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Abstract This is the first part of an analysis examining the initial perceptions and evolving realities of the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022. Early Western media and political narratives were optimistic about Ukraine’s military resilience and potential victory, highlighting heroic resistance, Western support, and Russian operational failures. However, the reality has been more complex, as Ukraine faced significant challenges, including numerical and equipment inferiority, underfunding, limited combat brigades, and a lack of strategic reserves. Despite these hardships, Ukraine managed to resist Russia’s initial advances, as exemplified by symbolic events such as the defence of Snake Island. The article explores the human and economic costs of the ongoing war. Ukraine requires an estimated $524 billion in reconstruction funding, following a 30% drop in GDP in 2022 and ongoing economic hardships. Western aid has been substantial, exceeding €400 billion, but the conflict’s economic fallout also burdens donor countries, causing inflation and growth slowdowns. Key Words: Realism, War, Ukraine Introduction At the very beginning of the ‘Special Military Operation’ – an invasion of Ukraine by Russia - most academics, policymakers, political leaders, and media pundits were hugely impressed by Ukraine’s initial military response. Most were genuinely of the opinion that Russia was weak, economic sanctions would cripple its economy, President Putin had little to no public support, and that with enormous help from the U.S. as well as most EU Member states, Ukraine would not only resist the attack but ultimately win the war with Russia on its own territory and perhaps even facilitate the government change in Kremlin. Any skeptical views regarding the possible Ukrainian victory were swiftly silenced and dismissed as pro-Putin propaganda or even deliberate disinformation, therefore suggesting that any sceptics are more or less Putin’s agents. Let’s look at some media titles from March 2022 onward (the war started on 24 February, 2022). Overenthusiastic narrative At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, many initial media reports and analyses were pessimistic, predicting a swift Russian victory based on military disparities. However, by March 2022, as Ukrainian forces demonstrated unexpected resilience — repelling advances on Kyiv and inflicting significant losses on Russian troops—some Western media outlets began publishing more enthusiastic and optimistic pieces about Ukraine's potential to prevail. These often-highlighted Ukrainian morale, Western support, and Russian operational failures. Below, the reader will find several examples from that early period, drawn from a range of sources including news articles and opinion pieces. Admittedly, media coverage of this topic is inherently biased, with Western outlets generally favouring Ukraine's perspective. In contrast, Russian state media promoted the opposite narrative (e.g., RIA Novosti's premature victory declaration on February 28, 2022, which was quickly retracted). One of the events that genuinely inspired the world at the very beginning of the war was the so-called Snake-Island Campaign. Snake Island is a tiny (0.17 km²) Ukrainian outpost in the Black Sea, about 48 km off the coast of Odesa. Despite its size, the island is geostrategically vital: it hosts radar stations, enables missile launches, and controls maritime routes for grain exports from Odesa. Russian control threatened Ukraine's southern coast and Black Sea shipping.[1] On the invasion's first day, the Russian cruiser Moskva (Black Sea Fleet flagship) radioed: "Snake Island, this is a Russian warship. I repeat: put down your arms... or you will be bombed." The 13 Ukrainian border guards replied: "Russian warship, go f… yourself." Russians captured the island via helicopter assault; defenders were taken POW but later exchanged and awarded Ukraine's Hero of Ukraine title. Consequently, legacy media began painting a rather rosy picture of the Ukrainian campaign. Below, the reader will find several examples: - The Atlantic - "Ukraine Is Winning. Don't Let Up Now." (March 28, 2022). This opinion piece by Eliot A. Cohen expressed strong optimism about Ukraine's battlefield performance, crediting heroic resistance and Western aid while critiquing Russia's weaknesses. Key quotes: "Truly magnificent Ukrainian resistance — heroic and clever at once — backed by Western arms and intelligence accounts for much of this." and "If Ukraine prevails, its example will be at least a partial deterrent to further adventures by Russia, and perhaps by China." The article urged continued support to secure a Ukrainian victory. [2] - The Washington Post - "Ukraine-Russia talks stir optimism, but West urges caution" (March 29, 2022). This news report highlighted positive developments from peace talks in Istanbul, where Russia pledged to reduce military operations around Kyiv, fostering hope for a resolution favourable to Ukraine. It noted enthusiasm around Ukraine's proposals for neutrality with security guarantees, though tempered by skepticism. A key optimistic element: The talks "stirred a glimmer of hope" amid Ukraine's successful defence, with Ukrainian negotiators pushing for international backing to end the conflict on terms that preserved sovereignty. [3] - Associated Press (AP) - "Russia says it will cut back operations near Ukraine capital" (March 29, 2022). This wire report conveyed optimism following Russia's announcement of scaling back assaults on Kyiv and Chernihiv, interpreting it as a sign of Ukrainian leverage in negotiations. Key quote: "Russia announced Tuesday it will significantly scale back military operations near Ukraine’s capital and a northern city, as the outlines of a possible deal to end the grinding war came into view at the latest round of talks." It portrayed this as a potential turning point, with Ukraine's delegation outlining a framework for neutrality backed by guarantor nations.[4] - Deutsche Welle (DW) - "Ukrainians have won the information war" (March 7, 2022). While primarily focused on the information domain, this article by historian Margaret MacMillan extended optimism to the broader conflict, arguing that Ukraine's narrative success bolstered its military position. Key quote: "The Ukrainians have won the information war... This is helping them win support around the world, which in turn is translating into real help on the ground." It emphasized global sympathy, fuelling aid that could tip the scales toward Ukrainian victory.[5] - In a rather absurd tone, the Polish media reported that a Kiev female resident destroyed a Russian military drone with a jar of pickles when enjoying a cigarette on her balcony.[6] Reality on the ground was somewhat different, however. In fact, as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, rightly observed, before the invasion by Russia, the Armed Forces of Ukraine faced several significant challenges: 1. Numerical and Equipment Inferiority: As of the end of 2021, the Russian army was about five times larger than the Ukrainian army, with four times more tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 3.4 times more artillery, and 4.5 times more attack helicopters. The Ukrainian Navy was notably weaker, lacking aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes, or submarines.[7] 2. Underfunding and Stagnation: Despite politicians declaring that more than 5% of GDP was allocated to security and defence, less than half of the allocated budget went to the Ministry of Defence. There was no increase in funding for developing and procuring weapons and equipment, with most money going to financial support for the military personnel. This led to stagnation, with a lack of finances for development and combat readiness, personnel outflow, and understaffed military units. 3. Limited Combat Brigades: At the time of appointment of the author as Commander-in-Chief in August 2021, there were only 24 combat brigades in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with 12 already engaged in combat in the East and South. Only 12 combat brigades remained available for deployment in the event of aggression. 4. Insufficient Modern Weapons: Ukraine had very few modern weapons compared to Russia. The total need for funds to repel aggression, including replenishing missile and ammunition stocks, was estimated at hundreds of billions of hryvnias, which the Armed Forces did not have. 5. Lack of Strategic Reserves and Preparedness: The Armed Forces were unable to create sufficient strategic reserves, which are crucial in a strategy of defeat. Ukraine was significantly inferior in personnel, weapons, and military equipment, and lacked the preparation to meet the scale of the impending invasion. These challenges left Ukraine vulnerable and enabled Russia to pursue a strategy of defeat through swift, decisive military action. Reality on the ground – how much has the war cost so far? Russia's invasion has imposed staggering financial burdens on Ukraine and its Western allies through December 2025. Available reports evaluate these costs, encompassing direct damages, economic contractions, and international aid expenditures, drawing from economic assessments and aid trackers. Ukraine has endured profound economic devastation. According to the World Bank's February 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, the country requires an estimated $524 billion for reconstruction over the next decade, reflecting cumulative physical damages from infrastructure destruction, housing losses, and disrupted industries.[8]     Source: UKRAINE FOURTH RAPID DAMAGE RDNA4 AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT. (2025, February). World Bank Group. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099022025114040022/pdf/P180174-ca39eccd-ea67-4bd8-b537-ff73a675a0a8.pdf The war has apparently obliterated key sectors: agriculture, energy, and manufacturing suffered massively, with export routes like Black Sea ports blocked, leading to a 30% GDP contraction in 2022 alone. By mid-2025, Ukraine's GDP remained 25-30% below pre-war levels, with annual losses projected at $40-50 billion due to reduced output and trade.[9] Military expenditures have surged, consuming over 50% of the national budget, totalling around $100 billion since 2022, funded partly through domestic borrowing and inflation, which peaked at 26% in 2022. [10] Humanitarian costs, including the displacement of 6 million refugees and internal migrants, add billions in social support.[11] Overall, projections estimate Ukraine's total war-related economic harm at $2.4 trillion by 2025, though this likely understates indirect effects like human capital loss and environmental damage.[12] Western nations, primarily the United States and European Union members, have shouldered high costs through aid and indirect economic repercussions. Total bilateral aid from Western donors exceeded €400 billion ($430 billion) by June 2025, including military, financial, and humanitarian support.[13] The U.S. has committed $175 billion in appropriations, with $130.6 billion spent by August 2025, including $66.9 billion in military assistance like weapons and training.[14] EU institutions and member states provided nearly $197 billion, encompassing $63.2 billion from EU budgets and refugee support for 8 million arrivals.[15] The UK itself pledged £12.8 billion, with £7.8 billion for the military.[16] Beyond aid, the war triggered economic shocks in the West. Energy prices soared due to sanctions on Russian oil and gas, contributing to EU inflation averaging 8-10% in 2022-2023 and to a 0.5-1% reduction in annual GDP growth.[17] The U.S. faced similar inflationary pressures, with global growth slowing to 3.1% in 2022, partly from supply disruptions.[18] Proximity to the conflict amplified costs for Eastern EU states, with cumulative GDP shortfalls estimated at €200-300 billion across Europe by 2025.[19] All in all, the war's financial toll surpasses $3 trillion combined for Ukraine and its supporters, straining budgets and exacerbating global inequalities.[20] Sustained aid is vital for Ukraine's resilience, but escalating costs underscore the need for diplomatic resolutions to mitigate further economic fallout. To be continued… References [1] Colibășanu, A., Crowther, A., Hickman, J., & Scutaru, G. (2022, September 27). The Strategic Importance of Snake Island. CEPA. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-strategic-importance-of-snake-island/ [2] Cohen, E. A. (2022, March 28). Don’t Let Up Now. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/west-strategy-against-russia-ukraine-war/629387/ [3] Fahim, K., Stern, D. L., Lamothe, D., & Khurshudyan, I. (2022, March 29). Don’t Let Up Now. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/29/ukraine-russia-turkey-negotiations/ [4] Jones, T. (2022, March 30). Optimism, pessimism or skepticism? News outlets focus on the right thing in Russia-Ukraine coverage. Poynter. https://www.poynter.org/commentary/2022/optimism-pessimism-or-skepticism-news-outlets-focus-on-the-right-thing-in-russia-ukraine-coverage/ [5] Haas, B. (2022, March 7). Ukrainians have won the information war. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainians-have-won-the-information-war-historian-margaret-macmillan/a-61022603 [6] Wawrzusiszyn, D. (2022, March 8). To były pomidory, a nie ogórki. Znaleziono Ukrainkę, która strąciła drona słoikiem. Na:Temat. https://natemat.pl/400859,znaleziono-ukrainke-ktora-stracila-drona-sloikiem-z-ogorkami [7] Zaluzhnyi, V. (2025, November 29). Politics and War. Reality vs Expectations. LIGA.Net. https://www.liga.net/en/politics/opinion/politics-and-war-reality-vs-expectations#comment-list-4601543 [8] Ukraine. (2025, December 9). World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/ukraine [9] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [10] Samoiliuk, M. (2025, December 8). Ukraine War Economy Tracker. Centre For Economic Strategy. https://ces.org.ua/en/tracker-economy-during-the-war/ [11] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war [12] Gorodnichenko, Y., & Vasudevan, V. (2025, July 27). The (projected) cost of Russian aggression. CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/projected-cost-russian-aggression [13] Davis Jr., E., & Wolf, C. (2025, March 11). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. U.S.News. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/these-countries-have-committed-the-most-aid-to-ukraine [14] U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. (2025, March 12). U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine [15] EU Assistance to Ukraine (in U.S. Dollars). (2025, November 19). Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253 [16] Mills, C. (2025, July 17). Military assistance to Ukraine (February 2022 to January 2025). UK Parliament. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9477/ [17] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [18] Jenkins, B. M. (2023, March 7). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout. European Commission. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html [19] The cost of EU Member States’ proximity to the war. (2025, November 17). European Commission. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/cost-eu-member-states-proximity-war_en [20] Rogoff, K. (2025, December 9). The Long-lasting Economic Shock of War. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2022/03/the-long-lasting-economic-shock-of-war

The recently released Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has upended what had been the decades-long consensus about American foreign policy. Most notable in it is the Trump Administration’s prioritization of the Western Hemisphere as an American security concern, its deemphasis on defending America’s traditional European allies, its identification of China as far more of a threat than Russia, and its determination not to be drawn into conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. But while the 2025 Trump Administration National Security Strategy breaks with much of previous American foreign policy, the logic behind it is not something completely new. Even though the document makes no mention of him, the policy outlined in the NSS comports with what John Mearsheimer described in his influential book, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, which was first published in 2001 and updated in 2014. In his book Mearsheimer declared that no nation has ever achieved global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer, America is the only country that has achieved predominant influence in its own region (the Western Hemisphere) and has also been able to prevent any other great power from dominating any other region. Mearsheimer wrote, “States that achieve regional hegemony seek to prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers” (2014 edition, p. 41). Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy has, whether knowingly or not, adopted these aims as well. It discusses the various regions of the world in the order of their priority for the Trump Administration: the Western Hemisphere first, followed by Asia (or Indo-Pacific), Europe, the Middle East, and lastly Africa. With regard to the Western Hemisphere, the NSS unambiguously calls for the restoration of “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” and states, “We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” This is very much in keeping with what Mearsheimer described as America being a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. As for the other four regions of the world, though, the Trump Administration seeks either to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant — or it doesn’t see this as a possibility that needs to be worried about. According to the NSS, the Middle East was a priority in the past because it was the world’s most important energy supplier and was a prime theater of superpower conflict. Now, however, there are other energy suppliers (including the U.S.) and superpower competition has been replaced by “great power jockeying” in which the U.S. retains “the most enviable position.” In other words: the Trump Administration does not see any other great power as able to become predominant in this region which is now less strategically important than it used to be anyway. Similarly, the NSS does not see any other great power as even seeking to become predominant in Africa. The NSS thus sees America’s main interests there as mainly commercial. By contrast, China is seen as a threat in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS, though, discusses Chinese threats in the economic and technological spheres before turning to the military one. A continued U.S. military presence in the region is seen as important for preventing Chinese predominance. But Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia are all enjoined by the NSS to increase their defense spending in order to counter this threat. The NSS also identifies “the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea” as a common threat that not only requires investment in U.S. military capabilities, “but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond.” Unlike the Middle East and Africa, then, the NSS does identify a rival great power as striving for predominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Countering it, though, is not seen as just being America’s responsibility, but also that of other powerful states in the region. The strangest section in the 2025 NSS is the one on Europe. While acknowledging that “many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat,” the NSS envisions America’s role as “managing European relations with Russia” both to “reestablish conditions of strategic stability” and “to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.” This is very different from the decades-long U.S. policy of seeing America’s role as defending democratic Europe against an expansionist Soviet Union in the past and Putin’s Russia more recently. Indeed, the NSS’s claim that the European Union undermines “political liberty and sovereignty” and its welcoming “the growing influence of patriotic European parties” (in other words, anti-EU right wing nationalist ones) suggests that it is not Russia which the Trump Administration sees as a rival, but the European Union. The 2025 NSS does call for a “strong Europe…to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.” The NSS, though, seems to envision the European Union as either greater than or equal to Russia in threatening to dominate European nations. In his book, Mearsheimer did not envision the European Union as a potential great power rival to the U.S. Indeed, there isn’t even an entry for it in the book’s index. The way that the NSS envisions the world, though, comports with how Mearsheimer described America’s great power position: predominant in the Western Hemisphere and able to prevent any other great power from becoming predominant in any other region of the world. Mearsheimer, though, is a scholar who described the position in the world that he saw the U.S. as having achieved and which would seek to maintain. The 2025 NSS, by contrast, is a policy document laying out how the Trump Administration believes it can best maintain this position. And there is reason to doubt that it has done so realistically. Keeping non-Hemispheric great powers out of the Western Hemisphere will not be easy when there are governments there that want to cooperate with them. Further, devoting American resources to being predominant in Latin America when this will be resented and resisted could not only take away from America’s ability to prevent rival great powers from becoming predominant in other regions, but could counterproductively lead Latin American nations than have already done so to increase their cooperation with external great powers which the Trump Administration wants to avoid. Further, the Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the influence of the European Union runs two risks: the first is that such an effort will succeed, but that the rise of anti-EU nationalist governments throughout the old continent results in a Europe less able to resist Russian manipulation and incursion. The second is that Trump Administration efforts to weaken the European Union backfire and result not only in a Europe united against American interference but unnecessarily emerging as a rival to the U.S. It would be ironic indeed if pursuing the NSS’s plan for upholding what Mearsheimer described as America’s ability to predominate over the Western Hemisphere combined with an ability to prevent any rival from predominating over any other region ended up undermining America’s ability to do either.

According to the IEA by 2024, more than 20% of new cars sold worldwide were electric, exceeding 17 million and positioning China as the leader in the market with more than 11 million sales. In comparison, the European and US markets also saw a growth in the sector, but not comparable to the Chinese counterpart. Figure 1: Global EV sales, 2014-2024. Source (IEA, 2025) Figure 2: EVs registrations share in China, US and Europe: 2018-2023. Source: IEA, 2025. On the other hand, autonomous vehicles, whose market value size was estimated at USD 68.09 billion in 2024, are also trending worldwide, North America being the largest market in 2024 (market share of 37.1% and passenger vehicles leading the market with 69% of the global revenue), while the Asia Pacific region is the fastest-growing market. Figure 3: Autonomous Vehicle Market. Source: Grand View Research. (Grand View Research, 2025) Recently, despite the data and market share, discussions and analysis of the vehicle industry have moved into new concerns related to security risks, trade protectionism and unfair competition. Why? Because the vehicle industry has evolved and adopted new technologies, at the same time, concerns have shifted accordingly. These changes have relied on or prioritized human convenience and connectivity over everything else. A New Security Paradigm for Mobility: Are Connected Cars Data Weapons A simple answer is no, but there are elements that can change the answer into a yes in the future. Vehicles are evolving into connected machines, with software-driven platforms, sensors, cameras, connectivity modules and AI systems. Thus, the vehicle industry is entering a new era where data is key, and whoever controls it, is likely to control the market itself. As mentioned before, vehicle-related security risks have sparked discussions in recent years. Nowadays, practically any vehicle sold has a certain degree of connectivity, naturally this leads to a continuous and massive collection of information (sensitive or not), including for example: real-time location, driving patterns, biometric data, audio recordings, images from the Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) and more. For common people this might pass unnoticed but for governments, the fact of collecting and storing data or having the possibility to do so has become a critical point and a threat to their national security. After all, fear is real, and the more connected a vehicle is, the higher the chances that it can become a surveillance device, for example. The speculations can grow as much as our/their imagination leaves them, but after all, security risks and fear related to them exist. In line with the security risks, the possibility of software backdoors hidden in operating systems or telematic units is another possibility. Naturally, if exploited this possibility, these vulnerabilities could allow a remote shutdown of vehicles or fleets, manipulation of navigation systems or even data extraction could occur. In simple terms, this could open the door to cyberattacks, including the potential loss of control of a vehicle. Once again, the possibility of these ideas has reshaped and changed the paradigm of connected vehicles Actual measures and global regulatory trends As governments start recognizing these security threats associated with connected vehicles, many have begun implementing several regulations to protect their national security. For instance, the UK, Israel, the USA and the EU are among the most active actors. One of the branches of the economic war between the US and China is exactly the mobility industry, the fierce competition between both nations has tightened the nationalist policies of President Trump, in fact the US has rapidly adopted a national-security lens for automotive imports. There have been discussions in Congress and even the Commerce Department has proposed rules allowing Washington to prohibit connected car technologies linked to foreign adversaries. In addition, there is huge pressure over the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), specifically in the encouragement to revise the vehicles entering the US and the promotion of US vehicle-manufacturing companies. For those reasons, the US had imposed tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles (from 25% up to 100% on 2024 during Biden’s administration and later a 35.5% extra tariff on Chinese-made EVs) and had set several rules in line with the USMCA, to limit or protect the American market from Chinese vehicles, as it argued that China is taking advantage of the USMCA by using Mexico or Canada as the entry points to the American market, avoiding tariffs and minimizing costs. According to experts, this Chinese circumvention of US tariffs can occur in three main ways. First through transshipment – products enter Canada or Mexico and then they are shipped to the USA. The second way is by incorporating the Chinese products into the North American supply chains. And the third way is through direct Chinese investments in manufacturing facilities in Mexico or Canada. At the same time, across the Atlantic the EU has also been working on tightening regulations through the Cyber Resilience Act, as well as strengthening the General Safety Regulations, both focusing on the application of rigorous standards to vehicle cybersecurity, data governance, and supply-chain transparency. Also in Europe, recently, a British newspaper reported that military and intelligence chiefs had been ordered not to discuss official business while riding in EVs, and cars with Chinese components had been banned from sensitive military sites. In addition, the former head of the intelligence service MI6 claimed that Chinese-made technology, including cars, could be controlled and programmed remotely. Consequently, the UK has begun evaluating supply chains for hidden dependencies in infotainment systems, telematics, and semiconductors. In the same line, Israel has adopted rigid measures, the Israeli army has begun withdrawing Chinese-made vehicles from officers, citing espionage concerns. Other measures implemented include auditing imported vehicles to ensure no remote-access pathways existence, plus the encouragement of local automakers and tech firms to develop secure telematics modules to minimize foreign reliance. What is China’s role in this new paradigm? To understand the role of China in the EVs and connected vehicles is important to highlight the low labor costs in China, coupled with government subsidies and a well-structured and established supply chain, these three factors gave the Chinese firms huge advantages over their competitors. However, those are not the only factors involved in the equation, the promotion of EVs over internal combustion vehicles and the adoption and development of technologies that turn “simple” vehicles into connected vehicles are important to mention too. All these factors have been well capitalized by Chinese firms, in consequence, China has become the world’s largest EV exporter and somehow a threat for the West. As mentioned throughout the article, the security risks have sparked discussions and concerns, and it is fair, as Chinese-made vehicles have become competitive and technologically well-connected, much, that nowadays are in conditions to fight for the global automotive market. Therefore, there is a clear sense of concern among Western governments, especially in conditions of a politicized world that we live in nowadays. Naturally Beijing argues that bans and investigations on their Chinese-made vehicles are forms of economic protectionism and rejects any claims related to espionage, data leaks or misuse. While, it has also responded by tightening its own domestic rules: foreign vehicles are prohibited from accessing sensitive regions, including areas near government buildings and military facilities. Benefits and challenges for other key players and global automakers Automakers from Korea, Japan or the European and American are being directly benefited from the rising Chinese scrutiny of connected cars, meaning that new export and investment opportunities could be achieved by them. If these countries can materialize transparent software supply chains, strong cybersecurity frameworks, and local data-storage compliance, their advantage would increase. Specifically Korean and Japanese firms – which are proven reliable players with a strong presence worldwide and strengths in battery technology and infotainment systems –, can position themselves as trusted suppliers in those markets that are worried about Chinese-made vehicles and their possible espionage or security risks. On the other hand, however, there are big challenges ahead. If each country or region decides to have proper regulations, major hurdles will appear. For example; compliance costs will rise as automakers must meet different cybersecurity rules across regions; the technology surrounding software auditing, and the transparency of the supply chains itself will require significant investments; the supply chain and design of vehicles will be affected and in consequence production cost will increase; and, if there are different digital standards or rules, it is likely that there could be some limitations in the global interoperability. Conclusions While the rapid growth of EVs worldwide can be considered a good sign for sustainability goals – as they displaced over 1 million barrels per day of oil consumption in 2024 –. Recently there have appeared certain concerns related to security risks – proven or not – trade protectionism and unfair competition. On top of that, the transformation of cars into fully connected digital platforms has created a new paradigm, in which certain nations – mostly western nations – have started to be worried and rethinking their mobility through the lens of national security. In consequence, governments have tightened rules related to data, cybersecurity and foreign software dependencies. This new vision is already changing and transforming the vehicle industry, while the most affected, being the Chinese firms – due the natural competition and geopolitical reasons – there are other global automakers that, if they take the chance, could become key players – as far as they prioritize transparency in supply chains, security and technological trust. The new paradigm has shifted what used to be an ordinary, everyday product into a critical national infrastructure that must be subject to regulation. Finally, this paradigm also highlights the importance of data sovereignty and how important it has become and will be in the future. Referencias Carey, N. (2025, December 2). China floods the world with gasoline cars it can't sell at home. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/china-floods-world-with-gasoline-cars-it-cant-sell-home-2025-12-02/ European Commision. (2025, March 5). Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector . Retrieved from European Commision: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en Financial Post. (2025, December 11). Why China's EVs are dangerous to Canada: CVMA. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WV7bn29lpOQ Grand View Research. (2025). Autonomous Vehicle Market (2025 - 2030). Retrieved from Grand View Research: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/autonomous-vehicles-market IEA. (2025). Trends in electric car markets. Retrieved from IEA: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2 Introvigne, M. (2024, February 6). Should Chinese Electric Cars Be Banned in the West? Retrieved from Bitter Winter: https://bitterwinter.org/should-chinese-electric-cars-be-banned-in-the-west/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=11726773838&gbraid=0AAAAAC6C3PdZ9Jx_edcTzlW0hHoO8yN2D&gclid=CjwKCAiA3L_JBhAlEiwAlcWO59TNJrosoZkG7MwAid0bRuGKs5KY0P7csiXimfUzLlbYshtFMafkdxoCqvQQAvD_Bw Leggett, T. (2025, June 10). China's electric cars are becoming slicker and cheaper - but is there a deeper cost? Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8d4v69jw6o Meltzer, J. P., & Barron Esper, M. (2025, September 23). Is China circumventing US tariffs via Mexico and Canada? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/#:~:text=Chinese%20intermediate%20goods%20used%20in,to%20the%20production%20of%20new Navarrete, F. (2024, May 21). Aranceles de EU a autos chinos ponen en aprietos a México. Retrieved from El Financiero: https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/2024/05/21/aranceles-de-eu-a-autos-chinos-ponen-en-aprietos-a-mexico/ Oertel, J. (2024, January 25). European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/: https://ecfr.eu/article/security-recall-the-risk-of-chinese-electric-vehicles-in-europe/ Radio biafra. (2025). Fearing data leaks, Israel bans Chinese-made cars for army officers. Retrieved from Radio biafra: https://radiobiafra.co/ Schuman, M. (2025, November). China’s EV Market Is Imploding. Retrieved from The Atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2025/11/china-electric-cars-market/684887/ Zhang, Z. (2025, December 4). China’s EV dominance sparks EU retaliation. Retrieved from East Asia Forum: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/04/chinas-ev-dominance-sparks-eu-retaliation/

With its fragmented production process, European defence procurement is inefficient and uncompetitive in comparison to the United States. A new approach, prioritising cross-country collaborations, could improve things, but would not be without its own challenges. Introduced in March 2024, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) forms the centrepiece of European Defence Industrial Policy. The strategy aims to strengthen the competitiveness and readiness of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through greater inter-state collaboration. It includes some ambitious targets, all of which are designed to allocate more resources to the EDTIB. For example, by 2030 the goal is for 50% of defence procurement budgets and at least 40% of defence equipment procurement to come through collaboration. There is also a designated €1.5 billion budget for European defence industry ‘readiness’. The background to all of this is British and European rearmament (readiness), largely in response to the increasing threat of Russia (following its acquisition of Crimea and its illegal military operations in Ukraine). European defence spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €381 billion in 2025. Figure 1 shows 2024 defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) by European country. Taking 2% as a target, Italy, Spain and Portugal are below the threshold. Poland – which shares a border with war-torn Ukraine – spent more than double the target last year, at 4.15%. At the same time, last year Russia spent an estimated 7.05% of its GDP on ‘defence’. Figure 1: European defence spending as a share of GDP, 2024. Source: NATO & SIPRI. Note: NATO members have agreed a new benchmark for defence spending, targeting 5% of GDP by 2035. How do inefficiencies in the European defence market affect spending? Inefficiencies within the European defence market shape spending patterns. For example, there are cases of duplication of defence R&D, fragmented national defence markets, ‘off-the-shelf’ procurement from non-EU suppliers, and a general failure to exploit economies of scale and learning. Compared with the US market, for instance, Europe is neither efficient nor competitive. This inefficiency is reflected in Europe producing three different types of combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the French Rafale and the Swedish Gripen. Each type supplies national and export markets: 782 Typhoons, 710 Rafales, and 369 Gripen aircraft had been ordered or delivered as of October 2025. So, if each European nation had agreed to buy one type of combat aircraft, total output would have been around 1,800 units. Common procurement would also have reduced production costs by an estimated 10-20%. In contrast, the American F-35 combat aircraft has a total planned output of 3,556 units – almost twice the total for Europe. What about sixth-generation aircraft? The sixth-generation fighter aircraft market already looks highly competitive. By 2027, Europe plans to build the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS), with France, Germany and Spain all taking part in the project. At the same time, the UK is developing the Tempest combat aircraft jointly with Italy and Japan, with the first flight also due in 2027. Meanwhile, across the pond, in March 2025, the United States announced that Boeing would be developing the F-47 Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter. It is designed to replace the F-22 aircraft, with the first flight planned in 2028. There have already been 185 orders. For public policy purposes, there are questions as to whether Europe can afford to fund two similar combat aircraft projects. In one sense, the answer must be that Europe and the UK can afford to pay the price of having two separate independent developments. Even so, there are other policy options (with differing costs). On the one hand, European countries could collaborate further and undertake the project with great cost-sharing. On the other hand, they could simply buy American aircraft. Further collaboration is economically and politically attractive. Economically, more nations joining a project would lead to greater sharing regarding R&D and the pooling of production orders. But this assumes all else remains unchanged – which is unlikely. Further collaboration is costly, as each partner nation demands its share of high technology on the project – namely, a share of the advances in airframe, engine and avionics (aviation-specific electronics), and duplicate flight test centres. Similarly, partners will each demand a share of the production work, leading to duplicate final assembly lines and adding to total costs (although these could still be less than a national-level initiative would cost). At the same time, and perhaps most importantly, more collaborative partnerships could lead to cost sharing and cost savings. This is likely to mean lower prices for each partner nation compared with an independent, single-nation solution. But problems can also come from further collaboration. The number of partner nations will rise from three to six, increasing transaction costs. More difficult will be the process of selecting the ‘winning project’ and the inevitable ‘national champion’ – namely, a choice between BAE Systems in the UK and Dassault of France. In an ideal world, sharing design work between two world-class firms should produce an outstanding design. But in reality, the outcome is likely to be a compromise, with equal sharing of development work on the aircraft, which might not be an efficient solution. Even so, some inefficiencies are the price of further collaboration. An alternative solution would be for European governments to buy American units. The options here are to buy off-the-shelf, either completely or with some form of ‘offset’ (a type of compensation arrangement made between a supplier and the purchasing government) offering varying amounts of work to the importing nation. Again, these options involve different benefits and costs. For example, direct imports involve foreign currency payments while an offset provides some jobs and the retention of domestic industrial capability for the importing nation. Another possibility is a negotiation similar to the F-35, where the UK was a ‘level 1 partner’ with a 15% share of the programme. A similar deal might be negotiated for the purchase of the US F-47, with the UK enjoying similar benefits. Where next in an ideal world for European defence? European defence industrial policy must address the choice of the next-generation combat aircraft. A simple solution would be to continue with the FCAS and UK-led Tempest projects as separate independent ventures. But the new EDIS framework, with its commitment to European solutions, suggests a better option would be to seek a new collaboration between the FCAS and Tempest. These seem like similar aircraft, and creating a new collaboration involving six partner nations could be beneficial. Such a collaboration would offer cost savings in both R&D and production. Fixed R&D costs would be shared between six nations rather than three, and production orders would be considerably increased (possibly even doubled). This could allow for further economies of scale and learning, and at least a 10% unit cost savings (PwC, 2021; Mueller, 2025). Indeed, production numbers for the FCAS have been estimated at 200-300 units and a merger with the Tempest could double this to 400-600 units (Mueller, 2025). There would, however, still be transaction costs associated with the six-part collaboration. This is not a unique problem. For example, the Airbus Atlas military transport aircraft is a seven-nation collaboration, and the Eurofighter Typhoon involves four partner countries. Conclusion A possible merger between the FCAS and Tempest programmes might be a way forward for both projects. It would create a large military-industrial-political complex whose true economic benefits and costs would still need to be assessed. It would also be a centrepiece of the new European defence industrial policy, and might attract new export customers from the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. A more ambitious target is the formation of a European Army, Navy and Air Force. But this would require a single European decision-making mechanism replacing the current arrangement of individual European Member States. It would allow common procurement policies and large-scale purchasing for land, sea and air weapons. This is certainly a long run dream but could be one worth pursuing. Removing the inefficiencies in European defence markets described above by creating a single European market for defence equipment could create substantial gains, both economically and in terms of security.

Introduction An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft system (UAS), commonly known as drone, is an aircraft without a human pilot, crew or passenger on board, but rather controlled remotely or autonomously. Drones can be seen as cutting-edge technologies with tremendous ramifications across various fields, including military, security, economics, and logistics – ranging from lightweight consumer drones to advanced autonomous combat platforms – that have transformed global security economics and technological developments. Their proliferation marks a shift in the conduct of warfare, industrial processes, and urban infrastructure design. In this context, this article aims to analyze these dynamics across three domains: geopolitical and security implications, economics and industrial processes, and future technological transformation. I. Geopolitical and Security Perspective: "Game Changers" The Dawn of the Unmanned Warfare Era The past decade — and especially during the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Caucasus —has showcased an irreversible shift toward unmanned warfare. Low-cost drones have enabled nations and non-state actors to conduct reconnaissance, precision strikes, and electronic warfare at a fraction of traditional military costs. The democratization of drone warfare erodes conventional military hierarchies by giving smaller nations and even non-state groups asymmetric capabilities (Kania, 2020), (Vision of Humanity, 2024). Figure 1: Use of drones by type. A major consequence of this shift is the emergence of continuous aerial presence, which fundamentally alters operational rhythm and tempo. Previously, only major powers could afford persistent surveillance through manned aircraft or satellites. Today, even insurgent groups can deploy swarms of commercial drones to maintain near-constant observation of enemy movements. This constant presence of drones on the battlefield forces militaries to make decisions much faster and operate as if they are always being watched. As drone technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, it also becomes easier for states or groups to launch low-risk, hard-to-trace attacks without putting their own people in danger. This reduces the barrier to starting or escalating conflicts and makes the overall situation far more unpredictable. On the other hand, despite automation, drone warfare remains heavily dependent on human adaptation, moreover, in practice, drones’ use is constrained by weather, terrain, and limited night capability (Newton, 2025). Nonetheless, and as seen in the Ukraine War, the adaptation, development and improvement of the designs and systems have skyrocketed and shortened from months to weeks. A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare Traditional doctrines built around armored vehicles, manned aircraft, and centralized command structures are giving way to distributed, networked, and automated operations. Drones allow for constant ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), rapid kill chains, and battlefield transparency that reduces the effectiveness of concealment and mass maneuver (Biddle & Oelrich, 2016). Swarm technology further accelerates this shift by overwhelming air defenses through algorithmic coordination. On a broader strategic level, unmanned systems are transforming operational art, forcing militaries to rethink how they structure campaigns. Instead of relying on a small number of high-value manned platforms, modern forces must integrate thousands of expendable, semi-autonomous assets into a coherent command-and-control ecosystem. This shift elevates the importance of data fusion, algorithms, and electronic warfare, as success increasingly depends on which side can process information more effectively rather than which side has heavier armor or more firepower. Furthermore, the psychological effects of drone warfare — constant monitoring, unpredictable strikes, and the invisibility of operators — alter the morale and behavior of both soldiers and civilians. In this sense, unmanned warfare not only changes tactics but reshapes the human dimension of conflict. Evolution of Defense Strategies States now are prioritizing anti-drone systems (C-UAS), electronic warfare, and resilient supply chains. Defense strategies emphasize dispersion, decoys, deception, and multi-layered air defense, recognizing that the cost ratio favors attackers using cheap drones against expensive assets. Militaries increasingly incorporate AI-enabled targeting, autonomous perimeter defense, and drone-versus-drone combat (Mehta, 2022). The rapid evolution of offensive drone capabilities has forced governments to pursue a new generation of integrated counter-unmanned systems, blending kinetic interceptors, directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency jamming, and cyber tools. However, the challenge is not merely technological — it is organizational. Modern militaries must revise procurement cycles, adopt flexible doctrine, and restructure units to counter the fast-changing drone threat. For example, some nations are creating dedicated “drone defense battalions” or embedding electronic warfare teams at lower echelons of command. Once more the Ukraine War is a good example: Ukraine’s early-warning systems (so called, “drone walls”) use layered reconnaissance UAVs to identify threats and enhance battlefield visibility, unfortunately, these are highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar destruction. More examples include the fiber-optic FPV drones as countermeasure of jamming, or decoy drones to lure air defenses and absorb munitions. (Newton, 2025) The rise of drone warfare also places huge demand on secure communications and resilient digital infrastructure; adversaries increasingly target supply chains, software vulnerabilities, and satellite links that control unmanned systems. Thus, the evolution of defense strategies represents a multi-domain effort that spans hardware, software, organizational culture, and national-level industrial capacity. Major Countries' Competition in Drone Weapon Development The United States, China, Israel, Turkey, and Iran dominate the global drone arms race, while Russia and Ukraine deserve a special mention too. • USA: it focuses on high-tech autonomous systems, for example the MQ-25, Collaborative Combat Aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Aviation Administration they have an estimated 822,039 drones registered as of July 2025. (FAA, 2025)• China: leads in export volume, offering cost-competitive platforms like the Wing Loong series (Fischer, 2020).• Turkey: gained strategic influence through the Bayraktar TB2, proven in multiple regional conflicts like the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 or its use for strategic communications for Ukraine during the ongoing conflict. (Péria-Peigné, 2023)• Israel: its research, development and production of innovative drone technology and exports roughly $500 million worth of UAV-related products per year, have positioned Israel as a world leader in the area. Israel is well known for its indigenous and competitive manufacturing UAVs like the Hermes 450, the Searcher Mk II and the Heron. (Sadot, s.f.)• Iran: their Shahed-136 drone is a low-cost drone that has gained attention internationally as it has shown affordability, precision, long-range, and cheapness during the Ukraine War – deployed by Russia. (Kesteloo, 2025)• Ukraine: has emerged as a leader in tactical warfare, including mass quantities of low-cost First-Person View (FPV) drones for frontline and deep-strike operations. But also, it has implemented “Spider’s Web” operations, which strike deep inside Russia, while using low-cost assets but with strategic and punctual strikes. Ukraine has also expanded into the maritime domain with unmanned surface vessels (USVs) using them with a kamikaze-style operation targeting ships and critical offshore infrastructure in the Black Sea. (Newton, 2025)• Russia: the war has institutionalized an UAV doctrine with mass deployment of FPV drones (Newton, 2025) and the creation – similar to Ukraine – of an Unmanned System Force (USF) aiming to encompass aerial, land and surface drones. (Altman, 2025) II. Economic & Industrial Perspective: “Flying Industrial Revolution” Future Logistics and Delivery Systems Beyond the battlefield, drones are reshaping global economies and enabling new industrial ecosystems. For instance, drones are rapidly transforming last-mile delivery by reducing transportation time, bypassing road congestion, and enabling access to remote or disaster-affected areas. Companies like Amazon, Wing, and Zipline have already demonstrated how unmanned aircraft can deliver medical supplies, parcels, and consumer goods more efficiently than traditional vehicles. As autonomous navigation, battery technology, and payload capacity continue to improve, drones are expected to become critical components of global supply chains, especially in regions where infrastructure is limited or demand for ultra-fast delivery is increasing. Global drone delivery is expected to reach multi-billion-dollar scale by 2030 (PwC, 2023). In the longer term, logistics networks are expected to evolve into hybrid ground–air systems, where drones work alongside autonomous ground vehicles and smart warehouses. These systems could drastically reduce operational costs by automating pickup, sorting, and delivery processes. Integrating drones with AI-driven inventory management and predictive delivery algorithms will allow companies to anticipate demand and route products dynamically. As eVTOL cargo aircraft mature, the concept of “airborne logistics hubs” may also emerge, enabling rapid long-distance transport between distribution centers without the need for airports. Together, these developments point toward a future where aerial logistics are not just an add-on, but a central pillar of modern supply chains. Improving Industrial Efficiency Across agriculture, energy, construction, and mining drones significantly improve efficiency by automating tasks that previously required expensive equipment or manual labor. By replacing manned inspection systems, drones can reduce labor costs, increase safety, and provide data of unprecedented detail (McKinsey, 2022). For example, farmers use drones for precision spraying and crop monitoring, reducing fertilizer and water usage. Energy companies deploy unmanned systems for pipeline inspections and powerline surveys, minimizing downtime and enhancing worker safety. Construction and mining firms rely on drones for site mapping, progress tracking, and 3D modeling, improving project accuracy while lowering operational costs. Beyond task automation, drones are becoming essential to data-driven industrial optimization. Equipped with thermal sensors, LiDAR, and multispectral cameras, unmanned systems can capture high-resolution data that feeds directly into AI analytics platforms. This allows companies to detect inefficiencies, predict equipment failure, and optimize resource allocation in real time. As industries move toward digital twins — virtual models of physical assets — drones will play a key role in continuously updating these systems with accurate spatial and environmental data. The result is a more responsive, efficient, and resilient industrial ecosystem that leverages aerial automation for competitive advantage. Regulatory Environment and Market Growth Regulation remains the single most influential factor shaping the global drone market. Governments are gradually introducing frameworks to enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Remote ID tracking, and certification standards for commercial drones. Regions like the European Union have adopted unified risk-based rules through EASA, while the United States continues to refine its Part 107 and UTM integration policies through the FAA. These regulatory milestones are essential for scaling commercial drone usage, as they provide clarity to manufacturers, operators, and investors. As regulatory frameworks mature, they are also becoming a competitive advantage for regions that adopt them early. Countries that implement drone-friendly ecosystems — such as Singapore, the UAE, and Rwanda — are rapidly emerging as hubs for drone research, testing, and deployment. This regulatory momentum encourages multinational companies to establish operations in these markets, accelerating local innovation and talent development. Furthermore, harmonized international standards will make it easier for drone manufacturers to reduce production complexity and expand globally. Ultimately, the pace of market growth will depend not just on technological advancement but on how effectively governments balance innovation with safety, privacy, and public acceptance. Investment Trends Investment in drone-related technologies has surged, driven by the convergence of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. Venture capital firms increasingly fund companies developing autonomous navigation systems, UTM software, battery technology, and specialized industrial drones. Defense investors continue to expand their portfolios into dual-use drone companies, reflecting growing geopolitical interest and national security incentives. Meanwhile, major tech firms and automotive companies are exploring opportunities in cargo drones, eVTOL aircraft, and autonomous mobility ecosystems. Beyond private investment, government funding and public–private partnerships are accelerating drone adoption globally. Many nations are launching test corridors, innovation hubs, and subsidies to attract drone startups and support local manufacturing. This trend is particularly strong in Asia and the Middle East, where governments see drones as strategic tools for digital transformation and economic diversification. As markets mature, investment is shifting from hardware-heavy startups toward software, analytics, and integrated airspace management solutions — reflecting a broader transition from drone manufacturing to drone ecosystems. This shift signals a long-term, sustainable evolution of the drone industry from early experimental phases to full-scale commercial and civil integration. III. Future Technologies The Need for Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) As drones and future eVTOL air taxis multiply, low-altitude airspace will become increasingly crowded. To prevent collisions and maintain order, UTM frameworks — already being developed by NASA, the FAA, EASA, and ICAO — aim to coordinate autonomous flights using real-time tracking, automated route planning, and digital air corridors (Kopardekar, 2016). These systems will act as the “air-traffic control of the future,” but designed for far larger numbers of smaller, faster-moving vehicles. In addition, as demand grows, it is likely that UTM will evolve into a fully automated, AI-driven airspace ecosystem capable of managing thousands of simultaneous flights with minimal human oversight. Future systems could incorporate weather prediction, dynamic rerouting, and AI-powered detect-and-avoid features, which more than a technical upgrade, would transform the air mobility in the cities worldwide. Global Standardization Competition The need for standard UTM, drone certifications, communication systems, and detect-and-avoid technology is critical, but it also represents a geopolitical contest. The U.S., the European Union, and China are each developing distinct technological ecosystems, hoping their standards will dominate global markets. Whichever region’s standards become the international norm will shape supply chains, aircraft design, and regulatory practices for decades. This competition mirrors earlier battles over telecommunications and 5G. Nations that establish widely adopted drone standards will gain strategic advantages, including influence over global manufacturing, software ecosystems, and aviation governance. As a result, UTM and drone certification are no longer just technical debates — they have become instruments of national power, economic leverage and somehow geopolitical importance. Urban Safety and Privacy Issues In addition, another major concern for cities is the widespread adoption of drones itself, which translates into surveillance risks, noise pollution from frequent flights, and vulnerability to cyberattacks that could compromise flight controls. Therefore, urban areas need strict rules governing data collection, flight paths, and liability in case of accidents to maintain public trust and safety. In the future, cities will also require integrated emergency response protocols, stronger cybersecurity defenses, and digital identity systems for all unmanned aircraft. Public engagement and transparent oversight will play a major role in ensuring that drones enhance urban life without creating new forms of intrusion or risk. Managing these challenges will be essential for the successful adoption of unmanned urban mobility. Integration with Future Urban Infrastructure In line with the previous section, smart cities could incorporate drones into their core infrastructure. For example, vertiports, rooftop landing pads, sensor-equipped air corridors, and digital twins could enable efficient navigation and real-time monitoring. In addition, drones will become essential for urban mobility and public services – from medical or any goods deliveries to emergency response like fire unit responses. As cities evolve, this integration will create a hybrid transportation ecosystem, where ground vehicles, aerial drones, and automated control systems would operate in sync. Urban planning will increasingly consider airspace as a valuable layer of infrastructure, much like roads or power grids. Therefore, collaboration between governments, industry, and technology providers to design cities capable of supporting high-density autonomous air mobility is required. Conclusion Unmanned systems are redefining the global balance of power, transforming industrial processes, and reshaping urban futures. The convergence of autonomy, AI, and networked airspace introduces both unprecedented opportunity and profound risk. Geopolitically, drones dilute traditional military dominance; economically, they catalyze a new airborne industrial revolution; technologically, they push societies toward complex management of shared automated airspace. Future policy, regulation, and innovation will determine whether unmanned systems become drivers of prosperity or vectors of instability. References Altman, H. (2025, November 13). Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare. The War Zone (TWZ). https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-creates-new-military-branch-dedicated-to-drone-warfare Amazon. (2023). Prime Air: The Future of Drone Delivery. Amazon Corporate Publications. Biddle, S., & Oelrich, I. (2016). Future Warfare in the Age of Drones. Council on Foreign Relations. Deloitte. (2022). Drones in Industrial Operations: Transforming Asset Inspection and Performance. Deloitte Insights. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2023). Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System. U.S. Department of Transportation. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration). (2025). Drones. https://www.faa.gov/uas Fischer, S. (2020). China’s Military–Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Washington. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kania, E. B. (2020). Learning Warfare from the Laboratory: China’s Progress in Military Innovation. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Kesteloo, H. (2025, September 29). Global Military Drone Race Intensifies as Nations Rush to Copy Iran’s Shahed Design. Medium. https://medium.com/@hayekesteloo/global-military-drone-race-intensifies-as-nations-rush-to-copy-irans-shahed-design-404badf482fb Kopardekar, P. (2016). Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations. NASA Ames Research Center. McKinsey & Company. (2022). The Commercial Drone Market Outlook: Insights on Market Growth, Industrial Adoption, and Regulation. McKinsey Robotics & Automation Practice. Mehta, A. (2022). Counter-Drone Systems and the Future of Air Defense. Defense News. Newton, M. (2025, November 3). How Are Drones Changing War? The Future of the Battlefield. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). https://cepa.org/article/how-are-drones-changing-war-the-future-of-the-battlefield/ Péria-Peigné, L. (2023, April 17). TB2 Bayraktar: Big Strategy for a Little Drone. IFRI. https://www.ifri.org/en/memos/tb2-bayraktar-big-strategy-little-drone PwC. (2023). Clarity from Above: Global Drone Market Analysis. PwC Global. Roland Berger. (2022). Urban Air Mobility: The Rise of the Drone Economy. Roland Berger Strategy Consultants. Rwanda Civil Aviation Authority. (2021). Regulatory Framework for Drone Delivery and BVLOS Operations. Government of Rwanda. Sadot, U. (n.d.). Proliferated Drones: A Perspective on Israel. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-israel/ Schmidt, E., Work, R., & Clyburn, M. (2021). Final Report: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. U.S. Government Printing Office. Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Penguin Books. Statista. (2023). Global Drone Market Value and Investment Trends. Statista Market Outlook. Vision of Humanity. (2024, June 13). How Drones Have Shaped the Nature of Conflict. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/how-drones-have-shaped-the-nature-of-conflict/ Wing (Alphabet). 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Drug trafficking is the illegal trade, in large quantities, of drugs or narcotics (RAE, 2025). However, while this definition is accurate, it is insufficient to describe the complexity of a global phenomenon that transcends borders and involves the production, purchase, and distribution of illicit substances. Drug trafficking has developed hand in hand with global trade and interconnection (Saldaña, 2024). In other words, the evolution of drug trafficking is closely linked to globalization, which has strengthened the logistical, technological, and financial networks that enable its expansion. Therefore, more than isolated crime, drug trafficking must be understood as a transnational system of power that feeds on globalization itself. Drug Trafficking as a Transnational System of Power Drug trafficking is described by some authors as a profoundly complex transnational phenomenon resulting from globalization (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). This phenomenon involves and connects global networks of production, logistics, financing, and consumption, all made possible by economic interdependence, information technologies, and established global logistical routes. These authors analyze drug trafficking from a multidimensional perspective, identifying seven interrelated spheres that sustain this activity: the economic (money laundering and investment diversification), institutional (corruption and institutional capture), organizational (organized criminal networks and advanced logistics), social (presence in territories with state vacuums and community legitimization), technological (use of cryptomarkets, encryption, and innovation), geopolitical (route adaptability and resilience against state policies), and cultural (narratives and subcultures that normalize illicit practices) (Luna Galván, Thanh Luong, & Astolfi, 2021). These dimensions form a web of relationships in which criminal groups not only control the flow of drugs but also influence economic and political structures. As Interpol (n.d.) warns, this global network undermines and erodes the political and economic stability of the countries involved, while also fostering corruption and generating irreversible social and health effects. Furthermore, drug trafficking is intertwined with other crimes — such as money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and arms smuggling — thus forming a globalized criminal ecosystem, a global issue and a national security concern for nations worldwide. Origins and historical context There are records of the use of entheogenic drugs for ritual or medicinal purposes in Mesoamerican cultures — such as the Olmecs, Zapotecs, Mayas, and Aztecs (Carod Artal, 2011) — as well as in Peru (Bussmann & Douglas, 2006), the Amazon region, and even today among the Wixárika culture in Mexico (Haro Luna, 2023). Likewise, there was widespread and diverse drug use among the ancient Greeks and Romans, including substances such as mandrake, henbane, belladonna, cannabis, and opium, among others (Pérez González, 2024). However, modern drug trafficking can trace its origins to the First Opium War (1839–1842) between the Chinese Empire (Qing Dynasty) and the British Empire, marking the first international conflict directly linked to the drug trade. During the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, several drugs —such as heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and amphetamines — made their debut in the pharmaceutical field, being used in medicines and therapeutic remedies (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). This period is considered the pharmaceutical revolution, characterized by the emergence of researchers, research centers, and major discoveries in the field. During that time, the term “drug” began to be associated with “addiction.” The pharmaceutical revolution had its epicenter in Germany; however, it was the British and Americans who promoted its expansion (Luna-Fabritius, 2015) and contributed to the normalization of psychoactive substance consumption. Military promotion, use and dependence Armed conflicts — from the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) to the First World War (1914–1918) — played a key role in spreading and promoting the military use of psychoactive substances. For instance, stimulants such as alcohol, cocaine, amphetamines, and methamphetamines were used to combat sleep, reduce fatigue, boost energy, and strengthen courage, while depressants like opium, morphine, and marijuana were used to relieve combat stress and mitigate war trauma (Marco, 2019). The dependence that developed led to a process of expansion among the civilian population, which entered a period of mass experimentation that often resulted in substance abuse and chemical dependency (Courtwright, 2001). In response, the first restrictive laws emerged, particularly in the United States (López-Muñoz & Álamo González, 2020). However, the high demand for certain substances, such as opium, gave rise to the search for markets capable of meeting that demand. Thus, Mexico — influenced by Chinese immigration that introduced the habit of smoking opium in the country — became, by the 1940s, the epicenter of poppy cultivation and opium processing in the region known as the Golden Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). It became the main supplier for drug markets in the United States and other parts of the continent, at times providing up to 90% of the demand during periods of shortage (Sosa, 2025). Even during World War II (1939–1945) — when the traditional supply of heroin and morphine to Europe was disrupted — Mexico strengthened its role in the illicit trade by providing smoking opium and processed morphine or heroin. These developments, alongside the implementation of opiate regulations in Mexico, helped consolidate and structure Mexican drug trafficking, which has persisted for more than sixty years (Sosa, 2025). Social expansion and regulatory restrictions The end of World War II brought stricter restrictions and regulations, but that did not prevent socio-cultural movements such as the hippie movement (in the 1960s) from adopting the use of marijuana, hashish, LSD, and hallucinogenic mushrooms (Kiss, 2025) without facing severe repercussions. That same hippie movement — which promoted pacifism and opposed the Vietnam War (1955–1975) — in one way or another encouraged drug use among young people. Moreover, the demand for substances by returning veterans led to the internationalization of drug markets, fostering, for example, the heroin trade from Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) (Saldaña, 2024). The Nixon administration and the US “War on Drugs” The dependency became so severe that it was considered a public health emergency in the United States. On June 18, 1971, Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” at an international level, labeling drug trafficking as “public enemy number one” (Plant & Singer, 2022). Nixon’s strategy combined international intervention with increased spending on treatment and stricter measures against drug trafficking and consumption (Encyclopedia.com, n.d.), along with the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. Although the War on Drugs was officially declared in 1971, it had a precedent in 1969 with the failed Operation Intercept, whose goal was to combat marijuana trafficking across the U.S.–Mexico border (M. Brecher, 1972). As part of his international strategy, Nixon launched several operations such as Operation Condor with Mexico (1975 and 1978), Operation Stopgap in Florida (1977), and Operation Fulminante, carried out by Colombian President Julio César Turbay in 1979. Most of these efforts were aimed at combating marijuana trafficking. The results were mixed, but the consequences were significant, as drug traffickers resisted and adapted — giving rise to a more active and violent generation and marking the consolidation of modern drug trafficking. The Consolidation of Modern Drug Trafficking: Colombia and Reagan Era. During the 1980s and 1990s, drug trafficking evolved into a highly organized industry. Figures such as Félix Gallardo [1], Amado Carrillo Fuentes [2], Pablo Escobar [3], Carlos Lehder [4], Griselda Blanco [5], Rafael Caro Quintero [6], and later Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera [7], among others (Wikipedia, 2025), symbolized the growing power of the cartels in Colombia and Mexico. During this period, criminal organizations consolidated their operations, and the profits from drug trafficking fueled violence and corruption. Moreover, the struggle for power — not only in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, or the United States but also in other regions of Latin America — and the competition for markets led to greater sophistication, as well as the construction of infrastructure and distribution networks. Pablo Escobar’s famous phrase, “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”), reflects the immense power and influence that drug traffickers wield, even over governments and authorities. Colombia, through the Cali and Medellín cartels, dominated the production and export of cocaine via a triangulation network that connected through Mexico or the Caribbean, with the final destination being the United States, where the Reagan administration (1981–1989) intensified the War on Drugs, focusing on criminal repression rather than public health. The Reagan’s War on Drugs was characterized for setting aggressive policies and legislative changes in the 1980s which increased the law enforcement and the punishment, as a consequence the prison penalties for drug crimes skyrocketed from 50,000 in 1980 to more than 400,000 by 1997 (HISTORY.com Editors 2017) Mexican cartels consolidation and Mexico’s transition to a consumer nation Around the same time, on the international arena, following the fragmentation of the Guadalajara Cartel in the 1980s, the emergence of new Mexican cartels — the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Tijuana Cartel, and Juárez Cartel — combined with the downfall of Colombia’s Cali and Medellín cartels in the mid-1990s, catapulted Mexican cartels into prominence. They seized control of trafficking routes and diversified their operations, thus consolidating their role in the global drug market. Later, the September 11, 2001, attacks altered U.S. security policy, affecting border transit, increasing security measures, and tightening inspections along the southern border with Mexico (Rudolph, 2023) — one of the main drug distribution routes into the United States. Although some studies suggest that U.S. security policies at land ports of entry had only marginal pre- and post-9/11 effects (Ramírez Partida, 2014), in reality, these measures significantly impacted Mexico more than the US. Mexico transitioned from being primarily a producer, distributor, and transit country for drugs to also becoming a consumer nation. In 2002, more than 260,000 people were reported to use cocaine, whereas today the number exceeds 1.7 million addicts, according to data from the federal Secretariat of Public Security (Alzaga, 2010). Likewise, the ENCODAT 2016–2017 survey shows that the percentage of Mexican adolescents who had consumed some type of drug increased from 1.6% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2016 (REDIM, 2025). By disrupting one of the main drug distribution routes to the United States, the situation led to drugs being redistributed and sold within Mexican territory. This, combined with the country’s social and economic conditions, facilitated the recruitment of young people by organized crime groups (Becerra-Acosta, 2010) for the domestic distribution of drugs. Mexico and the Contemporary War on Drug Trafficking The escalation of violence caused by the power struggle among Mexican cartels became so critical that President Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) declared an open war against organized crime on December 10, 2006 (Herrera Beltrán, 2006). His strategy involved deploying the armed forces throughout Mexican territory, as well as obtaining financial aid, training, and intelligence through the Mérida Initiative from the United States to support the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and Central America (Embassy of the United States in Mexico, 2011). His successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–2018), shifted the focus toward prevention and civil protection, although he continued the militarization process and the transformation of police institutions (BBC News, 2012). The strategies of Calderón and Peña Nieto — often grouped together — while questioned and criticized (Morales Oyarvide, 2011), achieved significant arrests, including figures such as “La Barbie,” “La Tuta,” “El Menchito,” “El Chapo,” “El Marro,” and “El Ratón.” They also eliminated key figures like Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, and Nazario Moreno González. Later, during the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024), the strategy shifted once again toward a stance of “hugs, not bullets,” showing clear signs of passivity that allowed cartel expansion (Fernández-Montesino, 2025). His successor, Claudia Sheinbaum (2024–2030), on the other hand, has navigated both internal and external pressures (particularly from the United States), seeking to balance intelligence, coordination, and attention to structural causes (Pardo, 2024), although continued militarization suggests a hybrid strategy remains in place. Fentanyl and synthetic drugs: The future of drug trafficking The president of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Jallal Toufiq, said that “the illicit drug industry represents a major global public health threat with potentially disastrous consequences for humankind.” In addition, the 2024 INCB Annual Report found that illicit synthetic drugs are spreading and consumption is increasing, moreover, these could overtake some plant-based drugs in the future. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025) The press release before mentioned also points out that Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific drug markets are increasing, while production in Central America, Peru, Colombia and the Caribbean keeps on developing. On the other hand, the opioid crisis (fentanyl) remains a serious problem for North America and the cocaine keeps affecting Europe with a spillover Africa. (International Narcotics Control Board 2025). The fentanyl crisis in North America is well documented. Data show an increase of 540% in overdose deaths between 2013 and 2016 (Katz 2017), with 20,100 deaths in the USA, while by 2023, the number increase to 72,776 deaths (USA Facts 2025). On the other hand, Canada has reported 53,821 deaths between January 2016 and March 2025 (Government of Canada 2025), while Mexico reported only 114 deaths from 2013 to 2023 (Observatorio Mexicano de Salud Mental y Adicciones 2024). These figures reveal not only the unequal regional impact of the synthetic opioid crisis but also the ongoing adaptation of organized crime networks that sustain and expand these markets. Evolution and Diversification of Organized Crime The phenomenon of adaptation, evolution, and diversification of new illicit markets is not an isolated issue. Experts such as Farah & Zeballos (2025) describe this in their framework Waves of Transnational Crime (COT). The first wave is represented by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, pioneers in moving tons of cocaine to the U.S. market through Caribbean routes. The second wave is represented by the Cali Cartel, which perfected the model and expanded trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico — still focusing on one product (cocaine) for one main market (the United States). The third wave is characterized by the criminalization of criminal structures, the use of armed groups (such as the FARC in Colombia), and the use of illicit production and trafficking as instruments of state policy, with clear effects on public policy functioning. At this stage, there is product diversification, with the main market remaining the U.S., but expansion reaching Europe (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Finally, the fourth wave — the current stage — is defined by total diversification, a shift toward synthetic drugs, and global expansion, involving extra-regional groups (Italian, Turkish, Albanian, and Japanese mafias), where many operations function “under government protection.” This fourth wave offers clear examples of collusion between criminal and political spheres, which is not new. However, the arrest of Genaro García Luna (Secretary of Public Security under Calderón), the links between high-profile Mexican politicians and money laundering or fuel trafficking (Unidad de Investigación Aplicada de MCCI, 2025), and even Trump’s statements claiming that “Mexico is largely governed by cartels” (DW, 2025) reveal a reality in which drug trafficking and criminal organizations are no longer merely producers and distributors of illicit substances. Today, they possess the power and capacity to establish parallel governance systems, exercise territorial control, infiltrate institutions and local economies, and even replace core state functions (Farah & Zeballos, 2025). Future Perspectives and Challenges Currently, drug trafficking and organized crime represent structural threats. It is well known and widely studied what drug trafficking means for public security and health, but it has now also become a threat to politics, democracy, and the rule of law. With divided opinions, many analysts argue that the war on drugs has failed — in addition to being costly and, in many cases, counterproductive (Thomson, 2016). Punitive strategies have generated more violence without truly addressing the social causes behind the phenomenon (Morales Oyarvide, 2011). In this context, a paradigm shift is necessary: drug trafficking should not be approached solely as a security issue, but also as a public health and social development problem. Drug use has been a historical constant, and its total eradication is unrealistic. The key lies in harm-reduction policies, international cooperation, and inclusive economic development. Moreover, organized crime demonstrates adaptive resilience, making its eradication difficult — especially given that its operational capacities are so diversified, it maintains alliances with groups worldwide, and globalization and new technologies continually help it reinvent itself. Furthermore, even political and economic tensions among the United States, Mexico, Canada, and China are now intertwined with the trade of synthetic drugs — particularly fentanyl —, revealing the geopolitical magnitude of the problem (Pierson, 2024). Conclusion In summary, drug trafficking has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a transnational structure capable of influencing politics, the economy, and society. Its persistence can be explained not only by the profitability of the business but also by social inequality, institutional corruption, and sustained global demand. History demonstrates that repression has not eradicated the problem but rather transformed it. Today, it is essential to rethink drug policies from a comprehensive approach that integrates security, public health, education, and international cooperation. Only through a multidimensional strategy will it be possible to contain a phenomenon that — more than an illicit economy — constitutes a global form of parallel governance that challenges the very foundations of the modern state. Notes[1] Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, also known as “El Jefe de Jefes” (“The Boss of Bosses”), “El Padrino” (“The Godfather”), or “The Drug Czar”, was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [2] Amado Carrillo Fuentes, known as “El Señor de los Cielos” (“The Lord of the Skies”), was the former leader of the Juárez Cartel. [3] Pablo Escobar was the founder and former leader of the Medellín Cartel. [4] Carlos Lehder was the co-founder of the Medellín Cartel. [5] Griselda Blanco, known as “The Black Widow,” “The Cocaine Queen,” or “La Patrona” (“The Boss”), was a founder of the Medellín Cartel. [6] Rafael Caro Quintero, known as “El Narco de Narcos” (“The Drug Lord of Drug Lords”), was one of the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel. [7] Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as “El Chapo,” was the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. ReferencesAlzaga, Ignacio. 2010. 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Abstract This paper examines the NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, focusing on its benefits and challenges within the U.S.-EU security framework. Nuclear sharing involves the U.S. deploying B61 nuclear bombs in select European NATO countries, with host nations providing delivery systems and infrastructure while the U.S. retains full control, ensuring compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The arrangement strengthens NATO's deterrence posture, promotes alliance cohesion, and supports non-proliferation by dissuading the development of independent nuclear arsenals. Recent geopolitical tensions, especially Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have intensified calls for expanding sharing to countries like Poland, enhancing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank. Exercises such as Steadfast Noon validate operational readiness and signal resolve. Critics, however, highlight legal and escalation risks, potential NPT violations, and domestic opposition in host countries. Despite these issues, nuclear sharing remains a crucial component of Euro-Atlantic security, adapting to evolving threats while balancing deterrence, alliance unity, and non-proliferation goals.  Key Words: International Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Sharing, Alliances Introduction Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's deterrence strategy, designed to distribute the benefits, responsibilities, and risks of nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. Under these arrangements, the United States deploys a limited number of B61 nuclear gravity bombs at bases in several European NATO member states. At the same time, those host countries provide the necessary infrastructure, security, and dual-capable aircraft (DCAs) to deliver weapons in a crisis. The weapons remain under full U.S. custody and control at all times, in compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A nuclear mission can only be authorised after explicit political approval from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which includes all NATO members, and the U.S. President (and potentially the UK Prime Minister). This setup ensures collective decision-making and underscores the U.S.'s extended deterrence commitments to its allies, helping prevent nuclear proliferation by giving non-nuclear states a stake in the Alliance's nuclear posture without independent arsenals.[1] The arrangements originated in the Cold War era, with the first U.S. atomic weapons arriving in Europe in 1954. By the 1960s, they were formalised through the NPG to allow non-nuclear allies input on nuclear policy. Today, approximately 100 B61 bombs are forward-deployed in Europe, hosted by five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Seven NATO allies contribute DCA, including F-16s and F-35s, which serve dual roles in conventional operations and as potential nuclear delivery platforms. France and the UK maintain independent nuclear forces that complement the US-led sharing but operate outside the formal NATO structure. While the question references the EU, nuclear sharing is strictly a NATO framework; all host countries are EU members except Turkey, creating significant overlap but no direct EU-level involvement.[2] These arrangements serve multiple purposes: they enhance Alliance cohesion, provide tools for managing escalations in conflicts, and signal resolve to adversaries, such as Russia. Recent geopolitical tensions, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have prompted discussions about expanding sharing to strengthen deterrence on NATO's eastern flank.[3] Poland, a NATO member since 1999, has long advocated for a stronger role in the Alliance's nuclear mission amid heightened Russian threats, particularly following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In June 2023, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki first publicly expressed interest in hosting U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO's sharing policy, arguing it would bolster deterrence without violating the NPT. This push intensified in early 2025, driven by concerns over U.S. reliability under the second Trump administration and Russia's aggressive posture.[4]   On March 13, 2025, President Andrzej Duda explicitly urged the U.S. to deploy nuclear warheads on Polish territory, stating in interviews that NATO infrastructure—including nuclear assets — should "shift east" to match the eastward expansion of the Alliance's borders since 1999. He emphasised that such a move would enhance security guarantees and deter future Russian aggression, while also praising France's potential extension of its "atomic umbrella" as a complementary option. Duda's proposal carried domestic political weight, positioning Poland's conservative opposition as pro-U.S. ahead of the May 2025 presidential election, where candidates debated transatlantic ties versus European autonomy.[5] Proponents argue Poland is an ideal candidate: it spends 4.7% of GDP on defence (exceeding NATO's 2% target), has built one of Europe's strongest militaries, and hosts significant U.S. rotational forces. Analysts suggest that deployment could involve adapting Polish F-35s for DCA roles or constructing secure storage facilities. However, logistical and political hurdles remain, including a potential Russian backlash and the need for NPG consensus.[6] As of October 2025, however, no U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed to Poland, and the proposal remains under discussion without a formal U.S. commitment. Instead, Poland has deepened integration through participation in NATO's annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, which began on October 13, 2025, across Belgium, the Netherlands, and the North Sea — testing procedures for credibility and safety. Poland joined as a full participant alongside Finland, Germany, and the U.S., signalling growing involvement in nuclear planning but stopping short of hosting assets. Alternatives like a dedicated U.S. "nuclear umbrella" declaration for Poland have been floated to avoid escalation without physical deployment.[7] What academics say Academic experts agree that Nuclear sharing is a cornerstone of NATO's defence strategy. This arrangement refers to an agreement according to which the United States deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons on allied territory while maintaining ownership and peacetime custody.[8]This allows selected NATO members to participate in nuclear planning and provide delivery systems, creating a framework that extends American nuclear deterrence across the Alliance. The operational structure of nuclear sharing involves dual-key arrangements in which both U.S. and host-nation authorisation are required for weapon employment. The United States maintains absolute control and custody of its nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe, while Allies provide military support for the DCA mission with conventional forces and capabilities. Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the Alliance's interconnection and remain a key component of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security across the entire Euro-Atlantic area.[9] These arrangements are coordinated through NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, ensuring multilateral consultation on nuclear policy and targeting decisions. Currently, only five European NATO members have signed bilateral nuclear-sharing agreements with the U.S. These are: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, under which the U.S. stores B61 nuclear gravity bombs at their airbases and their dual-capable aircraft can deliver them in a NATO context. These arrangements, dating back to the Cold War and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties, involve approximately 100 U.S. warheads as of 2025.[10] Nuclear sharing serves multiple strategic purposes within the alliance framework. It strengthens extended deterrence by visibly integrating allied forces into NATO's nuclear posture, thereby reassuring front-line states of American commitment.[11] Experts claim that these arrangements helped prevent nuclear proliferation by reducing incentives for European allies to develop independent arsenals during the Cold War.[12] Additionally, nuclear sharing distributes the political and operational burdens of nuclear responsibility across participating members rather than concentrating them solely with the United States. However, nuclear sharing faces significant criticisms. Legal scholars argue that forward-deploying U.S. weapons on non-nuclear states potentially contravenes the Non-Proliferation Treaty's spirit, creating ongoing diplomatic tensions with Russia and other nations.[13] Domestic opposition within host countries and concerns about the escalation of crises further complicate these arrangements.[14] Despite these challenges, nuclear sharing remains integral to NATO's deterrence strategy, particularly as renewed great-power competition has reinforced alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defence in the contemporary security environment. Benefits of Nuclear Sharing Firstly, official sources from NATO and the U.S. government consistently highlight the benefits of their efforts in preserving peace, deterring aggression, fostering unity, and aligning with global non-proliferation norms. The primary official argument for nuclear sharing is its role in bolstering NATO's deterrence posture against evolving threats, particularly from nuclear-armed adversaries like Russia. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept and related documents emphasise that the Alliance's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons, serve to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression". [15] The 2024 Washington Summit Declaration reaffirms this, stating that "nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security" and that NATO's capabilities provide the "supreme guarantee" for all members.[16] By integrating U.S. nuclear assets with European contributions, such as DCA from seven Allies, these arrangements complicate adversaries' planning and enhance crisis management. As noted in NATO's factsheet, "nuclear sharing provides military and political tools for deterrence and can be used to manage escalation in a crisis," with DCA serving as a "visible and valuable instrument for strategic communications" to signal resolve.[17] Accordingly, in a security environment marked by Russia's integration of nuclear forces into its military strategy and threats against Allies, nuclear sharing ensures credible deterrence without provoking conflict. NATO’s former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that "the purpose of NATO's nuclear weapons is not to provoke a conflict but to preserve peace, deter aggression and prevent coercion," underscoring that arrangements like those involving Germany are vital for the "security of the whole alliance".[18] The U.S. State Department echoes this rationale, claiming that with NATO "numerically outgunned on the central front," nuclear sharing maintains a "nuclear deterrent posture sufficient to deter the Soviet aggression," a logic that persists against modern threats.[19] Against this backdrop, exercises like Steadfast Noon[1] Further strengthen this by simulating nuclear scenarios, ensuring "the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission".[20] Overall, according to official sources, these mechanisms help preserve stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and adapt to challenges posed by actors such as China and North Korea. Secondly, nuclear sharing fosters unity and shared responsibility among NATO members, distributing the benefits, risks, and political burdens of deterrence more evenly among them. NATO's publications explicitly state that these arrangements "ensure that the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared across the Alliance," demonstrating "unity and cohesion amongst all Allies" through joint decision-making in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).[21] This shared approach, as NATO sources claim, reinforces the indivisibility of security, as outlined in NATO's nuclear policy: "Nuclear sharing arrangements play a vital role in the interconnection of the Alliance and remain one of the main components of security guarantees and the indivisibility of security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area".[22] The 2024 Summit Declaration commits to "modernising its nuclear capabilities" and "strengthening its nuclear planning capability," ensuring broader participation to "demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve".[23] By involving European Allies in Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions and infrastructure, nuclear sharing is intended to help mitigate disparities in capabilities, promote equitable burden-sharing, and prevent fragmentation within the Alliance. Thirdly, NATO posits that nuclear sharing supports non-proliferation efforts. Contrary to criticisms, official sources argue that nuclear sharing advances non-proliferation by reducing incentives for Allies to pursue independent nuclear programs. NATO's review of the NPT at 50 years notes that these arrangements "have contributed to security in Europe and non-proliferation as Allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella have not felt pressure to develop their own weapons".[24] Codified during the 1960s negotiations, they comply fully with the Treaty, as both the U.S. and the USSR ensured that no prohibitions were placed on such setups.[25] The U.S. State Department details this compromise, which allowed for "wartime nuclear sharing" without requiring peacetime transfer, thereby reassuring allies like West Germany and dissuading proliferation.[26] Post-Cold War reductions — over 90% in NATO's nuclear stockpile — align with NPT Article VI disarmament goals while maintaining deterrence.[27] This balance facilitates peaceful nuclear cooperation under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, thereby strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.[28] Finally, according to the U.S. State Department, nuclear sharing underscores the U.S. commitment to European security, countering fears of "decoupling" where allies doubt American resolve. The State Department describes it as addressing whether the U.S. would "sacrifice Chicago to save Hamburg," by making nuclear weapons available for Europe's defence.[29] NATO's policy affirms that U.S. strategic forces, supplemented by forward-deployed assets, provide the "supreme guarantee," with Allies contributing to ensure integration across domains.[30] To sum up, official arguments portray nuclear sharing as indispensable for deterrence, cohesion, non-proliferation, and transatlantic solidarity. These arrangements, according to Western policy-makers and experts, have sustained European stability for decades, with ongoing modernisation ensuring their relevance in an unpredictable world. Nuclear Sharing in the Face of an Ongoing War in Ukraine Nuclear sharing has allegedly bolstered NATO's overall deterrence posture, helping to prevent Russian escalation in Ukraine, including potential nuclear use. NATO's nuclear capabilities, including U.S. forward-deployed weapons in Europe, are described as essential to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression" in the face of Russia's nuclear threats and integration of nuclear forces into its strategy.[31] This has indirectly supported Ukraine by signalling to Russia that any significant escalation — such as nuclear strikes or attacks on NATO territory — would invoke a collective response, thereby limiting Russia's options in the conflict. Russia's invasion has been accompanied by nuclear sabre-rattling to deter Western intervention, but nuclear sharing has helped counter this by maintaining credible deterrence without direct NATO involvement in Ukraine.[32] In that sense, the already mentioned exercises like Steadfast Noon simulate nuclear scenarios, reinforcing the "credibility, effectiveness, safety and security" of the deterrent, which has been crucial amid threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. Analysts note that this has made Russian nuclear signalling less credible over time, allowing the West to provide advanced weapons to Ukraine that were initially considered taboo.[33] However, Russia's threats have still delayed and limited the scale of Western aid, such as restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia, due to fears of crossing "red lines".[34] As mentioned before, nuclear sharing agreements have arguably fostered greater unity among NATO allies, enabling sustained military and economic support for Ukraine. By sharing the "benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence," nuclear sharing demonstrates Alliance solidarity and the "indivisibility of security" in the Euro-Atlantic area.[35] This has reassured European allies, particularly those near Russia, allowing them to commit resources to Ukraine without fearing abandonment. For example, Poland's push to join nuclear sharing reflects heightened threat perceptions from the war, aiming to strengthen deterrence and defence in a hostile environment. NATO's support, including intelligence sharing and strategic communications, has, at least in the eyes of Western policy-makers, deterred Russian use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in Ukraine.[36] Without reassurance from nuclear sharing of U.S. commitment — countering fears of "decoupling" — it might have been harder for Europe to maintain this level of involvement.[37] From Russia's perspective, nuclear sharing exacerbates tensions, viewing it as part of NATO's eastward expansion that provoked the invasion.[38] Putin has used this to support claims behind "Russia's Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, framing Ukraine's potential NATO integration as a threat that could place U.S. nuclear weapons near Russia's borders, similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse. This rationale has fueled Russian nuclear threats, which aim to limit Western aid and prolong the conflict by raising escalation fears.[39] The war has heightened nuclear risks, with some analysts arguing it presents greater dangers than the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the potential for miscalculation.[40] Russia's deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a counter to NATO's sharing arrangements has further escalated postures.[41] Recent decisions by the U.S., UK, and France to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russian targets have prompted Putin to warn of a direct NATO-Russia war, indirectly tying into nuclear sharing's role in deterrence dynamics.[42] This has possibly complicated peace efforts, as Russia perceives Western escalation as existential, making negotiations harder. As mentioned earlier, nuclear sharing has arguably helped mitigate proliferation risks during the war. By providing a shared nuclear umbrella, it reduces the incentives for allies like Poland and Germany to pursue independent nuclear programs, thereby supporting the NPT.[43] Possibly then, the invasion has not sparked widespread proliferation, partly because NATO's deterrent reassures members. Interestingly, however, the debates over a "European nuclear deterrent" independent of the U.S. — spurred by uncertainties such as potential shifts in U.S. policy under Trump — could undermine this if not managed effectively.[44] The war has also renewed focus on modernising nuclear sharing, with NATO committing to enhancing capabilities at the 2024 Washington Summit.[45] This has indirectly affected Ukraine by diverting Russian resources and attention, though some argue it prolongs the stalemate without a decisive victory. In summary, nuclear sharing has possibly acted as a stabilising force for NATO, enabling robust support for Ukraine and deterring Russian nuclear escalation. However, it has also contributed to heightened tensions and Russian intransigence, complicating pathways to peace. As the war persists into 2025, proposals to expand sharing (e.g., to Poland) reflect its evolving role in countering ongoing threats. Conclusion The "Steadfast Noon" exercises are arguably a clear signal to any potential adversary, including Russia, that NATO is prepared to defend all its members against any threats, including nuclear ones. Such exercises involve the use of American non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, although no real combat weapons are used during the drills. The exercises serve not only to practice deterrence against possible nuclear attacks but also to prepare for the potential use of nuclear weapons by NATO if necessary. The fact that these exercises involve nuclear deterrence indicates that NATO's defence strategy includes readiness to escalate to a nuclear response if provoked by a nuclear attack. The locations of these nuclear weapons are not publicly disclosed. Still, there is speculation about their presence in countries like Poland, particularly in light of recent secret agreements that allow foreign troops to enter Polish territory. On the other hand, one should also consider potential downsides, especially for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Nuclear sharing for potential allied use in wartime poses significant risks despite its deterrence aims. One major downside is its incompatibility with the NPT, which violates Articles I and II.[2] Enabling the indirect transfer of control to non-nuclear states undermines global non-proliferation efforts and draws criticism from states such as China. This arrangement also heightens proliferation risks, as peacetime training and exercises normalise nuclear readiness, potentially inspiring similar setups in Asia-Pacific regions like Japan and South Korea, escalating regional tensions.[46] Security concerns include increased escalation dangers, where limited nuclear use could spiral into full-scale war, especially amid vulnerabilities at host bases like Incirlik in Türkiye during political instability. Expanding sharing, such as to Poland, fuels arms races with Russia and exposes more European sites to attacks, without adding credible deterrence given NATO's conventional superiority. Politically, it breeds divisiveness within NATO, fostering resentment among allies and diverting resources from conventional forces, while eroding U.S. control and complicating disarmament. Domestically, host nations face public backlash and moral burdens from anti-nuclear norms, straining alliance cohesion. Russia's objections in NPT forums further highlight how sharing provokes international backlash, risking broader conflicts. Notes [1] On Monday (October 13 2025), NATO began its annual nuclear deterrence exercise Steadfast Noon. The exercise is a long-planned, routine training activity and part of NATO’s broader efforts to maintain readiness and ensure transparency around its nuclear posture. It is not linked to any current world events, and no live weapons are used.[2] Article I - Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II - Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. See more at: https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html References [1] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[2] Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight-Boyle, M. (2023, November 8). Nuclear weapons sharing, 2023. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-11/nuclear-weapons-sharing-2023/[3] Johns, E. (2025, October 10). Incomplete Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath Raise Questions About Suspected US Nuclear Deployment. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[4] Johns, E. (n.d.). Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing. IISS. Retrieved October 14, 2025, from https://fas.org/publication/incomplete-upgrades-lakenheath-questions-nuclear/[5] Poland’s president urges U.S. to move nuclear warheads to Polish territory, FT reports. (2025, March 13). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/polands-president-urges-us-move-nuclear-warheads-polish-territory-ft-reports-2025-03-13/[6] Poland’s president vows to spend 4.7% of GDP on defence this year. (2025, February 5). Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/05/polands-president-vows-to-spend-47-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year[7] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[8] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[9] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_50068.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=Nuclear%20consultation,are%20members%20of%20the%20NPG[10] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (2022, February). NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[11] von Hlatky, S., & Lambert-Deslandes, É. (2024). The Ukraine war and nuclear sharing in NATO. International Affairs, 100(2), 467-485. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/100/2/509/7617216?redirectedFrom=fulltext[12] Khalessi, D. (2015). Strategic ambiguity: Nuclear sharing and the secret strategy for drafting articles I and II of the nonproliferation treaty. The Nonproliferation Review, 23(1-2), 81-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1155865 [13] Park, K. C., & Choo, J. (2022). NATO's nuclear sharing strategy and its implications for establishing a new strategy for strengthening extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. International Area Studies Review, 26(1), 51-78. https://doi.org/10.18327/jias.2022.1.26.1.51 [14] Smith, M. A. (2004). To neither use them nor lose them: NATO and nuclear weapons since the cold war. Contemporary Security Policy, 25(3), 485-514. https://doi.org/10.1080/1352326042000330637[15] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[16] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[17] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[18] Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom. (2020, May 11). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm[19] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[20] NATO’s annual nuclear exercise Steadfast Noon begins. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_238367.htm[21] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[22] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[23] Washington Summit Declaration. (2024, July 10). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm[24] Durkalec, J. (2018, June 29). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis. NATO. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/06/29/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/index.html[25] NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements. (n.d.). NATO. Retrieved October 20, 2025, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf[26] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[27] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf[28] See more at: https://www.iaea.org/[29] Ford, C. A. (2019, December 9). Challenges of Policymaking in Responsible Nuclear Weapons Stewardship. US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/challenges-of-policymaking-in-responsible-nuclear-weapons-stewardship/[30]NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm[31] NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces. (2025, October 13). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm [32] Nuclear Stability and Escalation Risks in Europe. (2023, September 1). Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/09/nuclear-stability-and-escalation-risks-in-europe/[33] Ibidem.[34] Kimball, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine[35] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[36] Dickinson, P., Arick, R., & Lander Finch, N. (2025, October 15). How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/how-the-us-and-europe-can-deter-and-respond-to-russias-chemical-biological-and-nuclear-threats/[37] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[38] Magnier, E. J. POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/ejmalrai/status/1796511588465201374[39] Ukraine: how nuclear weapons continue to increase the risks, two years on. (n.d.). ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons). Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://www.icanw.org/ukraine_two_years_how_nuclear_weapons_increase_the_risks[40] Kimballl, D., & Bugos, S. (2022, February 28). Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/FAQ-russia-ukraine [41] Kayali, L., Jungholt, T., & Fritz, P. (2024, July 4). Europe Is Quietly Debating a Nuclear Future Without the US. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/04/europe-us-nuclear-weapons-00166070[42] Katchanovski, I. (n.d.). POST. X. Retrieved October 21, 2025, from https://x.com/I_Katchanovski/status/1858244090909127000[43] Dalton, T. (2022, April 8). Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/[44] Samuelki, O. (2025, March 11). Europe going nuclear would be a catastrophic mistake. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/3/11/europe-going-nuclear-would-be-a-catastrophic-mistake[45] NATO’s support for Ukraine. (2025, October 14). NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm[46] Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (2024). China Arms Control and Disarmament Association China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy. https://www.cinis.com.cn/zhzlghyjzy/yjbg/1446912/2024072914514738359.pdf 

The fall of Kabul with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was not an end to the long standing Afghan crisis but rather turned into a more complex challenge for Afghans at large & for Taliban leaders alike. The Taliban had to transform from a nimble insurgency to a functioning state. Nearly three years on, it is clear that the group’s strategy for maximizing relevance is not based on building a prosperous nation but on a dangerous and calculated paralysis. Both internally, through draconian social policies and externally through provocative engagements, the current regime is placing its ideology above the interests of the general populace. This approach, recently highlighted by a deadly skirmish with nuclear-armed Pakistan, threatens to freeze Afghanistan in a state of perpetual crisis, sacrificing its people’s future for the regime’s ideological purity and survival.   The Pakistan Conundrum: A Calculated Maneuvering.The recent escalation along the Durand Line with Pakistan served as a stark reminder of the Taliban’s precarious external posture. The exchange of fire, which included airstrikes within mainland Afghanistan and mortar shelling, resulting in casualties on both sides, was not a fight among equals.  Pakistan possesses one of the world's largest and most battle-hardened militaries, backed by a nuclear arsenal. Its conventional military capabilities from a modern air force to sophisticated artillery and armour can not be compared with the Taliban’s minimal and largely infantry-based forces, who possess no air force, limited air defence, and very basic command and control structures.   For the Taliban to engage in such a conflict, even briefly, seems suicidal. However, this is where their insurgency mindset becomes apparent. Their power does not lie in matching Pakistan’s might but in leveraging asymmetry. A direct, conventional war is unwinnable, but a low-intensity conflict along the border, leveraging their ideological kinship with Tehreek i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions is a tool of influence. The subsequent ceasefire agreement, brokered through backchannel dialogues involving Turkiye & Qatar was a tactical retreat, not a strategic surrender.   Immediately after the truce, the Taliban leadership felt compelled to issue clarifications to its own population. This narrative management is crucial. It underscores the regime’s primary audience, its own hardline base and the wider Afghan populace, which remains afraid of foreign domination. The entire episode was a high-stakes performance, demonstrating defiance to solidify internal legitimacy while avoiding a full-scale war that would be catastrophic for the fledgling regime. The costs of such a war for Pakistan would be significant—economic disruption, a massive refugee crisis, and further destabilisation of its own restive western regions. For Afghanistan, it would be existential, leading to immediate state collapse and humanitarian catastrophe.   Internal Paralysis: The War on Half the Population   The Taliban’s internal policy is catastrophically self-sabotaging too. The most glaring example of state paralysis is the systematic eradication of women’s rights, particularly the access to education. By banning girls from secondary school and university, the Taliban are not just enforcing a brutal societal code, they are actively paralysing the state’s potential.   This policy effectively keeps away half of the nation’s human capital. It ensures a future with fewer doctors, engineers, teachers, and administrators, crippling almost all long-term economic development or social progress. The health system, already on life support, cannot function without female staff in a gender-segregated society. This is not merely repression, it is institutionalised crime against humanity. The regime, by its own decree, is preventing itself from building the skilled workforce necessary for society to function smoothly. This creates a controlled, paralysed society where the regime’s ideological control is prioritised over the state’s functional capacity.   The Geopolitical Tightrope: Beijing and Moscow’s Cautious Gaze   The Taliban’s isolation is not absolute. Its relationships with China and Russia are pragmatic alliances of convenience, yet they are tied with unspoken conditions. Beijing is primarily interested in stability which eventually leads to integrating Afghanistan into its Belt and Road Initiative, particularly as an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China values the Taliban’s promise to not host Uyghur separatists and offers economic and diplomatic engagement in return. However, the ongoing internal instability which has already cost a huge oil extraction deal, &  ties to groups like TTP, which threaten Pakistan, makes Beijing stay on alert.   Similarly, Russia seeks to use the Taliban as a barricade against the spread of ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which it sees as a threat to its interests in Central Asian allies. It engages with the Taliban for intelligence sharing but like China, it withholds full diplomatic recognition. Both powers are playing a long game, providing just enough engagement to keep the Taliban engaged and prevent complete state failure, but not enough to legitimize its worst excesses. They are investing in the idea of a stable Afghanistan, not necessarily in the Taliban’s model of governance.   The Thirst for Recognition and the umbrella of sanctions   Taliban’s central quandary, the desperate thirst for international recognition to get away from sanctions. The frozen assets abroad, the collapse of the formal banking sector and the aid-dependent economy are a direct result of the regime’s policies. The international community’s conditions for recognition, forming an inclusive government, respecting human rights, and severing ties with terrorist groups are precisely what the Taliban’s base rejects.   Therefore, they have chosen a path of managed paralysis, maintaining a firm grip on power through internal suppression and external defiance, hoping to wait out the international community and force a recognition on their own terms. They are betting that the world’s fear of a completely failed state, a haven for terrorists and a source of uncontrollable refugee flow will eventually outweigh its principled objections to their governance.   Conclusion   In an era defined by profound global realignment, sustainable statecraft necessitates avoiding international isolation, a burden no state can long bear. The Taliban’s current orientation however, blatantly violates this principle, presenting a multi layered threat to regional stability and global security. Central to this crisis is the regime’s unwavering prioritization of a rigid ideology over the sustainability of global security and the welfare of its own population. This doctrinal commitment manifests in a dangerously irresponsible foreign policy, including active support for transnational terrorist groups like the Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). By engaging in war-mongering with a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the Taliban not only invites an existential retaliatory war that could draw in global powers but also demonstrates a reckless disregard for regional security balance. This external belligerence is compounded by a foreign policy confined to the conditional alignment with only Russia and China only, a model not suitable for navigating the transitional nature of contemporary global power dynamics.   The consequences of this ideological inflexibility are catastrophically domestic too. The Afghan people bear the harshest price, suffering under a reign of terror and a collapsing economy. A profound food security crisis has left millions malnourished and desperate. This immense internal suffering does not merely constitute a humanitarian tragedy, it actively generates a threat to global peace. A starving, disenfranchised, and radicalized population becomes a fertile recruiting ground for international terrorist networks. As misery deepens, the potential grows for Afghanistan to export not just ideological inspiration but also a desperate, battle-hardened cadre of extremists, who could destabilize far beyond its borders. Thus, the Taliban’s preference for ideology over pragmatic statecraft creates a vicious cycle. This path is unsustainable, promising only further devastation for Afghanistan and heightened peril for the world.References CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE.(2023).Russia’s Growing Ties With Afghanistan Are More Symbolism Than Substancehttps://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/09/russias-growing-ties-with-afghanistan-are-more-symbolism-than-substance?lang=enHUMAN RIGHTS WATCH.(2024Taliban’s Attack on Girls’ Education Harming Afghanistan’s Futurehttps://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/17/talibans-attack-girls-education-harming-afghanistans-futureLOWY INSTITUTE.(2025).Afghanistan must tread a narrow path to stabilityhttps://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/afghanistan-must-tread-narrow-path-stabilityNiKKEI ASIA. (2025).Taliban cancel oilfield deal with Chinese in Afghanistan's northhttps://asia.nikkei.com/economy/taliban-cancel-oilfield-deal-with-chinese-in-afghanistan-s-northSCIENCE DIRECTUpdate on the state of food security and safety in Afghanistan: A reviewhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2949824425001545WILSON CENTER.(2024)Mining for Influence: China's Mineral Ambitions in Taliban-Led Afghanistanhttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/mining-influence-chinas-mineral-ambitions-taliban-led-afghanistan

Introduction Hegemony is the core principle in International Relations. It has been conceptualized through military strength, economic influence, and ideological control. The theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci is based on assuming control but not necessarily through force, whereas realist theorists such as John Mearsheimer stress the relevance of military strength for ensuring global dominance (Mearsheimer 2001). The 21st century, though, brought into being a different era of transformation and technological breakthroughs that turned the existing arrangements on their head. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber war, and space technology, great powers are transforming from traditional soldiers to cyberspace warriors. AI and other cyber tools are altering the strategic equation between major powers, providing avenues for countries like China and Russia to undermine US hegemony (Rooney et al. 2022). Hegemony in the past had been founded on military superiority, but at present, academics have discovered that technological hegemony is leading the way. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) and AI have captivated researchers because they can transform war. Cyberspace has become the new battleground of power. The US and China are competing for cyber hegemony (Akdaǧ 2025). Space is increasingly regarded as a new battleground in geopolitics. The US Space Force and China’s BeiDou system illustrate how nations weave surveillance and communication in their strategic decision-making (O’Hanlon 2020). Thus, new technologies are reshaping the China-US rivalry. To counter this, countries are investing in tech-based industries, which will change the way human thinks. The analysis will explore whether emerging technologies can efficiently replace traditional tools of hegemony or not. Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power provides a critical framework in this modern era, where influence may flow from military boots to silicon chips. Global powers are moving towards influence and deterrence-based tech models, supplementing hard power. However, this transition has its risks, such as overdependence and ethical concerns. The paper argues that a complete transformation is not happening, but there will be dual-track hegemony where military and technology will coordinate to dominate. Policy implications of this shift are profound. Global powers must collaborate to draft international norms for AI and cyberwarfare, developing nations must develop their technology rather than dependency on global powers, as it will be easier for them to surveil and dominate, and international institutions must proactively govern the techno-political landscape to prevent destabilization. This study will use a qualitative approach, and it will be a case-based methodology combining theoretical perspectives of philosophers. This analysis is important as it delves into the transformation of the mechanics of global power from military hegemony to technology-oriented hegemony. It uses secondary sources like policy briefs, think tank reports, books, etc. Finally, this analysis concludes that soldiers may never be the first line of every fight, but the battle for global supremacy is firmly human-hinged in decisions on technology, ethics, and governance. Hegemony is a core concept in International Relations, grounded in military capacity, economic influence, and institutional influence. Historically, great civilizations like the Roman and British empires attained hegemony by dominating in naval power, making alliances and expanding their territories. In the post-World War II era, the US built dominance through overseas military bases and nuclear deterrence. Historical Foundations of Traditional Hegemony The Roman Empire, a classic example of past hegemony, attained this power by constructing roads, forts, and legions in the world's islands. Later, the British Empire sustained its dominance by modernizing the Royal Navy and the global trade network. The post-World War II era saw the hegemony of the United States with overseas military bases and security alliances. John Mearsheimer, in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, says that according to great powers, hegemony is the best way to ensure their security (Mearsheimer 2001). Limitations of Traditional Hegemony The primary limitation of the traditional hegemonic model is the risk of overreach, entering into too many overseas agreements that become economically and politically unsustainable. Imperial overstretch, a model proposed by Paul Kennedy, explains the collapse of empires when they are unable to maintain their economy due to huge global aims (Kennedy 1988). Concurrently, we can see that after so many years have passed in the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, the US is spending trillions. Approximately $3.68 trillion was spent on Iraq and Afghanistan (Costs of War | Brown University 2025). This highlights that military dominance can be costly and unsustainable. Mearsheimer, in an interview at the New York Times, claimed that ‘the United States is responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis’. Lack of legitimacy and local resistance is another great flaw in the traditional hegemonic pattern. For example, in Vietnam, soldiers used their knowledge of geography to push back against America's advanced weapons. Similarly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign-led missions struggled with local insurgents. The New Tools of Technological Hegemony Cyber Power Cyber power has rapidly become a strategic field where states project their influence far beyond the geographic borders, often without soldiers. Cyber operations are dominating in this digital age, and the SolarWinds hack shows how states can achieve global influence through an Information Technology (IT) infrastructure breach. In March 2020, Russian hackers placed a secret backdoor in SolarWinds’ Orion software. This infected around 18000 users, including US major government departments (Cybersecurity 2021). The cyberattacks went undetected for several months, revealing vulnerabilities in the digital network. It was the worst cyber-espionage attack ever, an analyst described. Iran's 2019 cyberattack on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia shows that the acquisition of digital superiority can help influence norms, command the critical infrastructure, and set global political narratives without foreign boots on the ground. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to know cyber deterrence theory. It discusses capability, attribution, and resolution. States should advance digital tools, modify their tracking system and enhance communication and transparency. The most lethal weapon today may not fire a projectile-it fires packets. This metaphor illustrates that state actors can erode adversary national infrastructure, banks and election systems without traditional warfare. The US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III described the integrated Deterrence that integrates cyber with land, sea, and space under a unified strategy (Masitoh, Perwita, and Rudy 2025). Cybersecurity experts say that cyberpower is now a geopolitical power. And cyber warfare is not a sideshow; it’s a frontline strategy. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data AI’s strategic significance for national security has been emphasized by leaders like Jason Matheny, CEO of RAND Corporation. He warns that AI could make it easier to make harmful weapons and dangerous technologies (Matheny 2024). The 2023 report of RAND on AI and Geopolitics argues that AI may be the next frontier in US-China rivalry (Pavel et al. 2023). ChatGPT and Bard, like generative AI models, have humanitarian strategic applications, which makes fake news so believable that it feels like fact. This capability of AI can transform propaganda into scalable digital warfare. Beyond surveillance, AI has transformed military operations tactics. Military applications like drone swarming, algorithmic targeting, and predictive ISR create scenarios where the frontline shifts from kinetic zones to data centers. AI diplomacy is becoming the new foreign aid. Financial Times article notes that tech giants are deploying AI mechanisms in Africa not only for development but for their advantage as an influence tool. Thus, AI and big data are a new form of informational hegemony. Space Militarization and Satellite Dominance Space militarization emerged during the Cold War. States like the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan have developed anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (Samson and Cesari 2025). General John Jay Raymond at the US Space Command Launch said that, “Outer space is now recognized as a domain of military operations” (Raymond 2021). China’s 2007 ASAT test, which destroyed its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite, is still a thorn in the eyes of major powers. Russia has also launched missions like Kosmos-2553. Evolution from GPS to GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems) reflects strategic change. The US has GPS, China has BeiDou, Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite constellation, and Europe has Galileo; each system highlights the sovereignty in digital positioning. China’s counterpart doctrine states in its 2021 Space White Paper that space-based assets are not crucial for renaissance only but for strategic deterrence without deploying soldiers or causing deaths of your military men (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2022). Undersea Cables and Digital Infrastructure Control Undersea cables carry over 95% of global data transmission (Sherman 2021). Disruption or surveillance of these cables can impact the worldwide flow of data and diplomatic communications. In developing countries like Pakistan, Kenya, and Ecuador, Huawei-funded infrastructure provides smart city services. Cable route is not just wiring undersea, it is influenced by encryption. The US and EU have Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, like surveillance platforms. Cable-Landing zones (CLZs) are the chokepoints used for manipulation, Cloud interconnection policies allow control of traffic flow, and Surveillance software and firmware installed at data centers can be remotely controlled, bypassing local safeguards. Blocking connections can slow or disrupt foreign economic leverage. Digital infrastructure has become a domain for hegemony that is more insidious in strategic potential. This map exposes the physical foundations of digital power. Nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control. Disruption or surveillance of these cables can cripple economies or governance. Regional chokepoints also reflect strategic leverage in geo-economics and cyber diplomacy, making this infrastructure as consequential as traditional military bases. Figure 1: This map shows the physical foundations of digital power, nations with greater cable landing nodes, like the U.S. and China, wield asymmetric influence, not through soldiers, but through network control.Superpowers’ Technological Footprint United States Silicon Valley is the heart of US technological hegemony, and some other government agencies, like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are contributing to maintaining US technological hegemony. Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), drones, and defense-grade AI-powered decision-support systems are a tech-military hybrid force. Furthermore, the US controls major pillars of technology like operating systems (Microsoft, Apple, Google dominate desktops and mobile devices), and Satellites. Advanced technologies have enabled remote force projection like drone strikes, executing surgical operations, Cyber Command operations from SolarWinds retaliation, deployment of Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA), enhancing deterrence. China Made in China 2025 vision aims to displace US techno-hegemony. China’s centralized Social Credit System reflects a template of techno-surveillance hegemony. Beijing is now selling surveillance systems to developing countries, highlighting its tech supremacy. China is controlling telecommunications architecture by promoting Huawei’s 5G worldwide. China’s cyber army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), specializes in offensive and defensive cybertech warfare (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2019). China’s Digital Silk Road links infrastructure investments in Asia and Africa with national encryption systems and cloud data centers. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a bilateral dialogue, said that ‘our fiber networks and data exchanges are now integrated with Beijing’s national infrastructure policy’. Thus, acquiring such a position in technology will prove China’s hegemony and can make it a superpower, making the world again a bipolar one. China’s strategic doctrine focuses on autonomous systems and digital authoritarian export over occupancy and geopolitical projection, respectively. Russia Russia’s global strategy remains rooted in a hybrid doctrine that combines cyber tools, space capabilities and disinformation operations. The Gerasimov Doctrine, Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, emphasizes the blend of political, cyber, and economic tools to achieve strategic goals without casualties. The Ukraine conflict is a great example of cyber dominance. Russia has cyber units such as APT28 (Fancy Bears), Satellite Spoofing and Jamming, and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which have executed targeted hacks against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), disrupted Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, and led disinformation campaigns. Russia’s power formula centers on dense cyber capacity, economic coercion, and unpredictability (making deterrence harder). Risks and Criticism of Tech-Based Hegemony Technology provides tools for security and influence, but overdependence causes strategic vulnerability, which leads to ethical dilemmas and raises questions about digital sovereignty. Overdependence and System Vulnerability A fundamental flaw of technological hegemony is its fragility. Systems are dependent on infrastructure (cloud servers, AI control nodes, etc.). The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) says that lethal autonomous weapons are the cause of escalation in conflicts (CCW 2022). Take the SolarWinds breach of 2020, in which an update exposed thousands of sensitive pieces of information. Ethical Concerns China, Ethiopia, and some other states have AI-powered surveillance regimes. China exports networked camera systems and facial recognition tools to states that use them to suppress dissent. A senior researcher at Amnesty noted that, ‘delegating life and death decisions to software is ethically unjustifiable’. Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism Due to technological influence, digital dependency has increased in the Global South. Digital dependency without regulatory safeguards leads to digital colonialism. Countries lacking advanced technology are reliant on digital ecosystems developed by superpowers. It is said by Dr Ruha Benjamin that ‘when code becomes law, and pipelines become policy enforcers, sovereignty is outsourced’. Hegemony Without Consent Soldiers are a visible force, but technology imposes itself quietly via platforms, which results in domination without democracy. Tech-enabled coercion doesn’t need tanks; it needs standards embedded in devices, laws baked into algorithms. This contradicts liberal norms of International Relations (IR), where hegemony should rest on consent for international legitimacy (Sakumar, Broeders, and Kello 2024). Future Power Projections: Domain-wise Breakdown There are five interconnected domains of future power projections: land, air, sea, cyber, and space. Land Domain In traditional combat, troops were used to counter enemy force, but now in the third digital era, surveillance grids, AI-powered motion detection systems, and autonomous land robots are replacing soldiers. The Israeli military is testing unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), which they have named Jaguar, to patrol borders, and this will reduce human casualties. The diagram illustrates the interaction or the coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS), and the target within a given environment. At first, the operator gives a high-level command which activates the controller, and the system provides feedback to the operator, such as mission success or failure. The controller is the brain of this system. It monitors the environment, processes data and controls the weapons. It operates in loops, evaluating the environment and updating the decision. Once the target is detected autonomously, the gun acts, which includes missile launch or gunfire. This entire process takes place in a dynamic environment. Figure 2: The coordination between a human coordinator and an autonomous weapon system (AWS) Air Domain Traditional manned fighter jets were dominating in aerial combat. Now, aerial dominance is shifted towards hypersonic weapons and AI-enabled drone swarms. Russia’s Zircon and China’s DF-ZF are hypersonic missiles that can travel at Mach 5+ speeds. AI drone swarms are rendering conventional missile defense systems obsolete. The US Air Force’s “Golden Horde” project and China’s GJ-11 stealth drone exemplifies this shift. Sea Domain Sea powers used to refer to blue-water navies and submarine fleets. They remain the core of maritime protection, but unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are quickly supplanting aircraft carriers. UUVs are being used to surveil for months on their own, and they will not be detected. Subsea data cables, which transport 95% of internet traffic, are a strategic resource; such cables are undersea digital arteries. Securing the sea in the 21st century means controlling what is beneath it. The diagram illustrates major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). It is an important element in current naval battles and marine monitoring. The GPS/RF module is situated at the top of the AUV, through which the vehicle can position itself beneath the water. The propeller motor is the mobility unit of an AUV, driven by lithium-ion batteries. It provides thrust and directional movements. An electronic aid container serves as a housing store; it includes an onboard computer, a mission processor, a power distribution unit, and communication interfaces. AUVs have sensors which detect how deep the AUV is in the water column by measuring hydrostatic pressure. Acoustic Doppler Current Profile (ADCP), is a sonar device that uses Doppler shift in acoustic signals to measure the speed of water currents. An AUV manage its vertical position with a buoyancy tank. AUVs use an inertial navigation system; they determine the position of the AUV based on prior data. AUVs also contain forward-looking (Sound Navigation and Ranging) SONARs and Altimeters that scan and detect any obstacles in front of them and maintain a safe height from the seabed, respectively. Transducers are the mouth and ears of AUVs; they transmit and receive acoustic signals. They are crucial for clandestine communication and sensing of the environment. These AUVs are extremely crucial in contested sea areas such as the South China Sea or the Arctic. Therefore, AUVs are revolutionizing maritime operations by enlarging surveillance, exploration, and undersea warfighting capabilities. As technology evolves, AUVs will define the future of naval strategy and oceanographic study. Figure 3: Major elements of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). Cyber Domain Cyberspace has no borders. Global powers like the US, China and Russia have developed cyber command units to disrupt the power grids of the opposite side. Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, China’s alleged breach of U.S. personnel databases (OPM hack), and the Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program exemplify how software has become a strategic weapon. According to NATO’s 2025 Cyber Doctrine, ‘A cyberattack triggering Article 5 [mutual defense] is not just theoretical—it’s a matter of time.’ Space Domain Traditionally, space power was limited to spy satellites, but now anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), Starlink and military satellite systems have transformed into a combat zone. The US created its Space Force in 2019 to dominate in space militarization. In the Ukraine war, SpaceX’s Starlink became crucial for Ukrainian battlefield communication, prompting Elon Musk to limit military use to avoid escalation. Table 1 (figure 4): Old model versus new model comparison in each domain of future power projection. Done by the author. Domain Old Model New Model Land Troop deployment - Armored divisions - Occupation warfare AI-enabled surveillance grids - Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) - Real-time satellite + sensor networks Air Fighter jets - Airbases - Strategic bombers Hypersonic missiles (e.g., DF-ZF, Zircon) - Drone swarms with AI autonomy - Human-out-of-loop air dominance Sea Naval fleets - Aircraft carriers Submarines Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (ORCA UUV) - Seafloor cable warfare - Autonomous maritime surveillance Cyber (No traditional equivalent) State-sponsored hacking - Data theft & disinformation ops - Cyber jamming, spoofing in kinetic war Space Reconnaissance satellites Missile early-warning systems ASAT weapons (China, Russia tests) - Satellite internet constellations (Starlink) - Real-time warfighting integration (JADC2) Can Technology Fully Replace Military Power? The emergence of advanced technologies like AI, autonomous weapons and space militarization has sparked the debate about whether technology can replace military power, wholly or not? Strategic autonomy, in which a nation’s ability to defend its interests independently requires both technology and military. Technology acts as a critical enabler but not a substitute. AI can analyze satellite data in seconds, but only trained personnel can conduct peacekeeping missions in fragile regions. Modern warfare is shifting towards grey zone conflicts that fall below the threshold of open combat. Russian operations in Crimea in 2014 blended cyberattacks and physical deployments of troops, due to which the line between technology and military became blurry. This incident shows that technology without boots is of no advantage. In addition, technology needs regular upgrades and educated users, and excessive reliance upon these systems may cause interruptions such as electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. In a time of humanitarian crisis, disaster response, and counterinsurgency, forces are indispensable. To defeat an enemy or to dominate, one must employ both technology and an educated military. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have altered the character of air war. Great powers are investing heavily in military AI and quantum communication to improve battlefield awareness, minimize human loss of life, and enhance decision-making, but note that international decisions do not depend on a machine. They don't aim to replace the military, but they want to develop their technology. Thus, the emerging model of global power is not soldiering versus technology, but it is soldiers plus technology. It is known as dual-track hegemony, and a nation that acquires it will dominate shortly. A tech-savvy soldier, supported by AI and robotics, is the face of tomorrow’s war. Conclusion The United States, China and the EU are global powers of the modern era. These states possess the technological capital and military infrastructure that shape the regulation of engagement in cyberspace and AI. Firstly, they must strengthen international norms for cyber operations and AI governance. UNGGE has made some progress relevant to this, but this needs a broader enforcement mechanism like the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, global powers must invest in ethical and auditable technology. As AI is dangerous due to biased surveillance systems, facial recognition abuses, and it is also used in predicting policies, which is a major ethical concern. Algorithmic transparency, data protection, and privacy rights must be enforced as soon as possible. Lastly, multilateralism must extend to outer space. As space is becoming a battlefield, complicating geopolitical rivalry, to counter it, multilateralism must be encouraged. For developing countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria, the emergence of technological hegemony is both a threat and an opportunity. These countries should enforce digital sovereignty policies. These nations should avoid digital dependency, as it will be easier for global powers to surveil and dominate. Emerging powers should build defensive cyber infrastructure instead of offensive. They should build secure networks and legal protection against espionage on their own. Defensive strategy will serve as a strategic safeguard and can be used as a pawn in great power rivalries. Emerging powers should pursue a multilateral coalition among Muslim majority states to enhance their connectivity and ties. South-south cooperation must be promoted. The UN, G20 and other international bodies must move towards digital governance mechanisms instead of vague declarations. UN should form a Global Charter on Tech Governance, similar to a Digital Magna Carta. The charter should have ethical limits on the establishment and use of Artificial Intelligence and Lethal Autonomous Weapons. They should increase their coordination with the G20 to amplify these efforts. G20 should create a Tech and Ethics working Group, which can bridge the trust gap between Developed and developing countries in the digital arena. Global order continues to evolve in the 21st century, and the foundations of power projection are rewritten. There is a paradigm shift from boots to bots. This research demonstrates that while technology has transformed, it cannot entirely replace traditional modes of combat. Technology can only help the military to dominate in a region or conflict, but cannot fully replace it. There will be dual track hegemony, and the one who will acquire this hegemony will control world islands, and controlling world islands means ruling the world. However, this transformation comes with serious risks like AI miscalculations, vulnerabilities of digital infrastructure and ethical concerns. But we should keep in mind that military power is no longer sufficient, nor is technology alone a guarantee of dominance, in post-silo, where military, technological, and normative tools must function together to sustain leadership.ReferencesAkdaǧ, Yavuz. 2025. “Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony.” Perspectives on Politics. doi:10.1017/S1537592725000040.CCW. 2022. “Document Viewer.” : 16. https://docs.un.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2021/3 (October 18, 2025).“Costs of War | Brown University.” https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/ (October 18, 2025).Cybersecurity, Centre for. 2021. 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Introduction In the past few years, international tensions have intensified across the globe, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to rising frictions between China and Taiwan. These conflicts cannot be fully explained through traditional military or diplomatic frameworks. Instead, they reveal the emergence of a new strategic model: hybrid warfare, a method that blends military, economic, technological, and informational tools to achieve political goals without open war. Closely related is the concept of the gray zone, a sphere of competition that exists between peace and full-scale conflicts, where states use ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation. The ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates how hybrid warfare operates in practice. Russia’s combination of cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure, and drone warfare shows how modern conflicts blur the boundaries between combat and politics. Low-cost technologies such as drones have further revolutionized this form of warfare, enabling small actors to inflict significant damage and minimizing direct risk at the same time. What is a Hybrid warfare and gray zone Gray zone The concept of hybrid war is often covered in media as a synonym for the gray zone. However, within the academic field, the gray zone is considered more of a competing term2 It is suggested that the terms are not synonymous, and the gray zone is defined as a space of competition short of war. Hybrid warfare, in this context, is viewed as an operational solution to achieve political objectives in the gray zone, though it is not limited to it. Although both terms have a quite similar approach, the gray zone is considered more physical in comparison to hybrid war. A state’s operation in this area may clearly not cross the thresholds of war due to its ambiguity. For instance, an invasion of drones in the European Union might serve as an example of such a gray zone action. It is difficult to consider such actions as a threat of war, allowing the predatory state to operate near a border and keep itself safe through ambiguity. Simply put, the gray zone is a territory in politics where it is hard to clearly identify aggression, and the aggressor acts ambiguously, finding legal loopholes to gain advantages without necessarily provoking a military response. Historically, there are numerous examples of such gray zone tactics. Russia used these tactics multiple times before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is one of the particular reasons why the world’s reaction to the Crimea annexation and Russian actions prior to 2022 was low-key and had little impact. A gray zone conflict demonstrates a fundamental change in the rules-based international order. By weaponizing ambiguity, one state seeks to undermine norms and erode democratic institutions from within. Interestingly, Philip Kapusta argues that the gray zone might be beneficial. The ambiguity that makes gray zones vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. It is crucial in international relations when one state tests the waters with gray zone activities to determine the potential strength of domestic or international commitments to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. Briefly saying, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars. [1] [2] What is a hybrid war? While gray zone competition describes the ambiguous environment between peace and war, hybrid warfare refers to the methods used within that environment to achieve political aims. In other words, the gray zone sets the stage, and hybrid warfare provides the playbook. The new concept of hybrid warfare and its correlating hybrid threats can be explained as a wide range of means, not necessarily violent, and a concept that is quite distant from traditional military power. Through non-violent means, a state can achieve a political effect without being embedded in an armed conflict. This term was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman, who described the warfare model as a collection of different strategies and models, including conventional capabilities, violence, coercion, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder. This definition stressed the importance of combining traditional military force with the use of new technologies. [5] However, several scholars question whether hybrid warfare truly represents a new paradigm. Analysts such as Michael Kofman and Lawrence Freedman argue that the term simply rebrands long-standing practices of covert and irregular warfare under a modern label. From this perspective, hybrid tactics—combining propaganda, subversion, and limited military action—were already evident in Soviet “active measures” and Cold War proxy conflicts. Still, the scale and technological sophistication of Russia’s recent operations suggest that hybrid warfare has evolved in scope and impact, even if its core logic is not entirely new. [13] Key characteristics and elements of hybrid warfare include: Fluidity and Ambiguity Debates on hybrid war in Ukraine in 2014 brought attention to the new term. The fluidity and ambiguity of hybrid threats and warfare helped Moscow to achieve a relatively non-violent political shift in Crimea. To escape a power balance, Russia used a creative underdog strategy. [4] Non-State Actors For some scholars, hybrid war and its actors are a new breed of non-state actors (likely sponsored by the state) who replaced the traditional concept of terrorists. They retain ties with the population and devote themselves to the propaganda of the deed. Diverse Definitions The definition of hybrid warfare differs between the West and Russia. For Russians, hybrid war is a new way of dealing with a conflict that avoids the traditional battlefield, utilizing economic, political, and socio-cultural methods. [6] Tactical Methods and Synchronization It is hard to clearly identify hybrid threats of warfare due to their ambiguous nature. However, most of the literature defines it by tactical methods. It is the synchronized use of several operation methods, and due to its unclear nature, the victim state may not be able to identify these multiple instruments. [5] Calculated Ambiguity Similarly to nuclear deterrence, hybrid warfare is full of calculated ambiguity. It is a key factor that makes it reasonable and effective; it is essential. [12] Thus, due to the gray zone's ambiguity, it is hard to indicate hybrid threats until they escalate into warfare. And even in such a case, one cannot necessarily say that hybrid warfare actually happened. Currently, there are high possibilities that Russia has used hybrid threats in several Baltic countries as well as Eastern Europe. So-called pro-Russian parties were critically close to winning presidential or parliamentary elections numerous times Comparison Hybrid war vs Gray zone Since gray zone conflict in its essence can incorporate traditional methods and unconventional tactics, and a complete reliance on unconventional techniques is likely to be less effective at fully and rapidly compelling a relatively strong opponent, states engaged in a gray zone conflict are likely to use hybrid techniques. To clearly illustrate the key notices from this comparison, the following table is provided. As Table illustrates, the primary difference lies in the level and ambition of each concept. The Gray Zone Conflict is a higher-level concept that operates at the strategic level and is directly tied to global and/or regional revisionist ambitions. Hybrid Warfare, conversely, generally pertains only to the operational and tactical levels. [3] Key distinctions between two concepts are Duration and Symmetry and Conventionality of Operations Duration and Symmetry Gray Zone Conflict is characterized by protracted engagement and is used under both symmetric and asymmetric conditions. Hybrid Warfare, however, may be protracted or short and is largely used under asymmetric conditions. Conventionality of Operations In Gray Zone Conflict, non-conventional military operations may be used standalone or alongside conventional operations8. In contrast, Hybrid Warfare treats non-conventional operations as auxiliary tactics used alongside conventional operations. This reinforces the idea that the Gray Zone is a large strategic territory of competition, while hybrid warfare is an operational solution frequently used within it. Drones as a tool of Hybrid warfare Drones' Impact on the Modern Battlefield Nowadays, conflict in Ukraine has proven the role of drones in modern battlefields. Drones now account for approximately 70% of total casualties from both sides. Moreover, it is hard to find actual troops in the war zones; most of the time, there are drone controllers rather than typical soldiers. Thus, in Ukraine, drones act as key actors in modern conflict. Throughout the war, it was clearly shown that drones are very useful against much more expensive and massive military equipment like tanks and planes. A drone that costs less than a thousand dollars can destroy a million-dollar tank, and what's even more terrifying, it is unmanned, meaning the fight will have fewer casualties. By using such drones, Ukraine was able to defend its borders without a further escalation of the conflict to the western part of the country. By using cheap and easy-to-use AI-powered technology, Kyiv was able to fight back against a state that is 28 times bigger. Drones in Ukraine and the Context of Russian Hybrid Warfare The role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) remains complex: in direct combat, Ukraine uses drones not strictly as a hybrid weapon but as a fully powered kamikaze to destroy local goals, functioning as a conventional weapon. However, the nature of these drones is inherently dual use. Some drones used in war can be purchased through commercial websites. For instance, the drone previously used by Ukraine, the «DJI MAVIC», can be purchased online, with a price range starting at $500. Such drones are modified on the field and used as small bombs. In comparison to Russians, some Ukrainians have even spent their own money on new ammunition or drones, creating an emerging civilian-led military supply market in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine is multi-dimensional with blurred lines between the kinetic use of military force and the non-kinetic use of strategic assets. Through the simultaneous use of political, technological, and military measures in achieving its policy objectives to design an ambiguity, Russia deliberately exploited its power to secure consensus for subsequent military actions. Russia has employed all three parameters of ambiguity in hybrid warfare, leaving Ukraine no other option except to fight. Hybrid war in EU? Russia's Strategy: Hybrid Warfare and Grey Zone Tactics Since the US established its dominance in the global stage, Russian involvement in the Baltics, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine since 2007 has been characterized as grey zone and hybrid warfare. Russia employs these tactics against EU and NATO participants, using several methods of cyber-warfare to challenge the military alliance. In Ukraine’s Crimea, for instance, Russia engaged in hybrid warfare by using non-state proxies to supplement a military deficit. In Eastern Europe, Russia relies on economic tools, cyberspace to harm infrastructure, as well as non-state actors. For example, Gazprom canceled a gas discount agreement with the Yanukovych administration. Subsequently, when Ukraine refused to accept Russian hegemony, the power grid was attacked and disabled a large portion of the country's infrastructure. Such incidents, includes alleged election interference in Romania, when in November 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled results of first-round presidential election. Romanian intellegence agencies presented that Russian-linked cyber operations (social media campaigns with AI-driven misinformation and alleged cyberattacks) distorted the electoral process in favour of the far right candidate. In March 2025, investigative reporting detailed pro-Russia groups using Telegram to recruit EU-based individuals for sabotage, vandalism, arson and influence operations across NATO countries. [14] As the Russian economy is strained, the frequency of similar incidents appears to increase. [7] Across the period, the lines between hacktivism, cybercrime and state-nexus activity continued to blur. Intrusion sets historically distinguished by TTPs’ level of advancement. conducted activities, or assessed objectives increasingly shared toolsets and modus operandi. This was notably exemplified by hacktivist-led DDoS waves by pro-Russia groups around electoral events, where increased activity was often observed as typical FIMI-aligned behavior to associate disruption with aspects of information operations. A prominent facet of this trend is faketivism, where state-aligned intrusion sets leverage hacktivist personas and activities. Notable examples include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, associated to Russia-nexus Sandworm39, and the CyberAv3ngers group linked to Iran’s IRGC Hacktivists, seeking funding and visibility, embraced ransomware beyond DDoS and defacements. CyberVolk, operating in line with Russian interests, has used and promoted multiple strains—AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano, as well as LockBit and Chaos—since May 20244. KillSec, originally a pro-Russia hacktivist brand aligned with Anonymous, debuted its platform in June 2024. Drone Incursions: Testing Defenses and Undermining Support Russia has adapted new drone technologies and is now using them to test and threaten the European Union. For Europe, the usage of drones differs from the frontlines. Most incidents involve UAVs allegedly used for espionage or as a distraction mechanism. The possibility exists that drones sent into EU airspace are meant to frighten Europe and consequently pressure them to reduce military aid to Ukraine. Some argue that Russia uses this as a "carrot and stick" approach to force the EU to cut off military support. [8] Drones in the EU serve as one element of hybrid warfare: they are low-cost, deniable, and intentionally ambiguous. Russia's ambiguous attacks and hybrid threats, according to reports, might leave Europe's energy consumers vulnerable, especially during the winter. Economic Constraints and the Strategy of Exhaustion The financial strain on Russia does not diminish its ambitions. Such economic limitations directly shape Moscow’s strategic calculus. While the Central Bank attempts to manage the economy, the cumulative effect of sanctions and military expenditures is challenging the Kremlin's ability to cover its costs. Russian citizens and businesses are demonstrating creativity in navigating sanctions, but continued war and higher expenses are highly likely to destroy the economy. To maintain spending, the government is already seeking additional revenue sources by increasing taxes and fees on imports and making cuts to non-military budgets. [9] The consensus among experts is that a direct military conflict with NATO is highly unlikely, primarily due to Russian economic struggle. Russia simply cannot afford another large-scale war. [9] Even to sustain a major conflict with NATO, the state would first need to consolidate its forces by ending the war in Ukraine. Escalation Risk and European Resilience The latest drone attacks pose a severe threat to European energy and critical infrastructure. Even though recent drone incidents were relatively far away from key energy assets, they still represent a significant and deliberate risk. Reports suggest a potential disruption in energy supply, especially with winter approaching, could lead to price increases and higher heating costs, impacting not only the economy but also social stability. For instance, drone activity temporarily closed airports in Denmark, increasing the overall atmosphere of unease across EU countries. The Gray Zone attacks in Europe, including drone incursions, regular cyberattacks, and election interference, are part of a coherent hybrid warfare strategy aimed at testing Europe's resilience and preparedness. As international expert Christo Atanasov Kostov suggests, the Kremlin hopes to exhaust the West, not conquer it. This strategy aims to win in Ukraine by weakening the West—using hybrid tools to sow doubt over EU and NATO's ability to prevail and to cause domestic hardship that makes supporting Ukraine politically unattractive. [10] However, some scholars like Mark Galeotti argue that Russia’s hybrid campaigns have reached their limit: they can destabilize but not dominate resilient states. [15] It is very unlikely that Russia will cross the line of hybrid warfare and actually commit conventional forces against EU/NATO, as it is financially and politically untenable. The challenge for Europe is clear: to resist fatigue and demonstrate resilience, not fear. Moscow will likely continue its hybrid attacks, but Europe needs to be prepared through deterrence, technological and political autonomy, and collective defense. [11] Conclusion Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines conventional military force and non-conventional forces to achieve a strategic political objective. Russia's campaign in Ukraine in 2014 successfully exploited the ambiguity of this hybrid warfare model to capture the initiative and secure political and military gains, particularly in Crimea and Donbas. Through drones, cyber operations, and economic pressure, Moscow continues to challenge European security while remaining below the traditional threshold of conflict. These actions show that hybrid warfare is not an alternative to war but a constant state of confrontation carried out through indirect means. For Europe, this reality creates serious strategic and financial challenges. Responding to low-cost and deniable attacks with expensive defense systems is unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, the main priority for the EU is to adapt its deterrence model, strengthen technological and informational resilience, and reduce dependence on external energy supplies. The evolution of hybrid warfare proves that modern conflicts no longer begin with formal declarations or visible invasions. They emerge through ambiguity, disinformation, and the silent use of technology. As Russia continues to exploit these gray areas, the stability of Europe will depend on its ability to recognize such operations early and respond collectively before the next stage of escalation begins. All we can conclude is that Putin himself is unlikely to stop the war until his maximalist ambitions are satisfied. He will continue to use any method, including the destruction of European stability through hybrid attacks, to exhaust the West. For the EU, the suggested course of action remains to diversify energy sources and demonstrate resilience against hybrid attacks to minimize security and economic challenges. 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