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Abstract The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal network connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe, offering a shorter and cost-effective alternative to the Suez Canal. Established in 2000 and expanding with key infrastructure projects like the Rasht-Astara railway, the corridor aims to boost trade volumes significantly by 2030, facilitating faster, cheaper freight movement and enhancing Eurasian integration. Russia and Iran’s collaboration is central, enabling a sanctions-resilient trade route that counters Western dominance and supports economic growth in transit countries. The INSTC also offers environmental benefits, with lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to deep-sea shipping. Strategically, it diversifies Russia’s transport links, reduces dependency on vulnerable Western routes, and strengthens geopolitical ties within the BRICS framework. However, challenges such as infrastructure gaps, sanctions, and regional conflicts persist. For the EU, INSTC presents both opportunities for cheaper trade and risks to its geopolitical influence, necessitating strategic responses to maintain Eurasian connectivity and sanctions effectiveness. Key Words: International Trade, North, South, Europe, geopolitics Introduction The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal transportation network involving ships, railways, and roads designed to facilitate freight movement between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe.[1] Established in September 2000 under an agreement signed in St. Petersburg by India, Iran, and Russia, the corridor has since expanded to include additional members, including Belarus, Azerbaijan and several Central Asian countries. [2] Its primary aim is to enhance trade connectivity by linking major cities such as Mumbai, Tehran, Baku, and Moscow, and beyond, offering a shorter and more cost-effective alternative to traditional routes, including the Suez Canal. [3] Source: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ In 2025, container traffic along the eastern route (via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) nearly doubled, supported by discounts of 15 - 80% on shipments, which have been extended through 2026. [4] A milestone occurred in November 2025 when a cargo train from north of Moscow delivered 62 containers to Iran via Central Asia, highlighting the route's viability for India-Central Asia trade. [5] Overall, INSTC freight volumes reached 26.9 million tons in 2024 (19% up from prior years), with rail handling over 12.9 million tons, and projections aim for 15 million tons annually by 2027. [6] The INSTC operates through several interconnected paths. Western Route: from India via sea to Iran's Bandar Abbas port, then by road or rail northward through Iran to Azerbaijan, and onward to Russia. Central Route: involves transit across the Caspian Sea from Iranian ports like Bandar Anzali to Russian ports such as Astrakhan. Eastern Route: connects via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan for land-based links to Russia. This setup allows for efficient cargo transit, with railways playing a crucial role, including ongoing projects like the Rasht-Astara railway in Iran, to fully connect the network. [7] Suez and its geopolitical importance The Suez Canal stands as one of the world's most strategically vital maritime chokepoints, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and serving as a critical artery for global trade and energy security. Since its opening in 1869, the Suez Canal has fundamentally transformed global maritime trade patterns and geopolitical relationships. The canal provides the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia, eliminating the need for the lengthy circumnavigation of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. This strategic positioning has made the canal a focal point of international competition and a critical infrastructure asset whose security is of profound importance to the global economy. [8] The Suez Canal's economic importance cannot be overstated. The waterway attracts approximately 12 - 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic, with more than $1 trillion in goods transiting annually. An average of fifty to sixty ships transit the canal daily, carrying an estimated $3 billion to $9 billion in cargo value. [9] This concentration of trade flow makes the canal a critical node in global supply chains, particularly for trade between Asia and Europe.[10] The canal's strategic role extends beyond general cargo. It handles roughly 9% of global seaborne oil flows (approximately 9.2 million barrels per day) and around 8% of liquefied natural gas volumes. [11] his energy dimension amplifies the canal's geopolitical significance, as disruptions can directly impact global energy markets and prices. [12] The 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal by the Ever Given container ship demonstrated the canal's vulnerability, disrupting global supply chains and highlighting the systemic risks posed by maritime chokepoints. [13] The Suez Canal has long been recognised as a strategic asset of paramount importance. Historical analysis reveals that control of the canal has been central to imperial and regional power projection, particularly during the British Empire's dominance, when the canal was viewed as the "jugular vein of empire". [14] The canal's strategic value was dramatically illustrated during the 1956 Suez Crisis and its closure from 1967 to 1975, events that reshaped regional geopolitics and demonstrated how canal access could be weaponized. [15] Contemporary security challenges continue to underscore the canal's strategic vulnerability. Recent geopolitical threats in the Red Sea, including attacks on commercial shipping, have raised concerns about the canal's security and the potential for regional conflicts to disrupt global trade. [16] These hybrid threats demonstrate how the canal remains a potential flashpoint where regional instability can have worldwide economic consequences. [17] In brief, for the time being, the Suez Canal remains an indispensable component of global maritime infrastructure, whose geopolitical significance extends far beyond its physical dimensions. Its role in facilitating international trade, energy transportation, and strategic mobility ensures that the canal's security and accessibility remain matters of vital international interest. As global trade patterns evolve and new challenges emerge, the canal's strategic importance continues to shape relationships among nations and influence the calculus of regional and global powers. Iran-Russia Collaboration. Can INSTC be a viable alternative to the Suez Canal? In December 2025, Iranian and Russian officials met in Tehran to expedite the corridor, focusing on removing administrative barriers and finalising legal frameworks. Key projects include the Rasht-Astara railway (expected completion by mid-2026) and upgrades to Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas. [18] Russia and Iran's collaboration is central to operationalising the INSTC, involving joint infrastructure development, financial investments, and policy coordination to address connectivity gaps. [19] It is against this backdrop that Russia has funded the 162-kilometre Rasht-Astara railway in Iran (with a 1.3 billion euro loan, targeted for completion by 2027), which resolves a critical missing link in the western route by connecting Azerbaijan's rail network to Iran's, enabling seamless transit from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. [20] Iran, in turn, has upgraded ports like Bandar Abbas and Chabahar (the latter through a 10-year agreement with India signed in May 2024, involving $2.1 billion in investments to expand capacity to 8.5 million tonnes), while Russia has modernised Caspian ports such as Astrakhan and Olya, along with highways like the M6 Caspian and M29 Caucasus. These investments — estimated at 35% of total corridor funding from Russia and 34% from Iran — focus on railway electrification, port expansions, and digital tools such as electronic waybills to streamline border procedures, thereby reducing export times and costs, which are currently 5 - 7 times higher than EU averages. Bilateral agreements, such as the 1992 Russia-Iran transport pact and recent multimodal logistics deals (e.g., between Russian Railways and India's CONCOR for coal shipments via INSTC in June 2024), further support asymmetric trade flows, with north-to-south machinery and chemicals dominating from Russia, and south-to-north foodstuffs from Iran. In terms of international trade, this partnership enhances the INSTC's viability by boosting freight potential to 14.6 - 24.7 million tonnes annually by 2030 (including 5.9 - 11.9 million tonnes containerised, or 325 - 662 thousand TEU), with grains accounting for 8.7 - 12.8 million tonnes primarily via the eastern route through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. For India, the corridor unlocks untapped export opportunities worth up to $180 billion (nine times current levels) to Russia and Central Asia, while Russia's pivot to southern markets (Gulf, India, Africa) has seen bilateral trade with India surge to over $30 billion in 2022, driven by hydrocarbons. Iran's role as a transit hub could generate transit revenues exceeding oil income, potentially increasing 20-fold from $1 billion to support economic growth amid high inflation (54.6% in 2023) and unemployment (9.7%). Synergies with other corridors like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) add 127 - 246 thousand TEU in traffic, fostering Eurasian integration. Geopolitically, Russia-Iran ties make the INSTC a tool to counter Western domination by creating a sanctions-resilient route that avoids U.S.-influenced waterways, especially amid the Ukraine conflict and U.S. sanctions on both nations. This "pivot to the South" by Russia and Iran, and their positioning as a Eurasian bridge, reduce dependence on the Suez Canal, which handles vulnerable global trade, and promote diversified connectivity outside Western frameworks such as TRACECA. Challenges persist, including infrastructure overloads (e.g., 8.8 million tons transported in 2022 despite capacity constraints), uncoordinated policies, gauge differences and sanctions that affect insurance and port access, though exemptions for Chabahar help mitigate these. Overall, the collaboration not only addresses these hurdles through targeted investments and digital harmonisation but also positions the INSTC as a sustainable alternative, with environmental benefits such as 25% lower GHG emissions from rail shifts, comparable to those of deep-sea shipping. How does INSTC serve Russian security interests? In a recent analysis of the subject, Prokhor Tebin offers relevant observations examining the strategic importance of the INSTC within the framework of Russian national security amid intensifying great-power competition. The author argues that Russia’s security and economic resilience depend on developing a cohesive Eurasian transport network through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach that integrates various ministries, regional authorities, and foreign partners. This network includes robust domestic infrastructure and diversified international corridors, with the INSTC being a key route linking Russia to the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iran. [21] According to Tebin, Russian national security is defined broadly, encompassing socio-economic development alongside defence. Robust transport infrastructure is vital for economic security, military mobilisation, and rapid crisis response, especially given Russia’s diminished strategic depth and growing threats on multiple borders, including NATO expansion to the west and instability in the south. Against this backdrop, the current overreliance on vulnerable Western transport arteries (the Baltic and Black Seas) underscores the need for alternative routes, such as the INSTC and the Northern Sea Route, to ensure resilience against potential blockades. Furthermore, Tebin stresses the importance of a networked transport system rather than isolated corridors, advocating for coordination via an interdepartmental group to optimise resource allocation and strategic prioritisation. While alternative regional projects exist, such as the Zangezur Corridor and Trans-Caspian routes, Russia should not oppose them outright but seek to enhance its own projects’ competitiveness and foster regional stability, as stable neighbours contribute to Russian security. Iran’s role in the INSTC is pivotal due to its geographic position and economic potential. Supporting Iran’s stability through the corridor reduces regional risks like mass migration and terrorism. The corridor also provides Russia with critical connectivity to the Global South and lessens dependency on NATO-controlled maritime routes. Ultimately, the INSTC, though currently limited in cargo volume, is strategically crucial for diversifying Russia’s transport links, enhancing military and economic security, and fostering Eurasian integration in a complex geopolitical environment characterised by long-term great-power rivalry. Other authors, Vinokurov, Ahunbaev and Zaboev stress the strategic importance and development potential of the INSTC, a multimodal transport network connecting northwestern Europe and the Nordic countries with Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Accordingly, INSTC serves as a crucial alternative to traditional east-west routes by offering faster delivery times, supporting Eurasian economic integration, and enhancing connectivity for landlocked countries in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), four of whose five members are landlocked. The above-mentioned authors estimate that by 2030, the aggregate freight traffic on the INSTC, including containerised and non-containerised goods, could reach 15 – 25 million tonnes, with container traffic potentially increasing twentyfold. The main commodities transported include food products, metals, machinery, textiles, and grain — the latter being the major non-containerised cargo. The corridor’s rail-based transport offers environmental advantages over road and air freight, emitting significantly fewer greenhouse gases. Despite its potential, INSTC faces several challenges: uncoordinated transport policies among member states, international sanctions (notably on Iran), infrastructure bottlenecks, legal and regulatory inconsistencies, border-crossing delays, and differing railway gauges. Overcoming these issues requires improved coordination, infrastructure investments, digitalisation, and streamlined customs and tariff policies. To sum up, fully operationalising the INSTC would transform it from a mere transport corridor into an economic development corridor, fostering regional connectivity, trade expansion, and sustainable growth across Eurasia. It would also help convert landlocked countries into “land-linked” ones, boosting their economic prospects and integrating them into global value chains. Consequently, it raises questions about the future of the EU as a geopolitical actor within the broader West-BRICS context. Possible consequences for the EU Geoeconomically, INSTC could have significant consequences, centred on trade diversion and supply-chain shifts. The corridor promises 30 – 40% reductions in transit time (e.g., 23 days versus 45 – 60 days via Suez) and costs, enabling faster India–Europe flows of pharmaceuticals, textiles, and machinery, as well as Russian energy and agricultural exports to South Asia. [22] Post-2022 Ukraine invasion, volumes have grown amid Russia’s pivot from European markets, with India–Russia trade surging to around US$50 billion. For the EU, this creates dual pressures: potential cost savings for importers accessing Indian goods or Central Asian resources, yet practical barriers from EU and US sanctions on Russia and Iran, which restrict participation and financing. EU ports and logistics hubs (e.g., Rotterdam) risk losing transit volumes as cargo reroutes through sanctioned territories, while the corridor competes with EU-supported alternatives like the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor. [23] The EU’s Global Gateway strategy (€300 billion investment framework) explicitly promotes diversified, sustainable connectivity, allocating funds to bypass Russia - and Iran-dependent routes. Cargo between the EU and India is projected to double by 2032 under the prospective FTA, underscoring the need for reliable non-INSTC pathways. Overall, the INSTC accelerates Eurasian trade reorientation away from Western-dominated chokepoints, modestly eroding EU leverage in global logistics while exposing vulnerabilities to disruptions in sanctioned segments. [24] Geopolitically, the INSTC bolsters a Russia–Iran–India axis within BRICS, serving as a sanctions-circumvention tool that undermines the effectiveness of Western measures. By enabling Russia to monetise its geography for access to the Global South and Iran to gain transit rents, it advances multipolar narratives that challenge EU influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. [25] For Europe, this reduces coercive leverage over Moscow — previously derived from transit dependence — and fragments the rules-based order the EU champions. It also counters EU efforts to deepen ties with India via transparent initiatives like IMEC, potentially tilting New Delhi’s connectivity choices toward sanctioned partners. Challenges include infrastructure gaps (e.g., rail gauge mismatches, Iranian sanctions-induced delays) and regional conflicts (Armenia – Azerbaijan), limiting scalability. Yet momentum persists through bilateral deals, such as Azerbaijan’s financing for Iran’s Rasht–Astara railway. [26] In conclusion, the INSTC presents the EU with limited opportunities for cheaper diversified trade but primarily poses geoeconomic risks of route competition and geopolitical challenges to sanctions efficacy and Eurasian influence. To mitigate, the EU should probably accelerate Global Gateway investments in the Middle Corridor and IMEC, harmonise sanctions enforcement, and engage India on value-aligned connectivity. Failure to do so could accelerate a shift toward BRICS-led corridors, diminishing the EU’s role in shaping 21st-century Eurasian trade architecture. References [1] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [2] Cross-border Infrastructure International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). (n.d.). Asia Regional Integration Center. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://aric.adb.org/initiative/international-north-south-transport-corridor [3] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [4] Aliyev, N. (2025, December 19). Russia’s Pivot to the Eastern Route: Balancing Azerbaijan with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Iddle. https://ridl.io/russia-s-pivot-to-the-eastern-route-balancing-azerbaijan-with-kazakhstan-and-turkmenistan/ [5] Wani, A. (2025, November 27). INSTC Eastern Corridor: India’s Gateway to Central Asia. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/instc-eastern-corridor-india-s-gateway-to-central-asia [6] Bochkarev, D. (2025, November 27). The North–South Transport Corridor and Energy-Related Exports. Energy Intelligence. https://www.energyintel.com/0000019a-c479-d672-a9be-c77f8c740000 [7] International North–South Transport Corridor. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_North%E2%80%93South_Transport_Corridor [8] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [9] Ibidem. [10] Ducruet, C. (2016). The polarization of global container flows by interoceanic canals: geographic coverage and network vulnerability. Maritime Policy & Management, 43(2), 242–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2015.1022612 [11] Helwa, R., & Al-Riffai, P. (2025, March 20). A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/ [12] Rodrigue, J.-P. (2005). Straits, Passages and Chokepoints A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution. Erudit, 48(135). https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7202/011797ar [13] Lee, J. M., & Wong, E. Y. (2021). Suez Canal blockage: an analysis of legal impact, risks and liabilities to the global supply chain. MATEC Web Conf., 339. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/202133901019 [14] Morewood, S. (1992). Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919–1941. War & Society, 10(1), 81–107. https://doi.org/10.1179/072924792791198995 [15] Bhattacharya, S. S. (1982). Strategic Importance of the Suez Canal. Strategic Analysis, 5(12), 686–693. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700168209427575 [16] Kotait, A., & Ismail, A. (2025). Geopolitical Threats in the Red Sea: The Future of the Suez Canal amid Regional and International Challenges. EKB Journal Management System. https://doi.org/10.21608/jces.2025.435103 available here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393195669_Geopolitical_Threats_in_the_Red_Sea_The_Future_of_the_Suez_Canal_amid_Regional_and_International_Challenges [17] Lott, A. (2022). Hybrid Threats and the Law of the Sea Use of Force and Discriminatory Navigational Restrictions in Straits. Brill. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004509368 [18] Iran, Russia Push To Fast-Track North-South Trade Corridor. (2025, December 17). The Media Line. https://themedialine.org/headlines/iran-russia-push-to-fast-track-north-south-trade-corridor/#:~:text=Iran%20and%20Russia%20announced%20that%20they%20aim,Pushing%20the%20project%20into%20an%20operational%20phase [19] Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.86617 [20] Rawandi-Fadai, L. (2023, August 3). What North-South International Transport Corridor Means for Iran. RIAC Russian International. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-north-south-international-transport-corridor-means-for-iran/ [21] Tebin, P. Y. (2026). The International North–South Transport Corridor in Russian National Security Optics. Russia in Global Affairs, 24(1), 134–148. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2026-24-1-134-148 Vinokurov, E. Y., Ahunbaev, A., & Zaboev, A. I. (2022). International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s “pivot to the South” and Trans-Eurasian connectivity. Russian Journal of Economics, 8(2), 159–173. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.8.866171 [22] Fillingham, Z. (2024, September 10). Geopolitics of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-instc/ [23] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [24] Ghanem, D., & Sánchez-Cacicedo, A. (2024, June 18). From hype to horizon: what the EU needs to know to bring IMEC to life. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/hype-horizon-what-eu-needs-know-bring-imec-life [25] Kausch, K. (2026, February 11). Corridor Politics. Charting Europe’s de-risking route through Eurasia. G M F. https://www.gmfus.org/news/corridor-politics [26] Delivorias, A., & Falkenberg, D. (2024). India's connectivity initiatives: A multi-faceted strategy (EPRS Briefing No. PE 762.471). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/PE-762.471

I. Introduction As Figure 1 shows, Germany’s share of world GDP has declined from 6.99% in 1980 to 2.89% in 2025. Germany, which had been considered to be Europe’s economic powerhouse in previous decades, became the worst-performing major economy in 2023 with a 0.9% contraction, followed by another 0.5% contraction in 2024, leading to a recession. Several economists and business figures expressed concerns that Germany’s economic downturn could cause the country to reclaim its reputation as the “sick man of Europe” from the 1990s. [1] Economists argue that the German economy was in a permanent crisis mode, while the Handelsblatt Research Institute declared that it was in its “greatest crisis in post-war history” after projecting a third consecutive year of recession in 2025. [2]  Figure 1: Germany’s share of world GDP (based on PPP)  As Figure 2 shows, GDP in the United Kingdom in Q3 2025 was 5.2% above its pre-pandemic level of Q4 2019. This compares with Euro-zone GDP being 6.5% higher, with GDP in Germany up by 0.1% (the lowest among G7 economies). The United States has the highest GDP growth among G7 economies over this period at 13.3% (as of Q2 2025).  Figure 2: G7 nations’ GDP growth (source: OECD) With this information in background, this paper explores why the German economy has underperformed and fallen behind. This paper first describes the current economic situation of Germany and explains why the German economy has failed. II. Current economic situations of Germany The German economy has been sluggish. As Figure 3 shows, the average GDP growth rate in Germany during the 2013-2023 period was only 1.1%. And Germany experienced a 0.9% contraction in 2023 and a 0.5% contraction in 2024.  Figure 3: Average GDP growth rate in Germany, 2013-2024 In addition, as Figure 4 shows, the unemployment rate in Germany has recently increased following the Ukraine war. The unemployment rate dropped from 6.2% in January 2016 to 5% in January 2020, but then it rose following the Ukraine war in 2022. Unemployment rate increased from 5% in March 2022 to 5.6% in March 2023 and 6.3 % in December 2025.  Figure 4: Unemployment rate in Germany, 2016-2025 (source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit) Rising energy prices have been a main factor causing serious problems for the German economy. As Figure 5 shows, gasoline price in Germany has increased following the Ukraine war. Gasoline price in Germany averaged 1.73 USD/Liter from 1995 until 2025, but it reached an all-time high of 2.36 USD/Liter in May 2022. Gasoline price declined to 2.05 USD/Liter in December 2025, but it is still higher compared to the previous decade.  Figure 5: Gasoline price in Germany (source: Trading Economics) Moreover, fiscal imbalance has been a big problem for Germany. As Figure 6 shows, consolidated fiscal balance in Germany recorded a huge deficit in the 2020s. The deficit recorded $49,542 billion in January 2023 and $46,923 billion in September 2025, compared with an average of $13,425 billion from March 1991 to September 2025. Figure 6: Germany’s consolidated fiscal balance (source: CEIC Data) As a result, as Figure 7 shows, the German government’s debt as a % of GDP significantly increased in the 2020s. The German government’s debt reached an all-time high of 81% in December 2010 and then declined until 2019, but it started to increase from 2020. The German government’s debt as a % of GDP increased to 65.2% in October 2022.  Figure 7: Government debt in Germany: % of GDP (source: CEIC Data) Investment is a key to economic growth in every country. As Figure 8 shows, overall private investment in Germany has declined in the 2020s, particularly during the period of 2022-2024 after the Ukraine War. In addition, as Figure 9 shows, total government net investment in Germany has declined in the 2020s.  Figure 8: Private investment in Germany, 2010-2024 (Source: ECB, Eurostat, Destatis and European Commission calculations)  Figure 9: Government net investment in Germany, 2010-2024 (Source: ECB, Eurostat, Destatis and European Commission calculations) Reflecting Germany’s recent sluggish economy, as Figure 10 shows, the German manufacturing industry’s business expectation has been negative over the period of 2022-2025 after the Ukraine war.  Figure 10: German manufacturing industry’s business expectation III. Causes of the failure of German economy Why has the German economy failed? Germany’s economic decline can be attributed to multiple factors. The first factor is the energy crisis or energy policy in Germany. Economists cited Germany’s overreliance on cheap Russian gas as one of many primary factors for Germany’s economic stagnation. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Figure 11 shows, 56% of Russia’s gas exports went to Germany. This caused German industry and the broader economy to become dependent on cheap Russian energy.  Figure 11: Russia’s gas exports in 2021 Germany’s phasing out of its established network of nuclear power, a process initiated and led by the Greens and ultimately enforced by the second Merkel government, increased Germany’s dependency on Russian energy. The German government’s decision to phase out its nuclear power was influenced by the high-profile Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Until March 2011, Germany obtained one-quarter of its electricity from nuclear energy, using 17 reactors. The following gap after phasing out of its established network of nuclear power was primarily filled by Russian natural gas, inadvertently increasing dependency on Russian energy. Despite early leadership in renewable energy adoption, Germany’s transition has been hampered by antiquated bureaucratic obstacles, complicated and slow processes for approving projects for renewable energy, and local resistance to infrastructure projects, each discouraging further investment in renewable sectors. As of 2024, renewable sources accounted for just over 52% of the country’s electricity supply, insufficient to meet industrial demands. Germany’s dependency on Russian gas became a vulnerability following the Ukraine War in 2022. The abrupt disruption of Russian energy forced Germany to rapidly diversify its energy sources, leading to a 32.6% reduction in gas imports by 2023. The subsequent sanctions against Russia and supply disruptions led to a 32% increase in Germany’s energy prices, contributing to economic instability and decline. As Figure 12 shows, energy consumer price in Germany skyrocketed in the 2020s following the Ukraine War. Energy consumer price in Germany increased 32% in September 2022 compared to the previous year.  Figure 12: Energy consumer price in Germany (source: OECD) Although energy consumer price in Germany significantly dropped in 2024 and has stabilized afterwards, the damage to industrial competitiveness has been lasting. Energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and metals have shrunk, forcing businesses to either cut production or relocate abroad, thereby contributing to economic decline. The second factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is the under-development of the tech industry in Germany. Some experts argued that Germany’s economic troubles were partly due to its slow adaptation to technological advancements and shifting to low-productivity sectors, contributing to declining productivity. [3] This issue is about Germany’s insufficient investment in new technologies (computers, artificial intelligence (AI), software, etc.) and the low level of spending on research and development (R&D), compared to other advanced countries such as the US. When we compare OECD countries, we see that these two components have a strong influence on productivity differences between countries. The econometric estimate leads to the following effects: a 1-point increase in the rate of investment in new technologies leads to a 0.8 point increase per year in productivity gains. In a similar way, a 1 point increase in GDP for R&D expenditure leads to a 0.9 point increase per year in productivity gains. [4] As Figure 13 shows, gross domestic spending on R&D as a % of GDP in Germany in 2023 was higher than in many EU countries, but lower than in its Western rivals such as the US, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland.  Figure 13: Gross domestic spending on R&D as a % of GDP, 2023 Moreover, weak investment in public infrastructure and digitalization has further weakened Germany’s IT sectors. As Figure 14 shows, Germany has long underinvested in public infrastructure, ranking near the bottom among advanced economies in public investment levels.  Figure 14: gross public investment in OECD countries, 2018-2022 (source: IMF) As a result, as Figure 15 shows, there are no German tech firms among the global top 10 most valuable unicorns. The US and China lead the category of global tech unicorns.  Figure 15: Global top 10 Unicorns (source: https://www.hurun.co.uk/hurun-global-unicorn-index-2025#:~:text=In%20contrast%20to%20the%20UK's,the%20US%20and%20China%2C%20including The third factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is the demographics. As Figure 16 shows, the working-age population in Germany has declined, while old people over 65 have significantly increased.  Figure 16: Age group in Germany (source: UN, World Population Prospects & Financial Times) The IMF posited that the fundamental structural challenges for Germany are accelerating population aging. The country’s working-age population, which had been declining over the three decades, was projected to decline sharply as baby boomers retired. As Figure 17 shows, Germany’s working-age population growth is the lowest among G7 countries. This demographic shift in Germany is expected to decrease GDP per capita, further hinder productivity growth, and cause increased demand for healthcare, potentially forcing workers to go into healthcare away from other sectors.  Figure 17: Working-age population growth, G7 economies (source: IMF) Under this circumstance, shorter working hours increasingly constrain Germany’s labor supply, thereby reducing economic growth. As Figure 18 shows, employees in Germany work shorter hours on average than in any other OECD country.  Figure 18: Employees in Germany work shorter hours on average than in any other OECD country Another issue related to the demographics is the size of the welfare state in Germany. As Figure 19 shows, Germany’s public social spending has expanded and is now at record level. As Figure 20 shows, Germany spent around 30% of its GDP on welfare and social benefits in 2024, placing it among the largest welfare states in Europe, as well as in the world.  Figure 19: German social welfare spending is at record levels, excluding the Covid-19 pandemic (source: OECD, Financial Times)  Figure 20: Welfare and social spending as a % of GDP in 2024 (Source: Eurostat (2024) Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (1998) showed empirically that as the size of general government spending has almost doubled on average in OECD countries from 1960 to 1996, their real GDP growth rates have dropped by almost two thirds on average (see Figure 21). According to them, as public social spending goes up, GDP growth goes down.  Figure 21: High government spending reduces growth Moreover, any increase in welfare costs automatically leads to an increase in non-wage labor costs for employers. Under German law, employers are obliged to cover half of their employees’ insurance contributions. Since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, as Figure 22 shows, non-wage labor costs have risen at a faster rate than total wages, eating into companies’ profits and reducing the room for wage increases, thereby lowering economic growth.  Figure 22: Costs other than wages have started to make up a greater share of employers’ labor spending (source: Bundesbank & Financial Times) The fourth factor related to the sluggish economy of Germany is exports. Exports have been a driving force for Germany for a long time, but the year-on-year (YoY) exports growth rate indicates a decline over the 2023-25 period after the Ukraine War, as Figure 23 shows.  Figure 23: Year-on-year (YoY) exports growth rate in Germany (source: MacroMicro) In addition, German export performance against global competitors has not been so good, as Figure 24 shows. It was so bad in the 2020s.  Figure 24: Germany’s export performance against global competitors (source: Deutsche Bank Research & OECD) IV. Conclusion This paper showed that the German economy has been in big trouble with sluggish economic growth. This paper explained that the failure of the German economy can be attributed to an energy crisis, as well as underdevelopment of tech industry, a shrinking working-age population and shortest working hours of employees, a large size of welfare state, and sluggish exports. References [1] Germany, which had been considered to be Europe’s economic powerhouse in prior decades, became the worst-performing global major economy in 2023 with a 0.9% contraction, followed by further 0.5% contraction in 2024 leading to recession. [2] Partington, Richard (15 January 2024). "Germany on track for two-year recession as economy shrinks in 2023". The Guardian. [3] Fletcher, Kevin; Kemp, Harri; Sher, Galen (27 March 2024). "Germany's Real Challenges are Aging, Underinvestment, and Too Much Red Tape". International Monetary Fund. [4] https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/economy/economy-why-europe-is-falling-behind-the-usa/

1. Introduction to the conflict In the early 1920s Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), where the overwhelming majority of the population consisted of indigenous Armenians, was annexed to the Azerbaijan SSR. This ultimately led to Artsakh attempting to unite with Armenia in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union began to collapse. The region's Armenian people, facing anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, decisively voted to declare their independence from the country. This led to the outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1988 between the majority ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh backed by Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan with support from Turkey. Following thousands of deaths and more than a million displaced people, the war ended in a ceasefire in 1994 with Turkey, a nation that still denies the Armenian Genocide, supporting Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Battles broke up again in 2016, and it concluded in a 44-day war in 2020 that led to Azerbaijan annexing a significant portion of the area along with seven neighboring districts. Figure 1: Nagorno-Karabakh on map. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 2. Historical context Artsakh, in terms of geopolitics, has a long and complex history, dating several centuries back. Artsakh is celebrated for its strong Armenian cultural and religious identity. It has been a part of the Kingdom of Armenia since at least the 5th century BCE. Through several eras, including the semi-autonomous Armenian states, it remained an integral part of Armenian identity. Artsakh is directly related to Siunik and Utik, its bordering regions, linguistically and ethnographically. One of the earliest known Armenian dialects is the one spoken in Artsakh. In the 7th century AD, the grammarian Stephanos Siunetzi wrote the earliest account of it. (c. NKRUSA) In the early 1800s the Russian Empire annexed the Artsakh region which ended up bringing significant political and demographic changes. The term “Karabakh”, which is a Turkic version of the Persian name for the area, Bagh-e-Siah (meaning “Black Garden”), is frequently used to refer to Artsakh. This phrase is a portion of “Nagorno Karabakh”, which is a simplified version of the Soviet term “Autonomous Region of Mountainous [“Nagorniy” (Нагорный)] Karabakh,” which refers to the Armenian autonomy of Artsakh situated within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan of the USSR. (c. NKRUSA) This historical context is crucial in understanding the deep-seated nationalistic and cultural motivations behind the current conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. The ancient and medieval Armenian presence in Artsakh is central to Armenia's historical claim to the region. 3. Causes of the conflict How is the Armenian Genocide of 1915 tied to this conflict and how does it play into the mutual disdain between Armenians and Azerbaijanis to this day? The majority of Armenians worldwide are the great-grandchildren and grandchildren of those who survived the 1915 Genocide, and they are witnessing another instance of history as Turkey and Azerbaijan repeatedly massacre and drive out Armenians from regions where they have lived for thousands of years. Furthermore, there is a clear link between the Young Turks' swiftly assembled republic of Azerbaijan in 1918 and the Ottoman Empire of 1915, which sought to establish a presence in the Caucasus. The Young Turks advocated a pan-Turkic philosophy that aims to unite all Turkic peoples from Turkey to Kazakhstan via Azerbaijan, forming a large empire. The president of Turkey at the moment is pro Pan-Turkism. (c. Rajat Ghai, 2023) Perhaps one of the most disrespectful and heartbreaking evidences of the anti-Armenian narrative is the renaming of one of the streets in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, in ‘honor’ of Enver Pasha, one of the main perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, who was probably the most anti-Armenian official at the time. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Democratic Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan were established in 1918. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) became a disputed territory, with claims from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1923, following the formation of the Soviet Union, and Armenia-Azerbaijani wars over this disputed land, Joseph Stalin declared that Nagorno-Karabakh would become an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR. (c. Bulut, 2023). Despite being a part of Azerbaijan, the majority of the population and the cultural identity of the region remained Armenian. For decades, Azerbaijani forces have attempted to control Armenians and force them to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty through massacres, blockades, and ultimatums. When the Armenians of Artsakh wanted to exercise their right to self-determination, they were confronted with pogroms in Azerbaijan that resulted in the cruel death of Armenians and the theft of their belongings. These pogroms had the intention of frightening Artsakh's Armenian population into leaving or submitting, despite the fact that they had lived there for centuries and had developed and continuously defended their national sovereignty, which was vital to Armenian history. “The first victims of Azerbaijan’s policy to suppress the will of the people of Artsakh were the Armenians of the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait located several hundred kilometers away from Artsakh.” (c. Bulut, 2023) As the Soviet Union started to fall apart in the late 1980s, tensions increased. Violent encounters between Armenians and Azerbaijanis resulted from the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh's desire for unification with Armenia. 4. Conflict dynamics The first Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994): After the USSR collapsed, Armenia and Azerbaijan launched a full-scale war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia finally took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of its neighboring areas by 1994. The area remained in a state of frozen war despite the establishment of a ceasefire but no peace treaty was signed. The second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020): Six weeks of fighting ensued after reopening of hostilities in September 2020. Turkey and Israel provided major military assistance to Azerbaijan in order for it to retake control of portions of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. A ceasefire mediated by Russia brought the war to an end in November 2020, changing the map significantly and deploying Russian peacekeepers. Nevertheless, the military aggression by Azerbaijan on Armenians hasn't stopped. Azerbaijan and its ally, Turkey, started blockading Artsakh and its citizens (est. 130,000) in December 12, 2022. The Republic of Armenia's former human rights defender, Arman Tatoyan, reported that Artsakh had been without electricity since January 9. There hadn't been any gas since March 21 and no humanitarian help (including food) since June 15. (c. Bulut, 2023) This blockade persisted despite an internationally recognized court order from February 22, 2023, which guarantees the unhindered flow of people, cars, and goods along the Lachin Corridor in both directions, and lasted for 9 months. The forced displacement of Armeanians (2023): Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians left the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh in the last few days of September 2023 and fled into neighboring Armenia. As has been well documented, the mass escape occurred as a result of Azerbaijan subjecting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to a 24-hour period of intense bombing, preceded by a 10-month long blockade and forced starvation, all of which led to the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh to surrender. Before the occupation, indigenous Armenians had lived in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory for millennia. It is currently estimated by the UN that there are only 50 Armenians remaining. To this day, hundreds of Armenian cultural sites throughout Artsakh are at the risk of being destroyed or appropriated now that Azerbaijan has complete control over Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh. Some have already been destroyed or are currently being ‘restored’, as the Azerbaijani government refers to the erasure of their Armenian identity. “Despite the scale and severity of the damages, the erasure of Armenian cultural patrimony by Azerbaijan remains woefully under-reported, in large part due to the regime’s crackdown on independent journalists.” (Nayyar, 2024) 5. Armenia’s main allies Russia The core of Armenia and Russia's military cooperation has been their membership in the Joint CIS Air Defense System and the same military alliance (CSTO). However, due to the continuous tensions between Putin and Pashinyan, Russia appeared to be hesitant to publicly help Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020). Criticism of CSTO membership grew within Armenian political circles when the CSTO mission chose a rather uncertain stance in the conflict. Armen Grigoryan, the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, even stated that he no longer saw any hope for the CSTO. Pashinyan said that Russian peacekeepers sent to uphold the cease-fire agreement were not doing their duties. He also stated that Armenia is attempting to broaden its security partnerships. (c. France 24, 2026) Armenia has withdrawn from a regional security agreement with Russia, stating that Moscow failed to support it in its conflict with Azerbaijan. In recent years, Armenia has taken steps to strengthen ties with the US and the EU while suspending its membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, there are still strong cultural, linguistic, and economic links to Russia; as is the case with every other former Soviet country. Iran In September 2022, the Iranian foreign minister emphasized that the Iran-Armenia border must not change amid the recurring border tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a meeting with Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in May 2024, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khameri highlighted Iran's opposition to any border changes in the South Caucasus. After the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2024, Armenia and Iran increased their military relations and discussed a potential $500 million arms deal. (c. Sayeh, 2025) 6. Azerbaijan’s main allies Turkey Azerbaijan's longtime ally Turkey sees Armenia as one of its primary regional enemies. That is evident in Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement in 2023: “We support the steps taken by Azerbaijan – with whom we act together with the motto of one nation, two states – to defend its territorial integrity”. (c. Al Jazeera, 2023) In addition to military equipment, Turkish assistance takes the form of direct advisors, joint training, and perpetual diplomatic support. Turkey has previously supported Azerbaijan in all regional and global events. However, Turkey's position evolved to one that was more proactive, forceful, and involved by the beginning of the Second Karabakh War. (c. Villar, 2025) Israel Israel serves as Azerbaijan's primary supplier of advanced arms, including intelligence technologies, artillery systems, and Heron and Harop drones. These supplies were significant in the conflicts of 2016 and 2020, where Azerbaijani forces had technological advantage. In exchange, Israel receives intelligence cooperation regarding Iranian operations and general access to an area close to Iran. Additionally, about 40% of Israel's oil demands are met by hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan, making it an essential source for them. (c. Villar, 2025) Russia From 2022 to 2024, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan were at their strongest. The Declaration on Allied Interaction was signed in February 2022, which enhanced relations between both countries. Azerbaijan's president Ilham Aliyev realized that in order to accomplish Azerbaijan's regional goals of gaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh without the Russian peacekeepers and opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, he needed to improve ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity was the most significant aspect of the Declaration for Baku. In 2024 Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh entirely. (c. APRI Armenia, 2025) 7. Iran’s concerns Iran's territorial integrity is threatened by the Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation, according to Iran's political and military leaders. Citing remarks from Turkish and Azerbaijani officials as well as media that support the ‘liberation’ of so-called ‘Southern Azerbaijan’ – which refers to Iran's northwestern provinces with an Azerbaijani majority – the Iranian government has accused both countries of inciting “separatist movements” among Iran's Azerbaijani population. Iran's worries have been increased by what they call “historical distortion” in Azerbaijan's educational system, which promotes expansionist narratives to younger generations by speaking of a ‘Greater Azerbaijan’ that includes territory within Iran. (c. Villar, 2025) 8. EU’s response and involvement “I saw that governments would make grand statements about morality and do nothing. I saw that they would try to take advantage of the unrest in the Caucasus in order to further their own ideological agendas. I saw that it would be the people, my people, the Armenians of Artsakh, who would suffer.” (c. Arslan, 2023) While EU officials and lawmakers have expressed their ‘concerns’ and made vocal statements of sympathy with the people of Nagorno-Karabakh since December, none of the EU's member states or heads of state have attempted to advocate for involvement in Azerbaijan for the protection of the Nagorno-Karabakh population. According to French MEP François-Xavier Bellamy, the EU's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh is turning into a matter between the Parliament and the Commission. The Parliament has voted in favor of imposing sanctions on Azerbaijan, but the European Commission has chosen not to follow through. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, traveled to the city of Azerbaijan in July 2022 to announce the deal doubling Azerbaijan's gas imports into the EU. She said that the European Union made the decision to loosen its ties with Russia in favor of more dependable, trustworthy allies like Azerbaijan. She stated: “The European Union is committed to a secure, stable and prosperous South Caucasus”. Azerbaijan has a history of war crimes, violations of human rights, and is ranked very low on freedom indexes. It is also the biggest destabilizer in the South Caucasus. “Azerbaijan exported more than €21bn of gas to countries in the EU between January 2022 and the end of November 2023, according to Eurostat data obtained by openDemocracy. Armenia’s Human Rights Ombudsman’s office made more than 130 public statements warning of threats to ethnic Armenians caused by Azerbaijani military actions in the 18 months before the MoU was signed. Estonian MEP Marina Kaljurand, who heads the Parliament’s delegation for relations with the South Caucasus, told openDemocracy that the commission had “traded EU values for gas”.” (c. Martirosyan & Sargsyan, 2024) The hypocrisy of the European Union is astounding, as they are well aware of the ethnic cleansing that Azerbaijan intends to inflict on Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The idea that the European Union is in decline because of its disregard for morality comes from the EU's decision to support authoritarian governments, such as Azerbaijan and Israel, that are determined to erase Armenians and Palestinians rather than advancing peace and justice. 9. Consequences Although a wave of refugees from the Karabakh war in 2020 was taken in by Armenia, the problem is far more serious. Yerevan is facing pressure not only from its citizens, but also Karabakh Armenians who are unsure of their future and are pulling together the pieces of an integration plan. Azerbaijan had made it clear by openly announcing their intent to annex the Armenian region of Syunik in order to establish an oil pipeline that would link its borders with Turkey, furthering their century-long plan of pan-Turkism. Anti-armenian sentiment has grown into a dominant ideology in Azerbaijan. It rejects any and all claims made by other ethnic groups and civilizations to their territories. It ignores the facts of history. Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, is frequently referred to as an Azerbaijani city by Azerbaijani academics and media. “Baku might want to capitalize on the depopulating of Nagorno-Karabakh with a swift military movement across Armenian territory to control access to Nakhchivan, an exclave region of Azerbaijan bordering Iran. But now that Armenia is poised to join the ICC, Azerbaijan’s political and military leaders would likely risk investigation by the ICC prosecutor of the crime of aggression. That may explain the Armenian Parliament’s rapid move to ratify the Rome Statute – to address not only the fate of ethnic Armenians but to deter any Azerbaijani aggression across its territory.” (c. Scheffer, 2023) 10. The Peace Deal and current situation Under US guidance, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a peace deal in the beginning of August 2025. The White House declared it historic, and Western media quickly reported that a decades-long dispute had finally been resolved as a result of U.S. President Donald Trump's intervention. But is that really the truth? The United States' involvement in the proposed Zangezur corridor has been criticized by Iran and Russia as an incursion. The peace agreement's failure to address the right of return for former ethnic Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh due to Azerbaijan's nine-month military siege and offensive has also drawn criticism from observers. While the agreement secures the road linking Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, it is crucial to note that it gives the United States the right to manage and develop the corridor for 99 years. The US would sublease the property to a consortium that would build rail, oil, gas, and fiber optic lines in addition to potentially transmitting electricity along the 43km corridor. This further proves that the true intention behind this initiative was to gain more control by reducing the influence of Russia and Iran in the region. After the parties decided on the agreement form, Azerbaijan stated that before Armenia would sign, it needed to meet two additional demands. First: Baku wanted the two nations to jointly petition the OSCE to abolish the Minsk Group. The issue over “Nagorno-Karabakh”, which Baku interprets as the period of Armenian control, is the focus of the Minsk Group's 1995 mission, which Azerbaijan finds objectionable. The two signed a letter requesting that the OSCE shut down the Minsk Group, fulfilling that demand. The second one was far more concerning, which is Azerbaijan's demand that Armenia change its constitution. Officials from Azerbaijan say they want peace, but only if Armenia gives up its territorial claims. They reject claims that the demand for a constitutional change is unreasonable. The power ultimately stays with Azerbaijan once again. The executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, Aram Hamparian, stated that “normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace” and believed that the agreement was based on the erasure of Nagorno-Karabakh, the abandonment of holy sites, the disregard for hostages, and the strengthening of Azerbaijani occupation. The signing of the peace deal left the majority of Armenians in dismay. The general consensus is that the Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan has betrayed the people of Armenia and Artsakh, and that there should be no peace without justice. 11. Conclusion Peace does not always mean that there is no military conflicts. Aliyev hasn't completely stopped using hostile language toward Armenia. Azerbaijani leaders are emphasizing more and more that the war has ended. However, the president enthusiastically promoted the idea of “Western Azerbaijan” at a speech he gave in November. The normalization effort continues amid the fact that state media and elites, including Aliyev, continue to use anti-Armenian rhetoric for home audiences. Approximately 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian land are still occupied by Azerbaijan, which they acquired during their offensives in 2022. It is essential for Armenia's future administration to seek justice. In order to foster lasting peace, the first step is recognizing history. The fact that even Adolf Hitler admitted the massacre in 1939 makes the demand for greater acknowledgment all the more urgent. The Armenian Genocide served as a model for what he was about to achieve in Poland: “I have placed my death-head formations in readiness – for the present only in the East – with orders to them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish derivation and language. Only thus shall we gain the living space (lebensraum) which we need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in 1943-1944 to refer to the deliberate annihilation of peoples. After hearing about the trial of Soghomon Tehlirian in 1921, who killed a major perpetrator of the Armenian Genocide, he started studying mass exterminations. The term was developed to describe the mass atrocities against Armenians in order to define the Holocaust. The word itself would not exist without the Armenian Genocide, and yet, it is officially recognized by just 35 nations. Not enough people are prepared to stand up for victims and potential victims; too many would be happy to complete what was begun in the 1910s and ignore the Armenian people in the name of Turkish nationalism. If there is another threat of genocidal intent against Armenia and its people, we cannot and we must not turn a blind eye. 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Prime Minister Keir Starmer gave a speech during the Munich Security Conference For many years, for most people in the United Kingdom, war has been remote. Something that concerns us deeply, but which happens far off. But now we feel the solidity of peace, the very ground of peace now softening under our feet. It is the job of leaders to be ahead of these seismic shifts. Yet that is against the grain of history. Time and again, leaders have looked the other way, only re-arming when disaster is upon them. This time, it must be different. Because all of the warning signs are there. Russia has proved its appetite for aggression, bringing terrible suffering to the Ukrainian people. Its hyper-threats extend across our continent, not just threatening our security, but tearing at our social order. Collaborating with populists to undermine our values. Using disinformation to sow division. Using cyber-attacks and sabotage to disrupt our lives and deepening the cost-of-living crisis. It is true that Russia has made a huge strategic blunder in Ukraine, and the Russian casualties number well over a million. But even as the war goes on, Russia is re-arming, reconstituting their armed forces, an industrial base. NATO has warned that Russia could be ready to use military force against the Alliance by the end of this decade. In the event of a peace deal in Ukraine, which we are all working hard to achieve, Russia’s re-armament would only accelerate. The wider danger to Europe would not end there. It would increase. So, we must answer this threat in full. At the outset, it is important to be prepared. We do not seek conflict. Our objective is lasting peace, a return to strategic stability, and the rule of law. And in the face of these threats, there is only one viable option. Now, to break the convention of a house of speeches, we are not at a crossroads. The road ahead is straight and it is clear. We must build our hard power, because that is the currency of the age. We must be able to deter aggression. And yes, if necessary, we must be ready to fight. To do whatever it takes to protect our people, our values, and our way of life. And as Europe, we must stand on our own two feet. And that means being bold. It means putting away petty politics and short-term concerns. It means acting together to build a stronger Europe and a more European NATO, underpinned by deeper links between the UK and the EU, across defence, industry, tech, politics, and the wider economy. Because these are the foundations on which our security and prosperity will rest. This is how we will build a better future for our continent. True to the vibrant, free, diverse societies that we represent, showing that people who look different to each other can live peacefully together. But this isn’t against the tenor of our times. Rather, it’s what makes us strong, as we’re prepared to defend it with everything that we have. And we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore. Because we know that in a dangerous world, we would not take control by turning in. We would surrender. And I won’t let that happen. That’s why I devote time as Prime Minister to Britain’s leadership on the world stage. And that’s why I’m here today. Because I am clear, there is no British security without Europe, and no European security without Britain. That is the lesson of history and is today’s reality as well. So together we must rise to this moment. We must spend more, deliver more, and coordinate more. And crucially, we must do this with the United States. The US remains an indispensable power. Its contribution to European security over 80 years is unparalleled. And so is our gratitude. At the same time, we recognise that things are changing. The US National Security Strategy spells out that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own defence. That is the new law. Now, there have been a series of thoughtful interventions about what this means, including the argument that we’re at a moment of rupture. Now, I would agree that the world has changed fundamentally, and that we must find new ways to uphold our values and the rule of law. But in responding to that, we must not disregard everything that has sustained us for the last 80 years. That could be a moment of destruction. And instead, I believe, we must make this as a moment of creation. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it one of radical renewal. So, rather than pretending that we can simply replace all US capabilities, we should focus on diversifying and decreasing some dependencies. We should deliver generational investment that moves us from over-dependence to interdependence. I’m talking about a vision of European security and greater European autonomy. It does not herald US withdrawal, but answers the call for more burden-sharing in Europe and remake the ties that have served us so well. Because we know the value of our own power. The nature of our power is at the core of human decision. It achieved something that leaders have been trying to do for centuries. From Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna to Versailles. After centuries of conflict, the founders of NATO finally united our continents in peace and security. Our militaries, that once faced each other on the battlefield, now stand side-by-side, pledged to each other’s defence. It is a shield over our heads every single day. And whilst some on the extremes of our politics chip away at this alliance, we defend it. I am proud that my party fought for NATO’s creation. While our then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called it a spiritual union of the West. And we’ve shown our fidelity to that idea, asserting each other’s sovereignty, as we did on Greenland. And crucially, coming to each other’s aid under Article 5. We fought together in Afghanistan, at terrible cost to many in my country and across many allied countries. And so, I say to all NATO members, our commitment to Article 5 is as profound now as ever. And be in no doubt, if called on, the UK would come to your aid today. Instead, we must move forward together to create a more European NATO. As I see it, Europe is a sleeping giant. Our economies dwarf Russia more than ten times over. We have huge defence capabilities, yet too often this adds up to less than the sum of its parts. Fragmented industrial planning and procurement have led to gaps in some areas, and massive duplication in others. Europe has over 20 types of frigate, and 10 types of fighter jet. We have over 10 types of main battle tanks, whilst the US has one. It’s wildly inefficient, and it harms our collective security. The US security umbrella has allowed these bad habits to develop. But now we must break them. And we have shown that we can coordinate in great effect, as was just set out. Supporting Ukraine in a way that Putin never really imagined. Creating the Coalition of the Willing, which now covers almost all of Europe, as well as Canada and our friends in the Asia-Pacific. And going further in our support, with the UK announcing over £500 million this week for more air defence for the Ukrainian people. To meet the wider threat, it is clear that we are going to have to spend more faster. And we have shown our collective intent in this regard as well. With the historic agreement to increase spending to 5% on security and defence. And we are prepared to explore innovative solutions. So, we are stepping up work with like-minded allies on options for a collective approach to defence financing, to help accelerate this vital investment. And as we increase spending, we must use it to its full potential. We must come together to integrate our capabilities on spending and procurement and build a joint European defence industry. I welcome the steps that we have taken so far, which could allow us to participate in the £90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine. I hope we can work together like this going forward. Because, look, the logic of defence is solidarity and collective effort, not market access. In a crisis, our citizens expect us to be ready. So, we need to deliver a step change in collaboration. And I am proud of the work we are already doing together. Delivering cutting-edge drones with Ukraine. Developing next-generation long-range missiles with Germany, Italy and France. Working with our JEF allies to protect our northern flank. Doubling our deployment of British commandos in the Arctic. Taking control of NATO’s Atlantic and Northern Command in Norfolk, Virginia. And transforming our Royal Navy by striking the biggest warship deal in British history with Norway. We are building a fleet of warships to hunt Russian submarines and protect undersea infrastructure. We want to replicate this level of collaboration with other allies across the High North and the Baltics. And I can announce today that the UK will deploy our Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and the High North this year led by HMS Prince of Wales, operating alongside the US, Canada and other NATO allies in a powerful show of our commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. That is also why we are enhancing our nuclear cooperation with France. For decades the UK has been the only nuclear power in Europe to commit its deterrent to protect all NATO members. But now any adversary must know that in a crisis they could be confronted by our combined strength. It shows beyond doubt how vital it is that we work together. So, we must also look at what more we can do with the EU. We must go beyond the historic steps that we took at last year’s UK-EU summit to build the formidable productive power and innovative strength that we need. British companies already account for over a quarter of the continent’s defence industrial base. They are a job-creating, community-building machine employing around 239,000 people across the UK, including in Wales, where this month we’re launching the first of five regional defence-grade deals. We want to bring our leadership in defence, tech and AI together with Europe to multiply our strengths and build a shared industrial base across our continent which could turbocharge our defence production. That requires leadership. To drive greater coherence and coordination across Europe. That is what we’re doing with Germany and France in the E3, working closely with EU partners, particularly Italy and Poland as well as with Norway, Canada and Turkey. So, my message today is the United Kingdom is ready. We see the imperative. We see the urgency. We want to work together to lead a generational shift in defence industrial cooperation. Now this includes looking again at closer economic alignment. We are already aligned with the single market in some areas to drive down the prices of food and energy. We are trusted partners. And as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said this week, deeper economic integration is in all of our interests. So, we must look at where we can move closer to the single market in other sectors as well where that would work for both sides. The prize here is greater security. Stronger growth for the United Kingdom and the EU, which will fuel increased defence spending and the chance to place the UK at the centre of a wave of European industrial renewal. I understand the politics very well. It will mean trade-offs. But the status quo is not fit for purpose. And to me there is no question where the national interest lies. I will always fight for what’s best for my country. I started today talking about avoiding mistakes of the past like delaying action or fragmenting our efforts. But there is something else. In the 1930s, leaders were too slow to level with the public about the fundamental shift in mindset that was required. So, we must work harder today to build consent for the decisions we must take to keep us safe. Because if we don’t, the peddlers of easy answers are ready on the extremes of left and right and they will offer their solutions instead. It’s striking that the different ends of the spectrum share so much. Soft on Russia. Weak on NATO. If not outright opposed. And determined to sacrifice the relationship we need on the altar of their ideology. The future they offer is one of division and then capitulation. The lamps would go out across Europe once again. But we will not let that happen. If we believe in our values, in democracy, liberty and the rule of law. This is the moment to stand up and to fight for them. That is why we must work together. And show that by taking responsibility for our own security, we will help our people look forward. Not with fear, but with determination. And with hope. Thank you very much. Contenido bajo licencia Open Governement Licence v3.0 [https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/] UK Prime Minister’s Office. GOV.UK. Web.

On January 19, 2026, an unprecedented event in Bulgarian political history in the post-socialist period occurred: President of the Republic of Bulgaria Rumen Radev announced his early resignation. The resignation of the head of state fits into the logic of the country's long-standing crisis, in which European integration serves not so much as a factor in economic modernization but also as a catalyst for political instability and social alienation from traditional institutions. Radev served as president for nine years, from January 2017 to January 2026. During this period, the country underwent dramatic transformations: the collapse of the traditional bipolar party system (GERB-BSP), the formation of new political forces (especially the nationalist Vazrazhdane Party), the fragmentation of the parliamentary majority, and a wave of unprecedented government changes. Between 2021 and 2025, Bulgaria experienced ten government changes, including four technical cabinets appointed by President Radev himself. His resignation marked the eleventh change. This instability not only reflects a systemic crisis but also proves the inability of the country's political system to function and ensure governance. The July 2021 elections brought an end to decades of the two-party system between GERB and BSP. Although they remained major parties, their combined share of parliament fell from a historical 70% to 45%. The emergence of numerous new political actors for the following elections (ITN, PP-DB, Vazrazhdane, Sword, APS, and others) fragmented the political field and made it difficult to form stable coalitions. In the October 2024 elections, fragmentation reached new heights: nine parties won parliamentary representation, with the centrist GERB party winning 26.4% of the vote (66 seats), and the PP-DB coalition only 14.2% (36 seats). Turnout was 39%. Euro integration as a catalyst for political instability Radev's resignation takes on particular significance in the context of the Euro integration. Bulgaria's accession to the European Union in 2007 cemented European integration as a central vector of foreign policy and a key driver of domestic reform. However, this process has been characterized not only by the structural adaptation of institutions but also by growing socio-political polarization. Although more than half of the country's population opposed the introduction of the euro in February of last year, the transition to the single European currency was officially launched on January 1, 2026. In his final speech as president, Radev noted that during his tenure, the country had joined the Schengen Agreement and adopted the euro, but expressed doubt that these initiatives had brought stability and satisfaction. This rhetoric suggests that his resignation was a calculated move aimed at positioning Radev as an alternative center of political power capable of overcoming the crisis. Parallel to political instability, Bulgaria faced an unprecedented wave of mass protests. Beginning in November 2025 over a proposed budget that included tax and social security increases, the protests quickly escalated into a general expression of discontent with corruption and poor governance. According to the MYARA news agency, support for the protests stood at 71.3% of the population, indicating widespread alienation from traditional political institutions. Simultaneously, support for Rosen Zhelyazkov's government fell to 19.2%, while dissatisfaction reached 66%, just 100 days after its inauguration. Trust in the National Assembly was even lower: only 15.2%, compared to 75.1% of citizens who disapproved of its performance. Amid widespread dissatisfaction with political institutions, the only figure left with voter trust was former President Radev himself. According to the MYARA agency, 44.6% approved of his performance in September 2025, while only 37.9% dissatisfied, significantly higher than any other political figure. A paradoxical situation is emerging: a popular president is unable to resolve the crisis of a parliamentary system in which he has only limited powers; his resignation could be interpreted as a refusal to act as an arbiter of the parliamentary game and a transition to the role of an alternative leader capable of proposing a new political project. The strategic nature of Radev's resignation In Bulgaria's parliamentary system, the president has limited powers. His primary functions are essentially limited to appointing technical governments during parliamentary blockades, submitting laws for parliamentary review, and representing the country in international affairs. In practice, his role is to act as an "arbitrator" between the branches of government and various institutions. Real executive power rests in the hands of the prime minister and his government. During his nine years as president, Radev made the most of these limited powers – appointing seven technical governments was a record. His resignation allows the now-former president to move on to a new phase of his political career. There is active media speculation that the outgoing president will create his own political party and run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. If this happens, Radev will be able to assume the post of prime minister – a position that carries considerably more real power. The head of state's transition from institutional arbiter to active party leader has created a fundamentally new reality for all political forces, forcing them to urgently reassess their strategies. The ruling Euro-Atlantic coalition of GERB-SDS and PP-DB has suffered the most significant blow. For them, the emergence of Radev's political project is tantamount to a "black swan," disrupting the familiar bipolar model of confrontation. While the president could previously be used as a convenient lightning rod to excuse one's own failures, accusing him of exceeding his authority and blocking reforms, this tactic has now become meaningless. Radev has become a direct competitor, attacking the government's vulnerabilities in the socio-economic sphere. He is successfully attracting not only protest voters but also disillusioned moderate voters, tired of endless compromises within the government and the lack of tangible results. The conflict with Delyan Peevski's wing of the DPS has also entered a more acute phase. What previously looked like an institutional war between the branches of government has now evolved into a brutal, head-on clash on the electoral field. The former president now has a free hand to directly criticize corruption patterns, posing an existential threat to the "New Beginning" project, depriving its leader of the opportunity to position himself as the sole defender of parliamentarism from "presidential tyranny." Paradoxically, the new alignment poses the greatest electoral risks to forces ideologically aligned with Radev – the Vazrazhdane party and the BSP. The popular leader's emergence as a defender of national sovereignty threatens to "divvy up" their voter base. For the BSP, this could be a fatal blow, as their former candidate could completely absorb the remnants of the left-wing electorate, effectively relegating the party to the margins of history. Vazrazhdane, meanwhile, faces the loss of their monopoly on Eurosceptic rhetoric and the prospect of competing against a political heavyweight whose personal trust ratings significantly exceed those of their own party leaders. National minority parties (DPS, APS) have traditionally been crucial for the formation of majorities in Bulgarian politics, often determining the composition and viability of governing coalitions. Radev's resignation does not change their fundamental strategy – ensuring access to state resources for their communities and political representation of their interests. For them, his resignation could mark the end of a period in which they enjoyed disproportionate influence. If parliamentary elections result in a more stable majority (without the support of the DPS), these parties' influence could decline. However, given the fragmented nature of the Bulgarian parliament, it is unlikely that any coalition will be able to avoid the need for negotiations with national minority parties. Parliamentary elections in spring 2026: hope and risk The parliamentary elections planned for spring 2026 could either resolve the crisis or deepen it. On the one hand, new elections provide an opportunity for the electorate to express its will more clearly and create the basis for a more stable coalition. On the other hand, if voters continue to vote volatilely, as they did in 2021, 2023, and 2025, new elections will simply reproduce a fragmented parliament, and the crisis will continue. Moreover, if Radev creates a new political party and proves successful in the elections, this could lead to further fragmentation of parliament, as his new party will seek the votes of voters who currently support existing parties. During his nine years as president, Radev exhausted all constitutional tools available to him for managing the political crisis. The president's resignation could facilitate long-needed institutional reforms that could strengthen the Bulgarian political system. If new elections result in clearer political majorities, the former president could create a political party that positions itself as a reformist alternative to GERB and PP-DB. Or, if constitutional changes are made to strengthen executive power, this could usher in a new phase in the development of Bulgarian democracy.

Abstract This paper analyses the current challenges facing NATO and questions its future viability amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. It highlights the evolving U.S. stance, marked by a 2025 National Security Strategy that prioritises self-reliance for European allies and a reduced American military role in Europe, reflecting a broader "America First" approach. Russia's persistent opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine, fuels ongoing conflict and threatens regional stability. Germany's emerging leadership role in European security is explored, showcasing its increased defence commitments and strategic cultural shift from restraint to readiness. Turkey’s crucial geopolitical position and military capabilities underscore its significance within NATO despite recent tensions. The paper also discusses the Greenland dispute as a symbol of intra-Alliance tensions and as a challenge to collective defence principles under Article 5. Ultimately, the Ukraine war serves as a critical test for NATO, raising doubts about the Alliance’s coherence and effectiveness amid internal divisions and external threats. Key Words: NATO, Russia, US, Europe, Security Introduction Allegedly, Lord Ismay (Hastings Lionel Ismay), the first Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), famously claimed that NATO was set up for three major reasons: to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out (he meant the USSR) and to keep the Germans down.[1] Historians and international security experts generally agree that NATO has been a fundamental part of European security architecture, helping maintain peace on the European continent during the Cold War amid the great powers’ rivalry. Not only did the American presence on the European continent deter a possible Soviet invasion, but it also served as a pacifier regarding European military and political ambitions, especially German. As of today, "the Alliance" (as Nato is often referred to) seems to be edging towards the end of its coherence due to many internal and external reasons. This short paper will explore some of them, albeit the topic naturally requires a much longer and deeper approach. The Americans: still in? On December 9, 2025, Republican Congressman Thomas Massie of Kentucky introduced H.R. 6508, the NATO Act, which calls for the United States to withdraw from NATO. In his statement, following (consciously or not Lord Ismay) Massie states: “NATO is a Cold War relic. We should withdraw from NATO and use that money to defend our own country, not socialist countries. NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union, which collapsed over thirty years ago. Since then, U.S. participation has cost taxpayers trillions of dollars and continues to risk U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Our Constitution did not authorise permanent foreign entanglements, something our Founding Fathers explicitly warned us against. America should not be the world’s security blanket — especially when wealthy countries refuse to pay for their own defense.”[2] This is but a small ripple in a much bigger pool of water that hosts the U.S. concerns regarding their involvement in the European Security architecture. To cut a long story short, there seems to be a formidable force in U.S. politics advocating a "refocus" of US foreign policy doctrine and the consequent foreign policy and security strategies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the U.S. President has recently unveiled the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump administration indicates a shift away from the U.S. focus on Europe in foreign and security policy, emphasising greater self-reliance for European allies and prioritising other regions.[3] The NSS ranks global regions by priority, placing the Western Hemisphere first (elevated from fifth in the 2017 NSS), Asia second, and Europe third—a demotion from its previous second-place ranking. This reorientation aligns with an "America First" approach that emphasises burden-sharing, non-interventionism, and a narrower definition of U.S. national interests, thereby avoiding overextension in regions such as Europe. Key elements signalling a less focused approach to Europe include, among others, the encouragement of European self-defence. The strategy calls for Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own security as sovereign nations. It urges ending NATO's expansion and requires allies to meet a new 5% of GDP defence spending commitment (dubbed the "Hague Commitment"), far above the current 2% target, to ensure fair burden-sharing. Secondly, the NSS outlines a limited U.S. role in Europe. The U.S. involvement is framed as diplomatic support for stability (e.g. negotiating an end to the Ukraine war and fostering relations with Russia for reconstruction and strategic stability) rather than sustained military commitments. The document criticises Europe's economic decline, migration issues, and EU "transnationalism" that undermines sovereignty, but positions the U.S. as a helper only for aligned partners willing to open markets and combat hostile practices such as mercantilism. As far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the NSS asserts U.S. preeminence through a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, focusing on migration control, supply chains, and denying adversarial influence through active military and economic measures (Central and South America and the Caribbean). This marks a departure from past NSS documents, which often centred on Europe due to NATO commitments and threats like Russia, toward a more transactional and restrained U.S. posture in the region.[4] With regards to that last point, the very latest National Defence Strategy of the U.S. confirms the direction away from Europe.[5] The strategy prioritises Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defence, with critical but more limited support from the United States. This includes supporting Ukraine’s defence as primarily a European responsibility. Moreover, according to the document, Russia remains a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members. The Russians: already in? The ongoing war in Ukraine, which has lasted for 4 years now, has allowed the Russian army to make formidable advances in the field. Russian experts and military advisors are pushing for control of Odessa (I write about it here). It appears probable at this stage that the Russian Federation will want to control as much territory of Ukraine as possible and that the lack of effective diplomacy means that the outcome of the war will be settled on the battlefield rather than in the comfort of negotiation chambers. Regardless of the mainstream narratives constantly pushed by CNN or BBC, the Russians have not really changed their fundamental demand - that Ukraine should not be permitted to become a NATO member. Western societies and their political elites can, of course, feel moral outrage when confronted with such demands. The facts are, however, painfully simple. After the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany was agreed to and accepted by the then-Soviet Union, on the condition that NATO would not expand eastward. (I write about here). NATO did expand westward multiple times, however. From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukraine's possible membership in NATO is the last red line Russia cannot allow to be crossed. Put simply, Ukraine's geography makes it a strategic asset to NATO. Let us also remember that countries such as Turkey, Poland, all three Baltic states, and, recently, even Finland are already NATO members.[6] Importantly, Russian security and military experts see this as a fundamental threat to Moscow and its European environment. (Russia, after all, is also a European country). (The pivotal moment came at the April Bucharest Summit, where NATO leaders — despite opposition from France and Germany — declared that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO." This was not an immediate invitation but a promise of future membership once conditions were met, with the U.S. lobbying heavily for a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Ukraine had formally requested a MAP in January 2008.)[7] Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/central-europe-map.htm According to the European Parliament, as early as back in 2014, Moscow identified several challenges as threats to its national security, with a particular focus on the West. First, it is the opposition to Russia's independent foreign policy. Russia perceives that its independent foreign and domestic policies are met with resistance from the United States and its allies, who seek to maintain their domination in world affairs and to "contain" Russia through political, economic, military, and informational pressure.[8] Second, Russia had always viewed the enlargement of NATO, the location of its military infrastructure close to Russian borders, NATO's "offensive capabilities," and the trend towards NATO acquiring global functions as direct challenges to its security Third, Russia was concerned about U.S. initiatives like the global antimissile system, Global Strike capabilities, and the militarisation of space, which it views as efforts to undermine its strategic deterrent. Fourth, Russia resented Western criticism of its policies in the post-Soviet countries, often described by Moscow as neo-imperialistic, and perceives NATO and the EU's enlargement and development of cooperative ties in the shared neighbourhood as expanding their spheres of influence at Russia's expense. Fifth, Moscow condemned efforts to provoke regime changes through means such as "colour revolutions," as it views these as attempts to destabilise its internal situation, supported at times by military force. This includes references to events in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004 and 2014 "Revolution of Dignity"), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the Arab Spring (2010-2012). Sixth, the Kremlin perceived an increasing competition with the West, including rival systems of values and societal models, and it rejects the normative dimension of the EU's external action, which it sees as an attempt to impose its norms and values on Russia. Next, Russia faced economic sanctions, financial, trade, investment, and technological policies used by the West as instruments to address geopolitical problems and contain alternative centres of power, such as Russia. Finally, across its strategic documents, Russia consistently emphasised the West (including the EU) as its main challenger to its great-power ambitions and security. The latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation as approved by President Putin in July 2021 (still before the beginning of the War in Ukraine), NATO and Western European countries are perceived by Russia as sources of pressure and threats.[9] The Strategy states that attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies, and partners, including building up NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders and intensifying intelligence activities, contribute to increasing military dangers and threats to Russia. Moreover, there is mention of Western countries' desire to maintain hegemony, which is associated with the crisis of economic development models, rising disparities and social inequality, attempts to limit the role of states, and the exacerbation of political problems and inter-state contradictions. The document also notes that some states view Russia as a threat or even a military adversary, and that there are efforts to instigate disintegration processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States to undermine Russia's ties with its traditional allies. Additionally, unfriendly actions by foreign countries, including Western states, are seen as attempts to exploit Russia's socio-economic problems to undermine internal unity and radicalise protest movements. Furthermore, information campaigns by foreign countries seek to form a hostile image of Russia, restrict the use of the Russian language, ban Russian media activities, and impose sanctions on Russian athletes. The document describes these as unjustified accusations and discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots abroad. Overall, NATO and Western European countries are portrayed as pursuing policies aimed at containing Russia, undermining its sovereignty, and interfering in its internal affairs, which Russia views as threats to its national security and statehood. Now, as mentioned here, it seems that the outcome of the War in Ukraine is most likely to be decided on the battlefield and that the Russians will keep expanding their territory control, possibly even including Odessa, and that ultimately, they will want to keep as much Ukrainian territory under their direct or indirect control as possible. It is very unlikely at this stage that Ukraine will ever regain its territorial integrity (compared to pre-2014 status and Crimean operation). The Germans: up or what? In one of the recent publications (available here), I claimed that German leadership has, for some time now, promoted the idea of "special responsibility" for Europe and European security. To briefly recollect: "The former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, at Charles University in Prague on 24 August 2022, recently elaborated on German leadership’s vision regarding the European defence efforts. His presentation paints a broad picture of the EU's future at the beginning of the 3rd decade of the 21st century, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Among the four “revolutionary” ideas mentioned by Scholz, two stand out in particular. Firstly, given the potential enlargement of the European Union to up to 35 states, a transition to majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy is urged. Secondly, regarding European sovereignty, the former German Chancellor asserts that Europeans are becoming more autonomous across all fields, assuming greater responsibility for their security, working more closely together, and standing even more united to defend their values and interests worldwide. In practical terms, Scholz indicates the need for one command and control structure for European defence efforts.[10] Arguably, Germany's self-proclaimed special role stems from a re-evaluation of its strategic culture, moving from "restraint to readiness."[11] Post-reunification in 1990, Germany was reluctant to lead on security issues, preferring multilateralism through the EU and NATO while avoiding military assertiveness due to its Nazi past and a culture associating power with guilt rather than responsibility. However, events like the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 Ukraine invasion forced a "profound transformation," with leaders arguing that Germany's previous "strategic ambiguity" is no longer viable in a world of revisionist threats.[12] Former Chancellor Scholz described this as a "mandate to act," not just a description of change, emphasising Germany's obligation to secure peace and foster EU solidarity. [13] Chancellor Merz has built on this, asserting that "everything else is subordinate to external security" and that Europe expects German leadership after years of underperformance.[14] German leaders generally justify this role through a combination of geopolitical, economic, and normative arguments, often tied to specific policy actions like defence spending hikes and institutional reforms. First, geopolitical necessity and threat response. Germany portrays itself as uniquely positioned to confront existential threats like Russian aggression, given its central location in Europe and proximity to conflict zones. Scholz argued that Germany must act as the "guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be," defending the international order against autocracies and serving as a bridge-builder in the EU. [15] Merz has emphasised the need to fill the void left by U.S. disinterest, stating that Germany faces a "dual shock" from Russian imperialism and American retrenchment, necessitating leadership to maintain transatlantic security. [16] This includes strengthening NATO's deterrence, with Germany committing to nuclear sharing and viewing alliance solidarity as part of its "reason of state."[17] Second, economic power and resource capacity. As Europe's largest economy, Germany justifies its role by leveraging its financial clout for defence investments, aiming to reach 3 - 3.5% of GDP by 2029 — surpassing NATO's 2% target and outpacing France and the UK.[18] Apparently, recently, Merz has relaxed the constitutional debt brake to fund €500 billion in infrastructure and defence, arguing this enables Germany to lead systemic renewal in European security without overburdening allies. [19] Leaders like Scholz and Merz frame this as a responsibility commensurate with Germany's potential, turning economic strength into security leadership rather than mere fiscal discipline.[20] Third, there is the question of perceived historical responsibility and the evolution of strategic culture. Drawing on Germany's past, its contemporary political leaders argue for a shift from "fence-sitting" to "pace-setting," redefining power as responsibility rather than aggression.[21] This includes overcoming "outdated beliefs" about post-Cold War peace and embracing a "geopolitical, security-driven master narrative." Scholz invoked Germany's duty to foster multilateral solutions and reject isolationism, while Merz highlights the need to reshape public perceptions of military force as a tool for stability. This narrative aligns with broader values such as defending democracy, human rights, and the rules-based order, positioning Germany as a defender of European unity.[22] What of Turkey? Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, joining primarily to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War, and it remains a pivotal ally due to its unique geopolitical position, military strength, and contributions to alliance objectives. As far as the country's location, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, serving as NATO's southeastern anchor and controlling the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.[23] Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey regulates naval traffic through these waterways, effectively limiting Russian (and other non-Black Sea states') military movements — a role that's become even more critical amid Russia's actions in Ukraine and increased Black Sea presence.[24] This position also borders key regions like the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Iran), the Caucasus, and Europe, enabling NATO to project influence and address threats from multiple fronts, including countering Russian A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategies. In terms of military strength, Turkey boasts NATO's second-largest standing army, providing significant "military mass" for defending extended frontiers and sustaining operations where other allies might lack scale. [25] It hosts vital NATO assets, including the Incirlik Air Base (which stores around 50 U.S. nuclear weapons and supports Middle East operations), the Allied Land Command headquarters in İzmir, AWACS facilities at Konya, and a radar station in Kürecik for NATO's ballistic missile defence system. [26] These capabilities enhance the alliance's rapid response and deterrence in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. Turkey has actively participated in numerous NATO operations, from sending 4,500 troops to the Korean War (which helped secure its NATO membership) to leading roles in Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support), Iraq, the Balkans, and Mediterranean patrols like Operation Active Endeavour. More recently, it has supplied military aid to Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2 drones that have proven effective against Russian forces, and co-led the Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure global food security amid the ongoing war.[27] Turkey also collaborates on counterterrorism efforts against groups like ISIS and the PKK, and helps stabilise regions like the South Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean. [28] Turkey's growing defence sector produces affordable, battle-tested equipment, such as drones and other systems, which offer NATO alternatives to more expensive Western options and enable rapid production for allies like Ukraine.[29] This industrial capacity strengthens the alliance's overall resilience and reduces dependency on single suppliers. Beyond military might, Turkey extends NATO's diplomatic reach through cultural, economic, and political ties in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia — areas where Western allies often face credibility gaps. It engages with challenging regimes to secure resources, energy deals, and counter Russian or Chinese influence, acting as a bridge for the alliance. However, recently Turkey's relations with NATO have faced strains — such as its purchase of Russian S-400 systems (leading to U.S. sanctions and F-35 exclusion), disputes with Greece over Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and delays in approving Finland and Sweden's memberships (resolved by 2024). It is fair to say that Turkey plays a strategically important role in European security, and its leadership effectively leverages this position against European partners. Given its geographic location and military potential, Ankara will largely influence NATO's future. Greenland Conundrum Perhaps the most intriguing in recent days is the U.S. President's claim regarding Greenland. As of January 27, 2026, tensions between the United States, Denmark, and Greenland have escalated due to renewed U.S. interest in expanding its strategic presence on the Arctic island. President Donald Trump has reportedly issued an ultimatum, pushing for greater control over parts of Greenland to bolster military bases and counter Russian influence in the region, including restrictions on drilling rights for Russia. This follows historical U.S. attempts, such as Trump's 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland outright, which was rebuffed by Denmark. Importantly, the U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base in Greenland for early warning and missile defence, but the current demands aim to expand this amid Arctic geopolitical competition with Russia and China. Recent talks in Washington between U.S. and Danish officials have led to the formation of a working group aimed at a diplomatic resolution. However, interpretations differ: U.S. officials, including Ambassador Leavitt, frame it as facilitating a transfer or enhanced control, while Denmark emphasises disagreement and no sale. For example, a recent New York Times report indicates Denmark may grant the U.S. sovereignty over select land pockets for military bases, modelled after arrangements like those in Cyprus, to strengthen Arctic defences. [30] Greenland's Prime Minister has declared the island's sovereignty a "red line," rejecting any outright transfer.[31] Denmark has reportedly increased troop deployments to Greenland in response, insisting the territory is not for sale. To spice things up, Trump has questioned Denmark's legal claims, stirring further controversy.[32] This has arguably strained U.S. - EU relations, with Europe adopting a firmer stance against Trump's approach. As a NATO member and EU affiliate through Denmark, Greenland's status has prompted calls for allies to boost Arctic security.[33] Some European leaders worry this could force divestment from U.S. ties or heighten NATO divisions.[34] In an interesting twist, a number of European leaders issued strong rhetoric against Trump and his claims about Greenland. A Joint Statement from European Leaders declared in a collective rebuke: "Greenland belongs to its people. It is for Denmark and Greenland and them only to decide on matters concerning Denmark and Greenland," […] "Security in the Arctic must therefore be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. These are universal principles, and we will not stop defending them."[35] Herein lies the fundamental conundrum: the core of the security guaranteed by NATO (at least legally speaking) is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the so-called Casus Foederis.[36] The article 5 states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Originally conceived as a defensive military alliance, NATO was established to protect its member states from external threats, according to its founders. In the event that one member state turns against the others, the Alliance risks becoming ineffective, akin to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, which served as a mechanism for exerting control over weaker states. Should such a scenario occur, the survival of NATO would be in jeopardy. Historical precedent suggests that oppressive institutions inevitably collapse over time. Conclusion It is imperative to acknowledge that NATO is currently engaged, albeit indirectly, in a conflict with Russia. This situation is significant as it serves as a test of NATO's capabilities. Presently, it appears that NATO is not prevailing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert, as I have argued in my previous analysis (available here), that Russia is likely to achieve its primary objective: ensuring that Ukraine will not join NATO. Additionally, I expect Russia to retain its territorial acquisitions and, in some manner, exert influence over the political system that will emerge in Ukraine following the conflict. Several pertinent questions arise in this context. Will the eventual peace, following the conclusion of the conflict, be sustainable? Will it adequately consider the national interests of all parties involved? Will it offer a satisfactory compromise? Is there a probability of a resurgence of Cold War-like relations between Western European nations and Russia? In the event of a renewed Cold War scenario, will NATO continue to be perceived as an effective instrument? Furthermore, given the United States' strategic focus on the Far and Middle East, will it remain committed to participating in the European security framework through institutions such as NATO? References [1] NATO. (2026, January 15). A short history of NATO. NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/nato-history/a-short-history-of-nato [2] Rep. Massie Introduces Bill to Remove the United States from NATO. (2025, December 9). Congressman Thomas Massie. https://massie.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=395782 [3] United States of America. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America (November 2025). The White House. Washington. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf [4] Grieger, G. (2025, December). The 2025 US National Security Strategy. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://eprs.in.ep.europa.eu [5] Department of War. (2025). National Defense Strategy [Unclassified document]. U.S. Government. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF [6] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-on-the-map [7] Pifer, S. (2024, August). Ukraine’s Long Path toward NATO. American Diplomacy. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2024/08/ukraines-long-path-toward-nato [8] Facon, I. (2017). Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their implications for the EU (Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/Lot6/11 EN). European Parliament. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/379ea707-e9dc-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [9] President of the Russian Federation. (2021, July 2). National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree No. 400). Kremlin. [10] Sliwinski, K. (2025, June 16). Germany – the EU’s challenging leadership in challenging times. World and New World Journal. https://worldandnewworld.com/germany-eu-leadership/ [11] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [12] Kandyuk, O. (2025, October 15). THE END OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY? GERMANY’S NEW ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. Ukraine Analytica. https://ukraine-analytica.org/the-end-of-strategic-ambiguity-germanys-new-role-in-european-security/ [13] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [14] Cliffe, J., & Puglierin, J. (2025, May 6). From fence-sitter to pace-setter: How Merz’s Germany can lead Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/from-fence-sitter-to-pace-setter-how-merzs-germany-can-lead-europe/ [15] Bartenstein, A., & Wessels, W. (2024). German Claims for Leadership: From a Federalist to a Geopolitical Leadership Master Narrative. German Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2024.2374371 [16] Freytag von Loringhoven, A. (2025, December 16). Germany: Europe’s New Security Leader. Centre for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/germany-europes-new-security-leader/ [17] Dempsey, J. (2023, June 22). Judy Asks: Is Germany Getting Serious About Security and Defense? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2023/06/judy-asks-is-germany-getting-serious-about-security-and-defense?lang=en [18] Koenig, N., & Schütte, L. (n.d.). Don’t Dodge Dilemmas Three Tests for German Leadership in European Defense. Munich Security Conference. Retrieved January 23, 2026, from https://securityconference.org/en/publications/analyses/dont-dodge-dilemmas-german-leadership-in-european-defense [19] Fuhrhop, P., & Kempin, R. (2025, December). New ambitions, old constraints: Germany’s role in shaping European defence. Berlin Perspectives, (08). Institut für Europäische Politik. https://www.iep-berlin.de [20] U.S. Department of State. (2024). Integrated Country Strategy: Germany (Approved May 25, 2022; Revised January 30, 2024). [Report]. https://placeholder-url-for-document.org [21] Harsch, M. F. (2025, December 30). From Restraint to Readiness? Germany Considers Conscription. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/12/from-restraint-to-readiness-germany-considers-conscription/ [22] Weiss, S. (2016, October 1). Germany’s Security Policy. From Territorial Defense to Defending the Liberal World Order? Newpolitik. https://www.bfna.org/politics-society/germanys-security-policy-1ozhaghk6w/ [23] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [24] Ellehuus, R. (2019, December 2). Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving. Centre for Strategic &International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving [25] Jones, D. (2025, February 20). Turkish army could play key role in Europe’s security. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/turkish-army-could-play-key-role-in-europe-s-security/7982514.html [26] Turkish Armed Forces. (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved January 24, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Armed_Forces [27] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [28] The United States and Türkiye: A Key NATO Ally and Critical Regional Partner. (2023, February 19). U.S. EMBASSY TÜRKİYE. https://tr.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-and-turkiye-a-key-nato-ally-and-critical-regional-partner/ [29] Lucas, R. (2025, March 18). Turning Towards Turkey: Why NATO Needs to Lean into Its Relationship. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/turning-towards-turkey-why-nato-needs-to-lean-into.html [30] Jakes, L., Tankersley, J., & Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2026, January 21). Trump Says He Has Framework for Greenland Deal as NATO Mulls Idea of U.S. Sovereignty Over Bases. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-threats-diplomacy-force.html?searchResultPosition=2 [31] Greenland and Denmark say sovereignty ‘red line’ after latest Trump remarks. (2026, January 22). Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/trumps-greenland-pact-will-demand-allies-boost-arctic-security-nato-chief [32] Westfall, S. (2026, January 25). Trump tells one history of Greenland. Historians tell another. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/25/greenland-deal-trump-history-denmark-europe/ [33] Adler, K. (2026, January 20). Confronted over Greenland, Europe is ditching its softly-softly approach to Trump. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro [34] Schoen, D. E. (2026, January 26). What Trump’s risking in the row over Greenland. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5703677-trump-greenland-geopolitical-impact/ [35] Joint Statement on Greenland. (2026, January 6). ÉLYSÉE. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/01/06/joint-statement-on-greenland [36] See more at: https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty

The price of gold has risen to over US$5,000 (£3,662) an ounce for the first time ever, after doubling in value over the course of a very strong 2025 for the precious metal. The usual explanation for such strong rises is that gold is considered a safe bet for investors when other options look a little shaky. High inflation for example, when cash quickly loses value, is often linked to gold price rises. Trade wars and actual wars usually have a similar effect. A common view then, is that gold performs well in moments of instability. But the research I was involved with suggests that gold prices are not simply a reaction to short-term economic events. Instead, they are a response to something deeper, reflecting an overall level of confidence in how economic systems are managed over time. During recent periods of sustained economic stability in the west, gold prices have remained largely flat. The steady growth, moderate inflation and predictable policy of the early 1990s and 2000s for example, were not good times for gold. And rather than responding to every economic peak or dip, the thing that really pushes gold prices up is instability in what’s known as “monetary credibility”. In other words, when there are doubts about whether central banks and governments will be able to maintain discipline over inflation, public debt and currency value over the coming decades. At times like this gold becomes more desirable. This helps explain why gold can continue to rise even as inflation falls, as has happened recently in several big economies, including the US and parts of Europe. And although recent weakness in the dollar and political uncertainty in the US have probably added momentum to gold’s rise, these factors amplify a deeper shift in confidence rather than explain it on their own. Our findings suggest that no single set of macroeconomic variables (like inflation, interest rates and stock prices) consistently explains gold prices across developed and emerging economies. They matter sometimes, but not always. So simple narratives (whether they’re about inflation, or trade wars or the weakening of the US dollar) are not enough to account for today’s gold market. Inflation alone cannot explain why gold prices remain elevated even as headline price pressures have eased. What gold tells us about the world There is more evidence for this in the fact that, according to the World Gold Council, central banks have been buying gold at the fastest pace in decades, particularly since 2022. This has continued even as inflation has fallen in many countries, again suggesting that these decisions are driven by longer term considerations rather than short term price movements. The decisions of central banks reflect concerns about resilience, diversification and trust. And to those banks, gold’s appeal lies squarely in the fact that it carries relatively little risk. It is not issued by a government like fiat currencies. It cannot be created at will like paper money. And it does not depend on the credibility of any single institution. So, in a world of high public debt, geopolitical fragmentation and increasing pressure on central bank independence, gold offers stability and insurance. And its price rises when confidence in the rules governing money becomes uncertain. That uncertainty can persist even when growth resumes or inflation falls. Seen in this light, gold’s recent surge does not signal a kneejerk panic or imminent collapse. Instead, it reflects a reassessment of long-term monetary confidence at a time when governments face difficult trade-offs between debt sustainability, political pressures and price stability. With its current high value, gold is not predicting a specific crisis. Nor does it provide a clear forecast for inflation. But it is revealing something important about the current moment. Markets appear less certain that the frameworks governing money, debt and policy will remain unchanged. That does not mean those systems have failed, but it does suggest their credibility is no longer taken for granted in the way it has been in the past. Gold does not predict the future. But it does offer a window into how confident markets are about the foundations of the world’s economics system.

Good afternoon everyone, and thank you again for being here. I am very pleased to have hosted Chancellor Merz and his Ministers in Rome today for this intergovernmental summit between Italy and Germany – the second in just over two years, following the one we held in Berlin in November 2023. Among other things, this summit kicks off a particularly significant year for the bilateral relationship between our nations, with 2026 marking the 75th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin. This summit is also clearly being held at a particularly complex moment in time, which is forcing Europe to choose whether it intends to play a leading role in its own destiny, or have its destiny dictated to it. In our view, this phase requires clarity of mind, responsibility, courage and, above all, the intelligence required to transform crises into opportunities. I am personally convinced that, at this turning point in history, Italy and Germany have a special responsibility, by virtue of their history, influence and leadership. We are two great European nations, founders of the European Union and leading players in international dynamics. We are Europe’s two main manufacturing powers, with strongly interconnected production and industrial systems that are complementary in many ways. However, above all, we both share a common vision on some of the most strategic issues, and are in fact pursuing the same underlying goal: to build an authoritative Europe that is aware of its role in the world and is able to be competitive on the global stage, a Europe capable of strengthening its strategic autonomy with pragmatism, concreteness and common sense. Two years ago, in Berlin, we signed an Action Plan whose objective was to take our bilateral cooperation to a higher level and explore new areas for common growth. That is precisely what we have done over these years and months, as can be seen in the many examples of collaboration we have developed. I am thinking of the agreement on the security of gas supplies; the joint venture between Leonardo and Rheinmetall; the agreement for the integration of ITA Airways into the Lufthansa Group; and I could name many others. With today’s summit, we have decided to continue along this path and keep investing with conviction in our strengthened cooperation by setting ourselves even more ambitious goals. I believe I can now say that Italy and Germany are closer than ever, and I think this is good news, not only for our peoples, but also for Europe as a whole. For if two important nations are friends, allies, and solid from both an economic and an industrial point of view – as Italy and Germany are – and they decide to move in the same direction, with each contributing their own added value, then the conditions are in place to achieve excellent and significant results for our businesses, our workers, our citizens, and their families. Today, we have decided to strengthen our cooperation - cooperation in the truest sense of the word. As I have said before on several occasions: the etymology of words gives us back a picture and the underlying meaning of what we say. ‘Cooperation’ comes from the Latin ‘co-operari’, meaning ‘to work with’. Cooperation never involves an active and a passive role, someone who buys and someone who sells, for example. When there is true cooperation, something new is always born, with each party contributing their own added value. That is precisely what we are doing, and what we have done on this important day by adopting three very significant documents, in addition to the agreements you saw signed and exchanged earlier. The first is a cooperation protocol to expand our areas of collaboration, which updates the bilateral Action Plan we signed in 2023. I am thinking of agriculture, our plans to further strengthen our already solid industrial cooperation, cultural dialogue, and cooperation in the management of migration flows. Migration is one of the crucial challenges for our continent, on which there is full alignment with the German Chancellor. We both think the main challenge lies in defending the European Union’s external borders, fighting human trafficking, and working to ensure respect for legality in strengthening the return system, as well as in cooperating with the nations of origin and of transit, which Italy in particular (but not only Italy) is trying to develop through a new model of cooperation with the African continent. Clearly, our goal is to consolidate the change of approach which, thanks also to our governments, has taken hold and is becoming increasingly well established in Europe. Over the last years, this new approach has enabled us to guarantee a significant reduction in the number of irregular entries, illegal departures and landings. Italy also intends to pursue this commitment through innovative solutions, starting with the protocol with Albania we have been promoting. I want to tell Chancellor Merz that I am grateful for his decision to regularly participate in the informal working group of like-minded countries, which meets in the margins of European Council meetings to discuss precisely the issue of migration. The other very important matter on which Chancellor Merz and I agree is the need for a decisive step change in Europe regarding the competitiveness of our companies. It is now evident and clear to anyone with intellectual honesty that a certain ideological view of the green transition has ended up bringing our industries to their knees, giving Europe new and dangerous strategic dependencies, and without even managing to have a real impact in terms of protecting the environment and nature globally. We are convinced there is room to correct these mistakes and avoid our continent’s industrial decline, but, of course, courage is required. We want to accelerate on these issues, which is why we will be presenting our joint non-paper at the next informal meeting in Brussels on 12 February, where discussions will begin regarding the next European Council meeting in March - of particular importance precisely for matters regarding competitiveness. This joint non-paper is focused on a number of priorities which, in our view, cannot be postponed: simplifying and cutting EU red tape; strengthening the single market; relaunching the automotive industry based on technological neutrality; ensuring an ambitious trade policy based on shared rules and a level playing field. This is the second document we signed today, and it is a document which I consider to be very significant and which we intend to share with the European Commission and the President of the European Council as well as with all the other leaders who will be participating in these discussions. The third document we signed this morning on defence, security and resilience is equally as important. These are sectors in which Italy and Germany can count on industrial players of absolute excellence, which generate incredibly high added value. We want to strengthen our cooperation in this area, and we believe our production systems can make a significant contribution to building a solid European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, which for many years we have been calling for without ever really making any progress, and to act accordingly. To this end, I have informed Chancellor Merz of Italy’s decision to join the multilateral agreement on arms exports, which is already in place between Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. This is the reason why we held an important 2+2 meeting this morning between our Foreign and Defence Ministers, in order to coordinate our positions and also work even more closely together on the main international issues, starting with Ukraine and the Middle East. We have always been strongly aligned on both of these fronts too, and we will continue to do our part to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and to build a stable framework for security and prosperity in the Middle East. This morning, we also discussed how to enhance our cooperation in many other areas. I am thinking of energy interconnections and economic and infrastructure interconnections, which are increasingly crucial in this era. We are working together to support strategic initiatives that are in line with this goal, for example: the SoutH2 Corridor; Medlink; Elmed; and the IMEC, which is the corridor that will connect India, the Middle East and Europe, and in relation to which Italy and Germany are playing a key role in Europe. The work we have done, and have still yet to do, is very extensive. Today, Italy and Germany are not only confirming their partnership but are also deciding to strengthen it at all levels, by working side by side on challenges that are crucial for our time. I’ve read a number of comments over the last few hours, with some observers saying that 2026 will be “the year of Italy and Germany”. I can’t say whether this prediction corresponds to reality, but what I can say is that we intend to give it our all; we absolutely intend to do our part in order to consolidate a friendship that is strategic not only for our nations, but for Europe as a whole. Thank you again.

There is a major sticking point often overlooked in the ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia currently being held in Abu Dhabi. This relates to the fact that, as part of any agreement, Kyiv is being asked to give up the entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. If it does so, it will also be giving up the strategic positions that have prevented major advances by the Russian military for many months now. This is the significant line of defensive fortifications across the Donbas, known as the “Donbas line”. It’s Ukraine’s equivalent to the Maginot line of forts which were France’s main line of defence against Germany before the second world war. The “Anchorage formula” agreed by the US president, Donald Trump, and Russia president, Vladimir Putin, in Alaska late last year calls for Ukrainian forces to abandon the areas of western Donbas they currently hold. Washington is now talking up the idea of establishing a “free economic zone” or “de-militarised zone” which would cover the whole of the Donbas, including those portions currently occupied by Russian forces. This would mean Ukraine abandoning the Donbas line. The system integrates at least seven distinct defensive layers that any attacking force must penetrate sequentially to achieve effect. These include minefields, anti-tank ditches, anti-tank obstacles (“dragons’ teeth”), bunkers, trench lines and anti-drone defences. Such obstacles can either physically halt assaulting Russian forces or “canalise” them into swampy or otherwise impassible ground or into pre-arranged kill zones, wherein fires (mortar and artillery) can be used to destroy Russian formations. One of the most critical lines runs through the embattled town of Pokrovsk, which has been under constant Russian assault since early 2025. Lose Pokrovsk and the Ukrainians will then more than likely also lose the important city of Donetsk. Thus, Pokrovsk has been referred to as the “gateway to Donetsk”. The Donbas line took years to build and to perfect. It is very sophisticated. It would be a massive strategic blow for the Ukrainians if they were forced to give it up and pull back. In essence, the Russian demand that Ukrainian forces vacate the western Donbas can also be seen as a demand that they likewise give up, in the shape of this Donbas line, their one true means of protecting not only the western Donbas but also, arguably, the whole of the rest of Ukraine. Who can be trusted? If Kyiv were to accede to Russian demands and abandon the Donbas line, then this would only help bring about a lasting peace if, of course, trust could be placed in the Russians to keep their side of the bargain. They would need to cease all their assaults across Ukraine and themselves “de-militarise” the area of the eastern Donbas they currently control. But Putin has a history of reneging on deals. Anything agreed now by Kyiv in Abu Dhabi is likely, as respected Washington-based thinktank the Institute for the Study of War points out, to suffer the same fate. This seems to certainly be the view of many on the Ukrainian side. As Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, himself recently put it, “I don’t trust Putin”. He has good reason for doubting the Russian president’s bona fides. Russia was a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum alongside the US, UK and France by which those powers provided assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Kyiv giving up its arsenal of nuclear weapons. This didn’t stop Russia invading. Nor did the two Minsk accords in 2014 and 2015 which aimed to stop the fighting between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region. In the event of any peace deal being struck between Moscow and Kyiv, Ukraine’s western allies have offered what they are calling “robust security guarantees”. These would be provided by a “coalition of the willing” made up of more than 30 countries, mainly from within Europe. What’s on the table In terms of what these promises might actually mean, there is a proposal for a three-tier mechanism. A Russian breach of the ceasefire would initially trigger a diplomatic warning, as well as allowing Ukraine to respond militarily. The second tier would be provided by the coalition of the willing, primarily the UK and France, which plan to send troops to Ukraine as part of the deal, but also many EU members plus Norway, Iceland and Turkey. The third tier would be a military response from the US. But it’s been reported that the US has made its participation in any security guarantees contingent on the agreement of a ceasefire deal which gives Russia control of the “entire Donbas region in eastern Ukraine”. A further issue here is that Moscow is unlikely to agree to the presence of any Nato troops as official security guarantors. Moscow has said as much, insisting that any foreign troops in Ukraine would be a “legitimate target”. Would western governments forces really commit their troops into a situation where they might become targets – leading perhaps to a wider war? The whole idea of Ukraine abandoning its Donbas line is fraught with difficulties. For this is not just a question of Ukraine trading land for peace. It is more fundamentally a question of trading land and significant defensive lines for the promise of peace. The original version of the Maginot line did not save France in 1940. It was bypassed by German forces moving through Belgium to outflank the Maginot fortifications. The danger for Ukraine is that its own Maginot line could itself be bypassed if it accedes to Russian demands at the negotiating table in Abu Dhabi. Can Zelensky really give up the Donbas line that is protecting his entire country, and can he really rely on security guarantees from western states that may yet prove equivocal? As one Ukrainian official told Reuters recently, to give up remaining positions in the Donbas region would be “suicide”.

On 3 January 2026, the US carried out a surprise military operation in Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The US has made little effort to cloak its operation in either solidarist language, such as appeals to democracy promotion, human rights, or liberal peacebuilding – or in pluralist rhetoric emphasizing the preservation of international order. Instead, Washington has presented the action in largely instrumental and strategic terms, signalling a willingness to sidestep both dominant justificatory traditions within international society. While Maduro and Flores are charged with narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine importation conspiracy, international debates focus on the future of Venezuela’s oil (Poque González 2026). On 7 January administration officials said the US plans to effectively assume control over the sale of Venezuela’s oil “indefinitely” (Sherman 2026) and President Donald Trump confirmed that he expected the US to run Venezuela, insisting that the country’s interim government was “giving us everything that we feel is necessary” (Sanger et al. 2026). Attention is fixed not only on Washington’s plans for Venezuela’s oil sector and control over its export revenues, but also on the replies from Moscow and Beijing, Maduro’s chief foreign backers and heavyweight players in energy politics. Consequently, this article asks two questions. First, to what extent does American control of Venezuelan oil threaten China’s and Russia’s energy interests? Second, what does the resulting US–China–Russia triangle imply for how energy security itself is being redefined? A constructivist perspective, recognizes that oil is an idea—valuable not only because it burns but because control over it symbolizes power and authority (Kuteleva 2021). Thus, when the US claims the right to supervise Venezuelan oil revenues, it is not only increasing leverage over barrels, but asserting the authority to define legitimate energy exchange itself. In this context, while the material threat is limited for China and already largely sunk for Russia, the symbolic, institutional and political threat is profound. A straightforward constructivist interpretation of the US–China–Russia triangle centres on status. China had cultivated Venezuela as an “all-weather strategic partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025b) and major debtor, only to watch Maduro captured days after senior Chinese officials visited Caracas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2025a). In constructivist terms, this is an obvious status injury: China appeared present but powerless. China’s energy diplomacy had functioned as proof of its global influence, and the nullification of China’s energy ties with Venezuela by US force undermines China’s narrative as a protective patron for the Global South. Beijing accused Washington of “hegemonic thinking” (Liu and Chen 2026), “bullying” (Global Times 2026a), and violating Venezuelan sovereignty and “the rights of the Venezuelan people” (Global Times 2026b). This strong pluralist language is not incidental—it is a bid to reclaim moral authority and redefine the event as norm-breaking rather than capability-revealing. Similarly, Russia’s involvement in Venezuela was never purely economic. Moscow saw the alliance with Venezuela as a way to advance its anti-American agenda and to signal that it could cultivate allies in Washington’s traditional backyard (Boersner Herrera and Haluani 2023; Gratius 2022; Herbst and Marczak 2019). It used Venezuela as leverage against the US, subsidised the regime during periods of domestic recession, and framed support as proof of great-power reliability. As senior Russian executives put it, “economic considerations took a back seat to political goals of taking swipes at the US” (Seddon and Stognei 2026). US control of Venezuelan oil thus removes a symbolic platform on which Russia enacted its identity as an energy superpower and geopolitical spoiler. While Russia continues loud sovereignty talk, its demonstrated incapacity to protect partners pushes it toward opportunistic bargaining (“concert” deals, see Lemke 2023) rather than overt defense of UN-pluralist restraint. As such, Dmitry Medvedev (2026) bluntly claimed that the US special military operation in Venezuela all but justifies Russia’s own actions in Ukraine. Venezuela is not a core supplier for China in volumetric terms. In 2025, Venezuelan exports to China averaged roughly 395,000 barrels per day—about 4% of China’s seaborne crude imports, according to Kpler data cited by the FT (Leahy and Moore 2026). China has diversified routes, strategic reserves covering at least 96 days of imports, and strong purchasing power in global markets (Downs 2025). Hence, from a narrow supply perspective, the loss of Venezuelan oil is manageable. That said, around one-fifth of China’s crude imports come from suppliers under US or western sanctions, primarily Iran, Venezuela and Russia, much of it disguised via transshipment near Malaysia (Downs 2025). Independent “teapot” refiners (Downs 2017)—who account for about a quarter of China’s refining capacity—are structurally dependent on this discounted, politically risky oil. Consequently, Trump’s seizure of Maduro alarmed China not mainly because of Venezuela itself, but because it demonstrated Washington’s capacity to escalate from sanctions to physical control of an energy sector, and thus potentially to Iran. Here, constructivism reveals the problem: “sanctioned oil” is not simply cheaper crude; it is a political category—oil marked as illegitimate by a dominant legal-financial order. The US move signals that this stigma can be converted into coercive authority, turning commercial vulnerability into geopolitical dependence. This reclassification transforms Chinese domestic actors into security subjects. “Teapot” refiners are no longer just businesses; they become strategic vulnerabilities whose survival depends on US tolerance. Analysis warn that a cutoff of Iranian oil could force many to shut down entirely (Leahy and Moore 2026). In this context, US control of Venezuelan oil reshapes Chinese energy security discourse from one of diversification and market access to one of hierarchy and exposure to political permission. Russia’s oil interests in Venezuela were largely written down years earlier. In 2020, Rosneft had sold most formal assets after pouring around $800m into loans and projects that produced little return (The Economist 2020). Much of the remaining exposure consisted of debts and shadow ownership arrangements. More important is the damage to Russia’s sanctions-evasion architecture. Russia had become the leading marketer of Venezuelan oil by trading crude as debt repayment and using banks partly owned by sanctioned Russian institutions, creating what the 2019 Atlantic Council report described as “a counter financial system to the one dominated by the West” (Herbst and Marczak 2019). The recent reporting on the US tracking a tanker linked to Venezuela, Russia and Iran illustrates how this counter-order is being contested operationally (Sheppard et al. 2026). The vessel sailed under false flags, was sanctioned for carrying Iranian oil, later re-registered under Russian jurisdiction, and became vulnerable to boarding under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea because it was “without nationality.” Such episodes show that energy security is increasingly constituted by maritime law, insurance rules, and surveillance practices. US control over Venezuelan oil expands this regime of enforcement, making Russia’s informal trading networks less viable. A constructivist approach suggests that American control of Venezuelan oil is best understood not as a supply shock, but as an act of social stratification in the international system. Energy markets have always been hierarchical, but the hierarchy was largely implicit: reserve currencies, shipping insurance, futures exchanges, and contract law already privileged Western institutions. What is new is the explicit performance of hierarchy—the public demonstration that a great power can redefine ownership, legality, and access through coercion and administrative authority. This produces a stratified energy order: First, rule-makers – states whose legal systems, sanctions regimes, and corporate actors define what counts as legitimate oil (primarily the US and its allies). Second, rule-takers – states whose energy security depends on access to these institutions (most importers). And third, rule-evaders – states forced into informal networks (Russia, Iran, Venezuela) whose energy becomes socially “tainted.” China occupies an unstable middle category: economically powerful but institutionally dependent. 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