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Introduction In the past few years, international tensions have intensified across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to rising frictions between China and Taiwan. These conflicts cannot be fully explained through traditional military or diplomatic frameworks. Instead, they reveal the emergence of a new strategic model: hybrid warfare, a method that blends military, economic, technological, and informational tools to achieve political goals without open war. Closely related is the concept of the gray zone, a sphere of competition that exists between peace and full-scale conflicts, where states use ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates how hybrid warfare operates in practice. Russia’s combination of cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and drone warfare shows how modern conflicts blur the boundaries between combat and politics. Low-cost technologies such as drones have further revolutionized this form of warfare, enabling small actors to inflict significant damage and minimizing direct risk at the same time. What is a Hybrid warfare and gray zone Gray zone The concept of hybrid war is often covered in media as a synonym for the gray zone. However, within the academic field, the gray zone is considered more of a competing term2 It is suggested that the terms are not synonymous, and the gray zone is defined as a space of competition short of war. Hybrid warfare, in this context, is viewed as an operational solution to achieve political objectives in the gray zone, though it is not limited to it. Although both terms have a quite similar approach, the gray zone is considered more physical in comparison to hybrid war. A state’s operation in this area may clearly not cross the thresholds of war due to its ambiguity. For instance, an invasion of drones in the European Union might serve as an example of such a gray zone action. It is difficult to consider such actions as a threat of war, allowing the predatory state to operate near a border and keep itself safe through ambiguity. Simply put, the gray zone is a territory in politics where it is hard to clearly identify aggression, and the aggressor acts ambiguously, finding legal loopholes to gain advantages without necessarily provoking a military response. Historically, there are numerous examples of such gray zone tactics. Russia used these tactics multiple times before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is one of the particular reasons why the world’s reaction to the Crimea annexation and Russian actions prior to 2022 was low-key and had little impact. A gray zone conflict demonstrates a fundamental change in the rules-based international order. By weaponizing ambiguity, one state seeks to undermine norms and erode democratic institutions from within. Interestingly, Philip Kapusta argues that the gray zone might be beneficial. The ambiguity that makes gray zones vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. It is crucial in international relations when one state tests the waters with gray zone activities to determine the potential strength of domestic or international commitments to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. Briefly saying, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars. [1] [2] What is a hybrid war? While gray zone competition describes the ambiguous environment between peace and war, hybrid warfare refers to the methods used within that environment to achieve political aims. In other words, the gray zone sets the stage, and hybrid warfare provides the playbook. The new concept of hybrid warfare and its correlating hybrid threats can be explained as a wide range of means, not necessarily violent, and a concept that is quite distant from traditional military power. Through non-violent means, a state can achieve a political effect without being embedded in an armed conflict. This term was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman, who described the warfare model as a collection of different strategies and models, including conventional capabilities, violence, coercion, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. This definition stressed the importance of combining traditional military force with the use of new technologies. [5] However, several scholars question whether hybrid warfare truly represents a new paradigm. Analysts such as Michael Kofman and Lawrence Freedman argue that the term simply rebrands long-standing practices of covert and irregular warfare under a modern label. From this perspective, hybrid tactics—combining propaganda, subversion, and limited military action—were already evident in Soviet “active measures” and Cold War proxy conflicts. Still, the scale and technological sophistication of Russia’s recent operations suggest that hybrid warfare has evolved in scope and impact, even if its core logic is not entirely new. [13] Key characteristics and elements of hybrid warfare include: Fluidity and Ambiguity Debates on hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 brought attention to the new term. The fluidity and ambiguity of hybrid threats and warfare helped Moscow to achieve a relatively non-violent political shift in Crimea. To escape a power balance, Russia used a creative underdog strategy. [4] Non-State Actors For some scholars, hybrid war and its actors are a new breed of non-state actors (likely sponsored by the state) who replaced the traditional concept of terrorists. They retain ties with the population and devote themselves to the propaganda of the deed. Diverse Definitions The definition of hybrid warfare differs between the West and Russia. For Russians, hybrid war is a new way of dealing with a conflict that avoids the traditional battlefield, utilizing economic, political, and socio-cultural methods. [6] Tactical Methods and Synchronization It is hard to clearly identify hybrid threats of warfare due to their ambiguous nature. However, most of the literature defines it by tactical methods. It is the synchronized use of several operation methods, and due to its unclear nature, the victim state may not be able to identify these multiple instruments. [5] Calculated Ambiguity Similarly to nuclear deterrence, hybrid warfare is full of calculated ambiguity. It is a key factor that makes it reasonable and effective; it is essential. [12] Thus, due to the gray zone's ambiguity, it is hard to indicate hybrid threats until they escalate into warfare. And even in such a case, one cannot necessarily say that hybrid warfare actually happened. Currently, there are high possibilities that Russia has used hybrid threats in several Baltic countries as well as Eastern Europe. So-called pro-Russian parties were critically close to winning presidential or parliamentary elections numerous times Comparison Hybrid war vs Gray zone Since gray zone conflict in its essence can incorporate traditional methods and unconventional tactics, and a complete reliance on unconventional techniques is likely to be less effective at fully and rapidly compelling a relatively strong opponent, states engaged in a gray zone conflict are likely to use hybrid techniques. To clearly illustrate the key notices from this comparison, the following table is provided. As Table illustrates, the primary difference lies in the level and ambition of each concept. The Gray Zone Conflict is a higher-level concept that operates at the strategic level and is directly tied to global and/or regional revisionist ambitions. Hybrid Warfare, conversely, generally pertains only to the operational and tactical levels. [3] Key distinctions between two concepts are Duration and Symmetry and Conventionality of Operations Duration and Symmetry Gray Zone Conflict is characterized by protracted engagement and is used under both symmetric and asymmetric conditions. Hybrid Warfare, however, may be protracted or short and is largely used under asymmetric conditions. Conventionality of Operations In Gray Zone Conflict, non-conventional military operations may be used standalone or alongside conventional operations8. In contrast, Hybrid Warfare treats non-conventional operations as auxiliary tactics used alongside conventional operations. This reinforces the idea that the Gray Zone is a large strategic territory of competition, while hybrid warfare is an operational solution frequently used within it. Drones as a tool of Hybrid warfare Drones' Impact on the Modern Battlefield Nowadays, conflict in Ukraine has proven the role of drones in modern battlefields. Drones now account for approximately 70% of total casualties from both sides. Moreover, it is hard to find actual troops in the war zones; most of the time, there are drone controllers rather than typical soldiers. Thus, in Ukraine, drones act as key actors in modern conflict. Throughout the war, it was clearly shown that drones are very useful against much more expensive and massive military equipment like tanks and planes. A drone that costs less than a thousand dollars can destroy a million-dollar tank, and what's even more terrifying, it is unmanned, meaning the fight will have fewer casualties. By using such drones, Ukraine was able to defend its borders without a further escalation of the conflict to the western part of the country. By using cheap and easy-to-use AI-powered technology, Kyiv was able to fight back against a state that is 28 times bigger. Drones in Ukraine and the Context of Russian Hybrid Warfare The role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) remains complex: in direct combat, Ukraine uses drones not strictly as a hybrid weapon but as a fully powered kamikaze to destroy local goals, functioning as a conventional weapon. However, the nature of these drones is inherently dual use. Some drones used in war can be purchased through commercial websites. For instance, the drone previously used by Ukraine, the «DJI MAVIC», can be purchased online, with a price range starting at $500. Such drones are modified on the field and used as small bombs. In comparison to Russians, some Ukrainians have even spent their own money on new ammunition or drones, creating an emerging civilian-led military supply market in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine is multi-dimensional with blurred lines between the kinetic use of military force and the non-kinetic use of strategic assets. Through the simultaneous use of political, technological, and military measures in achieving its policy objectives to design an ambiguity, Russia deliberately exploited its power to secure consensus for subsequent military actions. Russia has employed all three parameters of ambiguity in hybrid warfare, leaving Ukraine no other option except to fight. Hybrid war in EU? Russia's Strategy: Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Tactics Since the US established its dominance in the global stage, Russian involvement in the Baltics, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine since 2007 has been characterized as grey zone and hybrid warfare. Russia employs these tactics against EU and NATO participants, using several methods of cyber-warfare to challenge the military alliance. In Ukraine’s Crimea, for instance, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using non-state proxies to supplement a military deficit. In Eastern Europe, Russia relies on economic tools, cyberspace to harm infrastructure, as well as non-state actors. For example, Gazprom canceled a gas discount agreement with the Yanukovych administration. Subsequently, when Ukraine refused to accept Russian hegemony, the power grid was attacked and disabled a large portion of the country's infrastructure. Such incidents, includes alleged election interference in Romania, when in November 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled results of first-round presidential election. Romanian intellegence agencies presented that Russian-linked cyber operations (social media campaigns with AI-driven misinformation and alleged cyberattacks) distorted the electoral process in favour of the far right candidate. In March 2025, investigative reporting detailed pro-Russia groups using Telegram to recruit EU-based individuals for sabotage, vandalism, arson and influence operations across NATO countries. [14] As the Russian economy is strained, the frequency of similar incidents appears to increase. [7] Across the period, the lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity continued to blur. Intrusion sets historically distinguished by TTPs’ level of advancement. conducted activities, or assessed objectives increasingly shared toolsets and modus operandi. This was notably exemplified by hacktivist-led DDoS waves by pro-Russia groups around electoral events, where increased activity was often observed as typical FIMI-aligned behavior to associate disruption with aspects of information operations. A prominent facet of this trend is faketivism, where state-aligned intrusion sets leverage hacktivist personas and activities. Notable examples include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, associated to Russia-nexus Sandworm39, and the CyberAv3ngers group linked to Iran’s IRGC Hacktivists, seeking funding and visibility, embraced ransomware beyond DDoS and defacements. CyberVolk, operating in line with Russian interests, has used and promoted multiple strains—AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano, as well as LockBit and Chaos—since May 20244. KillSec, originally a pro-Russia hacktivist brand aligned with Anonymous, debuted its platform in June 2024. Drone Incursions: Testing Defenses and Undermining Support Russia has adapted new drone technologies and is now using them to test and threaten the European Union. For Europe, the usage of drones differs from the frontlines. Most incidents involve UAVs allegedly used for espionage or as a distraction mechanism. The possibility exists that drones sent into EU airspace are meant to frighten Europe and consequently pressure them to reduce military aid to Ukraine. Some argue that Russia uses this as a "carrot and stick" approach to force the EU to cut off military support. [8] Drones in the EU serve as one element of hybrid warfare: they are low-cost, deniable, and intentionally ambiguous. Russia's ambiguous attacks and hybrid threats, according to reports, might leave Europe's energy consumers vulnerable, especially during the winter. Economic Constraints and the Strategy of Exhaustion The financial strain on Russia does not diminish its ambitions. Such economic limitations directly shape Moscow’s strategic calculus. While the Central Bank attempts to manage the economy, the cumulative effect of sanctions and military expenditures is challenging the Kremlin's ability to cover its costs. Russian citizens and businesses are demonstrating creativity in navigating sanctions, but continued war and higher expenses are highly likely to destroy the economy. To maintain spending, the government is already seeking additional revenue sources by increasing taxes and fees on imports and making cuts to non-military budgets. [9] The consensus among experts is that a direct military conflict with NATO is highly unlikely, primarily due to Russian economic struggle. Russia simply cannot afford another large-scale war. [9] Even to sustain a major conflict with NATO, the state would first need to consolidate its forces by ending the war in Ukraine. Escalation Risk and European Resilience The latest drone attacks pose a severe threat to European energy and critical infrastructure. Even though recent drone incidents were relatively far away from key energy assets, they still represent a significant and deliberate risk. Reports suggest a potential disruption in energy supply, especially with winter approaching, could lead to price increases and higher heating costs, impacting not only the economy but also social stability. For instance, drone activity temporarily closed airports in Denmark, increasing the overall atmosphere of unease across EU countries. The Gray Zone attacks in Europe, including drone incursions, regular cyberattacks, and election interference, are part of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy aimed at testing Europe's resilience and preparedness. As international expert Christo Atanasov Kostov suggests, the Kremlin hopes to exhaust the West, not conquer it. This strategy aims to win in Ukraine by weakening the West—using hybrid tools to sow doubt over EU and NATO's ability to prevail and to cause domestic hardship that makes supporting Ukraine politically unattractive. [10] However, some scholars like Mark Galeotti argue that Russia’s hybrid campaigns have reached their limit: they can destabilize but not dominate resilient states. [15] It is very unlikely that Russia will cross the line of hybrid warfare and actually commit conventional forces against EU/NATO, as it is financially and politically untenable. The challenge for Europe is clear: to resist fatigue and demonstrate resilience, not fear. Moscow will likely continue its hybrid attacks, but Europe needs to be prepared through deterrence, technological and political autonomy, and collective defense. [11] Conclusion Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force and non-conventional forces to achieve a strategic political objective. Russia's campaign in Ukraine in 2014 successfully exploited the ambiguity of this hybrid warfare model to capture the initiative and secure political and military gains, particularly in Crimea and Donbas. Through drones, cyber operations, and economic pressure, Moscow continues to challenge European security while remaining below the traditional threshold of conflict. These actions show that hybrid warfare is not an alternative to war but a constant state of confrontation carried out through indirect means. For Europe, this reality creates serious strategic and financial challenges. Responding to low-cost and deniable attacks with expensive defense systems is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the main priority for the EU is to adapt its deterrence model, strengthen technological and informational resilience, and reduce dependence on external energy supplies. The evolution of hybrid warfare proves that modern conflicts no longer begin with formal declarations or visible invasions. They emerge through ambiguity, disinformation, and the silent use of technology. As Russia continues to exploit these gray areas, the stability of Europe will depend on its ability to recognize such operations early and respond collectively before the next stage of escalation begins. All we can conclude is that Putin himself is unlikely to stop the war until his maximalist ambitions are satisfied. He will continue to use any method, including the destruction of European stability through hybrid attacks, to exhaust the West. For the EU, the suggested course of action remains to diversify energy sources and demonstrate resilience against hybrid attacks to minimize security and economic challenges. References [1] Damien Van Puyvelde, ‘Hybrid Warfare – The Continuation of Ambiguity by Other Means’, European Journal of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2019, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/hybrid-warfare-the-continuation-of-ambiguity-by-other-means/1B3336D8109D418F89D732EB98B774E5 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [2] U.S. Special Operations Command, Operating in the Gray Zone: A Strategy for Success, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [3] David Carment and Dani Belo, War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare, Webster University, October 2018, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25994.98249 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [4] Nathan K. Finney, ‘A Full Spectrum of Conflict Design: How Doctrine Should Embrace Irregular Warfare’, Irregular Warfare Initiative, 2023, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/a-full-spectrum-of-conflict-design-how-doctrine-should-embrace-irregular-warfare/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [5] Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [6] Steven Woehrel, Russia: Strategic Economic and Energy Interests, Congressional Research Service, 2011, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42006.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025]. [7] European Youth Portal, ‘How Romania’s Presidential Election Became the Plot of a Cyber Thriller’, 2024, https://youth.europa.eu/news/how-romanias-presidential-election-became-plot-of-cyber-thriller_en [accessed 17 October 2025]. [8] BBC Russian, ‘Как Россия готовится к выборам на фоне войны и цензуры’, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cm2zp2xl62mo [accessed 17 October 2025]. [9] Reuters, ‘Imported Cars Face Higher Fees as Russia Plans Domestic Production Boost’, 30 September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/imported-cars-face-higher-fees-russia-plans-domestic-production-boost-2024-09-30/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [10] Stefan Wolff, ‘Russia’s Permanent Test Is Pushing Europe to the Brink of War – Here’s What Moscow Actually Wants’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/russias-permanent-test-is-pushing-europe-to-the-brink-of-war-heres-what-moscow-actually-wants-266826 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [11] Stefan Wolff, ‘Putin’s “Forever War” Against the West’, The Conversation, 2024, https://theconversation.com/putins-forever-war-against-the-west-267679 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [12] Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Countering Hybrid Warfare: So What for the Joint Force?’, PRISM – National Defense University Press, 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1979787/countering-hybrid-warfare-so-what-for-the-joint-force/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [13] Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts’, War on the Rocks, 11 March 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/ [accessed 17 October 2025]. [14] European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, 2025, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-2025 [accessed 17 October 2025]. [15] Mark Galeotti, Trouble at Home: Russia’s Looming Demobilization Challenge, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, June 2025, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Mark-Galeotti-Trouble-at-Home-Russias-looming-demobilization-challenge-GI-TOC-June-2025.pdf [accessed 17 October 2025].

Will sanctions create a more inward-looking generation, or will VPNs and parallel imports keep Russia’s youth plugged into global culture anyway? 2010s in Russia – The “Peak of Freedom” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent severe economic, political, and cultural changes. Previously blocked by the iron curtain, Russians suddenly found themselves exposed to Western influence. In the early 2000s’, Russia was culturally and economically thriving. Nowadays, it is hard to imagine controversial artists such as drag artists, t.A.T.u. and others performing on the national stage, when back then all of this was broadcast across the country. For citizens of border cities such as Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad, this was a period of frequent travelling abroad. Trips to neighboring countries to buy products or visit relatives have become part of normal life. Russia seemed more democratic, integrated, and culturally alive. The 2010s’ marked the beginning of sanctions. Yet for most Russians, daily life hardly changed. Even after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, people continued to travel, buy “sanctioned” goods, and enjoy global events. Russia even hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2018, which was a moment of international recognition that contrasted with the West’s growing political distance. Сергей Ильницкий / EPA This changed drastically in 2022, when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This time, the sanctions were sweeping and deeply felt in everyday life. Major international companies announced their departure from the Russian market. According to Russian claims, U.S. companies lost more than $300 billion as a result, while the Financial Times reported that European firms lost over $100 billion in just 18 months. It has now been more than three years since major international brands officially “left” Russia. McDonald’s, Adidas, Zara, IKEA, and many others appeared to vanish from Russian market. On paper, they exited what many call a rogue state. In reality, most of them never truly left. Adaptation Under Sanctions By early 2023, Russia’s consumer market was full of “new-old” brands. While some companies left outright, the majority transferred stocks to local managers, often at discounts of up to 70%. As a result, there was a strange marketplace with familiar stores but unfamiliar names. At the same time, Ukrainian observers note a different reality. Forbes reported that many foreign revenue leaders in Russia, including Philip Morris, Pepsi, Mars, Nestlé, Leroy Merlin, and Raiffeisen Bank never left Russia at all. According to B4Ukraine, these companies together paid over $41.6 billion in taxes, equivalent to roughly one-third of Russia’s annual military budget. Back in 2023 Philip Morris International confirmed that it would “rather keep” its Russian holdings than sell them at a discount to local investors. For example, L’Occitane simply transliterated its name into Cyrillic, while Spanish corporation Inditex sold its stocks to Daher, and brands like ZARA, Pull&Bear, Bershka were replaced by alternative brands like Maag, Ecru, Dub. Thus, authentic ZARA’s clothing still can be easily found on internet marketplaces, such as Lamoda. Food and beverage: Starbucks transformed into Stars Coffee, McDonald’s into Vkusno i Tochka. Coca-Cola was sold to a Russian businessman and rebranded as Dobryi Cola. Yet, many shops still sell original Coca-Cola imported from neighboring countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Poland. Finnish company Fazer Group sold Khlebniy Dom (major bread and pastry company) to “Kolomenskyi” holding, keeping the same legal structure, representatives, and recipes. Consumer goods and toys: Lego returned as Mir Kubikov (“Cubic World”), offering identical products under a new name. German holding Henkel became Lab Industries, selling the same products under Cyrillic labels. Earlier this year Daher Group claimed that Adidas would reopen stores by November 2025, though details remain unclear. Nike, meanwhile, continues to operate in Russia under the abbreviation NSP — Nike Sport Point. For Russian youth, these “copycat” and alternative have a mixed reaction. On social media platforms like Telegram, Instagram and TikTok memes mocking the awkward logos and uninspired renamings were circulating. Young consumers still crave original products, especially iPhones, brand clothes and cosmetics, which are often purchased through parallel imports, friends, albeit at inflated prices. Polls confirm such trend. According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (RPORC), 94% of Russians believe that Western brands will eventually return, and 68% think it is only a matter of time. About 60% of the population continues to buy sanctioned goods; for 28%, it has become a habit. Two-thirds of respondents say they would prefer national brands only if the price were equal. This dual reality for young Russians means living in a consumer world that is both familiar and fractured. Economic Challenges Despite adaptation, Russia’s economic outlook remains mixed. Polling by RPORC suggests that while many Russians believe the economy is worsening, a growing number also describe it as “stabilizing.” As RPORC explained: “Businesses and people were able to adapt to new conditions. Not everyone succeeded, but economic catastrophe did not happen.” © Тимур Ханов/ПГ The Levada Center found similar resilience. Half of respondents said their lives had not changed in recent years, or that they had even found new opportunities. One in five, however, admitted to abandoning their old lifestyle or struggling to adapt. Two-thirds reported feeling confident about the future, most of them relying on wages and pensions, with fewer depending on savings or secondary income. Economic indicators, however, tell a more fragile story. The Consumer Sentiment Index fell to 110 points in August 2025, down from 117 in June. Assessments of current living conditions dropped sharply, while expectations for the future also declined. Businesses face ongoing challenges. According to the Bank of Russia’s September monitoring, companies reported weaker demand, especially in manufacturing, alongside persistent cost pressures from labor shortages and rising expenses. Inflation has moderated to 8.2% year-on-year, but expectations of higher prices remain. In response, the central bank cautiously lowered its interest rate from 18% to 17%. While this move was intended to encourage funding and investment, it came with warnings. High rates had already limited capital investment and strained both households and firms. For younger Russians, this translates into expensive loans, delayed purchases of homes or cars, and fewer stable jobs. Small firms are especially vulnerable, and larger companies hesitate to commit to long-term investment in Russia. The October 24 monetary policy meeting is expected to clarify whether further rate cuts will follow, but for now, the message remains one of “cautious easing amid a fragile economy.” For Russian youth entering the workforce, the environment is uncertain. Jobs in international firms are disappearing, wages struggle to keep pace with inflation, and credit is harder to access. Their career paths are increasingly shaped by state-owned companies or sanctioned industries rather than by global opportunities. Government Restrictions Sanctions are only half the story. Alongside them, the Russian government has tightened internal restrictions, from healthcare to social media, touching nearly every aspect of citizens’ lives. On September 1, 2025, a wave of new restrictions and laws came into force. In healthcare, paramedics and obstetric nurses were legally authorized to provide emergency care in the absence of doctors, while health and dietary supplements (“БАДы”) became subject to stricter regulation. Additionally, a new federal list of Strategically Significant Medicinal Products was introduced to encourage full domestic production of essential drugs. This move aims to reduce Russia’s dependence on imported medicine and support local firms. Beyond healthcare, other laws targeted digital life and education. Advertising VPNs was banned, along with advertising in prohibited apps. While internet users faced growing difficulties with messaging platforms, the government launched a new app called Max, a Russian equivalent of China’s WeChat, while simultaneously restricting access to competitors such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and Viber. Although text communication remains possible, audio and video calls are increasingly blocked. According to the Levada Center, 71% of Russians recently reported problems accessing the internet on mobile phones, and 63% experienced issues with messaging apps. Public opinion is split: 49% support Roskomnadzor’s decision to block voice calls on WhatsApp and Telegram, while 41% oppose it. Support varies by age and education level: younger people and the highly educated are far more likely to oppose restrictions, disapprove of Putin’s presidency, and favor a ceasefire in Ukraine. Education has also come under tighter state control. New quotas for universities, stricter graduation requirements, and the exit from the Bologna education system are expected to make it harder to pursue higher education abroad. For Russian youth, this means growing up in a system where schools and universities serve not only as centers of learning but also as instruments of political loyalty. Closing Reflection Older generations of Russians remember both the Iron Curtain and the sudden openness of the 2000s. Today’s youth, Gen Z and Gen Alpha, are growing up in a very different environment. Born into a Russia that once promised travel, global brands, and open media, they now face a country of copycat stores, patriotic lessons, and state-controlled apps. Their world is paradoxical: connected through VPNs, Telegram, and imported iPhones, yet isolated by censorship, propaganda, and restricted travel. They can mock “Vkusno i Tochka” on Telegram but cannot easily study abroad or see global TikTok trends without additional tools. This contradiction defines Russian youth today. They adapt quickly to new changes and even mock fake brands, find ways around bans, and stay tuned to global culture. But they are also growing up in a system that narrows horizons, imposes loyalty, and tries to shape them into a generation of compliance. Thus, the question remains. Will sanctions and state policies succeed in creating a more conservative, obedient generation? Or will Russian youth continue to find creative ways to remain connected to the wider world? Their choices will shape not only the future of Russian consumer culture, but the political and cultural direction of the country itself. References https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/02/18/1092830-amerikanskii-biznes-poteryal https://b4ukraine.org/what-we-do/corporate-enablers-of-russias-war-report https://www.ft.com/content/656714b0-2e93-467b-92d6-a2d834bc0e2b

If you ask the average person in any country about their concerns, their answers would likely be very similar. Across the globe, people are generally most worried about the uncertainty of the future, particularly regarding their finances. This holds true whether you're in the United States, China, or elsewhere. However, does this trend remain the same for a country in a state of war?2014: The Sochi Olympics & The Annexation of CrimeaThe year 2014 was significant for Russia, both economically and politically. It was marked by two major events: the Sochi Winter Olympics and the annexation of Crimea.The 2014 Winter Olympics were held in Sochi, a Russian resort city. To host the games, the government spent an enormous amount of money, over $50 billion, on transportation infrastructure and new sports complexes. In recent decades, the Olympics have been seen as a way for nations to exert "soft power," and there were even speculations in 2010 that Russia may have paid its way to host the games. Despite the celebration of the event's successful conclusion, this period was immediately followed by a major political decision.During late 2013 and early 2014, Ukraine's internal political situation was highly unstable. Many Ukrainians were unhappy with their pro-Russian government's policies, believing that President Yanukovych was a "Russian puppet" who had denied the country a chance to join the European Union. Yanukovych's suspension of a key pact with the EU sparked mass protests and eventually a revolution.While the world's attention was focused on the Olympics and the political turmoil in Ukraine, Russia swiftly moved its troops into the Crimean Peninsula. With military and political pressure, the Crimean government held a referendum, after which the majority of citizens voted to join Russia. This move led to massive international sanctions against Russia, which put its rapidly rising economy under immense pressure.Russian Concerns in 2014This period of political and economic pressure was reflected in the concerns of ordinary Russians. According to a Levada Center survey from May 2014, the top concerns for Russians were:Illness or death of relativesPoverty or job lossWorld warCrimePolitical repressionPublic humiliationHealth threatsHowever, the trends in these fears showed some notable changes compared to the previous decade (1999–2014). Excluding health concerns, these trends indicate that Russians became increasingly worried about the country's political and economic situation. The fear of war also increased due to the instability in Ukraine and the repercussions of their president's actions on the lives of ordinary citizens.2018-2019: The World Cup, Pension Reform, and Shifting Public ConcernsThe period of 2018 to 2019 was a abundant in all the aspects time for Russia, marked by a contrast between a successful international event and a significant domestic political turmoil. The main events of this year were the presidential election, the FIFA World Cup, and a highly questionable reform.Political Discontent and Public ProtestsIn the run up to the 2018 presidential election, Vladimir Putin, in order to secure his presidential spot banned all possible candidates from joining the race. One of the prominent opponents of Putin was Alexey Navalny, who was massively supported by younger generation. Along with allegations of widespread election fraud and a controversial pension reform, it acted as a major catalyst for public protests. Critics argued that with a low average life expectancy (66 years for men), many Russians would not live long enough to collect their state pensions.These events, combined with a documentary by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation exposing government corruption, fueled significant public demonstrations and damaged government’s image. Tens of thousands of people across Russia joined in these protests, leading to a major surge in political anxiety. Authorities responded with a lockdown, arresting many participants and detaining even more people. Educational institutions reportedly pressured students to not participate, threatening them with dismissal. Navalny himself was repeatedly arrested.Despite the size of protest, there were no results, nothing has changed.The Impact of the FIFA World CupIn stark contrast to the domestic political turmoil, the 2018 World Cup provided the government with a platform for soft power and a temporary boost in national image. While not considered an economic success, and costing over $14 billion with a minor economic benefit, the tournament significantly increased global attention on Russia. This international spotlight, along with a more stable economic situation, created a sense of national pride and momentarily overshadowed the public's grievances.Changing Public Fears (2014 vs. 2019) Data from the Levada Center highlights how Russians' concerns shifted between 2014 - 2019. The two periods show a marked increase in fears related to political instability and government repression. The most significant changes were in political concerns. The fear of "abuse of power" saw the largest jump, increasing by 18 percentage points to 33%. Along with the fear of a "return to repression" and a "tightening of the political regime", which increased by 15 pp and 13 pp, respectively. These statistics underscore a growing public distrust and disbelief in the government, fueled by the 2018 pension reform, “rigged” election and protests. As an expert, Denis Volkov, explained, "People decided that the authorities violated their obligations, deceived them," which directly links the pension reform to the surge in political anxiety.Despite these growing fears, a different Levada poll from late 2019 showed a slight increase in confidence in the government. This could be attributed to the successful staging of the World Cup and a powerful state propaganda campaign aimed at "reconciling people with reality." However, the long-term trends clearly indicate a population increasingly concerned with their political rights, personal freedom and security.2025: Economic Struggles and New Public RestrictionsFollowing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has faced harsh sanctions and economic challenges. While the government has responded with tight control over public discourse, these policies and their consequences have significantly altered the concerns of ordinary citizens.Russian public opinion has evolved throughout the conflict. Initially, there was a surge of patriotic sentiment, but as the war continued, public anxieties have shifted. While the fear of war remains a concern, the focus has increasingly moved toward domestic issues, such as the economy and social tensions. 2025 polls indicated that a majority of Russians supported peace negotiations to end the war, rather than continuing military action. This change is likely correlated with a growing economic impact of the war, as well as drone attacks and their damage on Russian territory, which brought the conflict’s sclale closer to home for many of Russians.  Economic and Social ConcernsEconomic stability has long been a top concern for Russians, and the current situation has only amplified these fears. Since the invasion, government spending on the military has skyrocketed, leading to a massive budget deficit. In an effort to stabilize the economy and combat rapid inflation, the Central Bank, under the leadership of Elvira Nabiullina, implemented a policy of extremely high interest rates, at one point reaching 21%. While this was a logical, albeit painful, economic maneuver to slow down inflation, it had a harsh effect on ordinary citizens, making things like mortgages and loans prohibitively expensive. This has led to a major rise in public concern over the country's economic future, with a significant portion of the population now worried about the state of the "cold" or stagnant economy.Another major concern is the issue of immigrant labor. Russia's aging population and the war have created a severe labor shortage, which is being filled by migrant workers, primarily men from Central Asian countries. These migrants often take low-paying, difficult jobs that Russians are unwilling to do. Despite their essential role in the economy, particularly in industries like construction, their presence has led to social tensions. Public fear, often fueled by nationalist sentiment and concerns over crime, remains a major issue. While some younger Russians may be more tolerant, the general atmosphere is a complex mix of necessity and xenophobia.Public Restrictions and Digital IsolationThe government has also tightened its control over public life and information. Laws restricting dissent and free speech have escalated, with hundreds of people being jailed under new repressive measures. Many journalists and activists have fled the country, and critical discussion is now largely impossible.A major part of this ban has been on internet and digital communication. Following the 2022 invasion, many social media platforms left Russia, forcing users to rely on VPNs to access sites like Instagram and Facebook. Further restrictions have been implemented, including limitations on popular messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. These measures were officially justified as a way to minimize fraud, but they have also been seen as a way to promote state-sponsored apps and control communication. For many Russians, especially the youth, this digital isolation has become a significant source of frustration, with reports of internet slowdowns and service outages becoming more common.How these concerns differ within age groups?While many fears are shared across generations, their intensity and focus vary significantly by age.  For all age groups, the fear of illness of loved ones remains the strongest emotional anchor, symbolizing the dominance of private, family-centered values in contemporary Russian life. Additionally, the fear of war unites all age brackets, suggesting a collective awareness of geopolitical instability and the lasting psychological effects of military conflict.Generational PatternsRecent data [1] reveals distinct generational patterns of fear and anxiety. While most citizens share concerns about security, stability, and well-being, the intensity and content of these fears vary sharply across age groups.Younger Russians (18–30) display the highest levels of anxiety about political instability and future uncertainty. Nearly one-third fear a civil war (32%), and about the same proportion express concern about migration (29%) and environmental threats (27%). These fears reflect their heightened sensitivity to social unrest and global crises, likely influenced by online political discourse.Middle-aged groups (31–60) tend to focus more on economic and social pressures. Concerns about rising prices and impoverishment (up to 29%), interethnic conflicts (29%), and terrorist threats (30%) dominate their worldview. This generation, responsible for families and careers, appears most affected by inflation, inequality, and the broader sense of insecurity in everyday life.In contrast, older respondents (60 and above) prioritize personal health and family safety over political or economic fears. For this group, the focus shifts inward, from collective or national threats to the vulnerabilities of aging and declining health.This progression from systemic to personal anxieties suggests that as individuals age, their fears become less ideological and more existential, mirroring the broader transformation of Russian society.ConclusionOver the past decade, Russian fears have evolved with political shocks, economic turbulence, and social change, yet in many ways, they remain strikingly universal. Like people in most countries, Russians fear illness, poverty, and war above all else. What distinguishes Russia is not the content of its fears, but the context that amplifies them: authoritarian governance, prolonged sanctions, and ongoing conflict.The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the 2018 protests, and the 2022-25 wartime restrictions each reshaped the emotional landscape of Russian society. Political repression and economic instability deepened existing anxieties, turning collective uncertainty into a defining feature of everyday life. Still, beneath these structural pressures, the same human concerns remain love for family, fear of loss, and hope for security.Ultimately, Russia is not an exception, but a reflection of the modern world: a nation where political fear overlays universal human vulnerability, and where personal and national uncertainty continues to define what it means to live in the 2020s.Note[1] It is important to acknowledge that the FOM is a state-funded organization, and the accuracy of its results may be subject to scrutiny.

Abstract This paper examines Poland's pivotal role in European geopolitics amid escalating tensions following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Highlighting the September 2025 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace—marking NATO's first engagement with Russian assets within allied territory—it analyses Poland's military, diplomatic, and strategic responses, including border closures with Belarus and the NATO-led Iron Defender-25 exercise.The study contextualises Poland's historical significance from its 1918 independence through Cold War dynamics to its contemporary position as a key NATO and EU member. Poland's substantial support to Ukraine, encompassing military aid, humanitarian assistance, and political advocacy, underscores its role as both a regional security actor and a logistic hub.The paper also addresses challenges stemming from refugee influxes and bilateral tensions, while discussing broader implications for EU security and autonomy, particularly regarding Ukraine's potential membership in the EU. Through this lens, Poland emerges as both a bulwark against Russian aggression and a spearhead of European defence initiatives, navigating complex geopolitical pressures with strategic resolve. Key Words: Poland, Ukraine, Geopolitics, Security, Europe Introduction Between September 9 and 10, 2025, a contingent of 19 to 23 drones, alleged to be Russian, breached Polish airspace. This incident marked the first occasion since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine that NATO forces engaged and neutralised Russian assets within allied airspace.[i] Allegedly, the drones were part of a massive Russian assault on Ukraine, involving over 400 drones and missiles. At least four drones were shot down, primarily by Dutch F-35 jets, with support from Polish F-16s, Italian airborne early warning aircraft, and a Belgian aerial tanker. German Patriot systems in Poland were also on high alert.[ii] The drones caused minor damage, and no casualties were reported. Four Polish airports, including Warsaw's Chopin Airport, were temporarily closed due to the incursion. Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, described the event as a "large-scale provocation" and the closest the country had come to open conflict since World War II. Poland invoked NATO's Article 4, prompting consultations among allies, and an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was requested. Polish officials, including Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, assert the incursion was deliberate, citing the number of drones and their flight paths, some of which reached deep into Poland, including near Gdańsk. The drones, identified as Gerbera models (simplified versions of Iran-designed Geran drones), were unarmed, suggesting they might have been decoys to test NATO's air defences. Russia denied targeting Poland, claiming the drones veered off course due to Ukrainian jamming, a claim supported by Belarus but dismissed by Polish and European leaders. Intelligence officials are divided on whether the incursion was intentional or accidental, with some suggesting Russia aimed to probe NATO's response without escalating to direct conflict.[iii] NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte condemned Russia's "reckless behaviour," and leaders from the US, UK, France, Germany, and others expressed solidarity with Poland, calling the incident a serious escalation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy labelled it a "dangerous precedent" and offered Poland anti-drone training, leading to a Poland-Ukraine agreement on joint drone defence initiatives. The EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, proposed a "drone wall" to protect Europe's eastern flank.[iv] The incident occurred amid heightened Russian attacks on Ukraine and joint Russia-Belarus military exercises (Zapad 2025), raising concerns about regional stability. Some analysts believe Russia was testing NATO's resolve, especially after failed US-brokered peace talks. NATO has since bolstered its eastern defences, and Poland has closed its border with Belarus, citing security threats. The Zapad (meaning "West" in the Russian language) series began in 2009 as part of the Union State agreement between Russia and Belarus, alternating with other drills, such as Union Shield. Previous exercises often raised alarms among NATO members due to their scale and proximity to alliance borders. For instance, Zapad 2017 involved scenarios with fictional states resembling the Baltic nations.[v] At the same time, Zapad 2021 reportedly included up to 200,000 troops and integrated Belarusian forces more deeply into Russian command structures, with elements simulating operations involving Ukraine. The 2023 Zapad exercise was cancelled, attributed to Russia's resource strain from the Ukraine conflict. Notably, similar drills like Union Resolve in early 2022 were used to mask troop buildups for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fuelling suspicions around Zapad events. Zapad 2025 took place from September 12 to 16 across 41 land and maritime training areas in both Russia and Belarus. Around 100,000 military personnel participated in the exercise, which also involved up to 7,000 Belarusian soldiers and 10,000 pieces of military hardware.[vi] The operation explicitly framed itself as a defensive measure to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State. Still, it also incorporated high-intensity combat simulations, including the theoretical deployment of tactical nuclear capabilities and advanced missile systems. Despite the presence of military observers from NATO nations and other allied countries at the Zapad 2025 military exercises, the event has raised concerns about regional security, particularly among Poland and the easternmost members of NATO. According to the world's oldest and one of the most cited think tanks specialising in international security, the RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), "Zapad 2025 appears as a meticulously calibrated, scaled-down, and geographically-constrained exercise. This is a deliberate and rational adaptation to the immense human and material costs of the ongoing large-scale war in Ukraine and the persistent strain of international sanctions. The exercise worked as a multi-layered instrument of a state in wartime, even though not fully mobilised. Politically, it fostered a perception of resolve continuity to both domestic and international audiences, strengthening the Russian-Belarusian closeness and deploying calibrated, low-resource deterrent messaging. Militarily, it worked as a field laboratory where Russia stress-tested and refined its Initial Period of War (IPW) playbook, incorporating direct lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield. The focus this time was on high-leverage capabilities, such as long-range precision fires, integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), and electronic warfare (EW), while conserving mass and materiel that are critically needed in Ukraine."[vii]Polish reaction to ZAPAD 2025Poland responded resolutely to the joint Russia-Belarus Zapad 2025 military exercises, viewing them as a provocative threat due to their proximity to the Polish border, aggressive scenarios (including nuclear elements and targeting the strategic Suwałki Gap), and the broader context of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and recent incidents like Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace. The reactions encompassed military, border security, diplomatic, and intelligence measures, reflecting heightened tensions and a focus on deterrence.[viii] Poland closed all border crossings with Belarus, including railway lines, effective midnight on September 11-12, 2025 (local Polish time), for an indefinite period until the perceived threat subsided.[1] This decision, announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, was justified by the exercises' aggressive nature, their location near the border, and ongoing hybrid threats from Russia and Belarus, such as arson attacks, sabotage, propaganda, disinformation, and espionage. The closure impacted the transit of Chinese and Russian goods. Additional measures included heightened vigilance at the frontier, with Poland coordinating with allies like Lithuania, which also ramped up security at its borders with Belarus and Russia.[ix] Additionally, Poland deployed up to 40,000 soldiers to its eastern border with Belarus as a direct counter to the drills, emphasising preparedness amid the perceived escalation. In a pre-emptive move, Poland led the NATO-backed Iron Defender-25 exercise, starting on September 2, 2025, as its primary military response.[x] This was described as the largest NATO-led drill of the year, involving approximately 30,000 troops (including Polish Armed Forces, NATO battlegroups, Air Force, Navy, Territorial Defence Forces, and Special Forces) and over 600 pieces of heavy equipment, such as U.S.-made Abrams tanks, K9 howitzers, and Gladius drone systems. The multi-domain exercise (land, sea, air, cyberspace) incorporated lessons from the Ukraine war, testing combat effectiveness in realistic scenarios to enhance interoperability and demonstrate alliance unity. Poland's Defence Ministry framed it as non-targeted training but a clear signal of readiness against potential threats, including large-scale drone attacks and Russia's Iskander-M missile deployments in Kaliningrad. Concurrent NATO drills were also conducted along the border.[xi] Historical Context For a non-specialist, especially one from outside Europe, Poland may seem a big unknown. Let us then very briefly examine the role of Poland in European Politics from a historical perspective over the last one hundred years. Poland's role in European history since 1918 has been transformative, serving as both a symbol of national resilience and a catalyst for broader continental change. From regaining independence after 123 years of partition to becoming a cornerstone of modern European integration, Poland's journey reflects the complex dynamics of 20th and 21st century European politics. Poland re-emerged as an independent state in 1918 following the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. The newly reconstituted Second Polish Republic faced immediate challenges, including border conflicts with neighbouring states from 1918 to 1921 and internal struggles with multiethnic tensions and economic dislocation.[xii] The interwar period was characterised by political instability, debates over competing leadership visions, and the legacy of partitions that shaped Poland's regional ambitions and democratic consolidation efforts.[xiii] Poland became the epicentre of World War II, suffering devastating military occupation under both Nazi and Soviet policies. The country experienced unprecedented civilian trauma, displacement, and the systematic extermination of its population.[xiv] Historians still debate the numbers, but recent analyses suggest that the nation might have lost much more than initially was suggested. Instead of six million, some historians suggest that nine million would be a more realistic number, which would constitute almost 24% of the Polish population.[xv] This wartime destruction fundamentally reshaped Poland's demographics, political landscape, and postwar boundaries, leaving an indelible mark on European memory of the war. After 1945, Poland fell under the Soviet sphere, adopting a communist system that profoundly shaped its institutions, economy, and foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The Soviet-backed regime implemented state socialism, which combined industrialisation with political repression, resulting in periodic episodes of mass dissent.[xvi] Notably, as a member of the Warsaw Pact,[xvii] Poland occupied a central strategic position within the Central and Eastern European architecture, serving as both a critical forward staging area and a substantial contributor to the alliance's conventional forces throughout the Cold War period (1955 - 1989). As part of the "Northern Tier" alongside East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland's territory formed the primary staging ground for Soviet operational plans targeting Western Europe, providing essential buffer protection for Soviet rear areas while controlling crucial East-West transit routes across Central Europe.[xviii] The Polish People's Army constituted one of the largest non-Soviet contingents within the Warsaw Pact, with substantial ground forces integrated into Soviet-designed offensive operations that emphasised rapid cross-border campaigns and coalition warfare capabilities. Polish military doctrine was heavily subordinated to Soviet operational art, with force structures, equipment procurement, and training programs synchronised to complement Soviet General Staff concepts rather than independent national defence requirements.[xix] Poland's armed forces regularly participated in major Warsaw Pact exercises that rehearsed theatre-level offensive operations, serving as integral combat elements whose contributions were deemed necessary for the alliance's conventional surprise-attack options. However, this integration came at the cost of operational autonomy, as Soviet personnel and advisers maintained significant influence over Polish military leadership and strategic planning throughout much of the Cold War period. The relationship revealed inherent tensions between Polish national interests and Soviet strategic imperatives, particularly during political crises such as the 1980 - 1981 Solidarity period, when Moscow considered military intervention but ultimately relied on Polish authorities to maintain internal order. By the 1980s, while Poland remained formally committed to Warsaw Pact structures, domestic political changes increasingly undermined the reliability and willingness of Polish forces to serve Soviet strategic objectives, contributing to the gradual erosion of the alliance's military cohesion.[xx] The independent trade union Solidarity, born from mass strikes in 1980, became the primary catalyst for Poland's transition from communism. Despite the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the movement persisted and eventually led to the Round Table negotiations and the pivotal 1989 elections, which produced rapid systemic change.[xxi] Poland's peaceful transition initiated processes that reverberated across Eastern Europe, contributing to the end of the Cold War order. Poland's post-1989 trajectory transformed it from a transition exemplar to an active Euro-Atlantic partner. The country joined NATO in 1999 and acceded to the European Union in 2004, completing its integration into Western institutions.[xxii] Today, Poland serves as the largest economy in Central Europe. It plays multiple roles as a security actor countering Russian influence, a close US partner, and a significant voice in EU decision-making.[xxiii] Below, the reader will find a comprehensive table that contains key political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Source: Grok – prompt: Create a table with the most important political and economic developments in Poland since 1918. Visualisation by gamma.app. The Role of Poland in the Ukrainian War As allegedly a Chinese saying goes, "one picture is worth a thousand words", one needs to look no further than at a map of contemporary Europe to understand the central and therefore strategically important location of Poland. Source: https://www.escape2poland.co.uk/poland-guide/poland-map From the very beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Poland has emerged as one of Kyiv's staunchest allies, providing multifaceted support amid escalating geopolitical tensions. This assistance has spanned military, humanitarian, political, and economic domains, reflecting Warsaw's strategic interest in countering Russian aggression while bolstering regional stability. By mid-2025, Poland's total aid to Ukraine has approached $9 billion, equivalent to about 4.91% of its GDP.[xxiv] In the military sphere, Poland has delivered 47 aid packages, positioning itself as Europe's primary logistics hub for defence supplies, with 80% of allied donations transiting through its borders. Cumulative military support has reached €4.5 billion by May 2025, including over 300 T-72 and PT-91 Twardy tanks, BWP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, reconnaissance drones, and 100 million rounds of ammunition. Poland also trained Ukrainian troops on NATO equipment and, in April 2024, offered to repatriate draft-eligible Ukrainian men residing in Poland to bolster Kyiv's forces. A July 2024 bilateral security agreement further commits Warsaw to ongoing defence cooperation.[xxv] Humanitarian efforts have been equally robust, with Poland hosting over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees by 2025, after more than 7.57 million crossed its borders since the invasion's onset.[xxvi] Warsaw established nine reception points on day one and spent €40 billion (1.9% of GDP) on refugee and humanitarian aid from 2022 to 2024, including welfare, medical supplies, and integration programs.[xxvii] By 2024, Ukrainian refugees reportedly contributed a net 2.7% boost to Poland's GDP through employment, with rates rising from 61% to 69%. However, public support has waned, dropping to 45% for long-term stays by 2025, amid political debates over extending benefits.[xxviii] Politically, Poland condemned the invasion through a unanimous Sejm resolution on February 24, 2022, and has advocated for Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO within forums like the Lublin Triangle. Leaders like President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk have emphasised "non-negotiable" solidarity, pushing for sanctions and intelligence sharing. Tensions flared in 2023 over grain imports, leading to temporary bans and border protests, but dialogue resumed with high-level meetings in 2024.[xxix] Economically, Poland's aid encompasses reconstruction involvement, energy interconnections, and trade facilitation, with refugees contributing to growth. As of September 2025, Warsaw has joined the "Coalition of the Willing" for sustained defence pledges, although domestic fatigue and the 2025 elections pose challenges to its long-term commitment. Overall, Poland's role has solidified its regional leadership, balancing altruism with security imperatives.[xxx] The overall picture regarding the actual situation in Poland regarding the costs and benefits of Ukrainian immigration is not all roses. The influx has triggered notable social, economic, and infrastructural strains. Public support for long-term refugee stays has declined amid growing fatigue and political debates. Key challenges include social tensions, housing pressures, welfare strains, and integration barriers. Rarely, but especially painful from a Polish perspective, are anti-Polish sentiments manifested by some Ukrainians, mostly on social media, which often refer to support for Stepan Bandera, seen as a founder of the modern Ukrainian State. Stephan Bandera, was a Ukrainian nationalist leader associated with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — and a prominent instigator of Volhynia Massacre of 1943 - 1944. During the massacre, UPA forces killed up to 200,000 ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (civilians – mostly women and children) as part of ethnic cleansing efforts. Consequently, Bandera, viewed as a hero in Ukraine for resisting Soviet and Nazi occupations, is often equated in Poland with perpetrators of genocide. SAFE and European Autonomy As analysed here, the EU is in favour of Ukraine's integration into European defence cooperation through the SAFE fund, which highlights Ukraine's unique status as a semi-integrated security partner (SISP) despite not being an EU member. With its vast resources, Ukraine can potentially strengthen the EU and contribute to its economic and political growth, thereby enhancing European geopolitical influence. On the downside, Ukrainian semi- or full membership in the EU, which is likely to include membership in the postulated European Defence Union (EDU), will further stretch the EU dangerously to the East, shrinking the geographical distance between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Europe is likely to face an elevated strategic challenge posed by Russia, given its military potential and, most importantly, the historical and current context of political and economic adversary relations. Simply speaking, once Ukraine becomes an EU member, the EU will be exposed to constant security challenges to a degree much higher than before. The theory of escalation by Herman Kahn should therefore be studied in detail by European policymakers and military leaders to make sure that Europe does not find itself again drawn into a military conflict that may damage its societies for generations to come.[xxxi] Curiously, political leaders of Poland (such as Prime Minister Donald Tusk or Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski), supported by Estonian, German, French and British leaders, strike somewhat risky poses and flex muscles verbally challenging the delicate status quo. For example, a recent Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace (8-9 September 2025) produced a lot of chaos and uncertainty. As a consequence, some damage was done to civilian infrastructure. Polish authorities were quick to declare that Russian drones had caused the damage. Only later did it transpire through media reports that the damage had, in fact, been caused by friendly fire. A Polish missile mistakenly hit the civilian infrastructure instead of a hostile drone.[xxxii] Similarly, on November 15, 2022, during a massive Russian missile barrage targeting Ukrainian infrastructure, a missile struck a grain drying facility in the Polish village of Przewodów (near the Ukraine border), killing two Polish civilians and causing an explosion.[xxxiii] Initial reactions from the Ukrainian and the Polish governments hinted at Russian agency. Later on, it turned out that it was, in fact, a Ukrainian missile that mistakenly hit the Polish territory.[2] Interestingly, in a recent interview, the former President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, admitted that the Ukrainian side clearly used the event as an attempt to force the Polish hand to join the war against Russia.[xxxiv]Poland, once again, finds itself at the forefront of the geopolitical border between the collective West and Russia, and once again, it serves as both a bulwark and a spearhead. A role that never really paid any dividends in the 20th century. A role that cost millions of lives, destruction and decades of servitude. Broader Geopolitical Context In a broader geopolitical context, the Polish government has recently taken a significant step by blocking the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The closure of the border with Belarus halted all road and rail traffic, including a critical rail route that handles about 90% of EU-China freight train shipments — part of China's Belt and Road Initiative — valued at around €25 - 30 billion annually. The disruption affected perishable goods, forced rerouting to less efficient paths, such as the Middle Corridor (via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey), and led to potential losses for Chinese investors. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasised to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 16 that security took precedence over trade, rejecting the initial request to reopen. The border reopened on September 25, allowing rail trade to resume gradually, though short-term congestion and instability persisted.[xxxv]Initially, Poland was positive about OBOR, which was formally launched back in 2013. Poland's participation positioned it as a key European gateway, leveraging its central location for rail, port, and trade links. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Poland in June 2016 and held a meeting with then-President Andrzej Duda and then-Prime Minister Beata Szydło. They signed a declaration elevating ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, emphasising OBOR cooperation in trade, investment, and infrastructure. The next several years saw a focus on rail and port projects where Poland positions itself as a "hub" for the Silk Road Economic Belt, with investments in logistics and connectivity.[xxxvi] In June 2024, President Xi met Duda in Beijing to mark 75 years of diplomatic relations. They issued an Action Plan (2024–2027) for strengthening the partnership, including high-quality OBOR cooperation.Recent events show that the Polish leadership has reevaluated its role in global and European geopolitics. By doing so, it appears that the Polish political leadership is playing a high-stakes game in the current geopolitical arena — a picture all too familiar to anyone who has studied the history of World War II. We can only hope that this time the future will not bring an all-European war.  [1] The border was reopened at midnight 25 of September.[2] The Ukrainian side has issued no official acknowledgement nor any compensation.   [i] Easton, A., & Lukiv, J. (2025, September 11). Poland says it shot down Russian drones after airspace violation. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147065pzdzo[ii] Charlish, A., Kelly, L., & Erling, B. (2025, September 11). Poland downs drones in its airspace, becoming first NATO member to fire during war in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/poland-downs-drones-its-airspace-becoming-first-nato-member-fire-during-war-2025-09-10/[iii] Walker, S. (2025, September 15). Russian drone incursion into Poland ‘was Kremlin test on Nato.’ The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/14/russian-drone-incursion-poland-nato-ukraine-europe[iv] Emergency Briefing on Drone Incursion into Poland. (2025, September 12). Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/emergency-briefing-on-drone-incursion-into-poland.php[v] Yeryoma, M. (2025, August 26). As Russia-Belarus Zapad military exercises begin, here’s everything you need to know. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/everything-you-need-to-know-about-russia-belarus-zapad-2025-military-drills-set-for-september/[vi] Bifolchi, G. (2025, September 17). Russia-Belarus Joint Military Exercise “Zapad-2025”: Intel Briefing. The Kyiv Independent. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/09/17/russia-belarus-zapad-2025/[vii] Minniti, F. (2025, September 22). Wartime Zapad 2025 Exercise: Russia’s Strategic Adaptation and NATO. RUSI. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/wartime-zapad-2025-exercise-russias-strategic-adaptation-and-nato[viii] Query, A. (2025, September 20). Iron Defender-25: Is NATO Finally Ready to Shield Its Eastern Flank? UNITED24 MEDIA. https://united24media.com/world/iron-defender-25-is-nato-finally-ready-to-shield-its-eastern-flank-11795[ix] Poland to close Belarus border due to Russia-led military exercises, PM says. (2025, September 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-close-belarus-border-due-russia-led-military-exercises-pm-says-2025-09-09/[x] Polska odpowiedź na “Zapad-2025”. “Unikamy eskalacji, nie boimy się.” (2025, August 9). Polskie Radio24.Pl. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3562822,polska-odpowiedz-na-zapad-2025-unikamy-eskalacji-nie-boimy-sie[xi] Federation of Exercises codenamed IRON DEFENDER-25 - One Goal, Many Forces, Shared Readiness. (2025, August 26). Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/federation-of-exercises-codenamed-iron-defender-25--one-goal-many-forces-shared-readiness[xii] J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, "Independence regained and lost, 1914–1945," in A Concise History of Poland, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Also J. Böhler, Civil War in Central Europe, 1918-1921: The Reconstruction of Poland, 2018.[xiii] Górny, M. (2019). A Century of Selective Ignorance: Poland 1918–2018. Slavic Review, 78(3), 654–662. doi:10.1017/slr.2019.227  [xiv] A. J. Prazmowska, Poland: A Modern History, 2010. Also P. D. Stachura, Poland in the Twentieth Century, 1999.[xv] Davies, N. (n.d.). Europa walczy 1939-1945. Nie takie proste zwycięstwo. ZNAK.[xvi] A. Kemp‑Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History, Cambridge University Press, 2008.[xvii] See more at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact[xviii] M. Sadykiewicz, "Organizing for Coalition Warfare The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning," RAND, 1988.[xix] Jones, C. D. (2003). Soviet military doctrine as strategic deception: An offensive military strategy for defense of the socialist fatherland. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16(3), 24–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040308430567[xx] Mastny, V. (1999). The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War. Europe-Asia Studies, 51(2), 189–211. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153609[xxi] A. Paczkowski and C. Manetti, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980–1989, 2015.[xxii] A. F. Tatham, "The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and European Law," in European Law and the Eastern Enlargement, Brill, 2013.[xxiii] R. Zięba, "The Evolution of Poland's International Roles," in Central Europe and the Changing International Order, 2020. Or A. Szczerbiak, "A model for democratic transition and European integration? Why Poland matters?" Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 2016.[xxiv] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxv] Palowski, J. (2025, April 8). Poland delivered 100 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. Details on Germany and USA. Defence 24.Com. https://defence24.com/defence-policy/poland-delivered-100-million-rounds-of-ammunition-to-ukraine-details-on-germany-and-usa Also Słowański, M. T. (2025, January 13). Poland and Ukraine: A Partnership Forged in Resilience. Fair Observer. https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/poland-and-ukraine-a-partnership-forged-in-resilience/[xxvi] Fusiek, D. A. (2022, November 28). The needs of refugees. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees[xxvii] See more at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10781[xxviii] See more at: UKRAINE EMERGENCY. (2025, September 25). UNHCR. https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/[xxix] Prochwicz Jazowska, M. (2025, September 8). Home and away: Why Poland is fighting a war on two fronts. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/home-and-away-why-poland-is-fighting-a-war-on-two-fronts/[xxx] Ukrainian refugees give Poland big economic boost, report says. (2025, June 10). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-refugees-give-poland-big-economic-boost-report-says-2025-06-10/[xxxi]https://www.amazon.com/Escalation-Metaphors-Scenarios-Herman-Kahn/dp/1412811627#:~:text=In%20this%20widely%20discussed%20and,closer%20to%20all%2Dout%20war.[xxxii] Kacprzak, I., & Zawadka, G. (2025, September 16). Polska rakieta uderzyła w dom na Lubelszczyźnie. Rzeczpospolita. https://www.rp.pl/wojsko/art43015001-polska-rakieta-uderzyla-w-dom-na-lubelszczyznie[xxxiii] Henley, J. (2022, November 16). Missile that hit Poland likely came from Ukraine defences, say Warsaw and NATO. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/poland-president-missile-strike-probably-ukrainian-stray[xxxiv] Scheffer, J. (2025, September 5). Poland’s Ex-President Duda Exposes How Ukraine Tries to Pull Allies into War. Hungarian Conservative. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/ukraine-war-andrzej-duda-allies-false-flag-drone-strike/[xxxv] Dean, J. D. (2025, September 23). Poland to China: So, You Want to Play Hybrid War? Hungarian Conservative. https://cepa.org/article/poland-to-china-so-you-want-to-play-hybrid-war/[xxxvi] Jakubowski, A., Komornicki, T., Kowalczyk, K., & Miszczuk, A. (2020). Poland as a hub of the Silk Road Economic Belt: is the narrative of opportunity supported by developments on the ground? Asia Europe Journal, 18, 367–396. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-020-00571-6

1. Introduction Since the Korean War, South Korea had long relied on U.S.-made tanks, but in the 1970s it launched a full-scale domestic tank development program under the principle of self-reliant national defense. As a result, beginning with the K1 tank, the country gradually increased its localization rate, and today it has fielded the highly advanced K2 Black Panther, placing itself among the world’s leading tank powers. However, when compared to major tanks competing in the global defense market, a comprehensive analysis is still required not only in terms of performance, but also in cost-effectiveness and export competitiveness. This study examines the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and analyzes the performance of the K2 in comparison with other global competitors to highlight its export potential and strategic significance. 2. Early Background: The Korean War – Early 1970s During the Korean War 1950-1953, North Korean forces launched their invasion spearheaded by the Soviet Union’s best-selling tank, the T-34. In contrast, South Korea did not possess a single tank at the time. The power of the T-34 allowed the North Korean army to advance rapidly in the early stages of the war. However, the arrival of U.S. ground forces changed the situation. The M24 Chaffee light tank was the first to be deployed, followed by the M4 Sherman medium tank, the M26 Pershing heavy/medium tank, and the M46 Patton medium tank, all of which overwhelmed the North Korean forces. Thanks to this reinforcement, the Nakdong River defensive line was held, and the tide of the war shifted in favor of the UN forces. Additionally, by late 1950, the British Army had committed its renowned A41 Centurion tanks to the conflict. After the war, in 1959, South Korea received the M47 Patton tank from the United States as part of its allied support policy and broader equipment modernization program. After the war, South Korea relied on U.S. assistance until 1970 to accumulate experience in operating and maintaining tanks. In particular, in 1966, when the M48 Patton tanks were provided by the United States, South Korea also received a Technical Data Package (TDP), which included key technology transfers alongside major upgrades. Through this, South Korea acquired comprehensive expertise in armor casting and welding, production processes, precision manufacturing and assembly, as well as quality inspection and testing. This foundation became a crucial stepping stone for the subsequent development of the Korean tank industry. 3. Development of the K1 Indigenous Tank: 1970s–1980s Under President Park Chung-hee’s policy of self-reliant national defense, South Korea launched the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) program in 1975 in cooperation with the United States. Following the signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1978, full-scale development began. The design direction was set to base the new tank on the form and performance of the U.S. Army’s latest third-generation tank at the time, the M1 Abrams. Chrysler Defense (now GDLS), the manufacturer of the M1, participated in the project, while South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and Hyundai Precision (now Hyundai Rotem) worked together to create a smaller, terrain-optimized “Little Abrams” for the Korean Peninsula. In April 1984, two prototypes were produced, and after passing a series of tests, mass production began in 1985. The production K1 tank was armed with a 105 mm rifled gun and equipped with a 1,200 horsepower German MTU-series diesel engine, built with General Dynamics technology. A key feature was the adoption of a hydropneumatic suspension system, allowing adjustable ground clearance suited for Korea’s mountainous terrain. The tank weighed 51.5 tons, carried a crew of four, and a total of 1,026 units were produced between 1985 and 1997. During its service, the upgraded K1A1 variant was developed, featuring a 120 mm smoothbore gun, improved fire-control systems, and enhanced armor protection. A total of 484 K1A1s were produced between 1996 and 2008. Subsequent modernized versions, the K1E1 and K1E2, have ensured that the K1 series continues to serve as a core component of the South Korean Army’s armored forces. 4. The K2 Black Panther: 2000s – Present Beginning in 1996, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces acquired 68 T-80U tanks from Russia as repayment for an economic cooperation loan. At the time, the T-80U was Russia’s latest main battle tank, and for South Korean engineers, who had previously only worked with U.S.-made tanks, it provided a valuable opportunity to gain direct experience with a new model. The lessons learned from operating the T-80U contributed significantly to the later development of the K2 tank. After the Ministry of National Defense announced its next-generation tank program in 1992, a system concept study was carried out in 1995, followed by exploratory development in 1998. In 2003, full-scale system development began. By 2007, three prototypes were unveiled for operational testing and evaluation, and mass production was initially scheduled to begin in 2012. However, issues arose during the development of the domestic powerpack (engine and transmission). These included an engine protection temperature setting error, which failed to safeguard the engine from overheating, and insufficient cooling fan speed in the transmission at maximum output, which led to inadequate cooling. Despite multiple redesigns, persistent problems in performance and reliability testing delayed deployment. As a result, the first production batch of 100 K2 tanks was equipped with Germany’s MTU engines and RENK transmissions instead of the domestic powerpack. These vehicles began delivery to the ROK Army in April 2014. By September 2014, the domestic engine had passed the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s evaluation, and the second batch of 106 tanks and the third batch of 54 tanks were produced with a “hybrid powerpack”—a Korean-made engine combined with a German transmission. Starting with the fourth production batch, SNT Dynamics’ domestic transmission was successfully integrated, completing full localization of the K2 powerpack. Unlike its predecessor, the K1, which had been developed under the leadership of General Dynamics and relied heavily on U.S. components, the K2 Black Panther is a fully indigenous South Korean tank. With domestically developed engines and transmissions, it achieved a high localization rate, giving South Korea independence from U.S. and German export restrictions and allowing greater freedom in operating and exporting its tanks. As South Korea’s most advanced tank, the K2 incorporates cutting-edge technologies that set it apart from its predecessors. These include a 120 mm smoothbore gun, an active protection system (APS), an autoloader, and stealth features, delivering superior mobility, protection, and firepower. Today, it stands as a core asset of the South Korean Army. Specifications (K2 Black Panther):Crew: 3Weight: 55 tonsEngine: Doosan Infracore DV-27K diesel engineTransmission: SNT Dynamics EST15K automatic transmissionMain Gun: Hyundai WIA 120 mm smoothbore CN08Fire Control System: South Korean domestic technologyArmor: Korean-developed composite armor  5. Timeline of South Korea’s Tank Development: From U.S. Aid to the K2 The introduction and development of tanks in the ROK Army have been organized in a chronological timeline with images. This timeline is designed to provide a clear overview of the entire progression — from U.S. aid tanks, to tanks acquired from Russia, and finally to the development of indigenous Korean tanks.   6. K2 vs. Regional Main Battle Tanks — Performance Comparison Tank performance can be compared across four key categories: Mobility, Firepower, Protection, and Sensors & C4I. MobilityComponents: engine & transmission (powerpack), suspension, roadwheels, sprockets, tracks, and fuel systems.Role: determines speed, acceleration, cross-country mobility, and operational range. Maintainability (ease of maintenance and access) is also included here. FirepowerComponents: main armament (gun) — barrel and mantlet, stabilization system, autoloading/manual loading systems, coaxial and anti-aircraft machine guns, ammunition stowage.Role: defines ability to defeat enemy armor and other targets, hit probability (integrated with the fire-control system), and ammunition variety (e.g., APFSDS, HE).ProtectionComponents: baseline composite/steel armor, explosive reactive armor (ERA), active protection systems (APS), smoke generation, fire suppression and NBC protection, and crew survivability compartments.Role: protects crew and systems from penetration, fragmentation, anti-tank weapons, and environmental threats.Sensors & C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)Components: fire-control system (FCS), thermal and night sights, laser rangefinder, communications suites, electronic warfare and laser warning receivers, and power-management systems.Role: responsible for target acquisition, firing accuracy, and networked combat — i.e., information sharing with friendly forces.Below is a comparison of the K2 and the region’s current main battle tanks.    The K2 Black Panther is regarded as a world-class main battle tank, demonstrating well-balanced excellence in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic systems compared to neighboring countries’ tanks. 7. South Korea’s Tank Export Outlook and Key CasesWhile exports of the K1 tank were restricted due to U.S. technology regulations, the K2 tank—developed with fully indigenous Korean technology—became eligible for overseas sales. In 2022, South Korea successfully signed a contract with Poland, and negotiations are currently underway with countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, signaling the expansion of Korean tanks into the global defense market. 7.1. Turkish Joint Development of the Altay Tank Based on the K2 (USD 540 million)In 2007, South Korea signed a design support and technology transfer contract with Turkey for the development of the Altay main battle tank. Under this agreement, South Korea transferred several core technologies derived from the K2 tank, including:- 120 mm CN08 smoothbore gun technology (Korean-produced main gun)Advanced armor and composite equipment design consultation and production support- Powerpack (engine + transmission) technology transfer and testing: the Altay successfully completed durability trials with the HD Hyundai Infracore engine and SNT Dynamics transmission The Altay is scheduled to enter full-scale mass production in 2025, with an initial production run of 250 units and a long-term goal of building up to 1,000 tanks. 7.2. K2 Export to Poland: First Batch of 180 Units (USD 3.4 billion), Second Batch of 180 Units (USD 6.5 billion) In 2022, the K2 tank was selected by Poland over strong competitors such as Germany’s Leopard 2A7 and the U.S. M1A2 Abrams. The key factors behind this successful export were as follows: - Rapid delivery and phased supply: South Korea demonstrated its ability to deliver tanks within a very short timeframe. Following the 2022 contract, the first batch of 10 units was delivered within the same year. By contrast, competitors faced production line bottlenecks, raising concerns over delivery delays. - Modern design with European upgrade potential: The K2 features a 120 mm 55-caliber smoothbore gun, an autoloader, an active protection system (APS), and hydropneumatic suspension—technologies equal to or in some cases more advanced than those found in Europe’s latest MBTs. Moreover, South Korea promised to develop a localized version, the K2PL, through joint development with Poland, tailored to Polish requirements. - Local production and technology transfer: South Korea offered local production of the K2PL, guaranteeing the participation of Polish defense industries, along with technology transfer, industrial cooperation, and the prospect of using Poland as a base for future exports. - Cost competitiveness: Despite being a state-of-the-art tank, the K2 is relatively more affordable than the M1A2 or Leopard 2A7. Maintenance and sustainment costs are also projected to be lower than those of European tanks, giving the K2 a strong reputation as a “cost-effective MBT” with excellent value for performance. - Tactical versatility and advanced systems: Equipped with an autoloader, hydropneumatic suspension, and advanced smart fire-control systems, the K2 offers outstanding adaptability across diverse operational environments, including mountainous terrain, urban warfare, and extreme cold.Through this deal, South Korea and Poland established a relationship that goes beyond a simple arms sale, building long-term defense industry partnership and mutual trust. Potential export destinations for the K2 include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, and India. 8. Comparison of Tanks from Export Competitor Nations South Korea’s K2 tank has attracted global attention for its outstanding performance, but the international tank market is already dominated by several major players.This chapter analyzes and compares the leading tanks that compete with the K2, while also examining each country’s export competitiveness.   The K2 Black Panther, while incorporating cutting-edge technologies, is lighter than many Western main battle tanks, resulting in relatively lower sustainment costs. It is therefore widely regarded as a cost-effective, well-balanced tank. The cost of a tank varies greatly depending on its design and configuration, but if we break down the production cost (manufacturing, components, and assembly) into four categories, the estimated shares are as follows:- Protection: 30–40%- Firepower: 20–30%- Mobility: 15–25%- Electronics & C4I: 15–25% The actual share, however, depends on specific factors. For example, the use of advanced armor materials (composite/uranium) or the inclusion of an Active Protection System (APS) significantly increases protection costs. Similarly, specialized gun and ammunition systems (such as a 120mm smoothbore, autoloader, or advanced munitions) raise firepower costs. Integration, testing, and safety features greatly affect electronics costs, while options like autoloaders, high-performance thermal sights, and networked systems can heavily influence the final balance. Other important factor is Lifecycle Perspective (Unit Cost vs. Total Life-Cycle Cost), which can be defined as below.- Procurement: About 20–30% of total life-cycle cost (highly variable)- Operations & Support (O&S): 60–70% — dominated by fuel, maintenance, spare parts, and maintenance personnel costs- Upgrades & Depreciation: 10–20% In other words, the long-term operation and maintenance costs take up a much larger share than the initial procurement cost of a tank.Below is a comparison table of modern main battle tank costs: unit acquisition cost, annual sustainment cost, and 30-year life-cycle cost (procurement + sustainment).*The sustainment cost for China’s Type 99A and Russia’s T-90M is an estimate.   9. Conclusion This study has systematically examined the evolution and localization of South Korea’s tanks, and verified the level of their advancement through performance comparisons with leading global competitors. In particular, the K2 has demonstrated balanced capabilities in mobility, firepower, protection, and electronic command-and-control, supported by advanced technologies and a high degree of localization. At the same time, it offers superior cost-efficiency in sustainment and operational expenses compared to heavier Western MBTs. This makes the K2 not only a key asset for strengthening domestic defense, but also a competitive and cost-effective platform in the global arms market. Taken together, these findings suggest that South Korea’s tanks have progressed beyond being a mere symbol of self-reliant defense, and are now positioned to expand exports and build long-term strategic partnerships worldwide.

Abstract This analysis critically examines the European Union's security guarantees for Ukraine as of 2025, amid ongoing conflict and geopolitical tensions. Despite ambitious diplomatic efforts and increased defence spending, the EU faces significant economic and military challenges that undermine its capacity to ensure Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.Economically, the EU struggles with sluggish growth, structural inefficiencies, high public debt, and trade deficits, particularly with China, limiting resources for sustained military investment. Militarily, the EU's fragmented forces and reliance on NATO contrast sharply with Russia's extensive, war-driven military production and strategic nuclear capabilities.The war in Ukraine demonstrates the increasing prominence of drones and missiles, areas where the EU lags behind both Ukraine and Russia in production scale and innovation. Furthermore, the shifting global order towards multipolarity and the strategic alignment of Russia and China further constrain the EU's role as a formidable security actor beyond its borders. Key Words: EU, Ukraine, Security, Guarantees Introduction Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement on September 5, 2025, warning that any foreign troops deployed to Ukraine — particularly in the context of the "coalition of the willing" led by France and the UK — would be considered legitimate targets for Russian forces. This was in direct response to a summit in Paris on September 4, where 26 countries pledged to contribute to a potential postwar security force for Ukraine, which could involve deploying troops on the ground, at sea, or in the air to deter future aggression after a ceasefire. Putin's exact words, as reported from his appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, included: "Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction."[i] He further emphasised that even post-ceasefire, he saw no need for such forces if a long-term peace is achieved, adding, "If decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop."[ii] The "coalition of the willing" refers to a group of primarily European and Commonwealth nations, co-chaired by France and Britain, formed in early 2025 to provide security guarantees for Ukraine amid ongoing peace efforts led by US President Donald Trump. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Putin's stance, calling the presence of any foreign or NATO forces near Russia's border a threat and unacceptable.[iii] While Putin did not explicitly name the "coalition of the willing" in his quoted remarks, the timing and context—immediately following the Paris summit announcements—make it clear his warning targets their proposed deployments.[iv] As bold as President Putin's statement is, the EU has been making lots of noise in recent months regarding European guarantees for the future of Ukrainian security and its territorial integrity. This analysis aims to provide a "hard-eyed" assessment of the formidability of these claims, following a previous piece that analysed European diplomatic efforts to support Ukraine's territorial integrity, published here: An analysis of European Diplomatic Efforts to Support Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity. Challenges and Opportunities. EU Economic Stance and Prospects As of 2025, the European Union's economy remains sluggish, troubled by structural inefficiencies and mounting external pressures. Arguably, the EU bloc is increasingly uncompetitive on the global stage. Despite some stabilisation in inflation and resilient labour markets, the overall trajectory suggests a region struggling to keep pace with the United States and China, with GDP growth forecasts hovering around a dismal 1% — well below the global average of 3.2%. This underperformance is not a temporary hiccup but a symptom of deep-rooted issues, including overregulation, demographic decline, and dependency on volatile external factors.[v] Critics argue that the EU's adherence to rigid "globalist" policies, such as burdensome environmental regulations and fragmented fiscal strategies, has stifled innovation and exacerbated trade imbalances, leading to a €305.8 billion deficit with China in 2024 alone. It is pretty probable that without radical reforms, the EU risks sliding into prolonged stagnation or even collapse, as high energy costs erode competitiveness in export markets. State of the Union (2025,10 September ) openly admits that "In the trade of goods, the EU has long had a trade deficit with China. The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached in 2022. In terms of volume, the deficit increased from 34.8 million tons in 2023 to 44.5 million tons in 2024. In the period 2015-2024, the deficit quadrupled in volume, while it doubled in value.China is the EU's third-largest partner for exports and its biggest for imports. EU exports to China amounted to €213.3 billion, whereas EU imports from China amounted to €519 billion, indicating year-on-year decreases of 0.3% and 4.6% respectively. In 2024, EU imports of manufactured goods accounted for 96.7% of total imports from China, with primary goods comprising just 3%. The most important manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (55%), followed by other manufactured goods (34%), and chemicals (8%). In 2024, EU exports of manufactured goods constituted 86.9% of total exports to China, with primary goods making up 11.5%. The most exported manufactured goods were machinery and vehicles (51%), followed by other manufactured goods (20%), and chemicals (17%).[vi] The EU's core metrics reveal an economy that is stable but uninspiring, to put it mildly, with persistent disparities across member states that undermine cohesion.   *Created by Grok – prompt: critical evaluation of the EU economic situation as of 2025. These figures highlight internal fractures: Southern Europe (e.g., Spain at 2.6%) outperforms the core (Germany at 0%), but overall, the bloc's growth is "stuck in first gear," with services stagnant and manufacturing barely registering. Household savings are rebuilding, but consumer confidence remains low amid trade disruptions and geopolitical noise. At its core, the EU suffers from endemic structural flaws that no amount of monetary tinkering can fix. An ageing population—projected to strain fiscal sustainability—exacerbates labour shortages and boosts welfare costs, while policies to increase participation among older workers and women remain inadequate.[vii] Productivity has lagged behind that of the US and Asia for over 15 years, hindered by fragmented regulations that impede innovation in AI and biotech.[viii] The much-touted Green Deal, while environmentally ambitious, imposes extreme costs on industries, with 44% of firms reporting trade disruptions from China (mostly dumping). Energy dependency, exposed by the Ukraine war, has led to sky-high costs that "erode competitiveness," pushing the EU toward deindustrialisation. Critics decry the EU as a "technocratic regime" where national sovereignty is eroded by Brussel’s alleged blackmail tactics, rendering parliaments mere puppets and stifling bold reforms. The EU's economy is dangerously exposed to global headwinds, with risks tilted firmly downward.[ix] Escalating US-China trade tensions, including potential Trump-era tariffs, threaten exports (over 50% of GDP), particularly in the automotive and machinery sectors.[x] Geopolitical conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East disrupt supply chains and energy prices, while climate events add further volatility.[xi] The loss of the "peace dividend" forces a diversion of resources to defence, inflating costs and deterring investment. Capital outflows to a faster-growing US, driven by tax cuts, compound the issue, leaving Europe starved of investment. Politically, instability, such as France's government collapse over budget cuts (€44 billion), signals deeper fractures, risking social unrest and further eroding confidence.[xii] The analysis above only scratches the surface. To have a better picture, one should also look at current and projected budget deficits and public debts. For example, according to the EU-27, the total public debt was approximately €14.2 trillion in Q1 2025.[xiii] As for budget deficits, the aggregate EU-27 deficit stood at -2.9% of GDP in Q1 2025, according to Eurostat. [xiv] Looking forward, the situation does not seem to look much better. The prospects for public debt and budget deficits in the EU-27 over the next 5 to 10 years are characterised by gradual upward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios due to persistent deficits, ageing populations, increased defence spending, and potential shocks like higher interest rates or geopolitical tensions. Based on the latest forecasts from the European Commission (Spring 2025), IMF (April 2025 World Economic Outlook and Fiscal Monitor), and other analyses as of September 2025, debt levels are expected to stabilise or edge higher in the short term (2025–2026), with longer-term sustainability risks emerging from megatrends like climate adaptation and demographic shifts. No comprehensive projections extend fully to 2035, but medium-term analyses (up to 2030) suggest debt could rise to 85–90% of GDP for the EU aggregate if fiscal consolidation is uneven. Deficits are projected to hover around -3% of GDP, testing the Maastricht 3% limit, with calls for prudent policies to avoid unsustainable paths.[xv] It is against this backdrop that the SAFE investments, of which I have written here, here, here and here will have to be somehow balanced against other public policies, including immigration, education, public healthcare or housing. The picture does not look good for the EU, to put it mildly. Current European Military Capabilities as Compared to Russia The EU The European Union's military and defence capabilities remain fragmented, relying on the collective forces of its 27 member states rather than a unified army. As of 2025, the EU and the UK boast approximately 1.4 million[xvi] active personnel, over 7,000 tanks, 1,300 combat aircraft, and a naval fleet including 18 submarines and multiple aircraft carriers, primarily from France and Italy. Combined defence spending has risen to approximately 2% of GDP, totalling €343 billion as of 2024, but gaps persist in strategic enablers, such as air defence, munitions, and cyber capabilities.[xvii] The EU's strengths include industrial bases in countries such as Germany and France, which support exports and innovation in areas like drones and AI. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) facilitate missions, while PESCO fosters joint projects. Recent initiatives, such as the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 and the ReArm Europe Plan, aim to mobilise €800 billion for investments, including €150 billion via the SAFE loan instrument, targeting two million artillery rounds in 2025, enhanced drone systems, and military mobility.[xviii] The EU's major weaknesses include a heavy reliance on NATO, particularly on US troops, with estimates suggesting that Europe needs an additional 300,000 soldiers and €250 billion annually to achieve independence. This includes addressing shortfalls in tanks (1,400 needed), artillery, and shells (one million for sustained combat). Challenges include political divisions, with Hungary blocking aid, and supply chain vulnerabilities amid climate threats.[xix] Overall, while progress toward a "European pillar" in NATO accelerates, achieving full strategic autonomy by 2030 hinges on member states' commitment to joint procurement and increased spending. The Russian Federation Russia's military capabilities in 2025 are formidable yet strained by the ongoing Ukraine war, with approximately 1.1 million active personnel, including 600,000 deployed near Ukraine.[xx] According to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Russia's Defence spending reached 15.5 trillion roubles ($150 billion), or 7.2% of GDP, up 3.4% in real terms from 2024, funding war efforts and modernisation. Inventory includes roughly 5,000 tanks (after refurbishing Soviet stocks amid 3,000+ losses), 1,000 combat aircraft (down from pre-war due to 250 losses), and a navy with one aircraft carrier, 60 submarines, and 800 vessels total, emphasising submarine advancements.[xxi] Russia's strengths seem to lie in strategic nuclear forces (1,550 deployed warheads, up to 2,000 non-strategic), electronic warfare, drone production (over 100 daily), and global power projection via naval deployments. Adaptations include glide bombs and unmanned systems, enabling incremental gains in Ukraine despite 750,000 - 790,000 casualties.[xxii] According to experts, Russia's weaknesses include degraded conventional forces against NATO, stagnation in innovation, sanctions-driven dependencies on China/Iran/North Korea, labour shortages, and rising costs that hamper the development of advanced technology.[xxiii] Reforms prioritise nuclear deterrence, robotics, and force enlargement, but demographic/economic constraints may limit rebuilding over a decade. Overall, Russia sustains attrition warfare but faces sustainability challenges for broader threats.[xxiv] The Realities of the Current Wars – the case of the war in Ukraine The war in Ukraine is surprisingly static in a sense in which the First World War was static. We can observe numerous troops fighting a 21st-century version of a trench war, at least to an extent where the front lines seem pretty much fixed. Technological aspects of the Ukrainian war are, however, decidedly different from a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine is marked by an extensive use of drones. The analysis of available data from the military, UN reports, and media, up to mid-2025, indicates that the weapons causing the highest number of casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war are primarily drones and artillery systems. These two account for most of both military and civilian losses, with a notable shift toward drones in recent years. Total casualties exceed 1.2 million (primarily military, including killed and wounded), though exact figures are estimates due to underreporting and classification issues.   *Generated by Grok. Prompt: What weapons cause the most significant number of casualties in the Ukrainian war? Multiple Sources. Please see below.[xxv] According to publicly available data, military casualties dominate, with around 1.2 million total for Russia and Ukraine combined.[xxvi] As for civilians, the estimates indicate around 50 thousand casualties, mostly from wide-area explosives.[xxvii] Can the EU be a Formidable Military Power of Tomorrow? The existing intel indicates that the drones are responsible for 70 to 80% of battlefield casualties. Exact numbers are naturally difficult to come by, but experts estimate that the total usage of drones likely exceeds production slightly due to imports/donations. Having said that, the production is probably the best indicator. Consequently, the cumulative totals since 2022 exceed 10 million, with 2025 projected to add 7-9 million drones to the battlefield.[xxviii] If this trajectory continues, it means that the future wars will increasingly be fought with drones and missiles, probably operated by AI systems. So how about the EU? The EU production is small-scale and high-value, with countries like France (Parrot SA, Thales) and Germany (Flyability) among the global top 10 manufacturers. No specific unit numbers, but the EU lags in mass production, urging scaling to millions annually for defence. The current output is likely in the tens to hundreds of thousands, primarily focused on (ISR) – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.[xxix] Tellingly, "Defence Data 2024-2025" from the European Defence Agency (EDA) does not even explicitly mention drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At best, the document alludes to the substantial increase in defence investment, procurement, and R&D in the EU Member States in the future, strongly suggesting that unmanned systems, including drones, are part of ongoing and future defence capability developments.[xxx] Interestingly, it is Ukraine that outpaces the EU in its own domestic production of drones. According to the Global Drone Industry 2025 Market Report, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones domestically in 2024 and, per President Zelensky in early 2025, has the capacity to build 4 million drones annually.[xxxi] Among other interesting information, one finds: 1. The global drone market was valued at about $73 billion in 2024 and is forecast to reach $163+ billion by 2030, with a 14%+ CAGR in the latter 2020s2. Military and defence end-use accounted for about 60% of the total drone market value in 2024.3. DJI (Chinese producer) held an estimated 70%+ share of the global drone market by 2024. One of the most promising developments in this respect appears to be the Eurodrone, officially known as the European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), a twin-turboprop unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions. It is being developed collaboratively by Airbus (leading the project), Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo, under the management of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), to meet the needs of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The program aims to provide a sovereign European capability that's affordable, operationally relevant, and certified for flight in non-segregated airspace, thereby reducing reliance on non-European systems, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drone.[xxxii] As of 2025, it's in the development phase, with the prototype assembly underway and a maiden flight targeted for mid-2027, followed by initial deliveries around 2029-2030. As such, it is still more of a project rather than any real formidable capability.   Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/20005/total-forecast-purchases-of-weaponized-military-drones/   Source: https://quasa.io/media/top-10-drone-manufacturing-countries-in-2025-global-leaders-trends-and-analysis Apart from drones and UAVs, it is missiles that feature prominently in the modern battlefield. Here, the EU's production capabilities seem equally modest. EU production has indeed tripled overall since 2022, driven by the war. Still, it remains defensive-oriented, with slower scale-up due to component shortages (e.g., rocket motors) and a reliance on U.S. partners. Offensive long-range strike capabilities are limited, with focus on air-defence interceptors under initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI).[xxxiii] Key systems include U.S.-made Patriot (PAC-2 GEM-T and PAC-3 MSE) and European Aster 30 (via MBDA's Eurosam). Global Patriot production is 850 – 880 annually, but Europe receives only 400 – 500. Aster output is 190 – 225 in 2025, nearly all for Europe. Combined, EU availability is 600 – 700 interceptors per year. Under a 2:1 targeting ratio (multiple interceptors per incoming missile), this equates to defending against 235 – 299 ballistic missiles annually. Projections aim for 1,130 by 2027 and 1,470 by 2029, with licensed production in Germany (e.g., Rheinmetall).[xxxiv] Recent analyses indicate Russia has significantly boosted its missile manufacturing since 2022, shifting to a wartime economy with 24/7 operations and foreign inputs (e.g., from North Korea and Iran). Estimates for 2025 suggest an annual output in the thousands, far outpacing pre-war levels, though exact figures are classified and reliant on external intelligence.[xxxv] As for ballistic missiles, Russia's Production of short- and medium-range systems such as the 9M723 (Iskander-M) and Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal) has surged. Pre-war estimates pegged 9M723 at around 72 units per year, but by June 2025, this had risen to at least 720 annually, with monthly output at 60 – 70 units. Kinzhal production stands at 10 – 15 per month (120 – 180 annually). Combined, these yield 840 – 1,020 ballistic missiles per year, marking a 66% increase over the past year and a 15–40% jump in Iskander output alone during the first half of 2025. Regarding cruise missiles, Russia's output has similarly expanded, with the Kh-101 rising from 56 pre-war to over 700 annually. Total land-attack cruise missiles (including 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks adaptations) could reach up to 2,000 per year. Stocks are estimated at 300 – 600 units currently, with projections for 5,000 by 2035. All in all, most experts point to a significant "missile gap" favouring Russia, where its 840 – 1,020 annual ballistic missiles alone exceed the EU's defensive capacity (e.g., intercepting only 300 ballistic threats per year). Russia's total missile/drone output dwarfs EU efforts. However, that is not all; one should also examine the usage and development of AI and AI-driven and operated military systems. This limited analysis does not allow an in-depth look into the matter. I have written about it here, claiming that the current war in Ukraine is also a huge lab for testing AI and AI-driven military systems. Apparently, the "AI arms race" gives Russia's wartime AI applications (e.g., drone swarms) a practical edge, potentially outpacing the EU's ethical focus by 2–3 times in deployment speed. Russia's budget allocations (5–15%) exceed the EU's EDF share (4–8%), but EU venture surges (500% growth) and NATO ties provide qualitative advantages in reliable, regulated AI. Gaps include Russia's hands-on war experience versus the EU's potential lag, with calls for international law bans and more substantial EU investments to counter the risks of escalation. Optimistically, Europe's rearmament ($865 billion) could close the divide by 2030, but analysts warn of vulnerabilities without faster AI scaling.[xxxvi] Last but not least, similar arguments can be made about the munition production capabilities. To cut a long story short, the answer to the question presented in the title of this section has to be rather negative. For example, even NATO officials, including Secretary General Mark Rutte, claimed Russia produces three times as much ammunition in three months as the whole of NATO in a year," implying 9 – 12 million annually, or even 20.5 million for a 12 times advantage. However, analysts critique these as exaggerated, noting Russia's industrial limits make figures above 4 – 6 million unfeasible without full mobilisation. External supplies bolster output: North Korea delivered ~7 million rounds by mid-2025. Russia's $1.1 trillion rearmament plan through 2036 supports long-term growth, but 2025 estimates hover at 3 – 4 million new/refurbished shells.[xxxvii] The New World Order - Incoming!!! Importantly, if the EU were to offer security and territorial integrity guarantees to Ukraine outside NATO, it would not face Russia alone. It would, or should I instead say will, face Russia and China cooperating and supporting each other, with other members of BRICS, remaining negatively neutral, that is, informally supporting Russia. I suggest that, especially a European reader, carry out a little experiment. I propose that they take any map of the world that is printed in China and locate Europe. When looking at the map, the reader is advised to compare the sizes of the territories of the EU countries with those of Russia (and China combined). Apart from that the reader is advised to compare the GDP output of the EU as Against that of Russia and China, their GDP structures, the international trade vectors, structures and volumes, the number of people, natural resources (rare earths as well as gas and coal, the number and strength of TNCs (Trans-National Companies) with headquarters in Asia and Europe. In other words, carry out a simple geopolitical comparison. To say that the EU does not look impressive as compared to Russia and China is to say nothing. When carrying out such a comparison, the observer should swiftly realise that the EU is a small region in the upper left-hand corner of the map and that its relevance and importance regarding most, if not all, of the indicators mentioned above is diminishing. The fact of the matter is that we are witnessing an absolute overhaul of the international system towards a multipolar model with the centre of gravity away from the collective west. There does not seem to be much room for Berlin, Paris or Brussels for that matter to operate as a formidable security agent outside Europe perimeter not only by the virtue of the lack of capabilities and military tools but perhaps most importantly by the lack of international recognition by the three Great powers (USA., China and Russia) and global actors such as BRICS. References[i] Soldatkin, V. (2025, September 5). Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be fair targets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-any-western-troops-ukraine-would-be-fair-targets-2025-09-05/[ii] Walker, S. (2025, September 5). Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘legitimate targets’, Putin says. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/05/western-troops-ukraine-legitimate-targets-vladimir-putin-says[iii] Western troops in Ukraine would be ‘targets’ for Russian forces: Putin. (2025, September 5). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/5/western-troops-in-ukraine-would-be-targets-for-russian-forces-putin[iv] Putin says Russia would consider foreign troops deployed in Ukraine “legitimate targets.” (2025, September 5). CBS NEWS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-putin-says-foreign-troops-legitimate-targets/[v] The Conference Board Economic Forecast for the Euro Area Economy. (2025, September 5). The Conference Board. https://www.conference-board.org/publications/eur-forecast[vi] China. EU trade relations with China. Facts, figures and latest developments. (2025, September 9). European Cmmission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en#:~:text=Trade%20picture,%2C%20and%20chemicals%20(17%25).[vii] A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts. (2025, April). 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Brugel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed[xvii] European Commission, EU defence in numbers. European Council, Council of the European Union. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-numbers/[xviii] European Commission, Acting on defence to protect Europeans. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en[xix] Mejino-Lopez, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2025). Boosting the European Defence Industry in a Hostile World. Interconomics, 60(1), 34–39. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/boosting-the-european-defence-industry-in-a-hostile-world.html[xx] Carlough, M., & Harris, B. (n.d.). Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian Militaries. 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New Eurasian Strategies Centre. https://nestcentre.org/military-lessons/[xxv] Adams, P. (2025, July 18). Kill Russian soldiers, win points: Is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war? BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80p9k1r1dlo, Drones become most common cause of death for civilians in Ukraine war, UN says. (2025, February 11). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/drones-become-most-common-cause-death-civilians-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-02-11/, Grey, S., Shiffman, J., & Martell, A. (2024, July 19). Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/, Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians. (2025, August 1). Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). https://aoav.org.uk/2025/ukraine-casualty-monitor/, Court, E. (2025, February 13). What is the death toll of Russia’s war in Ukraine? 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EUROPEAN MEDIUM ALTITUDE LONG ENDURANCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – MALE RPAS (EURODRONE). Retrieved September 15, 2025, from https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/european-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-male-rpas-eurodrone/[xxxiii] Casimiro, C. (2025, August 14). European Defense Production Triples Since Russia-Ukraine War: Report. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/european-defense-production-tripled/[xxxiv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, July 6). Europe’s Missile Gap: How Russia Outcompetes Europe in the Conventional Missile Domain. MIssile Matters - with Fabian Hoffmann. https://missilematters.substack.com/p/europes-missile-gap-how-russia-outcompetes[xxxv] Hoffmann, F. (2025, September 8). Denial Won’t Do: Europe Needs a Punishment-Based Conventional Counterstrike Strategy. WAR ON THE ROCKS. https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy/[xxxvi] Zysk, K. (2023, November 20). Struggling, Not Crumbling: Russian Defence AI in a Time of War. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/struggling-not-crumbling-russian-defence-ai-time-war and Cohen, J. (2025, June 30). The Future of European Defense. Goldman Sachs. https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense[xxxvii] Lehalau, Y. (2025, July 25). Is Russia Outpacing NATO In Weapons Production? Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-weapons-production-us-germany/33482927.html

Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization with significant Chinese influence and spans over the vast Eurasian region. Considered to be among the world’s largest regional organizations, SCO has gained immense attraction and a boost in its mission, particularly in 21st-century geopolitics.(SCO 2017) Since its very inception in 2001, the SCO has been promoting three main objectives, including regional stability (terrorism, extremism and separatism), multilateral cooperation (politics, trade, economy and culture), and a multipolar global order.(Calderonio 2025) The fundamental geopolitical dynamics have been further elucidated by the SCO summit in 2025. Held in Tianjin province of China, the SCO 2025 was a notable diplomatic event where friends and foes were brought under a common framework. By extraordinary meet-and-greets, the summit sends a clear message to the Western bloc that accepting the realities is the key to success in the current international structure. While, on the stage, the summit depicted a united multipolar world, but the internal differences between the member states reveal the illusion behind the optics. Tianjin Summit: Strategic Signaling to the West The CCP selected Tianjin city for the summit, primarily due to the following reasons: · Historically, Tianjin had been under the control of European powers. China signals the West of its supremacy by holding a summit in the same city.· Located very close to Beijing, Tianjin is a port city that represents China’s economic might.· Tianjin is a technological and industrial hub of China. It represents China's readiness to advance its vision of peaceful development.· Tianjin is also a critical junction of China’s BRI project, which further glorifies China’s growing economic significance in the international arena. No doubt, China tried its best to project its economic superiority to the west by selecting Tianjin for the summit. But this selection can be considered as China centrism by the member states. It will give rise to the feelings of Chinese brand promotion rather than collective ownership. Summit Significance The current geopolitical dynamics make the 2025 SCO summit unique. This year witnessed the revival of President Trump in the Oval Office, which altered the political and economic status quo of the international arena in a very short period of time.(Jonathan Swan 2023) The Russia-Ukraine war is still there. The Trump administration has tried its best to somehow resolve the Ukraine war, but it has miserably failed to do so. The previous Biden administration, along with the European allies, had frozen the Russian assets. In addition, the ongoing Israel-Gaza tensions have further added fuel. This year witnessed the combined US-Israel efforts to denuclearize Iran through military means. Israel has put an iron hand on the axis of resistance. Last but not least, 2025 once again witnessed a military standoff between Pakistan and India, where China provided immense support to Pakistan.(Clary 2025) Similarly, the situation in the Middle East has completely deteriorated. The 2025 SCO summit gathers half of the world’s states on a single platform with a prime motto of multi-polarity to be the sole solution to increasing crises in the international arena. In spite of all this, this summit didn’t result in any new development. As usual, the initiatives were taken but remain merely declaratory. The consensus-driven decision-making has caused serious hurdles for the SCO to deduce some fruitful results. The difference of opinion of the member states belonging to different parts and blocs of the world creates a mess that at the end cannot produce any concrete decision. Dead Economies: Response to Trump After the recent tensions between the US and India due to the tariff issue, President Trump titled both Russia and India as dead economies. In a broad context, Trump slammed the eastern powers, saying that without US assistance, their economies are considered as fatal.(Kay 2025) However, President Trump's bold claims were shattered by the attendance of 26 world leaders at the SCO summit in 2025. To foster regional and global cooperation, nations from opposing ideologies came together under the SCO banner. Furthermore, the idea that China, Russia, and India were isolated nations that the West ignored was destroyed. Instead, the three major regional titans teamed up to strengthen their connections even more. Yet, one can say that this collective response to the West is just for a stage show. It is due to the fact that SCO is surrounded by internal rivalries and differences of opinion in driving the international structure. Concerns of Central Asian states are its best manifestation. According to them, SCO is becoming more a China-centric platform rather than a multi-vocal stage. Moreover, Chinese debt trap diplomacy and Uyghur issues are also a cause of divide. Similarly, Indian strategic rivalry with China and its close ties with the West, i.e., QUAD, will always be a major loophole in the SCO. The member states know the reality that the world is heading towards Multipolarity, but the US dominance and hold in the international arena can’t be neglected. UN Chief Participation The participation of the United Nations Chief, Antonio Guterres, in the SCO meeting at this juncture also gives more strength to the multipolar manifestation of the international system. This visit is of huge importance, as Trump's political and pro-Israeli actions have caused the allies, particularly the UN and European allies, to lose their confidence. By attending the SCO summit, Guterres positively sent the message that only the new international order dominated by China could provide a practical solution to global regional peace and security. Xi, in response, showed his willingness to work with the UN.(Fisayo 2025) But his statement is more like just a symbolic gesture. This is due to the fact that SCO, up till now, can’t meet the institutional level of the UN, NATO or the EU. With weak institutional structure, including consensus-based decision-making, absence of supranational authority, no permanent parliament or court, etc., the SCO is still very far away from that of the Western security and economic bloc. Thus, the participation of the UN Chief was no doubt of much significance, but the participation has to go beyond declaring statements and symbolic gestures. East Meets West: NATO Boots in SCO NATO’s prominent member state, Turkey, participated in the SCO summit 2025.(Xinhua 2025) In view of recent geopolitical dynamics, the revival of Turkey has increased its vitality. The role of Turkey in post-Assad Syria and its continuous support to Gaza has emboldened its footprints in the region. The strained relations between Turkey and Israel further added to the duel. Moreover, in the recent Indo-Pak conflict of May 2025, Turkey played its vital part assisting Pakistan alongside China against India. President Erdogan’s participation signals to the West that nations have many balls in the air to play with. Not only Turkey, but also the Slovakian Prime Minister also participated in the summit. Note that Slovakia is a member of both NATO and the European Union. Fico has a pro-Russian view, maintaining neutrality in the foreign policies. His government also denies President Trump’s proposal of raising NATO defense spending up to 5%. Similarly, the ideological rift with the EU has further broadened the gap. While meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit 2025, President Putin praised Robert Fico’s policies, saying, “We are very grateful that you and your government are following an independent foreign policy and are not contributing to the widespread anti-Russo sentiment that is engulfing most of Europe. Right now, there are constant attempts to spread fear about Russia's alleged plan to attack Europe.”(Reuters 2025) In addition, many non-NATO US allies participated in the SCO summit 2025. These include Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia unquestionably belongs to the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). But the latest peace brokered by the Trump administration between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has reduced the Russian influence in the region. Their participation in the summit at such a critical time suggests that the eastern flank, especially the PRC and China, can’t be ignored.(Yerevan 2025) Now, it seems like there is a clear divide in the western blocs i.e. NATO or the EU, and the SCO is going to attract these divided western members. But, that’s not the only case. There is also another side of the coin. No doubt, Turkey is taking interest in eastern initiatives, but still it is not given any permanent member status by China and Russia. It is still under the observer status. This is because Turkey has been an essential member of NATO for a very long period of time. As of now, Turkey is trying to balance its relationship with east and west. It can’t simply ignore the Western dominance and, at the same time, can’t leave the rising multipolar world alone. Similarly, several EU states, including Hungary and Slovakia, have some differences with the European Union, but it does not mean that they will be completely switching their blocs. Moreover, these EU states have a very low status in the Eastern Bloc, while on the other hand, they enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the EU. Sino-Indian Convergence The participation of Indian Prime Minister Modi in the SCO summit 2025 after a five-year gap was an immediate shift. India emerged as a key ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States recognized India as the region's “Net Security Provider.”(Hassan and Ali 2025) But the recent clash between the Trump administration and India over the tariff issue and Trump’s supportive statements for Pakistan have created a political divide between the two allies. Participation of the Indian prime minister in the SCO summit explicitly signals to the US that they have an independent foreign policy, and if not the US, then the eastern flank is ready to cooperate with them. And the world witnessed that both Xi and Putin welcomed PM Modi warmly, signaling to the US that they have been successful in destroying the Indo-Pacific struggle of the US against China. President Xi stated while meeting with PM Modi, “Let the dragon and elephant dance together.”(Simone McCarthy 2025) Now, this statement by the Chinese leader is just like a symbolic gesture. The realities can’t be ignored. China is continuously increasing its military arsenals and building a new military city, but where? In the backyard of India. In addition, there are border disputes between both the states. For this, the Indian strategic thinking cannot compromise its security over diplomatic relations with China. Here, the long-term vital ally of India is only the US in the Indo-Pacific. The dragon and elephant will not dance together until and unless historical grievances, security dilemma and public perception are all addressed. Institutional Limitations of SCO   US Foreign Policy Failure From the very first day of his second tenure, President Trump has been trying to create a divide between China and Russia. During his election campaign, he used to propagate a pro-Putin stance, stating that he will be going to end the Ukraine war in just 24 hours.(Hagstrom 2023) Similarly, he has given multiple times this statement that Russia is a very big power, and the US doesn’t want to strain its relation with Russia. Trump also accepted Putin’s demands of expelling NATO from its eastern borders. At the same time, Trump started a tariff war against China. He tried to get the favor of the Russian president while creating tensions with China. This policy is not new. President Richard Nixon had done this before. But the current geopolitical dynamics have completely changed as compared to the past, and this is the reason that Trump’s Nixonian version has miserably failed.(Wright 2025) In doing so, it seems that the Trump administration has lost the trust of its historical allies, including the European states and India. Despite the fact that the ongoing situation is going against the US, we can’t ignore the strategic hold of the US in the international arena. Whether it is trade, security or technology, the US is still considered to be the dominant player. The rising multipolarity has no doubt created dents in the Western system, but the dollar monopoly in the international markets is still playing its part, with many nations, whether by choice or not, conducting their financial transactions in the US dollar. Cooperation and Caution in SCO The SCO member states are somehow caught in between balancing and hedging. They not only try to balance between East and West but also between China and Russia. The Central Asian republics can’t ignore Russia, which is sitting in their backyard. Similarly, they want Chinese to invest but simultaneously restrain from overdependence on China. Then comes the case of Iran, which tends to be active in eastern diplomatic and security initiatives. The western sanctions and isolation forced it to join the eastern camp. But, due to its economic constraints, Iran does not have much say in the decision-making process. Last but not least, Pakistan and India. Both rivals try to improve their image by projecting their different stances in the Eastern Bloc. Pakistan plays its part in the SCO to gain regional popularity, but its fragile economy is again the main hurdle. On the other hand, India does a to-and-fro motion by maintaining close strategic relations with the West, especially the US and on the sidelines, not ignoring Russia completely. This creates a fractured picture, which demonstrates that the outer layer is hard, but the inner one is soft enough to be broken by just a small shock. Conclusion The 2025 SCO summit has become a landmark event where friends and foes were seen under a common banner. It can be considered a political power show where China and Russia conveyed a clear message to the West that capitalist behavior is no longer a viable option for anyone. The world is moving towards a multipolar region where there are multiple options for states to collaborate with. But, simultaneously, the internal contradictions, fractured structure and geopolitical hedging have surrounded the SCO stage. Thus, we can conclude that the SCO is more a symbolic platform where cohesion and coherence is still absent. Only the illusion of photo shoots, smiles and handshakes are apparent. References Calderonio, Vincenzo. 2025. “A Basis for Human Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence Computation.” ArXiv, 1–14. http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.12498.Clary, Christopher. 2025. “Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/.Fisayo, Jeremiah. 2025. “China’s Support for Multilateralism Is Essential, Says UN Chief Antonio Guterres at Key Summit.” Euro News. 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/30/chinas-support-for-multilateralism-is-essential-says-uns-antonio-guterres-at-key-summit.Hagstrom, Anders. 2023. “Trump Describes How He Could Solve Russia-Ukraine Conflict in 24 Hours.” Fox News. 2023. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-describes-how-he-could-solve-russia-ukraine-conflict-24-hours?msockid=3238bbf1abda66eb085dadedaada6754.Hassan, Abid, and Syed Hammad Ali. 2025. “Evolving US Indo-Pacific Posture and Strategic Competition with China.” Policy Perspectives 22 (1). https://doi.org/10.13169/polipers.22.1.ra4.Jonathan Swan, Maggie Haberman & Charlie Savage. 2023. “How Trump Plans to Wield Power in 2025: What We Know - The New York Times.” New York Times. 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/article/trump-2025-second-term.html.Kay, John Reed & Chris. 2025. “Donald Trump Slams India and Russia as ‘Dead Economies’ after Tariff Stand-Off.” 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/390be64a-1527-4f71-a322-59af41133914.Reuters. 2025. “Slovak Prime Minister Fico to Meet Xi, Putin, Zelenskiy This Week.” Reuters. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/slovak-prime-minister-fico-meet-xi-putin-zelenskiy-this-week-2025-09-01/.SCO. 2025. “General Information | External Communication | The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.” Accessed September 6, 2025. https://eng.sectsco.org/20170109/192193.html.Simone McCarthy, Nectar Gan & Rhea Mogul. 2025. “India’s Modi Meets Xi on His First China Trip in Seven Years as Trump’s Tariffs Bite.” CNN. 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/31/china/india-china-xi-modi-meeting-intl-hnk.Wright, Mark Antonio. 2025. “Why a ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Won’t Split Xi and Putin.” National Review. 2025. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-prospects-of-a-reverse-nixon-to-split-russia-and-china-grow-dimmer/.Xinhua. 2025. “Xi Meets Turkish President.” Xinhua News. 2025. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202508/31/content_WS68b44ea4c6d0868f4e8f5365.html.Yerevan. 2025. “Armenia Intends to Join SCO in Line with Its Balanced Policy - Pashinyan.” Arka News Agency. 2025. https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia-intends-to-join-sco-in-line-with-its-balanced-policy-pashinyan/. 

Abstract The United Nations (UN), eighty years after its creation, faces a structural crisis that reveals the tension between justice and power. This essay examines how the design of the Security Council, with its veto power, perpetuates an unequal order inherited from 1945 and limits the effectiveness of the collective security system. Through theoretical perspectives — Morgenthau, Schmitt, Habermas, Falk, and Strange — it is shown that international law remains subordinated to power interests, that proclaimed universality masks hegemonies, and that global economic dynamics lie beyond institutional reach. Cases such as Kosovo, Libya, Gaza, and Myanmar illustrate the paralysis and delegitimization of the Responsibility to Protect. Considering this scenario, two paths emerge: reforming multilateralism with limits on the veto and greater representativeness or resigning to a fragmented order. The conclusion is clear: without adaptation, the UN will become a symbolic forum, making chronic its inability to respond to current challenges. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, warned: “The United Nations was not created to take us to heaven, but to save us from hell.” [1] Eighty years after its founding, that promise seems to falter in the face of multiple wars, such as those in Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan, or Myanmar, among many others, with a sense of ineffectiveness, loss of prestige, and collective impotence being perceived: does the UN no longer fulfill the role it once assumed? At first glance, blame falls solely on the nature of the institution itself. But the root of the problem seems to lie not only in New York, but also in the main capitals of the world. The UN is nothing more than what States allow it to be. Its effectiveness depends on the will of those who comprise it; and the uncomfortable truth is that the great powers prefer to limit its scope rather than cede parcels of sovereignty. As John Rawls pointed out, a just international system requires that peoples accept common principles of justice. [2] Today, by contrast, it is a constant that collective interest systematically gives way to particular interest. The Security Council is the most evident symbol of this contradiction. It remains anchored in post-war logic, with five permanent members clinging to the privilege of the veto. That power, already met with skepticism in San Francisco in 1945, turned into a tool of paralysis. As Canada denounced in 2022, the veto is “as anachronistic as it is undemocratic” and has prevented responses to atrocities. [3] Aristotle said that “justice is equality, but only for equals.” [4] In the UN, the Assembly proclaims sovereign equality, while the Council denies it in practice: some States remain “more equal” than others. The UN Charter articulates its backbone in a few luminous rules: the prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2.4), non-intervention in internal affairs (Art. 2.7), and, as a counterbalance, the collective security system of Chapter VII (Arts. 39–42), which grants the Security Council the authority to determine threats to peace and authorize coercive measures. In parallel, Art. 51 preserves the right of self-defense against an “armed attack.” [5] This normative triangle — prohibition, collective security, defense — is the promise of a world governed by law and not by force, but it must be put into practice. In the 1990s, a dilemma arose: what to do when a State massacres its own population or is unable to prevent it? The political-legal response was the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), affirmed at the 2005 World Summit (paras. 138–139). [6] Its architecture is sequential: (I) each State has the primary responsibility to protect its population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (II) the international community must help States fulfill that responsibility; and (III) if a State manifestly fails, the international community, through the Security Council, may adopt collective measures — preferably peaceful ones; as a last resort, coercive — case by case and in accordance with the Charter. Properly understood, R2P is not a license to intervene; it is a duty to protect framed within International Law. The historical record shows both its necessity and its perverse effects. Kosovo (1999) inaugurated, without authorization from the Council, the narrative of “humanitarian intervention,” based on a supposed “legitimate illegality.” [7] The precedent left a dangerous standard: humanitarian purposes invoked to circumvent the hard core of the Charter. Libya (2011) seemed to be the “ideal case” of R2P: the Council authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. [8] However, the shift toward regime change eroded the trust of Russia and China, which since then have blocked robust resolutions on Syria, hollowing out the effectiveness of R2P. [9] The lesson is bitter: when protection is perceived as a vehicle of hegemony, the norm is delegitimized, and the veto becomes reflexive. Gaza and Myanmar display the other face of paralysis. In Gaza, the Council’s inability to impose sustainable ceasefires — despite patterns of hostilities that massively impact the civilian population — has shifted the debate to the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice through interstate actions and provisional measures. [10] In Myanmar, the genocide of the Rohingya mobilized condemnations, sanctions, and proceedings before the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ), [11] but did not trigger a coercive response from the Council. R2P exists on paper; its implementation is captive to the veto. Thus, the “right to have rights” that Arendt spoke of still depends on geopolitics. [12] History teaches that international law has always been strained by force. Rousseau warned that the strong seek to transform their power into law. [13] That is what the winners of 1945 did by crystallizing their hegemony in the Charter. And so, what Kant dreamed of as perpetual peace remains chained to an unequal order. [14] The UN, more than a republic of law, still seems a field of power. That fragility has opened space for alternatives. The BRICS, for example, have emerged as a heterogeneous bloc that combines the cohesion of historically homogeneous powers such as China and Russia with the diversity of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Paradoxically, their strength lies in articulating that heterogeneity against a common enemy: the concentration of power in the Security Council. [15] In a multipolar world, heterogeneity ceases to be a weakness and becomes a driver of plurality and resistance. The UN crisis is not only about security; it is also economic and distributive. The universalist promise of the Charter (Arts. 1.3 and 55–56, on cooperation for development) coexists with a global financial architecture whose heart beats outside the UN: the IMF and World Bank, designed in Bretton Woods, project a structural power — in Susan Strange’s terms — that conditions public policies, access to liquidity, and investment capacity. [16] The sovereign equality proclaimed in New York becomes blurred when the asymmetry of weighted voting in financial institutions (and the conditionality of credit) makes some States more “equal” than others. This is not a recent claim. Since the 1960s, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and, later, the Declaration on a New International Economic Order (1974), sought to correct structural problems such as the deterioration of terms of trade and the dependence between “center” and “periphery” countries, as Prebisch had pointed out. [17] However, the results were limited: ECOSOC lacks teeth, UNDP mobilizes cooperation but fails to change the rules of the system, and the 2030 Agenda sets important goals but without mandatory enforcement mechanisms. [18] The pandemic and the climate crisis have further worsened these inequalities, highlighting problems such as over-indebtedness, the insufficiency in the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and climate financing that often arrives late and under unsuitable conditions. In this scenario, the New Development Bank of the BRICS emerges, seeking to open a path toward greater financial autonomy for developing countries. [19] International economic justice is the reverse side of collective security. Without fiscal space or technological transfer, the Global South remains trapped between development promises and adjustment demands. The UN has political legitimacy to outline a Global Economic Council (as proposed by the Stiglitz Commission in 2009) [20] to coordinate debt, international taxation, and global public goods, but it currently lacks normative muscle. The result is fragmentation: fiscal minilateralism, climate clubs, and value chains that distribute risks to the South and rents to the North. The solution does not lie simply in “more aid,” but in prudent rules such as: (I) a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism under UN auspices; [21] (II) effective international taxation on intangibles and the digital economy; [22] (III) binding compliance with the loss and damage fund in climate matters; [23] and (IV) a reform of quotas in IFIs that reflects the real weight of emerging economies. [24] Without constitutionalizing — even gradually — this economic agenda, sovereign equality will remain an empty liturgy and the discontent of the Global South a political fuel that erodes the UN from within. The truth is that the United Nations of 1945 no longer responds to the challenges of 2025. As the president of Brazil recently said: “The UN of 1945 is worth nothing in 2023.” [25] If States do not recover the founding spirit — placing collective interest above particular ones — the organization will remain prisoner of the veto and the will of a few. The question, then, is not whether the UN works, but whether States really want it to work. Taking the above into account, this essay will analyze the UN crisis from three complementary dimensions. First, the theoretical and philosophical framework that allows us to understand the tension between power and law will be addressed, showing how different authors highlight the structural roots of this contradiction. Second, historical episodes and current examples will be reviewed to illustrate the paralysis and democratic deficit of the organization. Finally, possible scenarios for the future will be projected, engaging in the exercise of evaluating the minimum reforms that could revitalize multilateralism in contrast to the alternative of critical global fragmentation. Considering all together, the argument is that the UN finds itself trapped between justice without power and power without justice, and that its survival depends on its ability to adapt to an international order radically different from that of 1945. I. The contradiction between power and law: Hans Morgenthau and political realism To understand the paralysis of the UN, it is useful to turn to Hans Morgenthau, a pioneer of realism in international relations. In his work “Politics Among Nations” (1948), he warned that the international order is always mediated by the balance of power and that legal norms only survive to the extent that they coincide with the interests of powerful States. [26] His idea is provocative: international law is not an autonomous order, but a language that powers use so long as it does not contradict their strategic objectives. Applied to the UN, this analysis is clear: the institution reflects less universal ethical commitment and more correlation of historical forces. The Security Council is not a neutral body, but the mirror of the hegemony of 1945, crystallized in Article 27 of the Charter, which enshrines the right of veto. The supposed universality of the UN is subordinated to a mechanism designed precisely to ensure that no action contrary to the superpowers could be imposed. Contemporary critiques confirm Morgenthau’s intuition. When Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine, [27] or the United States does the same regarding Gaza, [28] it becomes evident that international justice is suspended in the name of geopolitics. The legal is subordinated to the political. In this sense, the UN crisis is not an accident, but the logical consequence of its design, and what Morgenthau pointed out seventy years ago remains valid: as long as there is no coincidence between law and power, international norms will remain fragile. Political realism helps explain why the UN fails when it is most needed. States continue to act according to their national interests, even when this contradicts the international norms they themselves have subscribed to. The Security Council has become a space where powers project their strategies of influence, blocking collective actions whenever these affect their geopolitical priorities. The war in Ukraine, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide show that international law is applied selectively, reinforcing the idea that rules are valid only when they do not interfere with the power of the strongest. This pattern evidently erodes the legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of societies, because it generates the perception that the organization is incapable of representing the collective interest and, instead, merely reflects the correlation of forces of each historical moment. II. Carl Schmitt and the Myth of Universal Order Another voice that resonates is that of Carl Schmitt, who in “The Nomos of the Earth” (1950) argued that every international legal order arises from a founding political decision, that is, an act of power. [29] For Schmitt, there is no “universal law” that imposes itself; what is presented as universal is, in reality, the crystallization of a particular domain. The UN perfectly embodies this diagnosis. The founding discourse of San Francisco in 1945 spoke of “we the peoples of the United Nations,” [30] but in reality the Charter was written under the predominance of the winners of the Second World War. What was presented as a universal order of peace and security was, in fact, the codification of the Allied hegemony. Schmitt helps explain why the UN has never escaped that original logic. Although the General Assembly proclaims sovereign equality in Article 2 of the Charter, the structure of the Council reproduces the privilege of a few. [31] The international law of the UN appears, in Schmittian terms, as a “nomos” imposed by the winners, not as a true universal community. The consequence is a legitimate deficit that has persisted until today and explains much of the perception of ineffectiveness. The original structure of the UN perpetuates an unequal design that remains in force. The veto privilege is not only a defensive mechanism for the winners of the Second World War, but it has also functioned as a lock — one without keys — that prevents any real evolution of the system. Over eight decades, demands for reform have clashed with the resistance of those who benefit from keeping the rules intact. The contradiction is evident: developing States, which today represent the majority in the General Assembly, lack effective power in the most important decisions on international security. The gap between the universalist discourse of sovereign equality and the hierarchical practice of the Council undermines the credibility of the multilateral order. As long as this tension persists, the UN will hardly be able to become the space of global governance that the world requires more urgently than ever in the 21st century. III. Habermas and the Need for a Deliberative Community In contrast to this pessimism, Jürgen Habermas offers a different perspective. In “The Inclusion of the Other” (1996) and in later essays, he proposed moving toward a “constitutionalization of international law,” understood as the creation of a global normative space in which decisions are not based on force, but on rational deliberation. [32] From this perspective, the UN would be an imperfect embryo of a community of world citizens. The impact of this idea is enormous: it suggests that, beyond current deadlocks, the UN embodies the possibility of transforming power relations into processes of public deliberation. Article 1 of the Charter, which speaks of “maintaining international peace and security” and of “promoting friendly relations among nations,” can be read not only as a political mandate but also as a normative ideal of cosmopolitan coexistence. [33] Criticism of Habermas is evident: his proposal errs on the side of idealism in a world where national security interests remain paramount. However, his contribution is valuable because it allows us to think of the UN not only as a paralyzed body but also as a field of normative struggle. The problem is not only the strength of the vetoes but also the lack of will to transform that space into a true deliberative forum. [34] Thinking of the UN as a deliberative community requires recognizing that its current procedures do not guarantee authentic dialogue. Debate in the General Assembly is often reduced to formal statements, while crucial decisions, as everyone knows, are taken in restricted circles. The lack of effective mechanisms for the participation of non-state actors, such as regional organizations or civil society, further limits the inclusive character of the institution. Genuine deliberation should open spaces where multiple voices can influence decision-making processes, not only through speeches but by building binding consensus. However, the most powerful States fear losing control over the international agenda, which generates a vicious circle: an elitist governance system is maintained that protects privileges, but at the cost of sacrificing legitimacy and effectiveness. Thus, the promise of a deliberative order is reduced to a normative horizon that has not yet been realized. IV. Richard Falk and the Global Democratic Deficit A more recent contribution comes from Richard Falk, jurist and former UN rapporteur, who has insisted on the “democratic deficit” of the international order. In his view, the UN suffers from a structural contradiction: while the Charter proclaims the sovereignty of peoples, in practice it concentrates power in a small club of States. [35] This not only limits its effectiveness but also erodes its legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of the world. The case of Palestine is emblematic. The General Assembly has repeatedly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but the veto in the Council blocks any effective measure. [36] Falk interprets this as evidence that the UN operates under a “democracy of States” but not under a “democracy of peoples.” The impact is devastating: millions of people perceive the organization not as a guarantor of rights, but as an accomplice to inequality. This leads us to a brief analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC), born from the Rome Statute (1998), which promised a civilizational breakthrough: that the most serious crimes (“which affect the international community as a whole”) would not go unpunished. [37] Its design is cautious: complementarity (it acts only if the State is unwilling or unable), restricted jurisdiction (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and — with limits — aggression), and jurisdiction based on territory, nationality, or referral by the Security Council. The two major milestones of the Council — referrals of Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011) —demonstrated both the potential and the limits. There were procedural advances and arrest warrants, but also contested operative clauses and very little cooperation for arrests. [38] The implicit message to the Global South was ambiguous: justice is universal, but its activation depends on the map of alliances in the Council. At the same time, key powers are not parties to the Statute (United States, China, Russia) and yet influence when the Court acts. The result fuels the argument of “winners’ justice” that several African foreign ministries have raised. The Court has tried to rebalance its map: investigations in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Ukraine, as well as arrest warrants against high-ranking authorities in cases of aggression or serious international crimes, have partly disproved the idea of a one-sided persecution. But the Achilles’ heel persists: without State cooperation, there are no executions of warrants; without the Council, there is no activation in key contexts; with the Council, there is a veto. In addition, Article 16 of the Statute allows the Council to suspend investigations for 12 renewable months, a political valve that subordinates the judicial to the geopolitical. [39] Integrating Falk’s critique into this essay makes it possible to highlight that the UN crisis is not only institutional but also democratic. Article 1.2 of the Charter proclaims respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, but this ideal becomes empty when the veto power systematically contradicts it. [40] The democratic deficit of the UN is not limited to the Security Council but runs through the entirety of its institutional architecture. Developing countries have little influence on global economic governance, despite being the most affected by decisions on debt, trade, or climate financing. Unequal representation in bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, together with dependence on international cooperation, reproduces relations of subordination that contradict the principles of equality and self-determination. Moreover, world citizenship lacks a real channel of influence: peoples see their demands diluted in state structures that do not always — or almost never — reflect their needs. This divorce between peoples and States turns the UN into an incomplete democracy, where the most vulnerable collective subjects fail to make their voices heard. Overcoming this limitation is essential to restoring the legitimacy of multilateralism. V. Susan Strange and the Geopolitics of the Economy Finally, Susan Strange adds another dimension: the economic one. In “The Retreat of the State” (1996), she argued that power in the contemporary world does not reside only in States, but also in transnational forces — financial markets, corporations, technologies — that escape institutional control. [41] The UN, designed in 1945 under the logic of sovereign States, lacks instruments to govern this new scenario. The impact is evident. While the Security Council is paralyzed in debates over traditional wars, global crises such as climate change, pandemics, or the regulation of artificial intelligence show that real power has shifted toward non-state actors. [42] Strange warns that if international institutions do not adapt to this reality, they risk becoming irrelevant. In this sense, the UN faces not only a problem of veto or representativeness, but also a historical mismatch: it was designed for a world of States and conventional wars, but today we live in a world of transnational interdependencies. The Charter, in its Article 2.7, continues to emphasize non-interference in the internal affairs of States, but this clause seems insufficient to govern global threats that transcend borders. [43] And it is vitally important to note that the global threats of the 21st century do not fit the traditional paradigm of interstate wars that has been preconceived. Challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and technological revolutions pose risks that no State can face alone. However, the UN lacks effective mechanisms to coordinate global responses in these areas. The fragmentation of climate governance, competition for vaccines during the pandemic, and the absence of clear rules to regulate large digital corporations illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. In this context, state sovereignty proves insufficient, and the principle of non-interference becomes obsolete. If the UN does not develop innovative instruments that integrate transnational actors and strengthen multilateral cooperation, it risks becoming a merely declarative forum, incapable of offering concrete solutions to the problems that most affect contemporary humanity — and it is important that these critiques be heard before it is too late. VI. Current Scenarios All the above opens up a momentous dilemma of our time: either we reform multilateralism so that law contains “force,” or we normalize “exception” forever. [44]Scenario A: A minimal but sufficient cosmopolitan reform. A critical group of States —supported by civil society and epistemic communities — agrees to self-limit the veto in situations of mass atrocities (ACT-type codes of conduct), promotes the expansion of the Council with some permanent presence of the Global South (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and one African seat, probably South Africa), and strengthens “Uniting for Peace” mechanisms to circumvent blockages. [45] The ICJ gains centrality with advisory opinions politically bound by prior compliance commitments, the ICC ensures interstate cooperation through regional agreements, and the UN creates a rapid civil deployment capacity for the protection of civilians, minimal cybersecurity, and climate response. [46] In the economic sphere, a Global Economic Council emerges within the orbit of the UN to coordinate debt, climate, and international taxation with common standards. [47] Scenario B: Ordered fragmentation of anarchy. Blockages become chronic. Security shifts to ad hoc coalitions and minilateralisms (NATO Plus, QUAD, expanded BRICS), economic governance is decided in restricted membership forums, and the UN remains a symbolic forum without decision-making capacity. [48] Exception becomes the rule: “preventive interventions,” widespread unilateral sanctions, proliferation of private military companies, opaque cyber-operations, and a data ecology controlled by a few platforms. [49] International law endures as a language, but its social force dissipates; incentives push toward strategic autonomy and legal security by blocs. In other words, the future of the UN will depend on its ability to balance justice and force in an international environment marked by multipolarity. I insist that one possible path is to advance toward gradual reforms that strengthen transparency, broaden the representativeness of the Council, and grant greater autonomy to the General Assembly and judicial bodies. Another, far more radical, is the consolidation of parallel mechanisms that de facto replace the role of the UN through regional alliances, ad hoc coalitions, and alternative economic forums. Both paths involve risks: reform may stagnate in the lowest common denominator, while fragmentation may deepen inequalities and conflicts. However, what seems clear is that maintaining the status quo will only prolong paralysis and further weaken the legitimacy of the multilateral system. The choice between reform or irrelevance will, ultimately, be the decisive dilemma of the 21st century. I believe that three milestones will indicate where we are headed: (1) effective adoption of commitments to abstain from vetoes in the face of mass atrocities; (2) funded and operational implementation of the climate loss and damage mechanism; (3) cooperation with the ICC in politically sensitive cases, without ad hoc exceptions. [50] VII. Conclusion: Between Disillusionment and Hope The UN marks eighty years caught in Pascal’s dilemma: “force without justice is tyranny, justice without force is mockery.” [51] The diagnosis is clear: the Security Council has turned justice into a mockery, while the great powers have exercised force without legitimacy. [52] The result is a weakened organization, incapable of responding to the most urgent tragedies of our time. However, it would be a mistake to fall into absolute cynicism. Despite its evident limitations and alongside all that has been mentioned, the UN remains the only forum where 193 States engage in dialogue, the only space where there exists even a minimal notion of common international law. [53] Its crisis should not lead us to abandon it, but rather to radically rethink it. Perhaps the path lies in what Habermas calls a “constitutionalization of international law,” as previously proposed, or in a profound reform of the Security Council that democratizes the use of force. [54] History teaches that institutions survive if they manage to adapt. [55] If the UN does not, it will be relegated to the status of a giant that humanity needs but that is paralyzed, a symbol of a past that no longer responds to the challenges of the present. [56] But if States recover something of the founding spirit of 1945, perhaps it can still save us from hell, even if it never takes us to heaven. [57] VIII. References [1] Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld. Citado en Brian Urquhart. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[2] John Rawls. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.[3] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[4] Aristóteles. Política. Traducido por Antonio Gómez Robledo. México: UNAM, 2000.[5] Naciones Unidas. Carta de las Naciones Unidas. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 26 de junio de 1945.[6] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[7] Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. New York: Penguin, 1968.[8] Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 1795; repr., Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003.[9] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[10] Susan Strange. States and Markets. London: Pinter, 1988. 11. Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.[12] Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.[13] Martha Finnemore. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.[14] Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.[15] Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.[16] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[17] Joseph Nye. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.[18] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[19] Robert Keohane y Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.[20] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[21] Stephen Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.[22] Robert Cox. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.[23] Robert Cox. Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.[24] Charles Kindleberger. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.[25] John Ikenberry. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.[26] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[27] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[28] Michael Doyle. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.[29] Charles Beitz. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.[30] Andrew Moravcsik. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53[31] Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.[32] Friedrich Kratochwil. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.[33] Nicholas Onuf. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.[34] Christian Reus-Smit. The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.[35] Martha Finnemore y Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.[36] Michael Barnett y Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.[37] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[38] Allen Buchanan y Robert Keohane. “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions.” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 405–37.[39] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[40] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.[41] Ian Hurd. After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.[42] Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. Statement on the Veto. UN General Assembly, 26 April 2022.[43] Oliver Stuenkel. The BRICS and the Future of Global Order. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.[44] Naciones Unidas. World Summit Outcome Document. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005.[45] Corte Internacional de Justicia. Advisory Opinions. La Haya: CIJ, varios años.[46] Naciones Unidas. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. A/59/565, 2 December 2004.[47] Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.[48] Robert Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.[49] Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.[50] Joseph Nye. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.[51] Blaise Pascal. Pensées. París: Éditions Garnier, 1976.[52] Brian Urquhart. Hammarskjöld. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.[53] Naciones Unidas. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: Naciones Unidas, 1945.[54] Jürgen Habermas. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.[55] John Ikenberry. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.[56] Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.[57] David Held. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Beijing’s Victory Day parade in Tiananmen Square was designed to dazzle: ranks of uniformed troops, formations of aircraft, and an arsenal of new systems meant to underscore China’s rapid military modernization. But the most consequential image was not a missile or a stealth jet. It was a tableau of three leaders—Xi Jinping at the center, flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un—watching the spectacle together. The scene, widely broadcast and photographed, turned a commemorative event into a geopolitical marker. It was less a snapshot than a signal: the public normalization of a deepening alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea, at a moment when Western democracies are struggling to sustain cohesion on core strategic questions. The parade itself offered the familiar mixture of hardware and narrative. Coverage highlighted the unveiling or public confirmation of advanced systems across domains: upgraded intercontinental missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, long-range bombers, early warning aircraft, and a broad stable of unmanned platforms, including undersea vehicles and “loyal wingman” drones. Chinese media presented these developments as evidence of a “world-class” People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moving beyond legacy constraints and into truly multi-domain operations, with information, space, and cyber now integrated alongside land, sea, and air. Independent reporting catalogued the breadth of systems and emphasized a narrative of credible deterrence and strategic depth rather than mere choreography. Yet the more instructive message was political. The presence of Putin and Kim, alongside other leaders, was not a mere ceremonial occurrence. Each leader arrived with clear incentives to be seen at Xi’s side, and each gained by lending visual weight to Beijing’s story. For Moscow, the image reinforced the claim that Russia is not isolated, that it retains powerful partners and is embedded in a wider non-Western coalition. For Pyongyang, the moment was even more significant: an opportunity to step out of diplomatic isolation and be recognized publicly as a member of a consequential strategic grouping. For Beijing, hosting both leaders signaled that China can convene and coordinate—projecting status, reassuring sympathetic governments, and unsettling adversaries by hinting at a tighter web of cooperation among U.S. rivals. The convergence behind the optics has been building for years, and could have happened only on Chinese soil. China and Russia have expanded their coordination across energy, defense, and diplomatic, even as they preserve maneuvering room on sensitive issues. North Korea’s accelerating exchanges with Russia, alongside growing political warmth with Beijing, provide a third leg to this emerging tripod. None of this amounts to a formal alliance with mutual defense obligations. But it does resemble a strategic alignment held together by shared interests: resisting a U.S.-led order, blunting sanctions pressure, reducing vulnerability to Western technology restrictions, and demonstrating that alternatives exist to dollar-centric finance and Western supply chains. The choreography on the rostrum did not create this alignment; it made it more legible and clear. Memory politics is a key component of that legibility. Beijing’s decision to anchor the parade in the commemoration of victory over Japan allows contemporary power projection to be cloaked in a unifying moral narrative. China increasingly leverages World War II memory in diplomacy—shaping a “memory war” that reframes the post-1945 order and what is seen from China as its rightful place within it. Russia’s long-standing use of the “Great Patriotic War” plays a parallel role, justifying current policies through selective historical continuity. North Korea’s revolutionary mythology fits easily into this narrative architecture. By standing together at an anniversary of anti-fascist victory, the three leaders signaled an ideational convergence that complements their material cooperation: a claim to moral legitimacy as guardians of an alternative international vision. The military dimension of the parade, while not the core of this argument, still matters. Displays of a maturing triad—land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched systems, and an air-launched nuclear component—aim to convey survivable second-strike capacity. The public presentation of hypersonic and anti-ship systems is meant to complicate adversary planning in the Western Pacific. The range of unmanned platforms suggests an intent to saturate domains with relatively low-cost, attritable assets, improving persistence and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. It is prudent to treat parades cautiously: not all showcased systems are fully operational or fielded at scale, and performance claims are difficult to validate. But as an indicator, the breadth and integration of platforms reflect a planning culture committed to joint operations and “intelligentized” warfare, where AI-enabled targeting and decision support are not theoretical ambitions but programmatic priorities What, then, does the image of Xi–Putin–Kim actually change? First, it clarifies expectations. Observers no longer need to infer the trajectory of this triangular relationship from scattered bilateral overtures. The three leaders have chosen to make their alignment visible. Visibility creates deterrent value, raising the perceived costs of coercing any one member, and it can also facilitate practical cooperation: intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination at the UN and other fora, synchronized signaling during regional crises, and mutually reinforcing sanctions-evasion practices. Second, it complicates Western planning. Even if Beijing keeps caution around direct military assistance in Europe or the Korean Peninsula, diplomatic top-cover, economic buffering, and technology flows short of lethal aid can still alter the correlation of forces over time. Finally, it resonates across the Global South. Many governments seek strategic autonomy and resist being forced into binary choices. The parade’s optics supplied a ready-made narrative for those who argue that the international system is already multipolar and that non-Western coalitions can deliver security and development without Western tutelage. The contrast with Western coordination was strikingly evident. In the transatlantic community, support for Ukraine remains substantial; however, debates about resource levels, war aims, and timelines have intensified. In the Indo-Pacific, there is a growing alignment on deterring coercion in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea; however, national economic interests and differing risk tolerances result in uneven policies toward China. Across Europe and North America, electoral politics continue to inject volatility into foreign policy, complicating efforts to sustain long-term, bipartisan strategies. None of these frictions amounts to collapse, and there are genuine Western successes in coalition-building—from NATO enlargement to evolving minilateral formats in the Indo-Pacific. However, an analytically honest reading of the moment acknowledges that the authoritarian trio in Beijing has projected a unity of purpose that Western capitals currently struggle to match consistently. Three implications follow. The first is narrative competition. If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang can turn a commemorative event into a global story about legitimacy and resilience, they will continue to use history as a strategic resource. The appropriate Western response is not to cede the narrative field but to invest in historically grounded, forward-looking messaging that explains the link between rules-based order and practical benefits—trade reliability, crisis management, and sovereignty protection—for diverse audiences. The second is coalition maintenance. Western policymakers will need to prioritize “coalition hygiene”: aligning export controls and investment screening where it matters most; building redundancy into critical supply chains; closing divergences in sanctions enforcement; and coordinating messaging so that tactical differences do not obscure strategic alignment. This requires political discipline more than new institutions. The third is theater integration. As the Beijing image suggested a cross-regional understanding among three adversarial capitals, allied planning must better account for cross-theater linkages—how actions in Europe affect deterrence in Asia, and vice versa—and ensure that resource allocations and industrial policies reflect genuinely global prioritization. It is important not to overstate. The emerging alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea is asymmetric and interest-based, not a tightly binding alliance. Beijing’s global economic integration imposes constraints that Moscow and Pyongyang do not share. Russia and North Korea each bring liabilities that China will manage carefully. Frictions—over technology, pricing, and regional equities—will persist. But the threshold crossed in Beijing is nonetheless meaningful. These governments judged that the benefits of public proximity now outweigh the costs. That judgment, once made, is difficult to reverse quickly; it tends to generate its own momentum through bureaucratic follow-through and sunk reputational costs. One image cannot rewrite the balance of power. It can, however, crystallize a trend and concentrate minds. The sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together did exactly that. It captured an authoritarian convergence rooted in shared grievances and converging strategies, and it highlighted the challenge facing democracies that wish to preserve an open and stable order: maintaining the patience, unity, and policy discipline to act together. The test for the West is less whether it recognizes the signal—most capitals do—than whether it can convert recognition into sustained, collective action. If Beijing’s parade was a demonstration of choreography and intent, the appropriate answer is not a counter-parade, but the quieter work of alignment: aligning narratives with interests, interests with instruments, and instruments with partners. That work is not glamorous. It is, however, what turns a photo into policy.

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin turned out to be the largest gathering in the institution’s history, convening 20 foreign leaders and 10 heads of international organisations, including United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. More than a display of institutional breadth, the summit served as a stage for geopolitical signalling, most visibly through the joint presence of the leaders of China, India, and Russia. Their highly choreographed meetings were designed for maximum optics and deployed as deliberate instruments of international messaging, reflecting the emergence of a multipolar world. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the summit provided an opportunity to engage closely with both India and China while demonstrating that Moscow is not bereft of partners. Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed to use the occasion to burnish his credentials as the architect of an emergent political and economic order. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, conveyed a distinct and calculated message — that Indian foreign policy is rebalancing its strategic relations with the world’s major powers and restoring its posture to the centre. In doing so, New Delhi is translating its long-proclaimed doctrine of multi-alignment into practice, positioning itself as a pivotal actor in an increasingly multipolar system. Strategic Leverage  Since the end of the Cold War, Indian foreign policy has been adjusting by building its ties with the West in general and the US in particular. To illustrate in just one domain, New Delhi has purchased an array of advanced US systems, including C-17 and C-130 strategic airlift aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol planes, Chinook, Apache, and MH-60R helicopters, F404/414 engines, and MQ-9 drones, transactions that together totalled $24 billion between 2000 and 2024. This surge in US acquisitions has coincided with a marked decline in Russian influence: Moscow’s share of India’s arms imports fell from 76 per cent during 2009–2013 to just 36 per cent over the past five years. India’s pivot toward the US, and its rapid defence and economic diversification have kept Beijing on edge. During the Cold War, China extracted substantial strategic and economic benefits while playing a swing-state role between Washington and Moscow. Today, Chinese observers worry that India may play a similar role as its vaunted strategic autonomy has given way to a de facto US alignment, visible in defence procurement, economic cooperation, and a network of mini-laterals aimed at constraining Beijing. However, this narrative has softened somewhat after President Trump imposed a 50 per cent tariff on Indian exports, introducing a note of friction into the US-India equation. Against this backdrop, New Delhi and Beijing, cautiously engaging since the 2024 Kazan Summit, have stepped up their rapprochement efforts. At their bilateral meeting in Tianjin, both sides signalled a clear desire to restore stability and predictability: The focus on peace along the border and rebuilding mutual trust was unmistakable. Mr Xi emphasised strengthened communication, expanded exchanges, and multilateral cooperation, all aimed at returning bilateral relations to a pre-2020 baseline. Mr Modi, visiting China after seven years, framed a peaceful border as essential to the smooth development of the broader relationship. He also ensured that counterterrorism remained front and centre at the SCO, with the final Tianjin Declaration explicitly and emphatically condemning the Pahalgam terror attack in India. Structural Tension Vs Strategic Triangulation Beneath the polished optics, the India-China standoff remains unresolved. Around 60,000 troops on each side still face off along the Line of Actual Control, and Tianjin offered no concrete road map for demobilisation or border delimitation. Disputes over Pakistan, Tibet, and Taiwan persist, a reminder that diplomacy cannot paper over deep strategic fissures. Strategic triangulation adds another layer of complexity. Both capitals have long leveraged ties with third powers to boost bargaining power and extract economic or diplomatic advantage. Beijing seeks a show of unity with India against Washington’s tariffs but remains wary: If New Delhi secures a better deal, alignment with the US is always on the table. Institutionally, the SCO continues to lag behind Brics in global visibility, yet its operational significance is rising. China’s trade with SCO members hit $512.4 billion in 2024, doubling the 2018 level. Therefore, Mr Xi’s advocacy for a “new type of international relations”, coupled with initiatives such as the SCO Development Bank and multilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy, reflects a strategic calculus: to insulate Beijing from the volatility of Washington while steering the engines of future economic growth. Ultimately, the India-China meeting in Tianjin exemplified a nuanced balancing act: cooperation where feasible, vigilance where imperative, and a stark reminder that even as optics improve, the underlying geopolitical chessboard remains fiercely contested. Conclusion Mr Modi’s Tianjin visit and his meeting with Mr Xi signalled New Delhi’s growing international leverage. The summit remains low on concrete agreements, but it revitalised efforts to normalise ties and restart Chinese investment in India. Therefore, visa restrictions are loosening, direct flights are set to resume, and barriers to Chinese exports of fertiliser, machinery, and rare earths are gradually falling. Beneath the diplomatic optics, however, structural competition between India and China persists. Nevertheless, New Delhi is carefully striving to avoid overreliance on Washington, resisting a return to single-nation dependency. The India-China-Russia camaraderie on display in Tianjin sends a deliberate signal: Indian foreign policy will not be shy to reclaim its centrist, multi-aligned stance, leveraging strategic autonomy to navigate a complex, multipolar world. This commentary originally appeared in Business Standard.