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한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском On September 24, 2024, speaking from the gargantuan Kazan International Exhibition Centre during the BRICS Summit in Russia, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphatically extolled the “collective rise of the Global South [as] a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world.” While celebrating “Global South countries marching together toward modernization [as] monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” the Chinese leader hastened to add that China was not quite a part of but at the Global South’s “forefront”; that “will always keep the Global South in [their] heart, and maintain [their]roots in the Global South. As emerging powers in the BRICS+ grouping thronged Kazan in a clear sign to the West that they would not unwittingly entrench Vladimir Putin’s full-scale diplomatic isolation, China’s message was clear: as a great power, they would not ignore or undermine the interests of the Global South.  The rise of the Global South as a central voice in world politics concurs with the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a diplomatic field. This is not a coincidence, as they are both intimately related to broader changes in the international order, away from a US-led liberal international order, toward a post-liberal one, whose contours are still being defined, but where informal groupings, such as the BRICS+ play a key role. One could even argue that it is this transition to a new order that has pushed states to engage diplomatically on issues around cyberspace. What was once the purview of the Global North, and particularly the US, is now a contested domain of international activity. In this text we explore how the Global South has entered this contestation, and how it articulates its ever-growing presence in shaping the agenda of this domain. However, as cyber diplomacy is mainstreamed across the Global South, it is unclear whether it will continue to be a relevant collective force in forging the rules and norms that govern cyberspace, or whether the tendency will be for each country to trace their own path in service of their independent national interests. The evolution of cyber diplomacy in a post-liberal world Cyber diplomacy is very recent. One could argue that its practice only really started in the late 1990s, with Russia’s proposal of an international treaty to ban electronic and information weapons. Cyber diplomacy, as “the use of diplomatic resources and the performance of diplomatic functions to secure national interests with regard to the cyberspace” (or more simply, to the “the application of diplomacy to cyberspace”  is even more recent, with the first few writings on the topic emerging only in the last 15 years.   To be sure, the internet was born at the zenith of the US-led liberal international order and was viewed as an ideal tool to promote based on liberalism, free trade and information exchange with limited government intervention and democratic ideals. Cyber libertarians extolled the virtues of an independent cyberspace, free from state control and western governments, particularly the US, did not disagree. They viewed the internet as the perfect tool for promoting US global power and maintaining liberal hegemony -“ruling the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas.” The internet was ensconced in the relatively uncontested unipolar geopolitical moment. As the pipe dreams of a liberal cyberspace began to unravel with China and Russia pushing for an alternate state-centric vision of cyberspace, cyber diplomacy began to emerge both as a “response to and continuing factor in the continuing battle in and over cyberspace.” Explicitly, we can pin down its origin to two factors. First, is the perception that cyberspace was becoming an increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and geo-economics, with states starting to better understand its threats, but also its opportunities. Moonlight Maze, the 2007 attacks against Estonia or even Stuxnet were all cases that helped focus the mind of policymakers around the world. Second, the broader context of underlying changes in the international order necessitated cyber diplomacy as a bridge-building activity both to mitigate great power rivalry and to preserve the stability of cyberspace and the digital economy. Private companies, till then the beneficiaries of an open and de-regulated internet, also had to step in to ensure that their own interests and profit motives were safeguarded. These two intertwined factors dominated the discussions around cyber diplomacy for most of the 2000s. Initially, the predominant focus was arms control, reflected in the composition of the first few Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) iterations, the forum created by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to discuss the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in international security. And although experts appointed by countries from the Global South were present since the first meeting in July 2004 the debate was very much framed as a discussion among great powers. As discussions progressed, and the GGE became a process in itself, some states outside the permanent members’ group started to engage more actively. This also coincided with the progressive creation of cyber diplomacy posts and offices in foreign ministries around the world. The field was becoming more professional, as more states started to realise that these were discussions that mattered beyond the restrictive group of power politics. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, or Kenya started to push for the discussion of issues that affected a larger group of states, with a particular focus on cyber capacity building not just at the UN-GGE but also at other multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes and conferences including the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The creation of a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) at the UN First Committee (after an acrimonious diplomatic process) had an important effect in the diversification and democratisation of the discussions, as these were now open to the whole UN membership, and non-state actors were given the opportunity to observe and participate in these sessions. Further, in 2022, the UN set up an Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cybercrime convention (adopted by consensus by UNGA members in December 2024) that also enabled all UN members to participate in the negotiations. The opening up of these processes exposed many states, particularly in the Global South, to the field, and it forced them to actively engage in discussions that until recently were seen as the dominion of great powers. The African Group and the G77 were now able to actively participate in the discussions, with frequent statements and contributions. Conceptualising the Global South in cyber diplomacy As cyber diplomacy progressed, policy-maker and academics alike understood global cyber governance to be divided along three main blocs of states. The status quo defenders were led by the US and (mostly Western) like-minded states, focused on the promotion of liberal values and non-binding norms shaped by a multi-stakeholder approach and adherence to existing tenets of international law but resisted significant changes in the governance of cyberspace. A revisionist group, led by Russia and China, advocated for a new binding international treaty and multilateral governance with the objective of guaranteeing security and order rather than necessarily promoting liberal values. Given this impasse, the role and influence of a group of states termed ‘swing states’ or ‘digital deciders’ has been recognized as critical to determining the future of cyberspace, most prominently in a detailed 2018 report by the Washington DC-based think-tank New America . This grouping that largely includes emerging powers from the Global South including India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, are understood as countries that are yet to “gravitate towards either end of the spectrum, some undecided and others seeking a third path.” Given these groupings, it is worth considering how the Global South fits in with present conceptualisations of cyber diplomacy, or whether it is a grouping at all. The term ‘Global South’ has come in for some criticism given the heterogeneity of countries it describes and its geographical inaccuracy (many Global South countries are not quite in the geographical South.) To be fair, the term never aspired for terminological accuracy and was instead coined to conceptually represent a group of countries during the Vietnam dissatisfied with the political and economic exploitation from the Global North. In that regard, Global South is a “mood,” a metaphor for developing countries aiming to find their way in an increasingly contested world. The war in Ukraine only augmented these fissures as the West were confounded by the Global South’s refusal to take a stand against brazen Russian aggression in Europe. The developing world saw it differently though: in an international order long-built on racism and inequality, expecting these countries to take a stand in their “petty squabbles” while they had also carried out “similarly violent, unjust, and undemocratic interventions—from Vietnam to Iraq” was a bridge too far. The Ukraine war helped clarify the combination of behaviours that countries within the Global South exhibit to attain this strategic goal: ideological agnosticism or neutrality; selective engagement with norms and rules; and finally, multi-pronged bilateral and minilateral groupings, with equidistance from the major powers. These three approaches helped illuminate the multiple different forms of agency that each developing country exercises vis-à-vis the international order based on their own interests and quest for strategic autonomy. However, what became evident as Russians bombs started to fall on the street of Kyiv, was already visible in these states’ interactions in cyber diplomacy. First, much of the Global South has refused to take an explicit stand on the controversial fissures that the leading powers have spent much of their time debating, including whether cyberspace governance should be state-centric or driven by new rules or existing international law.  Throughout the negotiating processes at the UN OEWG and AHC, as Russia and China clashed with the United States and its allies on the text of several controversial proposals, most developing countries took an agnostic approach, neither explicitly endorsing or opposing any of these potential treaty provisions. (There are naturally some exceptions: an analysis of voting patterns suggests that Iran and North Korea have firmly pegged themselves to the Russian and Chinese side of the aisle whereas some smaller developing countries have gravitated towards the US side of the aisle.) Second, there has been selective engagement when security or developmental interests are directly impacted. For example, in its joint submission to the UN’s Global Digital Compact (GDC), the G77+China asserted the need for equitable cross-border data flows that maximize development gains. The GDC is the UN’s first comprehensive framework for global digital cooperation. Long concerned about the misuse of the multi-stakeholder model by private actors for profit at the expense of developmental interests, the G77 also highlighted the need for “multilateral and transparent approaches to digital governance to facilitate a more just, equitable and effective governance system.” Finally, countries in  the Global South have entered into multiple technology partnerships across political and ideological divides. US efforts at restricting the encroachment of Chinese hardware providers like Huawei and ZTE into the core technological periphery of several Global South countries using allegations of surveillance were sometimes rebuked, given the Five Eyes’ proclivity and reputation for also conducting similar surveillance, including on top officials. By being agnostic on controversial ideological issues, countries in the Global South have been able to maintain ties with great powers on all sides of the political spectrum and foster pragmatic technological partnerships. Will the Global South rise? The Global South’s rise as a potent force in cyber diplomacy will, however, depend on three factors. Can it maintain ideological consistency on developmental and rights concerns, including on how the internet is governed at home? Can they continue to work with multiple partners without succumbing to pressure either from Washington or Beijing? Will emerging powers in the Global South (like India, Brazil and Indonesia) bat for the interests of the larger developing world, rather than simply orchestrating global governance to service their own interests or that of the regime in power? Given that cyber diplomacy emerged and developed as the playground of great powers, analysing it through the perspective of the Global South enables us to focus on cyber governance as an issue that goes beyond (cyber)security concerns – including economic development and identity (cutting across issues of race, gender, and colonialism) – and to see the world from a perspective that goes beyond the dynamics of great power competition. Analytically, it is useful to understand how these states position themselves and justify their actions on behalf of the whole. When looking inside the box, we see some collective movement but also a desire on part of the great powers, including China to incentivise the developing world to see the world as they do. The Global South remains relevant as a construct that captures the mood of the developing world on the geopolitics of technology of cyber issues. Its “great strength” will emerge not from swinging between Washington and Beijing or being orchestrated through New Delhi or Brasilia. It will instead come through standing their ground, in service of their own security and developmental interests in cyberspace. And as they progress, it remains to be seen whether the “Global South” retains its relevance as an analytical construct or whether it will give way to other denominations that better capture the developing world’s nuances and differences vis-à-vis the international cyber order. The text of this work is licensed under  a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском AbstractPurpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse the international political economy of Korea and its effects due to geopolitical tension between China and the USA. Design/methodology/approach Economic war between China and the USA has prolonged longer than expected. Aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, reforming the supply chain has been the centre of economic tension between China and the USA. Quite recently, with the rapid expansion of Chinese e-commerce platforms, distribution channels come upon a new economic tension between the two. And now is the time to pivot its pattern of conflict from competition into cooperation. In this end, economic diplomacy could be a useful means to give a signal of cooperation. From the view of economic diplomacy, this paper tries to analyse the projected transition of economic war between China and the USA with its implication on the trade policy of Korea. Findings As an implementation of economic diplomacy, China suggested the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhancing trade logistics among related countries to gain competitiveness. In 2023, the Biden administration suggested the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor as a counter to BRI, which will be a threshold for changing trade policy from economic war into economic diplomacy. As a result, it is expected China and the USA will expand their economic diplomacy in a way to promote economic cooperation among allied states, while the distribution channel war would continue to accelerate the economic tension between China and the USA. Korea has to prepare for and provide measures handling this geopolitical location in its trade policy or economic diplomacy. Originality/value This research contributes to the awareness and understanding of trade environments from the perspective of economic diplomacy. 1. Introduction The advent of globalisation has led to widespread economic integration, creating global production networks and markets. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has acted as a significant setback to this trend. In the wake of COVID-19, an economic war has arisen between China and the USA, centred on the restructuring of global supply chains following widespread disruptions. International political economy (IPE) examines the power dynamics between states and the structures of influence within regional economies. Consequently, economic diplomacy has gained unprecedented attention. Economic diplomacy focuses on government actions regarding international economic issues, distinct from political diplomacy through its market-oriented approach in foreign policy. Putnam (1988) categorises economic diplomacy into two levels: unilateralism and bilateralism. Unilateral economic diplomacy (or unilateralism) often relies on hard power, involving decisions on trade liberalisation or market protection without negotiation. Bilateral economic diplomacy (or bilateralism) or multilateral economic diplomacy (or multilateralism), by contrast, involves negotiation among trade partners, resulting in agreements such as regional or global free trade agreements (FTAs). A vast range of state or non-state actors engage in economic diplomacy, navigating the complex interplay between international and domestic factors. Defining economic diplomacy is extremely challenging, but one useful definition is “the broad concept of economic statecraft, where economic measures are taken in the pursuit of political goals, including punitive actions such as sanctions” (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2008).  Figure 1 Recent trend of economic diplomacy To exert influence internationally, ministers and heads of government strive to demonstrate their capacity for national security through two primary approaches, as shown in Figure 1 (above): economic war (or competition) and economic diplomacy (or international cooperation). In the context of global supply chain restructuring, the economic conflict between China and the USA has intensified, marked by threats of supply chain disruptions. This has led to emerging strategies aimed at “crowding out” the USA from global supply chains (去美戰略) or excluding China through alliances such as the Allied Supply Chain and Chip 4. While economic war is inherently “temporary” due to its painstaking nature, economic diplomacy or international cooperation offer a more “long-term” approach because it is gains-taking. This paper analyses the factors contributing to the prolonged nature of this economic war and explores potential outcomes of the supply chain tensions between China and the USA from the perspectives of IPE or geo-economics. In conclusion, it highlights the importance of preparing for trade policy adjustments and strategic economic diplomacy. 2. International trade war and strategic items2.1 Supply chain The supply chain encompasses a network of interconnected suppliers involved in each stage of production, from raw materials and components to the finished goods or services. This network can include vendors, warehouses, retailers, freight stations and distribution centres. Effective supply chain management is a “crucial process because an optimised supply chain results in lower costs and a more efficient production cycle” [1]. Within the supply chain, a leading company typically holds governance power, enabling it to coordinate scheduling and exercise control across the interconnected suppliers, resulting in reduced costs and shorter production times (Gereffi et al., 2005) [2]. Since the 2000s, forward and backward integration have been key strategies for managing time, cost and uncertainty in supply chains. For example, Toyota’s Just-In-Time (JIT) system demonstrated the efficiency of locally concentrated supply chains until disruptions from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake and the Thailand flood. Following supply chain shutdowns in 2020, many businesses shifted from local to global supply chains, utilising advancements of the information technology (IT) and transportation technologies to geographically diversify operations. As the need for a systematically functioning global supply chain has grown, a leading nation, much like a leading company, often assumes governance power in international trade and investment, as illustrated in Figure 2 (below), by aligning with the leadership of a dominant market competitiveness, which makes this leadership valuable.  Figure 2 Supply chain The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to the global supply chain, causing sudden lockdowns that led to widespread supply chain disruptions. To mitigate the risks of future global disruptions, supply chains have begun restructuring to operate on a more regionally segmented basis. In this shift toward regional supply chains, China and the USA are at the centre, drawing allied countries within their spheres of influence. This alignment helps explain why the economic war between China and the USA has lasted longer than anticipated. 2.2 Strategic items China has restricted exports of two rare metals, gallium and germanium, which are critical to semiconductor production. Kraljic (1983) highlighted the importance of managing “strategic items” within the framework of supply chain management, as shown in Figure 3. Kraljic emphasises the need to strengthen and diversify critical items. The Kraljic matrix provides a valuable tool for identifying essential items that require focused management within the supply chain.  Figure 3 Kraljic matrix Kraljic identified the importance of managing “bottleneck items” in strategic supply chain management – items that present high supply risk but have relatively low business value. Due to the potential costs associated with non-delivery or compromised quality of strategic items, these must be closely monitored and controlled. From a risk management perspective, establishing medium-term business relationships and collaboration with suppliers is essential. For example, South Korea imports over 90% of its urea for agricultural and industrial purposes from China [3]. Heavily dependent on China for urea supplies due to pricing factors, Korea faced challenges when China imposed export controls on urea, underscoring Korea’s vulnerability within China’s sphere of influence. The European Union (EU) also faces challenges with critical raw materials (CRMs). China remains the EU’s sole supplier of processed rare earth elements, while Chile supplies 79% of its lithium. In response, the EU introduced the CRM Act (CRMA) to support projects aimed at increasing “the EU’s capacity to extract, process, and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify supplies from the third countries” [4]. 2.3 Resilient supply chain alliance In contrast to China’s approach of leveraging supply disruptions to strengthen its influence, the Biden administration in the USA has adopted a cooperative approach focused on building resilient supply chains (Pillar 2) through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which includes 14 member countries [5]. The need for resilient supply chains has been further underscored by the Russia–Ukraine crisis. The IPEF aims to address supply chain vulnerabilities by fostering global efforts to reduce risks associated with concentrated, fragile supply chains [6].  Figure 4 Resilient supply chain alliance In Figure 4, the EU Commission presented the Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) in September 2022, a crisis governance framework designed to ensure the availability of essential goods and services during future emergencies. The SMEI operates on three levels: contingency planning, vigilance and emergency. The contingency planning phase focuses on collaboration among member states to mitigate supply chain disruption and monitor incidents. The vigilance phase can be activated when a significant disruption is anticipated, enabling specific measures such as mapping and monitoring supply chains and production capacities. Finally, the emergency phase is activated in cases of severe disruption to the functioning of the single market [7]. Establishing a resilient supply chain through international cooperation may be appealing, yet the reality often falls short of the ambition. In South Korea, the IPEF took effect on 17 April 2024, after an extended negotiation process, marking the first multilateral agreement on supply chains. As a result, during non-crisis periods, the 14 member countries will collaborate to strengthen international trade, investment and trade logistics. In times of crisis, member countries will activate a “crisis response network”. Conversely, opportunities for negotiation with China, South Korea’s largest trading partner, are essential for building supply chain resilience [8]. China has pursued an industrial policy focused on enhancing its supply chain management capabilities. In the semiconductor sector, the decoupling between China and the USA has become increasingly evident. Contrary to expectations, China has adopted a policy of internalising its supply chains, returning to the integration strategies of the 2000s rather than furthering globalisation. A promising opportunity for transformation between the two countries has emerged recently. Since 2015, China and South Korea have maintained bilateral FTA, and with the second phase of FTA negotiations currently underway, there is an opportunity to strengthen trade and investment ties, fostering positive progress through international cooperation. 2.4 China manufacturing exodus During the COVID-19 pandemic, China imposed sudden lockdowns without prior notice or preparation, halting production and logistics cycles. This “zero COVID” policy may have triggered a shift towards “de-risking” China from supply chain disruptions. Although China still offers significant advantages as “the factory of the world,” with vast market potential, prolonged trade tensions with the USA, intensified during the Trump administration, have prompted global manufacturers with substantial USA market bases to relocate operations amid rising geopolitical uncertainties. For example, Nike and Adidas have shifted much of their footwear manufacturing to Vietnam, Apple has begun iPhone production at a Foxconn in Chennai, India, and AstraZeneca has contracted production with India’s Serum Institute. In the pre-globalised era, defining the Rule of Origin (ROO) was straightforward, as a product’s components were usually manufactured and assembled within a single country. However, with the complexity of global supply chains, particularly since 2012, determining ROO has become a time-consuming and subjective process. ROO are classified as either non-preferential or preferential. The USA applies non-preferential ROO to restrict imports from countries like Cuba, Iran and North Korea, while offering trade preference programmes for others. Preferential ROO are used to determine duty-free eligibility for imports from approved countries [9], whereas non-preferential ROO play a crucial role in “country of origin labelling, government procurement, enforcement of trade remedy actions, compilation of trade statistics, supply chain security issues.” [10] China manufacturing exodus may negatively impact capital inflows into Hong Kong, traditionally seen as the Gateway to China. In 2023, Hong Kong’s initial public offering volume fell to a 20-year low of $5.9bn [11]. While China-oriented business remains in Hong Kong, which returns fully to Chinese control in 2047, non-China-oriented businesses have migrated to Singapore. As the certainty of contract and ownership rights forms the foundation of capitalism, this capital flight from Hong Kong is likely to persist. 3. Trade logistics and economic corridors Globalisation has allowed supply chains to leverage interdependence and interconnectedness, maximising efficiency. However, while these efficiencies have been beneficial, they have also created a fertile ground for friction between trade partners due to a “survival of the fittest” mindset and the principle of “winner takes all.” This interdependence has also highlighted vulnerabilities; the global supply chain struggled to manage the disruptions caused by COVID-19, prompting a shift towards regional integration initiatives, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. As the global economy seeks stability, collaboration over competition has become increasingly essential, with economic diplomacy emerging as a priority. The prolonged economic war between China and the USA arguably needs to shift towards economic diplomacy. The global supply chain is restructuring into regional supply chains, building resilience by operating in regional segments that can withstand crises. Michael Porter introduced the concept of value chain as “a set of activities that a firm performs to deliver a valuable product or service to the market.” [12] Complex finished goods often depend on global value chains, traversing multiple countries. As shown in Figure 5, the value chain consists of supply chain and trade channel components. While the focus has traditionally been on which country holds lead status within a regional supply chain, the emphasis is now shifting to how these regional segments can be interconnected and relayed. In this context, the supply chain competition may evolve into a “channel war” in international trade, where trade logistics will centre on the internal flow of goods, standardising channel processes and establishing authority over these channels.  Figure 5 Supply chain v. trade channel 3.1 Trade logistics It is natural for governments to seek environments that enhance competitiveness within in their countries. In terms of trade, effective trade logistics are essential for maintaining competitive advantage. As a prerequisite, a strong IT management infrastructure is indispensable. As shown in Figure 6, trade logistics encompass the internal flow of goods to market, integrating physical infrastructure with operating software – such as transport hubs, warehouses, highways, ports, terminals, trains and shipping vessels. Key areas of conflict in trade logistics involve the standardisation of channel processes and determining who holds governance over operation of these logistics systems. This is equally relevant within the digital economy. Recently, Chinese e-commerce – often referred to as C-commerce – has aggressively sought to gain control over digital distribution channels, interconnected delivery networks and trade logistics via digital platforms. Chinese platforms such as Taobao, Temu and AliExpress are actively working to increase their monthly active users (MAUs), positing themselves as counterweights to USA-based platforms such as Amazon and eBay in digital trade [13].  Figure 6 Trade logistics When the agenda of establishing international trade logistics is introduced to relevant trade members across various countries, initial progress and effective responses are often achieved. However, efforts soon encounter obstacles related to standardising logistics processes and establishing operational governance. Greater reliance on international institutions could help resolve these issues (Bayne, 2017). Yet governments frequently prioritise domestic interests, and after prolonged negotiations, the risk of international agreements failing increases. Amid the economic war between China and the USA, China launched a trade logistics initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt One Road, in 2013. Often referred to as the New Silk Road, the BRI aims to establish economic corridors for trade logistics. The World Bank estimates that the BRI could boost trade flows by 4.1% and reduce trade costs by 1.1% [14]. In response, the Biden administration proposed the India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in September 2023 to strengthen transport and communication links between Europe and Asia as a countermeasure to China’s BRI. IMEC has been well received by participating countries, with expectations of fostering economic growth, enhancing connectivity and potentially rebalancing trade and economic relations between the EU and China [15]. Both BRI and IMEC are ambitious projects aimed at boosting international trade through substantial investments in trade logistics infrastructure. Each seeks to assert governance over international trade channels, signalling that the supply chain war may soon evolve into a trade channel war between China and the USA. 3.2 Economic corridors Economic corridors are transport networks designed to support and facilitate the movement of goods, services, people and information. These corridors often include integrated infrastructure, such as highways, railways and ports, linking cities or even countries (Octaviano and Trishia, 2014). They are typically established to connect manufacturing hubs, high-supply and high-demand areas, and producers of value-added goods. Economic corridors comprise both hard infrastructure – such as trade facilities – and soft infrastructure, including trade facilitation and capacity-building measures. The Asian Development Bank introduced the term “economic corridor” in 1998 to describe networks connecting various economic agents within a region [16]. Economic corridors are integrated trade logistics networks, providing essential infrastructure for connecting regional segments of supply chains. As supply chains increasingly operate in regional “chunks,” linking these segments becomes ever more important. Economic corridors typically include a network of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, terminals and ports. Initiatives like the BRI and IMEC use economic corridors as instruments of economic diplomacy, shifting strategies from hard power to soft power, as shown in Figure 7. Because less-developed or developing countries often lack sufficient funding to invest in trade logistics, they tend to welcome these initiatives from developed countries, which offer international collaboration and support. However, these initiatives usually come with the condition that participating countries must accept standardised trade processes and governance led by the sponsoring developed country.  Figure 7 Economic corridor initiatives as economic diplomacy To succeed, economic corridors must meet three key conditions [17]. First, government intervention is essential, as economic corridor initiatives primarily involve public infrastructure investments beyond the scope of the private sector. In realising these projects, governments must reconcile three tensions to ensure their policies are mutually supportive: tensions between politics and economics, between international and domestic pressures and between governments and other stakeholders. Second, intermediate outcomes should be measured and demonstrated as results of economic corridors, allowing participants to experience tangible benefits throughout these longer-term projects. Finally, economic corridors should deliver broader benefits. Participants need incentives to utilise the infrastructure sustainably. These benefits may extend beyond economic welfare, such as wages and income, to include social inclusion, equity and environmental gains, which support the long-term viability of the infrastructure. 4. BRI vs IMEC4.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - Silk Road The BRI can be a modern-day realisation of the Silk Road concept, connecting Europe as a market base with China as a production base. Unlike the ancient Silk Road, which connected trade routes across Eurasia, the BRI poses potential challenges due to its extensive connectivity. Firstly, there are social and environmental externalities, such as increased congestion and accidents from concentrating traffic flows through limited links and nodes within trade networks. Secondly, while the connectivity may benefit the production and market bases at either end, regions situated between these hubs, through which highways and railways pass, may gain minimal advantage. Thirdly, there is often a mismatch between where costs and benefits are realised. Transit regions that facilitate network traffic often see fewer direct benefits compared to high-density nodes within the network. 4.2 India-Middle East and Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) - The Spice Road The ancient Spice Roads once connected the Middle East and Northeast Africa with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods such as cinnamon, ginger, pepper and cassia, which, like silk, served as a form of currency. The IMEC proposes a modern route from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Israel and Greece. Since its announcement in September 2023, some regional experts have expressed reservations about its feasibility, particularly regarding the connection between the Middle East and Israel. The project has faced delays due to the Israel–Hamas war. Despite these challenges, IMEC holds potential to drive economic growth and strengthen connectivity, especially as countries like Vietnam and India emerge as alternative manufacturing bases for companies relocating from China. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, IMEC is not viewed as a challenge to China but rather as an opportunity to diversify their economies and solidify their roles within the Middle East region [18]. 5. Conclusion A new trade war between China and the USA has begun, with the Biden Administration’s introduction of IMEC as a counter to China’s BRI. This shift could soon transform the nature of economic war from a focus on supply chains to one on trade channels. The China manufacturing exodus was further accelerated by supply disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst the economic tensions between China and the USA, the restructuring of global supply chains into regional networks has made significant progress. With China maintaining its stance on export controls for strategic items, South Korea must prepare for resilient supply chain management. In relation to China–Korea FTA, which is currently undergoing its second phase of negotiation, South Korea should seek clarity on the transparency of China’s strategic item controls. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) plays a key role in monitoring the quality of inbound investments; similarly, South Korea is experiencing increased inbound investment due to the manufacturing shift from China and should apply similar standards to evaluate investment quality. This emerging economic war between China and the USA is now marked by the competing initiatives of the BRI and IMEC. The BRI can be viewed as a modern Silk Road, linking China with Europe, while the IMEC seeks to establish a trade logistics corridor connecting Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and Greece. The South Korean Government should take proactive steps to prepare for the evolving dynamics of the trade war between China and the USA. CitationOh, J.S. (2025), "International trade war - Spice Road against Silk Road", International Trade, Politics and Development, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-11. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-06-2024-0031  Notes 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/supplychain.asp2. According to Gary Gereffi et al, 5 governance types of a lead company could be categorised as market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy.3. Korea imports urea from 12 countries including Qatar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in addition to China.4. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/strategic-projects-under-crma_en5. IPEF was launched on May 23,2022 at Tokyo. 14 member countries are Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the USA. 4 Pillar of IPEF are Trade (Pillar 1), Supply Chain (Pillar 2),Clean Economy (Pillar 3) and Fair Economy (Pillar 4).6. Critics say “lack of substantive actions and binding commitments, instead focusing on process-driven framework building.” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/its-time-ipef-countries-take-action-supply-chain-resilience7. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_54438. As of 2023, the first-largest trade partner of Korea is China (Trade volume of $267.66bn), the second is the US ($186.96bn) and the third is Vietnam ($79.43bn)9. As preferential ROO contain the labour value content requirement in the USMCA, it could increase compliance costs for importers. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL3452410. USITC(1996), Country of Origin Marking: Review of Laws, Regulations and Practices, USITC Publication 2975, July, pp. 2–411. https://www.barrons.com/articles/hong-kong-financial-center-china-46ba5d3612. Porter identifies a value chain broken in five primary activities: inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and post-sale services. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/concepts_approaches_in_gvc_research_final_april_18.pdf13. MAU is a metric commonly used to identify the number of unique users who engage with apps and website. MAU is an important measurement to the level of platform competitiveness in the digital trade logistics or e-commerce industry.14. https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/12/china-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-global-chemical-industry.html15. https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2023/10/the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-us-businesses16. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which first used the term in 1998, defines economic corridors as important networks or connections between economic agents along a defined geography, which link the supply and demand sides of markets. http://research.bworldonline.com/popular-economics/story.php?id=350&title=Economic-corridors-boost-markets,-living-conditions17. Legovini et al. (2020) comments traditional cross border agreements of transport investment focuses only on a narrow set of direct benefits and cost. However, economic corridors can entail much wider economic benefits and costs such as trade and economic activity, structural change, poverty reduction, pollution and deforestation.18. Arab Centre Washington D.C. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-geopolitics-of-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/ References Bayne, N. (2017), Challenge and Response in the New Economic Diplomacy, 4th ed., The New Economic Diplomacy, Routledge, London, p. 19.Blanchard, J.M.F. and Ripsman, N.M. (2008), “A political theory of economic statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, pp. 371-398, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005), “The governance of value chain”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 78-104, doi: 10.1080/09692290500049805.Kraljic, P. (1983), “Purchasing must be supply management”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 61 No. 5, September.Legovini, A., Duhaut, A. and Bougna, T. (2020), “Economic corridors-transforming the growth potential of transport investments”, p. 10.Octaviano, B.Y. and Trishia, P. (2014), Economic Corridors Boost Markets, Living Conditions, Business World Research, Islamabad, October.United States International Trade Commission (USITC) (1996), “Country of origin marking: Review of Laws, Regulations, and Practices”, USITC Publication, Vol. 2975, July, pp. 2-4.Further readingPorter, M. (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, Free Press.Putman, R.D. (1988), “Diplomacy and domestic politics; the logic of two-level games”, International Organization, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 427-600.USITC (2019), “Global value chain analysis: concepts and approaches”, Journal of International Commerce and Economics, April, pp. 1-29.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском This paper was earlier published as Issue & Policy Briefs on May, 16th 2025 on the Website of The Institute for Security & Developement Policy. The April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack marks a significant moment in South Asia’s evolving security matrix. While the India–Pakistan binary continues to dominate discourse, China’s ambiguous posture following India’s Operation Sindoor warrants deeper scrutiny. This issue brief assesses Beijing’s silence, the implications for China-India ties, and China’s alignment with Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Drawing on past crises like Pulwama, Balakot, and Uri, it interrogates China’s selective neutrality, its shielding of Pakistan, and the erosion of its credibility as a regional stabilizer. By weaving in Chinese media narratives and official statements, the analysis critically evaluates whether Beijing is prepared—or even interested—in playing a constructive role in South Asian stability. The brief concludes that unless India recalibrates its strategic assumptions and narrative posture, China will continue to manipulate the region’s instability through plausible deniability and transactional diplomacy. The terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025,1 which killed 25 Indians and 1 Nepali and injured dozens more, is the latest chapter in South Asia’s long-running saga of cross-border militancy. Yet it would be a mistake to frame it solely within the India–Pakistan binary. As India launched Operation Sindoor in response— targeting terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control (LoC)—the silence and subsequent posture of China signaled deeper tremors in the broader regional architecture. Kashmir has long served as a crucible of IndiaPakistan hostility, but the Pahalgam attack— attributed to the Pakistan-backed group The Resistance Front (TRF),2 which is a front for the UN-proscribed Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba—has unfolded in a regional context far more complex than previous crises. India’s swift military response via Operation Sindoor, while reminiscent of the 2019 Balakot precedent, came in a more layered geopolitical moment, where any Indian action reverberates beyond Islamabad to Beijing. Despite issuing a generic statement of terming India’s Operation Sindoor “regrettable,”3 Beijing offered no commentary on the Pakistan-backed terror attack itself. By sidestepping the central provocation—the targeting of Indian civilians by a known Pakistani terror outfit—China has raised fundamental questions about the strategic calculus guiding its relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi.  New Delhi’s official narrative continued to underscore its commitment post Operation Sindoor to “commitment to non-escalation, provided it is respected by the Pakistan military”.4 However, during May 8-9, Pakistan responded with a drone offensive targeting Indian military sites,5 prompting countermeasures. By May 10, Pakistan had a name for its retaliatory escalation: Operation Bunyan Marsoos,6 which came to an abrupt halt when a ceasefire was agreed upon between India and Pakistan later in the day.7 Despite ceasefire violations by Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the agreement seems to be holding currently.  Yet what stood out amid this tit-for-tat dynamic was China’s conspicuous silence and strategic responses. Post Pakistan’s escalation on May 9, the topic of India-Pakistan conflict was completely absent from the pre-approved questions of the regular press briefing by the Chinese Ministry.8 Even in response to the news of the ceasefire, China’s statement has been guarded, stating it hopes India and Pakistan will “consolidate and extend” the same.9 As China distances itself from India’s narrative but attempts to show semblances of neutrality, it raises doubts over the credibility of Sino-Indian normalization. While the two countries may engage in tactical military disengagements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Pahalgam episode demonstrates that deep strategic distrust remains. India’s engagement with counterterrorism in the region has often required it to navigate a diplomatic minefield, particularly when the international community does not uniformly support its security concerns. The post-Balakot moment saw similar divisions, with China refusing to back India’s actions at multilateral fora while amplifying Pakistan’s grievances. Such flashpoints, unpacked later in this brief, underscore a consistent Chinese pattern—a trend that has deepened in the aftermath of Pahalgam. What differentiates this latest incident, however, is the broader geopolitical backdrop.  The Pahalgam incident hence emerges as a compelling prism through which to examine the strategic entanglements involving China in South Asian geopolitics. China’s posture following Operation Sindoor calls to question its regional credibility10 and the future of the still recovering India-China bilateral post the 2020 Galwan clash. In essence, the Pahalgam incident is a microcosm through which to assess whether Beijing is capable of playing a stabilizing role in South Asia or if it remains tethered to old geopolitical loyalties that undermine its normative credibility.11 China’s Calculated Ambiguity and Strategic Hedging  At first glance, China’s reaction to the Pahalgam attack appeared predictably neutral,12 reiterating a standard line against terrorism in all forms albeit without naming Pakistan-based groups, which then evolved into calling for an “impartial probe” into the attack.13 Beijing’s ambiguous position is hardly new. It has long shielded Pakistan from international pressure on terrorism-related matters. In 2023, for instance, China blocked a UN Security Council listing of Sajid Mir—a Lashkar-e-Taiba commander with ties to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.14 Such acts are not isolated; they are part of a broader calculus in which Pakistan is Beijing’s irreplaceable partner in South Asia. This alignment is driven by both geopolitical and geo-economic considerations. Pakistan is China’s all-weather partner (全天候伙伴关系 or quántiānhòu huǒbàn guānxì),15 crucial not just for counterbalancing India but also for securing the western front of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a flagship component of BRI and runs through an unstable Gilgit-Baltistan and, despite India’s vehement opposition, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Stability in these zones is key to China’s western frontier strategy, giving it a vested interest in maintaining the status quo—even if that includes cross-border terrorism targeting India.  Further compounding the issue is the unspoken quid pro quo between Beijing and Islamabad: Pakistan remains silent on China’s domestic repression of Uyghurs,16 while China refrains from condemning Pakistani-linked Islamist militant groups. This transactional compact allows both states to shield each other on their respective internal and external security issues, forming a mutually reinforcing axis of silence.  In times of crisis, this axis manifests through diplomatic choreography. For example, during the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020, Pakistan was among the few countries to openly17 support China’s position, even as the rest of the world urged de-escalation.18 Conversely, during moments of India-Pakistan tension, Beijing reliably leans toward a neutral but structurally pro-Pakistan position. During the 2016 Uri attack, Beijing maintained a studied silence while subtly encouraging bilateral restraint. In 2019, when India moved to revoke Article 370 granting Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, China supported Pakistan’s “legitimate rights and interests” in Kashmir.19  Furthermore, post the 2019 Pulwama attack, China refused to list Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad chief as a global terrorist under UNSC Resolution 1267.20 This narrative strategy appears to serve a dual function: first, to construct a regional imaginary in which India is framed as a destabilizing actor across multiple contested peripheries; and second, to subtly align with Pakistan’s security perceptions without overt endorsement as seen during Balakot as well with Chinese state media closely relaying Pakistan’s perspectives.21 Such framing enables Beijing to reinforce an adversarial posture vis-à-vis India while maintaining formal neutrality. More critically, it delegitimizes India’s counterterrorism imperatives by projecting them as part of a broader pattern of assertiveness rather than as legitimate responses to asymmetric threats. The aftermath of Pahalgam has reinforced this pattern. Structural Limits of Sino-Indian Normalization –and the idea of China as a stabilizer Although India and China have made some progress in military disengagement following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and the October 2024 border agreement, the Pahalgam episode reveals the limitations of this tactical thaw. China’s refusal to acknowledge Pakistani provocations— or even address the cross-border violence in its Operation Sindoor press briefings—shows that Beijing’s strategic alignment with Pakistan remains intact. This persistent ambiguity damages the credibility of any “reset” in India-China relations. It also underscores a recurring pattern in Chinese state discourse, where India’s actions across both the LoC and Line of Actual Control (LAC) are presented as signs of regional destabilization.22 The result is a rhetorical sleight of hand: India’s counterterrorism efforts are rebranded as adventurism, while China claims neutrality.  India for its part has walked a delicate line on China’s own internal security policies.23 India’s cautious approach is also seen on the Uyghur issue, where it has stopped short of criticizing China. India’s intent is to prevent further escalation with China, particularly amid the tensions along the Himalayan border.24 Ironically, this caution has earned India neither Chinese neutrality on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism nor any softening of China’s positions on Kashmir. India must prepare for the possibility of a more overt China-Pakistan strategic alignment in the Himalayan theatre—as seen briefly with the short-lived Himalayan Quad.25 A major point of pride in Chinese social media and state-media news circulating currently is the alleged downing of Indian aircrafts, “three Rafale f ighter jets, one MIG-29 fighter aircraft, one Su30 fighter jet, and one Heron drone”26 by the Pakistani air force. India has not confirmed these losses. China has emerged as Pakistan’s principal defense partner, supplying approximately 81 percent of its arms imports between 2020 and 2024.27 This strategic partnership was evident during the recent military exchanges with India, where Pakistan deployed Chinese-made J-10C f ighter jets and PL-15 air-to-air missiles.28 The J-10C, a 4.5-generation aircraft equipped with advanced avionics and radar systems, played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s aerial defense, which the Chinese social media is celebrating in disc. China’s support extends to artillery systems, such as the SH-15 155mm truck-mounted howitzer, and advanced radar installations along the LoC.29 China’s participation in February 2025 in Pakistan’s multinational naval exercise AMAN further consolidates the partnership’s expansion into the Indian Ocean.30 This deepening military collaboration underscores China’s commitment to bolstering Pakistan’s defense capabilities, thereby influencing the strategic balance in South Asia. Concurrently, on May 9, as Pakistan responded to Operation Sindoor,31 China conducted a live-fire military exercise in Tibet involving truck-mounted artillery and long-range rockets. Although conducted within Chinese territory, the exercise’s temporal proximity to the crisis raised red flags within Indian security circles. Of particular concern was increased PLA logistical activity along the G219 highway—an artery critical for mobilization across Tibet and Xinjiang. Such maneuvers are not incidental; rather, they reflect deliberate strategic signaling. Given the history of the China-India border standoff from April 2020 to October 2024, this latest development underscores Beijing’s continued use of military exercises as coercive diplomacy (胁迫性外交 xiébò xìng wàijiāo). The drill’s timing suggests that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not merely observing the India-Pakistan escalation, but actively inserting pressure on India’s northern front to exploit its two-front dilemma. At the same time, China’s approach to international order is selective. It supports rules when they are advantageous and obstructs them when they threaten. This raises an important question for policymakers: can Beijing ever be a partner in building a rule-based regional order when its strategic habits are so conditional? The Pahalgam silence is not simply an oversight; it reflects a broader unwillingness by China to apply consistent normative standards when its interests are at stake. India, therefore, faces not just a tactical silence, but a strategic contradiction—one that complicates regional security architecture. This difference also further highlights China’s inability to be a stabilizing regional actor or mediator—a niche it is building for itself in West Asia—in South Asia owing to its national interest driven biased approach to regional conflicts.32 China increasingly brands itself as a mediator in global hotspots—from IranSaudi rapprochement to ceasefire proposals in Ukraine. Yet in South Asia, this “stabilizer” identity appears performative. Its refusal to challenge Pakistan undercuts its credibility as a neutral actor. The narrative of “community of shared future” (人类命运共同体 rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) rings hollow when Beijing prioritizes geopolitical returns over regional peace. In this regard, it is also critical to note that India’s claim to great power status hinges not only on its material capabilities but also on its willingness to shape global norms on terrorism. To do so, a post-Pahalgam India may need to deepen its engagement with global norm entrepreneurs—from middle powers in Europe and Asia to civil society actors and multilateral institutions. Additionally, it must better leverage its leadership in forums like the G20 and BRICS to reframe regional security debates. If China wishes to be seen as a responsible stakeholder, it must be challenged to behave like one. In forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which have been focused on regional non-traditional security, China’s bias becomes more evident—obstructing Indian efforts to spotlight Pakistan’s terror links33 while promoting counterterrorism cooperation that suits its agenda.34 The SCO’s regional antiterrorism structure (RATS) has increasingly focused on threats aligned with Beijing’s internal definitions, particularly extremism related to Xinjiang, while sidelining India’s concerns about transnational Islamist militancy based in Pakistan.  However, Beijing’s notion of “Asia for Asians” appears hypocritical when it shelters Pakistan but obstructs regional counterterrorism consensus—especially in RATS under the SCO umbrella. Beyond multilateral diplomacy, China’s reluctance to endorse Indian perspectives has extended to informal channels. While India and Pakistan engage in kinetic and symbolic war over territory and identity, China operates in the background as both facilitator and firewall for Pakistan. Backchannel discussions have repeatedly seen Chinese interlocutors urge restraint on both India and Pakistan—without distinguishing between a state defending its civilians and one enabling non-state actors. This false equivalence erodes India’s trust and limits the scope for genuine regional cooperation. From Response to Strategy:  How Should India Read into Beijing’s Silence? India’s recent history is littered with crises where tactical victories often came at the cost of longterm ambiguity. In the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, for instance, India successfully reestablished control over its territory but failed to push for international accountability on Pakistan.35 Similarly, the 2017 Doklam standoff with China ended with a disengagement, but left the broader strategic questions unresolved. Even the 2020 Galwan clashes, despite their tragic costs, did not lead to sustained support or narrative building. What unites these episodes is a recurring pattern: India seeks resolution through calibrated responses while both adversaries exploit the absence of sustained international pressure. The Pahalgam attack threatens to repeat that pattern unless India broadens the strategic scope of its response—not merely in military terms but in diplomatic signaling, normative positioning, and alliance formation. India’s challenge is not just the asymmetry of violence with Pakistan—it is the asymmetry of narrative and support in multilateral spaces. Despite India’s restraint on Chinese internal matters, such as its silence on Xinjiang in UN forums, China has shown no reciprocal flexibility on Kashmir or Pakistan-based terrorism. This lack of strategic reciprocity is widening the gap between tactical cooperation and strategic mistrust. It also casts doubt on China’s repeated offers to play the role of a regional stabilizer. Beijing is unlikely to act as an honest broker in India-Pakistan disputes because it is structurally invested in Pakistan’s strategic and territorial claims, especially those in Kashmir. Moreover, the geo-economic dimension complicates the landscape further. China’s massive infrastructure projects through Pakistan-administered territories give it a direct stake in the political and security status quo in Kashmir. Any Indian attempt to assert sovereignty over the entire region threatens not just Pakistan’s territorial claims but China’s physical investments. It is for this reason that Chinese diplomats have avoided endorsing even moderate Indian positions on Kashmir. Even in backchannel diplomacy, Chinese officials urge restraint from both sides but refrain from applying pressure on Pakistan to dismantle terrorist networks—a selective neutrality that undermines India’s trust in Beijing’s intentions. Going forward, Indian policymakers may consider more assertive linkages between China’s Kashmir positions and India’s stance on Tibet and Xinjiang. While such rhetorical escalation risks deepening the rift, it may serve as a deterrent to Beijing’s selective neutrality. More broadly, India must prepare for a strategic environment in which a China–Pakistan alignment in the Himalayas becomes less tactical and more entrenched. If China continues to describe Jammu & Kashmir as “disputed territory,” Indian policymakers may feel justified in elevating the discourse on Chinese internal colonialism in places like Tibet and Xinjiang.36 While such a shift would risk further alienation, it could also serve as a deterrent against China’s one-sided narratives in multilateral spaces. Forecasting China’s future position on Jammu and Kashmir suggests continuity rather than change. As long as CPEC remains central to China’s regional vision, Beijing will oppose any Indian attempt to alter the territorial status quo in ways that threaten Pakistan’s legal or strategic control over its administered areas. Even if the Pahalgam incident spurs limited backchannel diplomacy, it is unlikely to alter China’s fundamental incentives in the region. The question, then, is whether the Pahalgam attack has merely revealed existing patterns in China’s South Asia policy or whether it marks a turning point. In one sense, it reaffirms an uncomfortable reality: Beijing’s anti-terrorism policy is primarily inward-looking and defined by the logic of state sovereignty, not regional peacebuilding. Terrorism that originates in Xinjiang is treated as an existential threat to the Chinese state, meriting mass surveillance, reeducation camps, and transnational intelligence cooperation. But terrorism that originates in Pakistan and targets India is diplomatically bracketed, treated as either a bilateral problem between New Delhi and Islamabad or, more insidiously, as a counterweight to Indian assertiveness. In the wake of Pahalgam, Indian policymakers face a difficult but necessary recalibration. While India has long pursued strategic autonomy, this doctrine cannot translate into strategic silence in the face of double standards. New Delhi must continue to assert its case in global forums— not only in terms of territorial integrity but also normative consistency. A longer-term Indian strategy may also involve diversifying its diplomatic partnerships in ways that offset Chinese influence. This includes expanding cooperation with regional and extra-regional actors who share India’s concerns about crossborder terrorism and authoritarian influence in multilateral institutions. The elevation of minilateral forums such as the Quad and closer coordination with Europe and Southeast Asian partners could enable India to construct new coalitions that constrain Chinese room for maneuverability as Beijing’s current incentives give it little reason to alter course. As long as CPEC remains a geostrategic and economic priority, and Pakistan serves as both a buffer and a partner, China will continue to downplay Islamabad’s transgressions. Any backchannel diplomacy following Pahalgam is unlikely to produce meaningful rebalancing unless India reshapes the cost-benefit calculations driving China’s current Sout​h Asia posture. The Pahalgam terrorist attack is not merely an India-Pakistan crisis. It is a regional flashpoint that pulls China out of the shadows and into the foreground of South Asian security dynamics. Beijing’s silence—strategic, deliberate, and revealing—shows that China is not yet ready to play the role of a stabilizing power in the region. Instead, it continues to hedge its bets, uphold transactional alliances, and avoid normative positions on terrorism that might alienate Pakistan. For India, the path forward involves more than military preparedness. It demands a recalibration of strategic assumptions about China’s role in regional crises. The Pahalgam attack may not shift China’s behavior immediately, but it sharpens the contours of a regional order where Beijing is less bystander and more stakeholder— one whose interests often run counter to India’s pursuit of stability and security. In this landscape, India must think beyond Pakistan and confront the deeper structural dynamics of the Pakistan-China bonhomie. About ISDP  The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute’s primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe’s neighborhood. Endnotes  1. Esha Mitra, Mukhtar Ahmad, Aishwarya S Iyer, Kara Fox and Jessie Yeung, “Dozens killed as gunmen massacre tourists in Kashmir beauty spot,” CNN, April 23, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/22/asia/gunmen-open-firejammu-kashmir-intl. 2. “Statement by Foreign Secretary: OPERATION SINDOOR,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 7, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39473; see also, M. Sudhir Selvaraj, “A Primer on The Resistance Front, the Group Behind the Pahalgam Attack,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2025, https://thediplomat. com/2025/04/a-primer-on-the-resistance-front-the-group-behind-the-pahalgam-attack/. 3. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Ongoing Situation Between India and Pakistan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 7, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202505/ t20250507_11616523.html. 4. “Transcript of Special briefing on OPERATION SINDOOR (May 08, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 8, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/39479/Transcript_of_Special_ briefing_on_OPERATION_SINDOOR_May_08_2025. 5. “Special briefing on Operation Sindoor (May 09, 2025),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 9, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSEo4RpICoY&t=491s. 6. Abid Hussain, “Pakistan launches Operation Bunyan Marsoos: What we know so far,” Al Jazeera, May 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/10/pakistan-launches-operation-bunyan-marsoos-what-we-know-so-far. 7. “India-Pakistan ceasefire updates: Pakistan violates ceasefire understanding along Jammu border,” The Hindu, May 11, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/operation-sindoor-pahalgam-attack-india-pakistan-live-updatesmay-10-2025/article69559875.ece. 8. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on May 9, 2025,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, May 9, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202505/t20250509_11618305. html. 9. “China calls on India, Pakistan to consolidate ceasefire momentum: FM spokesperson,” Xinhuanet, May 12, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20250512/3024d6c69d154eb7ac23968925bdca2b/c.html. 10. Eerishika Pankaj and Omkar Bhole, “China’s Thinking on Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor: Impact on its Regional Credibility,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, May 7, 2025, https://orcasia.org/article/1165/chinasthinking-on-pahalgam-and-operation-sindoor. 11. Hayley Wong and Seong Hyeon Choi, “Why China may find it hard to play peacemaker in India-Pakistan conflict,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3309452/why-chinamay-find-it-hard-play-peacemaker-india-pakistan-conflict. 12. “China condemns Pahalgam terror attack that resulted in multiple casualties: FM,” Global Times, April 23, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1332699.shtml. 13. Suhasini Haidar, “China calls for ‘impartial probe’ into Pahalgam,” The Hindu, April 28, 2025, https://www.thehindu. com/news/international/china-calls-for-swift-and-fair-investigation-into-pahalgam-terror-attack/article69499929.ece. 14. PTI, “India slams China at UN for blocking move to designate 26/11 accused Sajid Mir as ‘global terrorist’,” The Hindu, June 21, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-slams-china-at-un-for-blocking-move-todesignate-2611-accused-sajid-mir-as-global-terrorist/article66993043.ece. 15. “中华人民共和国和巴基斯坦伊斯兰共和国联合声明（全文）,” FMPRC, February 6, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202502/t20250206_11550130.shtml; see also, “Wang Yi: Develop China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership with “Four Commitments”,”Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of India, May 15, 2024, in.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/202405/t20240516_11305420.htm. 16. Ben Westcott, “Pakistan PM Imran Khan refuses to condemn China’s Xinjiang crackdown,” CNN, June 22, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/22/asia/imran-khan-xinjiang-axios-intl-hnk. 17. “Interview: ‘India wants to quell domestic dissent after China clash by diverting attention’,” Dawn, June 26, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/1565331.18. Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “What Does the China-India Standoff in Ladakh Mean for Pakistan?” The Diplomat, June 24, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-does-the-china-india-standoff-in-ladakh-mean-for-pakistan/. 19. Keegan Elmer, “China says it will support Pakistan ‘upholding its rights’ in Kashmir row with India,” South China Morning Post, August 10, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3022254/china-says-it-willsupport-pakistan-upholding-its-rights. 20. “Pulwama attack: What about Wuhan spirit, Shashi Tharoor condemns China’s protection to Jaish-e-Mohammad,” India Today, February 15, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pulwama-attack-wuhan-spirit-shashi-tharoorcondemns-china-protection-jaish-e-mohammad-1456963-2019-02-15. 21. “Pakistan condemns India’s ‘blatant aggression,’ says it brings ‘two nuclear-armed states closer to major conflict’,” Global Times, May 7, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333486.shtml#:~:text=,said%20the%20 statement; Xinhua, “Pakistan army says Indian aircraft cross LoC,” China Daily, February 26, 2019, https://www. chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/26/WS5c74eebba3106c65c34eb81d.html#:~:text=,minister%20told%20the%20state%20 TV. 22. “India can change course for the better with China,” Global Times, July 8, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ content/1193819.shtml#:~:text=India%27s%20relations%20with%20many%20of,even%20adventurous%2C%20 recent%20foreign%20strategies. 23. “Human rights must be respected: India after Xinjiang vote,” The Times of India, October 8, 2022, https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/human-rights-must-be-respected-india-after-skipping-xinjiang-vote/articleshow/94713915.cms. 24. “Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute,” International Crisis Group, November 14, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india-china/334-thin-ice-himalayas-handling-india-china-borderdispute; Arkoprabho Hazra, “Why Is India Silent on China’s Human Rights Record at the UN?” The Diplomat, October 27, 2020,  https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/why-is-india-silent-on-chinas-human-rights-record-at-the-un/; see also  Raj Verma, “Domestic Political Drivers and Chinese Diplomacy: Xinjiang and Counter-Terrorism in South Asia,” Asian Perspective 44, no. 4 (2020), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/766324. 25. Jagannath Panda, “The Trans-Himalayan ‘Quad,’ Beijing’s Territorialism, and India,” China Brief 20 (20), November 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/the-trans-himalayan-quad-beijings-territorialism-and-india/. 26. Feng Fan, “Pakistani PM vows to avenge ‘our innocent martyrs’; India FM warns any attacks will be met with ‘firm response’: media,” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202505/1333630.shtml. 27. Hayley Wong, “China supplied 81% of Pakistan’s arms imports in the past 5 years, SIPRI says,” South China Morning Post, March 16, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3302515/china-supplied-81-pakistans-armsimports-past-5-years-sipri-says. 28. Seong Hyeon Choi, “Kashmir conflict: the Chinese warplanes and weapons used by Pakistan,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3310172/kashmir-conflict-chinese-warplanesand-weapons-used-pakistan. 29. “Pakistan Deploys Chinese SH-15 Howitzers Along India Border: New Long-Range Artillery Threat Emerges,” Video, Defence Security Asia, April 30, 2025, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/pakistan-deploys-chinese-sh-15-howitzersalong-india-border-new-long-range-artillery-threat-emerges/. 30. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy to join multinational drill in Pakistan, eye maritime security boost,” Global Times, February 6, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1327941.shtml. 31. Ajay Banerjee, “China holds military drills in areas adjoining Ladakh,” The Tribune, May 9, 2025, https://www. tribuneindia.com/news/india/china-holds-military-drills-in-areas-adjoining-ladakh/. 32. Tushar Shetty, “The Dragon-Elephant Dance: China and India’s Battle for South Asia,” The Diplomat, April 22, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/the-dragon-elephant-dance-china-and-indias-battle-for-south-asia/. 33. “India delivers strong message to Pakistan at SCO; Jaishankar condemns terrorism,” The Economic Times, October 17, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-delivers-strong-message-to-pakistan-at-sco-jaishankarcondemns-terrorism/articleshow/114274767.cms?from=mdr. 34. Linda Maduz, “Flexibility by design: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the future of Eurasian cooperation,” Center for Security Studies, May 2018, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securitiesstudies/pdfs/Maduz-080618-ShanghaiCooperation.pdf; see also  Gunjan Singh, “Terrorism casts its shadow over SCO meet, China-Pakistan ties,” Deccan Herald, October 14, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/terrorism-castsits-shadow-over-sco-meet-china-pakistan-ties-3231147. 35. Pravin Sawhney, “Bottomline - Kargil Legacy,” Force, https://forceindia.net/bottomline/kargil-legacy/. 36. “Kashmir issue proves India unqualified for UN Security Council seat,” Global Times, September 8, 2019, https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1161229.shtml.

Abstract The EU-India–Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, relaunched in 2022 after a nine-year hiatus, represent a significant step towards deepening economic and geopolitical ties between the European Union (EU) and India. The agreement, with its potential to eliminate tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and enhance market access, particularly in services such as telecommunications, could substantially increase trade volume between the two entities, offering promising economic prospects. By creating a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, the FTA offers significant economic opportunities in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. More importantly, it serves as a geopolitical tool aligned with the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, aiming to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democracies and potentially counterbalance China’s increasing influence, reassuring them about its geopolitical implications. Therefore, this study examines the potential economic and geopolitical opportunities and challenges associated with the EU-India FTA. It concludes that, perhaps unsurprisingly, much depends on the foreign and security policies of great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. Key Words: EU, India, Free Trade Area, Geopolitics Introduction Negotiations regarding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were initially launched in 2007. The talks were suspended in 2013 due to a gap in ambition and resumed after a nine-year pause with a formal relaunch on June 17, 2022, announced by Union Minister Piyush Goyal and European Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis in Brussels.[i] This relaunch also included separate negotiations for an Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) and an Agreement on Geographical Indications (GIs), reflecting a broader agenda to enhance bilateral economic relations. The EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion in goods trade by 2023 (12.2% of the total Indian trade). India is the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, representing 2.2% of the total trade in goods. Trade in services reached €59.7 billion in 2023, nearly double the 2020 level, with a significant portion being digital services, highlighting the growing economic interdependence.[ii]       *Data acquired from the European Commission at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en Negotiation Rounds and Progress Since the relaunch, ten rounds of negotiations have been conducted, with the following timeline detailing key developments:   ·         Acquired through Grok. Prompt: What is the latest on the EU – India FTA Negotiations? At: https://x.com/i/grok?conversation=1922705918707265888 (14 May 2025) What is so important regarding FTAs? Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have become the cornerstone of international trade policy by reshaping global economic landscapes and geopolitical dynamics. These agreements aim to reduce trade barriers and foster economic cooperation among member states; however, their implications extend far beyond mere economic exchanges. Economic Consequences of Free Trade Areas One of the primary economic consequences of FTAs is the creation of new trade opportunities among the member states. By reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, FTAs encourage specialisation and efficiency and increase trade volumes. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to boost intra-African trade by creating a single market for goods and services that can unlock regional value chains and enhance economic integration.[i]  Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has expanded trade between Indonesia and China, although the benefits may be asymmetric, with Indonesia's imports growing faster than exports.[ii] However, FTAs can also lead to trade diversion, in which member states import goods at the expense of non-member countries. This phenomenon can harm non-members by reducing market access and undermining global trade liberalisation efforts.[iii] For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force,[iv] and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which shared the same fate, were criticised for potentially marginalising non-member states and creating a fragmented global trade system.[v] FTAs often attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by creating more integrated markets. For instance, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has stimulated FDI inflows into member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, contributing to GDP growth.[vi] Similarly, establishing Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in China has promoted financial employment and industrial upgrading, particularly in the middle and western regions, balancing regional development.[vii] However, the benefits of FTAs are not always distributed evenly. Some studies suggest that while FTAs may boost economic growth for member states, non-members may experience adverse impacts such as reduced trade volumes and deteriorating terms of trade.[viii] Geopolitical Consequences of Free Trade Areas FTAs often serve as tools for geopolitical influence, allowing powerful states to shape their global economic order. For example, the TTIP and TPP were partly designed to counterbalance China's rising economic influence and establish new trade standards.[ix] Similarly, the RCEP has reinforced China's economic leadership in Asia, while the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has allowed the United States to maintain its influence in North America.[x] For smaller countries like Vietnam, FTAs can enhance international recognition and strategic balancing between major powers, contribute to regional integration and stability, influence internal political legitimacy and power dynamics, and provide tools to manage geopolitical risks and external shocks. FTAs, especially New Generation Free Trade Agreements (NGFTAs) such as the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), act as economic instruments and geopolitical tools that shape Vietnam's global and regional order position.[xi] The geopolitical implications of FTAs are evident in their impact on international trade governance. The proliferation of mega-regional trade agreements has challenged the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO), creating a fragmented trade landscape.[xii] This shift has raised concerns about the marginalisation of developing countries and the erosion of global trade rules. FTAs can also mitigate interstate conflict by increasing war costs. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) catalyses regional peace, fostering economic interdependence and reducing the likelihood of conflict.[xiii] Similarly, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has strengthened economic ties between Indonesia and China, reducing potential geopolitical tensions in the region.[xiv] FTAs are not always effective in preventing conflict. In some cases, they may exacerbate tensions by creating unequal benefits or excluding certain states. For example, the TPP and TTIP have been criticised for their exclusionary nature, which may have contributed to trade tensions between member and non-member states.[xv] FTAs often serve as building blocks for broader regional integrations. For instance, the EU began a series of FTAs and customs unions before evolving into a deeply integrated economic and political bloc. Similarly, AfCFTA is part of a broader vision for African economic integration, aiming to create a single market and customs union. The proliferation of FTAs has also raised concerns regarding the future of multilateralism. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has stalled, and the rise of mega-regional trade agreements has further fragmented the global trade system.[xvi] This has led to calls for a more inclusive and equitable approach to trade governance that ensures that developing countries are not left behind.Free trade has profound economic and geopolitical consequences. It shapes global trade patterns, influences regional stability, and affects the distribution of wealth and power. Although FTAs offer significant economic growth and integration opportunities, they also pose inequality, exclusion, and sustainability challenges. EU – India FTA Opportunities Economic The potential Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and India presents significant economic opportunities for the EU driven by eliminating trade barriers, increased market access, and deeper economic integration. First, the services sector is a critical area where the EU can benefit significantly from an FTA with India. The EU's services exports to India could more than double, while India's services exports to the EU would increase by approximately 50%.[xvii] This growth is attributed to reduced trade barriers and the liberalisation of sectors such as telecommunications, which has been identified as a key area for reform. Arguably, half of the predicted export expansion is driven by reforms to domestic regulations, particularly in the telecommunications sector, which could further enhance the EU's competitive position in the Indian market. The FTA is expected to eliminate tariffs and reduce non-tariff barriers, creating a more level-playing field for the EU businesses in India. The FTA of EU-Indian trade could approximately double, particularly in business services.[xviii] This liberalisation would increase trade volumes and lead to structural changes in both economies, with the EU potentially gaining a competitive advantage in high-value-added sectors. The FTA would create a combined market of over 1.5 billion people, enabling the EU and India to reap the benefits of economies of scale. This integration would be particularly beneficial for manufactured goods, such as chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment, where intra-industry trade could lead to efficiency gains and cost reductions. These economies of scale could also give the EU a competitive edge in global markets, helping to stimulate economic growth and job creation.[xix] Geopolitics and security The EU–India FTA is an economic arrangement and a geopolitical tool that aligns with the EU's broader objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU's geopolitical position and security interests are central to understanding the opportunities and challenges presented by the FTA. The EU's engagement with India through the FTA is deeply rooted in its Indo-Pacific strategy, formally launched in 2021. This reflects the EU's ambition to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, particularly between the United States and China. The EU's strategy is driven by recognising that the Indo-Pacific is the "pivotal region" of the 21st century, and its economic and security dynamics will shape global governance.[xx] While the EU's new strategy does not take a confrontational stance towards China, it reflects increased concerns about Beijing’s growing assertiveness and the implications of the US-China rivalry for Europe. The strategy advocates for a multifaceted engagement with China, encouraging cooperation and protecting EU interests and values. An FTA with India is a key component of the EU’s strategy. India's growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a critical partner for the EU. The EU views India as a like-minded democracy that shares concerns about China's assertiveness and the need for a rule-based international order. This alignment creates a unique opportunity for the EU to deepen its strategic partnership with India by leveraging economic cooperation to strengthen geopolitics.[xxi] The EU's engagement with India is part of its broader effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. The EU and India share concerns regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and the challenges posed by China's growing influence in the region. The FTA can serve as a foundation for deeper collaboration on security issues such as counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and disaster management.[xxii] The EU's security strategy in the Indo-Pacific also emphasises the importance of upholding a rule-based international order. An FTA with India can help promote this objective by reinforcing shared norms and standards in trade, investment, and intellectual property rights. This alignment is critical in China's increasing assertiveness and need for like-minded partners to counterbalance its influence.[xxiii] The EU's approach to an FTA is also shaped by its identity as a normative power. The EU has historically sought to promote its values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, and social justice, through trade agreements. The FTA with India allows for advancing these values by incorporating labour rights, environmental protection, and sustainable development clauses.[xxiv] However, its geopolitical and economic realities constrain the EU’s ability to promote its normative agenda. The EU must be pragmatic and balance its value-based approach with the need to secure concessions on market access and other economic interests. This tension is evident in EU trade policy, where strategic and economic interests often precede normative objectives.[xxv] EU – India FTA Challenges Existing literature on the challenges the EU–India FTA poses is sparse. Generally, scholars admit that FTA, especially those negotiated by the EU, can face varying degrees of politicisation and contestation from civil society, as seen with TTIP and CETA.[xxvi] This finding suggests the potential for public opposition to new FTAs. In addition, the EU often pursues ambitious agreements beyond tariff reductions, including behind-the-border measures and regulatory cooperation.[xxvii] While FTAs aim to boost trade, their impact can be uneven. Some agreements have failed to entirely realise the expected benefits of trade and investment flows.[xxviii] There are also concerns that FTAs may reduce policy space for developing country partners to pursue alternative development strategies.[xxix] Economic However, several economic challenges regarding the EU-India negotiated FTA can be easily identified. To begin, the talks were stuck for nearly two decades, mainly because the EU and India had different goals. The EU wants deeper integration, including investment and competition policies, whereas India prefers a more limited agreement. This has led to repeated delays, and little progress has been made. Specifically, market access has been a point of contention, especially in sensitive sectors such as agriculture and automobiles. India imposes high tariffs on EU cars (60-100%) compared to the EU's 6.5% on Indian cars, and it protects its agricultural sector, making it difficult for EU farmers to enter the market. The EU also wanted India to open up services such as accountancy and legal work, but India resisted due to fears of competition.[xxx] The EU has strict rules, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and sustainability directives, which India sees as overregulatory and burdensome. This creates friction, as India worries these rules could act as trade barriers. There are also issues with intellectual property rights, where the EU wants stronger protection, but India resists keeping generic drugs affordable.[xxxi] Finally, the EU has invested heavily in India, around €100 billion by 2020, but India's decision to end bilateral investment treaties in 2016 and stalled talks on investment protection since 2023 creates uncertainty. There is also a trust deficit, with India fearing EU regulatory overreach and the EU worrying about compliance.[xxxii] Geopolitics and security As mentioned above, the EU's engagement with India is part of its broader strategy to deepen ties with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is driven by the need to counterbalance rising powers like China and enhance its global influence. The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Global Gateway Initiative reflect this ambition, emphasising the importance of strategic partnerships with like-minded actors such as India.[xxxiii] China's growing economic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region poses a significant challenge for the EU and India. The EU has expressed concerns about China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is seen as a tool for expanding Chinese influence.[xxxiv] The EU and India share a common interest in promoting rules-based international order and countering China's increasing dominance. This alignment has been a key driver of their strategic partnership, with both sides seeking to enhance trade, technology, and security cooperation.[xxxv] The Russia-Ukraine war has further complicated the geopolitical landscape, with significant implications for EU-India relations. While the EU has strongly supported Ukraine, India has maintained a more neutral stance by prioritising its strategic partnership with Russia.[xxxvi] This divergence in approach has created tensions, particularly in terms of energy security and sanctions, which could impact FTA negotiations. The EU and India face various traditional security challenges that affect their strategic partnerships and FTA negotiations. China's military modernisation and assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region have heightened security concerns for the EU and India. The EU has expressed support for India's role in maintaining regional stability, particularly in China's actions in the South China Sea and along the India-China border.[xxxvii] The EU and India are also concerned about regional instability, including Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. These issues underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation between the two partners.[xxxviii] As for non-traditional security challenges, climate change and energy security are key areas of cooperation between the EU and India. The EU has emphasised the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources, while India has sought to balance its energy needs with environmental concerns.[xxxix] In addition, the increasing importance of digital technologies has highlighted the need for cooperation in cybersecurity and data protection areas. The EU and India are interested in collaborating with digital infrastructure and innovation.[xl] Conclusion According to the European Parliament, “India was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community in 1962. With the formal establishment of the EU in 1993, India signed a Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which opened the door to broader political interaction between the two. […] The relationship was upgraded to a 'Strategic Partnership' during The Hague's 5th India-EU Summit in 2004. From 1980 to 2005, EU-India trade grew from €4.4 billion to €40 billion. The EU was India's largest trading partner at the time, accounting for 22.4% of Indian exports and 20.8% of imports”.[xli] Despite these incentives, India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[xlii] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[xliii] Finally, although the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. 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International efforts, such as the Paris Agreement, aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But experts say countries aren’t doing enough to limit dangerous global warming. Summary Countries have debated how to combat climate change since the early 1990s. These negotiations have produced several important accords, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Governments generally agree on the science behind climate change but have diverged on who is most responsible, how to track emissions-reduction goals, and whether to compensate harder-hit countries. The findings of the first global stocktake, discussed at the 2023 UN Climate Summit in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), concluded that governments need to do more to prevent the global average temperature from rising by 1.5°C. Introduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. But despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already facing the consequences of climate change, and they are expected to get worse. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. Scientists warn that if this warming continues unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, devastating wildfires, record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread species loss. Since negotiating the Paris accord in 2015, many of the 195 countries that are party to the agreement have strengthened their climate commitments—to include pledges on curbing emissions and supporting countries in adapting to the effects of extreme weather—during the annual UN climate conferences known as the Conference of the Parties (COP). While experts note that clear progress has been made towards the clean energy transition, cutting current emissions has proven challenging for the world’s top emitters. The United States, for instance, could be poised to ramp up fossil fuel production linked to global warming under the Donald Trump administration, which has previously minimized the effects of climate change and has withdrawn twice from the Paris Agreement. What are the most important international agreements on climate change? Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle climate change, the Montreal Protocol [PDF] was a historic environmental accord that became a model for future diplomacy on the issue. Every country in the world eventually ratified the treaty, which required them to stop producing substances that damage the ozone layer, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The protocol has succeeded in eliminating nearly 99 percent of these ozone-depleting substances. In 2016, parties agreed via the Kigali Amendment to also reduce their production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), powerful greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the United States, the landmark accord [PDF] was the first global treaty to explicitly address climate change. It established an annual forum, known as the Conference of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol [PDF], adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally binding climate treaty. It required developed countries to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel developing countries, including major carbon emitters China and India, to take action. The United States signed the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later withdrew its signature.  Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement requires all countries to set emissions-reduction pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of preventing the global average temperature from rising 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to reach global net-zero emissions, where the amount of greenhouse gases emitted equals the amount removed from the atmosphere, in the second half of the century. (This is also known as being climate neutral or carbon neutral.) The United States, the world’s second-largest emitter, is the only country to withdraw from the agreement, a move President Donald Trump made during his first administration in 2017. While former President Joe Biden reentered the agreement during his first day in office, Trump again withdrew the United States on the first day of his second administration in 2025. Three other countries have not formally approved the agreement: Iran, Libya, and Yemen. Is there a consensus on the science of climate change? Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific community, though some deny that climate change is a problem, including politicians in the United States. When negotiating teams meet for international climate talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says David Victor, an international relations professor at the University of California, San Diego. The basic science is that:• the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate; • human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers of this rapid warming and climate change; and,• continued warming is expected to have harmful effects worldwide. Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s average temperature is rising more now than it has in eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is largely a result of human activities over the last 150 years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation. These activities have dramatically increased the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet to warm. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly assesses the latest climate science and produces consensus-based reports for countries. Why are countries aiming to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C? Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic environmental consequences if global temperature continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s average temperature has already increased approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels, according to a 2023 assessment by the IPCC. The report, drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately. (Several estimates report that global warming already surpassed that threshold in 2024.) An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report summarized the severe effects expected to occur when the global temperature warms by 1.5°C: Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days, with about 14 percent of people worldwide being exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every five years. Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult, lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.  Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal regions that will be submerged in the coming decades. Small island nations are particularly vulnerable. Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The world’s fisheries will become far less productive. Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the century.  Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will be at risk of extinction.  The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR senior fellow for energy and the environment. Which countries are responsible for climate change? The answer depends on who you ask and how you measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—developed or developing—are more to blame for climate change and should therefore curb their emissions. Developing countries argue that developed countries have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They say these developed countries should now carry more of the burden because they were able to grow their economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States has emitted the most of all time, followed by the European Union (EU).   However, China and India are now among the world’s top annual emitters, along with the United States. Developed countries have argued that those countries must do more now to address climate change.   In the context of this debate, major climate agreements have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions. The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement recognized that climate change is a shared problem and called on all countries to set emissions targets. What progress have countries made since the Paris Agreement? Every five years, countries are supposed to assess their progress toward implementing the agreement through a process known as the global stocktake. The first of these reports, released in September 2023, warned governments that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.” That said, countries have made some breakthroughs during the annual UN climate summits, such as the landmark commitment to establish the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The fund aims to address the inequality of climate change by providing financial assistance to poorer countries, which are often least responsible for global emissions yet most vulnerable to climate disasters. At COP28, countries decided that the fund will be initially housed at the World Bank, with several wealthy countries, such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and EU members, initially pledging around $430 million combined. At COP29, developed countries committed to triple their finance commitments to developing countries, totalling $300 billion annually by 2035. Recently, there have been global efforts to cut methane emissions, which account for more than half of human-made warming today because of their higher potency and heat trapping ability within the first few decades of release. The United States and EU introduced a Global Methane Pledge at COP26, which aims to slash 30 percent of methane emissions levels between 2020 and 2030. At COP28, oil companies announced they would cut their methane emissions from wells and drilling by more than 80 percent by the end of the decade. However, pledges to phase out fossil fuels were not renewed the following year at COP29. Are the commitments made under the Paris Agreement enough? Most experts say that countries’ pledges are not ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The policies of Paris signatories as of late 2022 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F) rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate Analytics and the NewClimate Institute. “The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,” says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the expectation was that as time went on, countries would return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.” Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling former President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile, the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030. But the world’s average temperature will still rise more than 2°C (3.6°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one hundred countries that have set or are considering net-zero targets follow through, warming could be limited to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.   What are the alternatives to the Paris Agreement? Some experts foresee the most meaningful climate action happening in other forums. Yale University economist William Nordhaus says that purely voluntary international accords like the Paris Agreement promote free-riding and are destined to fail. The best way to cut global emissions, he says, would be to have governments negotiate a universal carbon price rather than focus on country emissions limits. Others propose new agreements [PDF] that apply to specific emissions or sectors to complement the Paris Agreement.  In recent years, climate diplomacy has occurred increasingly through minilateral groupings. The Group of Twenty (G20), representing countries that are responsible for 80 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas pollution, has pledged to stop financing new coal-fired power plants abroad and agreed to triple renewable energy capacity by the end of this decade. However, G20 governments have thus far failed to set a deadline to phase out fossil fuels. In 2022, countries in the International Civil Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile, cities around the world have made their own pledges. In the United States, more than six hundred local governments [PDF] have detailed climate action plans that include emissions-reduction targets. Industry is also a large source of carbon pollution, and many firms have said they will try to reduce their emissions or become carbon neutral or carbon negative, meaning they would remove more carbon from the atmosphere than they release. The Science Based Targets initiative, a UK-based company considered the “gold standard” in validating corporate net-zero plans, says it has certified the plans of  over three thousand firms, and aims to more than triple this total by 2025. Still, analysts say that many challenges remain, including questions over the accounting methods and a lack of transparency in supply chains. Recommended Resources This timeline tracks UN climate talks since 1992. CFR Education’s latest resources explain everything to know about climate change.  The Climate Action Tracker assesses countries’ updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. CFR Senior Fellow Varun Sivaram discusses how the 2025 U.S. wildfires demonstrate the need to rethink climate diplomacy and adopt a pragmatic response to falling short of global climate goals. In this series on climate change and instability by the Center for Preventive Action, CFR Senior Fellow Michelle Gavin looks at the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the National Defense University’s Paul J. Angelo for Central America. This backgrounder by Clara Fong unpacks the global push for climate financing.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском India and Pakistan have seen the scenario play out before: a terror attack in which Indians are killed leads to a succession of escalatory tit-fot-tat measures that put South Asia on the brink of all-out war. And then there is a de-escalation. The broad contours of that pattern have played out in the most recent crisis, with the latest step being the announcement of a ceasefire on May 10, 2025. But in another important way, the flare-up – which began on April 22 with a deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed – represents significant departures from the past. It involved direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the use of advanced missile systems and drones by the two nuclear rivals for the first time. As a scholar of nuclear rivalries, especially between India and Pakistan, I have long been concerned that the erosion of international sovereignty norms, diminished U.S. interest and influence in the region and the stockpiling of advanced military and digital technologies have significantly raised the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation in the event of a trigger in South Asia. These changes have coincided with domestic political shifts in both countries. The pro-Hindu nationalism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has heightened communal tensions in the country. Meanwhile Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, has embraced the “two-nation theory,” which holds that Pakistan is a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims and India for Hindus. This religious framing was even seen in the naming of the two countries’ military operations. For India, it is “Operation Sindoor” – a reference to the red vermilion used by married Hindu women, and a provocative nod to the widows of the Kashmir attack. Pakistan called its counter-operation “Bunyan-un-Marsoos” – an Arabic phrase from the Quran meaning “a solid structure.” The role of Washington The India-Pakistan rivalry has cost tens of thousands of lives across multiple wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. But since the late 1990s, whenever India and Pakistan approached the brink of war, a familiar de-escalation playbook unfolded: intense diplomacy, often led by the United States, would help defuse tensions. In 1999, President Bill Clinton’s direct mediation ended the Kargil conflict – a limited war triggered by Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir – by pressing Pakistan for a withdrawal. Similarly, after the 2001 attack inside the Indian Parliament by terrorists allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi, averting war. And after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which saw 166 people killed by terrorists linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, rapid and high-level American diplomatic involvement helped restrain India’s response and reduced the risk of an escalating conflict. As recently as 2019, during the Balakot crisis – which followed a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, that killed 40 Indian security personnel – it was American diplomatic pressure that helped contain hostilities. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later wrote in his memoirs, “I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.” Where is Kashmir?  A diplomatic void? Washington as peacemaker made sense: It had influence and a vested interest. During the Cold War, the U.S. formed a close alliance with Pakistan to counter India’s links with the Soviet Union. And after the 9/11 terror attacks, the U.S. poured tens of billions of dollars in military assistance into Pakistan as a frontline partner in the “war on terror.” Simultaneously, beginning in the early 2000s, the U.S. began cultivating India as a strategic partner. A stable Pakistan was a crucial partner in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; a friendly India was a strategic counterbalance to China. And this gave the U.S. both the motivation and credibility to act as an effective mediator during moments of India-Pakistan crisis. Today, however, America’s diplomatic attention has shifted significantly away from South Asia. The process began with the end of the Cold War, but accelerated dramatically after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. More recently, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have consumed Washington’s diplomatic efforts. Since President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, the U.S. has not appointed an ambassador in New Delhi or Islamabad, nor confirmed an assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs – factors that must have hampered any mediating role for the United States. And while Trump said the May 10 ceasefire followed a “long night of talks mediated by the United States,” statements from India and Pakistan appeared to downplay U.S. involvement, focusing instead on the direct bilateral nature of negotiations. Should it transpire that Washington’s role as a mediator between Pakistan and India has been diminished, it is not immediately obvious who, if anyone, will fill the void. China, which has been trying to cultivate a role of mediator elsewhere, is not seen as a neutral mediator due to its close alliance with Pakistan and past border conflicts with India. Other regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to step in during the latest crisis, but both lack the power clout of the U.S. or China. This absence of external mediation is not, of course, a problem in itself. Historically, foreign interference – particularly U.S. support for Pakistan during the Cold War – often complicated dynamics in South Asia by creating military imbalances and reinforcing hardline positions. But the past has shown external pressure – especially from Washington – can be effective. Breaking the norms The recent escalation unfolded against the backdrop of another dynamic: the erosion of international norms since the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 2001. America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged international legal frameworks through practices such as preemptive strikes against sovereign states, targeted drone killings and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” of detainees that many legal scholars classify as torture. More recently, Israel’s operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have drawn widespread criticism for violations of international humanitarian law – but have resulted in limited consequences. In short, geopolitical norms have been ebbed away and military actions that were once deemed red lines are crossed with little accountability. For India and Pakistan, this environment creates both opportunity and risk. Both can point to behaviors elsewhere to justify assertive actions that they have undertaken that, in previous years, would have been deemed a step too far – such as attacks on places of worship and sovereignty violations. Multi-domain warfare But what truly distinguished the latest crisis from those of the past is, I believe, its multi-domain nature. The conflict is no longer confined to conventional military exchanges along the line of control – as it was for the first five decades of the Kashmir question. Both countries largely respected the line of control as a de facto boundary for military operations until the 2019 crisis. Since then, there has been a dangerous progression: first to cross-border airstrikes into each other’s territories, and now to a conflict that spans conventional military, cyber and information spheres simultaneously. Reports indicate Chinese-made Pakistani J-10 fighter jets shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including advanced French Rafale jets. This confrontation between Chinese and Western weapons represents not just a bilateral conflict but a proxy test of rival global military technologies – adding another layer of great-power competition to the crisis. In addition, the use of loitering drones designed to attack radar systems represents a significant escalation in the technological sophistication of cross-border attacks compared to years past. The conflict has also expanded dramatically into the cyber domain. Pakistani hackers, claiming to be the “Pakistan Cyber Force,” report breaching several Indian defense institutions, potentially compromising personnel data and login credentials. Simultaneously, social media and a new right-wing media in India have become a critical battlefront. Ultranationalist voices in India incited violence against Muslims and Kashmiris; in Pakistan, anti-India rhetoric similarly intensified online. Cooler voices prevailing … for now These shifts have created multiple escalation pathways that traditional crisis management approaches weren’t designed to address. Particularly concerning is the nuclear dimension. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is that it will use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, and it has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons intended to counter Indian conventional advantages. Meanwhile, India has informally dialed back its historic no-first-use stance, creating ambiguity about its operational doctrine. Thankfully, as the ceasefire announcement indicates, mediating voices appear to have prevailed this time around. But eroding norms, diminished great power diplomacy and the advent of multi-domain warfare, I argue, made this latest flare-up a dangerous turning point. What happens next will tell us much about how nuclear rivals manage, or fail to manage, the spiral of conflict in this dangerous new landscape.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском In 1995, World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin warned that whereas the conflicts of the previous 100 years had been over oil, “the wars of the next century will be fought over water.” Thirty years on, that prediction is being tested in one of the world’s most volatile regions: Kashmir. On April 24, 2025, the government of India announced that it would downgrade diplomatic ties with its neighbor Pakistan over an attack by militants in Kashmir that killed 26 tourists. As part of that cooling of relations, India said it would immediately suspend the Indus Waters Treaty – a decades-old agreement that allowed both countries to share water use from the rivers that flow from India into Pakistan. Pakistan has promised reciprocal moves and warned that any disruption to its water supply would be considered “an act of war.” The current flareup escalated quickly, but has a long history. At the Indus Basin Water Project at the Ohio State University, we are engaged in a multiyear project investigating the transboundary water dispute between Pakistan and India. I am currently in Pakistan conducting fieldwork in Kashmir and across the Indus Basin. Geopolitical tensions in the region, which have been worsened by the recent attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, do pose a major threat to the water treaty. So too does another factor that is helping escalate the tensions: climate change A fair solution to water disputes The Indus River has supported life for thousands of years since the Harappan civilization, which flourished around 2600 to 1900 B.C.E. in what is now Pakistan and northwest India. After the partition of India in 1947, control of the Indus River system became a major source of tension between the two nations that emerged from partition: India and Pakistan. Disputes arose almost immediately, particularly when India temporarily halted water flow to Pakistan in 1948, prompting fears over agricultural collapse. These early confrontations led to years of negotiations, culminating in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.   Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has long been hailed as one of the most successful transboundary water agreements. It divided the Indus Basin between the two countries, giving India control over the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – and Pakistan control over the western rivers: Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. At the time, this was seen as a fair solution. But the treaty was designed for a very different world. Back then, India and Pakistan were newly independent countries working to establish themselves amid a world divided by the Cold War. When it was signed, Pakistan’s population was 46 million, and India’s was 436 million. Today, those numbers have surged to over 240 million and 1.4 billion, respectively. Today, more than 300 million people rely on the Indus River Basin for their survival. This has put increased pressure on the precious source of water that sits between the two nuclear rivals. The effects of global warming, and the continued fighting over the disputed region of Kashmir, has only added to those tensions. Impact of melting glaciers Many of the problems of today are down to what wasn’t included in the treaty, rather than what was. At the time of signing, there was a lack of comprehensive studies on glacier mass balance. The assumption was that the Himalayan glaciers, which feed the Indus River system, were relatively stable. This lack of detailed measurements meant that future changes due to climate variability and glacial melt were not factored into the treaty’s design, nor were factors such as groundwater depletion, water pollution from pesticides, fertilizer use and industrial waste. Similarly, the potential for large-scale hydraulic development of the region through dams, reservoirs, canals and hydroelectricity were largely ignored in the treaty. Reflecting contemporary assumptions about the stability of glaciers, the negotiators assumed that hydrological patterns would remain persistent with the historic flows. Instead, the glaciers feeding the Indus Basin began to melt. In fact, they are now melting at record rates. The World Meteorological Organization reported that 2023 was globally the driest year in over three decades, with below-normal river flows disrupting agriculture and ecosystems. Global glaciers also saw their largest mass loss in 50 years, releasing over 600 gigatons of water into rivers and oceans. The Himalayan glaciers, which supply 60-70% of the Indus River’s summer flow, are shrinking rapidly. A 2019 study estimates they are losing 8 billion tons of ice annually. And a study by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development found that Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Himalayan glaciers melted 65% faster in 2011–2020 compared with the previous decade. The rate of glacier melt poses a significant challenge to the treaty’s long-term effectiveness to ensure essential water for all the people who rely on the Indus River Basin. While it may temporarily increase river flow, it threatens the long-term availability of water. Indeed, if this trend continues, water shortages will intensify, particularly for Pakistan, which depends heavily on the Indus during dry seasons. Another failing of the Indus Waters Treaty is that it only addresses surface water distribution and does not include provisions for managing groundwater extraction, which has become a significant issue in both India and Pakistan. In the Punjab region – often referred to as the breadbasket of both nations – heavy reliance on groundwater is leading to overexploitation and depletion. Groundwater now contributes a large portion – about 48% – of water withdrawals in the Indus Basin, particularly during dry seasons. Yet there is no transboundary framework to oversee the shared management of this resource as reported by the World Bank. A disputed region It wasn’t just climate change and groundwater that were ignored by the drafters of the Indus Waters Treaty. Indian and Pakistan negotiators also neglected the issue and status of Kashmir. Kashmir has been at the heart of India-Pakistan tensions since Partition in 1947. At the time of independence, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was given the option to accede to either India or Pakistan. Though the region had a Muslim majority, the Hindu ruler chose to accede to India, triggering the first India-Pakistan war. This led to a U.N.-mediated ceasefire in 1949 and the creation of the Line of Control, effectively dividing the territory between Indian-administered and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since then, Kashmir has remained a disputed territory, claimed in full by both countries and serving as the flashpoint for two additional wars in 1965 and 1999, and numerous skirmishes. Despite being the primary source of water for the basin, Kashmiris have had no role in negotiations or decision-making under the treaty. The region’s agricultural and hydropower potential has been limited due to restrictions on the use of its water resources, with only 19.8% of hydropower potential utilized. This means that Kashmiris on both sides — despite living in a water-rich region — have been unable to fully benefit from the resources flowing through their land, as water infrastructure has primarily served downstream users and broader national interests rather than local development. Some scholars argue that the treaty intentionally facilitated hydraulic development in Jammu and Kashmir, but not necessarily in ways that served local interests. India’s hydropower projects in Kashmir — such as the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams — have been a major point of contention. Pakistan has repeatedly raised concerns that these projects could alter water flows, particularly during crucial agricultural seasons. However, the Indus Waters Treaty does not provide explicit mechanisms for resolving such regional disputes, leaving Kashmir’s hydrological and political concerns unaddressed. Tensions over hydropower projects in Kashmir were bringing India and Pakistan toward diplomatic deadlock long before the recent attack. The Kishanganga and Ratle dam disputes, now under arbitration in The Hague, exposed the treaty’s growing inability to manage transboundary water conflicts. Then in September 2024, India formally called for a review of the Indus Waters Treaty, citing demographic shifts, energy needs and security concerns over Kashmir. The treaty now exists in a state of limbo. While it technically remains in force, India’s formal notice for review has introduced uncertainty, halting key cooperative mechanisms and casting doubt on the treaty’s long-term durability. An equitable and sustainable treaty? Moving forward, I argue, any reform or renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty will, if it is to have lasting success, need to acknowledge the hydrological significance of Kashmir while engaging voices from across the region. Excluding Kashmir from future discussions – and neither India nor Pakistan has formally proposed including Kashmiri stakeholders – would only reinforce a long-standing pattern of marginalization, where decisions about its resources are made without considering the needs of its people. As debates on “climate-proofing” the treaty continue, ensuring Kashmiri perspectives are included will be critical for building a more equitable and sustainable transboundary water framework.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Abstract This study examines the short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications of recent "tariff wars" on the European Union (EU). The imposition of tariffs by the United States, particularly the "Liberation Day" tariffs announced by President Trump on April 2, 2025, led to significant disruptions in global supply chains, negatively impacted GDP growth, increased financial market volatility, and exacerbated geopolitical tensions. The EU faces challenges in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape while maintaining its economic interests and influence. However, the EU has opportunities to leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market, foster international cooperation, and emerge as a more resilient global actor. The paper concludes by discussing the potential end of transatlanticism, the future of the EU, and the implications for globalisation in light of the current "tariff chaos." Keywords: Tariffs, Geopolitics, European Union, Trade Wars Introduction Before we examine the topic of tariffs, let us recall that the terms "tariff war" or "trade war" are not strictly academic. International Security scholars generally believe that the notion of war is reserved for military conflicts (both domestic and international) that involve at least a thousand casualties in any given year.[1] One of the most prominent sources in this regard is the Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, published by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, and the International Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University in Uppsala.[2] Therefore, "tariff war" or "tariff wars" are more journalistic and hyperbolic. Hence, they are used in this study with quotation marks. Journalists and commentators from various backgrounds often use inflated language to impress their readers. On the other hand, wars are cataclysmic events that have game-changing consequences. In this sense, some tools that state leaders use to achieve political and economic goals, such as tariffs, may have short- and long-term outcomes. Nonetheless, scholars who tend to be precise in their explanations will mainly discuss economic competition rather than "economic war" or "wars." This study investigates the short-, medium-, and possible long-term implications of "tariff wars" on the European Union. These implications appear multifaceted and encompass stability, political relationships, and a broader international order."Liberation Day" On April 2, US President Trump announced new tariffs under the banner of "Liberation Day" – a minimum baseline of 10 per cent tariffs on goods imported from all foreign countries and higher, reciprocal tariffs on nations that impose tariffs on US exports.[3]  Crucially, the White House claims that the new tariffs are reciprocal: "It is the policy of the United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall start at 10 per cent, and shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until such time as I determine that the underlying conditions described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated".[4] We did not have to wait for strong reactions to occur worldwide. China vowed to retaliate against the 34 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Wednesday (April 2 2025) and protect its national interests while condemning the move as "an act of bullying".[5] Doubling down, a few days later, Trump threatened a 50 per cent tariff on China on top of previous reciprocal duties,[6] to which Chinese President Xi Jinping already replied hawkishly.[7] In an equally hawkish response, the Trump administration declared that Chinese goods would be subject to a 145 per cent tariff.[8] In a twist of events, on April 9, the US  declared a 90-day-long pause for previously declared tariffs covering the whole world (keeping a minimum of 10 per cent, though) except against China.[9] The next couple of weeks will show whether the world will enter the "tariff arms race" or we will enter some "tariff détente". Importantly, as one can surmise, "Xi has sold himself domestically and internationally as the guy standing up to America, and people that want to stand up to America should get in line behind Chairman Xi".[10] For the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described US universal tariffs as a significant blow to the world economy and claimed that the European Union was prepared to respond with countermeasures if talks with Washington failed. Accordingly, the EU was already finalising a first package of tariffs on up to 26 billion Euro ($28.4 billion) of US goods for mid-April in response to US steel and aluminium tariffs that took effect on March 12.[11] Consequently, on April 7, 2025, a meeting was organised in Luxembourg[12] regarding the EU's response to US tariffs on steel and aluminium and the preparation of countermeasures, which included a proposal to impose 25 per cent tariffs on US goods. Interestingly, the "Liberation Day" tariffs do not include Russia. According to numerous commentators, this indicates Moscow's importance as a future trade partner once the Ukrainian war is over. However, the official explanation issued by the White House suggests that the existing sanctions against Russia "preclude any meaningful trade."[13] Tariff imposition: short, medium and long-term consequences Several observable phenomena can be identified regarding their economic ramifications: First, the imposition of tariffs can lead to significant disruptions in global supply chains, thereby affecting industries that rely heavily on international trade. This disruption can lead to increased costs and reduced competitiveness for EU businesses, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.[14] While national measures may yield political and economic benefits in the short term, it is essential to note that global prosperity cannot be sustained without cooperative and stable international trade policies. Second, the Gross Domestic Product is likely to be impacted. The imposition of tariffs has been shown to negatively affect GDP growth. For instance, the US-China "trade war" decreased the GDP of both countries, which could similarly affect the EU if it becomes embroiled in similar conflicts.[15] Third, we examine volatility in the financial markets. "Tariff wars" contribute to financial market volatility, which can cause a ripple effect on EU economic stability. This volatility can deter investment and slow economic growth.[16] Fourth, political targeting and retaliation. "Tariff wars" often involve politically targeted retaliations, as seen in the US-China trade conflict. The EU has been adept at minimising economic damage while maximising political targeting, which could influence its future trade strategies and political alliances.[17] Fifth, global alliances are shifting. The EU may need to reconsider its trade alliances and partnerships in response to these shifting dynamics. This could involve forming new trade agreements or strengthening existing ones to mitigate the impact of "tariff wars."[18] Next, increased geopolitical competition and economic nationalism can exacerbate tensions between major powers, potentially leading to a crisis in globalization. As an aspiring global player, the EU must navigate these tensions carefully to maintain its influence and economic interests.[19] Social impacts should also be considered. "Trade wars" can lead to changes in employment and consumer prices, thus affecting the EU's social equity and economic stability. These changes necessitate policies that enhance social resilience and protect vulnerable populations.[20] Does Team Trump have a plan? The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration appear to be part of a broader strategy that Trump describes as a declaration of economic independence for the US, notably heralding them as part of the national emergency. The long-term effects of this strategy depend on how effectively the US can transition to domestic production without facing significant retaliation or trade barriers from other nations. Notably, the US dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency has been supported by military power since the introduction of the Bretton Woods system. The US military, especially the US Navy, has helped secure trade routes, enforce economic policies, and establish a framework for international trade, favouring the US. dollar. The countries that subscribed to the system also gained access to the US consumer market. Importantly, what is explained by the Triffin Dilemma, back in the 1960s, the US had a choice: to either increase the supply of the US Dollar,  sought after by the whole world as a reserve currency and international trade currency and that way to upkeep global economic growth, which was pivotal for the US economy or to end the gold standard. In 1971, the US finished its Bretton Woods system. What followed was a new system primarily dictated by neoliberalism based on low tariffs, free capital movement, flexible exchange rates and US security guarantees.[21] Under that neoliberal system, reserve demand for American assets has pushed up the dollar, leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run.[22] This made manufacturing in the US very expensive, and consequently, the deindustrialisation of the US followed. Therefore, it appears that Trump wants to keep the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and reindustrialise the US. According to Stephen Miran, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (a United States agency within the Executive Office of the President), two key elements to achieve this goal are tariffs and addressing currency undervaluation of other nations.[23] The second element in that duo is also known as the Mar-a-Lago Accord.[24] Scott Bessent, 79th US Secretary of the Treasury, picked up this argument.[25] In a nutshell, the current "tariff chaos" is arguably only temporary, and in the long term, it is designed to provide an advantage for the US economy.A readjustment of sorts fundamentally reshapes the existing international political economy. Whether or not this plan works and achieves its goals is entirely different. As market analysts observe, "For the past two decades, the US has focused on high-tech services like Amazon and Google services, which have added to a service surplus. However, the real sustainable wealth comes from the manufacturing of goods, which, for the US, went from 17 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in 2023 of GDP. The entire process of building goods creates many mini ecosystems of production/capital value that stay in a country for many decades. […] Initially, the Chinese started in low-tech and low-cost labour manufacturing before 2001, but shifted towards becoming major manufacturers of high-tech products like robotics and EV automobiles. […] For President Trump to levy high tariffs on the Chinese in the current moment, he is doing everything that he can to resuscitate US manufacturing".[26] EU's options The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with 2024 data showing EU exports to the US at 531.6 billion euros and imports at 333.4 billion euros, resulting in a 198.2 billion Euro trade surplus for the EU.[27] While the EU faces significant challenges due to "tariff wars," there are potential opportunities for positive outcomes. The EU can leverage these conflicts to strengthen its internal market and enhance its role in global trade. By adopting proactive trade policies and fostering international cooperation, the EU can mitigate the negative impacts of "tariff wars" and potentially emerge as a more resilient and influential global actor. However, this requires careful navigation of the complex geopolitical landscape and a commitment to maintaining open and cooperative trade relations. It seems likely that the EU can leverage recent US tariffs to strengthen ties with China and India, potentially reducing its dependency on US trade. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade at 739 billion euros in 2023, though a large deficit favouring China (292 billion euros in 2023).[28] The EU's strategy is to de-risk, not decouple, focusing on reciprocity and reducing dependencies; however, competition and systemic rivalry complicate deeper ties. Meanwhile, India's trade with the EU was 124 billion euros in goods in 2023, and ongoing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, expected to conclude by 2025, could yield short-term economic gains of 4.4 billion euros for both.[29] India's fast-growing economy and shared interest in technology make it a potentially promising partner. EU and China: Opportunities and Challenges Economically, there are more opportunities than challenges. China remains the EU's second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching 739 billion euros in 2023, down 14 per cent from 2022 due to global economic shifts.[30] The trade balance shows a significant deficit of 292 billion euros in 2023, driven by imports of telecommunications equipment and machinery, whereas EU exports include motor cars and medicaments. The EU's strategy, outlined in its 2019 strategic outlook and reaffirmed in 2023, positions China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, focusing on de-risking rather than decoupling. Recent actions, such as anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre yarns in March 2025, highlight tensions over unfair trade practices. Despite these challenges, China's market size offers opportunities, especially if the EU can negotiate for better access. However, geopolitical rivalry complicates deeper ties, including EU probes, in Chinese subsidies. Politically, the EU and China differ significantly in this regard. Regarding human rights policies, the EU consistently raises concerns about human rights issues in China.[31] These concerns often lead to friction, with the European Parliament blocking trade agreements and imposing sanctions on them. Moreover, China's stance on the war in Ukraine has created tension, with the EU viewing Russia as a major threat, and China's support of Russia is a significant concern.[32] China is often perceived in Western European capitals as not making concessions on issues vital to European interests.[33] The understanding of the war's root causes, the assessment of implications, risks or potential solutions - in all these areas, the Chinese leadership on the one hand and the European governments and the EU Commission in Brussels on the other hand have expressed very different, at times even contrary, positions.[34] Finally, China's political model demonstrates that democracy is not a prerequisite for prosperity, challenging Western emphasis on democracy and human rights.[35] EU and India: Growing Partnership and FTA Prospects and Political Challenges Economically, it seems that there are more opportunities than challenges. India, ranked as the EU's ninth-largest trading partner, accounted for 124 billion euros in goods trade in 2023, representing 2.2 per cent of the EU's total trade, with growth of around 90 per cent over the past decade.[36] Services trade reached nearly 60 billion euros in 2023, almost doubling since 2020, with a third being digital services.[37] The EU is India's largest trading partner, and ongoing negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA), investment protection, and geographical indications, initiated in 2007 and resuming in 2022, aim for conclusion by 2025.[38] A 2008 trade impact assessment suggests positive real income effects, with short-term gains of 3–4.4 billion euros for both parties. The EU seeks to lower Indian tariffs on cars, wine, and whiskey. Simultaneously, India has pushed for market access to pharmaceuticals and easier work visas for IT professionals. However, concerns remain regarding the impact of EU border carbon taxes and farm subsidies on Indian farmers. Politically, challenges to EU-India relations stem from several sources. Trade has been a persistent friction point, with negotiations for a free trade agreement facing roadblocks (Malaponti, 2024). Despite the EU being a significant trading partner for India,[39] differing approaches to trade liberalization have hindered progress. India's historical emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance can sometimes clash with the EU's multilateral approach.[40] Further, India's complex relationship with Russia, particularly its continued reliance on Russian defence technology, presents a challenge for closer EU-India security cooperation.[41] Finally, while the EU and India share concerns about China's growing influence, their strategies for managing this challenge may differ. These issues, if left unaddressed, could limit the potential for a deeper, more strategic partnership between the EU and India.[42] Conclusions "What does Trump want? This question is on the minds of policymakers and experts worldwide. Perhaps we are witnessing the opening salvo of a decisive phase of the US-China economic conflict - the most serious conflict since 1989. It is likely the beginning of the end of the ideology of Globalism and the processes of globalisation. It is arguably aggressive "decoupling" at its worst and the fragmentation of the world economy. For the EU, this is a new situation which dictates new challenges. Someday, probably sooner than later, European political elites will have to make a choice. To loosen or perhaps even end the transatlantic community and go against the US. Perhaps in tandem with some of the BRICS countries, such as India and China, or swallow the bitter pill, redefine its current economic model, and once again gamble with Washington, this time against the BRICS. It seems that the EU and its member states are at a crossroads, and their next choice of action will have to be very careful. In a likely new "Cold War" between the US and this time, China, the EU might not be allowed to play the third party, neutral status. One should also remember that Trump, like Putin or Xi, likes to talk to EU member states' representatives directly, bypassing Brussels and unelected "Eureaucrats' like Ursula Von der Leyen. In other words, he tends to leverage his position against the unity of the EU, which should not be surprising given the internal EU conflicts. More often than not, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, or Nordic members of the EU clash on numerous Issues with Berlin, Paris and most importantly, Brussels. (I write more about it here: Will the EU even survive? Vital external and internal challenges ahead of the EU in the newly emerging world order. https://worldnewworld.com/page/content.php?no=4577).   References [1] See more at:  For detailed information, consult one of the most comprehensive databases on conflicts run by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme at: https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia[2] Pettersson, Therese. 2019. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 19.1. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf[3] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/[4] Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify… op. cit.[5] Hanin Bochen, and Ziwen Zhao. "China vows to retaliate after 'bullying' US imposes 34% reciprocal tariffs". South China Morning Post. April 3 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3304971/trump-announced-34-reciprocal-tariffs-chinese-goods-part-liberation-day-package[6] Megerian, Chris and Boak, Josh. "Trump threatens new 50% tariff on China on top of 'reciprocal' duties". Global News. April 7, 2025. https://globalnews.ca/news/11119347/trump-added-50-percent-tariff-china/[7] Tan Yvette, Liang Annabelle and Ng Kelly. "China is not backing down from Trump's tariff war. What next?". BBC, April 8 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg51yw700lo[8] Wong, Olga. “Trump further raises tariffs to 120% on small parcels from mainland, Hong Kong”. South China Morning Post, 11 April 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3306069/trump-further-raises-tariffs-120-small-parcels-mainland-hong-kong?utm_source=feedly_feed[9] Chu, Ben. “ What does Trump's tariff pause mean for global trade?”, BBC, 10 April, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz95589ey9yo[10] Wu, Terri. "Why US Has Upper Hand Over Beijing in Tariff Standoff". The Epoch Times April 7, 2025. https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/why-us-has-upper-hand-over-beijing-in-tariff-standoff-5838158?utm_source=epochHG&utm_campaign=jj  [11] Blenkinsop, Philip, and Van Overstraeten, Benoit. "EU plans countermeasures to new US tariffs, says EU chief." April 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/eu-prepare-countermeasures-us-reciprocal-tariffs-says-eu-chief-2025-04-03/[12] Payne, Julia. The EU Commission proposes 25% counter-tariffs on some US imports, document shows". Reuters, April 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/eu-commission-proposes-25-counter-tariffs-some-us-imports-document-shows-2025-04-07/  [13] Bennett, Ivor. "US seems content to cosy up to Russia instead of imposing tariffs." Sky News, April 4, 2025. https://news.sky.com/story/us-seems-content-to-cosy-up-to-russia-instead-of-coerce-it-with-tariffs-13341300[14] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research, 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[15] Ilhomjonov, Ibrohim, and Akbarali Yakubov. "THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USA ON THE WORLD ECONOMY," June 16, 2024. https://interoncof.com/index.php/USA/article/view/2112[16] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship." Business and Economic Research 14, no. 4 (October 27, 2024): 62. https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v14i4.22185[17] Fetzer, Thiemo, and Schwarz Carlo. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." Economic Journal 131: no. 636 (May 2021): 1717–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa122[18] Angwaomaodoko, Ejuchegahi Anthony. "Trade Wars and Tariff Policies: Long-Term Effects on Global Trade and Economic Relationship …op. cit.[19] Mihaylov, Valentin Todorov, and Sławomir Sitek. 2021. "Trade Wars and the Changing International Order: A Crisis of Globalisation?" Miscellanea Geographica 25: 99–109. https://doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051[20] Wheatley, Mary Christine. "Global Trade Wars: Economic and Social Impacts." PREMIER JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, November 5, 2024. https://premierscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/pjbm-24-368.pdf[21] Money & Macro, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ts5wJ6OfzA&t=572s[22] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System." November 2024. Hudson Bay Capital. https://www.hudsonbaycapital.com/documents/FG/hudsonbay/research/638199_A_Users_Guide_to_Restructuring_the_Global_Trading_System.pdf[23] Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"... op.cit.[24] Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "Why the Proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord May Not be the Magic Wand That Trump Is Hoping For", 9  April 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-proposed-mar-lago-accord-may-not-be-magic-wand-trump-hoping  [25] Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent Breaks Down Trump's Tariff Plan and Its Impact on the Middle Class. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zLnX1SQfgJI[26] Park, Thomas. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7316122202846765056/[27] See more at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/fr/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20250311-1[28] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[29] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know." World Economic Forum. March 7 2025. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/eu-india-free-trade-agreement/[30] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en[31] "The paradoxical relationship between the EU and China'. Eastminster: a global politics & policy blog, University of East Anglia. http://www.ueapolitics.org/2022/03/29/the-paradoxical-relationship-between-the-eu-and-china/[32] Vasselier, Abigaël. "Relations between the EU and China: what to watch for in 2024". January 25 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/relations-between-eu-and-china-what-watch-2024 [33] Benner, Thorsten. "Europe Is Disastrously Split on China." Foreign Policy, April 12 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/[34] Chen, D., N. Godehardt, M., Mayer, X., Zhang. 2022. "Europe and China at a Crossroads." 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads.[35] Sharshenova, A. and Crawford. 2017. "Undermining Western Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: China's Countervailing Influences, Powers and Impact." Central Asian Survey 36 (4): 453. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2017.1372364.[36] See more at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india_en[37] See more at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council[38] Kar, Jeet. "The EU and India are close to finalising a free trade agreement. Here's what to know"… op. cit.[39] Malaponti, Chiara. 2024. “Rebooting EU-India Relations: How to Unlock Post-Election Potential.” https://ecfr.eu/article/rebooting-eu-india-relations-how-to-unlock-post-election-potential/.[40] Sinha, Aseema, and Jon P. Dorschner. 2009. “India: Rising Power or a Mere Revolution of Rising Expectations?” Polity 42 (1): 74. https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2009.19.[41] Chandrasekar, Anunita. 2025. “It’s Time to Upgrade the EU-India Relationship.” https://www.cer.eu/insights/its-time-upgrade-eu-india-relationship.[42] Gare, Frédéric and Reuter Manisha. “Here be dragons: India-China relations and their consequences for Europe”. 25 May 2023. https://ecfr.eu/article/here-be-dragons-india-china-relations-and-their-consequences-for-europe/

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025. Yet the world's most populated country can see this aggressive US policy as an economic boon for three reasons: its low level of integration into the global market, its ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ policy of strategic autonomy and its position as an alternative to China. The United States is India's biggest customer. It accounts for 19% of India's exports. India considered itself relatively unaffected by the new US customs policy unveiled on April 2. US tariffs on Indian goods will rise from 17% in 2023 to 26% in 2025, if President Trump does not postpone the implementation date once again... This 26% figure is much lower than the duties imposed on other South-East Asian nations, which to some extent compete with Indian industry. Bangladesh, for example, has tariffs of 37%, Vietnam 46% and Thailand 36%. Certain key sectors of Indian industry, such as pharmaceuticals, are even exempt from additional duties. This exemption underlines the strategic importance of India's exports of generic medicines to the United States. A variable geometry customs strategy. India, which has no plans to retaliate, is confident of concluding a relatively advantageous agreement thanks to the bilateral negotiations that began in February 2025, following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United States. Indian reindustrialisation? Some see this new customs policy as an opportunity for India to reindustrialise, something it badly needs to boost employment. Over the years, India has lost its comparative advantage in certain sectors to other South and South-East Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand and Vietnam. The latter face customs duties that are higher than India's, and that are rising faster. Is this likely to boost the competitiveness of these Indian industries? However, they would require long-term investment. India's industrial strategy has preferred to focus on more technologically advanced sectors, by introducing subsidies for the creation of production capacity through the Production Linkes Incentive (PLI) Scheme. The aim is to reduce dependence on imports and boost exports in priority sectors. The semi-conductor sector, for example, has benefited greatly, with the hope, among other things, of turning India into a manufacturing hub for these products. It hopes to attract €27 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI). The task will certainly be made more difficult by the protectionist policies of the United States. Re-industrialisation in India will require regulatory reforms and investment in infrastructure. Despite the substantial progress made in these areas, more remains to be done. In any case, for US protectionist policy to encourage the development of Indian industry, it would have to be stable, which does not seem to be the primary orientation of the current Trump administration. Weak integration into world trade India's participation in world trade in goods is modest given the size of its economy: in 2023, India's market share in world trade was 2%. Despite its growing trade surplus with the United States, India has been relatively unaffected by the rise in tariffs, partly because Indian imports account for only 3% of total US imports. Its economy, which is very little integrated into global value chains, will de facto be less severely affected by the new US customs policy.  Although its economy trades few goods with the rest of the world, India has a comparative advantage in the service sector, which accounts for almost half of its exports of goods and services. Yet services are largely unaffected by tariffs and remain outside the perimeter of the new US policy. Indian protectionism: "Atmanirbhar Bharat" The protectionist stance adopted by the United States may reinforce the Indian government's conviction that it is right for its economy to be only marginally integrated into world trade in goods. The Indian economy is not very open and its trade policy has long tended towards protectionism. The latest industrial policy plan, "Atmanirbhar Bharat" ("Self-sufficient India"), aims to promote both exports and the strategic autonomy of the Indian economy in a number of sectors, including pharmaceuticals, solar energy and electronics. Since the ‘Made in India’ programme, India's industrial policy has not sought to create growth through exports, but to attract foreign capital to create production capacity in India, mainly for the Indian market. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen sharply, albeit from a relatively low base: it stood at 45.15 billion dollars in 2013. By 2022, it will have risen to $83.6 billion. India, more than ever courted India is strengthening its strategic position on the international stage. Its economy was already attracting the attention of investors, thanks to its potential market of 1.4 billion consumers and its position as Asia's alternative to China. The erratic behaviour of the Trump administration makes any partnership with India even more desirable, particularly for Europeans. There is no doubt that the trade talks for an agreement between the European Union and India, that began in 2022 and were brought back to the forefront by the visit of the President of the European Commission to New Delhi in February 2025, will take on a new dimension in the eyes of the Europeans. India's current nationalist government has worked hard to ensure that India becomes a pivotal player in the international community. This leading role on the international stage is a significant electoral asset that should strengthen Narendra Modi's influence within the country.

한국어로 읽기 Leer en español In Deutsch lesen Gap اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français Читать на русском Escalating Baloch insurgency challenges Pakistan’s authority, as militant coordination grows and state repression deepens regional instability The insurgency in Balochistan is becoming ominous and has been palpable for a couple of years. But the gravity of the situation in Pakistan's biggest province failed to register in the Byzantine corridors of power in Islamabad. In Pakistan's capital city, the only thing that mattered was controlling and manipulating the state’s institutions to ensure the survival of the hybrid regime controlled by the military junta of General Syed Asim Munir and fronted by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The fires in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) received cursory coverage in the media. The public discourse has predominantly revolved around Imran Khan and his trials and tribulations in prison, and the regime’s machinations in countering his narrative, and his popularity. Balochistan was too distant from Islamabad and even Lahore for anyone to bother about what was happening in the restive province. Latelast month, after Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman’s speech in the National Assembly where he said that “five to seven districts in Balochistan were in a position to announce independence” and the “United Nations (UN) would recognise them the next day,” Pakistani people and beyond started taking notice of the sharply deteriorating security situation in the province. Although Maulana may have gone a bit overboard over the UN recognising a declaration of independence in Balochistan, he has his ears and eyes on the ground in the province and has a very good understanding of how bad things are. Following the Maulana, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in the National Assembly, Omar Ayub, said that the Pakistani state had virtually ceased to exist in more than half a dozen districts of Balochistan. According to Ayub, the Pakistani flag was not flying in these districts. Nonetheless, it was not only political leaders opposed to the hybrid regime who were flagging the alarming situation in Balochistan. One of the closest advisors of PM Sharif, Rana Sanaullah, warned that armed groups could descend from the mountains and seize control of Balochistan. After initially trying to deny that things were spiraling out of control in the province, the Chief Minister, Sarfraz Bugti, finally admitted the situation was alarming. However, the insurgents could not hold any area for longer than a few hours. That the insurgents could strike at will and seize control of major highways and small towns for even a few hours was hardly something that any responsible administrator could be sanguine about. If anything, the rising frequency of high-profile, high-impact strikes by the Baloch insurgents has completely undermined the authority of the state. Worse, it has fuelled so much uncertainty that it has put paid to ambitious plans to attract foreign investment in infrastructure and mining projects. It was against this backdrop that the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella group of four militant insurgent groups namely Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Republic Guard (BRG) and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) announced the formation of a Baloch National Army with a unified command structure and a shift of focus from "Scattered operations to an organised, coordinated and decisive force”. BRAS declared its intent to intensify the war against both Pakistan and its main patron, China and bring greater lethality in its guerilla operations. To hit Pakistan and China where it hurts, the BRAS decided to ‘intensify the blockade on all important highways of Balochistan to disrupt the logistical, economic, and military interests of the occupying state.’ Within days of the BRAS announcement of ramping up its operations, the guerillas hit the strategic Coastal Highway and set six gas tankers and police vehicles on fire. There was also a sudden uptick in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks on Pakistani security forces and Baloch collaborators. The sheer expanse of geography where these attacks took place was particularly notable–a suicide attack in Kalat city, an IED blast in Quetta, another IED in Khuzdar against a pro-regime tribal leader, targeted killings of two clerics in Zehri, the same town that was stormed and occupied for a few hours by nearly a 100 insurgents in January last. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in just the first nine weeks of 2025, there have already been 70 incidents, in which around 135 Pakistani security forces personnel have been killed as against 66 insurgents/extremists–a ratio of 2:1 which reflects the enormity of the problem. Some of these insurgent attacks caused serious damage in men and material to the Pakistani security forces. In early February last, insurgents ambushed a van carrying troops, killing 17 Pakistani soldiers in the Kalat district. Two weeks later, in attacks on a Pakistan army checkpoint and a convoy in the Mand area, another 17 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The insurgents also attacked a bus carrying mine workers in Harnai, killing 11. Although the  Pakistani media presented this as an extortion racket run by the insurgents, the fact that it was an attack on an economic target–the insurgents call it exploitation of Balochistan’s resources by Punjab–made it a legitimate target in their view. Similarly, the targeting of Punjabi businessmen and settlers the Baloch call them spies and collaborators–is also a part of the strategy of the Baloch fighters against the Pakistani state. Perhaps the most devastating attack was carried out in August 2024 when the Baloch insurgents launched Operation Herof, in which they carried out coordinated attacks across the length and breadth of the province. In 2024 alone, over 900 attacks were carried out by the insurgent groups, the bulk of them by BLA, BLF and under the label of BRAS. Except for the Pashtun-dominated districts of Northern Balochistan, the Baloch insurgents have been active in every district of Balochistan. This is a qualitative change from past insurgencies when the fighting was restricted to a few districts and tribes. Now, it is pan-Balochistan and cutting across tribal, linguistic, and gender divide. While the Baloch insurgents have upped their game, not just in terms of the ferocity, intensity, and organisational capability, the Pakistani state—which is a euphemism for the Pakistan Army—has not been able to evolve to respond effectively. Its playbook is the same decades-old one: increase brutality, offer blandishments to tribal chieftains, bribe influential politicians, browbeat the people, stifle all dissent, keep a very tight leash over the media, install puppets and Quislings to run the province under the garb of democracy. But it is proving counterproductive, and the more the Pakistan Army doubles down on its repressive rule, the more it alienates the Baloch people and swells the ranks of the insurgent groups with recruits, including women and young people from educated middle-class. Finding itself losing the narrative war, the Pakistan Army has responded predictably. It has started raiding universities and abducting Baloch students, keeping them in illegal custody and, in some cases, killing them and dumping their bodies on the roadsides or in the wilds. In just the first few weeks of this calendar year, over 250 students have forcibly disappeared. This enforced disappearances issue has only fuelled disgust and alienation against the Pakistani state, arguably becoming one of the central pillars around which Baloch public opinion has been mobilised. Apart from the brutal repression that has been unleashed, the Pakistan Army is trying to play catch up in the narrative game by using tactics which are now anachronistic. For instance, authorities often parade a ‘surrendered militant’ who recites a predictable narrative – accusing commanders of greed, claiming India funds them, and asserting they work against Baloch interests. The Pakistani media then plays up these stories to amplify them. But no one except perhaps people in Punjab are buying what the Pakistan Army’s disinformation wing is selling. Similarly, exaggerated and often utterly fictitious claims of the Pakistan Army’s operations either to repel an attack or to raid insurgent hideouts are not impressing anyone. In most cases, the Pakistan Army conjures up an imaginary number of insurgents killed just to show that it is fighting back, and hard. The BRAS declaration to restructure its organisation and intensify its operations makes it clear– the insurgents believe the struggle in Balochistan has entered a decisive phase. The political narrative is dominated by young leaders of the Baloch Yakjheti Council, such as the indomitable Mahrang Baloch, Sami Deen Baloch and other members spearheading massive protests across the province. Members of the legislative assembly and the ‘elected’ government in the province have become political pigmies who are in power only because they have been foisted on the people of Balochistan by the Pakistan Army. The political and democratic processes in Balochistan have become redundant because they have been completely compromised and rigged by the Pakistan Army, all of which feeds into the narrative of pro-independence voices. Militarily, the Baloch insurgents have demonstrated their reach, capability and ability to coordinate complex attacks. While there is some skepticism about how much the Baloch can achieve because they constitute less than 5 percent of Pakistan's 250 million population, the insurgents believe that they have the critical mass required to win against the Pakistani state. What they lack in sheer numbers, they make up because of the raging Taliban insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, which is bogging down and bleeding the Pakistan Army. Add to this the sharp deterioration in relations between the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban appear to be giving space to the Baloch as it gives them a certain leverage over Pakistan, which they suspect of flirting with Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) to undermine the Islamic Emirate. The situation in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran is also proving conducive for the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan. Faced with the audacity and ferocity of attacks being carried out by the Baloch freedom fighters, and given that Pakistan’s antediluvian approach to tackling the restiveness in the province is not working, there are limited options available to the Pakistan Army. It can continue doing what it has been over the last 25 years since this fifth insurgency has been raging in Balochistan, perhaps intensify what it has been doing. But the result is unlikely to be any different. The Pakistan Army could also decide to carry out a scorched earth steamroller operation in Balochistan. Managing the operation’s political, military and diplomatic consequences could prove disastrous. A third option is to try reconciliation. This is, however, a long and difficult path to take and beyond the intellectual ability of Pakistan's Punjabi military elite because it militates against the colonial control fetish of Pakistan's ruling class. But regardless of what policy Pakistan adopts, the situation in Balochistan will continue to be fraught for the foreseeable future. And while intimations of Balochistan shaking off the ‘shackles of slavery’ (to use the evocative phrase of Imran Khan) might be highly premature and overly optimistic, Balochistan will remain the bone stuck in Pakistan's throat—one it cannot expel, yet one it struggles to swallow.