Furthermore, Iran began to lose its regional influence. Israel carried out a series of successful operations against Iranian allies, primarily targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon and pro-Iranian militias in Syria. Key Hezbollah commanders and several IRGC officers were killed, and arms depots were destroyed. It is remarkable that some Syrian Islamists, who had previously been hostile to Israel, welcomed this development as a form of revenge for Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and thus became temporary tactical allies of Israel. Following the December 2024 coup that brought anti-Iranian Islamists to power, Syria—once a strategic ally of Iran—is now increasingly taking a negative stance toward Tehran. By the start of this year, a sense of pessimism had settled over Iran. Feelings of confusion, anxiety and the realization of diminished influence in the Middle East became widespread among many Iranians, especially conservative ones. At the same time, a different sentiment was growing in Tehran among Iranian patriots and supporters of the Islamic regime: if the U.S., Israel or both launched a military attack, Iran’s response would be as harsh as possible. IRGC officials and prominent religious figures have made this clear. A change within: tracing Iran’s path to negotiations After a long period of tough rhetoric, Iran has made a strategic shift in its foreign policy in recent weeks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had firmly banned any negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear program, suddenly changed course. What drove this decision? It is important to recognize that this shift resulted not only from an external threat but also from a deep internal reassessment, one that was rational, compelled by the circumstances, yet conscious. Until recently, Iran stuck to the principle of “no concessions under pressure.” Khamenei pointed to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, which the U.S. exited during Trump’s presidency in 2018. From Khamenei’s perspective, new talks would be meaningless and dangerous because “the Americans will deceive again.” However, by April 2025, the situation had changed so much that Iran’s political and military elites began convincing the supreme leader of the need for dialogue. Reformist circles—especially the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian—played the leading role in this process. He insisted that without negotiations, Iran faced the risk of catastrophe: a major war, domestic unrest and even the fall of the regime. Reports from Tehran suggest he emerged as the main negotiator within the political establishment, persuading Khamenei to invoke the concept of maslahat (expediency)—a religiously sanctioned method for setting aside principles in order to save the Islamic regime. This decision was informed by several factors: - Economic crisis: according to official data, inflation between March 21 and April 20, 2025, reached 39%, while youth unemployment in the last quarter of 2024 stood at 20%. While Iran has seen worse in its recent past, these figures are nonetheless troubling. Furthermore, reserve funds were significantly depleted last year, investments have all but disappeared due to sanctions, and foreign currency reserves have declined. The country has also been hit by an energy crisis.- Erosion of ideology: satellite channels broadcasting from the U.S. and the UK have significantly expanded their reach. Outlets like Manoto, BBC Persian and Iran International have long championed secular, pro-Western views while criticizing the Islamic regime. What has particularly alarmed the authorities is the promotion of the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty: despite its brutal rule and fight against traditional Iranian and Islamic values—still remembered by the older generation—some youths have begun to see the Pahlavis as a possible “alternative” to the ruling clerical establishment.- Risks in domestic politics: political analysts, military officials and intelligence agencies warned the leadership about the risk of a “nationwide uprising” that could be sparked by an external attack. The concern was not just about protests but the potential for pro-Western groups to cooperate with foreign aggressors. The Iranian Interior Ministry said that these elements had become more active amid the 2022 protests and were receiving support from abroad. All these signals from the army, the clergy, the administration and the intelligence agencies compelled the Iranian leadership to adopt a political survival strategy. Drawing on the experience from the Iran–Iraq War, Khamenei reasoned that “continued confrontation would lead to catastrophe.” This is why he allowed the talks to begin while keeping control over their scope and substance. The nuclear program: compromise is possible, surrender is not One of the key issues in the Iran–U.S. negotiations remains the future of the Iranian nuclear program. Despite years of mutual accusations and broken trust, Tehran appears open to tactical compromises but not to surrender. According to sources within Iranian political circles, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has agreed to discussions on all parameters of the nuclear program, including uranium enrichment levels and the terms for international inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities. However, a complete dismantling of the nuclear program is widely seen as out of the question, as it would be perceived as a national humiliation within Iranian political culture. Khamenei and top IRGC officials—guardians of the regime’s ideological foundations—have repeatedly reinforced this position in their public statements. The scenario under consideration in Tehran includes these possible concessions: - a temporary halt to uranium enrichment beyond 60%,- a reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium,- broader IAEA access to selected nuclear sites,- a declaration affirming the peaceful purposes of the nuclear program with legal guarantees. In return, Iran will push for major sanctions relief—not only in the financial sector but also in technology, including the lifting of the ban on investments in the oil and gas industry. These restrictions, in force since the late 1990s, have been particularly damaging: former Iranian official Hossein Selahvarzi put the total economic loss to Iran since 2012 at over USD 1 trillion. Iran’s missile program remains a separate and highly sensitive issue. It is regarded as an untouchable symbol of national pride and strategic autonomy. The supreme leader has made it clear that Iran’s nuclear capabilities “ensure the country’s security” in the face of potential isolation or attack. As a result, Tehran is likely to reject any proposals for reducing its missile potential. All this means that negotiations are possible, but their scope is quite limited. The outcomes of the two latest rounds of indirect talks in Oman and Rome offer some optimism. Flexing muscles: a show of force as a negotiating tool The prospect of talks between Iran and the U.S. does not preclude military tensions. On the contrary, this year both countries carried out a series of shows of force to send a message: “We are approaching negotiations from a position of strength.” Iran, on the one hand, has stepped up military activity along its external borders. In April 2025, Tehran for the first time supplied its allies in Iraq with long-range ballistic missiles and drones, including the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6. These moves were seen both as acts of support for Shiite militias and as a signal of Iran’s readiness to launch strikes in the event of major conflict. The military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz took on special significance, as Iran’s navy conducted a series of maneuvers with missile boats, mines and underwater drones. Up to 20% of the world’s sea-traded oil, or about 18 million barrels per day, passes through the strait. Its possible blockade was considered a measure of last resort to pressure international markets if another round of sanctions was imposed. In addition, Iran has increased its military footprint in the southern provinces, expanding bases in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Hormozgan. This builds operational depth in the event of a U.S. or Israeli attack and reinforces the internal narrative that “Iran will not surrender but stands ready to defend itself.” The U.S., in turn, responded by deploying six B-2 Spirit strategic bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, within striking range of key targets in Iran. These warplanes can carry both nuclear and precision-guided conventional weapons. The U.S. also sent a carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf and reinforced air defense systems at its bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq. Thus, the military buildup in the region is not just preparation for a possible conflict but part of the diplomatic game. Tehran is demonstrating that it can deliver a firm response and that any concessions it makes are not a sign of surrender but a pragmatic step toward stability. Meanwhile, Washington is signaling its readiness for a military scenario in order to gain leverage in the talks. Russia as a mediator: interest in stability and strategic partnership Amid rising tensions between Iran and the U.S., Russia is emerging more clearly as a potential mediator and stabilizing force. Its role is shaped not only by current political dynamics but also by the deep structural ties built between Moscow and Tehran over the past years. In April, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow to discuss preliminary outcomes of consultations on a new nuclear deal with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Beyond nuclear diplomacy, the parties addressed a broad range of regional issues, including Syria, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This meeting was more than a diplomatic gesture; it reflects the genuine interests of both countries. Moscow is interested in the continuity of Iran’s current regime as a source of stability and a partner in the emerging multipolar world. Tehran, for its part, refrains from anti-Russian rhetoric, does not endorse resolutions against Russia at international platforms and shows respect for Moscow’s interests in the region. Russian–Iranian ties are strengthening not only politically but also infrastructurally. In 2023, both countries made significant progress in advancing the International North–South Transport Corridor, a project designed to link St. Petersburg with the Indian port of Mumbai via Iran. This initiative, backed by both Russia and Iran, offers an alternative to Western-centric logistics routes, and its success depends on the stability of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Moscow has already shown itself to be an effective broker in regional conflicts. In 2023, Russian diplomats helped revive dialogue between Iran and Azerbaijan after a long period of hostility fueled by disputes over borders, religious matters and relations with Israel. This experience could be leveraged in the context of Iran–U.S. negotiations, especially given the deep mistrust and the lack of direct dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Russia’s position is clear: Moscow is opposed to any destabilization of Iran, as it threatens to undermine regional balance, strengthen Western influence and jeopardize the partnership with Iran. As Sergey Lavrov has emphasized, Russia will support any steps aimed at de-escalation and the lifting of sanctions from Iran, as long as sovereignty and international law are respected. Thus, Russia is more than just an ally of Iran; it is one of the few actors that maintains channels of trust-based communication with both Tehran and several Western nations. This makes Moscow a potentially successful mediator, especially at a time when the U.S. has limited options for direct dialogue with Iran, and European brokers have lost much of their former influence. Possible scenarios and a window of opportunity The situation around Iran has reached a critical juncture. Amid a deep internal crisis, sanctions pressure and rising external tensions, Tehran must choose between a limited deal with the West that preserves its strategic assets or a drawn-out standoff that risks plunging the region into broader instability. First scenario: moderate de-escalation If the U.S. and Iran reached a compromise on the nuclear dossier, even in a limited format, it would create a short-term opportunity for stabilization. Iran would benefit from partial sanctions relief, increased oil export capacity and attract investment in critical sectors. In return, Tehran would commit to transparency, lower uranium enrichment levels and IAEA oversight. This scenario could also partially ease tensions around Israel, reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, even this scenario does not remove several fault lines: - The ideological hostility between Iran and Israel,- Tehran’s unwavering position on the missile program,- U.S. military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.This “frozen détente” could last for one to three years, assuming both sides show political will and avoid provocations. Second scenario: a new wave of escalation If the negotiations reach a deadlock—whether due to Washington’s excessive demands, Iran’s refusal to compromise on sensitive issues or outside interference—the situation could quickly spin out of control. In that case, possible outcomes include: - Direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (by Israel or the U.S.),- Retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Qatar,- Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,- More active operations by Shiite militias in the region. Inside Iran, this could trigger another major wave of protests, especially if the economy takes another hit from stricter sanctions. There is also a risk that some radical opposition groups could try to take advantage of the unrest to start an uprising with high casualties—something Iran’s counterintelligence has already warned about.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Does the Muscat Round Pave the Way for a Potential Deal Between Washington and Tehran? The US-Iranian talks held in Muscat concluded on Saturday, April 12, 2025, successfully addressing contentious issues between the two nations, particularly the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi led the Iranian delegation, while Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff headed the US team, with Oman serving as mediator throughout the proceedings. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the prevailing atmosphere during the discussions. President Donald Trump characterized the talks as "progressing very well," while Witkoff described the Oman negotiations as "very positive and constructive." According to Araqchi, all parties demonstrated their commitment to advancing discussions until reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Upon conclusion of these productive negotiations, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced a second round of indirect talks would be held on Saturday, April 19, again in Muscat with Omani mediation. Round One The US-Iran talks in Muscat hold significant importance as they represent the first diplomatic engagement since negotiations ceased between April 2021 and September 2022, which had occurred in a 4+1 format with indirect US participation. Notably, these Muscat discussions mark the first diplomatic exchange under both Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump. Several key implications emerge from these talks: 1- A face-saving negotiation format for both sides: Following the announcement of planned discussions, Washington consistently pressed for direct talks to expedite the process and quickly reach an agreement. Tehran, conversely, insisted on indirect engagement, at least initially, to build confidence in American sincerity. According to published reports, the American and Iranian delegations occupied separate rooms in Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi's residence, exchanging written messages through Omani mediators—satisfying Iran's requirement for indirect negotiations. Reports also indicate that after the approximately two-and-a-half-hour session concluded, Araghchi met briefly with Uytkov, conversing for several minutes in the Omani Foreign Minister's presence before departing—thereby fulfilling Washington's desire for direct engagement. Beyond these procedural arrangements for the initial round, such compromises demonstrate both sides' willingness to overcome obstacles impeding an agreement, potentially foreshadowing solutions to other challenges expected during future negotiation rounds. 2- Disagreement over the framework for negotiations: A disagreement over the scope of negotiations has persisted between the two sides since the initial round of talks. Iran adamantly maintains that discussions should focus exclusively on nuclear matters, leaving out both the missile program and regional role concerns. Supporting this position, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated on April 13 that an agreement had been reached to limit negotiations to the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, confirming these topics would constitute the agenda for upcoming talks. Meanwhile, Washington remains adamant about including additional issues in negotiations with Tehran, particularly arms programs, with the missile program at the forefront. Witkoff stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran would depend on verification of its uranium enrichment programs and, ultimately, confirmation of the missile arsenal Iran has developed over the years. Tehran has repeatedly declared openness to measures verifying it does not possess nuclear weapons, often citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting such weapons. Such declarations may indicate willingness to reduce its nuclear program and potentially return to the 3.67% enrichment levels stipulated in the 2015 agreement—significantly lower than current levels exceeding 60%. However, Iran has firmly rejected completely dismantling its nuclear program (like the "Libyan model") or transferring highly enriched uranium to third countries, citing distrust of Washington and concerns about another withdrawal from agreements as occurred during Trump's presidency in 2018. Regarding the missile program, Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini responded to Witkoff's statement about including the missile arsenal in negotiations by declaring that Iran's military capabilities, including its missile program, represent a "red line" that remains non-negotiable under any circumstances. 3- Potential Iranian economic incentives: Some sources indicate that, in response to Trump's letter, Iran offered "economic benefits" that could advantage American companies if an agreement was reached between the two sides. These sources estimated potential benefits at $1 trillion or more. The proposal aligns with President Pezeshkian's April 9 statement that Supreme Leader Khamenei would not object to American investments entering Iran, "but without conspiring against Iran." Araghchi confirmed this position in his Washington Post article published that same day, calling on the United States to prefer diplomatic options when dealing with Iran and describing the Iranian economy as a "trillion-dollar opportunity" for American companies and businessmen. Tehran's attempts reveal a desire to motivate the Trump administration, which prioritizes trade and investment as key determinants of political engagement. One reason Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement was Washington's lack of benefit from investment deals allowed by the opening to Iran, while Europeans gained advantages, particularly in oil and petrochemical sectors. Consequently, Tehran is strategically focusing on economic opportunities, potentially driving Iran toward diplomatic approaches with Washington and an agreement that would lift the burden of sanctions imposed on the country. 4- European exclusion: No European party participated in the Muscat negotiations, and Washington likely held no consultations with the "European Troika" (Britain, France, and Germany) that participated with Iran in the 2015 agreement. Sources indicate that the meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of the three European countries, on the sidelines of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on April 3, failed to produce any joint plan addressing contentious issues with Iran. The exclusion reflects tense relations between Washington and its European allies, stemming from numerous disagreements—most notably the current US administration's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war and the tariffs imposed on most countries, including European ones. Moreover, it highlights Trump's desire to engage with Iran unbound by other parties' interests. Europeans prefer a diplomatic approach to dealing with Tehran, an approach Trump does not see as entirely reliable. Instead, he considers the military option a viable alternative should negotiations fail or not yield an agreement with Tehran. Nevertheless, the "European Troika" maintains significant leverage over Tehran through the so-called "trigger mechanism." The mechanism enables automatic reinstatement of UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the 2015 agreement if any of these countries complains to the Security Council about Iran's violation of the agreement. Such leverage perhaps explains why the Iranian delegation in Muscat requested its American counterpart ensure Washington assumes responsibility for preventing activation of the "trigger mechanism" against Tehran. Consequently, the "European Troika" countries will remain parties to negotiations between the United States and Iran, regardless of their format. Potential Effects Following the initial US-Iran discussions in Muscat, several potential repercussions can be anticipated: 1- Postponing the military option: The positive atmosphere during the Muscat talks, coupled with the announcement of future rounds of discussions, suggests Washington may delay military action regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Initially, the Trump administration advocated for military intervention as a pressure tactic to compel Tehran back to negotiations and secure a swift agreement on its nuclear program. Nevertheless, with ongoing dialogue between both parties, any military options might remain on hold until the results of these diplomatic exchanges become clearer. The escalating costs of military conflict may compel both sides to favor diplomatic negotiations and concessions. Tehran recognizes that American strikes on its nuclear facilities—whether conducted unilaterally or with Israeli cooperation—would present an overwhelming challenge to counter and manage. Similarly, Washington acknowledges that bombing Iran's nuclear installations could expose American forces and bases throughout the region to retaliatory attacks from Tehran or its armed proxies, while potentially disrupting vital maritime traffic. Given these high-stakes calculations, both nations may increasingly prioritize diplomatic solutions to resolve their differences, with Washington maintaining military action only as a final option should negotiations fail. 2- Supporting the chances of signing an agreement: Unlike previous negotiations during the Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi administrations, realistic data suggests Tehran faces severe time constraints. Trump has imposed a temporary deadline for Iran to resolve its nuclear program, with military action serving as the alternative. The military option has gained momentum as Tehran lost substantial capabilities among its regional proxies, which would have increased the cost of any attack against it. Moreover, according to Israeli and American accounts, the Israeli strike on October 26, 2024, successfully destroyed critical defense systems within Iranian territory. The approaching October 18 expiration date of the 2015 nuclear agreement intensifies pressure on Iran. Urgency mounts as the nation seeks a solution before the European Troika countries activate the "trigger mechanism" prior to that deadline. Unlike negotiations during the Rouhani and Raisi administrations, current talks will likely proceed more rapidly. Trump's April 13 statement that he expects "a decision on Iran will be made very quickly" further suggests the possibility of an expedited agreement with Iran. 3- Internal Iranian opposition: The move to hold negotiations with Washington may face opposition from some hardline fundamentalist groups. Despite Tehran's negotiations with Washington receiving approval from Khamenei and influential institutions rather than originating from Pezeshkian's government, resistance to these discussions remains possible. Statements from hardline Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) member Hamid Rasaei suggest underlying opposition when he claimed "the current negotiations were conducted with the Supreme Leader's approval to prove their failure, and for some optimistic officials to discover once again that the Americans are not committed and that it is irrational to rely on them." Additionally, any potential deal allowing American investments into the Iranian market might trigger objections based on constitutional restrictions. Articles 81 and 153 specifically prohibit granting concessions to foreign companies and foreign control of resources. From this perspective, such diplomatic moves could encounter resistance from institutions controlling key economic sectors, including the Revolutionary Guard and the bazaar. Some hardliners may interpret these developments as "Westernization of the economy," viewing them as concerning repetitions of historical scenarios embedded in Iranian collective memory. 4- Strengthening the role of the Iranian Foreign Ministry: The information that preceded the Muscat round of talks claimed three figures had been appointed to represent the Iranian delegation: Ali Larijani, advisor to the Supreme Leader; Mohammad Foruzandeh, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council; and Mohammad Javad Zarif, former assistant to the Iranian president for strategic affairs. However, the actual Iranian delegation to Oman was headed by Foreign Minister Araghchi, and included his aides for political affairs, Takht-e Ravanchi; Kazem Gharibabadi, for legal and international affairs; and Ismail Baghaei, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, along with other negotiators and technical experts. The composition aligned with Araghchi's earlier assertion that responsibility for the negotiations would fall to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such prioritization indicates the regime's desire to send diplomatic messages, similar to events following former Iranian President Rouhani's election in 2013, which ultimately led to the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement. The diplomatic approach contrasted with periods when Tehran leaned toward hardline positions, during which broad powers were granted to the National Security Council to manage the nuclear issue, as seen during the terms of former presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Raisi. The regime's strategy appears inseparable from other domestic preparations made in anticipation of signing an agreement with the West. Notable examples include moving toward approval of conditions necessary for joining the Financial Action Task Force on Terrorism and Money Laundering (FATF), which would help Iranian banks access services provided by the SWIFT international financial transfer system. Some analysts attribute additional internal measures to this effort, including revisions to the strict provisions of the "chastity and hijab" law, the release of individuals under house arrest such as prominent reformist figure Mehdi Karroubi, and the easing of certain restrictions on internet use. 5- Russian and Chinese discontent: Negotiations between the United States and Iran may provoke discontent from Russia and China, fellow parties to the 2015 nuclear agreement. Both nations fear Tehran might forge an agreement with Washington that would undermine the coordination among Russia, China, and Iran. These concerns intensify amid severely strained Washington-Beijing relations following the announcement of historically high mutual tariffs between the two countries. Adding to the tension is Trump's apparent indifference resulting from Russian President Putin's delay regarding the US peace plan for Ukraine. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi's visit to Moscow was announced ahead of the second round of talks scheduled for April 19 to brief the Russian side on the progress of the talks with Washington. Additionally, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Vasilievich Vershinin, during a meeting of supporters of the UN Charter in Moscow. The diplomatic efforts represent an attempt to allay Russian concerns and send a message to Washington that Tehran has other international alternatives if the current negotiations fail. In conclusion, the Muscat negotiations served as an exploratory round for both American and Iranian delegations, allowing each side to clarify intentions and demonstrate commitment before proceeding to subsequent steps. Complex and difficult differences persist between the parties, yet both clearly favor diplomatic solutions, at least temporarily, with success hinging upon American demands and potential Iranian concessions. Future rounds will likely experience heightened tension, leaving all possibilities open regarding the ultimate outcome of these diplomatic efforts.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Introduction Amid the rapidly shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq, international and regional warnings about the resurgence of ISIS have resurfaced, driven by mounting evidence of the group’s reorganization and its exploitation of the security vacuum left by military collapses and political instability. Since late 2024, multiple reports have pointed to a noticeable uptick in ISIS activity, an increase in the frequency of its attacks, and a growing ability to maneuver and recruit—fueled by weak regional coordination and diverging priorities among key international actors. Far from being ideologically defeated, ISIS appears to be reshaping itself within a volatile landscape, threatening to usher in a new phase of instability. Against this backdrop, the following analysis explores the main features of the group’s resurgence, the dynamics of its territorial re-expansion, and the regional and international efforts to contain it—seeking to unpack the nature of this renewed threat and assess its potential implications. International Warnings Over the Growing Threat of ISIS A series of international and regional statements and warnings issued since late 2024 reflect mounting concerns over the reemergence of the terrorist group ISIS on the regional scene, amid fragile security conditions and a diminished capacity to contain unconventional threats. In December 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, in a phone call with the UK Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa, Hamish Falconer, revealed alarming signs of ISIS regrouping. He noted that the organization had managed to seize large stockpiles of weapons following the collapse of Syrian army units that abandoned their arsenals—enabling ISIS to expand its territorial presence in parts of Syria. This alarming development has not only been flagged by Iraq but has also featured prominently in international reports. On February 10, 2025, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, during a briefing before the Security Council, confirmed that ISIS continues to demonstrate a striking ability to adapt and evolve its tactics, despite ongoing security and military pressure from member states and international and regional partners. The 20th report of the UN Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security emphasized that the group has not been ideologically defeated; rather, it is restructuring itself within the security and political voids present in Syria, Iraq, and other areas. In the same context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned in March 2025 of a "real danger" posed by ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, pointing to the lack of political settlements and the breakdown of certain internal security structures as conditions conducive to the group's return. His warning echoed the concluding statement of the meeting of foreign ministers from Syria’s neighboring countries, held in Amman, Jordan, on March 9, 2025. The ministers expressed deep concern over the escalating ISIS threat and underscored the need to strengthen regional cooperation mechanisms—particularly in intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations along Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In a joint press conference following the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stressed that "combating ISIS is no longer a local issue, but a collective responsibility that demands effective regional readiness and robust international support." He highlighted that the group’s threat has grown not only in terms of manpower but also in terms of military capabilities, and that its reach is now expanding beyond border areas into the Syrian heartland itself. These developments indicate that, despite the significant blows dealt to it in recent years, ISIS continues to benefit from the fluid geopolitical landscape in Syria—one that creates security gaps the group can exploit to reposition and reorganize itself. Furthermore, the conflicting priorities among international and regional actors in the Syrian file are hindering the formation of a unified front to confront this renewed threat. This fragmentation makes the challenge far more complex and reinforces the notion that the battle against ISIS remains far from over—both on the ground and within the broader framework of collective security. Signs of Escalation ISIS continues to consolidate its presence in Syria through its deployment across two geographically separate yet strategically interconnected regions—demonstrating the group’s persistent ability to exploit security gaps and divergences among local and international actors. The first area lies in Syria’s northeastern region, known as al-Jazira, which is nominally under the control of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite this control, ISIS has maintained a notable presence in the southern desert of al-Hasakah province, geographically linked to the northeastern outskirts of the city of Al-Bukamal, particularly around the town of Al-Baghuz—the group’s last urban stronghold before its official collapse. This geographic footprint extends beyond Syria’s borders into Iraq, specifically into the Hadar desert in Nineveh province. Although concrete barriers now separate the two countries, ISIS has retained a clear ability to move across the border, as confirmed by testimonies from residents in the rural areas of al-Hasakah—rekindling memories of the "parallel state" dynamic the group sought to establish during its peak between 2014 and 2017. The year 2024 saw a marked increase in ISIS activity within Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the group carried out 491 operations throughout the year. In its report released on December 30, 2024, the Observatory noted that ISIS has successfully exploited political and military turmoil to reorganize and launch targeted attacks. In line with this, the Soufan Center reported on December 18 that ISIS attacks had tripled in frequency compared to 2023. Meanwhile, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on July 17 that the group claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria during just the first half of 2024—clearly reflecting a strategy aimed at “escalating operational activity to compensate for structural decline.”  This upward trend reinforces the growing assumption that ISIS is leveraging fragile security conditions not only to expand its territorial influence but also to challenge other extremist groups—most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria. HTS has faced internal challenges linked to the novelty of its governance experiment and has been weakened by surprise attacks that undermine its structure and heighten insecurity in its areas of control. ISIS, in turn, appears intent on diffusing HTS’s efforts, exacerbating divisions among factions, and exploiting public discontent with local elites. These developments have also triggered serious concerns over potential spillover effects in Iraq, especially given the deeply interwoven geographic linkages between the Syrian and Iraqi theaters of operation. The cross-border mobility of ISIS operatives could reactivate dormant cells in Iraq’s western and northern provinces—particularly given the thousands of radicalized individuals currently held in Iraqi prisons, making these facilities potential targets for jailbreaks or attempts to reassert control, as seen in the earlier Ghweran prison attack in al-Hasakah. In light of this complex battlefield landscape, the fight against ISIS is far from over. The group—demonstrating notable tactical agility—is reconstituting itself within existing voids, capitalizing on fragmentation, and continually seeking new pathways for resurgence through the shifting terrain of regional geopolitics. The inability of certain local and regional powers to formulate a sustainable, collective counterterrorism strategy only further emboldens the group’s ambitions. Contours of a New Phase in the War Against ISIS The final months of 2024 and early 2025 witnessed a series of high-profile operations targeting senior ISIS leaders, signaling a tactical shift in the counterterrorism strategies adopted by international and regional powers. This shift marks the beginning of a new phase in the fight against ISIS—one that moves beyond random strikes to a focused campaign against the group’s leadership infrastructure. On December 20, 2024, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a precision airstrike in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, initially claiming it had killed ISIS’s leader, known as “Abu Yusuf.” However, CENTCOM later revised its statement, clarifying that the target was not the overall leader but a senior commander named Mahmoud “Abu Yusuf,” along with two of his aides. This correction reflects the complex intelligence challenges involved in identifying high-ranking ISIS figures, especially in an environment riddled with infiltration and security deception. In a related development, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani announced in March 2025, via a post on the platform X, the killing of one of the group’s most dangerous operatives: Abdullah Maki Masleh Al-Rifai, known as “Abu Khadijah,” who held the title of “Wali of Iraq and Syria” within ISIS's organizational structure. His elimination, the result of coordinated efforts between Iraqi intelligence and the Joint Operations Command—supported by the international coalition—demonstrates the effectiveness of multi-layered coordination in tracking down the group’s hidden leadership. On the European front, France returned to active operations against ISIS in Syria for the first time in over two years. In December 2024, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced that French warplanes had conducted precision strikes on ISIS positions inside Syrian territory. He emphasized that the operation, carried out the previous Sunday, underscored France’s continued commitment to counterterrorism efforts in the Levant. This marked France’s first such strike since September 2022—indicating a potential reactivation of its counterterrorism role and a broader effort to reassert European engagement in Syria, a file that has largely been dominated by the U.S., Russia, and Turkey. These three operations—American, Iraqi, and French—reflect what appears to be a renewed “leadership decapitation campaign” targeting ISIS commanders amid rising concerns over the group’s resurgence in Syria and Iraq. Yet, while such strikes carry strategic importance, they cannot substitute for broader efforts to dismantle the ideological, organizational, and financial foundations that allow ISIS to regenerate. Killing leaders may temporarily weaken the group’s capabilities, but it does not ensure its eradication unless accompanied by comprehensive political and security solutions that address the roots of extremism and the institutional fragility on which the group thrives. In a notable development suggesting a qualitative shift in how regional states are approaching the terrorism file, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria announced in February 2025 the establishment of a joint cooperation mechanism to confront ISIS. The agreement emphasizes close coordination between foreign and defense ministries and intelligence agencies, covering areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, and joint military operations. This move reflects a shared recognition that the terrorist threat transcends borders and demands coordinated frameworks that go beyond bilateral interests toward a collective regional security logic. This agreement laid the foundation for a broader process that culminated in a high-level five-party summit on March 8, 2025. The meeting brought together foreign and defense ministers, senior military commanders, and intelligence chiefs from the four founding countries, with Lebanon later joining the process. From the Turkish side, the meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın—highlighting Turkey’s strategic investment in this forum as a platform for reshaping the security landscape in northern Syria and Iraq. More broadly, this nascent regional alliance reflects a growing inclination to reduce dependence on Western powers in managing regional security issues. Instead, it seeks to establish a “new security architecture” led by Middle Eastern nations themselves—reviving the role of Arab and regional capitals in controlling border zones and reclaiming areas that ISIS may seek to exploit as fallback havens for regrouping and redeployment. Conclusion The available data indicates that ISIS is entering a new phase of reactivation and repositioning in the Syrian theater, capitalizing on the security and political collapse following the fall of central authority, and on the conflicting agendas of regional and international actors. Despite targeted strikes against some of its leaders, the group continues to demonstrate its operational adaptability and its ability to evolve amid shifting field dynamics. The resurgence of ISIS attacks and its expansion into ungoverned spaces signal a complex phase of confrontation—one that demands more than just military maneuvers. The success of the war against ISIS in Syria depends not only on precision strikes but also on the establishment of effective regional security partnerships and the activation of political and developmental pathways that address the root causes of extremism. As the group seeks to exploit divisions, its complete disappearance will hinge on the creation of a comprehensive deterrence architecture—one that goes beyond temporary fixes and moves toward sustainable strategies that tackle the structural foundations of militancy, not just its symptoms.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Signed in 2024, the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has reshaped regional dynamics, potentially granting Ethiopia sea access via Berbera in exchange for Somaliland’s recognition. This move challenged Somalia’s territorial integrity and prompted Mogadishu to align itself with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti against Ethiopia. While the crisis reflects Ethiopia’s strategic push for a maritime presence, it also captures Somaliland’s long-standing quest for independence. In the wider Red Sea region, regional tensions are exacerbated by extra-regional actors which include the UAE, Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, all of which have their own interests therein. Although, external actors do not directly cause conflict, their involvement emboldens local actors and escalates rivalries. Hence, the Red Sea region has a growing importance in contemporary global geopolitics. Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Geopolitical Ambitions and the Quest for Recognition The year 2024 began with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The latter, formerly British Somaliland, was part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after Siad Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somaliland has been self-ruled and is considered a de facto state. However, the Hargheisa authority does not enjoy any international legal recognition. If implemented, the agreement with Addis Ababa would give Somaliland its first significant de jure recognition. In return, the Hargheisa authorities would grant Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera and the concession of a coastal area for military use. The situation revolves around three key regional players: Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland. Each of these actors has engaged in activities driven by its own objectives and strategic priorities. Ethiopia’s decision is influenced by several practical economic and strategic factors. Following the Eritrean War in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and became the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 per cent of trade to and from Addis Ababa. Sea access through Djibouti costs Ethiopia between $1.5 and $2 billion annually which Ethiopia’s rulers, since 2019, begun to express more strongly that they consider this spending excessive and unsustainable in the medium to long term. To reduce Addis Ababa’s dependence on Djiboutian ports, the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed believes it is necessary to find a viable alternative. Before the MoU, Ethiopia had considered several alternatives to Djibouti, including Eritrea, Somalia, and Kenya. The idea of developing an economic and trade corridor between Addis Ababa and the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden began to take shape in the final months of 2023. Somaliland’s main port has been operated by the Emirati company – DP World since 2015, which has developed its infrastructure and increased its cargo transit capacity. Ethiopia estimates that it can divert between 12 and 15 per cent of the total volume passing through Djibouti’s ports to Berbera and, in the long term, connect its industrial zones to several trade corridors. From a strategic point of view, Ethiopian assessments are influenced by Addis Ababa’s national role conception. Ethiopia sees itself as the leading regional power because of its history and traditional economic and political weight in the region. Consequently, Ethiopian elites perceive the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as their natural strategic spheres. For this reason, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs recently announced the ‘Grand Strategy of the Two Waters.’ The new agenda aims to expand the sphere of national interest and action eastwards towards the sea, unlike in the past when the focus of Ethiopia’s strategic projection was mainly on the Nile Basin. Indeed, Ethiopia’s ambitions as a regional power are challenged by its lack of a maritime gateway. For Addis Ababa, having a presence in the Red Sea would provide two strategic benefits: first, it would strengthen its standing in the region; second, it would bolster Ethiopia’s international role by enhancing cooperation in multilateral anti-piracy efforts. In short, the Ethiopian government sees maritime projection as a strategic resource and a gateway to the geopolitics of the coming decades, which will focus on Asia and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Therefore, one of the key clauses of the MoU allows Ethiopia to establish a military outpost in Lughaya, a town overlooking the Gulf of Aden, for at least fifty years. According to Ethiopian plans, the naval base will become the headquarters of the nascent Ethiopian navy. For Somaliland, the MoU represents a further step on the difficult path to independence. In the past year, the issue of Somaliland’s independence has gained renewed attention and relevance. This pursuit of self-determination is deeply rooted in a historical context that stretches back to the 19th century, predating the regime of Siad Barre. The Somalilanders’ path began during a pivotal time when the British Empire established agreements with various Somali clans, particularly the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was officially designated as British Somaliland, a protectorate that enjoyed a measure of autonomy and governance, distinguishing it from the colonial dominance exerted by Italian authorities in southern Somalia. Following the unification of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960, the social, economic, and political conditions of the people of Somaliland began to deteriorate, leading to widespread discontent and a strong desire for independence. Over time, the Siad Barre regime cast a long shadow over Somaliland, leading to widespread discrimination and marginalisation. The political and economic machinations of the central government often neglected the aspirations of the Somaliland people, fuelling a growing sense of injustice. In this context, collective memory became a powerful cornerstone of identity, highlighting the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s struggles and Somalia’s divergent trajectories in the turbulent post-Siad Barre era. Hargheisa’s quest for independence is rooted in historical grievances and reflects the unique identities and trajectories of its people. The Somaliland narrative often draws comparisons with the current situation in the rest of Somalia. Over the past three decades, this de facto state has made significant progress towards sustainable institutional and administrative development albeit on a very limited budget. The democratisation process is also crucial to further the development of Somaliland’s independence. The recent national elections held last November demonstrated the political maturity of all parties involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated government to the electoral process is a remarkable event in the region and stands out as one of the few such instances in the continent. The achievements of the institution-building process in Somaliland are even more striking when compared to the path taken by Somalia. Somalia’s Diplomatic Counterbalance and the Emergence of an Anti-Ethiopian Block  The signing of the MoU by Ethiopia and Somaliland raised concerns among regional actors, particularly Somalia. As Somaliland is formally and legally recognised as an integral part of Somalia, there were fears that Hargeisa’s claims to independence were gaining momentum. Mogadishu was particularly concerned that Ethiopia’s official recognition of Somaliland’s claims could trigger a domino effect, leading other regional and extra-regional actors to follow suit. Therefore, Somalia saw Ethiopia’s actions as a deliberate act of intimidation that threatened its territorial integrity at a sensitive time for its political future. Somalia faces several challenges, including the struggle to establish an effective institutional framework, particularly with regard to the relationship between the central government and the federal states, and also the fight against the terrorist group – al-Shabaab. In response to the MoU, the Somali executive, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, launched an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent its implementation and recognition by the international community. Somalia has sought support from regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), and the African Union (AU). In doing so, Somalia has consolidated alliances with both regional and extra-regional actors. As a result, the dynamics between these three actors – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Somaliland have become increasingly intertwined. Mogadishu’s natural anti-Ethiopian partners are two of Addis Ababa’s historical rivals: Eritrea and Egypt. Compared to 2018, the year of normalisation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the situation today is very different. The positions of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed quickly diverged following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement (2022), which ended the two-year conflict in Tigray. Eritrea, which had supported the Ethiopian military campaign, refused to negotiate with the Tigrayan authorities, represented by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The distance between the two leaders has widened as Ethiopia’s claims to the sea have grown. Indeed, Asmara fears that Ethiopia is eyeing its ports, a fear fuelled by the rhetoric of Abiy and other Ethiopian leaders. Conversely, Isaias has used his leadership and many regional relationships to foster a kind of ‘anti-Ethiopian coalition’. One significant change has been Egypt’s increasing involvement in the region. Mogadishu’s rapprochement with Cairo was formalised in August 2024 with the signing of a defence agreement. This agreement centres on Egypt’s intention to support Somalia’s request for the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops currently stationed in Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission (formerly known as Atmis, replaced by the Aussom mission on 1 January 2025). The strengthening of Somali-Egyptian relations, supported by Asmara and involving Djibouti through a security cooperation agreement, has consolidated an anti-Ethiopian bloc. This alignment represents a significant shift in the regional balance and illustrates Egypt’s changing Africa policy. Since 2020, Egypt has reaffirmed the importance of its southern relations. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has gradually reassessed Egypt’s African relations and promoted a geopolitical strategy that emphasises a north-south axis, rather than the east-west axis that dominated in previous decades. The Red Sea region, including the Nile Basin, is now a key part of this new strategic framework, which is shaped by Egypt’s historical rivalry with Ethiopia. Between the two states, the balance on the Nile has changed. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia a strategic advantage over Egypt. Egypt therefore had to adapt its approach to the ongoing dynamics by deciding to expand the areas of contention toward the sea. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia therefore provided an opportunity to increase Egypt’s footprint in the region. Regional Tensions and Extra-regional Actors in the Red Sea The MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland has opened a new phase in tensions. The focus of regional tensions is shifting to the coastal areas, particularly the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are marked by a number of security and defence agreements. Common strategic interests underpin the alignment of the anti-Ethiopian bloc, which includes Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Egypt. Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat. For Djibouti, the economic damage from increased trade through Berbera is marginal but potentially devastating to its fragile internal balance of power. Eritrea perceives Ethiopia as an ongoing threat, and the current Ethiopian government is seen by Asmara as highly unreliable, raising concerns about a potential escalation of violence along their shared borders. Finally, for Egypt, the assessment of its regional position is of particular importance. Traditionally, Cairo has regarded the waters between Suez and Aden as its ‘lake’. As a result, like Addis Ababa, it regards the entire region as part of its sphere of influence. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey are among the most active players in the region. The UAE has supported the MoU to capitalise on investments in Berbera and Addis Ababa. Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a more balanced approach, thanks to its strong political and commercial ties with Ethiopia and Somalia. For Ankara, however, Somalia’s integrity must not be questioned. Following their rapprochement in 2021, the UAE and Turkey have maintained good relations. Despite their different strategies and some disagreements, both nations share a common interest in maintaining a central role in regional affairs. Other extra-regional players, such as France and Saudi Arabia, are also active in the background. France supports the MoU as part of its ongoing efforts to increase its presence in East Africa, which began at the same time as its withdrawal from the Sahel region. Its base in Djibouti is destined to become more central to French policy as French military presence in West Africa is being reduced. French officials see this increased influence in regional affairs as essential to France’s future interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose geopolitical focus is shifting from the Gulf to the Red Sea, opposes the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. It seeks to counter regional projects promoted by the UAE. This might be as a result of the long-standing political rift between the two Gulf monarchies. Extra-regional actors do not directly cause an increase in regional conflicts. Rather, it is local actors who, feeling empowered by their connections with these extra-regional partners, perceive their environment as more permissive and gain the confidence to take assertive actions that they may not have considered before. Understanding these dynamics sheds light on why Ethiopia and Somaliland decided to sign the MoU at this historic moment. This perspective also helps to explain other regional crises, such as the civil war in Sudan and the conflict in Tigray. The different transformations in the international system have created a context in which local actors can seek multiple forms of external support. Increased alignment and overlap between local and regional rivalries has increased the willingness of actors to take assertive action, leading to a general increase in inter- and intra-state tensions. However, the flexible nature of alliances can also mitigate the risk of the trickle-down effect that often accompanies such alliances. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/